BUDDHISM

CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Edited by PAUL WILLIAMS
BUDDHISM

Critical Concepts in Religious Studies

Edited by Paul Williams

Volume V

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Volume V

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M. Hattori and A. Wayman proposed two mutually opposed interpretations of Dignāga’s classification of pratyakṣābhāsa.¹ I shall proceed to propose yet a third interpretation which contains elements from both Wayman and Hattori, and can, therefore, be considered as a compromise between the two scholars. In the second part of this paper I shall try to deal with the philosophical considerations which led Dignāga to attribute all errors to the mind, and no errors whatsoever to the senses.

The discussion evolves around Pramāṇasamuccaya I,7cd-8ab:

\[ bhṛṇti-saṁvṛtti-saj-jñānam anumānānumānikam / \]
\[ smārtabhilāṣikam cēti pratyakṣābhamaṃ sataimiram // \]

The verse is translated by Hattori as follows: “erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and desire are not true perception and are accompanied by obscurity (sataimira).”²

Dignāga in his Vṛtti on this verse explains only three types of pratyakṣābhāsa:

1. Erroneous cognition (bhṛṇti-jñāna) is not perception, because it conceptually constructs such objects as water out of vapour etc.
2. Cognition of empirical reality (saṁvṛtti-saj-jñāna) is not perception, because it superimposes (āropa) on empirical reality something else, that is, conceptually constructs empirical reality as absolute reality.
3. Inference, its result etc., are not true perception, because they are conceptual constructions of previous experience (pūrvānta-kalpanā).

All three types of pratyakṣābhāsa explained by Dignāga are produced through conceptual construction. Jinendrabuddhi, however, explains a fourth type,
taimira, as a cognition caused by a defective sense organ (indriyopaghāta-jaṁ jñānam).

Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is based on Dhramakīrti’s interpretation in the Pramāṇavārttika 3.288–300, according to which there are three sorts of pratyakṣābhāsa produced by conceptual construction, and a fourth type, free from conceptual construction (avikalpa).

Dignāga’s silence on this fourth type of pratyakṣābhāsa, as well as his criticism of the Nyāya definition of perception, in which he argues that the word ‘nonerroneous’ (avyabhicārin) is superfluous, combined with the fact that some commentators disagree with Dhramakīrti’s interpretation led Hattori to the conclusion that Dignāga accepted only three types of pratyakṣābhāsa, all due to conceptual construction, and interpreted “the word ‘sataimiram’ as an adjective modifying ‘pratyakṣābhām’, … [and] not as mentioning a separate kind of pratyakṣābhāsa.”

Against this conclusion, Professor Wayman argued that the interpretation of taimira as obscurity is linguistically impossible, and that Dignāga did not make any comment on a fourth type of pratyakṣābhāsa simply because it is too obvious, and that this becomes clear by the similarities in structure between the four kinds of pratyakṣābhāsa, the four kinds of errors enumerated by Dharmottara (cf. below), and the four kinds of perception.

The reader is advised to read Wayman’s article himself. I do not know whether I can reproduce his arguments faithfully, as I am puzzled by most of them. I really do not understand, for instance, how the following speculation on Kamalaśīla’s education could lead us anywhere:

“Hence the [Monier-Williams] dictionary recognizes only the concrete significance of the derived form taimira. We may presume now that Dhramakīrti knew this by his wide reading in general Indian literature, while Kamalaśīla, restricting himself to Buddhist texts and philosophical works of adversaries of Buddhist logicians, did not encounter the literary contexts of the term taimira and too hastily jumped to the conclusion of what it means in Dignāga’s verse.”

First, with all the respect due to the Monier-Williams, it can by no means be considered as an extensive dictionary, and is especially insufficient for philosophical texts. If there happens to be a contradiction between Monier-Williams and Kamalaśīla, I would rather believe Kamalaśīla. Second, if Kamalaśīla’s reading list was shorter than Dhramakīrti’s, then one would expect him to interpret taimira in its usual sense of a cognition produced by the tīmira sickness, as Dhramakīrti does, and not in the highly unusual one of ‘deceptive’ (visamvādaka). Third, the interpretation of taimira as visamvādaka, which is based on the interpretation of tīmira as ajñāna (ignorance), is not even Kamalaśīla’s, who simply reports here the point of view of svayūhīyas (“some Buddhist insiders” as Wayman himself translated it, p. 391). Fourth, this interpretation of taimira does not indicate that whoever proposed it, did not know enough Sanskrit, but is, obviously, a simple commentators’ trick. Fifth, nor is this interpretation adopted by Hattori, since he translates taimira as obscurity, and not as deceptive.
To support his interpretation of the word taimira, Wayman establishes the following association:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>causes of error</th>
<th>types of perception</th>
<th>pratyakṣābhāsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) error due to object (viṣaya-gata)</td>
<td>mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa)</td>
<td>erroneous cognition (bhrāṇti-jñāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) error due to place (bāhyāsraya-sihita)</td>
<td>perception of Yogin (yogi-pratyakṣa)</td>
<td>cognition of empirical reality (saṃvṛtti-saj-jñāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) error found within (ādhīyātma-gata)</td>
<td>self-awareness (svasamvedana)</td>
<td>inference etc. (anumāṇādi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) error due to senses (indriya-gata)</td>
<td>sense-perception (indriya-pratyakṣa)</td>
<td>caul (taimira)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I think the above association is far-fetched, and that Wayman has no convincing argument on which to rest his interpretation. I really don’t see, for instance, how moving trees, seen from a boat, can be associated with the perception of a Yogin just “because the prescription for the Yogin from ancient times is that he should be careful of the place – hence he retreats to the forest etc.; or in his home has a room secluded from people in general and conventional usages. If the Yogin does not see things rightly in his visions, he would be projecting unrealties.”

The last sentence cannot be objected to, of course, but Wayman fails to provide an answer to the most obvious objections which immediately arise against the association he tries to establish. For instance, Dharmottara himself, from which the examples of error are taken, derives all causes of error from the senses. Wayman is well aware of that as he says that Dharmottara “appears content (or safe) to derive all four causes of error either immediately or remotely from the senses (indriya)”, but he provides no reason why we should not accept Dharmottara’s interpretation.

Furthermore, the whole comparison is based on the assumption that Dignāga recognized four types of perception, an assumption which Wayman, like all modern scholars who wrote on the subject, simply takes for granted. This assumption, however, is highly doubtful. And it is not based on Dignāga’s own words, but rather on Dharmakīrti’s reshuffle of them. In my opinion Dignāga recognized only three types of perception: indriya-pratyakṣa, mānasa-pratyakṣa and yogi-pratyakṣa; he did not accept svasamvedana as a fourth type of perception. The point becomes quite clear when we look at Pramāṇasamuccaya k.6ab and the Vṛtti thereupon: In a manner which leaves no place for ambiguity Dignāga subsumes the self-apprehension of desire etc., under mental perception! One could argue perhaps that k.7ab introduces a fourth type of perception, namely, the self-apprehension of conceptual construction. But since in the case of mental perception Dignāga did not recognize self-apprehension as a different type of perception, there is no reason to assume that he did so in the case of conceptual construction. I do not claim, of course, that Dignāga rejected
self-apprehension altogether. All I mean is that self-apprehension is an aspect of the cognition (an aspect which, in as much as the cognition is pramāṇa, can be considered as pramāṇaphala), and not a fourth type of perception.

The last argument brought up by Wayman is based on the following passage from Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2: caksur-ādīnām āpy ālambanatva-prasāṅgaḥ, te ‘pi hi paramārthato ‘nyatā vidyāmāṇā nilādy-ābhāsasya dvicandrady-ābhāsasya ca jñānasya kāraṇi-bhavanti. "If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then] there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other [senses] would be [admitted as] objects [of cognition]. This is because they also exist, in the ultimate sense, in different forms [from those appearing in a cognition], and [yet they] become the cause of such cognitions as the representation of something blue, etc., or of double moon, etc."8

Dharmakīrti refers to this passage in PV, 3.294, and says that it proves that Dignāga admitted errors caused by sense organs; those who interpret erroneous cognitions like the one of double moon etc., to be mental, will find themselves in contradiction with Dignāga’s own words in the above passage. Therefore, concludes Dharmakīrti, there is a fourth type of pratyakṣābhāsā, which is an exception (apavāda) in so far that it is free from conceptual construction.

I think this passage should be understood otherwise. There is nothing in it to commit Dignāga to the view that sense organs produce wrong cognitions, because the mode of argument employed is a prasāṅga, a reductio ad absurdum of one’s opponent’s view which does not involve one’s own philosophical positions. In fact, Dignāga can argue, quite consistently with his theory that the mind is always the cause of wrong cognitions, that if one considers the external and internal objects of a cognition to be different, for instance, the sun rays to be the external object (ālambana) of an erroneous cognition of water although they do not appear in it (i.e. just because they are supposed to participate in its production), then the definition of object becomes too wide and can be applied to the other causal factors, such as the eye etc., too. There is nothing in this argument to compel Dignāga to accept as his own view that erroneous cognitions are produced by sense organs. He could claim for instance that erroneous cognitions are produced by the mind or by memory, and still employ the argument successfully against the Vādavidhi.

This interpretation of Dignāga’s argument is corroborated by his criticism of the Nyāya definition of perception, where he argues that the word nonerroneous (avyabhicārin) is superfluous, because erroneous cognitions are produced by the mind. In other words, there are no errors when sense organs are in contact with their objects, and those errors which arise when sense organs are not in contact, are already excluded from the definition by the word indriyārtha-sannikārṣotpannam.

It should be emphasized that all the above arguments are not directed against Wayman’s interpretation of taimira as “caul”, but only against his endorsement
of Dharmakīrti’s view that taimira-jñāna is free from conceptual construction. In that respect, his suggestion seems to be better than Hattori’s, for the interpretation of taimira as obscurity is, indeed, highly unusual, and in the context of this verse not very probable. Note, however, that ‘caul’ is not a literal translation of taimira. It could be taken as a translation of keśoṇḍuka, but the timira sickness produces also the cognition of the double moon etc.9 In any case the view that taimira-jñāna is free from conceptual construction could not possibly have been Dignāga’s view, because it has a clear-cut effect: it invalidates Dignāga’s definition of perception. For if one defines perception as free from conceptual construction, the following two inferences should be true (otherwise the definition is either too broad or too narrow):

(1) This cognition is free from conceptual construction, because it is perception.
(2) This cognition is perception, because it is free from conceptual construction.

Obviously, if one accepts a pratyaksābhāsa free from conceptual construction, the second inference becomes false. Dharmakīrti who accepted as an exception a pratyaksābhāsa free from conceptual construction, had to modify the definition of perception, and added to it the word abhrānta. But one could hardly expect Dignāga to accept such an “exception” to his own definition.

Cf. PVA, p. 334.25–27: yadi [taimiram] avikalpakaṁ kalpanāpodhatvāt pratyakṣam prāptam. na sarvam kalpanāpodhaṁ pratyakṣam api tv abhrāntatve sati. “abhrāntam kalpanāpodhaṁ pratyakṣam” na sarvam. “[Objection:] If [the taimira-cognition] is free from conceptual construction, it would be perception, [precisely] because it is free from conceptual construction. [Answer:] Not every [cognition] which is free from conceptual construction is [also] perception, but [only] in case it is [also] nonerroneous. [For the definition of] perception is nonerroneous [and] free from conceptual construction; not every [cognition which is free from conceptual construction is also nonerroneous].”

Moreover, since inference was considered bhrānta, and no other means of right cognition except inference and perception was accepted, the introduction of the word abhrānta to the definition of perception rendered the word kalpanāpodha completely superfluous.

Prajñākaragupta is aware of this problem, but the explanation he gives lacks, I think, any historical plausibility; cf. PVA, p. 335.12–14: abhrāntagrahaṇam eva kasmāna kriyata iti cet. satyam etat. sākṣāt-kāri hi pratyakṣam tac cābhṛanta-grahaṇena sākyam nidarsayitum. na hy asākṣāt-karaṇā-kāram abhrāntam savikalpasya bhṛantatvāt. pare tu savikalpaṁ api sākṣāt-karaṇākāraṁ abhrāntam icchati, tad-anurodhena dvayah etad ucyate. “[Objection]: Why is [the word] nonerroneous (abhrānta) not employed alone [in the definition of perception]? [Answer:] True. Perception is immediate experience, and it can be designated by employing [the word] nonerroneous [alone], for [a cognition] which does not have the form of immediate experience is not nonerroneous, because conceptual [cognition] is [always] erroneous. But others
accept conceptual (cognition) too as having the form of immediate experience (and) as nonerroneous. With reference to that [view] both these [words, i.e. abhrānta and kalpanāpadha] are taught [as the definition of perception]. When we see what was left of Dignāga’s definition at the time of Prajñākaragupta, we cannot be dupe of Dharmakīrti trying to persuade us that this was Dignāga’s original intention. For first we start with perception defined as kalpanāpadha, then the word abhrānta is added, and finally the word kalpanāpadha is practically rejected: it is formally kept in the definition out of deference for Dignāga, but its role is not to define perception – the word abhrānta alone does that! – but merely to reject the view of certain others who recognize conceptual perception.

Granted that taimira is to be understood as taimira-jñāna, and that it is not free from conceptual construction, the question arises whether it is a fourth kind of pratyakṣābhāsa or not. I was inclined to believe that it does not form a separate kind of pratyakṣābhāsa, and that Dignāga mentions it only as an illustration, for it could be included under bhrānti. But Professor Schmithausen who kindly read through the first draft of this paper and saved me from some embarrassing mistakes, pointed out to me that in such a case the sā- of the sataimira becomes problematic. But then, if taimira is a fourth type of pratyakṣābhāsa, why did not Dignāga comment upon it, as he does on the other three types? Professor Schmithausen proposed the following solution: In several places in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, there are important differences between the kārikās and the Vṛtti. From that we can conclude that the Vṛtti was not written at the same time as the kārikās, and that Dignāga changed his mind in the meantime. Here we have one such case. When Dignāga wrote the kārikās, he considered four types of pratyakṣābhāsa, but when he come to comment upon them, he saw that the taimira-jñāna involves a problem which he did not know how to solve, and therefore left it without commentary. The Vṛtti being his last work, perhaps he did not have the time to make up his mind. (Note also that taimira is absent in the Nyāyamukha.)

Now, if the above analysis is true, then Dignāga propounds a very strange philosophical position: our senses can produce only right cognitions. This is also the conclusion reached at by Hattori, as he says: “Dignāga attributed errors only to the mind (manas) and ... he admitted cognitions produced by sense organs as absolutely free from error.”10 And this position contrasts sharply not only with our common sense, but with the Indian tradition as well. Indeed, if a wrong cognition is produced when a sense organ is defective, why blame it on the mind?

The question I am asking myself is what led Dignāga to take such a radical philosophical position. But this is exactly the kind of question one is not liable to get a satisfactory answer to. “Why” questions rarely get a clear-cut answer, “because writers (at any rate good writers) always write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are ‘likely to be interested’, which means those who are already asking the question to which an answer is being offered; and consequently a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a ‘classic’ and his contempor-
aries are all dead, the question has been forgotten; especially if the answer he
gave was generally acknowledged to be the right answer; for in that case people
stopped asking the question, and began asking the question that next arose.”

One could expect, of course, some insight from autobiographical literature,
personal letters and so on, but this is exactly the kind of literature which is com-
pletely lacking in India. Should we, then, as serious Indologists, avoid the ques-
tion “To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?”

The trouble is that even if we had the Sanskrit original of Dignāga, in a
perfect critical edition, with all philological problems solved, we would still not
be able to understand what he means by simply studying his statements. In order
to understand what he means, we have to know what was at the back of his
mind. If, like Collingwood, we characterise a statement in terms of questions
under discussion, then the context of a statement depends on questions raised in
previous discussions. Moreover, methodologically, we have to assume that these
previous discussions have reached us in some form or another. I say ‘method-
ologically’, for it may be possible that a context is lost to us temporarily, or
without recovery.

Question and answer must, of course, be strictly correlated, a particular
answer presupposing a particular question. One is not likely to gain much under-
standing by saying that Dignāga, in the Pramāṇasamuccaya I, asks himself
questions such as “what are the means of right cognition?”, or “how can we dis-
tinguish between true and false cognitions?”, or “how is knowledge possible?”
etc., but rather “how is knowledge possible, taking into account this particular
objection made by this particular philosopher?”

In what follows, I shall try to interpretate Dignāga’s theory of knowledge as a
reply to the sceptical problems raised by Nāgārjuna. When stating that Nāgār-
juna raised sceptical problems, I do not mean to say that he was a full-fledged
sceptic. However, I do claim that Nāgārjuna’s arguments function – or give rise
to the same problems – as sceptical arguments. The reason I chose Nāgārjuna
and not, say, the Sautrāntikas or the Yogācāras, is that Dignāga’s claim that
sense organs never produce wrong cognitions looks like an exasperated attempt
to secure the possibility of valid cognition, and, as we know from multiple
examples in Western philosophy, such attempts usually arise as a reaction to
scepticism.

Now, before I am accused of begging the question or of circularity, let me
emphasize that this is nothing but a supposition. Dignāga himself does not tell us
why he says what he says, and, therefore, we can only guess, that is, make sup-
positions. And suppositions are, of course, not definite conclusions, but possi-
bilities and and probabilities, which can be easily criticised as “sheer
speculations”. But a good supposition can explain a number of things, whereas
prudent silence explains nothing at all. This is why we make suppositions, and
this is how we choose among different suppositions. When two suppositions are
checked and compared with each other, the one to be adopted is the one which
has a better explanatory power.
Nāgārjuna is one of the most studied Indian philosophers, he hardly needs to be introduced here. I shall therefore simply recall a few points which I believe crucial to our subject matter. Among the characteristics of reality (tattvalakṣaṇa) enumerated in MMK, 18.9 one finds prapañcair aprapañcitam and nirvikalpam; and Candrakīrti ad loc. explains prapañca as speech (vāk) and vikalpa as the play-ground of thought (citta-pracāra). Is it a mere coincidence that Dignāga defines perception with practically the same word (nirvikalpa = kalpanāpoḍha)? If reality is beyond conceptual construction, then a true cognition which has to be a faithful representation of it, has to be free from conceptual construction.

Starting from his definition of reality, Nāgārjuna demonstrates that none of the concepts cherished by the Hīnayāna Buddhists fulfills the conditions of reality, and they are therefore all void. His way of arguing seems quite tedious. He rejects one concept after the other, showing that there is nothing independent, and that violates the first condition given in the definition of reality (aparpattyayam). Sense and mind data are illusive, just like the mirage of water, or the celestial city of the Gandharvas.¹³

Nāgārjuna claims that all concepts are relational concepts, such as “the father of”, “the son of”; which are meaningless alone and presuppose one another (VV, 49).¹⁴ But he does not really bother about the nature of this dependence relationship which is mentally constructed. It does not seem important to him to determine the exact way in which they function, the kind of dependence relationship involved, whether they form closed or open systems, and so on. Thus, in one place he can analyse a two-term-dependence relationship such as between cause and effect; but, in another place, the number of terms can be increased to five, for instance, cause, effect, agent, instrument of action and action itself (MMK, 24.1) The basic distinction is between sva- and para-bhāva, where parabhāva can be anything else in the world. Svabhāva is accordingly defined as non-dependence on anything else (MMK, 15.2). As long as Nāgārjuna manages to show that there is at least one thing on which the object under discussion depends, his purpose is accomplished for he can conclude that it is empty, devoid of intrinsic nature.

In the Vigrahavyāvartānī, Nāgārjuna substitutes his specific refutations with a general criticism of the means of knowledge, and here his sceptical arguments are pressed to their furthest limit. For if the means of knowledge themselves are deceptive, no matter how careful one is in establishing one’s theories, one can never be sure that one is not led astray by the only means at one’s disposal for gaining knowledge.

But Nāgārjuna is certainly not suggesting that we should stop talking because reality cannot be expressed by words, nor does he suggest that we abandon our everyday activities, which necessarily involve conceptual constructions, because these constructions are devoid of intrinsic nature. All he says is that one should not take empirical reality for absolute reality, or superimpose (samāropa, cf. MMK, 16.10) one on the other.
MMK, 24.6–8: “[By your theory of] emptiness, you reject the real existence of fruit (phala-sadhāva), dharma and adharma, and all everyday practice.

On this [objection] we reply: You do not understand neither the aim of emptiness, nor emptiness [itself], nor [even] the meaning of [the word] emptiness. That is why you frustrate yourself. The Buddhas teach the dharma on the basis of two [levels of] truth, the empirical truth (loka-saṃvṛtti-satya) and the absolute truth (paramārthataḥ satyam).”

All the elements of this short exposé of Nāgārjuna’s thought have been integrated by Dignāga into his theory of knowledge: the two levels of empirical and absolute truth, the consideration of empirical reality as a superimposition (āropa, samāropa) on absolute reality, the definition of absolute reality as inexpressible by words and beyond conceptual construction, the interdependence of all concepts, their being viewed as mental constructions, which are incapable to refer to reality. This and the fact of “Thematisierung” of pramāṇas by both Nāgārjuna and Dignāga give the supposition that Dignāga took Nāgārjuna into account while formulating his theory of knowledge some probability in its favour. This does not mean, of course, that each and every element had to be taken directly from Nāgārjuna, and from Nāgārjuna alone. Dignāga could borrow for instance, his definition of perception from Vindhyavāsin. But to affirm this is to answer the question where he took his definition from, not why he took it. As for the question “why”, I suggest the following answer: The onslaught of Nāgārjuna’s dialectics crumbled the old foundations that used to support the entire Buddhist religion. A new basis to justify and guarantee again the Buddha’s teaching (or, at any rate, what the non-Madhyaamaka Buddhists took it to be) was required, and Dignāga sought to provide this by establishing a new theory of knowledge.¹⁵

Dignāga would then proceed in the following manner. First he establishes an absolute distinction between perception and inference, according to their respective objects:

“k.2a–b1. the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa).

They are only two because

k.2b2–c1. the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.

Apart from the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal.”¹⁶

Then, in a second step, Dignāga defines perception as free from conceptual construction, and conceptual construction is defined, in turn, as the association of a word with a thing perceived, which results in the verbal designation of the thing.
This twofold operation results in the restriction of Nāgārjuna’s critique to the realm of inference. For linking to inference all conceptual constructions which, admittedly, result in words denoting nothing real (arthā-sūnya-sabda), which cannot denote reality as their function consists of a superimposition of empirical reality on absolute reality and so on, Dignāga clears the ground for perception to apprehend absolute reality. In other words, Dignāga tries to win the war by losing a battle.

But, the attribution of all errors to conceptual constructions, and the close association between conceptual construction and inference, made inference a highly vulnerable means of knowledge. If inference was to be at all considered a means of knowledge, Dignāga had to take into account the fact that it dealt with empty interdependent concepts. Having made an absolute distinction between reality as a particular (sva-laksana) and concept as a universal (samanyalaksana), his problem was to bridge the gap between them again. This is where the theory of apoha comes in. A word gets its meaning, not by referring directly to reality, but by the exclusion of everything else (anyāpoha). Here again, one can see that the idea that all things or concepts are interdependent is incorporated in the apoha theory. For to say that meaning is obtained by the exclusion of all other things means that these other things delimit the semantical field of a word; and this presupposes a dependence on these other things, for without their being there, there is neither delimiting nor meaning.

If our supposition is true (the final judgment of which, as I emphasized above, has to wait till alternative suppositions are checked and compared), then the phenomenon of “Inklusivismus”, which was so capably analysed by P. Hacker, is not limited to religious texts, but plays an important role in philosophical reasoning as well. In other words, Dignāga saw that in order to overcome Nāgārjuna’s arguments he had to accept them, that is, by integrating them into his system, and by delimiting their validity. By accepting and rearranging Nāgārjuna’s specific positions he tried to check-mate the general conclusion and reopen the way to knowledge.

After this long digression, we can go back to our initial point, namely, why Dignāga refused to admit the existence of erroneous cognitions produced by sense organs. I think the point becomes clearer now. If one admits that some of our cognitions are false, the criterion problem, that is, how to distinguish between true and false cognitions, is immediately raised. In fact, several criteria had been suggested long before Dignāga, for instance, the efficiency of the activity (pravṛtti-samarthya), the absence of sublation (bādhā-rahitaatra), and so on. None of these criteria could stand a serious sceptical attack, for the criterion problem is the sceptic’s realm. What Dignāga did was to offer a new kind of criterion which he thought could stand the sceptical critique, because it literally complied with the sceptical requirements. One of the characteristics of reality enumerated by Nāgārjuna was that it cannot be conceptualized. Dignāga not only admits this, but he proceeds to making a criterion out of it. If reality cannot be conceptualized, then a true cognition must be free from conceptual construc-
tion, for a necessary condition of knowing is that our cognitions be the exact likeness of the object to which they correspond. This, of course, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. In order to guarantee the truthfulness of a cognition, a further assumption has to be made, namely, senses should be denied the capability of falsifying. This assumption is compatible with most of the Indian stock-examples of error. The mirage of water, for instance, can be easily analysed in the following manner. The sense organs apprehend correctly a bright surface, and the mind interprets it wrongly as water. The same analysis applies to mother-of-pearl mistaken for silver etc. (Note that under this analysis the notion of illusion disappears, resolved into the notion of error.)

The fact that Dignāga uses the absence of conceptual construction as a criterion of truth is corroborated by a passage in the Prasannapadā in which the pūrvapakṣin, a logician from Dignāga’s school, tries to establish causality by the fact that we have an immediate experience (anubhava) of it.18 (For Dignāga too immediate experience is always free from conceptual construction.)19

If I am right, then “free from conceptual construction” is not only the definition of perception, but its criterion as well. A Naiyāyika asked “How do you know a cognition is true?” would answer “Because of the efficiency of the activity”, or something to that effect. Dignāga, on the other hand, faced with the same question, would answer “Precisely because it is free from conceptual construction.”

(A criterion does not always have to be a confirmation or coordination principle among different cognitions. Think of Descartes’ criterion according to which clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true!)

Further, one can always tell whether a cognition is free from conceptual construction or not, because the absence of conceptual construction itself is always rightly apprehended. This is probably the reason why Dignāga insists that the self-apprehension (svamvedana) is always, even in the case of conceptual cognitions, free from conceptual construction. By this he avoids the fallacy of infinite regress which is inherent to such criteria as the efficiency of the activity.20

But Dignāga did not conceive his theory of knowledge in order to substantiate common sense fancy of reality. The fact that perceptual cognitions are absolutely true is useless for everyday practice, for they are evanescent and unique, they can neither persist nor recur, and, therefore, no relations among them can be established. The flux of sense destroys any sensum before it has lasted long enough to permit its relations being studied. In everyday life, one must operate with conceptual constructions; and indeed Dignāga classifies the cognition of empirical reality as pratyaksabhāsa. The real aim of Dignāga’s theory of knowledge was probably to provide a foundation for the Buddha’s teaching, and for that a third type of perception was necessary – the yogi-pratyakṣa. In the case of the Yogin, we have the exact opposite of the usual cognitive process. In everyday life, the perceptual cognitions are immediately transformed, or more precisely give rise to, conceptual cognitions; the Yogin, on the other hand, starts with a conceptual cognition, which becomes clearer and
clearer as he moves forward from one stage of meditation to the next, till it becomes a yogi-śāna, that is, free from conceptual construction. The most common simile to illustrate this process is the meditation of the lover on the beloved girl. The mental image of the girl gains in vividness till, as it were, she stands before her lover. The postulation of the yogi-śāna was necessary in order to establish the Buddhist dogmas such as the four noble truths, the momentariness etc., which are necessarily transmitted in the form of conceptual construction, as absolutely true.

It is clear that what holds all this together is the equation between absence of conceptual construction and truthfulness. The equation had to be established in both directions: (1) by correspondence or likeness between cognition and reality, i.e. since a conceptual cognition cannot have the likeness of an unconceptualizable reality, it follows that whatever is true cognition is free from conceptual construction, (2) by the attribution of all falsification to the mind; from this it follows that whatever is false cognition is conceptual.

In order to establish the second proposition, Dignāga had to deny that there are erroneous cognitions free from conceptual construction, and, therefore, could not allow the senses to produce erroneous cognitions.

Dignāga’s position is very original, but it is not without a parallel in Western philosophy. The sceptics of the 16th century undermined the assumption that sensation gives us a real acquaintance of the real world. Hobbes who granted that there is no way to distinguish between real sensation and imagination sought to avoid the distinction. Sensa, he says, are “fancy, the same waking as sleeping ... so that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy” (Leviathan ch. 1). Spinoza (for whom imaginatio is the regular term for sensation) and Leibniz (for whom all sensa are confused ideas) agree with Hobbes on this point, but Locke propounds the opposite view. For him “our simple ideas are all real”. The only ideas which he allows to be fantastical are complex ideas which are formed by combining simple ones. Dignāga’s and Locke’s conception of all sensa as real met no success at the hands of their followers. And just as Berkeley and Hume thought it a matter of urgency to disown it, Dharmakirti had to pretend that Dignāga never meant it.

Let us attend to the taimira-śāna again. How can it be interpreted without jeopardizing the equation of truthfulness with absence of conceptual construction? Here, the interpretation proposed above for the mirage of water, i.e. as impressions rightly apprehended and wrongly interpreted, cannot be applied, because there is no external object which stands in the same relation to the hair-net as the sun-rays to the water. Nor could the error be attributed to the mind alone (as in the case of dreams), because taimira is an eye sickness, not a mind sickness. One possible solution to this problem is to say that sense organs are passive. The eye by itself does not have the capacity of “inventing” the image of caul, what it could do at most is to disturb the mind in such a way, that a mental cognition of a caul is produced. This solution has the advantage of keeping all cognitions free from conceptual construction true, and, at the same time,
accounting for such cases as taimira where sense organs are defective. Dharmakirti mentions briefly (PV, 3.295) the possibility of sense organs being indirectly (pāramparya) responsible for the taimiraṇāna, a possibility which he, of course, immediately rejects. But as far as I can see this is the closest interpretation of Dignāga. (It is certainly more faithful to him than Dharmakirti’s interpretation.)

The trouble with this or any similar interpretation is that it is not very convincing. No matter how well each and every one of the Indian stock examples of errors could be explained away as being due to the mind, the basic conviction that sense organs are sometimes directly responsible for errors could not be uprooted, especially not in the case of defective sense organs. Moreover, if sense organs never produce false cognitions, then a defective sense organ has to produce either a true cognition or no cognition at all; and Dignāga was probably severely criticized on this point.

Another problem which was left open by Dignāga was how to account for the validity of inference. The triple criterion of valid reason (trirūpa-līṅga) adopted by Dignāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya II. enables one to differentiate between valid and invalid reasons, but it does not answer the question how the cognition of the inferred object, which is always a fictitious universal, could be valid at all. The apoha theory could explain on which basis inference operates, but it could not guarantee its validity, for the basic assumption remains that by inference one does not apprehend reality, but only conceptual constructions.

Dharmakirti had to complete and modify Dignāga’s theory on these two points in order to make it more acceptable. On the one hand he admitted that there are erroneous cognitions free from conceptual construction. On the other hand he had to find a new criterion to guarantee the validity of inference. This is probably the reason why he introduced the concept of artha-kriyā (efficient action), which was unknown to Dignāga. But as the universal could not possibly produce an efficient action, since it does not exist, a further modification of Dignāga was inevitable. As we have seen, the corner stone of Dignāga’s system is that perception has for its object only the particular, and inference only the universal. But if the particular alone has an efficient action, then inference, in order to be valid, must apprehend the particular. Thus, according to Dharmakirti the particular is cognized by both perception and inference: in its own form (svarūpena) by perception, in a different form (pararūpena) by inference.22 By introducing these modifications, Dharmakirti had to destroy the basic principles of Dignāga, namely, the absolute distinction between perception and inference according to their respective objects, and the equation of truthfulness with absence of conceptual construction.

Paradoxically enough, Dignāga’s concepts of validity and error were to be taken up and further developed in rival schools, by the Vyākhyātṛ and Prabhakara, into what later came to be called svatah prāmāṇya and smṛti-pramaṇa.23
Abbreviations


Notes


2 Cf. Hattori, op. cit. p. 28.

3 Ibid. p. 96.


5 Wayman, p. 394.

6 Ibid. p. 393.

7 In this connection it would be interesting to take a closer look at the Vṛtti, the second part of which Hattori reconstructs as follows: rāgaḍiṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvād mānasam pratyakṣam. First, it should be noted that according to the Tibetan translation (bdod chags dan śe sda han gti mug da bde ba dan sdu bsnal la sogs pa ni dbaṅ po la mit llos pahi phyir ran ri gahi pahi mnon sum mo. I quote Karnakavarmi’s translation; Vasudharakṣita’s translation is practically the same. Hattori arbitrarily replaces ni with la yan ran ri gah pa, and ran ri gahi with yid kyi) one has to read rāgaḍvesamhasukhadukhrādiṣu, and the ca should probably be omitted (cf. PVA p. 305.17–18). This, however, is not of much importance; the interesting point is that mānasam has no equivalent in the Tibetan, even though its presence is testified by Prajñākaragupta. We have, therefore two alternatives in order to account for this difference: either mānasam was originally in Dignāga’s text, and was later taken out; or it was not originally there, and was later added. Suppose it was not originally in the text, what could be the reason for interpolating it? One possible answer is that indriyānapekṣatvāt was misunderstood or not understood, that is, the ambiguous position of the ablative led to its being constructed with pratyakṣam instead of svasaṃvedanam; (the logical relation with svasaṃvedana is not at all obvious, even if we interpret it as apprehension through itself and not as apprehension of itself); indriyānapekṣatvāt pratyakṣam makes no sense, and, therefore, mānasam was added. But is the ablative really so ambiguous? The Tibetan translators who did not read mānasam rightly constructed indriyānapekṣatvāt with svasaṃvedanam, and anyone, after a moment of thought, would do the same. Now, suppose that mānasam was originally in the text, and later omitted, what could be the reason for that? This could have been done under Dharmakīrti’s influence (Note that Dharmakīrti expounds his theory of svasaṃvedana while commenting on PS(V) 6ab, (in PV 3.250f.)) and that Dharmakīrti’s works were translated in Tibetan before Dignāga’s). For if we take out mānasam, we can read the Vṛtti on 6ab as two independent sentences (this may also account for the ca being added), the one explaining mānasam-pratyakṣa (i.e. mānasam api rūpādiṣayālambanam avikalpikam anubhavākārapiṣayam), the
other as explaining svasamvedana in general, not as a type of mānasā-pratyakṣa, but as a type of perception (i.e. rāgadvesamohakadahādhiṣu svasamvedanam indriyānapekṣatvat pratyakṣam). Moreover, since rāga, dveṣa etc., were considered as caittas, one is immediately reminded of Dhamakirti’s definition of svasamvedana (sarvacitacittānāṁ atma samvedanām). Thus, one could reach a perfect harmonisation between Dignāga and Dhamakirti. I suppose the temptation was too strong to be resisted. This note is partly based on Professor Schmithausen’s lectures on Dignāga.

8 Translated by Hattori p. 35, Sanskrit fragment quoted from p. 120 n. 2.26.
9 Cf. for instance Tattvasangrahapaniṁ on v. 2879: tairimirikādānaṁ dvicandrādījānāṁcē puruṣāntaraparipraṣnād evānyathāvantiṣcayo bhavati.
10 Pratyaksābhaśa, p. 125; cf. also Dignāga p. 96.
13 MMK. 23.8. Nāgārjuna uses here the word kevala which I do not quite understand. Candrakirti, however, glosses it with parikalpitamātra.
15 This is not to say that Dignāga was the first to do so. What the Yogācāra reaction to Nāgārjuna was, and why Dignāga was dissatisfied by it are questions that lie far beyond the scope of this paper. I think Frawallner gives us a clue to this problem in “Dignāga, Sein Werk und seine Entwicklung.” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Südost Asiens, 3 1959, p. 129.
17 Ibid. p. 25.
18 Prasannapadā p. 58. Note that the argument could be brought up by a philosopher of the Prabhakara school.
19 Cf. Hattori, op. cit. p. 27 (Db), also p. 42 (Ba).
22 Hattori op. cit. p. 80, n. 1.14; cf. PV, 3.53d: meyyam tv evam svalaksanam. Cf. also Manorathamandin on 3.54, p. 118. Jayarāsi (Tattvopapalavastīḥa, p. 30.15 f.) points out the ambiguity and weakness of the Buddhist position. If there are two means of valid cognition because there are two kinds of objects, then what is the object of inference? If it is the particular, the distinction between the two pramāṇas cannot be established according to their objects. If it is the universal, inference cannot be a pramāṇa because the universal does not exist.

A note on abhilāśika

I have concentrated in the above paper on one type only of pratyaksābhaśa, namely, taimira, for the crucial point in my argumentation was to show that there is no pratyaksābhaśa free from conceptual construction, and in this respect taimira alone is problematic. However, the case of abhilāśika has already caused some confusion, and, therefore, a few clarifying words would not be out of place here. Hattori translates abhilāśika as “desire”. But if desire is pratyaksābhaśa, isn’t there a contradiction with Dhamakirti’s theory, according to which all cittas and caittas are immediate experiences? Were we fooled by Dhamakirti again? Should we conclude perhaps that the self apprehension of desire etc., is perception (as Dignāga says that the self apprehension of
desire etc., is mental perception), but desire itself is not perception, just as the self apprehension of conceptual construction is perception, whereas conceptual construction itself is, obviously, not perception?

Professor Wayman, who has given the problem some thought in his above mentioned paper, suggests that we can avoid the problem by taking abhilāṣika in a different meaning altogether: “This (i.e. abhilāsa) does not mean ‘desire’. My study of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary made clear that this term is employed like the verb form Iśyate, which in these contexts does not mean ‘desire’, but ‘it is believed, claimed’, so abhilāsa means here a belief, and the derivative form (i.e. abhilāṣika) ‘derivative belief’.” (ibid, p. 389)

I am not sure what a ‘derivative belief’ means, for Wayman’s way of expressing himself is, if not confused, highly confusing. I think he means a belief derived from speech, for, so he argues, it is preceded by speech. This interpretation of abhilāṣika takes its place in a wider ‘matching up’ of four pratyaksābhāsas with four pramānas:

\[
\begin{align*}
anumāna & \rightarrow \text{anumāna} \\
anumānika & \rightarrow \text{arthāpatti} \\
smāra & \rightarrow \text{upamāna} \\
abhilāṣika & \rightarrow \text{sābda (sic)}
\end{align*}
\]

Wayman considers this association ‘indisputable’, and probably for this reason, does not waste his time to bring forward logical reasons or historical evidence to substantiate it. While denying it, I shall do likewise, for the burden of proof lies, I think, on him.

But even if we refuse to accept the association between abhilāṣika and sābda, the question as to its meaning in Dignāga’s verse remains open. Wayman mentions a variant on this verse (from the Vibhūti) which reads abhiliṣhipa (‘derived from a word’) instead of abhilāṣika; but as he considers both words as synonyms anyhow, he does not deal with the question whether this variant should be opted for. Hattori, however, who knows of this variant, rejects it, and there are, I believe, sufficient philological grounds to reject this lectio facilior, which contradicts both Tibetan translations, and several Sanskrit quotations of this verse. It seems to me that this variant has arisen in order to solve the apparent contradiction mentioned above: Someone who took abhilāṣika to mean desire, and thought it would contradict Dharmakīrti’s theory of cattas as immediate experiences, meddled with the verse.

Not to complicate any further a matter which is basically simple, I suggest the following interpretation: abhilāṣika is not desire, as Hattori translates it, for abhilāsa is desire, nor is it a ‘derivative belief’ or a belief derived from speech, as suggested by Wayman, who saw that Hattori’s translation cannot be right, but opted for quite an absurd solution; abhilāṣika is something derived from desire, namely, such conceptual constructions which take the form ‘I want to obtain this object’ etc.
Buddhist doctrine (buddha-deśana) had its beginning with the fact that Gotama Siddhattha was awakened (buddha) to the truth (dharma), and enunciated that inner experience in doctrinal teaching (dharma, i.e., deśana). The subsequent history of Buddhist doctrine thematizes the question of just how one can personally realize such an inner experience of enlightenment. In short, at its inception Buddhist doctrine passed from the realm of inner enlightenment to that of enunciated doctrine, while the subsequent history of doctrine passes from the realm of enunciated doctrine to that of inner enlightenment.

However, inasmuch as words are unable to express inner experience just as it is, the realm of enlightenment, which is mediated in the words of doctrinal discourse, became somewhat distorted.1 Thus, a negative attitude developed in regard to words, for truth transcends verbal expression (nirabhilāpya). The tradition repeats that this inner experience of the realm of enlightenment (buddha) could be understood only by another one so enlightened (i.e., a Buddha).2 But it is a clear, objective fact that the passage from doctrine to enlightenment does indeed characterize the Buddhism of later times. On the other hand, there was a conscious, subjective attempt to restore the inner realization of enlightenment through doctrinal discourse, rather than to regard enlightenment as ascertainable only by inner experience. It is this conscious endeavour that constitutes the internal history of Buddhist doctrine. The everyday tendency to move from words to understanding is analyzed in such an endeavour, for the movement from doctrinal discourse to enlightenment replaces the tendency to move from direct insight to words.3 Such an endeavour probably formed the context in which the Yogācāra masters first formulated their thinking.

The present article does not attempt to describe the entire formulation of enlightenment in Vijñaptimātratā, but rather, from the above perspective, will
examine the teaching concerning “The Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas,” i.e., the realm of enlightenment in the context of the trisvabhāva doctrine, which is the fundamental insight of Viññaptimātratā.

This examination will be divided into four sections: 1) the realm of enlightenment as expressed in doctrinal interpretations; that is, the four kinds of pure dharmas, 2) verbal expression as doctrine and the inner subjectivity of the practitioner, that is, the relationship between the purity of object (ālambana-vyavādāna) and the purity of path (mārga-vyavādāna), 3) the relationship between the realm of enlightenment and the inner subjectivity of everyday verbalization, that is, the relationship between original purity (prakṛti-vyavādāna) and dependent co-arising (paratantra), and 4) the realm of enlightenment as the radical reorientation of verbal activity, that is, the formulation of undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavādāna).

I

The Viññaptimātra synthesis developed from a new awareness of the meaning of the earlier scriptures, principally of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. This new awareness was embodied in the trisvabhāva doctrine. In clarifying and re-interpreting these earlier Mahāyāna scriptures (vaipulya) of the Prajñā lineage, Asaṅga thematized this trisvabhāva in chapter two, section twenty-six of his Mahāyānasamgraha:

The Mahāyānistic Vaipulyas were spoken by the Buddha-Bhagavat, and in this teaching the question is raised as to how one is to understand the nature of mere imagining (parikalpita-svabhava). It should be understood as being synonymous with (paryāya) non-existence (nāsti). How should one understand the nature of dependent co-arising (paratantra-svabhava)? It should be understood to be like (upama) a magical trick (māyā), a mirage (marīci), a dream (svapna), a reflection (pratibhāsa), an image (pratibimba), an echo (pratīṣṛtu), as the moon’s reflection in water (udakacandra), as a transformation (nirmita). How should one understand the nature of full perfection (parinispanna-svabhava)? It should be understood through the teaching of the four kinds of pure dharmas (catuṣvırdho vyavadāna-dharmah). Among these four, the first is original purity (prakṛti-vyavādāna), that is, suchness (tathatā), emptiness (śūnyata), reality (bhūtakoti), the unmarked (animitta), the highest truth (paramārtha). It is equivalent to the dharmadhātu. The second is undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavādāna), that is, the same [original purity] inasmuch as it is free from all obstacles. The third is the purity of path (mārga-vyavādāna), which attains to the [undefiled purity], that is, all virtues (dharma) favorable to enlightenment (bodhipākṣikāh sarvadharmāh). The fourth is the purity of object (ālambana-vyavādāna),
which gives rise to that [path], namely, the doctrine of the true dharma of the Mahāyāna (mahāyāna-saddharma). Because this [doctrine] is the cause of purity (vyavadāna-hetutva), it is not merely imagined (parikalpita). Because it is the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (visuddhaha-dharmadhātu-nisyandatva), it is not dependently co-arisen (paratantra). All pure dharmas are included in this fourfold purity.

Concerning this the verses say: Magical tricks etc. are proclaimed in regard to that which is produced (bhūta, i.e. paratantra), and non-existence in regard to that which is imagined (parikalpita), and the four kinds of purity in regard to full perfection (parinispamna). These purities are original purity, undefined purity, purity of path, and purity of object. All pure dharmas are included in these four kinds of purity.

This passage is most important as a source for the interpretation of the earlier Mahāyāna scriptures (vaipulya) in terms of the trisvabhāva doctrine, but we here limit ourselves to an examination of the four kinds of purity, which are explained as parinispamna-svabhāva, because in this explanation the specific Yogācāra understanding of enlightenment is described. Vasubandhu comments on these purities:

Understand that wherever any of these four kinds of purity is explained, there is Mahāyāna, and know that this is the manifestation of parinispamna of the trisvabhāva.

Thus the broad meaning of enlightenment, which is scattered among the various Mahāyāna scriptures, is summarized under the theme of this fourfold purity. Vasubandhu continues:

The first two of these four kinds of purity are unchangeable (nirvikāra), and are the full perfection of full perfection, while the last two, being unfailing (aviparyāsa), are full perfection.

This passage corresponds to verse eleven of chapter three of the Madhyāntavibhāga, which explains that “because parinispamna is both unchangeable and unfailing, it is of two kinds.” The passage from the Madhyāntavibhāga is given as the response to the question of how the path, being a conditioned dharma (samskṛta), can be termed parinispamna. This inclusion of the path within parinispamna has a close connection with the interpretation of the three meanings of paramārtha as object (artha), realization (prāpti), and practice (pratipatti). In these three meanings the compound parama-artha is to be understood respectively as a taṭpurusa, karmadhāraya, and bahunīti compound. Artha-paramārtha, the truth of the ultimate object, is tathātā, i.e., paramārtha as the object of transcendent wisdom (paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ). Prāptiparamārtha, realized ultimate truth, is nirvāṇa, i.e. paramārtha itself becomes the transcendent object
(paramo' arthah). Partipatti-paramārtha, the ultimate truth of practice, is paramārtha inasmuch as the path of practice refers to that which has ultimate meaning (paramo 'syārthaḥ).\(^{15}\) The path is not itself paramārtha, but inasmuch as it bears ultimate meaning, or is in harmony with ultimate truth, it pertains to parinīspanna as unfailing (aviparyāsa). Taihatā, which is just as it is, whether one be conscious of it or not, and nirvāṇa, which embodies tathatā in one’s consciousness, are both the unchangeable realm of enlightenment. But the conscious practice (pratipatti-paramārtha), which leads to these, is subject to change. However, because such consciousness has the realm of enlightenment as its objective, it does not turn away from (aviparyāsa) that enlightenment, and, as such, is included in the broad meaning of the realm of enlightenment.

We can outline the relationships of the explanations of the Mahāyānasamgraha vis-à-vis the Madhyāntavibhāga as follows: Parinīspanna embraces:

A) The unchangeable realm of enlightenment, which includes:

1) Original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna), i.e., the truth of the ultimate object (artha-paramārtha read as a tatpurussa compound), which is the object of

2) Undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna), i.e., realized ultimate truth (prāpti-paramārtha read as a karma dhāraya compound).

B) The unfailing harmony with that realm of enlightenment, which includes:

1) Purity of Path (mārga-vyavadāna), i.e., the ultimate truth of practice (pratipatti-paramārtha read as a bahuvrihi compound), which takes as object

2) Purity of object (ālambana-vyavadāna) —

The correspondence of purity of path (mārga-vyavadāna) to practice (pratipatti-paramārtha) is clear, for both treat of the path. Again both texts similarly take undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna) or realization (prāpti-paramārtha) as nirvāṇa and consider it the result of practice. Furthermore, Sthiramati explains it as undefiled (nirmala) tathatā.\(^{16}\) However, the correspondence between original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna) and the truth of the ultimate object (artha-paramārtha) is not quite clear. But, since both texts do identify them as tathatā, one can conclude that they do correspond, although the Mahāyānasamgraha’s treatment seems to be much fuller. Also, in their commentaries on the Mahāyānasamgraha, both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva interpret prakṛti-vyavadāna as tathāgata-garbha, the matrix of tathagatahood.\(^{17}\) And both texts agree that the fullness of the world just as it is (tathatā) is tathāgata-garbha, whether people are conscious of it or not. They further agree that such is realized and known only by saints (paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ, i.e. tatpurussa compound). In his commentary Asvabhāva interprets paramārtha as one of the synonyms of prakṛti-vyavadāna. Although he probably knew about the three interpretations of paramārtha, he simply interprets paramārtha as a tatpurussa compound, thus emphasizing that the meaning
of paramārtha in regard to prakṛti-vyavadāna is that which is the object of the highest wisdom.\(^{18}\)

Thus, the first three of the four kinds of purity do correspond to the three meanings of paramārtha. But to what does the Mahāyāna-samgraha’s purity of object correspond? This purity of object, just as the purity of path, is included in the question of how a conditioned dharma can yet be pariniṣpanna, i.e. paramārtha. Doctrine is expressed in words, and such verbal expression is conventional (saṃvṛti) rather than ultimate (paramārtha).\(^{19}\) However, as the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (viśuddha-dharma-dhātu-nisyanda), doctrine is included within paramārtha. This paradoxical characteristic of doctrine is perhaps why the Mahāyāna-samgraha’s notion of ālaṃbana-vyavadāna is not found in the Madhāyāna-vibhaga. But we should carefully note that both purity of path and purity of object involve the inner subjectivity of practice, and are both objects of such practice. Both have this paradoxical nature, and both are open to the same question. Due to the trisvabhāva doctrine, both play an important role in Vijñāpimātratā, for the central theme of trisvabhāva is that the inner subjectivity of practice is dependently co-arisen.

II

In the Madyāntavibhāga, paramārtha is explained in contrast to saṃvṛti. Its explanation interprets the two truths, which were propounded in the Prajñā-pāramitā and Mādhyamika literatures,\(^{20}\) in the context of trisvabhāva. Just as there are three meanings for paramārtha, so there are three meanings for saṃvṛti, namely, conceptualization (prajñāpatti-saṃvṛti), practice (pratipatti-saṃvṛti),\(^{21}\) and manifestation (udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti). These correspond respectively to that which is imagined, the dependently co-arisen, and the fully perfected.\(^{22}\) Thus this interpretation differs from the three meanings of paramārtha, in which all three meanings are pariniṣpanna. However, the third meaning of saṃvṛti as manifestation includes both saṃvṛti and pariniṣpanna, and it is this that corresponds to the purity of objects. Since the text of the Madhyāntavibhāga is not entirely clear on this point, we will examine the commentary of Sthiramati:

Saṃvṛti as manifestation is an instruction by means of such synonyms as emptiness (śūnya), suchness (tathata), defilement (saṃala), and undeﬁlement (nirmala), even although pariniṣpanna transcends analytical understanding (vikalpa) and verbal expression (abhilāpa).\(^{23}\)

When one indicates (samsūcana) the dharmadhātu, which transcends verbal expression (nirabhilāpya), by means of words, such as tathata, etc., then the manifestation (udbhāvanā) and verbal expression (vyavahāra), which arise from this treatment of dharmadhātu, are saṃvṛti as manifestation (udbhāvanā).\(^{24}\)
Manifestation as verbal activity in regard to dharmadhātu (dharmadhātor vyavahāraḥ) is then quite similar in content to the purity of object (ālambana-vyavadāna), whereby doctrine is the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu. However, there is the important difference that, while the former has the characteristics of both saṃvṛti and parinispāna, the latter is defined only as parinispāna, even although it is not the unchangeable realm of enlightenment. The purity of object (ālambana-vyavadāna), since it occurs in the path (mārga) as conscious practice (pratipattipara-mārtha) does reflect everyday verbal activity, in which words lead to understanding. But the main point emphasized in the explanation of ālambana-vyavadāna is the inner experience that is in harmony with and flows from direct insight out into words, from the realm of enlightenment into doctrine. In contrast, saṃvṛti as manifestation (udbhāvanā), i.e., meaning verbally manifested, does nothing more than indicate parinispāna categories of thought. Within such limits, even parinispāna is located within the sphere of saṃvṛti, because it is verbal expression. On this level, the inner subjectivity of unconscious practice (pratipatti-saṃvṛti) passes from words to understanding, and has the constant danger of objectifying (prajñaptisāṃvṛti, i.e., parikalpita) even doctrine concerning parinispāna, and turning it into conceptual knowledge (prajñāpti).

This same danger is present in regard to the purity of object, and this is why Asaṅga emphasizes that it is neither that which is imagined (parikalpita) nor the dependently co-arisen (paratantra). Asvabhāva does not comment in any detail upon the purity of object, but Vasubandhu does take up Asaṅga’s text:

With regard to the phrase “the purity of object, which gives rise to this [path],” because all the virtues favorable to enlightenment (bodhipāk-ṣika-dharma) give rise to clear insight (abhisamaya), and, because they are objects, they are “objects which give rise.” Moreover, because they are pure, they are said to be “the purity of object, which gives rise to this [path].” This is also the teaching of the sūtra, [geya], etc. in the twelve-section canon (dvādaśāṅga-vacogata). Such being the case, whatever kind of doctrine arises from that which is imagined (parikalpita), arises from impure (samkleśa) causes. And whatever arises co-dependently (paratantra) is not true. But, since it is the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu, [the purity of object] is neither of these, is not untrue, and arises from parinispāna itself.

This commentary of Vasubandhu regards that which is imagined and the dependently co-arisen as positive conventional dharmas and describes them in a negative fashion even more than does Asaṅga in the principal text, probably because (Vasubandhu) was intensely aware of the above-mentioned danger. For when doctrine is conceptually understood (parikalpita) in the passage from words to understanding, then it will issue in verbal activity that is unconscious of paramārtha (pratipatti-saṃvṛti, i.e. paratantra). When doctrine is verbally
expressed by an inner subjectivity (paratantra) of unreal imagining (abhūtā-parikalpa), then it is not true. Doctrine is constantly faced with this danger. But doctrine itself, according to Vasubandhu, is the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu and is not subject to change, although the inner subjectivity of the practitioner may be either conscious (paramārtha) or unconscious (saṃvṛti) of the function of words in regard to paramārtha.30

The term dharmadhātu in the phrase viśuddha-dharmadhātu-nisyanda is synonymous with prakṛti-vyavādāna, and can be expressed by other similar terms, such as tathatā, śūnyatā, bhūtakoṭi, animitta, and paramārtha. But within the limits that it is pure, i.e., as viśuddhi, it corresponds rather to vaimalyavyavadāna.31 Outflow (nisyanda) means flowing out of the same essence (saddhāḥ syandah), a result that is consistent with that [essence] (tad-anurūpam phalam).32 How then does this outflow of the pure dharmadhātu relate to the four kinds of pure dharmas? Doctrine flows out from the same essence, and is a consistent result of the dharmadhātu of undefiled purity. It takes as its object original purity. Such doctrine is manifested to an inner subjectivity which is conscious of paramārtha, and in which the purity of path issues in the purity of object. Doctrinal enunciation, to be of the same essence as dharmadhātu, implies the presence of one who has realized undefiled purity, which intends original purity as its object. The inner experience of such wisdom is termed non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jīvana). But doctrine is not the realm of no thought or no words.33 Although this inner experience is said to transcend verbal expression (nirabhilāpya), yet such intensely aware consciousness does manifest itself in verbal expression. Even although it does indeed transcend such expression, nevertheless, of necessity, it attempts to embody the directly experienced insight in words.34 At the initial moment, the object given in the wisdom of undefiled purity (paramasya jñānasvārthah, i.e. nirvikalpa-jñānasvārthah) i.e. the dharmadhātu of viśuddha-dharmadhātu, flows out as the doctrine of wisdom and non-duality. This is doctrine as the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu. And such is none other than the passage from enlightenment to doctrine.

In the inner subjectivity of conscious practice (pratipattiparamārtha) doctrine issues forth in such a passage from direct insight into words, rather than passing from words to understanding. This is vividly described in the Aśtāsāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā:

Truly, when doctrine (dharma, i.e. deśana) is enunciated by the Tathāgata, those who cultivate that doctrine (dharma-deśana) gain insight into (sāksātkurvanti) and bear in mind (dhārayanti) that dharmatā. And, having insight into, and bearing it in mind, whatever they say, or explain, or relate, or speak, or clarify, or understand is all in accord with that dharmatā. Oh, Śāriputra, such good sons, when they narrate that dharmatā, in nowise contradict it, because such is the outflow of the certain doctrine of the Tathāgata (tathāgata-dharma-deśana).35
Haribhadra explains that at the stage of nirvedbhāgiya (i.e. that which conduces to insight, the third stage of the path), one cultivates the manifested doctrine, at darsanamārga (the path of insight) one gains direct insight into it, and at bhāvanāmārga (the path of meditation) one bears it in mind.\textsuperscript{36} This explanation re-arranges the simpler Prajnāpāramitā exposition of the necessity of direct insight. In order to understand doctrine, the dharmatā must first be given in direct experience. And then, by the radical re-orientation of the conventions of everyday words, one experiences the passage from enlightenment to words, in an outflow from direct insight into words. Spoken words then do not run counter to the realm of enlightenment. Those who have had such a direct insight do enunciate meaning and embody it in words, as did the sūtra writers. In support of this, the thrust of poetic understanding cuts through the conventions of everyday speech.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus Vijñaptimātratā seeks for a radical directional re-orientation from the passage from words to understanding to the passage from direct insight to words. It takes as its source the Prajnāpāramitā literature,\textsuperscript{38} and affirms such an occurrence in an inner subjectivity (āśraya) that is clearly dependently co-arisen. This is why Vijñaptimātratā so thoroughly analyzes this inner subjectivity of practice (pratipatti, i.e. āśraya) in its relationship to original purity.

III

In the Vijñaptimātra systematization, everything is included within dharmadhātu, which is prakṛti-vyavadāna. It is important to emphasize this point, for although Vijñaptimātratā is formulated in the trisvabhāva thesis, and systematically analyzed in the related explanations of ālayavijñāna, yet this entire endeavour is carried out from the prior direct insight into dharmadhātu. The term vijñaptimātra itself is an expression of direct insight. A contrasting term is found in verse eighty-one of chapter nine of the Mahāyānasūtradālāṃkāra:

Bodhi (wisdom) is said to have been attained by those non-discriminative bodhisattvas, who have seen that everything that has been explained is merely discrimination (kalpanā-mātra).\textsuperscript{39}

According to the commentary, the phrase “everything that has been explained” refers to the mind previously attained (āupalambhīka) in contrast to bodhi.\textsuperscript{40} Even though this insight is attributed only to bodhisattvas, it probably also applies to the generality of people, for the all-inclusive consciousness of both vijñapti-mātra and kalpanā-mātra is given in a completely non-discriminative direct insight. One who has had such an experience knows that he himself is included in dharmadhātu, i.e., in prakṛti-vyavadāna. Being so aware, he progresses along the path of ālambuna-vyavadāna to mārga-vyavadāna and vaimālya-vyavadāna. This systematization of object, practice, and result is clearly reflected in the Vijñaptimātratā literature.\textsuperscript{41}
However, what of the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of paramārtha (pratipatti-sāmyṛti)? Certainly it is also included within the originally pure dharmadātu, which is, as mentioned above, also termed tathāgata-garbha. One must note carefully that here tathāgata-garbha is simply another way of expressing prakṛti-vyavadāna. To borrow Vasubandhu’s own terminology, whenever tathāgata-garbha is explained, there is Mahāyāna, because it explains the original purity of the four pure dharmas.42 Thus, it is a mistake to interpret Vijñaptimātrata by means of such tathāgata-garbha thought as systematized in the Ratnagotravibhāga. But it is also a mistake to reject the notion of original purity in Vijñaptimātrata simply because it rejects that version of tathāgata-garbha. The first seems to be no longer present in the scholarly community, but the second has not yet been entirely eradicated. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between prakṛti-vyavadāna and the vijnapti-mātra thesis. Original purity includes all beings just as they are, whether they are conscious of it or not. But at the basis (āśraya) of their conscious activity there is a contradiction. In analyzing the nature of this conscious subjectivity, Vijñaptimātrata does recognize that beings, just as they are, are enmeshed in this contradiction. This is why Asaṅga says that paratantra is not entirely non-existent.43 Furthermore, Asanga’s statement, that if paratantra is non-existent, there would be no paramispanna, is further explained by Asvabhāva to mean that even if both were non-existent, parimiśpanna as prakṛti-vyavadāna would still exist, even though as vaimalya-vyavadāna it would not exist.44 Thus, the denial of the paratantric nature of inner subjectivity implies the non-existence of undefiled purity as the conscious attainment of the result. But even in this case, original purity would still be universal and unchangeable. But it is only when the wisdom, which is the result of undefiled purity (paramasya jñānasya) gains insight into original purity (arthā), which includes even unconscious beings (paramasya jñānasyārthah i.e., prakṛti-vyavadāna) just as it is, that one becomes conscious of original purity. Through the insight of such wisdom, the doctrine of the ālayavijñāna is formulated in the context of the trisvabhāva. Thus the relationship between inner subjectivity and doctrine is the relationship between the purity of path and the purity of object, which obtains in the case of one who is subjectively conscious of paramārtha. In the case of one who is not so conscious, the relationship of his inner subjectivity to doctrine is still defiled, and, while being included within original purity, constitutes the relationship between paratantra (everyday consciousness) and parikalpita (conceptualized doctrine). But, whether conscious or not, doctrine arises in synergy with the same basic inner subjectivity (āśraya), and it is herein that the contradiction of consciousness is most deep.

This relationship is set forth in the explanation of the famous verse on the beginningless dhātu.45 Asvabhāva’s commentary rightly indicates that this contradiction exists within the same inner subjectivity:

“The dhātu without beginning, etc.” is without beginning (anādikālika) because it has no limits for its arising (dang po’i mu, pūrvakoṭī). Dhātu
means cause (hetu), seed (bijā). But what kind of cause is it? It is the cause of all defiled dharmanas (saṃkleśa-dharma), and not the cause of the pure (vyavādāna). As is said in the next [chapter], “the basis (āśraya), which becomes permeated by much listening (bahu-śruta) is not comprised in alaya-vijñāna, but, being seeds, just as is alaya-vijñāna, they are comprised in correct reflection (yoniśo-manasīkāra).” Because it means “holding, (reten, dhrīti),” it is “the basis of all dharmas (sarvadharma-samāśraya),” and not because it is their cause. The meaning of holding is the meaning of basis (āśraya), and since it does not have the meaning of cause, the term “basis” is also employed. If this were not so, then the term “dhātu” alone would be sufficient.

This passage from Asvabhava explains the basic text of Asariga. Ālaya consciousness is the cause only of defilement, i.e., of illusion, and Asaṅga frequently indicates this contradictory nature of ālaya-vijñāna in contrast to the hearing of doctrine (śruta-vāsanā) within the same inner subjectivity. It is not that consciousness is a mixture of both truth and illusion. The term dhātu in the original verse may refer to the foundation (āśraya) of all dharmas, and include both truth and illusion, but, if it be interpreted as ālaya-vijñāna, then, in the Yogācāra formulation, it must be understood only as the cause of defilement.

The interpretation of dhātu as tathāgata-garbha is a separate and distinct tradition. Viññaptimātratā simply takes the Mahāyāna teaching that sarva-sattvās tathāgata-garbha (all beings are the womb of tathāgata) to refer to prakṛti-vyavādāna, and does not expatiate on the point. Thus, inner subjectivity (sattva), which is grounded upon ālaya-vijñāna, is only illusion, but it is included within prakṛti-vyavādāna. The practice of listening to doctrine (śruta-vāsanā), which issues in the awareness of this contradictory nature of consciousness, is mārga-vyavādāna, even though it occurs within the same inner subjectivity. Such a radical reorientation, which occurs in the same inner subjectivity, is a direct reversal, and Viññaptimātratā sees such as the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (viśuddha-dharmadāhu-nisyaṇa). In such a process, it is natural that Viññaptimātratā emphasizes that it is difficult to reveal ālaya-vijñāna to ordinary persons, who yet remain unconscious that it is the basis of their inner subjectivity. The foremost characteristic of ālaya is verbal permeation (abhihūpa-vāsanā), which is the passage from words to understanding. However, the consciousness of this situation, just as it is, is bodhi, i.e., the passage from direct insight to words. Such a passage is disrupted by the use of verbal meanings, for in their basic nature words are unsuitable to enunciate direct insight. The basic capability of words is to communicate, to describe. They are intended to evoke action, to point to things. As such, words reflect the process whereby knowledge selects from reality, and their efficacy is always selective and particularized. Everyday understanding (vikalpa) is dependent upon the accumulation of such selective knowledge in verbal traditions (abhilāpa-vāsanā), and only from this
matrix can one move on to an understanding of new affairs. But the understanding of new affairs, just as they are (tathāta), is not possible from a matrix of already-known verbalized thoughts. Such an understanding demands a radical re-orientation of inner subjectivity. This re-orientation is thematized as āśraya-parivṛtti, and is nothing other than vaimalya-vyavadāna. In a word, this is the realm of enlightenment. Let us then turn to a fuller consideration of undefiled purity.

IV

Asvabhāva, in his commentary, considers vaimalya-vyavadāna as self-evident: “This phrase is explained by itself.” But Vasubandhu adds some further explanation:

Vaimalya-vyavadāna means that the very same tathāta becomes buddhāta, which is characterized (prabhāvita) as pure tathāta, inasmuch as it is free from the defilements of the obstacles, of passion and knowledge.

The phrase “this very same tathāta” certainly refers to prakṛti vyavadāna, for prakṛti-vyavadāna and vaimalya-vyavadāna are the same tathāta. However, the latter is different, inasmuch as it is buddhāta, the attainment (prāptih) of that pre-eminent wisdom (paramasya jñānasya), whereby one’s inner subjectivity is radically re-orientated to that tathāta, which is severed from (prahāṇa) the obstacles of passion and knowledge. It is the result of conscious practice (pratipatti-paramārtha). Sthiramati is essentially in agreement with this commentary of Vasubandhu when he explains the phrase prāpti-paramārtha in the Madhyāntavibhāga as:

It has as its characteristic the re-orientation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) which is entirely undefiled (ekānta-nirmala) tathāta.

Vaimalya-vyavadāna, as the result of practice, is a unitary inner experience, in which the severance from obstacles and the attainment of wisdom are not two different things. The former emphasizes the negative aspect of severance, the latter the positive aspect of wisdom. The term that comprehends both of these aspects is bodhi. In the Bodhipañjala chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, bodhi is described as being both the severance from the two obstacles, of passion and knowledge, and as the corresponding establishment of the two kinds of wisdom. In the Bodhyadhihikāra chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra, where bodhi is thematized in verses fifty-six to seventy-six, the positive aspect is emphasized. Both Sthiramati and Asvabhāva recognize the internal unity of these verses, and offer almost the same commentary. For reasons of space, we give the commentary of Asvabhāva only:
After explaining the maturation of sentient beings (sattva-paripāka), [the Mahāyānasūtraḥamkāra] discusses dharmadhātu-visuddhi. What is their inner relationship (sambandhana)? This relationship is explained as bodhi. The text stated above:

By means of hundreds of difficult practices, having performed rare ascetical practices, having amassed all good, having traversed a great time period (mahākalpa) and innumerable ages, having severed all obstacles, because he has destroyed even the most subtle obstacle in all the bhūmis: such is buddhatā. Thus it is like the opening of a basket that contains many jewels, which has vast powers.59

In this manner we have considered bodhi in general. After this, the text investigated the maturation of sentient beings from the state (avasthā) of having attained buddhatā. Bodhi is examined from the aspects of its proper nature (svabhāva), cause (hetu), result (phala), activity (karman), associated [qualities] (yoga), and function (vṛtti).60 Thus is bodhi discussed.

But what does the bodhisattva cultivate? He cultivates the seven stages (gnyen bdun po)61 from the stage that benefits both himself and others to that of bodhi itself. Up to this point, bodhi has been considered in a broad sense as it appears in all the sūtras,62 but [in this part] it is considered as it appears in a particular sūtra. It is for this reason that the text takes dharmadhātu-visuddhi as its theme, and thus is correct. In the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra it says: “The stage of Buddha (buddhabhūmi) is comprised by the five dharmas, namely, the dharmadhātu-visuddhi (the immaculate ultimate realm), ādarsanajñāna (mirror wisdom), samatājñāna (equality wisdom), pratyavekṣanajñāna (wondrous insight wisdom), and kṛtyānusṭhānajñāna (performance wisdom).”63 Because the Buddhabhūmīsūtra first thematized dharmadhātu-visuddhi, so it is treated first [in this text]. Thus the analysis of the five dharmas must proceed as they are given in the Mahāyānabuddhabhūmīsūtra.64

Dharmadhātu-visuddhi is here understood as the object of the four wisdoms, but this does not imply that it is to be equated with prakṛiti-vyavādāna.65 Rather, both the four wisdoms and dharmadhātu-visuddhi are vāimalya-vyavādāna. This is so because verse fifty-six,66 which explains the nature (svabhāva) of dharmadhātu-visuddhi, states that its characteristic is tathatā severed from the defilements of the obstacles of passion and knowledge, and is also the unexhausted supernatural power in both vastu-jñāna (i.e., tat-prśhālabdha-jñāna) and tad-ālambana-jñāna (i.e., nirvikalpa-jñāna).67 Since this commentary parallels the above description of bodhi, which is characterized as both serverance and wisdom, dharmadhātu-visuddhi must pertain to vāimalya-vyavādāna. In this
understanding the terms dharmadhātu-visuddhi and dharmadhātu are not synonyms. Dharmadhātu, which is synonymous with prakṛti-vyavadāna, is the object of non-discriminative wisdom (tad-ālambana-jñāna) of dharmadhātu-visuddhi. Thus the word visuddhi is not just an unimportant adjective in the phrase dharmadhātu-visuddhi, but is rather to be taken in the same meaning as vaimalya. Dharmadhātu-visuddhi is thus definitely not prakṛti-vyavadāna.

The terms “resultative severance” and “resultative wisdom” emphasize severance and wisdom as the result of mārga-vyavadāna. These topics are treated, respectively, in chapters nine and ten of the Mahāyānasamgraha,68 as āśraya-parivṛtti and trikāya.69 But, if dharmadhātu-visuddhi be identified with prakṛti-vyavadāna, as the object of wisdom (jñāna), then āśraya-parāvṛtti, the radical re-orientation of consciousness, loses much of its meaning, because its specific characteristic is not original purity. Āśraya-parivṛtti takes place in the inner subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner (ālaya-vijñāna, i.e., paratāntra), which is included within prakṛti-vyavadāna. This inner subjectivity then becomes vaimalya-vyavadāna, through the mediation of mārgavyavadāna, and cannot be termed prakṛti-vyavadāna. Since that inner subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner cannot of itself become conscious of paramārtha, the hearing of doctrine (śutra-vāsanā), which depends on ālambana-vyavadāna, is necessary.

Thus, the main import of this article is to describe the process whereby the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of paramārtha is radically re-oriented to become so conscious, within all-inclusive prakṛti-vyavadāna, and, within this process, to examine the verbal enunciation of the realm of enlightenment as āśraya-parivṛtti, which passes from ālambana-vyavadāna (doctrine) to mārga-vyavadāna (practice), to issue in vaimalya-vyavadāna (realization). The development of the trisvabhinā thesis seems to have occurred in tandem with the verbalization of this process.

If, then, the realm of enlightenment, which has vaimalya-vyavadāna as its result, is the āśraya-parivṛtti of ālaya-vijñāna, then what relationship is there between śrūta-vāsanā, which plays such a crucial role in ālaya-vijñāna, and āśraya-parivṛtti? Āśraya-parivṛtti specifically means the severance of the obstacles of passion and knowledge (klesa-jñeyāvarana). In Vījñaptimātratā, the severance of passion issues in the body of deliverance (vimukti-kāya), while the severance of both obstacles issues in dharma-kāya. Vimukti-kāya is accorded but a low value, since it is seen as a Hinayāna result.70 The severance of the more difficult jñeyāvarana then becomes a major theme of Mahāyāna. However, this contrasting of klesāvarana and jñeyāvarana is not of ancient usage,71 and probably developed together with the new understanding of the fundamental function of ālaya-vijñāna as verbalization (abhilāpa-vāsanā).72 If such be the case, then we can conjecture that the severance of jñeyāvarana is precisely the radical re-orientation of verbalization in ālaya-vijñāna, whereby the passage from words to understanding is reversed into the issuance of words from direct insight.

Translated from the Japanese by John Keenan.
Notes

* Translator’s Note: Central to any religious thought is the notion of the ultimate. This article treats the nature of the ultimate of Yogācāra thinking, one of the foundational syntheses of Mahāyāna doctrine. It thus deals with notions that are basic to all later Mahāyāna thinking. It has been a strong point of Japanese Buddhology to interpret Chinese and Japanese doctrinal endeavours in light of their earlier Indian predecessors, for without a clear understanding of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, later thinking has no context in which to be interpreted.

1 This is the point of the Buddha’s hesitation to enunciate the Dharma teaching, even when importuned to do so by the Brahma Sahampati: “adhitagato myāyam dhammo gambhiro duddasdo duranubodho santo panīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paññita-vedaṇiya.” (SN, I, p. 136)

2 “tathāgata eva Śāriputra tathāgatasya dharmāṃ desayed yān dharmāṁs tathāgato jānatī.” (Saddharmapundarīka, Nanjio ed., p. 30, 11. 2–3). Another passage states that the Buddha’s wisdom is difficult to understand: “gambhiṅam Śāriputra durḍhaṁ duranubodhaṁ buddha-jānaṁ” (ibid., p. 29, 1. 2).

3 These two tendencies correspond to the two aspects of speech. In his Cours de linguistique générale (p. 166), Ferdinand de Saussure writes: “Un système linguistique est une série de différences de sons combinées avec une série de différences d’idées.” In this article, then, we distinguish the meaning of words, which corresponds to a series of thoughts from the physical enunciation of words, which corresponds to a series of sounds. We understand things because of the meaning of everyday words, and this is the tendency from words to understanding. In contrast, as occurs in poetry, a unitary awareness is first enunciated and given in direct insight, and then, from within that direct insight, draws upon the power of words. This we consider to be the tendency from direct insight to words. In general, the former is the verbal understanding of adults, while the latter can be seen in the verbal learning of children.

Furthermore, in this article the use of the term “direct insight” is quite close to Bergson’s notion of intuition: “Nous appelons ici intuition la sympathie par laquelle on se transporte à l’intérieur d’un objet pour coincider avec ce qu’il a d’unique et par conséquent d’inexprimable.” (“La pensée et le mouvant,” Œuvres, p. 1395).

4 For the Prajnāpāramitā literature, which treats parikalpa, vikalpa, and dharmatā, and thus has a close relationship with the trisvabhāva thesis, confer my article “Miroku Shōmoshō Wayaku” in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū, No. 6, pp. 210–190. For an historical consideration of the date of the composition of this chapter, see my “A Consideration of the Byam suś kyi leḥ from the Historical Point of View” in The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. XXIV, No. 1, Dec. 1975. It appears that Asaṅga at least knew about the existence of a Prajnāpāramitā passage similar to this chapter.

5 E. Lamotte, La somme du grand véhicule d’Asanga, I, pp. 37–38; II, pp. 120–122.

6 On vaipulya see my article “Asarina no Seitenkan — Abhidharma-samuccaya no dharmavinścaya sho ni tsuite” in Sōtōshū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō, No. 4, pp. 26–30. It is here probably not the name of a particular sūtra. Also confer Aramaki Noritoshi, “Shōda jōron no Etakishō” (Paratantra-svabhāva in the Mahāyānasamgraha) in Indogaku Shironshū, IV–V, pp. 49–50.

7 For the terms vaivālaya and prakṛti see Ratnagotravibhāga (Johnston ed., p. 80, II, 15–16): “Tatra viśuddhiḥ samāsato dvividhiḥ/prakṛti-viśuddhis vaivālaya-viśuddhiṣca.” In the thought of the Ratnagotravibhāga everything is explained by the relationship between these two, but in Vījñaptimārtatā the further two categories of mārga-vyavadāna and ālambana-vyavadāna fulfill an important role.

8 The Madhyāntavibhāga quotes this verse, and attributes it to the Abhidharmasūtra:
Māyādi-desanā bhūte kalpitān nāsti-desanā/ catuvridha-visuddhes tu parinīpanna-desanā/ sūddhiṣ prakṛti-vaimalyam ālambanam ca margata/ visiddhānām hi dharmanām catuvridha-grhītām. (Yamaguchi ed., p. 112)

9 See Hattori Masaaki, “Dignāgra no Hannyakyo Kaishaku” in Osaka-fūritsu Daikagaku Kiyō (Jimbun-shakai Kagaku), vol. 9, pp. 128–129. The same author indicates the verse in Dignāga’s Prajñāpāramitāpīdārtha (E. Frawallwer ed. WZKO, III, p. 142), which parallels the verse quoted in the above note: prajñāpāramitāyām hi trīn sāmāṣ – rīya desanā/kalpitām parantarām ca parinīpannm eva ca// nāstīty-ādi-padaḥ sarvam kalpitām vinivāryate/ māyopamādi-dṛṣṭāntiḥ parantarāsya desanā// caturdhā vyavādānena parinīpanna-kīrtanam/prajñā-pāramitāyām hi nāṇyā bud- dhasya desanā. This same verse is alluded to in Jñānāsīrmitra’s Sākārasiddhiśāstra and in his Sākārasamgrahasastra (A. Thakur ed., Jñānasīrmitrani-bandhava, p. 5050, p. 549). Note that in place of the Mahāyānasamgraha’s vaipulya, the term prajñāpāramitā is used.

10 yang gang du nam po bzhis po de dag las gang yang rung ba zhiig bstan pa ni theg pa chen po ste/ yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo ston pa yin no shes ’di ltar rig par bya’o // (P. ed., No 555 l, lI, 180b6)

11 de la dang po gnyis ni mi ’gyur bar yongs su grub pa nyid kyi yongs su grub pa’o // phyi ma ni phyin ci ma logs par yongs su grub pa yin no // (ibid., 180b6-7)

12 Nirvikāraśāsanī-sampradāyaśīvājanam. (Nagao ed., 41, 1, 22)

13 Paramārtha as practice (pratipatti) is closely related to samvit as practice (pratipatti) in the three kinds of samvit. Since the original term is the same, both are correctly translated as practice. Dependendent on whether this practice is conscious of paramārtasa or not, it is either paramārtha or samvit. Thus in this article pratipatti-paramārtha is rendered as conscious practice, and pratipatti-samvit as unconscious practice.

14 This interpretation of the grammatical forms is found in Bhāvaviveka. See Ejima Yasunori, “Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū” in Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō, No. 51, pp. 116-117, and p. 130.

15 artha-paramārthas tathā paddamasya jñānasyārthā iti kṛtā/ prāpti-paramārtho nirvāṇam paramo ’rtha iti kṛtā/ pratipatti-paramārtho mārggah paramo ’yāthā iti kṛtā/ (MAV, Nagao ed., 41, II. 18-20)

16 prāpti-paramārtho nirvāṇam, ekānta-nirmala-tathātāśraya-paravṛtti-laksanam/ (MAVT, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125, II. 19-20)

17 Vasubandhu’s commentary reads: de yang de bzhin nyid du yod pa yin na sems can thams cad la spyi’i mtschan nyid kyi de ni yod pa nyid kyi phyir chos thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po can zhes gsungs so//' (180a6-7). Asvabhāva’s reads: de bzhin nyid ni gsan du mi ’gyur ba’i phyir chos thams cad kyi spyi mtschan nyid ye/ de nyid la brien nas sems can thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po’o/ zhes gsung rab las ’byung ngo//' (282b1-2). Asvabhāva simply explains tathā as being within prakṛti-vaivyadāna, while Vasubandhu indicates that everything is contained in prakṛti-vaivyadāna, but they appear to be in essential agreement. See Takasaki Jikido, Nyoraičo shisō no Kenkyū, pp. 329–330 for both commentaries.

18 don dam pa ni ye shes mchog gis thob par bya ba’i phyir ro’i (282b34). That which must be realized by transcendent wisdom refers to the object realized (arthā), but not to the realization itself (prāpti). His interpretation of paramārtha means the same as paramasya jñānasyārthā, i.e., the object of the highest wisdom (tattvāra). samvit paramārtha/ (MAV, Yamaguchi ed., p. 124, 1.16)

20 See Fang-kuang Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 140a), Ta-hin Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 413c), Ta Pan-jo (T. 7, p. 422a), and the Tibetan translation of the Pañcavīṃśatisāhasīrīkā (P ed., No. 731, Di, 228b1–3) and the Aṣṭādaśasāhasīrīkā (P ed., No. 732, Phi, 159a2–5). Also confer Conze, The Gilgit Manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasīrīkāprajñāpāramitā II: bodhisattvo

21 For pratipatti-sanvṛti see note 13.

22 trividhā hi samvṛthi praṭipatti-sanvṛthi/ pratipatti-sanvṛthi/ udbhāvanā-sanvṛtī ca/ tayā samvṛti-satyavatāṃ mula-tatve (i.e., svabhāva-traye) yathākramam veditavyam/ (MAV, Nagao ed., p. 41, II. 11–13).


24 ibid., p. 124, II. 22–24.

25 Doctrinal explanations that flow from the pure dharmaḥattu (dharmaḥātunisya) are always revealed from the side of Buddha. That is, original purity, as paramasya jñānasya-arthaḥ, is enunciated from the enlightenment of undefiled purity. Conventional truth as manifestation (udbhāvanā-sanvṛti) implies the unenlightened use of words to refer to parinirvāṇa.

26 de skyed pa'i phyir dmigs pa rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba la de zhes bya ba ni lam dang sbyar te/ byang chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa'o/ (282b7).

27 de skyed pa nyid kyi dmigs pa rnam par byang ba. This translation differs from that in the immediately preceding note, as it is the work of a different translator.

28 For dvādaśāṅga-vacogata see my “Yuishikisetsu ni okeru Ho to Hossō” (Dharma and Dharmaṭa in Viśṇupamitṛatā) in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubun Ronshū, No. 5, p. 157.

29 P ed., No. 5551, Li. 180b2–6.

30 The Mahāyānāvibhāgaśāstra treats the practice (mārga-vyavādāna) of ordinary people before they reach darśana-mārga as follows: “Why does the practice of ordinary people not fail, since it indeed can fail? Because it arises from śrūta-vāsanā, which is the outflow of the most pure dharmaḥattu.” (kathāṃ viparyastā satī, aviparyāsanukāla bhavati/ suvīsuḥdha-dharmaḥattu-nisyanāyaḥ śrūta-vāsaṇāyā uppannāt). (Yamaguchi ed., p. 186, II. 5–7) Thus conscious practice, as unfailing, establishes mārga-vyavādāna.

31 See note 65.


33 In Viśṇupamitṛatā, non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāṇa) is defined as the denial of the five conditions, i.e., the severance of the five marks. See Dharmadharmaṭavibhāga (Yamaguchi Susumu’s “Mirokuzō Ho-Hossō Fumetsuron,” in Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyōgaku Bunshū, I, p. 189 and pp. 195–196, note 17). Also Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte ed., ch. VIII, sec. 2), Abhidharmasmuccaya (D ed., No. 4049, 74a 40, and Abhidharmasmuccayabhasya (Taita ed., p. 139, II. 10–26).

34 It is in this regard that tattvaḥparyabhedha-jñāṇa takes as its object nirvikalpa-jñāṇa. See note 67, which deals with Asvabhāva’s commentary on the Mahāyānasutratālakāra.


38 Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter 11, section 21; Abhidharmasmuccayabhasya (N. Taita ed., pp. 137–139, chapter IV, section 195b).

39 Paśyātām kalpanā-mātraṃ sarvam etad yathoditaṃ/ akalpabodhisattvānāṃ prāptā bodhir nirūpyatetel/ (Lévi ed., p. 49).

40 Both the commentary of Sthiramati (P ed., No. 533 l, Mi, 161b8–162a3) and that of Asvabhāva (P ed., No. 5530, Bi, 84b3–4) are identical.
In Paramārtha’s translation, Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya reads: From these ten points, we devolve the three virtues, viz., the unequalled object, the unequalled practice, and the unequalled result. (T. 31, p. 156a) The Tibetan version, Don gsang ba rnam par phyre ba bsdzus te bshad pa (P ed., No. 5553, Li. 359b3–6) has: the essence of practice is divided into six kinds of (3) entering (praveśa), (4) cause-result (hetu-phala), (5) the distinctions of their practice (bhāvanā-prabheda), and (6–7–8) the three learnings (śīṣṇa-traya). The object (dmigs-pa, alambana) is referred to as (1) the basis of the knowable (jñeyaśraya), and (2) the characteristic of the knowable (jñeyalakṣana). The characteristic of the knowable, as that which is to be known with certitude, is the actual real (dngos su rang gi ngo bso) known object. The basis of the knowable is the object as point of support. The result of such practice are the two pre-eminent elements of severance and wisdom, and thus they are explained last. The underlying theme of the above passage is The Discourse on the Mahāyāna Object, Practice, and Result.

42 See note 10.


44 gnys ka med na yongs su grub pa shin tu ‘grub pa ma yin nam zhe na/ rang bzhin gyis rnam par byang ba ni ‘grub kyi/ dri ma med pa’i rnam par byang ba ni med do zhes lan ’debs so/ (282a7–8).

45 anüdkāliko dhātuh sarva-samāśrayah/ tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvānādhigamopī vai/, quoted from the Abhidharmasūtra in the Triṃśikāvi jñāntibhaṣya Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter I, section 1.

46 mang du thos pas bsogs pa’i gnas kun g札i rnam par shes pas bsdzus pa ma yin la/ kun g札i rnam par shes pa litar tsul bzhin yid la byed pas bsdzus pa’i chos rnam kyi sa bon gang yin pa’o. This is cited from chapter III, section 1 of the Mahāyānasamgraha, and reflects the statement of Asariga himself.

47 P ed., No. 5552, Li, 238b8–239a4.

48 Uī Hakujū, in his Shodajoronkenkyū (pp. 214–215), has argued that the original conception of Asanga was that álāya-vijnāna was both pure and impure, and that the notion that it is cause only of defilement began with Asvabhāva and was inherited by Dharmapāla. But Asvabhāva’s passage here reflects Asanga’s statement in the Mahāyānasamgraha, and thus the understanding of álāya as cause only of defilement does go back to Asariga.

49 Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter I, section 46; Lamotte, II, p. 66: “Is the permeation of hearing (śruta-vāsana) comprised in álāya-vijnāna or not? If it is comprised in álāya, then how could it be the seed, which disciplines (pratipakṣa) that consciousness? But if it is not so comprised, then what is the ground (i.e. foundation) (āśraya) for such a permeation of hearing?”

50 For example, chapter I, section 4 of Mahāyānasamgraha quotes the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra verse on ādāna, a synonym for álāya: ādāna-vijnāna gambhīra-sukṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvāvijayo/ bālāna esṣo mayi na prakāṣī mā hāvā atmā parikalpaṇeyuḥ// Also see note 52.

51 The Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter I, section 58, distinguishes three characteristics of álāya: verbal permeation (abhilāpa-vāsanā), permeation of belief in self (ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā), and permeation of the elements of existence (bhavāṅga-vāsanā). Abhilāpa-vāsanā is the basis of nine of the eleven manifestations (vijñāpātri) herein described, while the other two correspond to ātmadṛṣṭi- and bhavāṅga-vāsanās.

52 The famous parable of the group of blind men and the elephant in chapter I of MS, section 20, expresses the difficulty of knowing álāya-vijnāna. (See Udāna, VI, 4, pp. 68–69) The group of blind men selectively extract parts of the elephant. But, even by gathering them together, they are unable to know the whole of the elephant. In order to know the whole, just as it is, it must be given in direct insight.
54 dīr ma med pas rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba ni tshig de nyid kyis bshad zin toli
55 P ed., No. 555 I, Li, 180a7–8.
56 MĀVṬ, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125; cited in note 16.
57 tatra bodhīkatāma, samāsāto dvividham ca prahānam dvividham ca jñānam bodhir ity ucyate. tatra dvividham prahānam kleśāvaranam jñeyāvaranam ca. dvividham punar jñānam yat kleśāvarana-prahāna ca nirmalam sarva-kleśa-nirvaddhāja-jñānam jñeyāvarana-prahāna ca yat sarvasmin jñeyo apratihatam anāvaranajñānam. (Bodhisattvabhūmi, Wogihara ed., p. 88, II. 1–7)
59 Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra, IX, verse 3 (Lévi ed., p. 33).
60 For these six meanings, see Takasaki Jikido, “Description of the Ultimate Reality by means of the Six Categories in Mahāyāna Buddhism,” in The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. IX, No. 2, pp. 24–33.
61 These words are translated as don rnam pa bdom in the Tibetan translation of Shirmati’s commentary. They are probably cited from the Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra, but I have been unable to locate the reference.
62 In place of “all the sūtras” Shirmati has Gzungs kyi bdang phyug go rgyal po, i.e., Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and so forth.
63 From this description, Asvabhāva appears to consider the Buddhabhūmisūtra as the basis of the Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra. Shirmati is in accord with this understanding. However, recently the opposite view has been expressed by Takasaki Jikido in “Hoshin no Ichigenron,” in Hirakawa Akira Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronshū — Bukkyō ni okeru Hō no Kenkyū, p. 239, n. 38.
64 P ed., No. 5530, Bi, 80b5–81a5.
65 In the above cited article (note 63) Takasaki Jikido mentions “the separation of the wisdom aspect from the dharmanahatā per se” and “the separation of the principle from wisdom.” I understand this as the distinction between dharmanahatu and dharmanahatu-visuddhi, i.e., as the distinction between prakṛti-vyavādāna and vaimalyavyavādāna. It is clear that the historical development of this distinction in Yogācāra is of the utmost importance. I think this distinction was first formulated as a description of vaimalya-vyavādāna in the light of prakṛti-vyavādāna, and did not see the basic dharmanahatu-visuddhi as vaimalya-vyavādāna, i.e., as āśraya-parivṛtti. However, when viewed in this manner, vaimalya-vyavādāna becomes absorbed into prakṛti-vyavādāna. The result of such an absorption is that tathātā, i.e., prakṛti-vyavādāna becomes aloof from and unrelated to all dharmas. See my article “Shōjo Hōkai Kö” (Historical Remarks on the Development of Interpretations of Dharmanahatu-visuddhi) in Nanto Bukkyō, No. 37, pp. 1–28.
67 Asvabhāva’s commentary states: “Being tathātā of all dharmas, it is characterized by purity from the two obstacles of passion and knowledge. That is to say, because it is purified from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, it has become pure of them. But what is pure? The tathātā of all dharmas, and because of this we speak of āśraya parivṛtti (gnas yongs su gyur pa) of tathātā. Vastu-jñāna is subsequently attained wisdom (tat-prṣṭhaladhatjañāna). By the word vastu (phenomenal) is meant the paratantric nature of ālaya-vijñāna. Because of this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the ineptitudes of consciousness (dauṣṭhayāśraya-parivṛtti). The radical re-orientation of this paratantric nature is the sphere (gočara) of nirvikalpa-prṣṭhaladbhaja-jñāna, and is not the sphere of any other wisdom. Tad-ālambana-jñāna, the wisdom that intends that as its object, has as its characteristic
the supernatural power (vaśita) that knows not exhaustion, and because of this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the path (mārgāṣraya-parivṛtti). The word tad [of tad-ālambana-jñāna] indicates the dharmadātu mentioned above. As that which is characterized by the abiding that knows no exhaustion, nirvikalpa-jñāna attains that abiding without exhaustion in uathatā, because it freely, abidingly, and universally operates. Prsthalaabhā-jñāna intends as its object that which is unfailing, and attains abiding without exhaustion in regard to paratantra-svabhāva.” (81a5–b6) See my article “Sanshu Tenne Kō” (On the Triple Āsraya-parivṛtti) in Bukkyō-gaku, No. 2, esp. pp. 57–58.

68 See quotation in note 41.

69 Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter IX, section 1. Also confer chapter X, section 1.

70 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, Lamotte ed., Chapter X, section 2, p. 149. The Mahāyānasamgraha, chapter I, section 10, explains that the reason why ālaya, i.e. ādāna-vijñāna is not presented to śrāvakās is because this term “refers to a subtle object. Śrāvakās do not venture to know all knowable objects (sarvajñeya). Thus, without it being presented to them, they realize wisdom. Because they realize vimukti-kāya, it need not be presented to them. But bodhisattvas do venture to know all objects, and thus it is presented to them. For, if they did not know it, it would not be easy to realize the wisdom of all wisdoms (sarvajñafñāna).”

71 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, IX, section 28 (Lamotte ed., p. 145, i. 33) appears to be the first instance.

72 Asaṅga’s statement in note 51 appears to be the first instance.
1. Critique of realism

Introduction

The doctrine of ālaya-consciousness (vijñāna) is a theory which accounts for the formation of mental images without dependence on external objects. “Ālaya” is a derivative of the verb “ā-lī,” which means “settle down upon” or “abide in” something and connotes a “dwelling,” “receptacle” or “storehouse.” For example, “himālaya” means “storehouse of snow.” The ālaya-consciousness is said to be a storehouse in which the residual force (vāsanā) of all previous experiences has been stored up as latent impressions. The Vijñānavāda theory is that an image appears when the latent residual force of experience is actualized, and that this image is not formed by the cognition of an external object. This theory makes clear that empirical cognition is karmic and stresses the need to find an absolute knowledge which transcends the level of empirical cognition. This Vijñānavāda theory, which denies the existence of external entities as objects of cognition, naturally invites the opposition of all schools which took a realist position. In responding to that opposition and criticizing realism, the Vijñānavāda thinkers firmly established their own representationalist epistemology. In the philosophical tradition of Abhidharma, they developed extremely subtle theories with regard to the problems raised in epistemology.

A criticism of realism is to be found in a coherent form in the Vimsatikā. It is believed that Vasubandhu, after criticizing the various theories of realism in this small work, then wrote the Trimśikā, which expounds the theory of “the transformation of consciousness” (vijñāna-parināma). This dispute between the Vijñānavādins and the various schools of realism was repeated again and again in later periods, but the main points of the dispute can already be seen in Vasubandhu’s exposition in the Vimsatikā. Subsequently, Dignāga wrote the Ālambanaparikṣā, in which he clarified the necessary conditions of an object of cognition, based on Vasubandhu’s explanations. He also criticized realism from
the same perspective, providing the basis for Vijñānavāda epistemology. The theory that he expounds in this text became the basis for all later philosophical discussions concerning the object of cognition. In the following discussion, I will use these two works in order to clarify the nature of Vijñānavāda epistemology.

Four questions and responses

In the beginning of the Vimsatikā, Vasubandhu quotes this passage from the Hua Yen Sutra (Dasabhūmika Section, T. 278). “Oh Jinaputra (Sons of the Buddha), in reality the Triple World is Mind-Only,” and then expounds the Vijñānavāda theory that all the things of this world, like the net-shaped hairs that appear in the illusion of a man suffering from a vision disorder, are unreal, and exist only as images. Four questions are raised by the opponents of this theory.

If external objects are not real, and images result from the residual force of experience which is latent in the mind, then:

1. Why is it that the image of a certain thing occurs only in a specific place and not anywhere?
2. Moreover, why does the image in that place occur only at a specific time, and not at any time?
3. The illusion of a non-existent hair occurs only for the person with a visual disorder, and not for other people. In contrast, the image of a given thing does not occur for only one person, but occurs in the minds of all the people who are in the same place and time. How is this explained?
4. Such things as appear in the illusion of a person with a vision disorder and as are seen in a dream do not, in fact, have efficacy. If, in a dream, one is bitten by a snake or injured by a weapon, it would not be the case that, on waking, poison is circulating in the body or that a scar remains. However, what is presented as images when one is awake actually achieves efficacy. How are these things to be explained?

Vasubandhu answers these objections in the following manner:

(1, 2) The fact that images occur within the limits of space and time does not necessarily presuppose the fact that what is presented as images really exists in an external world. This is because in a dream, although there is no real object, such images as a flower garden, a man, or a woman, are seen only in a certain specific place. Moreover, they are not seen at any time in that place, but only at a certain specific time.

(3) All those who have fallen into the state of ravenous ghosts as a result of deeds done in a previous existence, when facing a river flowing with pure water, together embrace the image of a river filled with pus, urine and excrement, and of the existence of watchmen, who
are not actually there, on guard with cudgels and swords in their hands. Consequently, just because an image occurs in the minds of more than one person, there is no reason to admit the existence of objects in the external world.

(4) Wet dreams occur as a result of sexual intercourse experienced in a dream; which is to say that even non-existent things do, in fact, achieve efficacy.

Vasubandhu goes on to explain all four of these points using the following hell simile. Sinners who have fallen into hell see such things as those who inflict punishment on them, and see iron mountains which press in to crush them. Moreover, not just one, but all persons see these things. Thus, although such things as tormentors do not really exist, the sinners in hell are actually made to suffer.

The Sarvāstivādins believe that the demons, etc., are real, but this cannot be said to be a valid opinion because the demons do not feel the torments inflicted on the sinners. On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas regard the demons, etc., as no more than subjective images, but they do not completely deny the reality of those images as do the Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vādins. They say this is because the sinners in hell produce certain kinds of material elements by means of the remaining force of deeds committed in the past, and these cause images of cudgel-wielding demons and groves of iron trees which torment sinners with their thorns. In his criticism of the Sautrāntika view Vasubandhu leads us into the Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vāda theories. The latent residual force of action permeates the stream of consciousness of the actor and does not exist outside of that stream. Consequently, instead of hypothesizing that the residual force produces material elements outside of the mind, it is more valid to think that when this residual force becomes actual, and a specific transformation occurs in the stream of consciousness, images of demons, etc. appear.

If we assume that images produced in the mind are things that arise from specific transformations of the stream of consciousness, and that objects which produce images do not really exist in an external world, then our daily experiences can be compared to a dream. Vasubandhu does, in fact, use the simile of a dream in replying to the questions raised by his critics. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers after him also recognized that the dream consciousness that sees unreal objects was an apt simile and made repeated use of it.

However, it might be objected that because the objects seen in a dream disappear when we are awake, we know clearly that they are not real. It might also be objected that we do not experience objects seen when we are awake in the same way we experience dream objects.

Responding to these questions, Vasubandhu says, “A person who is not yet awake does not realize the fact that the objects seen in a dream are not real.” A dreaming person does not know that the objects that appear in his own consciousness do not actually exist. The daily experience of the people of the world
is also the same. Because people have continued to hold, from past lives, the mistaken conception that external objects exist, they fall into the deep sleep of that latent residual force and do not realize that such objects do not, in fact, exist. However, when our knowledge of the mundane world has been purified through the eye-opening attainment of an imageless transmundane knowledge which counteracts the latent residual force, we awaken to the fact that the object does not really exist.

Vasubandhu's response clearly reveals that VijnanaVada philosophy has as its basic theme the awakening from dreamlike empirical cognition and the attainment of transmundane knowledge. The fact that empirical cognition is common to all people does not mean that such cognition is correct; it means no more than that people have the same dream because of similar karma in former lives. It was not the purpose of the VijnanaVada thinkers to inquire into the grounds of empirical cognition, given the fundamental fact that such cognition is characterized by a universal consensus. They understood all of empirical cognition as karma, and concertedly focused on finding a position which transcended karma. The analogy of dreams, ravenous ghosts and hell points to a position that transcends the level of the realists' discussion of the structure of cognition. However, subordinating this religious aspect within their argument, the VijnanaVada school stood on the same level as the realists and pursued the investigation of epistemological problems.

Three types of realism

In the Vimshatikā, Vasubandhu divided the theories that the object of cognition actually exists in the external world into three types. These theories are first divided into two types depending on whether the externally existent object of cognition is understood as a composite body formed from various parts, such as a jar which is made up of a neck, main body and foot, or whether it was understood as a unitary thing. If we push to its logical conclusion the position in which a single material body is understood as a composite body, by repeatedly dividing the various parts that make up the composite body into their respective parts until the dividing is carried to its limit, we will arrive at the atom (paramānu). In the case in which numerous atoms are recognized as composing a single composite body, there are two more theories, depending on the way in which the atoms are arranged. Thus Vasubandhu presents the following three theories. That which is believed to exist externally as an object of cognition is one of the following:

1. a unitary thing such as the whole hypothesized by the Vaiśeṣika, or
2. a collection of atoms which have not congealed, and thus have spaces between them, as viewed by the Sarvāstivādins, or
3. a thing that has achieved a single, coarse form, not apparent in a unitary atom, many atoms having assembled without spaces, as in the Sautrāntika theory.
Through successive refutation of these three types of realism Vasubandhu establishes the Vijñānavāda theory. The important points of his critique of realism are as follows:

1. A unitary thing does not exist anywhere as a whole distinct from its various parts.
2. Since, without spatial extension, individual atoms would not be cognizable, then even if many came together, they still could not become an object of cognition.
3. Since it is not possible to demonstrate the fact that the atom is a single substance, it also could not be demonstrated that the numerous atoms which have come together comprise an aggregation with a coarse form.

**Vaiśeṣika realism**

The theory of the Vaiśeṣika and their offshoot, the Nyāya school, is that the whole which is composed of many parts exists as a unitary entity, distinct from its parts. For example, a cloth exists as something different from the threads which make it up, and a jar exists as a unitary substance different from the two bowl-shaped pieces from which it is made. The cloth and the jar are considered not to be simply a combination of the respective material causes, but to exist as something newly created from, and independent of, the combination of these causes.

This Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine runs counter to the Buddhist position that all entities are the combination of various factors. Nāgārjuna criticized this Nyāya view in his *Vaidalya-prakārana,* where he argued that the whole does not exist separate from the parts. Vasubandhu’s denial of the whole follows Nāgārjuna’s argument. It is on this question of the whole and the parts that we can clearly see the difference between the Buddhist and the realist views of reality.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believed that concepts and the words which signify them are all real things. In technical terms these are called the “padārtha” (word-meaning) where “artha” is the externally existent referent of words. For example, corresponding to the word “cow,” there exists a substance (dravya), cow, and corresponding to words such as “white” or “walking” attributed to that cow, are the real quality (guna), white (color), and the real activity (karma), walking. Further, since “cow” can be used to refer to white cows or spotted cows, standing cows or walking cows, there also exists as its referent a cow-in-general—that is, universality (sāmānya) which makes all cows cows. At the same time, there also exists particularity (viśeṣa) to distinguish the referent of “cow” from horses, etc. Because white (color) and walking, universality and particularity are combined with the substance in an inseparable relationship, this relationship also exists, and is called “inherence” (samavāya). Hence, the judgment, “this cow is white” corresponds to a real state in which the quality referred to by “white” inheres in the substance referred to by “cow.”
In this way, the Vaiśeṣika divide what exists as “word referents” into six categories: substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, and inherence (or necessary relation). These six are given in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, which outlines the school’s system. Whereas these six all correspond to positive concepts, a seventh category of “non-existence” (abhāva) was added in later times to correspond to negative concepts. So, for example, the sentence, “The cow is not in the cowshed,” refers to the non-existence in the cowshed of the cow; and the sentence, “The cow is not a horse,” refers to the non-existence in the horse of the cow.

 Needless to say, among these “word referents” it is substance which occupies the central place: the others exist as factors inhering in and limiting the substance. There is no white color independent of something such as a cow or a piece of cloth. Neither is there any walking which does not inhere in some substance. Substance too, however, does not exist as pure substance. It always exists determined by its qualities, etc.: a cow is white, black or some other color; it is walking, standing, etc. As mentioned earlier, the word “cow” refers to a corresponding substance, cow. But while the word or concept “cow” can refer to all cows, the substance we cognize is always some particular cow, and not cows in general. Buddhists, therefore, argue that “cow” is a general concept constructed by the subject through the operation of abstraction from a plurality of individuals; it does not correspond to any real entity. The Vaiśeṣika position, however, is that the universal, cowness, which makes all the particular substances, cows, exists independently of the subject. And it is because the substance is determined by this universal that we grasp it as a cow. This individual substance restricted by the cowness is also determined by qualities, actions, and the other categories.

**Substance**

According to the Vaiśeṣika theory, then, the object of our cognition is the substance as determined by the various other categories; the cognition of quality, actions, and so on always presupposes the cognition of some substance. Since what is cognized is a “word referent,” we can express it through language. Words, according to the Vaiśeṣika (theoreticians), are signs established by the ancients to transmit concepts derived from the cognition of entities. Praśastapāda (sixth century) in his systematic treatise on Vaiśeṣika, Padārthadharmasamgraha, says that reality has three aspects: existing, being verbally expressed, and being the object of cognition; in the Vaiśeṣika system these three are essentially indistinguishable. What exists is what is expressed by language, and language expresses what is perceived.

The perceived substance is expressed by words such as “cow,” “cloth,” and “jar.” The substance directly cognized is simply “this,” but, because at the same time we also cognize the determining universal, cowness, “this” becomes perceived and expressed as “something possessing the cowness”—i.e., as “cow.”
Similarly, because we simultaneously cognize the determinant of quality and action, “this” becomes perceived as “a white cow” or as “a walking cow,” and can be expressed in sentences such as, “This cow is white,” or “This cow is walking.” One substance can also serve as a limiting factor for another substance. For example, the expressions, “This cow has a horn,” or “He has a stick,” are based on the cognition of a cow determined by a horn or of a man determined by a stick.

The Vaiśeṣika divide substances (dravya) into nine types: earth (prthivi), water (jala), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), ether (ākāśa), space (dik), time (kāla), soul (ātman), and mind (manas). These substances, moreover, are divided into those which are made up of a plurality of elements and those which are not. Substances that are not composed of elements are the five from ether on and the individual atoms of earth, water, fire, and air. When these atoms combine they make new substances which are separate, individual entities, possessing their own existence, and capable of being expressed by their own specific terms. Thus, atoms are called “causal substances” and the entities produced by their combination are called “resultant substances.” Moreover, those “resultant substances” themselves can combine to produce new substances. Thus, independent of the torso, legs, tail, etc. there exists the substance, cow, and independent of the threads there exists the substance, cloth. The referents of the words “cow” or “cloth” exists as an individual whole separate from their respective parts.

Uddyotakara gives the following argument for the reality of the whole. If the whole is not something other than the sum of the parts, and does not have its own existence different from these parts, then we could not perceive, for example, a tree in the garden as a “tree.” What we actually cognize is only the part of the tree facing us; we do not cognize the other side or the interior of the tree. Nevertheless, we can perceive as a “tree” the object of our cognition. The reason for this is that the whole, “tree,” is present in the part we cognize. He also gives the following examples. If we pull one part of a cloth, we pull the whole cloth; if we hold one part of a jar, we hold the whole jar. This would not be possible if the cloth and jar were only the sum of their parts. If we pull or lift one part of a pile of dust, for example, we do not thereby pull or lift the whole. Thus, we see the “cloth” and “jar” are present in the parts as separate single wholes.

Substance does not exist

In opposition to the Vaiśeṣika’s viewpoint that concepts and words all correspond to reality, Buddhists are of the opinion that what is expressed by words is not real and that words are only signs made for the purpose of daily functioning. What we express by a word such as “cow” or “man” is no more than a temporary collection of various elements which does not have existence as a thing in itself. From the beginning, Buddhists took the position that human existence was an aggregation of five types of physical and mental elements (the five skandhas), and denied any human substance outside of these elements. The aggregation of
elements, changing its aspect moment after moment, forms a stream. Eventually the collected elements disperse. There is no human existing as the substance corresponding to any such name.

In *The Questions of King Milinda*, a dialogue between the Bactrian king, Menander, and the Buddhist monk, Nāgasena, there is a passage in which Nāgasena employs a skillful simile to show that the substance, man, does not exist. To the King’s question, “What, Sir, is your name?” Nāgasena replies that as far as people of the world are concerned, he is Nāgasena, but that “Nāgasena” is merely an appellation, and there is no personal substance corresponding to it. The king is doubtful and raises the objection that if there is no personal substance, then there is no one who controls his conduct, no one who devotes himself to spiritual cultivation, no one who experiences the holy state; and there is no one who kills, steals, or commits any other of the Five Major Transgressions. The consequence of such a position is, therefore, a complete denial of good and evil deeds, as well as the fruit of such deeds. Then, thinking that without some entity to which it referred there could be no name, the King inquired to what entity the name “Nāgasena” has been given: is it the hair of the head? the hair of the body? the skin? the flesh? the nerves? the bones? the heart? the liver? blood? the brain? is it all of these combined? is it something other than these? In response to these questions, Nāgasena, taking the chariot in which the king has come as an example, now questions the King:

> “Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is the chariot?”
>
> “I did not say that.”
>
> “Is it the axle that is the chariot?”
>
> “Certainly not.”
>
> “Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?”
>
> And to all these he still answered no.
>
> “Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?”
>
> “No, Sir.”
>
> “But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?”
>
> And still he answered no.

> “Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is a falsehood that your majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no such thing as a chariot!”

In this way, the king who had intended to press Nāgasena with his questions is himself pressed by the same questions, and in the end, arrives at the position Nāgasena had wanted to take.

> “I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things—the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad—that it comes under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of ‘chariot.’”

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“Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of ‘chariot.’ And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned me about—the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five constituent elements of being—that I come under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of ‘Nāgasena.’"

This simile is quite famous, and is found in the Saṁyuttanikāyā. Candrakīrti too, in his commentary to the Madhyamakakārikā, uses this simile of the chariot to explain the concept of “dependent origination,” in which all things exist only in relation to others, and do not possess own-being.

The Sarvāstivāda view

The Buddhist theory that a thing that is made up of many components is only tentatively referred to by a single name, and that no substance corresponding to names exists clearly differs from the Vaiśeṣika view that there is a unitary whole separate from its composite parts and indicated by a word. Yet, even if we accept as non-existent the thing which is given a name, can’t we assume that the components really exist? Even if there is no such substance as a chariot, do not the shafts, axles, and wheels which compose it exist? If we take it that even they exist as something in name only, and are not real, what ultimately exists? The answer to such questions is laid out in the philosophical system of the Abhidharma.

The Sarvāstivādins recognize as ultimate entities 75 kinds of elements (dharma-s), divided into five groups: material entities (rūpa), thought (citta), thought functions (mentals, caitasika), things dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktasamskāra), and unconditioned things (asamskṛta). They are not something produced from other elements, nor can they be changed by other elements, nor are they things which ever loose their own inherent characteristic. For example, fire, a primary element, exists independently of other elements, does not lose its own homogenous nature, and has the inherent characteristics of heat. Water in a pot placed on a stove becomes hot, and a hot wind blows on a burning desert, but the water’s heat and the wind’s heat are something imparted by the fire of the stove and the sun, and if those conditions should cease to exist the heat is lost. Consequently in both the wind and the water heat is not an inherent characteristic. On the other hand, the heat of fire is never lost under any conditions. The primary element of fire which possesses heat is an ultimately existent element.

There seems to have been a problem about whether the number of ultimately existent elements counted by the Sarvāstivadins is seventy-five or not, but the various treatises of this school are united on the point of making of material entities eleven types. The eleven types are the five organs of cognition (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body-organ of touch awareness), the five objects of these organs (color-shape, sound, odor, taste, and tactile sense data) as well as unmanifested form. The cognitive organs of eye and ear, etc. are said to be a kind of
matter that is translucent and invisible, having the function of seeing and hearing, etc., and are called special transformations of the primary elements (bhūtavikāraviśeṣa), earth, water, fire, and air. Whereas we would regard these cognitive organs to be distinct from the visible bodily organs, such as the eyeball and ear orifice, within which they reside, the Sarvāstivādins considered them to be special material organs in their own right. The unmanifested form is the potential force remaining after the bodily activity which was manifested as form, and the potential force remaining after the function of words which were manifested as sound; it is a material substance which is invisible and which does not vie with other elements.

The five kinds of objects, other than the four primary elements themselves, are all made from the primary elements. Thus, we must first take note of the distinctive view of the Sarvāstivādins concerning the primary elements. According to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (dhātu-nirdeśa),\(^{12}\) the primary elements are earth, water, fire, and air, but they, being included under tactile sense data (tangibles) within the five kinds of objects, are not deemed to be color-shape (rūpa). Earth is hardness, not a hard thing. Water is dampness, not a damp thing. Similarly, fire is warmth and wind is motion. Here the primary elements are not being thought of as material causes of concrete matter, but as characteristics possessed by substances.

In the earlier texts, earth is clearly revealed to be a hard substance. If we consider this hard substance in terms of the human body, it is hair, nails, teeth, etc., and in terms of the external world, rocks, tiles and pebbles, etc. Water in people is sweat, tears, urine, etc., and again in the external world, such things as rain and dew, or wine and milk. However, in the Mahāvibhāṣā\(^{13}\) there gradually arises the tendency to abstract from these concrete substances those tangible properties which they possess, namely, hardness, dampness, etc., and it is here that the interpretation of the four primary elements are hardness, dampness, warmth, and motion clearly appears.

This tendency of Sarvāstivāda to abstract things is seen in its interpretation of the four primary elements, as well in its interpretation of the five kinds of objects. Color-shape (rūpa) is divided into color as such (varṇa), and form (samsthāna); the former are of four types, blue, yellow, red, and white, to which is added shadow, light, brightness, darkness, cloudiness, smokiness, dustiness, and fogginess, making twelve types altogether; the latter (shape) is of eight types, long, short, square, round, convex, concave, straight, and crooked. Sound, smell, and taste are divided into eight, four, and six types respectively. Tactile sense data totals eleven types since, besides the four primary elements, there are seven types, such as smoothness and roughness. The colors blue, yellow, etc., the forms, long, short, square, round, etc., sound, smell, taste, and tactile sense data are attributes of matter, and are not to be thought of as material entities in themselves. A blue thing, a round thing, or a thing that makes a sound has a definite mass and exists as impenetrable (sa-pratigha) matter, occupying a space corresponding to its mass, but it is difficult for us to conceive of a blue color, a
round shape, an emitted sound, etc. existing as such matter. They are attributes of matter, grasped by the functions of seeing and hearing. The Sarvāstivādins, taking an epistemological point of view, abstracted from concrete matter the attributes corresponding to each of the cognitive functions of the subject, and considered these to be material entities. In this way, concrete matter is analyzed into color and form, etc., down through tactile sense data.

Atom theory

If we carry to its logical conclusion the Sarvāstivāda theory which analyzes material existence into elements such as color and shape, etc., then the fact that matter has spatial extension becomes inexplicable. If we assume that color and shape, themselves, have extension, then there couldn’t be any shape where there is color, and in the space occupied by shape, there would be no room for tactile sense data to enter. It would be impossible to appreciate a celadon porcelain jar’s feeling of smoothness while enjoying its color. However, the Sarvāstivādins did not carry their logic to the point of denying that matter is extended. They did think of material entities as having spatial extension. It is in their atom theory that this way of thinking can be seen.

All material entities are aggregation of atoms (paramāṇu). The four primary elements are no exception to this. The individual atoms has no extension, but atoms do not exist alone; even the particles of dust floating in the sun’s rays which shine through a window are “assembled atoms” and have extension. Atoms are not homogeneous. The atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind each differ in substance. Colors and shapes, etc. are things made up of the four primary elements, and colors are thought to be collections of color atoms and shapes collections of shape atoms. Thus, when something in the external world is cognized, even in the case of the simplest inorganic substance, it is said to be cognized as a synthesis of at least eight elements, the four primary elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, and color-shape, odor, taste, and tactile sense data. In cases of a thing possessing the organs of touch (body), sight, hearing, etc., or again of a thing which emits sound, to these eight are added other elements corresponding to the respective cases. Quantitative differences in a thing originate from qualitative differences of the atoms. The hardness of a certain thing is because the power of the earth atoms of that thing is greater than the others. If one mixes cracked barley and salt together and tastes it, only the salty taste will be sensed, not the taste of the barley. In the same way, it is said that when the atoms of the eight kinds of elements are combined, if the strength of the earth atom is greater than that of the other atoms, only hardness will be sensed.

As the preceding explanation shows, the Sarvāstivādins did not think that the characteristics of hardness, dampness, warmth, and movement, or color and shape, etc. existed in themselves. What exists as a cognizable object is made up of eight elements, and has spatial extention. Tactile sense data such as hardness, etc. and color-shape, etc. represent conceptual abstractions from concretely
existing things and are elements corresponding to our cognitive organs. In this way, the Sarvāstivādins reified each of the elements thus abstracted. A concrete material object, a jar made from clay for example, if seen by the sight organ, is a russet color and has a round shape. If felt by the organ of touch, it has a rough, hard feeling. A “jar” is a synthesis of these elements. If the jar falls to the floor, it will be smashed, but the color and shape, etc. remain. Even when that jar ceases to exist, the same color and shape are seen in other jars, and the rough feeling and the hardness also continue to exist somewhere else. Color-shape down through tactile sense data (i.e., the five elementary objects of the cognitive organs) are constant and unchanging, but a concrete material object which is a synthesis of those elements is impermanent and no more than a temporary entity.

The atom is the limit in the division of the spatial extension of matter. The quantitative mode of matter is determined by the aggregation of atoms, but the qualitative mode is not. If the atoms composing a body are many, that body will be large, and if the atoms are few, it will be small, but the sensation of hardness exists in both a great boulder and a small stone, and white color exists in both a piece of cloth and a strand of thread. The Vaiśeṣika considered the atom to be the “substance” (dravya), and clearly distinguished it from attributes such as color and tactile sense data. In the theory of the Sarvāstivādins, both substance and attribute are combined. It can be called a mixing of two points of view, the epistemological view which analyzes matter into separate sense data, and the ontological view which cuts matter off from the subject and grasps it as entities having a definite mass. The epistemological view is given preference in the Sarvāstivādin position, which except for unmanifested form, takes the five organs of cognition and their objects as material existence. The atom theory was originally not a Sarvāstivādin theory and seems to have been adopted from the Vaiśeṣikas about the time of the Mahāvibhāṣā. This means that, because matter is grasped in terms of its qualitative distinctions by the various organs of cognition, the Sarvāstivādins recognized qualitative distinctions even in the atom which was basically the limit of quantitative analysis, thus harmonizing the atom theory with their theory.

Problems in the Sarvāstivādin theory

Concerning the whole and its parts, there is no intrinsic problem in the preceding theoretical position of the Sarvāstivādins. The concept of the whole and its parts is a general concept concerning the quantitative mode of matter. The bowl shape is part of the jar, but the jar’s color and tactile sense data are not its parts. If seen from a distance, an army composed of many troops, war chariots, elephants, horses, etc., or a forest in which all sorts of trees are collected is a single color and a single shape.

The view that a thing composed of many elements is only an appearance and not real runs throughout the Sarvāstivādin philosophy. There does not exist
anywhere the substance of a person corresponding to a given name. But the special characteristic of the Sarvāstivādin theory is that it regards the elements that compose a thing to be what is grasped by each organ of cognition, for example, color, shape, tactile sense data, etc., and not the parts of the entity as a whole, for example, the shaft, axle, etc. of the chariot. The Sarvāstivādins are of the opinion that a thing such as a jar or a cloth is a synthesis of various sense data and is, therefore, only a temporary entity, but that the sense data of color, shape, etc. really exist. Color and shape which are visible by virtue of the organ of vision are considered real because they possess the capacity to produce visual cognition. Thus, while treating as real the product of the analysis into discrete sense data of material entities that have the capacity to produce cognition ("doors of cognition"), the Sarvāstivādins also adopt a heterogeneous atom theory that is problematic for their position. For if color and shape are held to be collections of their respective atoms, then they cannot be real and will have no more than a provisional existence. A unitary atom is not something that can be seen by the organ of vision. It is not a door of cognition. The Sarvāstivādins seem to have held the inconsistent view that both the atom of color and the collection of such atoms are real; it was the Sautrāntikas who established a thoroughly consistent theory with regard to this point.

The Sautrāntika position

The Sautrāntika criticized the Sarvāstivādins on many points, and in the process ended up providing a bridge to Vijñānavādin philosophy. In particular the clarification of the distinction between conceptual entities and entities existing objectively in the external world was the achievement of this school. A detailed discussion of the Sautrāntika position on this point appears in the second chapter of the Abhidhāra-makośa-bhāṣya in the form of a criticism of the Sarvāstivāda. According to the Sautrāntika, among the entities the Sarvāstivādins held to be ultimate elements of existence, the two categories of "things dissociated from thought" (citta-viprayuktasamskāra) and "unconditioned things" (asamskrta) are not real, but merely concepts; for their existence is not known directly by the organs of cognition, as are color, sound, etc., nor do they have a clear function, as do the organs of vision, hearing, etc.

With regard to material entities (rūpa) as well, the Sautrāntika clarified the distinction between reality (paramārtha-sat, "ultimate reality") and appearance (prajñapti-sat, "nominal existence" or saṃवr̥ti-sat "empirical reality") which exists in name only and lacks any reality. In doing so they did not, like the Sarvāstivādins, consider as real what is seen by the organ of vision, such as the blue color or round shape; instead, by understanding as real that which has the efficacy to produce visual cognition, they sought to resolve the difficulties inherent in the Sarvāstivādin atom theory. As expressed in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (dhātu-nirdesa), the Sautrāntika opinion is that what is visible to the eye is the collection of atoms; the individual atoms are by themselves not seen by
the organ of vision, but when collected, each atom becomes the cause of visual cognition. The meaning of the Sautrāntika assumption that, “the aggregate of atoms is no different from the individual atom” should be understood from this point of view.

A real thing must be a unitary thing and possess a single efficacy. The thing which is formed from a mutual connection of many elements, because it would become non-existent if the elements which had joined were separated, is an appearance and unreal. That which is real is the ultimate unit reached by carrying analysis to its limit. The Sarvāstivādins divided the objects of the organ of vision into colors, such as blue, yellow, red, and white, and forms (samsthāna) such as long, short, square and round; but the Sautrāntika denied the reality of form. Form is something produced by the way in which color atoms collect and is appearance.

In the Abhidharma kośa-bhāṣya (āryapudgala-nirdeśa) the distinction between reality and appearance is made as follows: “That thing is an appearance if, when broken, the concept connected with it ceases to exist, as for example in the case of the jar. Likewise, that thing is an appearance if the concept of it ceases to exist when the atoms that compose it, such as color, taste, etc., are mentally abstracted out, as for example in the case of water. Reality is different from that mode of being.”

In other words, if a jar falls to the floor and is smashed, what exists are broken pieces, not the jar. If a cloth is unraveled, there are only the threads, and nothing called “cloth.” Water cannot be destroyed as a jar and cloth can, but because within it exist color, taste, and a cool feeling, it is possible to mentally analyze it into its various elements. If it is analyzed into color atoms, taste atoms, etc., there will exist nothing in addition to these to be called “water.” All such divisible things are appearance; only things that cannot be broken up or mentally analyzed into their components are real.

Samghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra14 quotes exactly this statement of the Abhidharma kośa-bhāṣya, and makes reference to an Elder who expressed what amounts to the same view: “When a thing formed from many components is said to exist, that existence is appearance. Conversely, when a unitary thing is said to exist, that existence is real. When an entity is analyzed, if it loses its former name, it is an appearance. If an entity is analyzed and does not lose its former name, it is real.” The person referred to as the Elder in the Nyāyānusāra is the old Sautrāntika teacher, Śrīlāta, who was active in Ayodhyā, and is said to have written the Vibhāṣā of the Sautrāntika.15 There can be no doubt that the distinction between reality and appearance in the Abhidharma kośa-bhāṣya is the Sautrāntika theory, following in the tradition of Śrīlāta.

**The concept of appearance**

A work that clarifies the Sautrāntika concept of appearance is Dignāga’s *Upādhyaprajñaptiprakarana*.16 This work states that the Sautrāntika considered
the “whole” (avayavin), the “continuum” (saṃtāna), and “modality” (avasthābhedā) to be appearance.

The Whole: If the whole possesses reality, then it must be either different from or the same as the parts which make up the whole. If the whole is not considered different from the parts, then each part is respectively the whole; thus we are led to the illogical conclusion that each part is the same as the other parts. If the body does not differ from the hands and feet, then both the hands and the feet are the body; therefore, the hands and the feet turn out to be the same. However, if on the other hand we consider each individual part making up the whole as differing from it, then a single entity would possess many existences, and this is also illogical. Thus, if the whole is assumed to be a thing possessing reality in itself then it cannot escape contradiction. Nevertheless, in man’s daily experience, what is expressed by words such as “body,” “forest,” or “army,” are not completely non-existent; on the basis of such words they are understood as things existing as wholes. In other words, the whole is not real, but its existence is recognized as appearance, and as such it cannot be said either to be the same as or different from the real parts.

The continuum: If the continuum is the same as what exists in each moment, then the infancy, childhood, etc. of a given person would each be that person’s entire life; and therefore, childhood, youth, maturity, etc. would all be the same as infancy. Moreover, because the person’s entire life would be lost when separated from childhood, human growth could not be admitted. Conversely, if the continuum is different from each individual moment, then it would be completely meaningless for a person now suffering from a fever to attempt to cure it by taking medicine. If we admit reality in the continuum, we are led to such contradictions; however we understand a name, such as Devadatta, as referring to a single person who exists continuously from birth to death. Thus, even though the continuum is not real, in the world of daily experience, its existence is tentatively taken as real.

Modality: A single material entity, according to differences in view-point, is grasped and determined in various modes. If it is being viewed as being a thing formed from the assembly of numerous atoms, then it is determined as being the result of that assembly rather than the cause; if juxtaposed to a permanent entity such as space, then it is determined as impermanent; if juxtaposed to mind which is invisible and without tangibility, it is determined as being a visible and impenetrable entity. In this way various determinations are employed, yet the thing expressed by these determinations is the same material entity. If it is maintained that this material entity must be a different thing from its variously determined modes, then it would not exist in any of these modes; however, if this material entity is taken to be the same as the various modes, then, for the same reason explained in the case of the whole and the continuum, we invite the illogical conclusion that there is absolutely no distinction between modes. Thus, differences of mode also do not exist in this sense, and are nothing but appearances based on differences in determinations.
That which can be established as the same as or different from a real thing must itself be real. The wholes, etc., which cannot be determined to be either the same as or different from their real parts, etc., are not real. Obviously, the relationship of sameness or difference between appearances is not thus denied. The body is not real, but to the extent that it’s existence as appearance is recognized, to say that A’s body differs from B’s is certainly reasonable. However, we cannot consider as analogous the body’s similarity to or difference from the hands and feet. For, in contrast to the hands and feet, which exist in themselves, the body is a temporary construct, having the hands and feet, etc. as its material cause (upādāna); if the material cause is removed, no trace of the body would remain. The real cannot be something which loses its own being when other things related to it are removed or destroyed. A thing which ceases to exist as itself when other elements related to it are removed is an appearance.

In the Upādāyaprājnāptiprakaraṇa, Dignon, while borrowing the concept of appearances from the Sautrāntika, concludes that all things considered as entities in the world of daily experience are appearances, and shifts towards Vijñānavāda thought; but that is not the question before us.

**Vasubandhu’s criticism of realism**

Now let us return to the Vīṃśatikā. The first of the three kinds of realism criticized by Vasubandhu was the Vaiśeṣika theory that the whole is separate from the parts. Vasubandhu’s position, which is critical of this theory, denying the existence of anything like a unitary whole, stands, needless to say, in a philosophical tradition handed down from early Buddhism in which human existence is dissected into its elemental components, and thus denied any substantiability. But it is also possible in particular to see in the background of Vasubandhu’s criticism, the Sautrāntika theory that the “whole” is an appearance.

The second kind of realism is the Sarvāstivādin atom theory. The general nature of that atom theory has already been explained, but the problem here is its unique exposition of the manner in which the atoms assemble. The Sarvāstivādins take the position that when the many atoms assemble and become a visible thing, the separate atoms are merely in the vicinity of one another, and not touching.

The atom, since it is the limit of the division of the spatial extension of matter, has no parts. Accordingly when two atoms touch, it is impossible for a part of each to come into contact. However, if the two atoms are wholly touching each other, then because they would be completely overlapping, they would be exactly the same as a single atom. Thus, the Sarvāstivādins claim that atoms assemble without touching each other.

This explanation raises a simple question. If a piece of cloth, for example, is taken to be many atoms collected without touching each other, and if someone were to take this cloth and shake it, would not the collected atoms be scattered about? Why is it that such a thing does not actually happen? The Sarvāstivādins reply that the element air maintains the collected atoms.
Vasubandhu criticizes this Sarvāstivādin theory, arguing that since the individual atoms are not perceived, even though they collect in numbers they will not become the object of cognition.

What would happen, then, if the atom theory is not employed? If we return to the original Sarvāstivādin position, and regard as the object the color, tactile sense data, etc., corresponding to the individual organs of cognition, then are not such fallacies as the non-cognition of the objects dissolved? However, color and tactile sense data are properties and not things that can be quantitatively analyzed. Vasubandhu points out the failure of the Sarvāstivādin theory on this point.

(1) If we see the earth’s surface as the object of the visual organ, namely, as rūpa, then it is a single, indivisible thing. Thus, it would be impossible to walk the earth’s surface step by step; for, if we advance the foot one step, then we should cover all the earth’s surface within the bounds of vision.

(2) There would be no situations in which one edge of a piece of cloth is grasped and not the other edge. Since the cloth, regarded as white, is without parts it would be impossible to grasp one edge and not grasp all edges at the same time.

(3) Let us assume that a horse and an elephant are in a certain place. In this case, if the place is seen as color, it cannot be divided. Thus, because the place of the elephant and the place of the horse would be the same, it would be impossible to distinguish between the elephant and the horse. Moreover, the space between the elephant and horse is occupied by neither, but that empty place and the places occupied by the elephant and horse would be the same. In other words, there arises the contradiction that in the same place animals both exist and do not exist.

(4) There is no quantitative distinction between colors or shapes. As white color, there is no difference between a small cloth and a large cloth. Accordingly, if we follow the Sarvāstivādin theory, then for example, because even a microscopic water creature would be equivalent to a large thing having the same color and shape, that microscopic creature ought not to be invisible to the eye.

Because objects of cognition are analyzed only qualitatively into such properties as blue, and green or hard and rough, problems like these will arise. Therefore, Vasubandhu says that it is necessary to examine the atom theory which explains an object’s quantitative distinctions. However, as previously shown there are faults in the Sarvāstivādin theory in which atoms assemble without mutual contact.

The third kind of realism is the view that the object of cognition is an aggregation of numerous atoms without gaps between them. This view is presented as the theory of the “Venerable One” (bhadanta) in the dhātu-nirdeśa of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, where Vasubandhu comments that “The Venerable One’s
theory ought to be accepted.” It is not clear who the person called “the Venerable One” is (in one theory, it is the Sarvāstivādin, Dharmatrāta), but this view is close to the Sautrāntika theory seen in later literature. When we consider the fact that Yaśomitra, in his commentary to the Abhidharmakośa-bhaṣya contrasted this view with the Sarvāstivādin view, and the fact that in the Abhidharmakośa-bhaṣya, Vasubandhu is often in agreement with the Sautrāntika theories, it would appear that this atom theory can be attributed to the Sautrāntika. The Sarvāstivādins also held that the atoms were adjacent to one another, but not that they adhere to one another without intervals. According to Yaśomitra’s explanation, they say that there is no room for light to enter between the atoms, but think that there is enough room for other atoms to enter. However, to think that there is space between atoms is to deny the doctrine of the impenetrability of matter. Accordingly, the Sautrāntika said that there is no gap between the collected atoms.

The Viṃśatikā criticizes this Sautrāntika theory, saying that, since in the first place the atoms which are parts of the aggregation cannot be established as a simple substance, it is impossible for numerous atoms to form an aggregation.

If the atoms are regarded as assembled, then because other atoms would be attached at the top, bottom and four sides of a given atom, the atom would have six parts. Something that possesses parts ought to be further divisible, and is not a simple substance. Conversely, if an atom has no parts, a single atom would completely overlap the six other atoms it combines with, and thus the entire body composed of an aggregation of atoms would be the size of a single atom. Hence, not a single thing would be perceived.

Whether atoms are considered to have spatial parts or not, in either case it is impossible to escape an illogical conclusion. Hence, the existence of the unitary atoms which form aggregates is not demonstrated, and lacking that demonstration, it cannot be claimed that aggregates of atoms are the objects of cognition.

Ālambana-parīkṣā (inquiry into the object of cognition)

It is necessary to discuss in further detail the Sautrāntika theory, but let us delay this briefly. We have seen in general the criticism of the three kinds of realism in the Viṃśatikā. The atom theories of the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntika were also criticized in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā. This small essay of Dignāga makes clear two conditions that must by possessed by the object of cognition, and from this point of view carefully inquires into realism.

An object of cognition must satisfy the following two conditions:

1. It must be the cause which produces the cognition.
2. It must have the same form as the image.

In order to satisfy the first condition, the object must be real. It would be impossible for an unreal thing to trigger the five sense organs and give rise to
cognition. If even an unreal thing could be the cause of the production of visual cognition, then people ought to be able to see even rabbit horns.

Moreover, the object must be the factor which limits the content of one cognition such that it is different from another; for each cognition necessarily possesses a unique content, and is not a generalized cognition unlimited in content. Furthermore, the object, being the factor determining the content of each cognition, must be thought of as having the same form as the image which is the content of the cognition. For, if a person, while having a round thing as an object, is able to have the image of a square thing, then it ought to be possible to have even a triangle as the object of that same image, and thus the individuality of cognition would be lost.

If we examine the Sarvāstivādin theory from this point of view, since the individual atoms combined without touching each other are real, they satisfy the first condition of any object of consciousness. However, since atoms do not have the same form as the image, they fail to satisfy the second condition; and hence, the Sarvāstivādin theory cannot be considered correct. If it were simply a matter of the first condition of being a cause of cognition, even the individual organs of cognition could satisfy it; but no one would consider the organ of sight to be the object of visual cognition.

How about, then, the Sautrāntika theory, which makes the aggregate of atoms the object of cognition? Because in the aggregate of atoms there is a gross form not visible in the atoms themselves, the second condition is satisfied. However, the form in the aggregate is an appearance, and not something real. As will be explained when we deal with the self-cognition of knowledge, this form is something inferred from the image. Since an unreal thing fails to satisfy the first condition of an object of cognition, the Sautrāntika theory is also incorrect. No one thinks that when the person with bad eyes sees a double moon the cause of that image is an unreal double moon.

In the Ālambara-parīkṣā along with the above two theories a third theory not seen in the Viśeṣa-ākāśa is introduced and criticized. This theory is attributed to the “New-Sarvāstivāadin,” though there is also a view which attributes it to Bhaddadeva, and can be seen in Saṅghabhadrā’s Nyāyānusāra. It takes the opposite view from the Sautrāntika, holding that the aggregate of atoms, directly perceived as something having a certain form, is real; and that the individual atoms, which are not directly perceived but whose existence is merely inferred, are appearances. The aggregate of atoms, being both real and possessed of a visible form, is considered to satisfy the two conditions of the object of cognition.

Dignāga criticizes this theory on the basis of the Sautrāntika doctrine of the real and the apparent introduced above. Although differences in the contents of separate cognitions are said to derive from differences in the form of the jars, plates, etc., which are the objects of these cognitions, still the form of these jars and plates, etc., is only an appearance and not real; for when analyzed into the component atoms, the knowledge of the forms of the jars and plates, etc., is completely lost. In the case of something real, even if one part is removed, the
knowledge of that thing is not lost. For example, in the case of the white color of a cloth, even if the cloth is cut in half or unraveled into a single thread, it is still perceived as a white color. Therefore, color is real. The form is the collection of color atoms, and is nothing but appearance. The atoms themselves are all round, and have no distinction as to form. Thus, if the individual atoms are held to be the cause of cognition, the cognition of a jar and the cognition of a plate would be the same.

2. The representationalist theory of knowledge

The lamp illumines itself

We have seen that in both the Viṣṇuṣṭīkā and Ālambanaparīkṣā all forms of realism are denied. What, then, ought to be accepted as the object of cognition? The answer given here is the Viññānavāda theory that it is the form within knowledge itself. In the Ālambanaparīkṣā Dignāga says, “The form of an object within knowledge, which appears to be something external, is the object of cognition.”

To say that the object of cognition is the form within knowledge is to say that knowledge cognizes knowledge itself. This notion that self-cognition is the essence of knowledge is one of the basic theories of the Viññānavāda school.

If we light a lamp in a dark room the walls and ceiling, tables and chairs, and other objects previously unseen are illumined. But we are also able to see the lamp itself; at the same time that the lamp illumines objects it also illumines itself. The Viññānavāda school holds that the nature of knowledge is similar to that of the lamp.

A metal weight set in one dish of a balance functions to measure the weight of a substance in the other dish. But in order to know that exact weight of that metal weight it must be weighed by another weight: the weight of the metal weight cannot be known by the metal weight itself. In other words, a metal weight reveals the weight of other objects, but not its own weight. Some schools of thought hold that knowledge has the nature, not of the lamp, but of the metal weight.

According to the Sāṁkhya theory, for example, reason (buddhi), which possesses the activity of cognition, is something evolved from the material principle (prakṛti), and thus is a non-spiritual entity. Therefore, while it functions to cognize objects presented to it by the sensory and thought organs, it is not conscious of its own function. That which knows the function of reason is the puruṣa, the spiritual principle which, like the audience watching a dancing girl on the stage, observes everything evolved from the material principle. The Nyāya school takes the view that one knowledge is known by another knowledge. First, through the contact between sense organ and object knowledge arises; but that knowledge is not self-conscious. Subsequently, knowledge mediated by the thought organ arises; and this knowledge knows the first knowledge.
After Dignāga, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (ca. 600–50) of the Mīmāṃsā school developed a unique theory. According to him, since cognition is a function, cognition itself is not known directly. But since, as a result of the function of cognition, the object is known—or as it is said, the character of “cognizedness” (jñātatā) occurs in the object—the function of cognition is inferred from this cognizedness. Thus, according to Kumārila, the cognitive function is known through the inference, “If there had been no cognitive function, this object would not have been known (would not have possessed ‘cognizedness’).”

In opposition to these schools, the Vijñānavāda argued that knowledge in so far as it is knowledge must be self-cognizant. When we perceive a blue color, we are also simultaneously conscious of that cognition. If we did not have this consciousness, we would not know that we had perceived a blue color. If the lamp illumined only the objects and not itself, we would see only the object and not the lamp; and therefore we would not know whether the objects appeared of their own accord or whether the lamp illumined them. The lamp by illuminating itself also reveals the fact that the objects are illumined by the lamp. Knowledge, like the lamp, illumines itself, and thereby reveals that the object has been illumined by knowledge. This is the special characteristic of knowledge which distinguishes it from non-sentient bodies.

Consequently, that an object is cognized means that within our knowledge there exist simultaneously the two factors of the object illumined by knowledge and the knowledge illuminating the object. Knowledge always has within itself these two factors. That being the case, the object of knowledge becomes an object internal to knowledge—i.e., an object which has already been taken into and made a part of knowledge. We know a blue color which we have perceived, a blue color within our knowledge, and not a blue color in the external world. It was this that Dignāga demonstrated in his criticism of realism.

Proofs of self-cognition

The two factors internal to knowledge—the perceived object and its cognition—are described respectively as “the form of the object” (arṭhākāra, viṣayākāra) and “the form of (knowledge) itself” (svākāra), or as “the manifestation (of knowledge) as object” (arṭhābhāsa, viṣayābhāsa) and “manifestation as itself” (svabhāsa); or again, the two factors are expressed by the terms, “the grasped aspect” (grāhyākāra) and “the grasping aspect” (grāhakākāra). In Chapter 1 of his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga offers several proofs for the existence of these two factors internal to knowledge. Here let us mention one or two of them.

(1) It is universally admitted that distinct from a given knowledge of an object there is another knowledge which takes that knowledge as its object. The knowledge which recollects, for example, that “I saw him yesterday” has as its object a knowledge occurring yesterday which had “him” as its object. If, then, there were not the two factors of object and cognition within know-
knowledge there would not be this distinction between “knowledge of the object” and “knowledge of knowledge of the object.”

If knowledge did not contain within itself the form of the object, then knowledge would always appear simply as itself, and would lose the particularity of individual knowledges: it would be like a lamp with nothing to illumine. The knowledge of an object, and the knowledge of that knowledge are both the activity of illumination itself, and are identical. If on the other hand, knowledge only illumined the object and not itself, then to know the object would mean simply that the form of the object is manifest, and we would not know whether the object was made apparent by knowledge or had appeared by itself. Furthermore, since knowledge of the knowledge of the object would only illumine the form of the object manifest in this way, even this knowledge would only be the manifestation of the same form of the object. Consequently, there would not be a distinction between knowledge of the object and the secondary knowledge which has that knowledge as its object.

Only when it is recognized that the “form of the object” and the “form of knowledge itself” are both included within knowledge—that is, that knowledge has self-cognition as its fundamental nature—can we explain the distinction between “knowledge of the object” and “knowledge of knowledge of the object.” Since the argument here is rather complicated let us symbolize it as follows:

\[ C_1 \text{ (knowledge of the object); } O_1 \text{ (“form of the object” in } C_1) \]; \[ S_1 \text{ (“form of itself” in } C_1) \].

\[ C_2 \text{ (knowledge of knowledge of the object); } O_2 \text{ (“form of the object” in } C_2) \]; \[ S_2 \text{ (“form of itself” in } C_2) \].

If we express the fact that \( C_1 \) includes within itself both \( O_1 \) and \( S_1 \) by \( C_1 = (S_1 \cdot O_1) \), then \( C_2 = (S_2 \cdot O_2) \). Since \( C_2 \) has \( C_1 \) as its object, \( O_2 = (S_1 \cdot O_1) \). Therefore, \( C_2 = [S_2 \cdot (S_1 \cdot O_1)] \), and \( C_2 \) and \( C_1 \) are clearly different.

In the case where knowledge does not include within itself the form of the object, \( C_1 = S_1 \); \( C_2 = S_2 \); but \( S_2 = S_1 \); therefore, \( C_2 = C_1 \).

In the case where knowledge does not include within itself its own manifestation, \( C_1 = O_1 \); \( C_2 = O_2 \); but \( O_2 = C_1 = O_1 \); therefore, \( C_2 = C_1 \).

(2) Recollection always occurs in reference to a past experience: it is impossible to recollect, for example, some animal we have never before seen. Now, we recollect not only, say, the pot on the table yesterday; we also recollect having seen the pot on the table yesterday. That is, what is recollected is not only the object, but the knowledge of the object as well. This means that yesterday we experienced the knowledge of the object; or in other words, that there occurred yesterday a knowledge which included within itself both the object seen and that which saw.
The Sautrāntika doctrine: Dharmakīrti’s theory

The Sautrāntika school also recognized the self-cognition of knowledge. This school taught a theory of momentariness (kṣanika) in which both the external entity and the mind disappear the moment they arise. In the moment when knowledge arises, the object in the external world has already vanished. Therefore, the external object itself is not perceived. What is perceived is the form produced in knowledge by the external object. Since in this way knowledge knows the form of the object within itself, that cognition is nothing other than the self-cognition of knowledge. This is the Sautrāntika view. They differ from the Vijñānavāda in admitting the existence of the external world.

If what we perceive is a form internal to knowledge then we cannot know whether or not the external object actually exists. The Sautrāntika recognized the existence of the external object, because they thought that the factors limiting cognition spatially and temporally must exist outside knowledge itself. The jar seen on this table now is not seen everywhere all the time: cognition always occurs in a specific time and place. If cognition arose of its own accord without any restriction by external conditions, the time and place in which the jar was seen would be quite arbitrary. The reason why the jar is seen only here and now is that cognition is limited (or conditioned) by the external object. On the basis of this way of thinking, the Sautrāntika inferred the existence of an external object not directly perceived.

Consequently, according to the Sautrāntika the external object is essentially the efficacy to give rise to, or cause, knowledge. Dharmakīrti says,

If it is asked how it is possible for the external object of the preceding moment, being of a different time from the knowledge (of that object), to be the object of cognition, the answer is as follows: it is recognized by those versed in logic that to be the object of cognition means nothing but to be the cause able to project into knowledge a form similar to its own form.

(Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa Chapter, 247.)

If we hold that which exists in the external world as the cause of knowledge has a form, then it could not be individual atoms, and must be considered a collection of atoms. But according to the Sautrāntika theory an aggregate is only an appearance, and in an appearance there could be no efficacy to produce knowledge. One solution for this problem contained in the Sautrāntika doctrine of realism was provided by Dharmakīrti’s theory.

His argument, presented in the Pramāṇavārttika (Pratyakṣa Chapter, 194–230), is developed against the background of Dignāga’s interpretation of one section of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (in Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pratyakṣa, 4), and the criticism of that interpretation by the Jain scholar Mallavādin (mid-sixth c.) (in Dvādasāra-Nayacakra, “Twelve-spoked Wheel of Viewpoints”);
but there is no need here to go into the details of this background. What was at issue was the question of whether or not the sight organ could grasp many things simultaneously. Dignāga’s view was that to cognize as a whole in terms of a characteristic aspect a multiplicity of objects in the visual field is different from cognizing that multiplicity individually, and then thinking the universal which unites them. Dharmakīrti, following this view, argued that the notion that forms are composed of a multiplicity of elements was valid only from the point of view of reason, and that in visual cognition the various colors decorating the wings of a butterfly are grasped in their variety as a single whole.

The same thing can be said of a collection of many atoms. This, however, raises the question of how the individual atoms, which cannot be seen in isolation, can become the object of vision when collected. Dharmakīrti argues that when many atoms collect without intervals between them, they come to have a special character not present when they are scattered individually. Pālanquin bearers individually do not have the strength to carry the pālanquin by themselves, but when two or four get together each display the ability to carry the pālanquin. In the same way, atoms, though individually incapable of being the cause of visual cognition, when collected, possess a special character (atiśaya) which is the cause of knowledge. And “to be an object is nothing other than to be a cause of knowledge.” (Pratyakṣa Chapter, 224).

In this way, the multiplicity of atoms collected without interstices become the object of visual cognition as a unified multiplicity. When a multiplicity of atoms are perceived simultaneously the form within knowledge is one. Reason which analyzes this form into many images caused by the separate atoms, does not function in perception. And since there is inferred an external object which throws this form into knowledge, this external object, while in reality being a multiplicity of atoms is at the same time understood as having a single form.

In this way, the combined multiplicity of atoms, because 1) they are the cause giving rise to cognition, and 2) they possess the same form as the image, satisfy the conditions for the object of cognition. This is the Sautrāntika theory worked out by Dharmakīrti.

The weakness in the argument for inferring the external world

The Sautrāntika, while beginning from the view that knowledge has self-cognition as its essence, at the same time sought to maintain that this self-cognition was the cognition of an external object. This was because, as we have said, they sought the factors temporally and spatially limiting cognition in the external world. If the occurrence in a specific time and place of knowledge having the form of the object can be explained without there being an object in the external world, then the grounds for the Sautrāntika realism will be insufficient. As we mentioned in the beginning, Vasubandhu in his Vimśatikā, using the analogy of the dream, argued that the spatial and temporal limitations of cognition could be established even where the external object does not exist.
Just as in the case of the dream, so during our ordinary waking experience as well the knowledge accompanied by the form of the object arises from “a special transformation of the stream of thought” (saññatti-parināma-viśeṣa). Therefore, the Vijñānabhāda philosophy holds that there is no need to posit the existence of an external object. This philosophy is a theory of knowledge worked out from the position of the practical subject, who realizes that empirical cognition is karma, and who seeks to awaken from the dream of empirical cognition to attain a trans-mundane knowledge transcending karma. In this sense, it differs qualitatively from the representationalist realism of the Sautrāntika, whose concern was only with the logical consistency of their theory.

The recognition of the existence of the external object as the factor limiting cognition spatially and temporally is not only unnecessary; there is clearly a weakness in the Sautrāntika logic, which infers the external object on the basis of the perceptual image. Though the object is considered external, its essence is not determined objectively, but is said by the Sautrāntika to exist as it is perceived. This, however, leads to the contradiction that one entity possesses a multiplicity of essences. This problem was pointed out by Dharmakīrti, who showed that even in Sautrāntika realism what knowledge cognizes is not the external object. (Praṇāṇavārttika. Pratyakṣa Chapter, 341.) The same point is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha18 in order to demonstrate the non-existence of the external world. It is sometimes the case that a number of people will have differing images of the same thing. In looking at a single red apple, will not the artist’s image differ from that of the ordinary man? Although looking at the same river, the ravenous ghosts will have an image that is filled with pus, excrement, and urine, while the human will receive an image of pure water. If one holds that the essence of the external object is inferred from the image, then this means that a single object will be possessed of a multiplicity of essences.

The cause of knowledge

In his Ālambanaparikṣā, Dignāga denies all forms of reality, and teaches that the object of cognition is to be understood as nothing other than the form of the object within knowledge. From this position, Dignāga explains several epistemological problems.

Dignāga himself gave two conditions for the object of cognition: 1) that it be the cause giving rise to the cognition; and 2) that it possess the same form as the image. The form of the object within knowledge obviously fulfills the second condition. But in regard to the first condition the opponent objects: “How is it that something which is a part of knowledge, and thus arises simultaneously with knowledge, can be a cause of knowledge?”

Dignāga gives two kinds of answers to this problem. First, he argues that to say that the form of the object is the cause, and the knowledge which is aware of the object is the result does not mean that there is temporal succession between the two; it means, rather, that the two are in a relation of necessary connection:
Although it (the form of the object within knowledge) is simultaneous with knowledge, because it is in a relation of necessary connection with knowledge, it is the cause of knowledge.

A “relation of necessary connection” here means a relationship of logical consistency—which is to say, when A exists B exists, and when A does not exist B does not exist. When such a relationship holds between A and B, although A does not temporally precede B, A is considered the cause of B. For example, the substance is the cause of the attribute: for only when there is the substance does the attribute exist, and where there is no substance the attribute does not exist. The relation of the form of the object within knowledge to the knowledge which is aware of that form is precisely such a relationship. This is Dignāga's first answer to the opponent.

Of course Dignāga does not deny that in addition to this cause there are other causes which bring about the occurrence of knowledge. It is an established theory of Abhidharma philosophy that the “mind (citta) and mental activities (cāittā) arise from four types of causes” (Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, indriya-nirdeśa) and Dignāga accepts this view (Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pratyakṣa Chapter). In particular, for any thought the immediately preceding thought (samanantara-pratyaya) is an important cause. Like the staff on which the man leans his body in order to support himself, the form of the object within knowledge is the “support” (ālambana-pratyaya) for the thought or knowledge arising from other causes, and in this sense it is seen as a cause.

As a second answer, Dignāga says that the form of the object within knowledge is a cause temporally preceding knowledge. Knowledge is momentary; and when one moment of knowledge is extinguished, the form of the object of that knowledge leaves its impression in the subconscious. That impression gives rise in the knowledge of the next moment to a similar form. Therefore, the form of the object in the knowledge of the first moment is the same as the form in the knowledge of the second moment; and, assisted by the impression left in the subconscious, becomes the cause of the latter.

The question of how something simultaneous with knowledge can be seen as a cause of knowledge was further examined in detail by Dharmakīrti. According to him, what is to be considered the primary cause of knowledge is not a cause common to any knowledge, but must be that element which limits the knowledge as a specific knowledge. The reason why a given cognition is a cognition of blue and not of yellow is because it possesses some cause other than the sight organ common to all cognitions of color. What gives to a knowledge its specificity is nothing other than the form of the object appearing in that knowledge. Without that form, individual knowledges would all become one. Therefore, it is precisely the form of the object within knowledge that must be seen as the principal cause of knowledge. In this case the cause is understood, not as “the producer” (janaka) of the effect, but as “the determiner” (vyavasthāpaka) of the effect.
The organs of cognition

A further question is put to Dignāga. According to the doctrine of the twelve āyatanas or the eighteen dhātus taught by the Buddha, "visual cognition results from the sight organ (caksur-indriya) and the material entity." But if there is no external material entity, then does it not follow that the sight organ as well cannot perform the function of producing cognition? To this Dignāga gives the following reply.

As is shown by its name, "indriya" (belonging to Indra), the essence of the organs of cognition is efficacy (See Abhidharmakośa-bhāga, indriya-nirdeśa). That is, the organs themselves cannot be perceived; rather, from the fact of cognition which is a result of their functioning, we infer their existence as the efficacy bringing about such cognition. Nothing more can be known about the nature of the organs of cognition. The Sarvāstivādins say that they are special transformations of the primary elements; there is the view of Buddhadeva that they are the elements themselves; and there are also those such as the Sāmkhya who hold that they are transformations most immediately of the sense of self (aḥaṃkāra) and ultimately of primordial matter (prakṛti). But these are all dogmatic assertions, and not based on proper inference. All that can be inferred is that the organs are the efficacy which results in cognition. And, if we suppose that efficacy to be within knowledge itself, then there is no necessity for an external entity.

While answering the objections of his opponents, Dignāga demonstrated that there is within knowledge, on the one hand, the form of the object, and on the other, the efficacy to know that form. Dignāga’s conclusion, then, is that, although the external object does not exist, through the interaction of these two factors there has come down from a beginningless past a stream of momentary knowledges.

Sākārajñāna-vāda and anākārajñāna-vāda

The view that knowledge contains within itself the form of the object is known as sākārajñāna-vāda. It cannot be said with certainty when this name began to be used, but its earliest appearance is thought to be in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra19 of Śaṅkarakṣita (ca. 725–88). The name is used in opposition to anākārajñāna-vāda, which holds that the form belongs to the external object, and that knowledge merely reflects it. The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and within Buddhism schools taking the realist position such as Sarvāstivāda, consider knowledge to be without form (anākāra).

The weakness of the anākārajñāna-vāda lies in its inability to explain the specificity of individual knowledges. Without the form of the object all knowledge would be identical as simply the activity of knowing, and could not be distinguished as a cognition, say, of blue or yellow. Although it is maintained that the form possessed by the external object internally limits knowledge, still as
long as it is external it cannot limit knowledge. If it is maintained that the form limits knowledge at the time it is perceived, then the form of the object perceived cannot be said to be external.

The Sautrántika advocated a realism based on the sākārajñāna-vāda. It may be characterized as a "representationalist realism." If one pursues the sākārajñāna-vāda position to its extreme, it leads to the Vijñānavāda doctrine denying the existence of the external world. This theory we have seen in Dignāga's Ālampanapariksā.

The main theme of the Vijñānavāda philosophy was not the proof that cognition could be established in the absence of an external object. They held empirical cognition as a whole to be a dream, and their basic concern was with the attainment of a transmundane cognition in which one awakes from the dream. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti carefully examine the structure of cognition from the point of view of Vijñānavāda, and construct subtle epistemological theories, but they almost wholly ignore the question of the transcendence of empirical cognition. Their Vijñānavāda system is called sākārajñāna-vāda, and is contrasted with the nirākārajñāna-vāda which emphasizes the "shining mind" of one awakened from the dream of empirical cognition.

Translated by William Powell

Notes

* The essay translated here appeared originally as a chapter in the book, Ninshiki to chōetsu: Yuishiki (Cognition and Transcendence: Consciousness-Only) (1970) written by Hattori Masaaki and Ueyama Shunpei. Carl Bielefeldt assisted in the translation. All footnotes have been added by the translator.

1 The Sanskrit version of the Viṃśatikā (Twenty Verses) of Vasubandhu was edited and translated into French by Sylvain Lévi, Vijñānapratāpāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (la Vingtaine), accompagnée d’une explication en prose, et Trimsikā (la Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris, 1925. It was translated into Chinese several times, most notably by Hsūan-tsang in 661. It’s Chinese title is Wei shih erh shih lun (T. 1590).

2 The Trimsikā (Thirty Verses). See note 1. Translated by Hsūan-tsang in 648 as Wei shih san shih lun sung. T. 1586.

3 The Ālampanapariksā (Examination of Objects of Cognition). Translated into Chinese by Hsūan-tsang in 657 as Kuan suo yuăn yuăn lun. T. 1624.

4 The Vaidalya-prakaraṇa exists only in Tibetan, edited by Kajiyama Yūichi, Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos. 6-7 (1965), pp. 129-155.

5 There is an English translation of this text, The Vaiśeṣika Śūtras of Kanāda, by Nandalal Sinha, Allahabad 1923 (Sacred Books of the Hindus, VI).

6 The Padārthaharmasangraha of Praśastapāda, tr. by Ganganatha Jha, Allahabad 1911 (Reprint from Pandit).

7 According to Vaiśeṣika theory, the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are imperceptible particles and only become perceptible substances when they combine in great numbers with each other. The other five substances are unitary and imperceptible.

8 Uddyotakara lived around the second half of 6th century and was the author of the Nyāyavārttika, a commentary on Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya.
10 Edited and published by the Pali Text Society in 5 volumes. T. 99 is a Chinese translation of the Sarvāstivāda version.
11 The Madhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna (second century C.E.) exists in a Sanskrit edition edited by De La Vallée Poussin (St.-Pétersbourg, 1903–13, Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV) and chapters 1 and 25 were translated into English by Stecherbatsky (Leningrad, 1927). The Chinese translation is in T. 1564. Chandrakīrti’s (c. 600 C.E.) commentary, the Prasannapada, is included in the edition and translation above.
12 The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya is Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, written before his Vijñānavāda conversion. The Sanskrit text has been edited by Pradhan (Patna 1967, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, VIII) and the Chinese translation is contained in T. 1558–60.
13 The Mahāvibhāṣā (Chinese, T. 1545–7) by Kātyāyanīputra is a commentary on the Jñānapraṇasthāna (Chinese, T. 1543–4) by Pārśva and Vasumitra II. The Jñānapraṇasthāna is the earliest known Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text. Both exist in Chinese only, though the earlier text has been reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese by Śāntī Bhikṣu (Santinketan, 1955).
14 Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra exists only in Chinese, T. 1562.
15 The Vibhāṣā of the Sautrāntika by Śrīlāta is not extant. However, it is referred to by Kuei-chi in Ch’eng wei shih lun shu chi (Commentary on the Vijnaptimātratā-siddhi), Vol. 4, T. 1830.
16 Dignāga’s *Upādāyaprajñaptipraṇakaṇa exists only in Chinese translation, T. 1622.
17 The “New-Sarvāstivādin” is discussed in Kuei-chi’s Wei shih erh shih lun shu chi, ch. 2, T. 1834.
18 The Mahāyānasamgraha is attributed to Asaṅga and exists in Tibetan (Tohoku No. 4048) and Chinese translations (T. 1592–4).
19 The Madhyamakālāṃkāra exists only in Tibetan (Tohoku Nos. 3884–3885).
DIÑNĀGA’S VIEWS ON REASONING (SVĀRTHĀNUMĀNA)

Richard P. Hayes


1.0. The aim of the following paper is to present an account of the views of the medieval Indian philosopher Diñnāga on the nature of correct reasoning and its rôle in the acquisition of new knowledge. The intention underlying this presentation is to present information on Diñnāga’s philosophical system that may be of interest to historians of philosophy in general, and not only to specialists in Indian philosophy. In accordance with this intention I offer a brief account of Diñnāga’s place in Indian philosophy and an overall view of his system of epistemology in the first part of this paper, and in the second part I present an English translation of a section of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, his most important treatise on epistemology, namely the first half of the second chapter, which deals with his views on the nature and scope of reasoning.

1.1. Diñnāga’s place in Indian philosophy

Diñnāga was a Buddhist philosopher whose main period of literary activity was in the first half of the sixth century. Although the early part of his career seems to have been devoted to producing exegetical tracts on various aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine and polemical critiques of rival philosophical systems, he came to be best remembered for his later work in the field of epistemology and logic, and in fact he is sometimes referred to as the founder of the medieval phase of Indian logic. He probably deserves this distinction, for his ideas, although rather crudely formulated by later standards, did provide the groundwork for many of the later developments in at least the Buddhist schools of logic in India; and insofar as his ideas and the developments of those ideas by his followers could not be ignored by non-Buddhist philosophers, his influence can be said to have been felt in all Indian logic until at least the beginnings of the 14th century.

Before taking a look at the contents of Diñnāga’s contribution to the development of logic in India, it may be worthwhile to consider the state of philosophy
in India at the time when Dinnāga entered the arena, and, having done this, to make a brief survey of the contents of Dinnāga’s most important treatise on logic and epistemology.

First, as for the philosophical literature of the Brahmanic tradition in the centuries preceding Dinnāga, it had consisted almost exclusively of collections of aphorisms and their commentaries; several such collections of aphorisms existed, each of them probably representing an attempt to extract the essential doctrines from one of several vast bodies of religious literature or folk literature, such as the Vedas or Upaniṣads or the great Epics, and to present those doctrines in a more systematic form.⁴ Each of these collections became the core of a different school of thought (or perhaps more accurately, of a different academic discipline, for being an adherent of one “school” did not necessarily prevent one from also being an adherent of another “school”). Essentially the same process had been going on in the Buddhist community, and several schools of Buddhist philosophy had developed, each having as its basis a different set of religious works that it accepted as best representing the teachings of the Buddha. With so many schools of thought flourishing in both the Brahmanic and the Buddhist traditions, and with each of them presenting doctrines that conflicted with at least some of the doctrines of other schools, there was naturally plenty of scope for debate among them. Although there did evolve from this debate-oriented milieu several different codes of conduct and sets of rules concerning those circumstances under which one side or the other lost a debate,⁵ and although people did begin to assemble and classify examples of blunders in reasoning and blunders in the presentation of arguments in debate (without always carefully distinguishing between these two kinds of blunder), less progress was made during this early phase of Indian thought in the development of ideas concerning formal criteria for differentiating sound arguments from unsound ones, or for differentiating accurate cognitions from erroneous ones. Such ideas as we do find on these topics tend to be so hopelessly entangled with, on the one hand, the above mentioned rules of debate, and, on the other hand, with various theories of the soul and mind and other metaphysical doctrines,⁶ that one very easily becomes frustrated in trying to extract such a thing as a set of principles of logic from these early writings. Moreover, in reading through arguments actually presented in polemical works, and even in early manuals of debate, we encounter numerous examples of fundamental errors in reasoning,⁷ so that we are led to wonder whether the principles of valid reasoning were unknown to early thinkers or whether they were simply disregarded whenever it seemed more convenient to do so.

It must not be imagined from what has been said thus far that Dinnāga entered the arena of Indian philosophy and single-handedly shaped order out of chaos. Rather, what he did was to take the most promising features of each of several different beginnings made by his forerunners towards the development of a theory of valid cognition, clarified some poorly defined concepts and added one or two important innovations of his own. To unravel all the sources of
Dīnāga’s final presentation of his system is well beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say here that although he was a creative thinker, he owed a great deal to his forerunners and that perhaps one of his greatest intellectual assets was that his drawing upon other’s ideas was relatively unrestricted by prejudice for or against any other system of thought.

1.2. The Pramāṇasamuccaya

The work in which Dīnāga’s thought is presented in its most mature form is his Pramāṇasamuccaya, a title that he gave it since it is for the most part a collection (samuccaya) of ideas that he had presented earlier in his career in various smaller works dealing with the problem of “the means of acquiring new knowledge” (pramāṇa). While it is true that much of the contents of this work had appeared in earlier works, the presentation of his ideas tends to be more orderly and rigorous here than in earlier works, and we also find ideas presented here that had not yet been articulated in works composed in his younger days. The book comprises six chapters, the contents of which are arranged as follows.

1. The first chapter introduces the general problem of the means of acquiring new knowledge, stating that there are essentially two mutually opposed aspects of things that can enter our knowledge, namely a particular aspect that, being a physical feature of the world existing outside the mind, can be cognized only through the physical sense-faculties, and a general aspect that, being conceptual in nature, can be cognized only by the intellect. That form of cognition that consists in the acquisition of information about particulars is called perception or sensation (pratyakṣa), and it is the topic of the first chapter. Dīnāga first presents his own views on perception, then criticizes in turn the views on perception of his forerunner Vasubandhu, the Nyāya system, the Vaiśeṣika system, the Sāṃkhya system and the Mīmāṃsā system. An English translation of this first chapter has been published along with an informative introduction and a very thorough set of footnotes by Hattori (1968).

2. The question of how we can acquire knowledge about objects not within the range of the physical senses, and the nature of that knowledge, is taken up for discussion in the second chapter. As with the first chapter, it is divided into a presentation of Dīnāga’s own views followed by a criticism of alternate views. A Japanese translation of the part dealing with Dīnāga’s own views has been published by Kitagawa (1965) pp. 73–125.

3. The topic of the third chapter is how knowledge that we have acquired ourselves can be imparted to others. This chapter deals in particular with the proper presentation of argument in formal debate. A Japanese translation of the first section of this chapter has also been published by Kitagawa (1965) pp. 126–238.

4. The fourth chapter deals with the role of the example in the presentation of
arguments in formal debate. Kitagawa (1965) pp. 239–281 has published a Japanese translation of the first half of this chapter, too.

5. Chapter five treats a variety of topics connected with the relation between language and that which is communicated through it. The essential point of this chapter is to show that language conveys knowledge in the same way and of the same nature as that which is conveyed by an inferential indicator (liṅga), and that therefore cognition involving verbal communication is essentially the same as inferential cognition. There is also a considerable amount of discussion of the nature of verbal apposition and the qualification of one word by another, on which matters Diṅṅāga presents his own views and criticizes alternate theories. And finally Diṅṅāga endorses the view of the grammarian Bhartṛhari that the sentence rather than the individual word is the basic meaning-bearing unit of language. No translation of this chapter into a modern language has yet been published.

6. The final chapter deals again with an aspect of formal debate, namely the refutation of the opponent’s position and errors which if committed render refutation invalid. The first part of this chapter, dealing with Diṅṅāga’s own views on the matter, has been translated into Japanese by Kitagawa (1965) pp. 282–351.

We can see in the above brief summary of the topics dealt with and the arrangement of those topics in the Pramāṇasamuccaya two distinct features of Diṅṅāga’s thought, features that were picked up and developed by subsequent generations of Buddhist logicians. The first of these is the differentiation of perception from inference on the basis of the kinds of objects cognized by them (about which more will be said below), and the second is his clear differentiation between inference as a process of acquiring new knowledge (svārthānumāna) and inference as a process of presenting knowledge to others (parārthānumāna), a distinction that had not always been clearly made before Diṅṅāga’s time. What this distinction amounts to is making a step towards treating the epistemological issue, of how new knowledge is acquired and what evidence is capable of generating certainty, as a separate issue of inquiry, one that is not to be confounded on the one hand with metaphysical commitments, nor on the other hand with a mere set of conventions concerning what is allowable in formal debate. Let us now look at Diṅṅāga’s system in more detail.

1.3 A summary of Diṅṅāga’s views on epistemology

1.3.1. His view of perception

It has been mentioned above that Diṅṅāga’s point of departure in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya is to draw a radical distinction between two kinds of things that can be cognized. On the one hand there is that which is immediately present to the physical senses, and on the other hand there is that
which is not present to the senses but which nevertheless enters into our cognition. The cognition whose content is that which is present to the senses is called perception (pratyakṣa), and that which is present to the senses is called by Diṅnāga a svalakṣaṇa¹⁴ (meaning roughly “that whose features belong only to itself”), which I shall call throughout the rest of this paper a “particular.” Now according to Diṅnāga, the moment we begin to synthesize those particulars into multi-propertied “objects” or to identify those particulars as individual instances of some class, we are engaging in a cognitive action of a different sort; we are now thinking, or reasoning, or making judgments.¹⁵ When the mind has assigned a percept some name or attributed to it some class-property, then it is no longer dealing just with what is at hand but with a shared something, and most of the things that share that something are objects remembered from the past or anticipated in the future or in some other way not present to the senses. And so, on the grounds that thinking or judgment (anumāna) is a complex cognitive act having as its content this shared or generalized aspect (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of what is not present to the senses, Diṅnāga regards it as a cognitive process of a sort that is essentially different from sensation, which is a simple cognitive act dealing only with what is at hand. Now just one further thing to point out about this distinction between sensation and judgment is that for Diṅnāga it would make no sense to speak of a sensation as true or false, accurate or inaccurate, for it is only when we analyze, classify, name and assign properties to things that the question arises as to whether we have analyzed properly, classified correctly, given a thing a suitable name or assigned it the right properties.¹⁶

Further light may be shed on how Diṅnāga distinguished sensation or perception from judgment by a quick review of which kinds of objects of cognition he explicitly said could and which he said could not be regarded as percepts. It has already been noted that the objects in the fields of operation of the five physical sense-faculties are regarded by Diṅnāga as percepts. But in addition to these five physical sense-faculties, Diṅnāga, as was the custom in contemporary Indian theories of the psychology of cognition, also acknowledged a sixth sense-faculty, namely the mind (manas). The objects in the mind’s field of operation are, according to this view, mental events of all types. Thus all mental events, even those that are not perceptions, are percepts. Accordingly, Diṅnāga classifies all acts of cognition themselves as percepts, because a cognition itself is known directly even if the object of that cognition is not.¹⁷ Similarly, all mental events of the type that we might call attitudes and moods are percepts, for they too are the objects of direct cognition. And finally the object of any cognition that is entirely free of the preconceptions arising from previous experience or education is regarded as a percept; such pure cognition was commonly believed in Indian philosophical systems to be within the capacity of yogins who could directly cognize the nature of things just as they are without the bias of former intellectual training and free of all expectations based on prior experience.¹⁸

On the other hand, certain kinds of cognitive acts cannot be considered as perception, nor can the objects cognized in those acts be called percepts.
Dinnāga specifically mentions the following cases. Ruled out as acts of perception are all erroneous cognitions, not because they are erroneous but because they are complex cognitive acts involving the superimposition of mental constructs upon percepts. Similarly, all cognitions that involve conventions (e.g. conventions of speech such as are shared by a linguistic community, or personal conventions, i.e. habits informed through our past experience) are ruled out as acts of perception, for they too involve superimposition of concepts upon percepts (albeit correctly). Further, the formation of such attitudes towards objects as desire or aversion is an act of judgment rather than an act of perception, for this act involves superimposing upon a percept something it does not intrinsically possess, namely value or repugnance. And finally, Dinnāga argues that while the visual field, the audible field etc. are percepts, and may be regarded as data, when these data are attributed by the mind as various properties belonging to a subject or property-locus (dharmin), this act of attribution is not an act of perception, nor is the property-locus a percept.

1.32. The theory of self-cognizing cognitions

It was said above that all cognitive acts are percepts, since cognitive acts constitute the field of operation of a sense-faculty, namely the mind. But actually the matter is not quite this straightforward in Dinnāga’s system, for the mind has a very different status from that of the other sense-faculties; whereas the five physical sense-faculties are regarded as separate entities that exist apart from the objects they cognize, the mind turns out in Dinnāga’s view to be merely an aspect of the cognitions that putatively constitute the mind’s field of operation. For Dinnāga argues that the cognitive act is aware of itself, which amounts to saying that the instrument of the act of cognition (the mind), the act of cognition itself (the mind’s object) and the awareness of that cognition are in fact a single entity. Closely related to this doctrine is his doctrine that a cognition and the means of acquiring that cognition are also a single entity. These two theses form the subject matter of five verses and their commentary in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and I will give here only an outline of Dinnāga’s argument as I understand it.

First let us begin with an analysis of a single datum, namely the fact that a cognition has occurred with a given content. Let us symbolize this datum: $K(c)$. When we think about this datum $K(c)$ we are inclined, says Dinnāga, to try to analyze it into three factors: (1) an object that has been cognized, i.e. the content of the cognition, the $c$ of $K(c)$. (2) consciousness itself, the $K$ of $K(c)$, and (3) an activity, performed by consciousness, of grasping or apprehending the object that becomes its content. When we analyze our single datum $K(c)$ in this way, we naturally regard the activity of apprehending as an instrumental cause, which we call “a means of cognition” (pramāṇa); and we regard $K(c)$, the cognition of the object, as an effect of that means of cognition (pramāṇa-phala), and we call this “knowledge” (jñāna). What prompts us to make this kind of analysis is the
fact that when we look back at a cognition, we can recall two things, namely (c) the object that was cognized, and K(c) the very fact that we were aware of the object. We may symbolize the recollection of the object itself R(c) and the recollection of the cognition R(K(c)). Now given these two recollections, R(c) and R(K(c)), it is natural to assume that each of them is the recollection of a distinct cognition, in other words that R(c) is a recollection based on K(c) and R(K(c)) is a recollection based on K(K(c)).

But the above assumption of a double cognition, K(c) and K(K(c)), does not, argues Diññāga, stand up well under close examination. For if we accept the principle that any given cognition requires a second cognition to know it, we are led into an infinite number of distinct cognitions, i.e. (1) K(c) followed by (2) K(K(c)) followed by (3) K(K(K(c))), and so on indefinitely. To avoid this infinite regress Diññāga suggests it is preferable to say that cognition of an object requires no second cognition to know it. Cognition of an object and awareness of that cognition is a single act. Cognition is awareness both of its object and of itself. K(c) is the same as K(K(c)). Moreover, recollection of an object R(c) and recollection of an awareness R(K(c)) are just two recollections about different aspects of a single entity K(c), cognition-cum-content, which appears not to be further reducible into the components K and c.

Now in the above attempt to think about K(c) by analyzing it into three factors, one of the factors mentioned was an instrumental cause of cognition whereby K apprehended c. According to Diññāga’s view there actually turns out to be no such instrumental cause, but it is still not entirely meaningless to talk in terms of an instrumental cause of a cognition insofar as, if K(c) is self-cognizing, we may consider K(c) to be its own instrumental cause. Therefore, says Diññāga, the instrumental cause of a cognition (pramāṇa) is the same entity as the resultant cognition (jñāna = pramāṇa-phala). Thus not only is every cognition, regardless of whether it is a perception or a judgment, a percept, but insofar as it cognizes itself it is also a perception. This conclusion of Diññāga’s, that the terms pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala refer to two aspects of the same entity and that a cognition cognizes itself, quite understandably drew a considerable amount of criticism from Uddyotakara and later Naiyāyikas; in the Buddhist camp, however, these doctrines became a matter of orthodoxy, probably because they suited very well both the fundamental Buddhist dogma that there is no experiencing agency, such as a soul, over and above the fact of experience itself,24 and the decidedly idealistic trend of the Vijnānavāda school of Buddhism with whose doctrines the later Buddhist logicians tended to be very sympathetic.

1.33.

With the above account of topics treated in the opening part of the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya as background, we can now turn to a discussion of some of the topics treated in the second chapter of that work. In broad outline at least, I will discuss the topics in the same order as Diññāga discusses them.
1.331. Further points of difference between perception and inference

As has already been indicated, the principle distinction between perception or sensation and inference or judgment is that the former is a process of cognizing objects present to the senses while the latter is a process of cognizing objects not present to the senses. The specific properties of things can be cognized through perception, while inference gives us no cognition of specific properties but only of general properties; to use the stock example of inferring fire from smoke, the resultant cognition can only be the general knowledge that there is some fire in a certain place, but it can never be knowledge of which fire it is or what sort of fire it is. And conversely, perception gives us no general information; perception gives us only the most simple cognition of exactly the thing at hand, but it gives no further information as to what this thing has in common with other things, i.e. of which classes this sensed object is a member, what this sensed thing is called etc. 25 Now this lead to a further distinction between perception and inference, namely that perception is quite private in the sense that a perceptual cognition cannot be shared by communicating it to another person. 26 An inferential cognition, on the other hand, can be communicated, for it is possible to tell some other person in a general way that which we know in a general way, and he will understand in a general way what we are talking about. The structure of the thought process and the nature of the inferentially derived cognition are essentially the same whether communicated to other people or not. It is on these grounds that Diśnāga treats verbal communication as a special case of inference rather than, as was generally the case in other schools of Indian philosophy, as a means of acquiring knowledge distinct from inference. But since communicating our cognitions to others, especially when those others would prefer not to believe what we are communicating to them, requires special techniques and is governed by certain conventions, Diśnāga feels this aspect of inference deserves chapters in his book separate from the chapter that deals with the basic structures of inferential cognition. Thus chapter two of the Pramāṇasamuccaya deals with these basic structures, chapter five shows that those same basic structures are found in verbal communication, and chapters three, four and six deal primarily with the conventions of debate and show how the basic structures of inference underlie those conventions.

1.332. The object of inference: that about which new knowledge is acquired

If inference is regarded as a means of acquiring new knowledge, the question naturally arises as to what the content of that new knowledge is. In dealing with this question, Diśnāga considers two answers that one might put forth, rejects them as inadequate, and offers a third answer of his own. The first position he considers is that from the observation of one property we gain knowledge
simply of a second property. Most likely what Diinnāga had in mind in discussing this position was that style of inference that deals primarily with causes and their effects, whereby a cause can be inferred from the observation of its effect; thus in this view of inference the new knowledge would be that of the cause. But Diinnāga rejects this view on the grounds that there is in fact nothing new learned in this case. It will be recalled that Diinnāga has pointed out that, in the case of inferring fire from smoke for example, all we can acquire is a general knowledge of fire anyway; but we already had a general knowledge of fire before we made the observation of smoke, so this is nothing new. And if we don’t already have a general knowledge of fire, it can only be because we have never before experienced it, and if that is the case, then the observation of smoke will not generate any cognition whatsoever of fire.

The second position that Diinnāga considers is that the object of inference is the relation of the inferred property to its locus. That is, we already know smoke-in-general and fire-in-general and the relation between them, but we learn of the relation between fire and the locus of smoke. Thus this relation is the object of inference. The general idea of this view is similar to Diinnāga’s view, but he rejects this formulation on the grounds that when we make an inference our knowledge of the relation between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general has the form “Every locus of smoke is a locus of fire.” Given this universal proposition and the proposition derived from an observation “This is a locus of smoke,” we can derive “This is a locus of fire.” Thus in Diinnāga’s view it is just the locus of the inferred property that is the object of inference. The relation between inferred property and locus cannot be the object of inference, because it is not a locus of fire or smoke; rather, fire and smoke are regarded as the loci of the relation between them.

1.33. The three criteria of successful evidence

The next question to be dealt with, one that naturally arises from all that has been said so far, is this: under what conditions can the cognition of a second property in a given locus be said to follow legitimately from the observation of a first property in that locus?

According to the logical tradition that Diinnāga belonged to, a piece of evidence offered in an argument as a reason for some conclusion could be considered proper evidence for that conclusion only if it met three criteria. Diinnāga adapted this test for proper evidence in argumentation, where one is trying to convince others, to the case of epistemology, where one is trying to determine for himself the correctness of a tentative judgment concerning the location of a “hidden” property in a given locus.

Let us first examine the classically formulated three criteria of proper evidence in debate. In this discussion, “proper” evidence is to be understood as that evidence which points only to the conclusion stated in debate and not to that conclusion’s negation. The conclusion stated in debate has the form “A certain
property occurs in a given locus,” or some such expression that though syntactically different expresses the same state of affairs; for example, “The fact of being black is in the locus cat.” and “The property ‘that it is black’ is in the locus cat.” and “Blackness is in the cat.” and “The cat has blackness.” and “The cat is black.” are all expressions of the same state of affairs, and expressions of these forms will be used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to the fact or supposition of a certain property’s occurrence in a given locus. In what follows I shall refer to that certain property whose occurrence in a given locus is being argued as the “argued property” (sādhyā) and to that given locus as “object of inference” (anumeyā or pakṣa). The expression “evidence” (hetu or linga) is to be understood to refer to a second property which is different from the argued property. This evidence can be considered proper only if all of the three following criteria are met:

**Criterion One:** The evidence must be a property of the object of inference.

**Criterion Two:** The evidence must be known to occur in other loci (i.e. other than the object of inference) in which the argued property occurs.

**Criterion Three:** The evidence must not be known to occur in other loci in which the argued property is absent.

In the context of debate, Criterion One rules out the introduction of irrelevant evidence, i.e. evidence that has no connection with the subject of the argument. Criterion Two rules out two kinds of evidence. First it rules out evidence that points only to the negation of the stated conclusion. And secondly it rules out as proper evidence those properties that occur in no other locus than the object of inference. And Criterion Three rules out as proper evidence that which could point either to the stated conclusion or to its negation. Those are the three criteria of proper evidence as Diinnāga inherited them.

1.3331. THE WHEEL OF EVIDENCE (HETUCAKRA)

Early in his career as a logician, Diinnāga seems to have noticed that even in those cases in which Criterion One of proper evidence was met, Criteria Two and Three, as formulated above, could be met either “completely” or “partially”. That is, the evidence could be found either in all loci in which the argued property occurs, or only in some. And it could be found either in all those loci in which the argued property was known to be absent, or only in some. In what was probably his earliest logical work he arranged in tabular form these possibilities of how a property that is evident in the object of inference can be distributed in loci in which the argued property is present and absent. The structure of the table and the conclusions drawn from it are as follows.

**Position One:** Suppose Criterion Two is completely met and Criterion Three
is completely violated. That is, the evidence occurs in every known locus of the argued property and also in every known locus in which the argued property is absent. In this case it is impossible to determine from the presence of the evidence in a given locus whether the argued property is present or absent in that locus, because the evidence is promiscuous, i.e. not restricted (vyabhicārin, anaikāntika) to just one set of loci. Hence that evidence is inconclusive with respect to the argued property’s presence in a given locus.

**Position Two:** Suppose Criterion Two is completely met and Criterion Three is completely met. That is, the evidence occurs in every known locus in which the argued property is present and it is absent in every known locus in which the argued property is absent. In this case, the evidence is restricted to loci in which the argued property is present, therefore it is reasonable to conclude from the presence of the evidence in a given locus that the argued property is not absence from that locus.

**Position Three:** Suppose Criterion Two is completely met while Criterion Three is only partially met. That is, the evidence is present in every known locus of the argued property and absent in some but not all of the loci in which the argued property is absent. In this case, as in Position One, the evidence is not restricted to just one set of loci.

**Position Four:** Suppose Criterion Two is completely violated and Criterion Three is also completely violated. That is, the evidence is absent in every known locus in which the argued property is present and it is present in every known
locus in which the argued property is absent. In this case, the evidence is restricted to those loci in which the argued property is absent. Hence in citing it as evidence for the conclusion that the argued property is present in a given locus, one is in fact giving evidence for the negation of his stated conclusion.

**Position Five:** Suppose Criterion Two is completely violated and Criterion Three is completely met. That is, the evidence is absent in every locus in which the argued property is present and also absent in every locus in which the argued property is absent. In this case, the evidence is restricted to exactly one locus, namely the object of the inference. But it leads to no conclusions as to whether the argued property is present or absent in that locus.

**Position Six:** Suppose Criterion Two is violated completely and Criterion Three is only partially met. That is, the evidence is absent in every locus in which the argued property is present and absent in some but not all loci in which the argued property is absent. In this case, as in Position Four, the evidence is restricted to those loci in which the argued property is absent.

**Position Seven:** Suppose Criterion Two is partially met and Criterion Three is completely violated. That is, the evidence is present in some but not all loci in which the argued property is present, but it is present in all loci in which the argued property is absent. In this case the evidence is not restricted to loci of the argued property, so, as in Position One, it is inconclusive with respect to that argued property’s presence in a given locus.

**Positive Eight:** Suppose Criterion Two is only partially met and Criterion Three is completely met. That is, the evidence is present in some but not all loci in which the argued property is present, and it is absent in all loci in which the argued property is absent. In this case the evidence is restricted to loci in which the argued property is present. Hence, as in the case of Position Two, it is reasonable to conclude from the presence of the evidence in a given locus that the argued property is not absent from that locus.

**Position Nine:** Suppose Criteria Two and Three are both partially met. That is, the evidence is present in some but not all loci in which the argued property is present, and it is absent in some but not all loci in which the argued property is absent. In this case the evidence is not restricted to loci of the argued property. Evidence distributed in loci in the manner of Position Nine is thus inconclusive.

As can be seen from the above, Diññāga concluded that in order for a property that occurs in the object of inference to be proper evidence, Criterion Three must be met completely, and if this were so, then Criterion Two could be met only partially and still yield proper evidence. This led to a reformulation of the second two of the three criteria as Diññāga received them. The refined formulations can be construed as follows:

**Criterion Two:** The evidence must be known to occur in at least one other locus (i.e. other than the object of inference) in which the argued property occurs.
Criterion Three: The evidence must not be known to occur in any other loci in which the argued property is absent.\textsuperscript{32}

These, then, are the reformulated criteria for proper evidence in the context of argument, where one is systematically communicating to another person the conclusions one has reached from certain observations. Their application to privately reached judgments, or inference for oneself as it is called, involves only substituting in the above formula the word “judged” for “argued”. This will give us the formula for judgments derived from the observation of evidence. A more general formula for the test of the reliability of any judgment of the form “a certain hidden property is in a given locus” might in Diśnāga’s system of epistemology appear as follows.

A judgment is reliable only if the following three conditions are met:

1. There exists in the object of judgment (i.e. the given locus) a second property, which is different from the judged property (the hidden property) and which is furthermore evident to the person making the judgment. (This second property will hereafter be called “the evidence”.)
2. There exists at least one other locus, different from the object of judgment, in which the evidence and judged property are both known to occur.
3. There is no known locus in which the evidence occurs but the judged property does not occur.\textsuperscript{33}

1.332. The function of examples

The structure of Diśnāga’s Hetucakra suggests that he had arrived at an inchoate understanding of some principles of quantificational logic. First of all, it appears that he understood the validity of a form of reasoning that bears resemblance to the syllogism of traditional European logic. A correct line of reasoning in Diśnāga’s scheme is one that has the form “All loci of the evidence are loci of the argued property. This is a locus of the evidence. Therefore, this is a locus of the argued property.” (I shall refer to this scheme as the Diśnāgan reasoning scheme). Moreover, there is in the structure of the Hetucakra evidence of an understanding of the circumstances under which the universal proposition “All loci of the evidence are loci of the argued property” either follows from or contradicts certain other universal or particular propositions; where these other propositions come from we shall see below.

In his presentation of the Hetucakra, Diśnāga offers nine sample arguments, one to illustrate each of the nine possible distributions of the evidence in the loci possessing and in the loci lacking the argued property. These nine samples are as follows.
Thus the formal presentations of these arguments would be statements such as “Sound is permanent, because it is knowable”, “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced” etc.

Now it was customary in Indian debate to offer one example of some locus, other than the object of the argument, in which the argued property and the evidence both occur. This was called a positive example. It was also customary to offer a negative example, i.e. a locus in which both argued property and evidence were absent. Diināga follows this custom, adapting it, however, to a slightly new purpose, namely to that of giving representative instances of universal or existential propositions34 – which of these two types of proposition the example stood for depended on the position of the Hetucakra under consideration.35 For example, in those positions in which the evidence is present in all loci in which there is presence of the argued property, one example is given of such a locus; this example can be seen as generating the proposition “All loci of the argued property are loci of the evidence.” But in those positions in which the evidence is present in some loci of the argued property but absent in other such loci, two examples are given, one for each case. These case be understood as generating respectively the propositions “Some loci of the argued property are loci of the evidence” and “Some loci of the argued property are not loci of the evidence.” And finally, in those positions in which the evidence is absent in all loci of the argued property, one example is given, which can be understood as generating the proposition “No locus of the argued property is a locus of the evidence.” Let us now look at the examples given for each of the above nine arguments and see what propositions can be generated from the combination of examples and position in the Hetucakra. In each case below, the example is a locus of the property represented by the italicized phrase in the proposition. If it is a locus of the argued property, it is marked (+); if it is not a locus of the argued property, it is marked (−). The evidence or its negation is represented by the predicate of the proposition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Propositions generated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>All that is permanent is knowable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>All that is not permanent is knowable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>pot (+)</td>
<td>All that is impermanent is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>either (−)</td>
<td>Nothing that is not impermanent is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>pot (+)</td>
<td>All that is manmade is impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lightning (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not manmade are impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ether (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not manmade are not impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>Nothing that is eternal is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>All that is not eternal is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>Nothing that is permanent is audible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>Nothing that is not permanent is audible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>Nothing that is permanent is manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not permanent are manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lightning (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not permanent are not manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>lightning (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are not manmade are impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are not manmade are impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>All that is manmade is impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>pot (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are impermanent are manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lightning (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are impermanent are not manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ether (−)</td>
<td>Nothing that is permanent is manmade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ether (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are permanent are incorporeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>atom (+)</td>
<td>Some things that are permanent are not incorporeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not permanent are incorporeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pot (−)</td>
<td>Some things that are not permanent are not incorporeal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A study of the above examples and their attendant propositions will show that positions 3, 6 and 9 of the Hetucakra contain propositions of the form “Some loci in which the argued property is absent are loci of the evidence,” which can be converted to “Some loci of the evidence are not loci of the argued property.” Since this is a contradiction of the universal proposition “All loci of the evidence are loci of the argued property,” the universal proposition cannot follow from positions 3, 6 or 9; and if we cannot derive that universal proposition, we lack the first premiss in the correct line of reasoning in Diññāga’s scheme.

Similarly, in positions 1, 4 and 7 of the Hetucakra we find propositions of the form “All loci in which the argued property is absent are loci of the evidence.”
which by conversion per *accidens* yields “Some loci of the evidence are not loci of the argued property.” Thus positions 1, 4 and 7 also contain propositions contradictory to “All loci of the evidence are loci of the argued property.”

Positions 2 and 8 contain the propositions of the form “No locus in which the argued property is absent is a locus of the evidence” which is equivalent to “All loci of the evidence are loci of the argued property.” Hence the first premiss of the Diṅnāga reasoning scheme can be derived from the propositions generated by the negative examples in these positions.

Position 5 also contains the proposition “No locus in which the argued property is absent is a locus of the evidence”. But it also contains a proposition generated by the positive example: “No locus of the argued property is a locus of the evidence.” Now if the proposition “There is at least one locus of the evidence” is true (and it is true whenever the evidence has been observed in the object of the argument), then the two universal propositions generated by the positive and negative examples cannot both be true. But there is no means of deciding from these propositions alone which is false; some further evidence must be introduced to decided the matter.

The above discussion is intended only to show that underlying Diṅnāga’s system of logic there seems to have been at least a dim awareness of logical principles similar to those worked out by traditional European logicians as the logic of propositions. But it should be pointed out that neither Diṅnāga nor his successors in the Buddhist tradition of logic ever worked out an explicit statement of these principles of formal logic, nor did they develop a vocabulary of technical terms corresponding to such terms in European logic as “universal proposition”, “particular proposition”, “singular proposition” etc. But rather, they worked out a different set of technical terms that were suited to the task of describing the various kinds of relations that might obtain between one property and another or between a property and its locus. We shall turn to a discussion of these relations in the next sections.

### 1.334. On promiscuity (vyabhicāra) and restriction (avyabhicāra)

The most important principles in Diṅnāga’s system of relations are to be found in kārikās 12 through 25 of the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Here he begins with the discussion of a property used as evidence for the occurrence of a second property in the same locus. Now in Diṅnāga’s system, a “property-locus” is a conceptual construct, a useful fiction of analysis. Hence that which is a property of a certain property-locus can in turn be regarded as a locus of another property or properties. For example, smoke can be regarded as a property of a smokey locus, but it can also be regarded as the locus of a number of properties of its own. Some of these properties of smoke will occur in many loci, some in only a few – and one of the properties of the smoke that we perceive in a given locus will be unique to that one instance of smoke and to that one locus of smoke. Now the question arises as to which of these many properties located
in a locus that is in turn regarded as an evident property in its locus contribute to knowledge of some other property or properties in that locus of the evident property.

In answering this question it is established first of all that the unique property, the particularity of the locus, can by itself lead to no further cognitions. It must be assisted by recollections of past experience, which provide associations pertinent to that particular; that is to say, we identify the particular or classify it according to past experiences. The process of identification is itself rather complex, involving a series of judgments consisting in attributing increasingly narrow classes to the object at hand: “Insofar as it is not unreal, it is a reality. Being a reality, insofar as it is not an action or a quality, it is a substance. Being a substance, insofar as it has qualities that belong to smoke but not to other substances, it is smoke.” And so on. Now in this process of identification, a number of properties have been associated with the particular, properties expressible by such phrases as “that it is real”, “that it is a substance”, “that it is smoke” etc. But which of these properties is significant when their locus is itself regarded as the property of the subject of an inference?

In answer to the above question, Diinnāga says that of the properties of the evidence, only those that are not promiscuous, i.e. only those that do not occur in loci other than loci of the judged property, are relevant to the inference of that judged property. As for the properties of the judged property, only those that occur in every known locus of the judged property can be cognized through the evidence. This can be represented visually by diagram. In the diagram below, the small letters \((a, b, c \ldots q)\) represent particular loci. The symbols \((R, S, F \text{ and } Sm)\) stand for generic properties or judgments; the symbol “\(R\)” stands for a property expressible by such words or phrases as “reality”, “that it is real”, “that it is the locus of reality” etc.; “\(S\)” stands for a property expressible as “that it is a substance” etc.; “\(F\)” stands for the property expressible as “that it is fire” etc.; “\(Sm\)” stands for the property expressible as “that it is smoke” etc. The extension of these properties will be indicated by a line (\(\overline{---}\)) such that whatever occurs below that line in the diagram is a locus of the property whose symbol is written to the left of that line. (Although in this diagram the line beside “\(Sm\)” is drawn slightly below the line beside “\(F\)” to aid the eye, it should be read as going through the same points of the line beside “\(F\)” as far as \(d\).)

\[
\begin{align*}
R & \quad \overline{\quad} \\
S & \quad \\
F & \quad \overline{\quad} \\
Sm & \quad \\
\end{align*}
\]

\(a \quad b \quad c \quad d \quad e \quad f \quad g \quad h \quad i \quad j \quad k \quad l \quad m \quad n \quad o \quad p \quad q\)

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In the above diagram loci $a$, $b$, $c$ and $d$ are loci of smoke and fire, loci $e$ and $f$ of smokeless fires; loci $g$, $h$, $i$, $j$, $k$ and $l$ may be loci of any smokeless and fireless substances such as dogs, pots, chewing gum, alarm clocks etc. Let us furthermore imagine some more specific attributes, e.g. that locus $a$ is the locus of red flames, a temperature of 220°C, and thick black smoke; locus $b$ of yellow flames, a temperature of 205°C, and wispy white smoke; and locus $e$ of blue flames, a temperature of 240°C, but no smoke.

Now suppose we observe just the thick black smoke at locus $a$. That smoke comes to be regarded by the mind as the locus of several properties, supplied by past experience. Among those properties is $R$, that it is a reality. But this property occurs not only in loci $(a \ldots f)$ but also in dogs, pots, the quality of smelling sweet and the act of sneezing, any one of which might also occur at locus $a$, but we cannot be sure on the basis of $R$ which of these other things do and which do not occur there. Another property supplied to what we observed at locus $a$ is property $S$, that it is a substance. This narrows down the field somewhat, for it excludes the act of sneezing and the quality of smelling sweet as things necessarily at locus $a$; there may be a sweetsmelling dog sneezing at locus $a$, but property $S$ provides no criterion by which it is possible to decide whether there is or not. Yet a third property supplied by experience to what we saw at locus $a$ is $Sm$, that it is smoke. Of all the properties at locus $a$ it is this property $Sm$ alone that is capable of being known not to occur at loci where property $F$ is absent; whether or not the cognizer of $Sm$ knows that $Sm$ does not occur at loci where $F$ is absent depends on the richness of his past experiences and on how well he has paid attention to what he has seen. Thus of all the properties at locus $a$, it is just this one property $Sm$ that has a potential for playing a rôle in the inference of property $F$.

Concerning property $F$, in inferring it we can also infer that it is the locus of $S$ and $R$, for $S$ and $R$ are found at every fire; but we can infer nothing more specific than $F$ such as the fact of red flames or the temperature of 220°C, since $F$ occurs in loci where those properties do not occur. The flames may be red but are not so necessarily.

Now this notion of promiscuity, the condition of one property $x$’s being able to occur in loci in which another property $y$ is absent, is expressed in Sanskrit by the abstract noun vyābhicāra or by the finite verb vyābhicārati. "$x$ can occur in loci other than those in which $y$ occurs" is expressed by a sentence of the form "$x'y^5$ vyābhicārati" or "$x'y^5$ vyābhicārati" where the superscript 1, 5 and 6 stand for the Sanskrit case-endings of the nominative, ablative and genitive respectively. But if $x$ is not promiscuous with respect to $y$, i.e. if $x$ is restricted to loci of $y$, this restriction is expressed by the terms avyābhicāra or na vyābhicārati. Thus all that we have said so far concerning which properties can be inferred from which evidence can be expressed as follows:

If "$x'y^5$ vyābhicārati", then $y$ cannot be known for certain from knowledge of $x$.
If not "$x'y^5$ vyābhicārati", then $y$ can be known for certain from knowledge of $x$.

That, then, is how Diśnāga formulates the principle that from knowledge of
any given class, one can derive knowledge of any wider class that includes it but not of that wider class’s subclasses.

1.335. On pervasion (vyāpti)

The concept of promiscuity is related to the concept of restriction in that restriction is the contradictory of promiscuity. Diṅnāga introduces another concept that is related to the concept of restriction, namely that of pervasion. A property \( x \) pervades a property \( y \) if \( x \) occurs in every locus of \( y \). To see how pervasion relates to restriction, consider the following universe comprising four loci \( (a, b, c, d) \) and four properties \( (w, x, y, z) \) in which the properties are distributed in the loci as shown in the following chart.

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<td>( a )</td>
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In this universe we can observe the following cases of pervasion:

1. \( w \) pervades \( x \)
2. \( w \) pervades \( y \)
3. \( w \) pervades \( z \)
4. \( x \) pervades \( w \)
5. \( x \) pervades \( y \)
6. \( x \) pervades \( z \)

And the following cases of promiscuity:

1. \( w \) is promiscuous with respect to \( y \)
2. \( w \) is promiscuous with respect to \( z \)
3. \( x \) is promiscuous with respect to \( y \)
4. \( x \) is promiscuous with respect to \( z \)
5. \( y \) is promiscuous with respect to \( z \)
6. \( z \) is promiscuous with respect to \( y \)

It will be noticed that pervasion is a nonsymmetrical relation in the above universe; \( w \) and \( x \) are in a relation of reciprocal pervasion, but \( x \) and \( y \) are in a relation of nonreciprocal pervasion in that \( x \) pervades \( y \) but \( y \) does not pervade \( x \). Similarly, promiscuity can be either reciprocal or nonreciprocal; in the above universe \( y \) and \( z \) are mutually promiscuous in that \( y \) is promiscuous with respect
to \( z \) and \( z \) is promiscuous with respect to \( y \), but \( w \) and \( y \) are nonreciprocally promiscuous in that \( x \) is promiscuous with respect to \( y \) but \( y \) is restricted to \( x \).

From the above it can be seen that given any two properties \( (P_1, P_2) \), there cannot be between them both a relation of reciprocal pervasion and of reciprocal promiscuity. But it may be that there is neither a relation of reciprocal pervasion nor of reciprocal promiscuity. In case there is neither reciprocal pervasion nor reciprocal promiscuity, there must be a relation of nonreciprocal pervasion. In other words, between any two properties there must be exactly one of the following three relations: reciprocal promiscuity, reciprocal pervasion or non-reciprocal pervasion.

Let us now return our attention to the problem of inference, the process wherein observation of one property in a locus leads to knowledge of a second property in that locus. It was pointed out above that Diśnāgā laid down the principle that observation of one property, the evidence, can lead to knowledge of a second property, the judged or argued property, only if the evidence is restricted to loci of the judged property. And we have seen in the discussion immediately above that one property is restricted to a second property if and only if it is pervaded by that second property. That which is pervaded is necessarily restricted to the pervader, but the pervader is not necessarily restricted to that which is pervaded. Similarly proper evidence can lead to knowledge of the judged property, but no certainty results if the roles of the properties be reversed, that is if we try to use what was formerly the judged property as evidence for the property that was formerly the evidence; the relation of evidence and judged property (or indicator and thing indicated, as these properties may also be called in Diśnāgā’s system) is a nonsymmetrical relation.

1.3351. ON PRECLUSION OF THE COMPLEMENT (ANYĀPOHA)

Diśnāgā seems to have been troubled by the process of both reciprocal and non-reciprocal pervasion within his system of logic. Apparently, he felt it would be more convenient to find some conceptual apparatus that would eliminate the necessity of knowing for any given case of pervasion whether it is reciprocal (in which the pervading property and pervaded property are reciprocally inerferable) or nonreciprocal (in which case only the pervading property can be inferred from the pervaded property but not vice versa). This more convenient apparatus was found by describing a feature that reciprocal and nonreciprocal pervasion have in common. That common feature is this: in all cases of pervasion, absence of the pervading property is restricted to absence of the pervaded property. Now any property can serve as a basis for dividing the universe into two sets of loci: the set in which that property is present, and its complementary set, i.e. the set of loci in which the property is not present. Thus another way to state the above common characteristic is: presence of a pervaded property in a locus precludes that locus’s being a member of the set of loci in which the pervading property is not present. The set of loci in which any given property is absent is

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called in Diṅnāga’s terminology that given property’s anya (literally, “other”), and the notion of preclusion is conveyed by the abstract noun apoha, which is a nominalized form of a verb meaning “to deny, exclude” etc.; hence the compound formed by these two elements, “anyāpoha,” refers to the above stated principle of precluding the complement. This principle, according to Diṅnāga, describes the essence of the inferential process, for it is that which is shared by private judgment and by communication of one’s ideas to others, whether that communication be in the form of a formal debate or informal conversation. In the context of private judgment, “preclusion of the complement” refers to preclusion of the membership of the locus of evidence in the set that complements the set of loci in which the judged property is present. In the context of verbal communication, it refers to preclusion of a symbol’s being used to stand for a member of the set that complements the set of things for which that symbol is allowed to stand according to whatever convention is governing the symbol’s use.

1.4. A brief note on Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of Diṅnāga

Diṅnāga’s presentation of his ideas on epistemology and logic is notoriously laconic. Even the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in which his thoughts are given their greatest amplification, tends to be much richer in suggestion than in precise formulation of his ideas. It was left to later interpreters to work out the details of what was suggested by Diṅnāga, and it is perhaps unfortunate that the first significant attempt to give a thorough interpretation of Diṅnāga’s system was so thorough that it seems to have discouraged all further attempts. I refer to the works of Dharmakīrti, which, aside from a few casual references to passages of the Pramāṇasamuccaya in post-Dharmakīrtian works, seem to have supplanted Diṅnāga’s work as the starting point for later logical investigations within the Buddhist tradition. Even the sole surviving commentary to the Pramāṇasamuccaya was written by a man heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti, and although the commentary is generally excellent, it is clear that in certain passages the commentator has gratuitously introduced Dharmakīrti’s concepts to explain passages that might have been explained as well if not better through other concepts. In twentieth century scholarship, too, owing to the fact that Diṅnāga’s works have not been studied carefully except by a few scholars, the general rule among modern scholars has been to assume that Diṅnāga’s ideas were essentially identical to Dharmakīrti’s. As both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti become better known to students of their period of Indian philosophy, however, more attention will undoubtedly be given to studying the question of just how the two thinkers differed and to assessing whether those differences between the two thinkers are trivial or substantial. This is not the place to discuss that question in any detail, but it may be interesting to mention just one respect in which Dharmakīrti’s philosophical priorities seem different from those of Diṅnāga, and that is in the extent of his commitments to certain ontological doctrines.
The extent to which Dharmakīrti’s metaphysical commitments differ from Dīnāga’s can be illustrated by considering the respective views of the two philosophers on the nature of the particular svālaksana. Judging from how little attention Dīnāga pays to discussing the nature of the particular, save to say that it is a thing that is cognized as it is, it would seem that his view of its nature does not deviate significantly from what might be called a commonsense view; a particular for him is essentially just a thing that is numerically different from other things. A particular is said by Dīnāga to be inexpressible, and what he seems to mean by this is quite simply that one cannot by just naming or even describing a particular thing impart to another person a precise and unambiguous understanding of just exactly that one thing, for by applying a suitable name or description to a thing one is inevitably saying something that is suitable not only to that one thing but to countless other particulars as well. Therefore, the audience of a verbal communication will not form exactly the same mental image as that of the author of that communication.

Now this view of words and of things, namely that one word applies suitably to many particular things and therefore a particular thing is not the sole referent of a word, is not in any way extraordinary, and Dīnāga makes few if any philosophical commitments beyond that very ordinary view. We find in Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, a different state of affairs; in his system the particular comes to be characterized according to the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, which doctrines deviate considerably from a commonsense view of the world. Thus for Dharmakīrti the particular is something that exist for exactly one moment; each particular is absolutely different from every other; and consequently all notions of similarity are fundamentally erroneous insofar as they violate the absolute uniqueness of the particulars that constitute reality.39 Having committed himself to these peculiar doctrines of the Sautrāntika school, Dharmakīrti must deal with a number of philosophical problems that no longer have much bearing on just the logical and epistemological principles that were Dīnāga’s primary concern.50 In doing all this, it is quite possible that Dharmakīrti set in motion within the Buddhist school of logic a philosophical trend that was not altogether consistent with Dīnāga’s philosophical positions. But let that be a matter for further research.

2.0. Following is an English translation of the first 25 kārikās, and Dīnāga’s own commentary on them, of the Svārthaṃsūkunāravaccheda, the second chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. This text is no longer extant in the original Sanskrit but has been preserved in two Tibetan translations. Also preserved in Tibetan is a commentary entitled Visālāmalavātī Tikā written by one Jinendrabuddhi. Both translations of the Pramāṇasamuccaya as well as Jinendrabuddhi’s Tikā are preserved in the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, in the division of the bstan ’gyur devoted to logic (Skt: hetuvidyā, Tib: gtan tshigs rig pa).

Concerning the two translations of Dīnāga’s work, the earlier was done probably in the late eleventh or early twelfth-century by Vasudhararakṣita and
2.01. Since I had available to me only the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, I relied on the edition of the Tibetan texts of Kanakavarmā and Vasudhararakṣita that appears in Kitagawa (1965) pp. 447–469 for information on variant readings in other editions of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. My translation generally follows the translation by Kanakavarmā, which usually seems to be the more reliable of the two Tibetan translations. In a number of places, however, in which the translation of Vasudhararakṣita seemed more accurate, I have followed it and have indicated these passages in the text of my translation.

2.02. Symbols and conventions used in the translation

Owing to the fact that in both Sanskrit and Tibetan sentences anything that is felt to be obvious from context is usually left unexpressed, a perfectly literal translation into English of a Tibetan sentence would usually produce a virtually meaningless string of words (even if the words were placed in normal English word-order). Therefore a translator must supply a great deal in order to produce well-formed English sentences in the first place, and it is often necessary to supply even more to show explicitly the logical relations among several sentences. Now there is always a risk that a translator, in supplying extra words and phrases to bring out the meaning of a passage, will supply the wrong words. It seems only fair, therefore, to give the reader some indication of where words have been supplied. Thus I have indicated supplied material by enclosing it in parentheses — with apologies to anyone who finds reading a text with an abundance of material in parentheses as annoying as I do. As for the sources of what is supplied in these parentheses, much of it comes from the context of Diṇṇāga’s text itself, i.e. from surrounding sentences, and the remainder comes from Jinendrabuddhi’s Tikā, without the help of which much of the Pramāṇasamuccaya would be nearly impossible to understand accurately.

In the original text the Kārikā verses are interwoven into the prose commentary in such a way that the verses, when isolated, are so laconic as to be nearly unintelligible. All material presented in verse form in the original text is indicated in the translation by italics. The numbering of the verses, which are unnumbered in the Tibetan texts, follows the numbering in Kitagawa’s edition.

The Tibetan texts are not divided into paragraphs. All paragraph divisions and numbering thereof are introduced by the English translator.
References in footnotes and the margins to passages in the Tibetan texts are to the folio numbering of the Peking edition. The obverse and verso of each folio are indicated respectively by “a” and “b” written just to the right of the folio number. The line number of that folio-side is indicated by a superscript. The letters “K”, “V” and “J” to the left of the folio number indicate whether the text being referred to is Kanakavaran’s, Vasudhararaksita’s or Jindrabuddhis. Thus “J107b” means the third line of the verso of folio 107 in Jindrabuddhis’s commentary.

Footnotes containing comments pertaining exclusively to a feature of the Sanskrit or Tibetan language are indicated by “S” or “T” to the right of the footnote number in the text. Anyone not interested in these languages will save himself vexation by not bothering to look up footnotes so indicated. The Romanization of Tibetan words follows the system of Wylie (1959).

Passages of the translation where I have found the reading in Vasudhararaksita’s translation preferable to that in Kanakavaran are indicated by the symbols “→V” and “←V”, placed respectively over the first and last words of the phrase that is based on Vasudhararaksita. In case neither Kanakavaran nor Vasudhararaksita was intelligible to me, I have provided a paraphrase of the passage based on information in Jindrabuddhis’s Tikā; such passages are marked by “J→” and “←J”. This convention of marking which Tibetan translation is being followed, which was used by Kitagawa in his translations into Japanese, is for the convenience of those who want to use the Tibetan texts as aids in understanding the English, or vice versa.

2.03. Finding suitable English expressions for technical terms in an ancient non-European philosophical tradition is not always simple and is a matter on which no two translators seem ever fully to agree. The expressions I have chosen for some terms may seem odd to people who prefer other English expressions for those same terms. Thus for those who might wish to know the Tibetan and Sanskrit basis of some of the key expressions in this text, I have included a small glossary as an appendix to the translation. Words and phrases appearing in this glossary are marked in the text of the translation by an asterisk placed directly behind the word at its first occurrence.

**Inference for oneself**

2.1. [Inference and how it differs from perception]

*K(ārik)ā lab* K109a¹

1) The inferential process is of two kinds: that which is for one’s own sake, and that which is for the sake of other people.

Of those, inference for oneself consists in discerning an object through an indicator⁴⁴ that has three characteristics. Inference for oneself is discerning an infeerable object through an indicator that has the three characteristics explained below [Section 2.2].
(2) As was the case above, this too refers (not only to the cognitive process but also) to the resulting cognition. The resulting cognition is explained in this case in the same way as it was explained in the case of perception, i.e. with reference to a cognition’s having two aspects.

(3) Q(uestion): Now if both (perception and inference) are characterized as cognitions, what is the difference between them?

A(nswer): Their fields of operation* and essential natures are dissimilar. Perception and inference have distinct fields of operation, and their essential natures are also distinct in accordance with their having different cognitive images*.

(4) Q: Now why is it that only inference is subdivided into two parts?

A: Because the particular* (which is within the field of operation of perception) is inexpressible.* (But inference), since the object grasped by it differs, is otherwise. Perception and inference have different fields of operation. If the object of perception were expressible, one could infer it just through speech.

(5) Q: Now suppose it is argued that sometimes we observe cases of inferring perceptible objects, as for example (when we infer) a tangible property through a visible one. A: Yes, there are such experiences, but it is not (really a case of inference and perception’s having the same field of operation). The inference of that (tangible property) is not the same as the perception of it, but rather it is otherwise; it is otherwise in that we infer a universal of the tangible property after recalling a former experience. Thus we infer the tangible property through the universal of the visible property rather than through the form of the perception of the visible property itself. Since the particular tangible property that was previously perceived cannot be designated by name, there is no confusion of the fields of operation of the two means of acquiring knowledge.

(6) Q: But if perceptible things are inexpressible, why are expressions such as “seen” etc. used with reference to things that are seen etc.?

A: There is no inconsistency here, for in that case it is described through the fact of its being seen, but it is not named through its essential property. They are referred to by some token such as “is seen” “is heard” “is desired” “is known” etc. but not through their essential properties.

(7) Q: But is it not the case that after we apprehend a blue colour through mind-consciousness*, the very object that we experienced through visual-consciousness is then expressed (with the words). “It is blue”*
A: Here too, *since it is cognized through a name, it is the (universal) cognitive image, which is different (from the cognitive image of the particular) that is expressible. The mind has (the capacity of grasping) two cognitive images. (The immediately preceding statement) says that since mind-consciousness, by rejecting what is not blue, is able to receive the object experienced by visual-consciousness, the mind has two cognitive images (i.e. the image of the universal and that of the particular)*.

(8) Given that the particular is inexpressible, since the essential nature of a knowable object is in the field of operation of perception, whereas inference has universals as its field and is expressible through verbal expressions, inference alone is divided into two parts.

(9) Q: But, it may be objected, we should not say that all inference has universals as its field of operation, because it is observed even when there is no universal. Although (the element) Wind does not have the character of a universal, it is nevertheless seen to be inferred by means of its touch, as it is said concerning touch (in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* II.1.10) “things that are seen have no touch” etc.

A: *No, that is not the case, for it is a universal that is (indirectly) indicated. It is not a case of inferring (a particular substance, namely the element) Wind, because since touch etc. are qualities, the general property of having a substratum is indicated (indirectly through the quality-universal). Or, to explain it another way, it is not the specific nature of Wind etc. that is inferred, but it is just the fact of being supported by some substance, which fact is common to touch (and the other qualities), that is indicated.*

(10) Q: Suppose it is argued that it (= the particular substance, Wind) is proved by a process of elimination*, i.e. it is established that this inference regarding the nature of things such as Wind is through a process of elimination, as follows: “Touch is absent in visible things, but (it is) not (absent) in invisible things.”

A: That is not the case, because it (= the substance Wind) is not proven to exist, and because (even if it were proven to exist, then) touch could be denied (to belong to it) in the same way (as it was denied to belong to the other elements).

(11) Q: It being established that Wind exists, there is no denying it. A specific substance is inferred on the basis of a specific quality without (recourse to) a general quality, because of that substance’s connection with that specific quality; that being the case, (the existence of) Wind is established.
A: (True), but the existence of touch (in Wind) is not established; it can be denied (in Wind) in the same way it was denied in the substance Earth and the other substances. Because it is not a specific quality.\textsuperscript{52}

(12) Q: Suppose one argues that touch is denied in visible substances just on the ground that it is invisible itself.

A: That also is incorrect. Touch cannot be denied as a quality of things that are visible, corporeal and resistant\textsuperscript{*},\textsuperscript{53} in fact, the mind infers touch as a quality of those things because touch is observed when (those) other (properties) are observed, and it is not observed when they are not observed. Therefore touch does belong to visible things.

(13) Thus, since there are more possibilities than one, confusion arises as to what touch does belong to, so one cannot infer Wind by denying all other possibilities.

(14) Besides, (that Wind is the substance in which the quality touch occurs is not really even an inference) because it is established by denying (substances) other than itself on the authority of the statements of credible persons\textsuperscript{*}.\textsuperscript{54} In this case, Wind is established (as the substratum of touch) after one first infers substance in general (on the grounds that touch, being a quality, must inhere in one of the nine substances) and then eliminates the other (eight) substances (as its substratum) by the authority of the statements of credible persons. The same (process) applies to other cases as well. Therefore it is on the basis of traditional doctrines\textsuperscript{*} that wind is established (as the locus of the quality touch).

(15) Q: Then the (above) point is proved, because there is no difference; since there is no difference between traditional doctrines and inference, it is established here that inference has the particular as its sphere of operation!

A: That is not the case, because in fact they are different. That verbal testimony is different from inference is established on the authority of common usage\textsuperscript{*}.\textsuperscript{55}

(16) Some say the distinction lies in the fact that (in verbal testimony) no example is stated. If this were the case, it would follow that whenever one or both examples were not explicitly stated because they are already well known, as for example in the inference of fire from smoke, that would be (a case of) verbal testimony\textsuperscript{*} (rather than inference).

(17) But others state the difference as follows: in the case of verbal testimony, the word indicates (its object) owing to a
(fundamental) identity between the word and the object, so in fact it does not reveal (the object) through a process of inference. But if this is the case, that a word signifies (its object) through (the object's) identity with the word, some account must be given of how we conclude (which aspect of) the object (is identical with and thus indicated by the word, for an object has many aspects). The object named by the word “tree” is nothing other (than the tree). Although the word “substance” makes the same object (i.e. the tree) known, it really does so in another way, by distinguishing it from what has no substance.

(18) Q: But the word “tree” also makes the distinction from nonsubstance known.
A: True, it does make that known, but it does so by implication, not explicitly, so that objection is invalid.

(19) Now there may be nothing wrong in saying that verbal testimony is a means of correct cognition in the case of words (classified as nouns etc.) such as “tree” etc., but words such as those that name actions also make us know something, but not through some characteristic (of whatever it is that such words indicate).

(20) Some assert that the only speech is the (whole) sentence, and individual words are a means of understanding that (sentence), they do not recognize an object conforming to speech. Thus, admitting a slight difference between inference and verbal testimony, they say that they are different.

(21) (So far) in the above explanations of inference, attention has been focused on indicators not connected with speech. But verbal communication also (is like inference in that it) does not apply to a unique thing (but only to generalities). Therefore, one should regard inference as being of two types according as (its object is) visible or invisible. In the case of a visible object, we may teach its name. With reference to an invisible object there is only a concept but there is no cognition of a particular object.

(22) Q: How can verbal testimony be classed as inference? (Inference is a means of correct cognition, but in the testimony of the ancient Seers we find) words such as “Heaven” (which) do not express any (real) object at all.

A: The statements of credible persons are (to be subsumed under) inference insofar as they have (in) common (with inference the) character of not being false. Because when one hears the statement of credible people; the (resultant) cognition is not false, and because this makes them similar (to inference) we say (such statements are to be classed as) inference. Further-
more, it is claimed that the name-giving* was previously seen first-hand (by the ancient Seers). This view denies inference with respect to such things as (the Sāṁkhya) thesis of Primordial Substance*\(^{59}\) (because it has never been seen before).\(^{60}\)
(23) Therefore inference does not have particulars as its range of operation.

2.2. [The three criteria of conclusive evidence]
(1) The phrase (from Kārikā 1) “through an indicator that has three characteristics” must now be explained. (A proper indicator must be) present in the object of inference* and in what is similar to it, and absent in their absence.\(^{61}\) The object of inference is a property-locus* qualified by a property; by discerning, either through perception or through inference, the indicator in a locus of the argued property, one later establishes its existence as a general property either in some or all loci of the same class.
(2) Q: Why is it (that we say “some or all loci of the same class”)? why do we not say “all” such loci)?
A: Since the requirement* is that the indicator occur in no loci but those that are similar (to the object of inference); there is no requirement that it occur (in all loci similar to the object of inference).\(^{62}\)
(3) Q: But then nothing (further) is accomplished by saying “the indicator is absent in the absence (of what is similar to the object of inference).”
A: This statement is made in order to emphasize that the indicator, being absent when what is similar to the object of inference is absent, is not present in what is other than or incompatible with the object of inference.\(^{63}\)
(4) Here then is the indicator with three characteristics from which we discern the indicated property*.
(5) Q: In that case, should one not also mention the knowledge (of the indicator as a factor in inference)?\(^{64}\)
A: That is not necessary to mention, because it is taken for granted here that there is also knowledge (of the indicator).
Q: How can what is not explicitly mentioned be taken for granted?
A: Because (the indicator) is the principal one of the factors that produced knowledge (of the indicator). The indicator is the foremost of the factors that make the indicator known, and although cognition of the indicator is itself dependent on an
agent of cognition, still it is not dependent on many things such as an instrumental cause etc., therefore it is established (automatically).\textsuperscript{65}

(6) Since we have said that a proper indicator has three characteristics, \textit{it is of course the case that an indicator having only one or two (of those characteristics) does not serve the purpose.}

(7) Of these, indicators having only one characteristics are as follows:

(1) those which are present only in the object of inference but are absent in what is similar and not absent in what is not similar,

(2) those which are present in what is similar to the object of inference but absent in the object of inference itself and also not absent in what is not similar to it, and

(3) those which are absent in what is dissimilar to the object of inference but absent in the object of inference and also absent in what is similar to it.

Indicators having only two of the characteristics are:

(4) those that are present in the object of inference and present in what is similar to it but not absent in what is dissimilar,

(5) those which are present in the object of inference and absent in what is dissimilar from it but are absent in what is similar, and

(6) those which are present in what is similar to the object of inference and absent in what is dissimilar but are absent in the object of inference itself.

(8) The above six types of apparent evidence* can be understood by implication to be ruled out (as proper evidence). Examples (of each of the above six forms of improper evidence are respectively):

\texttt{Sound is permanent (1) because it is produced}
\texttt{(2) because it is corporeal} \quad \texttt{\{\text{\rightarrow}\}} \quad \texttt{\{\leftarrow\}}
\texttt{(3) because it is unknowable}
\texttt{Sound is impermanent (4) because it is incorporeal}
\texttt{(5) because it is audible}
\texttt{(6) because it is visible.}\textsuperscript{56}
2.3. [Property-locus as object of inference]

kā 8ab
(1) Now on this matter, some people claim that it is another property that is cognized through the invariable association (of the evidence with that other property). They claim that since from smoke we cognize fire that accompanies it rather than cognizing a place possessed of fire, it follows that we infer the fire itself from the smoke.

kā 8cd
(2) Others assert that since the (inferred) property and that property’s locus are both already known, (the new knowledge arising in) an inference is that of the relation (between the inferred property and its locus). These people claim that since (the inferred property) fire and its locus are well-known to people, the thing that is inferred from smoke is the relation between fire and its locus.

kā 9ab
(3) Let us first answer the former view. If the indicator is known to occur at the (other) property, what else is inferred through it? If the indicator, smoke, is already known to be at the other property, fire, then what is the purpose of recalling the relation between smoke and fire; and what is inferred through smoke?

kā 9cd
(Febrthermore) if (the indicator is known to occur) at the (inferred) property’s locus, why isn’t that (locus) the thing that is inferred? If fire is inferred through the perception of smoke in a locus that is connected with fire, then why not say that the locus itself is inferred to be possessed of fire? For it is not the case that fire is not cognized there.

kā 10a
(4) And to those who say that it is the relation that is the object of inference (we reply): (1) The two do not occur in the relation. Fire and smoke do not occur in the relation, so (if the relation is regarded as the object of inference) this would amount to saying there is fire wherever there is no occurrence of smoke. (2) Furthermore, we would hear the genitive case applied to the possessor. If the relation were the object of the inference, we would see the genitive case applied to (the word for) fire, which has the relation, e.g. “The relation of fire.” (But in fact) we employ the nominative case: “Fire is here.” (3) A relation is not expressible through its intrinsic properties; a relation is expressible only in terms of something else (namely its relata). That being the case, it is not an object of inference, but rather, it is known by implication. When we say “There is fire here” the relation (of fire to the locus) is expressed only implicitly. For the reasons stated above it is not the object of inference through smoke.

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(4) This (relation) has no relation with the evidence, since it is not the case that an invariable relation (of the relation) with smoke is shown elsewhere; rather, (the invariable relation is shown to be of smoke) with fire.

(5) Q: The above criticisms are invalid, because you regard the locus-endowed-with-fire to be the object of inference despite the fact that smoke is not shown to be invariably related to that locus. Well, the same may be true of the relation as well.

A: This is not a parallel instance*, because it is the invariable relation of the indicator with the (inferred) property that is pointed out elsewhere. When it is established there, it will make the property-locus known to be endowed with that property. When one sees the invariable relation of smoke with fire in one place, then by observing only smoke in a second place, it is possible to establish this second locus to be possessed of fire on the grounds that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Otherwise, we cannot account for it; (we cannot say, for example) that a specific instance of smoke and a specific yet unproved locus are invariably related elsewhere; but we can point out the invariable relation with a universal, for what is indicated is that wherever there is smoke there is fire.

(6) Therefore it is correct to say that although the indicator is shown to be necessarily related to the inferred property, neither the (inferred) property itself nor the relation is the object of inference.

2.4. [On restricted and promiscuous properties]

(1) Now we must consider the other property, and also we must explain the indicator.

(2) Concerning the property-locus that displays an indicator that is restricted* to a property and is thereby proved to be in possession of that property: an object has many properties, but we do not cognize them all through the indicator; the indicator makes known those (properties) with which the inferred object is necessarily related* (and it makes this known) by a process of eliminating others. We cannot cognize by means of the smoke what kind of specific features the fire has, e.g. what kind of flames it has or its temperature, because the indicator may occur where those (specific features) do not*.

But one does cognize those things that are necessarily related, things without which no fire exists, such as the fact of being a substance* and the fact of possessing qualities*; these proper-
ties are cognized as incompatible with non-substance etc. For example, the cognition of fire is in accordance with things that being related to it can only rule out what is not fire; one does not observe them all in fire’s absence, but one does observe (some of them) in things other (than fire).

(3) Possession of qualities, aroma, sweet fragrance as a whole and a particular sweet fragrance – taken in this order, each (of the above four properties) increases the notion of a lotus by ruling out things such as non-substance etc. Possession of qualities rules out non-substances, and possession of aroma rules out non-Earth substances, and possession of a sweet fragrance generally rules out things that stink, and a particular sweet fragrance rules out what is not a lotus; each of these eliminations makes (the lotus more clearly) known.

(4) Otherwise, if the indicator made the object known by a means of proof similar to direct perception, then either the object would not be known at all, or it would be known in its entirety. If an indicator revealed (an object) at a later time in the same manner as the (earlier) perception (i.e. when we perceived the relation) of smoke in fire, then it would not reveal it anywhere; the indicator is as unperceived in every fire as it is unperceived when there is no fire at all. And if the indicator revealed the object in the same way as perception does, then it would also reveal it as possessed of a specific flame and specific temperature and so on. Since (the indicator, smoke) makes (the inferred property, fire) known generally, by ruling out non-fire, we know that by means of the established property (i.e. the indicator) we cognize only this (general) form, but not the particular form.

(5) But there is really no universal*. Because we do not observe it throughout its substratum*, nor do we see it outside its substratum. But if it is observed in each of its substrata, it is divided. First of all, there exists no universal “Firehood” in addition to the fire. Even if it exists, it is impossible to observe it, because one cannot observe its entire substratum. We observe that no property that is common to many substrata, e.g. duality, can be cognized in its every substratum (e.g. in every pair). Some say (the notion of) a universal is due to resemblance, but there is also no (such thing as) resemblance (existing as an entity separate from the particular things said to resemble one another). Some say that if a universal is known in a single
substratum it is known in all, but in this case it would be plural like the substrata themselves.\textsuperscript{72}

(6) And similarly, only part (of the properties of the indicator) reveal the thing to be inferred from it. Thus, although the indicator has several properties, it is really only part of them, namely those that do not occur away from the thing indicated, that make (the indicated thing) known; the others do not. In the case of smoke, it makes fire known only through part of its properties, namely those such as the fact of being smoke or the fact of having a smokey colour that do not occur except with fire; but (smoke does) not (make fire known through smoke’s) being a substance, because this property can occur elsewhere (than with fire).

(7) The following verses give the essence of the above topic:\textsuperscript{73}

The indicator makes known also that which is necessarily related to the thing indicated. It does not make the latter’s particular properties known, because the indicator can occur where those (particular properties) do not. An object necessarily related with the indicator does not make the indicated thing known, because it may occur where the latter does not. After we cognize (features) specific (to the indicator) it makes (the indicated thing) known.

2.5. [Nonsymmetry of restriction and pervasion]

(1) Now one might get this idea: since the relation between an indicator and the thing indicated by it resides in both relata, just as physical contact\textsuperscript{*} (resides in the two things contacting one another), it follows that the property that is indicated is interchangeable with the property that indicates it. But that is not the case. Although the relation of the co-existing indicator and what is indicated by it is located in both of them, it occurs in the manner of (the relation that occurs in) a content\textsuperscript{*} to its container\textsuperscript{*} rather than in the manner of (the relation of physical contact that occurs in) things in contact.\textsuperscript{745}

Although the relation (between a container and a content) is one that occurs in both (relata), the container does not assume the rôle of the content, nor does the content assume the rôle of container. In just the same way, the indicator does not in any case assume the rôle of thing indicated, nor does the thing indicated ever assume the rôle of the indicator. In the case of physical contact, on the other hand, the second relatum is just like the first. But such is not the case with this (relation between indicator and thing indicated).
(2) Thus, the thing indicated necessarily exists where the indicator exists, and the indicator exists only where the thing indicated occurs. When this restriction* is reversed, there is no relation of indicator and thing indicated. Since the thing indicated necessarily exists at the indicator, it is possible by means of smoke to cognize (the fire’s) being a substance as well as its being a fire, but not (to cognize the fire’s) temperature. Since the indicator exists only at the thing indicated but not elsewhere, such attributes of the smoke as its being smoke or its being smoke-coloured can make (fire) known, but (smoke’s) being a substance cannot. Thus when this restriction is reversed, there is no necessary relation of indicator and thing indicated.

(3) Q: But what if the indicator does in fact occur wherever the thing indicated occurs, as for example the fact of being produced which occurs wherever impermanence occurs?

A: Now if one claims that an indicator, e.g. the fact of being horned, pervades that which is indicated by it (i.e. a given horned entity), then some of it (may occur) away from the thing that is indicated. Since the indicator pervades the thing indicated, it cannot make the latter known. If only some of the indicator occurs at the thing indicated, then by virtue of the fact that it pervades the latter, it does not make the indicated thing known. For example, although the fact of being horned pervades cows, it is not capable of making cows known. But the fact of being a cow, since it does not pervade (the fact of being horned) does make this latter fact known.

(4) Why? Because non-occurrence (of the pervader) in the complement* (of the thing pervaded) depends on (the extension of) the pervader. Therefore, although an indicator does indeed pervade that which is indicated by it, it is not (on account of this pervasion) a basis (of the indicated thing’s becoming known).

(Returning now to the above question): The fact of being produced pervades impermanent objects, but it cannot make them known except by excluding permanence. Similarly, the fact of being impermanent pervades objects that are produced, but it cannot make them known except by excluding the fact of being unproduced. Therefore, since the fact of being produced pervades impermanent objects, the fact of being unproduced cannot occur in them. Therefore, impermanence can make the fact of being produced known by excluding the possibility of being unproduced, but it cannot make it known (through pervasion).
kā 24–25
K114b²
V33a⁻

(5) These verses summarize the above points: Since that which is perishable is pervaded by the condition of being produced, what is perishable is not unproduced. It is not claimed that on the basis of this pervasion perishability is absent in produced objects. That the condition of being horned pervades cows excludes the condition of being unhorned (from cows). That cows are pervaded by the condition of being horned does not exclude non-cows (from the condition of being horned).⁷⁵ This concludes the explanation of inference for oneself.

Appendix

In the following glossary of terms, the number in the left column indicates the section of the translation in which the term first appears marked by an asterisk.

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**Notes**

1 This section is intended primarily to provide basic background information for those who may be curious about Indian logic but whose field of specialization is not Indian philosophy. Since most of the information contained in it will be quite familiar to specialists, they may wish to skip to later sections of this paper. Since this account is brief and gives only a general outline, I will direct the reader to several other works that give more complete accounts of specific points mentioned here.
2 The evidence on the basis of which this time has been assigned to Dinnāga is presented in Frauwallner (1961) and Hattori (1968) pp. 4-6.

3 For an account of what little reliable information there is on the life of Dinnāga (whose name may also be spelled Dignāga), see Stcherbatsky (1930) pp. 31–34. A lively and entertaining but less factual biographical sketch also appears in Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1921) pp. 270–276. For a list of Dinnāga’s works see Hattori (1968) pp. 6–11, and for a more complete account of the various stages of Dinnāga’s philosophical career, see Frauwallner (1959).

4 Frauwallner (1953) and (1956) presents various evidence for many of the basic doctrines of the Sāmkhya, Yoga and Vaiṣeṣika systems stemming from different strains of Epic literature. As for the other main systems of Brahmanic thought, the Mīmāṃsā grew up as a system of interpreting Vedic injunctions, and Vedānta as a systematization of Upaniṣadic speculations. On the sixth orthodox system of Brahmanic thought, the Nyāya, see note 6.

5 For accounts of the pre-Nyāya codes governing debate see Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1921) pp. 1–37; for an account of the development of different traditions of debate, see Oebammer (1963); and for an account of the contents of some of the Buddhist treatises on debate, see Tucci (1929) pp. 455–467.

6 The early Nyāya system, which offers more material on the proper and improper forms of presenting arguments than the other schools, may have developed later than the other schools, although it shares many of its fundamental metaphysical doctrines with the Vaiṣeṣika.

7 For example, Frauwallner (1959), pp. 93–4, cites examples of arguments of the form (p → q. p. : q) in Buddhist manuals from before Dinnāga’s time. Specimens (in Tibetan language) of arguments of this form are to be found in Frauwallner (1957) pp. 139–140.

8 Tucci (1929) and Frauwallner (1959) trace some of Dinnāga’s ideas to the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (who may have been Dinnāga’s teacher) and to a pre-Vasubandhu text on reasoning entitled Tarkaśāstra by an unknown Buddhist author. Hattori (1977) records Dinnāga’s debt, especially in his theories on the relation between language and its referent, to the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari, who was probably an older contemporary of Dinnāga, and to certain key doctrines of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism.

9 Dinnāga is traditionally presented as advocating the position of the idealist Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) school of Buddhism, which denied the ultimate reality of objects external to consciousness. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in contradistinction to his works in which he advocates an idealist position, Dinnāga’s main purpose is to treat logical and epistemological issues, and he appears to have deliberately presented his views on these issues with a minimum of metaphysical bias; indeed, he shows every indication of having intended this work to be acceptable to both those who denied and those who affirmed the reality of objects external to consciousness. Thus to those who prefer to deny the reality of external objects, Dinnāga’s use of the term “external object” (bhāyārtha) can be regarded as no more than a conventional manner of speaking. For a full discussion of this point, see Hattori (1968), notes 1.55 and 1.60–64, pp. 97–99, 100–106.

10 A more detailed discussion of inferential indicators will be found below in section 1.333.

11 A fuller description of this view as it was propounded by Bhartrhari and his forerunners can be found in Brough (1951), (1952) and (1953).

12 But Frauwallner (1959) p. 96 and (1958) presents evidence to the effect that this distinction had been for the most part anticipated by Sāmkhya philosophers in a time near to but before Dinnāga’s.
Dīnāga’s Views on Reasoning

Dīnāga specifies that where perception ends and judgment begins is in the association of a thing with a name, a genus, a quality, an action or an accidental attribute. On this see Hattori (1968) p. 25 and 82–86, Matilal (1971) pp. 34–36, and Stcherbatsky (1930) p. 217 and p. 451. Incidentally, the line of demarcation between pratyakṣa and anumāna was one of the many points of controversy between the Nyāya philosophers and Dīnāga’s school. For Dīnāga the term “pratyakṣa”, which is used to refer either to the cognitive process or to the cognized object, is very similar to the notion of “sensing” and “sensus” (or “sense-datum”) as those terms are explained by Hirst (1967); that is, Dīnāga’s use of the term “pratyakṣa” is restricted to that experience which is certain and unquestionable and quite direct (in the sense of involving no interpretation of the sensum or senṣa). His position, then, could be stated in very nearly the same terms as Hdersers (1953) p. 536 used to describe the sense-datum philosophy of the early part of this century: “Sensing is different from perceiving. We sense sense-data; we perceive physical objects. Perception is impossible without sensing (without something given to sense), but it involves more. When we open our eyes we have certain visual experiences – sense-data; in this we are passive, and cannot help what we see. But in addition to this passive intake of sense-data there occurs an activity that we may call interpretation. We are classifying our present experience into molds already established by previous experiences.” The Nyāya philosophers, on the other hand, included more than just the above described sensation within the referential sphere of the term “pratyakṣa”, for them “pratyakṣa” also includes that interpretation of sensa that is decisive and correct. Thus, if one wanted to emphasize the difference between Dīnāga’s and the Nyāya use of the term “pratyakṣa”, it could be done by translating Dīnāga’s use as “sensing/sensa” and the Nyāya philosopher’s use as “perception/percept”. In the present paper, however, since I am not so concerned with how Dīnāga’s use of “pratyakṣa” differs from other philosophers’ as with how “pratyakṣa” differs from “anumāna” within his system, and since I feel the terminology “sensing/sensa” to be rather awkward and potentially misleading, I shall prefer to render even Dīnāga’s “pratyakṣa” by the more conventional English expression “perception”.

Dīnāga criticizes the Nyāya definition of perception as a “cognition arising from a sense-organ’s contact with its object, which (cognition) is nonverbal, non-erroneous, and by nature decisive.” In Dīnāga’s view it is nonsense to speak of a sensation (see n. 15 above) itself as being either erroneous or non-erroneous. A sensation is a sensation. What may be erroneous is only the further thinking we do about what is sensed. Thus in his criticism of the above quoted Nyāya definition of pratyakṣa, Dīnāga says with respect to the qualifying expression “non-erroneous” (avyabhicārin): “It is impossible too for the cognition-object itself to be erroneous, for error is only the content of misinterpretation by the mind.” (See Hattori (1968) p. 193, section Bb. for the Tibetan text, and pp. 122–3 nn. 3.6 and 3.7 for Hattori’s comments on this passage. I am inclined to agree with Hattori that Dīnāga, unlike his interpreters Dharmakīrti et al., regarded all erroneous cognition as arising in mental misconstrual of sensation. See Hattori’s note 1.53, p. 95–97.) To consider the stock Indian example of erroneous cognition, seeing a mirage and taking it to be water rather than heat waves in the distance, Dīnāga would say that it is not at the level of sensation that error occurs – for we really do sense something, i.e. we are not mistaking a sense-field for something that in fact is not a sense-field – but rather it is at the level of making a judgment that the error occurs, the error consisting in the mind’s imposing upon the visual-field a concept that later turns out to have been the wrong one. For other aspects of Dīnāga’s criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of pratyakṣa, see Hattori (1968) pp. 36–41 and pp. 121–133, and Oliver (1978).
The term here is *samyrtisajña*, a term which underwent several subtle changes in meaning in different schools of Buddhism; its exact meaning in Diṅnāga is difficult to decide. But Vasubandhu, from whom Diṅnāga draws many of his ideas, had put forth in his *Abhidharmakosa* a criterion for differentiating “conventional entities” (*sāṃś rūtisat*) from “real entities” (*dravyasat*): the former can be analysed, while the latter are irreducible. For a short comment on this distinction in Vasubandhu’s system of Abhidharma see Katsura (1976), and for a detailed account of the history of this distinction throughout the early history of Buddhist thought see La Vallée Poussin (1936–7).

The act of desiring is not an act of perception, but desire itself is a percept for it is a mental event and as such is directly cognizable. See above paragraph and section 1.32 below. As for whether objects have intrinsic value or repugnance, the earlier traditions of both Brahmanic and Buddhist thought had taken the more naïve position that we avoid objects because those objects are inherently repugnant or desire them because they are inherently attractive. But both the Sautrāntika and Mahāyāna movements, the latter with its celebrated doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), had begun a trend of trying to distinguish the inherent features of things from our subjective attitudes and reactions towards those things.

A property-locus is a complex concept that comprises a notion of a property and the notion of that property’s relation to something else. And since this concept is analyzable into parts, it is, by the criterion mentioned above in note 20, a “conventional entity” rather than a “real entity”.

See e.g. Stcherbatsky (19—–) pp. 64–65, or Warder (1970) pp. 118–9.

On this matter of whether general features, universals etc., could be perceived directly, the Buddhist philosophers in general differed sharply with other schools of Indian philosophy. For an account of the course of the debate among post-Diṅnāga thinkers on the perceptibility of universals, see Dravid (1972) pp. 103–130.

The period of Indian philosophy before Diṅnāga’s time had been one of considerable preoccupation with questions of various kinds of causality. The question of causality made up a substantial part of Buddhist exegetical (*Abhidharma*) literature and early Mādhyamaka literature as well as of the systems of “natural philosophy” such as the Vaiśeṣika system. While the Buddhist literature offers very little by way of a systematic treatment of inference, the Vaiśeṣikas, and to a lesser extent the Naiyāyikas, had dealt more fully with questions of inference based on causal relations, e.g. predictions of future effects from present causes and knowledge of past causes from present effects. For more on this see Matilal (1968). Incidentally, Diṅnāga has next to nothing to say about causal relations and inference, but his successor Dharmakīrti reintroduces the notion of causal relations as a basis of inference and in fact makes it a very important feature of his system.

Diṅnāga also advances other reasons against the position that the relation between the inferred property and its locus is the object of inference. See section 2.3 below.

The negation of the stated conclusion would follow if both Criterion Two and Criterion Three were violated but Criterion One were met. See section 1.3331 below. See also note 64 below.

In this case Criterion One and Three are met but Criterion Two is violated. Here the evidence has exactly the same extension as the object of inference, so naming that evidence is but another way of naming the object of inference. This case will be discussed further in sections 1.3331 and 1.3332 below.

This refinement was achieved by the introduction of the confinement particle eva into the Sanskrit sentences stating these criteria. (See section 2.2(2) and note 62 below.) Bocheński (1956) p. 505 and Staal (1967) p. 523 discuss the use of eva in Dharmakirti, but, since they both wrote when Dīnāgā’s system was known only in its barest outlines neither mentions its use in Dīnāgā.

It seems to me that Dīnāgā cannot make any stronger claim for the certainty of any given judgment than this: “This judgment is not inconsistent with previous experience” (where previous experience may be restricted practically to one’s own personal experience but can theoretically be extended to include the collective experience of, say, mankind as a whole). Thus his formulation of the three Criteria amounts not to a statement of the sufficient conditions of certainty (for a given evidence could meet these criteria and still turn out later to be in a locus in which the argued property is absent), but rather to necessary conditions of certainty. Consistency with previous experience still leaves open the possibility that some new experience may arise that is inconsistent with all previous experience. Some one hundred years after Dīnāgā, Dharmakirti tried to make stronger claims for certainty by introducing invariable causal relations as a basis for correct judgments.

That examples were intended as representative instances of universal propositions is clear from the fact that in the debate tradition, failure to state the universal proposition along with the example was regarded as an error in presentation. See for example the account of errors in offering examples (dṛṣṭāntabhāsa) in the debate manual Nyāyapravēṣa by Dīnāgā’s pupil Śāṅkaravīṃś, translated into English in Tachikawa (1970–72); the relevant sections in Tachikawa’s translation are 3.3.1. (4) and 3.3.2. (4) pp. 126–8 and footnotes thereto.

The presentation of the Hetucakra in Warder (1971) pp. 178–181 is founded, I believe, on two fundamental misunderstandings as to the nature of the propositions Dīnāgā intended to be generated from his examples. First of all, I think that Dīnāgā intended to generate only true propositions from the examples, for the point of the Hetucakra is to show that even in cases where every proposition in an argument happens to be true, there is still not necessarily a logical relation among those propositions whereby the truth of one is dependent on the truth of another. The argument Dīnāgā uses to illustrate Position three of the Hetucakra, for example, contains only true propositions, but the truth of the conclusion of that argument is logically independent of the truth of the propositions from which the conclusion is putatively derived. In Warder’s presentation, however, a number of false propositions are generated from the examples. (How Warder generates false propositions is by reversing the order of terms in Dīnāgā’s propositions – where Dīnāgā in fact says “All x is y” Warder represents him as saying “All y is x”.) And secondly, Warder generates only universal propositions from the examples, whereas I think it is clear that Dīnāgā intended not universal propositions but particular or existential propositions to be generated in those places where he offers two positive or two negative examples.
instead of the customary one, i.e. in Hetucakra positions 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9. This will be explained more fully in the presentation that follows.

36 The system of categories that Diṅnāga uses throughout the Pramāṇasamuccaya is essentially that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. To give only the barest outline of this system, the widest category is Reality (Sattā); its subcategories are Substance, Quality and Action. Qualities and Actions are properties that must have some Substance as their locus. Within the category of Substance are particular objects, which may be grouped into classes on the basis of generic properties.

37 If there is nonreciprocal pervasion, there is also of course nonreciprocal promiscuity. For $P_1$ pervades $P_2$ if and only if $P_2$ is restricted to $P_1$. And $P_2$ does not pervade $P_1$ iff $P_2$ is not restricted to $P_1$. Therefore, ($P_1$ pervades $P_2$ and $P_2$ does not pervade $P_1$) iff ($P_1$ is restricted to $P_1$ and $P_1$ is not restricted to $P_2$). The left side of this biconditional describes nonreciprocal pervasion, the right side nonreciprocal promiscuity.

38 This of course is nothing new, for it amounts only to another way of expressing Criterion Three of successful evidence.

39 For a more detailed account of these points and their place in Dharmakīrti’s system, see Frauwallner (1935). Stecherbatsky (1930) pp. 79–118, 181–203, 444–451 etc. or Steinkellner (1971).

40 One gets the impression that Dharmakīrti saw as his main task, especially in his most extensive work the Pramāṇavārttika, to reconcile Diṅnāga with Buddhist orthodoxy rather than to advance the study of logic. But to see to what extent this impression is accurate will require a very careful analysis not only of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti’s works, but also of their respective contemporaries.

41 Hattori (1968) pp. 13–14 gives an account of the evidence on the basis of which he arrived at the probable dates of the two Tibetan translations.

42 This claim is based on three considerations. First, for any given passage, the translation of Kanakavarman tends to make better overall sense than Vasudhararakṣita’s translation of the same passage. Second, of those passages of the text for which Sanskrit fragments have been identified, a comparison of the Sanskrit fragment with the two Tibetan translations usually shows Kanakavarman’s rendering to be more faithful to the Sanskrit both in vocabulary and in syntax than Vasudhararakṣita’s. And third, for passages of the Pramāṇasamuccaya quoted in Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary, the Tibetan text of the commentary usually corresponds to Kanakavarman’s translation both in vocabulary and sentence-structure. Moreover, the commentary often gives grammatical analyses of Diṅnāga’s sentences, and these analyses most often bear out Kanakavarman’s translation. Despite these general tendencies, Vasudhararakṣita’s translation is by no means useless. Kitagawa’s Japanese translation is generally based on Vasudhararakṣita rather than Kanakavarman.

43 The term “indicator” (liṅga) refers to a property that serves as evidence for another property that shares the indicator’s locus. Thus the term “indicator” is virtually interchangeable with the term “evidence” (hetu).

44 This refers to the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya, kārikās 8–12, for an account of which see section 1.32 above and Hattori (1968) pp. 28–31. Like the English word “inference” the Sanskrit “anumāna” has two distinct meanings, a) the process of inferring and b) the knowledge that results from that process. Similarly the Sanskrit “pramāṇa” is taken to refer to both the process of cognizing and to the resulting cognition.

45 The field of operation of a given cognitive process is that set of objects that are knowable through that process.

46 Jinendrabuddhi (J94b5) explains that perception has external objects making up its field of operation, as a consequence of which its cognitive images are vivid (snang ba
gsal ba = pratibhāsa). But the objects of inference are not external objects but concepts, hence inference’s cognitive images are vague.

47 In Dīnāga’s system “inference” refers to (a) the acquisition of new knowledge through reasoning, and (b) the communication of what one knows through argument or discourse. The knowledge of a particular, however, which is vivid and exact, cannot be transmitted verbally, since verbal communication is necessarily vague and inexact; therefore “perception” refers only to the acquisition of new knowledge.

48 This question arises from the perspective of Buddhist exegetical literature (abhidharma), according to which there are six sense-faculties (the faculties of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling, plus the faculty of thinking), six fields of operation (sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touch and thought), and an awareness of each of those six fields of operation. According to this system, the faculty of thinking can take as its object thoughts about the objects of the other sense-faculties. Hence after “visual-consciousness”, which consists in the experience of some sight such as a blue colour, there arises “mind-consciousness” wherein the faculty of thinking applies a concept or name to that blue object. This same question from the abhidharma perspective comes up also in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in Dīnāga’s own commentary on kārikā 4ab. See Hattori (1968) p. 26, section Daa-2.

49 Jinendrabuddhi (J96n1-3) says: “There is a cognitive image of the universal that is different from the cognitive image of the particular. It is by means of that universal cognitive image that a thing is expressible, not by means of the particular. Its name is the term ‘blue’, but the object cognized (through that word) is definitely not the particular. Therefore this kārikā asserts ‘the mind has two cognitive images’. The phrase ‘by rejecting what is not blue’ indicates the other cognitive image. What this means is ‘by excluding non-blue from the object that those who are expressing it in language are thinking about.’” Before a person speaks, his potential audience can imagine anything whatsoever as that about which the speaker is thinking. With each word that the speaker utters to express his thoughts, however, the audience is obliged to eliminate certain things from the universe of discourse, namely all those things that are logically incompatible with the “meaning” of the words uttered. After the speech is over, the audience still does not know precisely what the speaker was thinking, but the audience does know what the speaker was not thinking. “Mind-consciousness” according to Dīnāga classifies its data in essentially the same way as an audience assimilates what a speaker has said — by grouping together under a rough classheading those data of experience that are not mutually incompatible.


51 According to Vaiśeṣika system of categories, there are nine basic Substances: Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, Ether, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. Inhering in those substances are various qualities, and each substance can be known by the qualities that inhere in it. Now according to this system, the quality touch inheres only in the substance Wind. Thus when one perceives touch, one can infer the particular substance Wind. In this passage and the passages that follow Dīnāga argues against various aspects of this Vaiśeṣika doctrine. In this passage he argues that by perceiving the quality touch one can infer only that there is some substance in which it inhere, since a quality must inhere in a substance; but beyond this general fact, says Dīnāga, one can conclude nothing.

52 If it is argued that the quality touch must belong to an invisible substance, this still does not guarantee that it belongs to Wind, because Wind is not the only invisible
substance. This appears to be the point of this passage, but both Tibetan translations are rather obscure here.

53 Some substances, such as Space and Soul, are regarded to be ubiquitous, so obviously several ubiquitous substances can occupy the same space. In contrast to these ubiquitous substances, some substances have the property of “resistance” whereby they exclude other substances that also have the property of resistance from simultaneously occupying their space. Now Dīnḱa argues here that objects have this property of resistance if and only if they are both tangible and visible; therefore the property touch belongs only to substances that have the property of being visible, so it cannot belong to invisible Wind as the Vaiśeṣikas suggest.

54 The credible persons here referred to are the people whose statements the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system believe. The gist of this passage is that the doctrine under discussion, namely that the quality touch inheres in the substance Wind, is based in the final analysis on the basic dogmas accepted by the Vaiśeṣika system: if one does not accept those basic dogmas, he is not compelled to accept the line of reasoning that leads to the conclusion that touch inheres only in Wind.

55 Dīnḱa’s position, as argued below in section 2.1(22) and in the fifth chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, is that cognitions arising out of verbal testimony have the same fundamental structure as inferential cognitions, therefore the words “verbal testimony” and “inference” denote the same cognitive structure. But the connotations of the two terms are different; in ordinary usage, they refer to different processes.

56 This view that the whole sentence rather than the individual word is the basic meaning-bearing unit of language is accepted by Dīnḱa, who acknowledges it to be Bhartṛhari’s view. (See PS V.46–49). The issue here is not, as Vasudhararākṣita (29b) and Kitagawa (1965, p. 90) have it, that the individual word is incapable of making its object known, but rather, as Kanakavarman and Jinendrabuddhi (102a) have it, that words make the sentence known which in turn conveys a meaning. In this view, individual words are useful fictions, conceptual entities arrived at through the process of abstraction, that can help us understand the meaning of a sentence, e.g. when our command over a language is insufficient to enable us to grasp the meaning of a sentence straight away. See Brough (1951) and (1953).

57 In the process of learning an object’s name by having the object pointed out while its name is uttered, we simultaneously grasp its particular aspects and its general aspects. When that name is used later, only the general aspects are communicated. See J103a2 ff.

58 Randle (1926) cites the Sanskrit for this; it is his Fragment E.

āptavākyo viśaṁvādasāmānyād anumānātā.

59 Kitagawa (1965, p. 93 bottom) follows Vasudhararākṣita’s syntax here, which places phyogs and giso bo as two things whose natures are denied as objects of inference. Kitagawa translates phyogs as standing for Skt. diś, “direction”. But J105a supports Kanakavarman’s translation, which makes, I think, better sense; in this interpretation phyogs is taken to stand for Skt. pakṣa, “view” or “opinion” or “thesis”.

60 The fundamental metaphysical doctrine of the Sāṁkhya system is that all physical as well as sentient objects in the universe are nothing but modifications in form of a primordial substance. In the case of the metaphysical views of other systems, says Dīnḱa, there is at least some justification for believing them on the supposition that the doctrines were based on the first-hand experiences of ancient sages, who passed what they learned down into tradition. But this doctrine of a primordial substance is in another league altogether, for it is in principle impossible for it to have been witnessed firsthand. And that which has never been experienced can never, in his view, be inferred.

61 This kārikā is quoted by Uddyotakara (See Gautama, Nyāyadarśanam p. 301): anumāne ‘tha tattulye sadbhavo nāsitāsaii. (“anumāne” should read “anumeye”.)
The expression “tattulya” is not carefully defined by Dinnāga, but it evidently refers to the set of loci that are similar to the object of inference with respect to possessing the argued property. Later logicians referred to this set by the term sapakaśa.

In this seemingly simple passage, Dinnāga makes use of a device that was eventually developed into a means of quantifying an indefinite (i.e. unquantified) proposition. The device consists in introducing the restrictive particle eva into the proposition. For a discussion of how this device was developed by Dharmakīrti and later Buddhist logicians, see Kajiyama (1973), especially pp. 161–164. But for an insight into how Dinnāga used this device, our best source of information is the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (Gautama, Nyāyadarśana, pp. 301–302), who takes great pains to point out some of the disasters that Dinnāga is courting by introducing the restrictive particle into this discussion of the three criteria of conclusive evidence. Let us first look at how Dinnāga uses the particle, then turn to Uddyotakara’s criticisms. In the kārikā under discussion, Dinnāga has stated the second criterion as follows: “The indicator is present in what is similar (to the object of inference).” (lingasya) tattulye saddhāvah. At it stands, this is an indefinite proposition. It can, in principle, be restricted in one of two ways. A) The subject “indicator” can be restricted to the predicate, “present in what is similar.” This allows that the extension of the predicate may be wider than the subject, and it disallows that the negation of that predicate can be true of the subject. In other words, it is not the case that there exists any locus l similar to the object of inference such that the indicator is not present in l; thus, the indicator is present in all loci that are similar to the object of inference. This universal proposition would be written in Sanskrit: “lingasya tattulye saddhāvah eva.” Dinnāga explicitly states that he does not intend the proposition to be restricted in this manner (for it would, as Uddyotakara points out, eliminate hetucakra Position Eight as a form of proper evidence). B) The indicator’s presence can be restricted to: “what is similar”. This allows that the extension of “what is similar” may be wider than the extension of “the indicator’s presence”, and it disallows that the indicator’s presence be found in any locus of the set of loci complementary to the set of loci to which “is similar to the object of inference” is truly predicable. In other words, it is not the case that the indicator is present in some locus l such that l is not similar to the object of inference with respect to possession of the argued property. But this restriction does not imply that the indicator is present in every l such that l is similar to the object of inference. This is the restriction that Dinnāga explicitly prescribes be read into his formulation of Criterion Two of proper evidence. This, however, raises the question that Dinnāga discusses below in section 2.2(3), a question that is brought up again by Dharmottara in his commentary to Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu II.7 (cf. Stcherbatsky (1932) pp. 56 ff), namely that Criterion Two, interpreted in this way, renders Criterion Three redundant. About this question more will be said in the following note. But let us now turn to Uddyotakara’s comments on this passage. The main theme of Uddyotakara’s criticisms is that Dinnāga has been unjustifiably careless in his introduction of the restrictive particle eva into his interpretation of the three criteria. The gist of Uddyotakara’s attack is as follows:

(a) First of all, Dinnāga has said nothing about whether or not the indicator must occur throughout the object of inference. If Criteria Two and Three can be met either completely or partially (see section 1.3331 above), then so can Criterion One. Dinnāga has taken care to spell out that a property can be used as evidence so long as it meets Criterion Three completely, even if it meets Criterion Two only partially (i.e., it does not occur in any other loci in which the argued property is absent, and it must occur in at least one other locus in which the argued property occurs); but no mention has been made of whether the evidence must reside in all of the object of inference or whether it is sufficient that it reside in only a part.
(b) Second, Dinnāga has specified that the indicator’s presence be restricted to what is similar to the object of inference; but this surely eliminates the object of inference itself from inclusion in the set of loci in which the indicator is present, for the object of inference is not among those loci that are similar to the object of inference. Thus Criterion Two, as interpreted by Dinnāga, contradicts Criterion One.

(c) Third, it is unnecessary to state both Criterion Two and Criterion Three as Dinnāga reformulates them. For Two says that the evidence can occur nowhere but in loci in which the argued property occurs, and Three says, redundantly, that the evidence cannot occur in loci in which the argued property is absent.

Now it is clear from the context of Dinnāga’s discussion what he intended to accomplish by introducing the restrictive particle eva; he intended to justify his claim that an indicator can still be proper even if it resides in only some members of the set of loci similar to the object of inference, but that it must be absent from all dissimilar loci. The importance of Uddyotakara’s criticisms lies in his pointing out (successfully, I think) that what Dinnāga actually said is not entirely consistent with what he intended to say; owing largely to these criticisms, Dinnāga’s followers were compelled to try to make his formulations more precise. And it was in making the formulation more precise that they developed the use of the restrictive particle eva into a sort of logical operator with functions similar to quantificational operators in European logic. Following Uddyotakara’s lead, it was Dharmakīrti who came to appreciate that every proposition to be treated successfully within a system of logic must be restricted or “quantified”, which might indicate that he realized that one of the weaknesses in Dinnāga’s system derived from his failure to expunge indefinite (unquantified, unrestricted) propositions from his reasoning scheme.

“What is incompatible with the object of inference” refers, of course, to those loci that have a property incompatible with the argued property, or in other words, to those loci that have an absence of the argued property. Thus the intention of Criterion Three, according to Dinnāga’s interpretation, is to rule out as proper evidence any property that occurs in a locus in which the argued property is absent. It is noteworthy that, in interpreting the third criterion in this way, Dinnāga has not adequately answered the criticism that he has anticipated here, namely the question of what this third criterion says that is not already said in his interpretation of Criterion Two. The question of whether all three criteria need to be fulfilled or whether only two (viz. Criterion One and either Two or Three) hinges, I think, on whether the statement of the criteria is intended to be a statement of the requirements for the formal validity of an argument or whether it is to be a statement of the requirements for adding something new to our knowledge. If it is to be a statement of the requirements of formal validity, then either Criterion Two or Three as reformulated in Dinnāga’s interpretation is dispensable, for they stand in a relation of contraposition. But that Dinnāga was not interested solely in formal validity is clear from the fact that he does not regard an argument of the form represented by hetucakra Position Five as a proper argument. (See section 1.3331 above and section 2.2(7) below.) And his apparent reason for not including arguments of this form among proper arguments is not that they are formally invalid, but rather that they produce analytically true conclusions, i.e. conclusions that do not consist in additions to our knowledge. Now there is one other point well worth remembering in connection with the question of whether two or all three of the criteria need to be stated, and that is that we find in Dinnāga’s text not one but two formulations of the three criteria of conclusive evidence, namely the formulation that appears in the kārikās and the reformulation that appears in his prose commentary. These two formulations do not have the same logical status. The kārikā formulation contains unrestricted propositions, i.e. propositions without the particle eva. This
kārikā formulation is essentially the formulation that Diṅnāga received from his fore-runners, and its main intention seems to be to state the requirements for adding something new to our knowledge. In the kārikā formulation, Criteria Two and Three do not stand in a relation of contraposition. The commentary formulation, on the other hand, contains the eva-restricted propositions and may reflect an emerging awareness of a distinction to be drawn between purely logical considerations and epistemological considerations. In the commentary formulation, Criteria Two and Three do stand in a relation of contraposition, and hence the statement of just one of these criteria in conjunction with Criterion One should suffice to state the requirements for formal validity. It seems quite likely that Diṅnāga himself did not fully appreciate the implications of this shift in emphasis brought about by his reformulation of the three criteria. This whole topic, incidentally, is treated at greater length in a forthcoming article by B. K. Matilal entitled “An Interpretation of the Triple Character of Reason in Indian Logic,” in which Uddyotakara’s criticisms of Diṅnāga’s commentary formulation of the three criterion is discussed along with several possible re-interpretations of the three criteria (or, as Matilal calls them, “the triple character”). Many of the statements in this and the immediately preceding footnote reflect ideas generated by reading an early draft of the forementioned article and by a variety of discussions on these issues with Prof. Matilal and with Mr. Brendan S. Gillon.

64 J108b: ji itar rtags kyi yul can gyi shes pa (= lingaviṣayām jñānam).

65 The idea here is that the indicator and the person who knows it together constitute sufficient conditions for cognition of the indicator. If this were not so, i.e. if a variety of other conditions were also necessary to produce cognition of an indicator, then the absence of any one of these conditions would mean the absence of cognition of the indicator; in such circumstances one could not take cognition of the indicator for granted just on the grounds of the indicator’s presence. But in fact, argues Diṅnāga, no other such conditions are necessary. Following a general principle whereby stating the sufficient causes of a thing is as good as mentioning the thing itself, Diṅnāga concludes that the presence of cognition of an indicator, which cognition is a key element in inference, goes without saying once one has mentioned the indicator itself.

66 The original Sanskrit for this kārikā has been discovered by Chatterji (1929–30):

\[
\text{kṛtakāvād dhvanira nityo mūrttatvā aprameyatah/}
\text{amūrtosrāṣāyati vābhyām anityaś cākṣusatvātah //}
\]

That these six examples represent every possible form of evidence considered improper in Diṅnāga’s hetucakra is shown in the following chart. The positions on the hetucakra represented by each of these examples is given in the final column; since the hetucakra applies only to those indicators that satisfy Criterion One of proper evidence, we can assign hetucakra position 0 to those indicators that fail to satisfy this criterion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object of inference</th>
<th>Inferred property</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Criteria met?</th>
<th>hetucakra position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. sound</td>
<td>that it is</td>
<td>produced</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sound</td>
<td>permanent</td>
<td>corporeal</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. sound</td>
<td>permanent</td>
<td>unknowable</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. sound</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>incorporeal</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. sound</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>audible</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. sound</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>visible</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Sanskrit fragments for the next four kārikās are quoted from Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā (see Gautama Nyayadarsana, p. 320) by Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1921) pp. 281–2, Randle (1926) p. 18, and Matilal (1968); Matilal also provides information on how the verses were discussed by Vācaspati and later Naiyāyika commentators, and on the basis of this information suggests alterations in Randle's tentative translations. The Sanskrit kārikās read:

8 kecid dharmāntaram meyam lingasyāvyabhicārataḥ/
   sambandham kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharmīnnoḥ//

9 lingam dharme prasiddham cet kim anyat tena miyate/
   atha dharmīnī tasyaiya kimartham nānumeyatā//

10 sambandhe 'pi dvayam nāsti śaṣṭhi śāryeta tadvati/
   avācyo 'nugrahītatvān na cāsaun lingasamgataḥ//

11 lingasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmenānyatra disyate/
   tatra prasiddham tadyuktam dharmānāṁ gamayiṣyati//

Note: Some quotations of kārikā 11 read dṛṣyate for disyate, but the Tibetan translations all support the latter reading, using various forms of the root ston, "to teach, to show".

68 Jinendrabuddhi (J110a\(^4\)) and Kitagawa (1965) pp. 106–7 interpret this passage as follows. For an inference to be correct, the evidence (smoke) and the inferred property (fire) must reside in the same locus. Now when making an inference we do recall the relation of the evidence and the inferred property, but relata are the loci of a relation, not vice versa. Thus if the relation itself is regarded as the object of an inference, then the evidence, since it cannot reside in that object, would fail to meet Criterion One of proper evidence.

69 See J110b\(^{5}\)ff.

70 The point of this passage if to show that the indicator and the property inferred through it must be universals. The reasoning as explained in Jinendrabuddhi's Tīkā (J113b\(^1\)–114a\(^5\)) goes something like this: At the time when we observe smoke and fire together, we necessarily observe a particular instance of smoke (S\(_n\)) with a particular instance of fire (F\(_n\)). That instance of fire (F\(_n\)) is never seen with any other instance of smoke (S\(_m\), n \(\neq\) 1). Now suppose the property to be inferred were just that particular instance of fire (F\(_n\)). Since every subsequent instance of smoke (S\(_2\), S\(_3\), S\(_4\) \ldots S\(_n\)) is as absent from (F\(_n\)) as they are absent from places where there is no fire at all, we should never be able to infer the presence of the fire (F\(_n\)) from the indicator (S\(_n\)). Therefore, if there is any inference at all, it can only be of a universal fire-in-general. By a similar line of reasoning, it can be shown that the indicator can function only as a universal. For the particular instance of smoke (S\(_n\)) is as absent from (F\(_2\), F\(_3\), F\(_4\) \ldots F\(_n\)) as it is absent when there is no fire at all, and not being related to (F\(_n\), n \(\neq\) 1) it can of course never be the grounds for inferring it.

71 This passage is rather obscure in both Kanakavarman and Vasudhararakṣita, so I have had to rely entirely on Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at J114b\(^{6}\)ff. The passages under discussion read as follows:

K113b\(^1\): guyis nyid la sogs pa du ma dang/ thin mong ba rnams kyi rten ma
   bzung bar 'dzin pa ni mihong ngo/ gang dag 'dra ba phyir smra ba i 'dra
   ba'ang ma yin no/

V32a\(^4\): du ma rnams las guyis nyid la sogs pa'i thun mong ba ni yod pa ma
   yin no/ gang dag spyi mihog zhing gzung pa po yang rten ma gzung pa po
   dang mtshungs shing 'dra bar 'gyur ro/

72 Each school of Indian philosophy had its own way of dealing with the puzzle of how a universal, construed as a single, undivided, unchanging entity, can reside in a
plurality of changing entities. This topic comes up for discussion at greater length in the fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. But here Diinnāga confines himself to pointing out difficulties in accepting the view that universals are real entities that exist in addition to the particulars in which they are supposed to inhere. For more on how Diinnāga’s school and other schools of Indian philosophy treated universals, see Dravid (1972).

73 These two verses summarize what we might call Diinnāga’s indication relation, and they show that this relation is transitive, i.e. if $P_1$ indicates $P_2$ and $P_2$ indicates $P_3$, then $P_1$ indicates $P_3$. One property $P_1$ indicates another property $P_2$ if and only if $P_1$ is restricted to $P_2$, that is if $P_1$ occurs only in loci of $P_2$. If $P_1$ is restricted to $P_2$, then in Diinnāga’s terminology $P_2$ is “necessarily related” (*rijes su ’brel ba = anubaddha*) to $P_1$. Restriction is nonsymmetrical; if $P_1$ is restricted to $P_2$, $P_2$ may or may not be restricted to $P_1$. The nonsymmetry of this relation is the subjectmatter of the following section, 2.5.

74 The Sanskrit original for this verse has been discovered by Katsura (1975):

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sambandho yadyapi dvīṣṭāh sahabhūtingalinginoḥ/
adharādheyyavat vṛttiṁ tasya samyogivān na tu//
```

75 Summarizing what Diinnāga has said concerning three kinds of relation that may be said to exist between two properties, $P_1$ and $P_2$, namely 1) an indication relation (*lingalinginoḥ sambandha*), 2) restriction (*avyābhičāra*) and 3) pervasion (*vyāpti*), we can say:

1. $P_1$ indicates $P_2$ iff $P_1$ is restricted to $P_2$.
2. $P_1$ is restricted to $P_2$ iff $P_2$ pervades $P_1$.
3. If $P_2$ pervades $P_1$, then the absence of $P_2$ is restricted to the absence of $P_1$.
4. $P_1$ indicates $P_2$ iff absence of $P_2$ indicates absence of $P_1$.
5. These three relations are transitive.
6. These three relations are nonsymmetrical therefore it is not necessarily the case that if $P_1$ indicates $P_2$, then $P_2$ indicates $P_1$.

76 The original Sanskrit terms are likely to have been either these words or their synonyms. In many cases the Sanskrit terms are verified by fragments from either this chapter or other chapters in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. For terms not verified specifically for the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, relatively safe conjectures can be made on the basis of comparing other Sanskrit Buddhist texts on logic with their Tibetan translations. The following sources are very useful for this purpose.


References


ON THE THEORY OF INTRINSIC DETERMINATION OF UNIVERSAL CONCOMITANCE IN BUDDHIST LOGIC

Yuichi Kajiyama


The history of the theory of inference in Indian logic and particularly in Buddhist logic may be regarded as a development from the empirical interpretation of inference to the rationalistic. While Western logicians devoted themselves to demonstrate formal validity of the relation between the terms of inference, Indian logicians in the early schools had pursued realistic truth of knowledge. According to them probative efficiency of the reason (hetu) should be apprehended not in a universal proposition, but in a concrete, empirical example, which can illustrate the relation of the probans and the probandum. Even in the logic of Dignāga who first noticed the import of universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum (vyāpti), consideration given to the actual instances outweighed that to the abstract propositions. Dignāga showed his empiricist attitude toward logic in his theory of three conditions of the reason (middle term), though he interpreted the example as the major premise of an inference by virtue of the very theory. This fact can be clearly seen in the following two rules of inference which are derived from his theory of the triple-conditioned reason and vitally important with regard to the problem of universal concomitance. (1) The middle term must be an empirically proved fact: He prescribes in the first condition of the reason that the middle term must subsist in the minor, and it means that the middle term must be recognized by both the parties of debate as a proved fact. It is clear, therefore, that an inference which drops the reference to a fact, i.e., a hypothetical inference is not regarded as a true inference. Infringement of this rule causes the fallacy of the unreal reason (asiddhahetu). (2) The middle term should not be the particular essence of the minor term, or in other words, an inference becomes inconclusive when the middle term belongs exclusively to the minor: The second and third of his three conditions say that the reason must abide only in the homologous cases (sapakṣa) and never in the
heterologous cases (vipakṣa). If the reason belongs exclusively to the minor term, as in the case of audibility which is supposed to prove momentariness of sound (minor term), no homologous cases which are audible and momentary are available. In this case we cannot ascertain validity of the major premise, ‘Whatever is audible is momentary’. Infringement of this rule brings about the fallacy of the uncommon inconclusive probans (asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu), and gives birth to a tremendous difficulty in the problem of vyāpti. When no homologous cases are available, an Indian logician, in order indirectly to prove his conclusion, has to point out logical incompatibility of the contradictory supposition by means of the reductio ad absurdum (tarka), in which he assumes for argument’s sake the false probans, thus necessarily using a hypothetical inference and committing the fallacy of the unreal reason. Dignāga insisted on these two rules and consequently condemned hypothetical inference to be false knowledge. The more realistic Naiyāyika also never consented to accept the tarka as an independent instrument of true knowledge.

How can universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum be ascertained? This was the greatest problem left unsolved by Dignāga. When we try to prove the validity of a vyāpti, or the major premise, of an inference, we need another inference; to prove the vyāpti of the second inference we need the third, and so on ad infinitum. On the contrary, if we substantiate the vyāpti by repeated experiences of the individual instances, as the empiricist does, we commit the mistake of determining universality by means of finite experiences. Furthermore, abstract knowledge like the relation between existence and momentariness is never grasped by perceptive experience. Dharmakīrti proposed a sort of transcendentalism and declared that universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum is ascertained only when the relation between the probans and the probandum is based on either of the two transcendental principles of identity and causality. Yet he condemned, more insistently than Dignāga, the unreal reason to be fallacious; nor he accepted the reductio ad absurdum as the logical principle for determining vyāpti.

It is Jaina logicians who first proclaimed that the very reductio ad absurdum was the only principle for determining universal concomitance, and that no reference to the example was necessary for it. The Jaina view is called the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (antarvyāptivāda), because, according to it, universal concomitance is nothing but the inner relation of the two concepts which is apprehended in the subject of inference (minor term), without any reference to external cases. On the other hand the standpoint of the Buddhist logicians, including Dharmakīrti, and of the Naiyāyika is named the theory of external determination (bahiryāptivāda) as vyāpti is in this theory apprehended outside the subject of inference. The theory of antarvyāpti is made possible only when the terms of inference are regarded not as individual facts, but as the concepts determined in their denotations and therefore always opposed by their contradictory concepts. This interpretation of the concept was the achievement of the Buddhist theory of apoха. Thus the antarvyāptivāda

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owes much to the *apohavāda*, and the traditional explanation which includes under the name of *bahirvyāptivādin* both the Buddhist logicians and the Naiyāyika is sometimes misleading.

Later on Rāṇṭakārtī, an eminent Buddhist logician in 10th century A.D. actually made use of the theory of intrinsic determination in order to prove the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness. His brilliant student Rāṭhākaraśānti openly called himself an *antarvyāptivādin*. When a Buddhist tries to prove that whatever is existent is momentary, the probans, no matter what it may be, always belongs exclusively to the subject of inference; thus he commits the fallacy of the uncommon inconclusive reason. The only left way of proof is to indicate absurdity of the view that the existent is non-momentary, or permanent, by means of the *reductio ad absurdum* and to establish the original conclusion indirectly. For the very purpose a Buddhist logician has to argue on the hypothesis of the permanent which is not real to him, and it makes him commit the fallacy of the unreal reason. Therefore he has to approve hypothetical negative inference to be valid, contending that the unreal and uncommon reasons are not always fallacious. Rāṇṭakārtī as well as Rāṭhākaraśānti called the *tarka* or a form of hypothetical negative inference *prasaṅgapramāṇa* or *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, clearly recognizing the method as a valid instrument of knowledge.\(^1\)

In order to prove the Buddhist theory of universal flux by a *prasaṅgapramāṇa*, Rāṇṭakārtī formulated his argument into the following syllogism: 'Whatever lacks causal agency in succession or simultaneity, has no causal efficiency, as a rabbit’s horn. The supposed permanent entity has no such agency. Therefore the supposed permanent entity has no causal efficiency,'\(^2\) (i.e., it is not existent.) Rāṭhākaraśānti, explaining this syllogism of his teacher, argues as follows: Existence consists in causal efficiency, as no other definition of it is acceptable. And causal efficiency exercises in succession or simultaneity, i.e., existence is pervaded by succession and non-succession. Succession and non-succession are the mutually contradicting concepts, and cannot be predicated of the permanent entity. Why? Because the permanent which has an identical nature in previous and succeeding moments cannot have the two contradictory attributes. If the permanent entity exercises gradually in succession and produces the effect after some duration, there must be in the duration the moment in which causal agency is exercising and other moments in which it is not working. Then, it ensues that all the effects abide in the one moment, and thus the significance of causal efficiency in succession falls to the ground. But when all the effects abide in one moment it is clearer that the two contradictory natures, existence of causal agency and its non-existence, are found in one and the same permanent entity, which fact is quite absurd. Therefore succession and non-succession cannot exist in the permanent which maintains identity for a definite duration. As we cannot recognize in the non-momentary entity the pervader (*vyaṇaka*), succession and non-succession, it necessarily follows that the pervaded, causal efficiency, cannot abide in it. Thus we are sure that whatever is existent is momentary.\(^3\)

The Naiyāyikas vehemently attacked the above-mentioned arguments of the
Buddhists, and the most important points of their criticism consisted in pointing out the fallacies of the unreal and the uncommon inconclusive reasons. With regard to the first fallacy, Ratnakīrti replies: 4 When we set forth a real thing as the subject and predicate an imaginary attribute of it, then the proposition is false. But the minor premise of which the predicate is the negation of an unreal attribute of a hypothetically supposed subject, is logically valid. After all you cannot deny the validity of an unreal subject. For if you negate it, you predicate the negation of the very subject, thus forming yourself a proposition. The second fallacy arises from that the homologous instance in the above-mentioned syllogism, a rabbit’s horn, cannot be regarded as valid from the realistic standpoint of the Naiyāyika. The asādhihranānaikāntikatva is unavoidable. But Ratnakaraśānti boldly discarded the example. The example is, he opines, useful for the unintelligent people to understand universal concomitance only when it is beforehand available by virtue of the reductio ad absurdum. But when universal concomitance is understood in the subject of inference by the quick-witted persons, what is the use of the example? Ratnakīrti set forth the example only for the unintelligent people. In the same way did Dignāga prescribe the rule forbidding the fallacy of the uncommon reason only in consideration of dull intellect. However, if we understand vyāpti in the subject itself, all the trouble about the fallacy is thrown away. The uncommon reason is quite valid if it satisfies the principle of vyāpakānupalamba. Even in the case of audibility of sound, the subject of inference, sound, is a particular sound which is perceived at the present moment, while audibility is common both to the perceived and the unperceived sounds. Thus the unperceived sounds can come in as the homologous example. Therefore ‘audibility’ as well as ‘existence’ is a perfectly valid probans. 5

Notes
1 Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi, p. 21, l. 12 ff; p. 24, l. 3, etc.
2 ibid., p. 55, l. 8 ff.
3 op. cit., Antarvyāptisamarthana, p. 103.
4 op. cit., ksana, p. 62, l. 8 ff.
5 op. cit., Antar. vyā., p. 112, l. 5–p. 113.
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE SĀKĀRA- AND NIRĀKĀRA-VĀDINS OF THE YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL

Some materials

Yuichi Kajiyama


Sākāra-vāda, or the theory that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object, is maintained by the Sāmkhya, Vedānta as well as the Sautrāntikabuddha. The theory, in Mookerjee’s words,1 “holds that knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impress of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness.” The nirākāra-vāda is held by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣikabuddha, and2 “the theory maintains that our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution.” TS* v. 1999, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism’s sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes towards the problem of the relation between knowledge and its object: nirākāra-vāda (anirbhāsajñānavāda) according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object; sākāra-vāda (sanirbhāsajñānavāda) – the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; anyanirbhāsajñānavāda – the object is cognized by the knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the standpoint of ākāra-vāda. The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as nirākāra-vādin, while the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin are sākāra-vādins. When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vijñānavādin is again divided into both parties, as will be soon dealt with. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties the reader is referred, for example, to TRD 46–47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying: nirākāra bodho 'rthasa-
habhāvy eaksāmagnyadhīnas tatrārthe pramāṇam; the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin: sākāro bodhāh pramāṇam; and the Mādhyamika: svapnopamaḥ pramāṇaprameyayoḥ pratibhāgaḥ. mukits tu śūnyatādṛṣṭeh ... kecit tu mādhyamikāḥ svastham jñānam āhuh.3 The Mādhyamika’s attitude towards the problem is still to be investigated, though we know from the words of Ratnakaraśānti’s this much that the school is also divided into the two parties.4

The epistemology of the Sautrāntika is described in SDS 33, 320–38, 271, and many other texts, Brahmanical and Jaina. Jadunath Sinha gives a good account of it in his Indian Realism, Chap. II; Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the reproductions of the Sautrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works.5 Among Buddhist texts, TBh contains a brief but useful description, which is here translated. “The Sautrāntika holds the following theory. All that is manifested in the from of blue, etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (bāhyo ‘rthah), since an insentient (jaḍa) thing is not able to become visible (prakāśa). Concerning this it is said: The range of the senses [i.e. the external reality] (indriyagocara) is not perceptible itself, though it gives birth to the knowledge with the form [or image] of it [i.e. the objective reality]. The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika] Alamkāra [Prajñākaragupta] says too: If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge]; if a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external. [The opponent:] If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is the external reality? [The Sautrāntika:] The proof of the external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (vyatireka): Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only due to our own material cause (upādāna=samanantarapratyaya), since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Thus, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (samanantarapratyaya), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality.”6

The Sautrāntika’s argument regarding the problem of why knowledge must be endowed with the image of its object is as follows.7 “Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of its object (sākāra). If knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects.” Very similar passages are found also in DP8 and TSop.9 In connection of this kind of argumentation, the following verse of Dharmakīrti is often quoted: bhinnakālam kathāṁ grāhyam iti cet grāhyatām viduḥ, hetuvaṃ eva yuktiṁ jñānākārārpaṇaṣakam.10 (How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the direct perception grasping it] be an object of the direct perception? We reply: philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge.)
According to Ratnākaraśānti, the Mādhyamika, as well as the Yogācārin, is each divided into two groups, one maintaining sākāra-vāda and the other holding nirākāra-vāda. But the most important development is the schism among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntika thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārin advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all, the world being nothing but our ideas which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārin, the image of cognition is the appearance of our mind; and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus, all the Yogācārins must be sākāra-vādins so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who is supposed to have acquired nirvikalpa-kajñāna or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is freed from the fetter of cognition and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they held that this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal stains born due to our vāsanā. This is the essential of the nirākāra-jñāna-vāda. But others from the same school criticised this theory, saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise it would entail the unfavourable doctrine of asatkhyāti. Every cognition, inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image, and yet there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental of which is the bifurcation of cognition and cognizer. This is the essential point of the sākāra-jñāna-vāda of the Yogācārins. What we have seen above is a fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding sākāra and nirākāra, and must have been developed after Dharmakīrti, reaching its final phase at the time of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra, i.e. in 11th cent. Jñānaśrimitra, a sākāra-vādin, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti, a nirākāra-vādin, seems to be more akin to Śāntiraksita. We are not very sure of the aspect of the controversy before Dharmakīrti.

With regard to the problem of our concern, a passage of Bodhibhadra which was first introduced by Yamaguchi is well known.¹¹ It may be translated into English as follows. "Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, [those who maintain that knowledge is] always [endowed] with images (sākāra) and [those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is] without images (nirākāra). Of these, sākāra is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), as is said in the following:¹² The object of cognition is none other than internal image that appears pretending to be externally existent . . . They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. Nirākāra is taught by Ārya Asaṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and are [as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial
blindness. Concerning this the following is said: 13 If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained. And again: 14 When non-conceptual knowledge is acquired, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object, and since it is inexistent the content of cognition is also inexistent. They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind. This theory of one kind [of cognition] is maintained also by some of the sākāravādins.”

In TBh Mokṣākaragupta gives a similar description. 15 “Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i.e. sākāravādins] maintain as follows: All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, there is neither cognitum nor cognizer of anything; through logical construction (kalpanā), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. So it is determined. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (ākāra), is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer. Others [i.e. nirākāravādins] however, maintain: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday]. 16 Those images of cognition (ākāra) are indeed not real, and become perceptible being shown by nescience (avidyā). Therefore, the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is inexistent, the quality of cognizer which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized] is also inexistent.”

These two passages, being of Bodhichandra and Mokṣākaragupta, belong to 11th or 12th cent. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, etc. represented the sākāravāda, while Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc., the nirākāravāda. His opinion seems to be based on the above-cited passage of Bodhichandra and Hsüanchuang’s description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (唯識論 with K’uei-chi’s commentary. As well known, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. Nonetheless, the present writer thinks that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to that between sākāra- and nirākāra-vādins, of which some more materials from Sanskrit and Tibetan will be presented in this paper. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives a succinct and excellent survey 17 in Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, S. 396, 4–397, 6, with translations from the Siddhi. On reading it, we notice that the controversy between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati is in essence identical with that between Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti. Frauwallner’s opinion that the origin of Dharmapāla’s theory is traced back to Asanga differs from the description of Bodhichandra who ascribes the nirākāravāda to the same person. Apart from this, however, Dharmapāla’s
theory is similar to the sākāravāda of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakūṭi, while Sthiramati’s to the nirākāravāda of Ratnakaraśānti. Fortunately, the controversy between Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakaraśānti is attested by rich materials, some of which are introduced here.

The general feature of Ratnakaraśānti’s nirākāravāda may be understood by the following passage in PPU.18 “Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. And external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent. And accordingly the cognition is not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two [i.e. cognitum and cognizer] are the expression (abhilāpa) of the thinking (manas) and as such belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) of things. Where are they represented? [They are represented in] the wrong representation (abhūtapaṇikanalpa) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born due to the latent seeds of representation (vāsanā), which is attached to [constructing] represented images where there are no [external] realities. This abhūtapaṇikanalpa is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) of things, 19 and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognitum and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only due to falsity (bhrānti) and confusion (viplava). This is why it is said that [the two are represented] in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (prakāśamātra) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (ākāra) [of cognition] are marked by falsity (bhrāntinimitta), marked by manifoldness (prapañcamimitta). It is because they are objects of false [cognition]. They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two [i.e. cognitum and cognizer]. All the manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (lokottarajñāna). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (parinispannasvabhāva).”

The reason why the image of cognition is unreal is explained by him as follows.20 “[Represented images] such as a blue thing etc., though they are being manifested, are proved to be unreal (alika), since they are contradicted [by another cognition]. Since they are proved to be unreal, their substratum itself is proved to be unreal. However, the consciousness of illumination (prakāśa) itself is directly intuited as free from falsity, and accordingly is established as real. For illumination has as its inborn nature illuminating function, and cannot be approached by confusion (viplavopanita), so that the consciousness of it might be false. On the other hand, blue is another thing [different from the illumination itself], and can be approached by confusion; therefore, the knowledge of it may be false. Thus, there may be occasions in which [the knowledge of] blue etc. is [negated] by another contradicting cognition [e.g. we see a yellow shell, and it is sublated later by another true cognition that it is white]; but it cannot happen in the case of the illumination itself.”

This passage of Ratnakara’s is cited as a pūrvapakṣa by Jñānaśrīmitra in JNA (Sākārasiddhiśāstra) 368, 6–10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time: bhavatv ākārāṇāṃ bādhanaṅ ālikatvam, prakāśamātram
tu satyam āmnāyāḥ, tadātma vedaṇāya bhṛntatvāyogena pratyaṣvat. prakāsasya prakāśa eva nijam rūpam iti na tat tasya vīplavopanitam, yena tadvedanaṁ bhṛntiḥ syāt. nīlāṁ tu rūpāntaratvāḥ vīplavopanitam api syād iti syāt tadvedanaṁ bhṛntiḥ. tatośti nīlādau bādhakasyāvatāro, na prakāśe.

Ratnākaraśānti introduces the criticism of nirākāravāda by the sākāravādin and refutes it as follows.21 "Some of the sākārajñānavādins of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamika school say as follows: If [as the nirākāravādin maintains, the image of cognition] such as blue is unreal and the illumination [of cognition] is real, the [two] being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if [blue] would not be identical with the illumination, blue could not be illuminated [i.e. could not become visible]. But it is a fact that blue is seen. [But if they were identical] then, blue, etc. would not be an imagined thing, since it should not be different from the illumination which is not imaginary. [Answer:] If it is as they say, all cognitions would know the right nature [of things]; this would entail that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i.e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones . . ."

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel of the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8–23, and RNA 129, 1–12: tathā hi sarvair eva prakāraiv aviparitārtha svarūpasaṃvedanād bhṛnte ayantam abhāvāḥ syāt. tataś ca sarvasattvāḥ sadaiva samyakasambuddhā bhayeuyāḥ . . . It is not possible to quote further due to space-limitation, though the parallels between PPU and JNA may be increased much more. The present writer believes that what is said above is enough to clarify the fundamental aspects of the controversy between the sākāravādin and nirākāravādin of the Yogācāra school.


Notes

* It is by the information of Mr. Unno, Assistant, Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University, that I first came to know the existence of the controversy of our concern in PPU. On examining it, I found that the text was closely related to the Sākārasiddhi of Jñānasrimitra. Herewith I express my gratitude to Mr. Unno for the information.
1 2 S. Mukerjee, The Buddhist philosophy of universal flux, 77.
3 See also SDS 46, 368–371: artho jñānānvīto vaibhāṣikaṃ bahu manyate, sautrāntikaṃ pratyakṣaśāgrāhyo 'rtha na bahir mataḥ, ākārasaṅhitā buddhir yogācāraṃ saṃmātā, kevalāṃ satvavidāṃ svasthim manyante madhyamāḥ punāḥ. Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here a group of the Mādhyamika who is said to maintain pure consciousness independent of ākāra seems to represent nīrākāra-vādin.

4 Cf. p. 11 below (the last citation from PPU).

5 金蔵圖典, 外教の文献にみる経部説 (山口博士還暦紀念印度佛教學論叢 55 ff.).

6 TBh 63, 17 ff.: sautrāntikānām matam: jñānāṃ evēdam sarvāṃ mālyāvikārayaṃ pratibhāsate, na bāhyo 'rthaḥ, jaḍasya prakāṣāyogāt. yathākram, svākāra-jñānajānakā drśya nēndriyāgocarāt, iti. alamākārakāreṇdyā uktaṃ, yādi samvedyate nilam kathām bāhyām tad ucayate, na cēt samvedyate nilam kathām bāhyām tad ucayate. nanu yādi prakāsāmānaṃ jñānāṃ evēdam tadāsti bāhyo 'rtha iti kuṭaḥ. bāhyārtha-sāiddhiḥ tu sāyād ugyāreyakataḥ, na hi sarvatra sarvāda nilādayā ākārāḥ prakāśante, na cētāvān svopādānānātrahābha-vātivive sāti ucyate. niyātāvise pravṛttyāyogyāt. tasmād asti kimcid eṣaṃ samanantarapratyayavartitākām kāraṇaḥ yadvalena kvacit kācācit bhavantīti sākyam avasātum, sa eva bāhyo 'rtha iti. The two verses are identical with JSS v. 23 (ibid.); 中觀佛 教論叢 296) and PVbh 366, 17 (III, v. 718) respectively.

7 TBh 23, 7 ff.: sākāram cēdān jñānāṃ ēstavyam. yādi punah sākāram jñānam nesayate, tadānākāratvena sarvatra viṣaye tulyatāt vībhaṅgaṃ viṣayāvasthā na sādyati.

8 DP. 82, 24–26.


11 S. Yamaguchi, Chūkan Bukkyō Ronkō, 308 ff. The author translates the passage into Japanese and comments on it. The passage is found in JSSN, 51, b 3 ff.: tādā niṣṭar hīνyoraṃ spōd pa nāi rmaṇ pa gisī te, rmaṇ pa daṅ bcaṣ pa daṅ, rmaṇ pa med paḥo. de la rmaṇ pa daṅ bcaṣ pa ni slop dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ po la sogs pa dag gi hōd pa sa te, rmaṇ pa gīn gya daḥa du ston pas ji skad du: naṅ gi ṣes byaḥi no bo ni, phyi rol ltar naṅ (snāṇ ?) gaṅ yīn te, don yin ṣes bya ba la sogs ste rmaṇ pa ṣes pahi tshogs drug tu smra bhaḥo. rmaṇ pa med pa ni slop dpon hphags pa thogs med la sogs pa sa te, de dag rmaṇ pa kun tu bruags pa rab riṃ can gyi skra śad la sogs pa ltar smra bāṣ, don ni don tu grub hgyur na, mi rtog ye ṣes med pa hgyur, de med pas na saṃs rgyas niṅ, thob par hthad pa ma yin no. de bīzun du mi rtog ye ṣes rgyu ba la, don kun snāṇ ba med phyir yan, don med khor du chud par bya ba, de med pas na rmaṇ rig med ces brjod ciṅ, de med pas pahi tshogs bṛgyad daṅ, kha cīg cīg pur smra bāṣ ta ste. gcīg pu niṅ nī rmaṇ pa daṅ bcaṣ pa dag la yha kha cīg go.

12 Alambanaparikṣā v. 6.

13 Mahāyānasamgraha, ed. Lamotte, II, 14b. c = VIII, 20. c.

14 ibid. II, 14b. f = VIII, 20. f.

15 TBh 69, 11 ff.: tāra kecita evam āhūh: vijñānam evēdāni sarvān sarvasaśar- raviṣayabhaveṇa prasiddham, tōc ca svasamvedanām ēti na kasyaicit grāhyam grāhakaṃ vā. kalpanāyā tu grāhyagrāhakabhhā ēti vyavasthāyate. tathā parikalpita- grāhyagrāhakabhbharaṇaṃ viñābhisākāriṣi (Read so instead of sākāra) satyaṃ ēti. anyy tu sakalākārakalaiṅkāniṅkātiḥ sūdhaspaṭakasamākāḥ śuśvāvan vijnānam, ākāras tv amit vītāthā evāvīdayār daśītāth prakāśante. tasmāt grāhyam nāṃ nāasty ēva, grāhyabhāvītā tadapekṣāyād grahakatvam vijñānasya tad api nāstīti.

16 The bracketed words are found only in Tib. version.


18 PPU 161, a5–161, b4: de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam dan, rnam par šes pa tsam dan, gsal ba tsam yin pas rnam par rig pahi gzun ba phyi rol gyi don yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa rnam kyān hdsin pahi ran bzin du yod pa ma yin te, hdi giṇī yid kyi mnon par brjod pahi phyir chos thams cad kyi kun brtags pahi ran bzin yin no. gaṅ la brtags še na, don med par yon kun tu brtags pahi no bo ŋid la mnon par šen pahi bag chags las skyes pahi don du snaṅ bahi yain dag pa ma yin pahi kun tu rtog pahi. yain dag pa ma yin pahi kun tu rtog pa de ni chos rnam kyi gzan gyi dban gi no bo ŋid dan hkhrl pa dan, phyin ci log dan, log pahi šes pa yain yin no. hdi ltar dehī gzen ba dan hdsin pahi rnam pa ni hkhrl pa dan bslad pahi dban hbaḥ zīg gis snas bas brsdun pahi phyir. yain dag pa ma yin pahi kun tu rtog pa de la de skad ces bya ste, dehī ran bzin de ni yain dag pa ma yin pahi. yain dag pa ŋid gani yin ze na, gsal ba tsam mo. de ŋid kyi na rnam pa de ni hkhrl pa pahi mshn na dan, spros pahi mshn na žes bya bar brjod de, hkhrl pahi dmigs pa yin pahi phyir ro, giṇī kyi mshn žes kyi bya ste, giṇī ltar snaṅ bahi pahi phyir ro. spros pahi mshn med (Read ma) thams cad hjig rten las hdsas pahi ye šes la hjag par hjgr la, des na de ni ma hkhrl pa dan yain dag pahi ye šes su yain dag brjod de. de ŋid kyi phyir de yain yonis su grub pahi no bo ŋid yin te.

19 It is necessary to note that abhūtaparikalpa is an aspect of the paratantrasvabhāva, but the two bhāgas, cognitum and cognizer, as represented by it belong to the parikalpitasvabhāva.

20 PPU 167, b. 8–168. a 3: sīnon po la sogs pa de gsal bzin pa yin yain gnod pa yod pahi phyir brsdun pa yain grub po. de brsdun par grub pas na dehī bdag ŋid de yain brsdun par grub po. yain gsal ba de rigs pa ni hkhrl pa dan bral bas mion sum yin pahi phyir diḥos po ŋid du grub pa yin te. gani gi phyir gsal ba ni gsal ba ŋid kyi gyiug mahu ran bzin yin te. gani gi myon ba hi hkhrl par hjog pahi bslad pas bdag pa med pahi phyir ro. yain po la sogs pahi ran bzin yin pahi phyir bslad pas byas par hjguar la, ltar gyur bas na de myon ba yain hkhrl par hjguar ro. de bas na sīnon po la sogs pa la ni gnod pa hjog pahi skabs yod kyi gsal ba la ni ma yin yin no.
21 PPU 168. a 4 ff.: rnal hbyor spyod pa pa dan, dbu ma pa šes pa rnam, pa dan bcas par smra ba kha cig na re, sgon po dan gsal ba dag brdsun pa dan brdsun pa ma yin par gyur na, chos hgal ba ŋid kyis na dehi bdag tu ḫḥad par mī hgyur la, dehi bdag ŋid ma yin na yaṅ sgon po la sogs pa gsal bar mī hgyur na sgon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. sgro (ma) btags pahi dios por gyur pahi gsal ba las gzan ma yin pahi phyir sgon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags pahi dios por gyur ba yin žes zer te. de dag gi ltar na gsal ba thams cad phyin ci ma log pahi raṅ gi ǹo bo myon bahi phyir, thams cad ḫḥrul pa med por hgyur ro. des na sems can thams cad rtaṅ tu grol bar hgyur la, rtaṅ tu yaṅ dag par rdzogs pahi saṅs rgyas ŋid du hgyur ro...
THREE KINDS OF AFFIRMATION
AND TWO KINDS OF NEGATION IN
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Yuichi Kajiyama


I. vyavaccheda

In Indian logical texts the investigation of a proposition or judgement does not form a separate chapter. This, however, does not mean that Indian philosophers have been unaware of the differences of propositions in quality, quantity, and meaning. In order to meet this question, they have developed particular theories about the nature of the relationship between two terms—which is equivalent to a proposition in the Sanskrit language. They have had the theory of three kinds of exclusion (vyavaccheda) for the affirmative relationship between two terms and the theory of two kinds of negation (pratisedha) for the negative relationship. In the present paper the writer discusses logical aspects of these two theories and their applications to some of the most important problems of philosophy, limiting the scope of his argument to Indian Buddhist texts.

A specific aspect of the Buddhist theory of a proposition is that the nature of a proposition is determined in view of the particle eva which functions as a restrictive. From Dharmakīrti onward throughout the subsequent development of Buddhist logic, the function of the particle eva is always accorded special attention when Buddhists examine an affirmative proposition. In the case of a negative proposition, the particle has played a crucial role only in the earlier interpretations, losing its importance in later works, as the theory of negation is further developed.

The particle eva does not always appear in a sentence; but, insofar as a sentence is the expression of a speaker's [or writer's] will, which necessarily restricts the meaning, the particle eva is to be understood, at least implicitly, in every sentence. In other words, every sentence is determined in its nature by means of the context.

It is now well known that Indian grammarians, ritualists, and logicians
(Naiyāyika) have developed the theory of two kinds of negation, paryudāsa and prasajya-pratishedha. In Buddhism, Bhāvaviveka (or Bhavya, — 570 A.D.) seems to be the first scholar who used the theory as an important weapon for his philosophical argumentation. But his interpretation of the theory is different from that of the grammarians in that he discriminates between two kinds of negation by observing the particular position of the particle eva in a sentence, whereas the grammarians take note of the negative particle naḥ which is construed with either a verb or a nominal. Avalokitavara (7th c. A.D. ?) comments on Bhāvaviveka’s theory. Arcaṭa (8th c. A.D.) and Durekamiśra (10–11th c. A.D.), among others, give interpretations of the two kinds of negation which are closer to that of the grammarians. As for the affirmative proposition, Dharmakīrti (7th c. A.D.) has presented a clear idea; and Jñānaśrimitra (11th c. A.D.) further develops Dharmakīrti’s theory. Ratnakīrti (11th c. A.D.) and Mokṣākaraṇa (1050–1202 A.D.) follow Jñānaśrimitra’s interpretation.

Dharmakīrti demonstrates a kind of quantification theory of the affirmative proposition. In PV, Chap. IV, v. 190–192, he classifies the affirmative proposition into three kinds, and explains the differences in meaning with examples. The verses recur in PVn, Chap. II, 266, b3–5 (p. 108, 5, 3–5). They are cited verbatim in Guṇaratna, p. 35, 11.11–17:

ayogam yogam aparair atyantayogam eva ca /
vyaśacchinatti dharmsya nipāto vyatirecakah //
viśeṣānaviśeṣyābhyaṃ kriyā ca sahoditaḥ /
vivaksāto ’prayoge ’pi tasyārtho ’yam prāfyaite //
vyavacchedaphalam vākyam yatas caitra dhanurdharah /
pārtha dhanurdhara nilam sarojam iti vā yathā //

(Tr.) The particle (eva) that functions as separator, when stated with the qualifier, the qualificand, and the verb, [respectively] excludes the non-connection of the attribute [or qualifier, and the qualificand], the connection [of the attribute] with all things other [than the stated qualificand], and the absolute non-connection [of the attribute and the qualificand]. Even if [the particle eva] is not [actually] applied, one of these meanings is understood through the intention of the speaker, for [the meaning of] a sentence is the result of the exclusion [of the other meanings]. For example, [the above three relationships are illustrated by:] “Caitra is an archer”, “Pārtha alone is the archer”, and “There are some lotus blooms which are blue”.

1. A proposition consists of three major elements: qualificand (viśeṣya, dharmin), qualifier or attribute (viśeṣana, dharma), and verb (kriyā). The nature of a proposition is divided into three classes according to the position of the particle eva (indeed; alone) which is stated with one of the three elements. When eva is stated with the qualifier, as in “caitra dhanurdhara eva bhavati (Caitra is an archer), it negates the non-connection of the qualifier (dhanurdhara, archer)
and the qualificand (*caitra*). That is to say, it affirms the connection of the two, and indicates that the qualifier is an attribute of the qualificand. Thus, we obtain a universal proposition in which the class of the qualifier (*dhanurdhara*) is greater in extension than that of the qualificand (*caitra*). The proposition does not mean that there is no archer other than *Caitra*, but that *Caitra* is one of the members of the class of archer. This relationship is called *ayogavyavaccheda* (exclusion of non-connection).

2. When *eva* is stated with the qualificand, it negates the connection of the qualifier and that which is other than the qualificand, i.e., we have a universal proposition in which the class of qualificand and that of qualifier are equal in extension. For instance, *pārtha eva dhanurdharo bhavati* (*Pārtha* is the only archer). In this proposition the speaker’s intention is not that *Pārtha* or *Arjuna* is one of the archers, but that he is the only excellent archer (among the five brothers of the *Pāṇḍava*), the word ‘archer’ metaphorically expressing ‘the best archer’. This relationship is named *anyayogavyavaccheda* (exclusion of the connection with that which is other than the qualificand).

3. When *eva* is stated with the verb, it negates the total separation of the qualifier and the qualificand. At the same time, neither is the total connection affirmed. Hence, there exists a particular proposition in which some members of the class of qualificand overlap some members of the class of qualifier. *sarojani nam sambhavaty eva* (Some lotus blooms can be blue). Here, some of the lotus blooms can have the attribute ‘blue’, that is, a part of the lotus bloom is connected with a part of the blue. It means neither that all the lotus bloom is blue, nor that the lotus bloom alone is blue. Thus, this third relationship, being differentiated both from *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda*, is named *ayantāyogavyavaccheda* (exclusion of the absolute non-connection).

Jñānaśrīmitra says in *Kāryakāraṇābhāvasiddhi*, v. 10 (JNA, p. 321) and its commentary:

*sāmagryapekṣayānyasya ccchedo dravyapramekṣayā,
 yogyatāyām ayogasya siddho ‘tyantaṁ ca karmanī.
 yadā hi dahanāśabdena tadupalakṣitā sāmagri samāsenībhidyate,
 tadā sa evety anyayogavyavacchedah, yadā tu dahanadravyam eva
tadāpi kāraṇatvam nāṁ yadi yogyatā, tadā kāraṇam evety ayo-
gavyavacchedah, atha kriyāva, tadāpi bhavaty evety atyañtāyog-
gavyavacchedas ca siddhāḥ.

(Tr.) When a totality is concerned the others are excluded; when a sub-
stance in relation to [a certain] fitness is concerned the non-
connection is severed; regarding an action the absolute
non-connection is severed.

When by the word ‘fire’ we mean as a whole the entire things [fire, fuel, moisture, etc.] implied by it, that much alone is [the cause of smoke] (*sa eva kāraṇam*) and here the connection of the others is
severed (anyayogavyavaccheda). When only the substance of fire is meant and also when cause-ness means fitness [or latent force], then [fire] is fit to be [one of] the causes [of smoke] (dahanaḥ kāraṇam eva). This is the exclusion of the non-connection (ayogavyavaccheda). When furthermore an actual action is meant, [it means that fire] actually can be [a cause] (dahanaḥ kāraṇam bhavaty eva). Here the exclusion of the absolute non-connection (atyantāyogavyavaccheda) is admitted.

The proposition “Fire is the cause of smoke” can be understood differently according to which connotation of the two terms, ‘fire’ and ‘cause [of smoke]’ one takes. If ‘fire’ means the totality of fire, fuel, moisture, air, etc. together with the absence of hindrances such as rain, ‘fire’ and ‘the cause of smoke’ pervade each other, or have the same extension. Thus, the relationship between the two is anyayogavyavaccheda.

When we mean by ‘fire’ the substance of fire as separate from fuel, moisture, etc., and by ‘the cause of smoke’ mere possibility of producing smoke, then ‘fire’ is one of the causes of smoke, i.e., it is pervaded by ‘the cause of smoke’, but not ‘the cause of smoke’ by ‘fire’. That is to say, ‘fire’ is smaller in extension than ‘the cause of smoke’. Thus, the two terms are connected by ayogavyavaccheda.

Furthermore, if ‘fire’ means the substance of fire alone and ‘the cause of smoke’ not possibility, but the real action of producing smoke, we obtain a particular proposition that fire sometimes produces smoke or that some kinds of fire produce smoke. Although fire is one of the causes of smoke in possibility, in actuality it may be extinguished by unfavourable conditions, say cloud bursts; or it may not work because of the actual absence of any of the positive conditions of smoke, as in the case of a red iron-ball which does not yield smoke because it is not combined with moisture. In this case the relationship between the two terms is atyantāyogavyavaccheda.

We know many cases in which important problems of Buddhist logic are discussed in relation to the theory of vyavaccheda. Dharmakīrti’s verses introduced above are presented on an occasion of controversy in which his opponent argues: When Buddhist logicians define the probans (middle term; hetu, sādhanā) of an inference as an attribute of the thesis-locus (minor term; pakṣa = dharmin) (pakṣasya dharman) it can mean that the probans belongs solely to the thesis-locus and not to other things which share the probandum (major term; sādhya) with the thesis-locus. But a probans subsisting only in the thesis-locus (asādharana) is condemned to be fallacious. For instance “Sound is impermanent because of its audibility” is an inconclusive inference, since the probans ‘audibility’ is an exclusive property of sound, and since the inference is tantamount to say that sound is impermanent because of being sound.

To this objection Dharmakīrti replies that the relationship between pakṣa (thesis-locus) and dharma (probans) must not be understood to be anyogyavaccheda as the opponent does, but to be ayogavyavaccheda; i.e., the defi-
nition in question means not that the thesis-locus alone is the possessor of the attribute, but that the thesis-locus is one of the possessors of the attribute. It is for this purpose that Dharmakīrti refers to the theory of vyavaccheda in general. Jñānaśrīmitra explains this theory, when elaborating on the Buddhist principles of how to establish a causal relation. Ratnakīrti (RNA, p. 70, 11.7–10) also says that vyāpti or the relation between probans (sādhana) and probandum (sādhyā) can be of two kinds, samavyāpti and asamavyāpti, the former word being equivalent to anyayogavyavaccheda; the latter to ayogavyavaccheda.

A mere glance at the above discussions is sufficient to appreciate the import of the theory of vyavaccheda. As one of the most successful applications of this theory to decisive problems of Buddhist epistemology, we refer to Mokṣākaragupta who, following Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, reinterprets the Buddhist theory of perception. As is well known, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have defined perception as cognition bereft of conceptual thinking (pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham). Accordingly, they say that the object of perception is the extreme particular which, unlike a concept, is determined specifically in time, space, and nature (pratyakṣasya viśayaḥ svalaksanam). A universal, or concept, which is common to many individuals, never becomes an object of perception.

Later, however, this theory of perception comes to be criticized by Naiyāyikas such as Trilocaṇa and Vācaspatimiśra, who argue: If perception does not grasp universals (sāmānya), it cannot establish a universal concomitance (vyāpti) between two universals [e.g., the causal relation between smoke in general and fire in general]; and Buddhists cannot maintain the validity of inference which is based on the validity of a universal concomitance. Besides, Buddhists must not assert that a universal concomitance is not perceived but inferred, since inference always presupposes perception.

Against this criticism later Buddhist philosophers including Mokṣākaragupta reveal a new theory that a universal can also be an object of perception, and that a universal concomitance is grasped by perception7. In order to dissolve apparent incompatibility between the traditional and the new theories of perception, Mokṣākaragupta says:

nāyam doṣaḥ, yato'yogavyavacchedena svalakṣanam tasya [pratyakṣasya] viśaya eva, na tu anyayogavyavacchedena svalakṣanam eva tasya viśaya iti.

(Tr.) There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [perception], the non-connection [of the former with the latter] being negated, and not that the particular alone is its object, all other [than the particular] being excluded.

According to Mokṣākaragupta, Dharmakīrti's view that the particular is the object of perception must not be construed by anyayogavyavaccheda, but by ayogavyavaccheda. Thus, he demonstrates that the traditional theory does not
prevent a universal from becoming an object of perception. In so doing he relies on the theory of vyavaccheda.

II. paryudāsa and prasajyapratīṣedha

In contrast to the theory of vyavaccheda which has been pursued by very few, the Indian theory of negation has been studied by many modern scholars. On the following pages the writer attempts not to repeat that which others have already written concerning the latter, but aims to point out that the classification of negation into two kinds has much bearing upon Buddhist philosophy, and that the Buddhist theory of negation has special features which are not common to those demonstrated by the Vaiyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsaka, and Naiyāyika.

It is the sixth-century Buddhist, Bhāvaviveka, who first emphasized the significance of the discrimination between paryudāsa ‘limitation(al) negation’ and prasajyapratīṣedha ‘negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying’ in Buddhist philosophy. In the context of logic, they may be rendered as ‘the negation of a term’ and ‘the negation of a proposition’ respectively. The theory of two kinds of negation has since been developed by many Buddhists; and over the years it has continued to play an important role in Buddhist philosophy, especially in the Mādhyamika argumentation.

As is well known, Nāgārjuna declares in MK, Chap. 1, v. 1 (p. 12) that no existents ever occur anywhere which have arisen from themselves, from others, from both, or without a cause (na svato nāpi parato na dvāḥhyāṁ nāpy ahetu, utpānam jātu vidyante bhāvah kvacana kecana). While commenting on this verse, Bhāvaviveka says (PP, p. 10):

bdag las ma yin ūs bya ba'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa'i don du blta bar bya ste, dgag pa gtso che ba'i phyir dan, 'di liar rtog pa ma lus pa'i dra ba dgags pas rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye še ūs bya (ba'i) yul ma lus pa dan ldan pa 'grab par dgons pa'i phyir ro. ma yin par dgag pa yoṅs su bzūn na ni de sgrub pa gtso che ba'i phyir, chos rnam ma skyes so ūs sgrub pas skye ba med pa ston pa'i phyir mdsad pa'i mtha' ḍañ brał bar hgyur te, luṅ las gzugs kyi skye ba med pa la spyod na šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa ma yin no, ūs 'byun ba'i phyir ro. 'di dinos po rnam pa bdag las skye ba med pa kho na'o šes ūs par bzūn bar bya'o, gzan du ūs par bzūn na bdag kho na las skye ba med de 'o na ci ūs na, gzan las skye'o ūs bya bar ūs par 'gyur ba dan de bzin du bdag kho na las ni skye ba med de, 'o na ci ūs na, bdag dan gzan las skye'o ūs bya ūs par 'gyur bas de yaṅ mi bzed de. mdsad pa'i mtha' ḍañ brał ba'i phyir ro.

(Tr.) This negation ‘not from themselves’ (na svatah) must be understood in the sense of prasajyapratīṣedha (med par dgag pa), because [here] negation [and not affirmation] is primarily meant
and because [the author] intends to destroy the net of all concepts and to establish non-conceptual intuition which [at the same time] is endowed with all knowable objects. If you grasp it as paryudāsa (ma yin par dgag pa), [the phrase will] affirm that [there are] things [which] are not produced, since it [paryudāsa] has affirmation as its primary objective. Teaching the non-production [of things positively], it will differ from the traditional doctrine [of the Mādhyamika]. For a sūtra says that if you practise the non-production of matter, you deviate from practising the perfect wisdom (prajñāpāramitā). In the present case, we have to impose a restriction (avadhāraṇa) [on the sentence by means of the particle eva] so that it may mean “Things are never produced from themselves”. If you restrict it in a different way, it may mean “Things are produced not from themselves”. What follows then? It will be concluded that “Things are produced from others”. Similarly, when it is restricted so as to mean “Things are not produced from themselves alone”, what results from it is “Things are produced from themselves and others”. However, this [meaning] is not intended either because it deviates from the traditional doctrine.

Unfortunately the Prajñāpradīpa in which the above passage occurs is not extant in Sanskrit, but in Tibetan [and Chinese]; and we are not in a position to know exactly in the original language the three forms of propositions by which Bhāvaviveka interprets Nāgārjuna’s thesis na bhāvāh svata utpānā vidyante. However, we can infer that each of the three sentences must have been restricted in meaning by the word eva, which is inserted in a certain place. For the Tibetan kho na exclusively stands for the Sanskrit eva. The two sentences in which the negation represents paryudāsa may be tentatively rendered into Sanskrit as: naiva svata utpānā bhāvā vidyante (cf. MK, p. 13, 1.4. Things are produced not from themselves = They are produced from others) and svata eva utpānā bhāvā na vidyante (Things are not produced not from themselves alone = They are produced from themselves and others). Both of them, Bhāvaviveka says, are not consistent with Nāgārjuna’s purpose. Thus, Nāgārjuna’s thesis must be understood in the sense of prasajyapratīṣṭedaḥ so that it may mean “It is false that things are produced from themselves” (bhāvāh svata utpānā naiva vidyante).

Avalokitavrata, whose commentary on the Prajñāpradīpa is preserved in the Tibetan Tripitaka, cites a verse ascribed to an unknown grammarian, while explaining the above passage of Nāgārjuna’s. The verse, together with Avalokitavrata’s explanation, runs in Tibetan (PPT, Wa, 73, b1–74, a2; p. 185, 4–1~5–2):

dgag pa don gyis bstan pa dan, tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dan, de ldan ran tshig mi ston pa, ma yin gzhan pa gzan, yin no.
... di skad bstan te, dgag pa gan don glyi go ba ston pa dan, tshig gcig gis dnos po sgrub par byed pa dan. don glyi go ba dan dnos po sgrub pa de dan ldan pa dan, ra gi tshig gis mi ston pa, dper na rgyal rigs la rgyal rigs zes bya bari tshig gis mi ston par, bram ze ma yin pa zes bya bari tshig gis ston pa de ni ma yin par dgag pa yin par blta bar bya'o. gzan pa bzin (Read: bzan) no zes bya ba ni de las gzan pa'i dgag pa gan yin pa de ni ma yin, par dgag pa las gzan pa med par dgag pa yin no zes bya bari tha tshig go ... de'i don glyi go ba'i mtsan naid ston pa ma yin pa dan, dgag pa lhul len te dgag pa kho na de'i dgos pa yin zin gzan glyi khas blans pa gan yin pa de dgag pa tsam byed la dnos po'i de kho na'am dnos po med pa'i de kho na sgrub par mi byed pa dan, don glyi go ba dan ldan pa yan ma yin dnos po dan ldan pa yan ma yin zin dgag pa dan ldan pa dan, ra gi tshig gis ston te dper na bram ze ma yin la bram ze ma yin pa de naid ces dgag pa tsam ni ishe byed pa yin no.

(Tr.) Negation which is stated through implication, affirms a positive idea [too] by a single sentence (ekavākyā), and, besides having these (characteristics), does not use the [affirmed] term itself, is paryudāsa; what is different [from this] is the other [or prasajyapratisedha].

... The following is meant. Negation having the following characteristics must be regarded as paryudāsa: (1) it states implication (arthāpatti); (2) by a single sentence (3) affirms a positive entity [too]; (4) having [the characteristics of] implication and the affirmation of a positive entity, does not use the very word [of the entity], as when one, meaning a kṣatriya, uses not the word kṣatriya but the word abhrāhmaṇa. “What is different is the other” means that negation which is different from this, i.e. which is different from paryudāsa, is prasajyapratisedha ... This [prasajyapratisedha] has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign of arthāpatti; (2) is devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e., simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does not affirm the existence of an entity or a non-entity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without having [those of] implication and the affirmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negation] by its own word, as when one, meaning ‘not a Brahman’ says ‘not a Brahman’ by which he simply makes negation.

Fortunately we find in Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā (HBT, p. 171, l. 4 ff.) a Sanskrit passage which is almost parallel to Avalokitavrata’s explanation:

yatra vidhe pṛadhānyam, pratisedho rthaṅgrhitāḥ, vidihbhāk svapadena nocyate, ekavākyatā ca tatra paryudāsavrīttī ... prasajyapratisedhah punar etadviparīto mantavyah, tatra hi pratisedhasya pṛadhānyam, vidhir arthād ganyate, vākyabhedaḥ, svapadena naḥ pratisedhabhāk sambadhyaṭe.
From this passage too, it is clear that paryudāṣa has the following characteristics: (1) affirmation is primarily intended; (2) negation is understood by implication; (3) the object to be affirmed is not mentioned by its own name, as in the case of abrāhmaṇa (non-Brahman) which means a member of another caste—kṣatriya, vaiśya, śūdra; (4) a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both ideas are conveyed in a single sentence (ekavākyatā) because both refer to the same object (HBTA, p. 387, 1. 26: sāmānādhikaranya). prasajyapratisedha has four characteristics opposite to the above, although points 3 and 4 are placed in reverse order: (1) the primary aim is negation; (2) affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation; (3) the negation, e.g., sūryam na paśyanti forms a separate sentence from that which it tentatively supposed, i.e. sūryam paśyanti; the two sentences must be understood in two steps; (4) the object of negation is explicitly mentioned by its own word, as in the case of sūrya in sūrya na paśyanti = asūryampaśyāni (mukhāni)¹¹ (‘sun-not-seeing (faces)’).

Both Arcaṭa and Durvekamiśra, the author of the Hetubinduṭīkāloka, ascribe the reason why paryudāṣa yields a one-step operation and prasajyapratisedha a two-step operation (ekavākyatā and vākyabheda) to the fact that in paryudāṣa the negative (a-; na) is construed not with a verb but with the nominal following it, whereas in prasajyapratisedha it is construed not with a nominal, but with a verb (HB, p. 171, 1. 12: nañāṣ ca subantena sāmārthyaṃ na tihantena ity ekavākyatvam. HBTA, p. 388, II. 6-7: sūryaṃ na paśyantītī nañātra dṛṣīna tihantena sambaddho na tu subanteni vākyabhedaḥ). In abrāhmaṇa ete (= na brāhmaṇa ete, “These are different from Brahman’s”) the negative is connected with the nominal brāhmaṇa; but in asūryampāśya (or sūryam na paśyanti, ‘not seeing the sun’), the negative is connected with the activity, seeing, the meaning of the verb root (dṛṣī)¹².

As described before, Bhāvaviveka takes notice of the fact that paryudāṣa aims primarily at affirmation; prasajyapratisedha at negation. However, his discrimination between the two kinds of negation is made by means of the particle eva; and he says nothing explicitly about the function of the negative particle (nañ), upon which the grammarians and philosophers in later days lay special value. Avalokitavrata’s interpretation seems to be almost identical in content with those given by Arcaṭa and Durvekamiśra except that Avalokitavrata does not mention the function of nañ. All three attach importance to the above stated four characteristics of each negation. And the theory that the negative is construed with the nominal in paryudāṣa and with a verb in prasajyapratisedha seems to have been introduced by Arcaṭa and Durvekamiśra only in relation to ekavākyatā and vākyabheda which respectively form one of the four characteristics of paryudāṣa and prasajyapratisedha.

Instances of the application of the theory of two kinds of negation to philosophical problems of Buddhism are really inexhaustible. Arcaṭa refers to the above interpretation of negation when he comments on Dharmakirti’s theory of non-cognition (anupalabdhī). According to Dharmakīrti, a non-cognition, say,
of a jar on a table is nothing but the cognition of what is other than the object of the non-cognition, that is to say, the cognition of the table and things on it other than the jar (HB, p. 170, 1. 23: vastvantaraviṣayā upalabdhiḥ). Dharmakīrti here explains a non-cognition as another cognition (HB, p. 71, 1. 21: anyopalabdhir anupalabdhiḥ), interpreting the negation to be paryudāsa. Hence Arcaṭa’s detailed comments on the two kinds of negation.

In the Mādhyamika philosophy, the theory of two kinds of negation has much bearing upon the interpretation of the doctrine of ‘emptiness’ (sūnyata). Bhāvakīrti, the founder of the Svētantrika school, asserts that negation used by a Mādhyamika must be always prasajyapratisedha. As can be seen from the above cited passage of his, the Mādhyamika proposition that things are not produced from themselves must not be understood to mean that they are produced from others, both, or without a cause. A Mādhyamika, when he negates one concept, actually intends to negate all the human concepts together with it; something other than the concept negated is not to be affirmed either. For Bhāvakīrti, to negate the essential nature (svabhāva) in everything is the only way to establish nirvikalpakajñāna as the highest truth or non-conceputal wisdom, in which neither an entity nor a non-entity is grasped. Here, the theory of two kinds of negation is enhanced almost to a soteriological interpretation.

In contrast to the Mādhyamika, who tends to understand the highest truth (paramārtha, nirvikalpakajñāna, nirābhāsajñāna) by prasajyapratisedha, the Yogācārin explains the perfected nature of mind (parinispannasvabhāva) to be a reality, although it is bereft of the duality of cognitum (grāhya) and cognizer (grāhaka). In the latest stage of Indian Yogācāra idealism, Ratnakaraśānti says that parinispanna-svabhāva which is beyond the duality (advaya) is not the absence of duality, but the absolute reality that is other than the duality. And in so doing, he asserts that in this case the negation of duality must be understood as paryudāsa.

Beginning with Dignāga, all subsequent Buddhist logicians have maintained the theory of apoha. It is regarded as one of the most significant Buddhist contributions to philosophy. The theory denies the external existence of a universal and says that the knowledge of a universal or a word is inferential and that the meaning of a word (A) is none other than the negation of the other (non-A). The problem as to which of the two kinds of negation is involved in apoha is discussed by Buddhist logicians. They tend to say that ‘the negation of the other’ (anyāpoha) in this case must be paryudāsa, since hearing the word ‘cow’ we do not only understand the absence of ‘non-cow’ but also the image (buddhyākāra) of a cow. The writer does not enter into the detail of the discussion which is beyond the scope of this paper, but in the following he describes briefly a particular aspect of the theory of apoha which is closely related to that of vyavaccheda.

In the later stage of Indian Buddhist philosophy, Jñānaśrimitra and his student Ratnakirti define the meaning of the word apoha as a positive image qualified by the discrimination of the dissimilar things (anyāpohavaisisṭo vidhiḥ).
Just as upon hearing the word indīvara (blue lotus) we figure blueness at the same moment that we picture a lotus, similarly upon hearing the word ‘cow’ we figure the negation of non-cow at the same time that we picture a cow, since the former is the qualifier of the latter.

A positive image (vidhi), say that of a cow, is the qualificand (viṣeṣya) and a negation of the dissimilar (anyāpoha), i.e., the negation of non-cow is the qualifier. This means that the word ‘cow’ involves in itself vyāvaccheda as a relation of the qualificand and the qualifier, which is in the form “A cow is a non-non-cow”. Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakārti proceed to illustrate this fact by the expression “This path leads to (the town of) Śrughna”, in which apoha is understood (esa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva): (1) ‘this’ excludes paths other than the one indicated (aprakṛtapatāntarāpeksayā esa eva); (2) Śrughna excludes places which are undesired and other than Śrughna (śrughnapratyanikānistaṣṭaḥāpeksayā śrughnam eva); (3) ‘leads to’ excludes a break of the path as in the case of paths in a forest (aranyamārgavad vichchedābhāvaḥ upatiṣṭhata eva); (4) ‘path’ excludes a successful messenger who reaches Śrughna and so forth that are other than the path (sārthadūtādi-vyāvacchedena panthā eveti). In each and every word in this sentence vyāvaccheda is easily recognized (pratipadām vyāvacchedasya sulabhavāti).

As is clear from the above illustration, a word excludes all meanings other than that which the word denotes. Consequently, the theory of apoha interpreted as ‘a positive image qualified by the discrimination of dissimilar things’ is none other than the theory of anyayogavyāvaccheda.

**Abbreviations**


HBT, HBT/A: Arcata, Hetubinduṭikā, ed. S. Sanghavi and Jnanuvayya with Durvekamiśra’s Āloka, GOS CXIII, Baroda 1949.


NK: Nyāyakosha or dictionary of technical terms of Indian philosophy, ed. MM Bhimācārya Jhalakīkar. Revised and re-edited by MM V. S. Abhyankar. Poona, Bhandarkar Institute 1928.
Notes


2 The theory of vyavaccheda is introduced briefly by the present writer in: Trikāpan- cakacintā, Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality. Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos. 4–5, 1963, pp. 1–15: The paper includes a translation of the Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi of Jñānaśrīmitra. For an account of the three verses of Dharmakīrti’s see also STEINKELLNER, op. cit., Teil II, S. 88, Anm. 18.

3 See also PV I (Com.) p. 2, II. 8–10 in which a part of the theory appears.

4 Consult Manorathananandin’s commentary on the verses.

5 The present writer is not in a position to ascertain whether the theory of vyavaccheda is Dharmakīrti’s own or if he borrows it from the Alampāra, Vyākaraṇa or Nyāya tradition. The theory appears in later texts of other Indian philosophical schools, but the
essentials of the theory as it is interpreted by Dhamakirti remain unchanged. See e.g., Saptabhangitarangini, ed. Thakuraprasadasarma, p. 25, ll. 8–12; 26, 3–5; 26, 15–20, etc.; NK s.v. Eva. Radha Kanta Deva explains that the particle eva functions in three ways: 1) when eva is connected with the visesya (qualificand), it has the meaning of anyayogavyavaccheda; 2) when connected with the visesana (qualifier), eva has the meaning of ayogavyavaccheda; 3) and connected with the kriya (verb) eva means atyantiyogavyavaccheda. He illustrates (1) by partha eva dhamurdharaḥ, (2) by sankhah pandura eva (A conchshell is white), and, 3) by nilam sarojam bhavaty eva. He ascribes the theory to tradition (sampradaya) without specifying the source. See Šabda-kalpadruma, Part 1, p. 299. NK gives the same examples together with more detailed expositions.


7 Cf. TBh, p. 21; JNA, p. 166, ll. 11–21; RNA, p. 102, ll. 8–13. For a translation of Mokṣākara-gupta’s argument and the passage of Jñānaśrīmitra’s related to it see TBh Tr, § 7.1 (pp. 56–58) and n. 133.

8 See note 1 above.

9 The English renderings of paryudasa and prasajyapratisedha are made by Cardona. Matilal renders them as ‘nominally bound negative’ and ‘verbally bound negative’.

10 Compare the passage with the following two couplets, which are often quoted in the literature on grammar and poetics: apriddhanyam vidher yatra pratisedhe pradhānata, prasajyapratisedho ‘sau kriyāya saha yatra nañ; pradhānañyam vidher yatra pratisedhe ‘pradhānata, paryudāsaḥ sa viññeyo yatratttarapadena nañ. For expositions see Cardona, op. cit., p. 42; Matilal, op. cit., p. 157.

11 The compound form asūryampaśywāni (mukhāni) is cited by Cardona (op. cit. p. 41) from Nāgās’s Uddyota.

12 Jinnendrabuddhi (8th c. A.D.) displays the same kind of theory of pratisedha, stressing the function of the negative: itatra hi kriyāpratisedhamātram pratīyate, na sadṛṣam vastvantaram. “In this case (i.e., in prasajyapraitisedha) only the negation of an activity is known, but not another similar object” (Kāśikāvivaranapāñjikā, ed. S. C. Cakrabarti, p. 687, l. 19).

13 To be exact, however, this interpretation is different from that in the case of abhrāmāna. The negative particle a-, meaning anya, is construed not with cognition (upalabdhi) in general, but with a particular cognition, e.g., the cognition of a jar. Thus, anupalabdhi here means not that which is different from cognition, but the cognition of that which is different from a jar.

14 PPU, Ku, 169, 5 ff. (p. 243, 5, 5 ff.): . . . g尼斯 po de nīd kyis (de) stone pa ni yonis su grub pahi no bo nīd do . . . gan gi phyir ‘di g尼斯 po med ci g尼斯 kyis stone pa’i rnam par rig pa tsam yin pa nīd kyis na ma yin par dgag pa yin no . . . Ramākaraśanti is usually said to belong to the Nirākāravāda-Yogacāra school. But, stressing the religious identity of the Mādhyamika and the Yogacāra doctrines, he comes very near to the Mādhyamika school. In controversies among later Buddhist schools regarding the essence of mind, the important problem of sākara- and nirākāra-jñāna is involved. In this paper the writer omits the processes of their controversies and refers the reader to TBh Tr, p. 154ff., Appendix II.


16 This interpretation of apoha is proposed as against the other two theories: (1) those who stress affirmation (vidhiyādin) assert that after we have known a cow, we consequently determine that the essence of a cow is discriminated from that of a non-cow; (2) those who stress the negative function of apoha(nivṛtiyapohavādin) are of
the opinion that we first know the discrimination of a dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm a thing which is discriminated from the dissimilar thing. Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, and Mokṣākaragupta criticize the two theories saying that our cognitions of affirmation and negation do not occur in different moments but in one and the same moment. TBh, p. 52, ll. 14–17; TBh Tr, pp. 123–124; JNA, p. 206, l. 3, etc.; RNA, p. 54, ll. 1–15.

17 JNA, p. 206, l. 6ff.; RNA p. 55, ll. 6–9; cf. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 58–59. The example eṣa panthāḥ śrūghnam upatiṣṭhate appears already in Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭkā (Peking Reprint Edition, No. 5727), 216, b 8ff. (p. 264, 5, 8ff.). This example is adopted by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.
In understanding the ongoing process of the development of any doctrinal system, isolated insights into particular texts or particular doctrinal themes are not sufficient. No number of monographs on ālayavijñāna or trisvabhāva suffices, for, although such studies do clarify particular themes, no understanding is gained of the overall purpose for which these themes were developed. What is desired is an overall insight into what the system is trying to achieve. In the case of the Yogācāra system, the question of its basic intent and overall purpose is not easily determined. There are, it would appear, two reasons for this situation. The first is that the complex of questions regarding the dating, authorship, and compilation of the various textual data have not yet received definite answers in many instances, and yet each of these questions bears directly upon the understanding of the lines of doctrinal development. A second reason is that the doctrinal focuses of some of the basic Yogācāra texts appear to differ.

The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, and the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārinś to develop their thinking.

The Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra,¹ which in its basic verses appears to be quite early, shows close affinities with tathāgatagarbha thought. It affirms the original purity of the mind (cittapakṛtīprabhāsvartā) and the adventitious nature of defilement (āgantukasamklesa).
When water, after having been stirred up, settles, the regaining of its transparency is not due to something other than the removal of dirt. The manner in which the mind is purified is similar. It is to be understood that the mind is originally luminous (prakṛtiprabhāsvaram) at all times, but blemished by adventitious faults. It is not to be thought that apart from this mind of dharmatā there is any other mind that is originally luminous.²

This passage seems to be in full doctrinal accord with the tathāgatagarbha teachings and its content is reflected in many tathāgatagarbha texts.³ Again, the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra states:

Although tathatā is not differentiated in regard to all [sentient beings], when it has been purified, it is tathāgatahood. Therefore it is said that all sentient beings are that seed [tadgarbha].⁴

This seems to be a clear affirmation of the basic theme of the pure garbha, and the later prose commentary of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra explains that it means that all sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha.⁵

From such passages it appears that the basic focus of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra is upon the mind of original purity, the pure consciousness that is always present, even under the coverings of defilement, and which enables one to attain purification and enlightenment.

In discussing the ultimate realm, dharmadhātu, the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra laments:

Indeed there is nothing else in the world, and yet the world is unconscious of it. How has this kind of worldly illusion come about, whereby one clings to what is not and entirely ignores what is?⁶

Again, this seems to reflect the tathāgatagarbha theme that only the pure garbha actually exists, while all else is non-existent.⁷

The focus of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra is then upon the mind of original purity, and not upon an analysis of empirical consciousness. Thus, when it comes to an explanation of the trisvabhāva doctrine, the Mahāyānasūtraśāntkāra uses this doctrine to explain just how empirical consciousness has devolved from that original purity. The emphasis is not upon consciousness as experienced, but upon the original purity of that now illusory consciousness. The three natures (trisvabhāva) are treated as marks of tathatā,⁸ and the reality envisaged is not the everyday consciousness of sentient beings. The three natures are described as follows:

Reality (tatvam) is that which is always void of duality, that which is the basis of confusion, and that which can never be verbally expressed,
for its being is not conceptualizable. It is to be known, to be rejected, and to be purified, although it is originally undefiled. When purified from klesi/a, it is like space, gold, and water.9

These three categories correspond to parikalpita, paratantra, and parinispanna.10 The description of parikalpita as always void of duality (dvayena rahitaṁ) emphasizes the illusory nature of empirical consciousness, which clings to the dichotomy of subject-object. The description of paratantra as the basis of confusion (bhṛnteśca samniśrayah) identifies the source of the illusions of parikalpita. The description of parinispanna points to the originally pure mind, which, although undefiled (amalam), must be purified from adventitious defilements. Its being is also said to be not conceptualizable (yaccāprapañcātmaṇḍaṁ), which suggests the tathāgataagarbha tenet that only the pure garbha actually exists, and also implies that the reason why the world is unconscious of it is because it is beyond the realm of subject-object concepts. The only function of paratantra in this explanation is to identify the source of the confusion of parikalpita. When one has understood that in fact the duality of parikalpita is illusory, then its underlying source, paratantra, is to be rejected. The conversion of the basis (āśraya-parivṛtti) is then a turning around from the illusions of parikalpita to an awareness of the original purity of parinispanna that takes place through the rejection of paratantra. Because of the basic focus on original purity, the trisvabhāva doctrine is here employed in order to explain how empirical defilement arises to cloud over that purity. The consistent tension is between the pair of parikalpita-paratantra as illusion and its source, and the purity of parinispanna.

Thus, in the Mahāyānasūtraalāṃkāra the intent of the author appears to be the use of Yogācāra doctrines in order to explain just how there can be both pure consciousness and empirical defilement— for the principal weakness of the tathāgataagarbha tradition is its failure adequately to treat the causes of defiled consciousness.

The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra11 presents a different focus, for it does not admit the doctrine of the original purity of the mind. Rather, it focuses upon the seed consciousness (sarvabijaka, i.e., ādāna, i.e., ālaya-vijnāna) as the basis for karmic defilement.

The seed consciousness [of sentient beings in the six destinies] matures, evolves, becomes unified, grows, and reaches its development, because it makes its own two things: the physical body with its sense organs and the habitual proclivities (vāsanā) of discriminately and verbally conceptualizing (prapañca) images and names.12

The initial arising of consciousness results in prapañca, is due to the proclivities of prapañca, and does not manifest any purity whatsoever. This idea contrasts sharply with the teaching of the Mahāyānasūtraalāṃkāra. The
Samādhinirmocana goes on to present an analysis of phenomenal consciousness and offers an explanation of the relationship between the six sense consciousnesses and the base sarvabījaka-vijñāna.\textsuperscript{13} In its explanation of the trisvabhāva, the Samādhinirmocana parallels the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, but the trisvabhāva doctrine is here used to explain the characteristics of the dharma (dharma-lakṣaṇa), i.e., consciousness, rather than as a description of tathatā.

The dharma [of consciousness] is of three kinds: that which has been totally imagined (parikalpitalakṣaṇa), that which arises in dependence on others (paratantra-lakṣaṇa), and that which is full perfection (parinispānna-lakṣaṇa).

That which has been totally imagined is the discrimination whereby all dharmas are conventionally held to have their own svabhāva, and the verbal expressions that arise consequent upon this discrimination.

That which arises in dependence on others is the nature whereby all dharmas conventionally arise. For, if this exists, then that exists. If this arises, then that arises. This includes [the dependent co-arising] of ignorance up to [the dependent co-arising] of this grand mass of suffering.

That which is full perfection is the true nature of the equality of dharmas (samatātathatā). It is this tathatā which bodhisattvas come to realize because of their zeal (vīrya), and their fundamental mental apprehension (aviparīta-cintana). By gradual practices until they reach this realization, they finally attain full enlightenment (anuttarasamyak-sambodhi).

That which is totally imagined is like the defective vision of one who has cataracts in his eyes. That which arises in dependence on others is like the imagining of those images, such as the appearance of hairs, flies, small particles or patches of different colors before the eyes of one with cataracts. Full perfection is like the true, unconfused objects which are seen by the sound eye of one who has no cataracts.\textsuperscript{14}

This passage parallels that of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra in that the function of paratantra is to account for the delusions of parikalpita. Thus the Samādhinirmocanasūtra later explains that wisdom enables one “to destroy paratantra.”\textsuperscript{15} Although they do agree on this point, they seem to do so from differing perspectives. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra focuses upon the mind of original purity, describes the three natures as the mark of tathatā, and sees paratantra as the basis for empirical defilement and confusion. The Samādhinirmocanasūtra focuses upon the mind of karmic defilement, describes the three natures as the marks of phenomenal, defiled consciousness, and sees paratantra as the basis of that defilement.

In these two early texts one can detect a Yogācāra dilemma. If the mind is
originally pure, then how is one to account for empirical defilement? If the mind
is not itself pure, then, being defiled, how can one ever attain purification?16

It would appear from the extant fragments that the Mahāyānabhidharm-
asūtra17 attempted to deal with this dilemma. In what is perhaps one of the most
famous passages of Yogācāra, it writes:

The beginningless realm is the common support of all dharmas.
Because of this, there exist all the destinies and the access to nirvāṇa.18

This passage appears to be an attempt to account for both defiled empirical
existence (gatiḥ sarvā) and for the possibility of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇadhigamo/pi-eca).
Later Yogācārins offer different interpretations of this text. Asanga’s
Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra,19 Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandha,20
and Dharmapāla’s Vījñaptiśatāsiddhiśāstra21 all interpret anādikāliko dhātuḥ
to be ālayavijñāna. The Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra cites it and interprets the
beginningless realm to be tathāgatagarbha. Paramārtha’s translation of
Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, along with the other three Chinese
translations of this text, gives the interpretation of anādikāliko dhātuḥ as ālaya,
but then it alone appends the tathāgatagarbha interpretation.22

These explanations all represent later forms of doctrinal development, and it
would be anachronistic to follow such interpretations rigidly. Rather, it would
seem appropriate to interpret the passage in the light of the problematic current
at the time of the composition of the Mahāyānabhidharmasūtra and the Saṃd-
hinirvījanāsūtra. Thus, the anādikāliko dhātuḥ of the Mahāyānabhidharmasū-
tra can perhaps best be understood as an attempt to amalgamate the focus upon
original purity and the focus upon karmically defiled consciousness into a
broader synthesis that might enable one to explain both adequately.

But what precisely are we to understand by this beginningless realm? It
would seem that it indicates consciousness as both pure and defiled. In another
passage, the Mahāyānabhidharma says:

There are three dharmas: that which consists in the defiled aspect
(samklesabhāga), that which consists in the pure aspect
(yuvadānabhāga), and that which consists in both at the same time
(tadubhayabhāga).23

The text of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, which quotes this passage, goes
on to identify these with, respectively, parikalpita, parinispāna, and
paratantra.24 Thus, paratantra is not only the underlying cause for samsāric
defilement, but also includes a pure aspect.

Although paratantric consciousness does result in the defilement of
parikalpita, insight into its nature as dependent on others implies awareness that
there are no essences (svabhāva) to be grasped nor any essence that can grasp
(grāhya-grāhaka). One and the same consciousness, which, being dependent on
others, has no essence that could be pure or impure, gives rise to both the defilements of all the destinies and to the access to nirvāṇa. Thus anādikāliko dhātuḥ is neither a pure mind of tathāgataagarbha nor a basically defiled ālayavijñāna. Rather, it is dependently co-arisen phenomenal consciousness as including both.

The Madhyāntavibhāgastra also appears to predate Asaṅga, at least in its verse sections. It explains the trīsvabhāva as follows:

As for the three natures, one is eternally non-existent. [The second] does exist, but is not reality. [The third], since it is reality, both exists and does not exist. This is the explanation of the three natures.

The second nature, paratantra, is here accorded some degree of validity and plays a pivotal role in the development of trīsvabhāva thinking, for, although it is denied reality, it does exist and is not simply to be rejected, as in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. The Madhyāntavibhāga further describes paratantra as unreal imagining (abhūtaperikalpa):

Unreal imagining exists, but in it duality [of subject-object] does not exist. However, in this [unreal imagining] emptiness exists, and moreover in that [emptiness] this [unreal imagining] exists.

Thus, paratantra is the source of the duality and illusion of parikalpita. It is not to be entirely negated, though, for it does indeed exist, and within paratantric consciousness one can discover emptiness, i.e., the absence of duality. Here again the Madhyāntavibhāga is attempting to synthesize the two emphases, on the originally pure mind and on empirical consciousness.

If defilement did not exist, then all bodily beings would then be [already] delivered. If purification did not exist, then right practice would be without result. Neither defilement nor undefilement exists. Neither purity nor impurity exists, because mind is [originally] luminous, and its defilement is adventitious.

It would thus appear that the Madhyāntavibhāga does admit the notion of the original luminosity and purity of the mind, but only after reworking it in the context of the trīsvabhāva. The original luminosity of the mind does not mean that it has an impure or a pure nature, for both are svabhāvas that result from dualistic imagining and therefore do not exist. But, since the unreal imagining of paratantra does exist in emptiness, once the dichotomy of parikalpita has been understood and rejected, then the original luminosity and purity of the mind becomes manifest.

Thus, in parallel to the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, the Madhyāntavibhāgastra appears to be attempting a synthesis of the doctrine of original purity within a more empirically oriented emphasis upon defiled consciousness.
The overarching hypothesis that the preceding passages seem to suggest is that early Yogācāra thinkers are indeed concerned with the question of the purity or impurity of consciousness, and this in turn would imply that they developed their thinking in the same doctrinal circles that gave rise to the tathāgatagarbha tradition.

Yogācāra is frequently and correctly described as having developed as a resurrection of theoretical thinking in the context of prajñāpāramitā, i.e., śūnyatā.

In its methodology, the Vijñānavāda was really a successor to the Abhidharma Buddhism, but it was the Abhidharma based upon the śūnyatā of the Prajñā-pāra-mitā, and hence deserves to be called “mahāyāna-abhi-dharma,” as shown in the title of one scripture.29

Although such is clearly the case, one should also be aware of the possibility of a very close relationship between Yogācāra and the tathāgatagarbha doctrine. The earliest tathāgatagarbha sūtras began to appear shortly after the time of Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 – ca. 250), and thus were contemporaneous with or shortly before the above Yogācāra texts. The tathāgatagarbha tradition offered an alternative to what was perceived as the overly negative tone of the Mādhyamika and the prajñāpāramitā literature.30 It would thus be natural to assume some kind of connection between tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra.31

The fact that the five works traditionally attributed to Maitreyya,32 the putative founder of Yogācāra, include the Ratnagotravibhāgasāstra, as well as the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra, shows that this tradition regarded Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha as coming from the same source. Furthermore, the presence in the Ratnagotravibhāga of the famous quotation on the anādikāliko dhātuḥ from the Mahāyānabhidharmasūtra suggests that the author of the Ratnagotravibhāga regarded the Mahāyānabhidharmasūtra as being at least consistent with tathāgatagarbha themes.33 It does seem clear that in some instances the Ratnagotravibhāga is dependent on the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra. William Grosnick convincingly argues that the Ratnagotravibhāga’s understanding of buddhadhātu as the nonduality of subject and object can be traced to the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra,34 and Takasaki Jikidō holds that the triyāna teaching of the Ratnagotravibhāga is directly dependent upon the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra.35 Although this directly shows only the dependence of the Ratnagotravibhāga on the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra, it also suggests that this Yogācāra work was well received within tathāgatagarbha circles and was perceived as being consistent with tathāgatagarbha themes.

This does not mean that tathāgatagarbha is to be reckoned as a defined academic school in contrast to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. As Takasaki has pointed out,36 such an evaluation was a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism and is not found in either India or Tibet. This is further borne out by the complete lack of polemic against tathāgatagarbha teachings in Yogācāra works. Thus, while
tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra did exist at the same time in India, they were not rival systems.

The reason for this seems to be that the tathāgatagarbha tradition did not function on a theoretical, academic level at all, but was rather presented as a practical, religious teaching, expressed in poetic images and metaphors and aimed at the encouragement of practice. In none of the extant tathāgatagarbha texts is there a consistent development of that technical language necessary to a theoretical endeavor.37

The foregoing textual data seem to suggest that the initial, pre-Asaṅga Yogācāra thinkers represent a theoretical development from within the same circles that produced the tathāgatagarbha teaching. They appear to have taken their initial insights from the notion of the pure mind, as in the Mahāyānasūtra-lamkāra. The exigency for theoretical development demanded a more empirical approach to the analysis of consciousness, as is given in the Saṃdhinirmocana. The Mahāyānabhidharmasūtra and the Madhyāntavibhāga then attempt to synthesize both purity and defilement by stressing the basic Yogācāra tenet of the paratantric nature of the mind.38

Notes


The Chinese translation of Prabhakaramitra, who came to China in 627, contains a preface by Li Pai-yao, which says that Asaṅga compiled the text, but there is no firm evidence to uphold this claim. As the Mahāyānasamgrahāsāstra of Asaṅga frequently quotes the Mahāyānasūtra-lamkāra, it seems safe to conclude that the verse section of the Mahāyānasūtra-lamkāra was composed before the time of Asaṅga.

2 Lévi, p. 88: yathaiva toye lute prasadite na jayate sā punaracchatāntayataḥ/ malā-pakaraṣṭu sa tatra kevalaḥ savacitaśuddhītau vidhiṣeṣa eva hi/ mātamaḥ ca cittam prakṛtiprabhāsvaram sadā tadāgantukadosāduṣṭiṃ/ na dharmaśacitālamṛte nyācataṣṭaḥ prabhāsvaram prakṛtvaḥ vidhiṣyate.


4 Lévi, p. 40: sarvesmānaṃvisiṣṭaḥ tathātataḥ suddhimāgataḥ/ tathāgatatavatmaṃ tasmācca tadāgarbhaḥ sarvadehinah.

5 Lévi, p. 40: Sarvesmā nirvisiṣṭaḥ tathātataḥ laduśuddhisvabhāvasca tathāgataḥ/ ataḥ sarve satvāstathāgatagarbhaḥ ityucyati.

6 Lévi, p. 58: na khalaḥ jagatā tasmāvidyate kīmcidamajjagadapi tadaścetam tatra sammūdabuddhiḥ/ kathamayaṃabhāruḍa lokamohaprakāro yadasadabhiniviṣṭaḥ sat-samantādiviḥāya.

8 Lévi, p. 65: etena trividhām lakṣaṇaṃ tathātāyāh paridipitam svalaṅkaṇaṃ keśavyavādālakṣanamavakopalakṣanam ca uktam trividhām lakṣaṇam.

9 Lévi p. 58: tattvaṃ yatsatam dvayaṃ rahitaṃ bhūntesca samniśrayah sakyam naiva ca sarvathābhilapitum yaccāprapañcātmakaṃ jñeyam hiyamatho visodhyama-malaṃ vacca prakṛtya maśam vasyākāsasurvarṇavarṣāraddho klesādviśudhirnīta.

10 See Lévi, p. 58.


14 Lamotte, p. 60 and pp. 188–189. T. 16, p. 693a–b.


16 In his *Sesshin yuishiki no kenkyū*, Tokyo, 1956, pp. 168–169, Yūki Reimon argues that one of the specific characteristics of Vasubandhu was that, in contrast to earlier Yogācārin, who maintained the strict purity of the Yogācāra position in their contacts with tathāgatagarbha thought, he was influenced by tathāgatagarbha thought in a much greater degree. I rather think that, as in the *Mahāyānasūtraśāstra*, tathāgatagarbha influence can be seen in the earliest texts of the Yogācāra tradition. This does not negate the fact that Vasubandhu was influenced by such teachings in evolving his “new understanding,” but it does stress that there were already precedents available for Vasubandhu to work upon.

17 The *Mahāyānabhūdharmasūtra* is extant only in fragments quoted in other texts. These have been collected in Yūki Reimon, *Yuishikiron yori mitaru yuishiki shishōshi*, (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 240–250. Six quotations appear in Aśaṅga’s *Mahāyānasamgrahāsāstra*, one in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and one in *K’uei-chi’s Wei-shih erh-shih lun shu-chi*. The text is clearly before Aśanga.


20 P. Mdo ñgrel LVI, 238b-8-239a-6.


23 Lamotte, *La Somme*, II, 125.

24 Lamotte’s translation correctly does not include this section, which identifies the three dharmaś with the trisvabhāva, in the quotation from the *Mahāyānabhūdharmasūtra*. Yūki Reimon, *Yuishiki shishōshi*, p. 249, argues that the entire passage is from the *Mahāyānabhūdharmasūtra*. But, as my friend and colleague, Professor Hakamaya Noriaki, has pointed out to me, the Tibetan text clearly refutes Yūki’s interpretation.


trividhāḥ asac ca nityaṁ sac cāpy atatvataḥ/ sad-asat tattvataṁ ceti svabhāva-traya
īṣyate. Also confer, Yeh A-Ŷueh, Yuishiki shisō no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1975, pp. 79–84.

27 Nagao, p. 17: abhūtāparikalpo’sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate/ śūnyata vidyate tv atra

28 Nagao, pp. 26–27: sāṁkliṣṭa ced bhaven nāsaṁ muktiḥ suḥ sarva-dehinah/ visuddha
ced bhavan nāsaṁ vyāyāmo nisphalo bhavel/ / na kliṣṭa nāpi vākliṣṭa suddhāśuddhā
69–74.

29 Takasaki Jikidō, A Study on the Ratnagotrabhaga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise

30 See Takasaki, Study, pp. 305–306 for the section from the Ratna that treats this issue.
Also confer, Keenan, Buddhabhūmyupadesa, pp. 97–100.

31 Thus, I agree with the basic idea of E. Frauwallner, “Amalavijñānam und ālayavijñānam.
Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnislehre des Buddhismus,” in Beiträge zur indischen
Philologie und Altertumskunde: Walter Schubring zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht
von der deutschen Indologie, (Hamburg, 1951), pp. 148–160, in emphasizing the
importance of the question of the purity of the mind, against P. Demièville, but there
seems to be no firm evidence specifically to identify amāla with Sthiramati, nor ālaya
with Dharmapāla, nor to locate the center of each with respectively Valabhi and
Nalanda.


33 Takasaki, Study, p. 230.

34 Willaim Grosnick, The Zen Master Dogen’s Understanding of the Buddha Nature in
the Light of the Historical Development of the Buddha-Nature Concept in India,
China, and Japan, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1979, pp. 91–92.


36 Takasaki, Keisei, p. 3.

37 See Keenan, Buddhabhūmyupadesa, pp. 96–116.

38 For a discussion of Asanga’s thinking on original purity and that of the classical
Yogācāra tradition, see Hakamaya Noriaki, “The Realm of Enlightenment in Vijnaptimāritatā: The Formulation of the Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas,” in The Journal of the
THE MEANING OF “MIND-ONLY” (WEI-HSIN)
An analysis of a sinitic Mahāyāna phenomenon

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Modern Japanese Buddhologists, following a distinction that was evident already in the T’ang Buddhist circles, speak of a Mind-Only (Sanskrit: Cittamātra) school—usually covering Zen and Hua-yen— as being distinct from, and superior to, the Consciousness-Only (Sanskrit: Vijñāptimātra) tradition, represented by the Wei-shih school (Fa-hsien) of Hsūan-tsang’s followers. This distinction between the so-called Wei-hsin (Mind-Only) and Wei-shih (Consciousness-Only) is often assumed to be self-evident. However, there is, in Indian Buddhism, only one term, Yogācāra or Vijñāptimātra, covering these two distinct branches in China. In the Tibetan Buddhist canon also, the section known as Cittamātra designates only Yogācāra texts. There is no sharp distinction made in India or Tibet between Cittamātra and Vijñaptimātra, Mind-Only or Consciousness-Only, or, for that matter, between citta, mind, or (ālaya)-vijñāna, (storehouse)-consciousness. In Yogācāra traditions, citta is often another term for ālayavijñāna. How is it then that the Chinese and then the Japanese have this clear notion that Mind-Only is something other than, and superior to, Consciousness-Only? In the following article, I will discuss the meaning of Mind-Only from only one particular perspective by tracing the roots of the Zen concept of the Mind being the Buddha-nature. I will not touch upon the debate between Hua-yen and Fa-hsien, an ideological conflict that historically precipitated the Mind-Only versus Consciousness-Only dichotomy.

Chih-chih-jen-hsin,
Chien-hsing-ch’eng-fô.
Point directly to the mind (hsin),
Recognize your (buddha-) nature (hsing) and become enlightened.

These two lines are often given as two of the four traits that characterize Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism in China. They not only summarize a key outlook in Ch’an,
which is a uniquely Chinese Buddhist sect, but are the epitome of a key development in Chinese Buddhist thought as a whole.

The association of mind (hsin) and Buddha-nature (fo-hsing), implied in the two epigrams cited, is virtually accepted by all the Chinese Buddhist schools. The Northern Zen school is said to have embraced the notion of chi-hsin chi-fo, your mind is Buddha; the Southern Zen school is said to embrace the negative dialectics of wu-hsing wu-fo, neither mind nor Buddha. Their differences aside, mind and Buddha are seen as affiliates. Both Zen schools also adhered to the basic Chinese Buddhist doctrine of chung-sheng chieh-yu fo-hsing, all sentient beings have Buddha-nature. Your mind, your nature is the source and basis of enlightenment.

T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, Ching-tu (Pure Land) all accepted the association of mind with the universality of Buddha-nature. This association was so axiomatic that the Fa-hsiang school since, for disclaiming the doctrine of the universality of Buddha-nature and for speaking of a deluded ālayavijñāna (storehouse-consciousness), had the misfortune of being labelled as crypto-Mahāyāna or pro-Hinayāna. No Indian Buddhists would have thought of calling Yogācāra a Hinayāna school. T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, and Ching-tu all have key creeds concerning the mind. T’ien-t’ai talks about “the Three Truths as being of the One Mind”; Hua-yen talks about the “Three Realms as being created by the One Mind”; and the Chin-tu group speaks of the “Three Mind,” the “Attainment of the Mind of Faith in One Recitation (of Amida’s name),” or the “Mind of Peace.” All these creeds contain Chinese Buddhist elements not totally or immediately reducible to purely Indian authenticated scriptural sources. However, I will limit my discussion to the broader case of the Zen association of Mind with (Buddha-)nature. The Indian scriptural basis will be analyzed. However, it will be demonstrated that the Ch’ an tradition borrowed a Taoist concept of mind, incorporated the mind-nature (hsin-hsing) association made by Mencius, and thereby anticipated the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming in the Ming dynasty. The structure of analysis is given in Diagram 1.

The Indian contribution to mind-only

The qualities (of the things) come into existence after the mind (lit. the qualities have mind as their precursor), are dependent upon mind, and are made up (formed) of mind. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought (mind), sorrow pursues him as the wheel follows the foot of the drought-ox.

So begins the Dhammapada, which emphasizes, in a kind of “moral idealism,” the centrality of the mind. The same text recognizes the wavering restlessness of the mind. From an early date, mind or consciousness is a key object of Buddhist concern, in theory as in practice. However, the conception of an innately pure mind (visuddhi cittaprakriti; in Chinese, tzu-hsing ching-ching
hsin) that appear repeatedly in Mahāyāna sūtras and in Chinese Buddhist writings is traced back, supposedly, to a sermon ascribed to Gautama:

...all the component elements ... have their support in the Active Force and Defilements. The Active Force and Defilements are founded on the Irrational Thought and the latter has its support in the Innate Pure Mind. Therefore, it is said: the Mind is radiant by nature (but it) is polluted by occasional defilements7 [āgutakleśa].

This doctrine of “pure mind” clearly suggests something very close to the Hindu notion of the ātman in its essential purity. How the innately pure mind can be defiled or polluted by accidental defilements remains a mystery.

In a split second, the good mind is not tainted by defilements. In another split second, the evil mind itself too is also freed from being so tainted. It is a mystery how defilements never touch the mind, how the mind never affects defilements, and how the mind which is not affected by [worldly] dharmas can nevertheless become so tainted.8

The above description of this mystery of a pure-yet-tainted mind came from the Śrīmālā sūtra, a Mahāyāna sūtra of southern Indian origin produced around 300 A.D. By that time, the innately pure mind had been associated with a new concept called the “womb of the Tathāgata (Buddha),” tathāgata-garbha. All sentient beings have the embryonic Buddha inside them. This “womb,” acting as a seed, will flower eventually into enlightenment. This treasured germ or seed is the subject of discourse in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Pao-hsing-lun)9, Treatise on the Treasure Nature. There it is said that not only man possesses the germ or womb, but the womb also possesses man.

It is said by the (buddha) that all living beings are always possessed of the (Womb) of the Tathāgata, Tathāgata-garbha. That is to say, by the following three meanings (of the term “Womb” or “Store”): (1) the Absolute Body, Dharmaṇāyā, of the Tathagatagarbha penetrates all living beings; (2) the Tathāgata, being the Reality, tathatā (suchness) is the undifferentiated whole; and (3) there exists the germ of the Tathāgatagarbha (Tathāgata-gotra) in every being.9

The Ratnagotravibhāga, being a fifth century A.D. treatise, had successfully systematized the earlier notion of the innately pure mind, detailed its attributes, and magnified its power. The tathāgatagarbha envelopes or encompasses the whole world; the implication of a Mind-Only idealism is already suggested in this text.

Indian Buddhism also had another early tradition that the Chinese Buddhist tapped for a theory of a Mind-Only doctrine. In the Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras, we
find the mention of the aspiration for enlightenment (or Buddhahood), bodhicitta. The bodhisattva arouses this mind of enlightenment and directs his whole being toward the attainment of this enlightenment or wisdom. By the sixth century A.D., the Vairocana sutra developed this notion to the full. The mind, once started off to enlightenment, cannot backslide any more. Enlightenment is guaranteed. Oriental Buddhists often use the term p'u-t'i-hsin\(^p\) (bodhicitta), tzu-hsing ching-ching hsin (visuddhi cittapakrtri) and ju-lai-tsang\(^p\) or ju-lai-tsang-hsin\(^p\) (tathāgatagarbha), interchangeably. However, Suzuki has realized that originally "(to arouse) the bodhicitta" meant "(to cherish) the desire of enlightenment" and not a "(to possess) a mind of enlightenment" per se.\(^{10}\)

However, the scriptural source from which the Chinese produced the term "Wei-hsin" is from a famous line in the Hua-yen-ching\(^5\), particularly one Chinese translation of this sūtra from the Indian Avatamsaka sūtra. The sen-
tence goes “San-chiai wei-hsin tso;” the three realms (of kāma, desire: of form, rūpa; and the realms beyond form, arūpa) are of Mind-Only. All realities are of the Mind-Only. On the basis of this line, the Hua-yen school historically criticized and defeated the Fa-hsiang or the Consciousness-Only school in China. As the Chinese sentence goes and as traditional Chinese understanding stands, the line suggests that all realities are created (tso) by the (One, Pure) Mind. Only recent research into the original Sanskrit reveals that it was not intended to mean that.

The Chinese reading of the meaning of wei-hsin

It was discovered that the word “create” (tso) found in the Chinese translations was not in the original Sanskrit. The original Sanskrit, according to Tamaki, Koshiro’s investigation, is “Cittamātram idam yad idam taidhātukam.” It reads more literally, “The threefold realm /of/ the mind only” or as Hakeda gives it, “What belongs to this triple world is mind only.” A T’ang translation of the Avatamsaka sūtra into Chinese follows this more literal reading and does not include the word “tso,” make, create. Tamaki concludes that the Chinese interpretation which sees the worlds as products of the mind is peculiar to the Chinese and not attested to by either the Sanskrit or the Tibetan. Saigusa Mitsuyoshi in his essay in the same volume on Hua-yen thought lends support to Tamaki’s observation, for Saigusa discovers that the so-called “Mind-Only” philosophy was really tangential to the Avatamsaka sūtra.

Furthermore, the realization that the three worlds are of the mind only comes, according to the Daśabhumī (Ten stages) sūtra, to the bodhisattva upon the sixth stage of his spiritual ascent. This realization is crucial, though perhaps not as ultimate as the Chinese made it out to be. What is realized at this stage of the open way of wisdom or ‘facing’ reality (abhīmukhi) is that the mind and the objects are interdependent. It is clear from the context of the sūtra and from Vasubandhu’s commentary on the passage that the three worlds exist as “object” because the mind or consciousness (vijñāna) exists as a “subject.” Name-and-form (nāmarūpa) and consciousness (vijñāna) coexist. In fact, the “unreality” of the three realms corresponds to a “deluded” mind. It is the desiring, craving mind that sees the desired three realms. The realization of this should lead one to put a stop to the unreal world as well as the deluded consciousness and thereby transcend the mundane truth to reach the higher truth. The mind does not create the phenomenon of desire. Even if there is a subtle relationship between reality and consciousness, it is clear that the mind spoken of here is not the “Suchness pure mind” but the deluded consciousness.

How then did the meaning change from “The three [illusory] worlds are of the [deluded] consciousness” to “The three worlds are created by the [true] mind”? The clearest turning point can be located in Hui-yüan. Hui-yüan explicitly states that “The three worlds are created by the true mind, chenhsin.” Hui-yüan’s statement became definitive. For Hui-yüan, the true mind (chen-hsin) is
none other than the true consciousness (chen-shih*), that is, the alayavijñāna, or storehouse consciousness. This identification of hsin and shih was challenged later.

The concept of the storehouse consciousness as the most basic consciousness is a key component of the Yogācāra philosophy. Yogācāra philosophy looked deeply into the workings of the human psyche. According to its tenets, beyond the five senses (or consciousness) there are the still deeper consciousnesses of (a) the mental center, (b) the ego-consciousness and (c) the eighth and last—the storehouse consciousness. The mental center, somewhat like our notion of the brain, collects and integrates the separate impressions received by the five senses and produces what amounts to a mental image of an entity. However, Buddhism is not satisfied with an analysis of the cognitive process up to this point. Buddhism believes that there is neither a permanent subject called “I” nor a permanent object called a thing. The false conception of “I” and “It” as if they are two entities came from a deeper psychological source in the seventh consciousness or ego-consciousness. This ego-center creates the false sense of the subject and the object, partly because of ignorance and partly because of habitual ways of thought, that is, conceptual thinking, that it had inherited from past experiences. Finally, as a kind of reservoir into which all impressions/conceptions are deposited is the storehouse consciousness, alayavijñāna. The alayavijñāna is the most basic consciousness. Hui-yüan, a famous master, identified the true mind with this true consciousness. His scheme was like this:

8th consciousness: the chen-hsin (true Mind), alayavijñāna
7th consciousness: the deluded ego-consciousness (ādānavigñāna) or false mind (wang-hsin³)
6th consciousness: the deluded intent (r²)
Five senses: the deluded senses or consciousness (shih)²⁰

His interpretation was not the only one. In fact, it is more standard to refer to the eighth as mind hsin (citta, for alayavijñāna), the seventh as intention, i, (manas) and the rest as consciousnesses shih (vijñānas).²¹ Hui-yüan, however, was a very influential thinker at the time, and his interpretation of the Hua-yen sūtra became the orthodox pronouncement: The Three Realms are solely created by the True Mind.

Another crucial scripture that lent itself to the Chinese interpretation of Weihsin (Mind-Only) is the Lankāvatāra sūtra. D. T. Suzuki has made a thorough and commendable study of this work. He has actually used the term “Cittamātra” to describe its contents, and associated the Lankāvatāra sūtra’s position with the later Zen philosophies in China.²²

According to Suzuki, one of the key contributions of the sūtra lies with its notion of “revulsion,” paravratti, a sudden turnover in the seventh consciousness, manas. The manas, as said before, is the ego-consciousness that produced the illusion of the subject and the object and therefore the subject-object dichotomy.
A sudden turn in this psychic center will revert illusion into enlightenment that transcends that dichotomy.

Manas is conscious of the presence behind itself of Ālaya and also the latter's uninterrupted working in the entire system of the Vijnānas. Reflecting on the Ālaya and imagining it to be an ego, Manas cling to it as if it were reality and disposes of the reports of the six Vijnānas [the five senses and the mental center] accordingly. In other words, Manas is the individual will to live and the principle of discrimination. The notion of an ego-substance is herein established and also the acceptance of a world external to itself and distinct from itself.23

A sudden “conversion” in the manas “purifies” the manas and liberates the ālayavijñāna, which up to this moment has been tainted by defilements and trapped in ignorance. Suzuki then describes the transformation that takes place.

Let there be, however, an intuitive penetration into the primitive purity (prakritiparīṣuddhi) of the Tathāgatagarbha, and the whole system of the Vijnānas goes through a revolution.24

The “primitive purity” mentioned here (prakritiparīṣuddhi) is a synonym to the “innate purity” of the “innately pure” mind,” which is the tathāgatagarbha. The revulsion lets the innate purity reveal itself. The discussion above is summarized in Diagram 2.

Since the ālayavijñāna up to the moment of revulsion has been accompanied by defilements in an essential (and not an accidental) way, Chinese scholars have at times elevated the tathāgatagarbha above the ālayavijñāna. The tathāgatagarbha is essentially pure; it is the Pure Mind, or the True Mind. The ālayavijñāna is the impure consciousness or the deluded consciousness.25

The Chinese find justification of this distinction between Mind (hsin) and Consciousness (shih, implying the ālayavijñāna) in one line in the Bodhiruci-translated Laṅkāvatāra sūtra. The lines say:

The tathāgatagarbha is not within the ālayavijñāna, for whereas the seven vijñānas go through rise and fall (samsāra), the tathāgatagarbha is beyond life and death (samsāra).26

The passage seems to support the claim that whereas the various consciousnesses are tied to the phenomenal world of change and illusion, the tathāgatagarbha alone is immutable, is above change, and is the absolute (Dharmakāya). However, throughout the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, the ālayavijñāna always has been identified with the tathāgatagarbha.27 (The sūtra is the scripture in which the ālayavijñāna and the tathāgatagarbha traditions—up till then apparently separated from one another by their northern and southern origins—came together
A. The five sense-fields  
   The first 5 consciousnesses

   The 6th  
   The 7th  
   The 8th

B. 1. form \(\infty\) 1. eye-conscious.  
   2. sound \(\infty\) 2. ear-conscious.  
   Mental  Center  
   3. smell \(\infty\) 3. nose-conscious.  
   Ego-consciousness  
   4. taste \(\infty\) 4. tongue-consci.  
   House-consciousness  
   5. touch \(\infty\) 5. body-conscious.

C. No objective existence as such

   Receptor/projector of separate sense impressions

   Integrating 'brain'

   Creator of "I"
   "It" illusions

   Reservoir of past 'experiences'

D. Everyday state:
   "external" sense-data
   The Illusion and "internal false conceptions" create an endless and interdependent "It" illusion of "things out there" (It) and "self here" (I).

   The Deluded Consciousness "I"

E. Transition toward Enlightened State:
1. Elimination of mental defilements and insight into the Buddhist truth that there is neither a permanent self (I) nor a permanent objective world (It).
2. Realization that all name and form (world) have no objective existence but are "of the consciousness."

F. Moment of Traumatic Change:
   Psychic Revulsion
   in the (7th) manas

G. Enlightened State:
   Attainment of enlightenment, purification of the senses, seeing things "as they are": impermanent, selfless, there is "neither the 'I' nor the 'It'."

Diagram 2 The Yogacara Psychology (simplified)
for the first time.) The cited passage actually mentioned only the seven vijñānas as mutable, making no mention of the eighth, that is, the ālayavijñāna. It is very possible that the passage only says that the ālayavijñāna-qua-tathāgatagarbha is beyond life and death—not in the sense of nīrṇāṇa, but in the sense that both are substratum to the “rise-and-fall” of the active seven consciousnesse.

The Sanskrit version of the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra’s passage as compiled by Nanjo Bunyu gives, not surprisingly:

aparāvrte ca tathāgatagarbhasabdasyām śabdita ālayavijñāne nāsti saptāvām pravṛttivijñāṇaṁ nirodhah. “In the ālayavijñāna that is not [yet] revulsed and that is called the tathagatagarbha, there is no cessation of the seven active consciousnesses.”

One would like to ask then: what repeatedly motivated Bodhiruci and the Chinese Buddhist thinkers to posite a Pure Mind above a yet imperfect ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness? One possible answer is the Chinese association of Buddha-nature with Mind and principle.

The conjunction of mind, nature, and principle in the nirvāṇa school

The Chinese infatuation with a “pure core-self” is understandable and perhaps even legitimate. A basic axiom in the Chinese understanding of Mahāyāna is that Mahāyāna supports a theory of the universality of Buddha-nature. The phrase “chung-sheng chieh-yu fo-hsing” (all sentient beings have Buddha-nature) had been on the tongues of the Chinese Buddhists since the fifth century when the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra was translated by Dharmakṣema and made available to the southern gentry Buddhists. This sūtra pronounced the above-mentioned doctrine, and, in one of its many speculations on the seat of this Buddha-nature, placed it in the mind or the innately pure mind. The Mind is Buddha-nature. Given this doctrine in an authentic scripture, it is not surprising that Chinese Buddhists felt the need to assert a Pure Mind, qua Buddha-nature, qua Suchness (tathātā) qua tathāgatagarbha above the lesser understanding of those who followed a doctrine of a phenomenal ālayavijñāna as the deluded or tainted consciousness. If this is the case, then Mind-Only doctrine was not a Chinese innovation but, as many would argue, represents a better understanding of Consciousness-Only (that is, Yogācāra).

However, the issue is somewhat complicated by certain factors: (1) it has been shown that the term fo-hsing, Buddha-nature, has been a rather free translation of terms in Sanskrit; (2) in the process of using the term fo-hsing, the Chinese leaned toward an ontological reading that aligned it with the absolute in a noncausative context; and (3) Mencian and Taoist motifs have been incorporated in the process. Since the issues here are fairly involved and would demand a treatment more
detailed than possible at present, I will focus primarily on the Chinese proclivity for fo-hsing as defined by a metaphysical principle, it, and as identified with the mind. However, the other issues will also be briefly touched upon.

It would appear that the choice of the word “hsing” (nature) in the translation process was influenced by the popularity of this term in Chinese philosophical usage, especially that of Mencius who argued ably that the nature (hsing) of man is good. The original Sanskrit terms corresponding to the Chinese “hsing” is generally either gotra, meaning “seed,” or garbha, meaning “womb.” Both of these Sanskrit terms have been encountered already in previous discussions. Gotra appeared in the title of the Ratnagotravibhāga, Treatise on the Treasured Seed (the Chinese, however, have translated it as Pao-hsing-lun, Treatise on the Treasured Nature). Garbha appears in the term tathāgatagarbha, womb of the Tathāgata, which Chinese usually translated properly with ju-lai-tsang, the “store” (tsang) of the Thus-come (ju-lai). The original Sanskrit of “fo-hsing” actually corresponds to Buddha-garbha, Buddha-womb, a synonym of tathāgatagarbha. It is either a stroke of genius, poetic license, or misappropriation that the choice of “fo-hsing” to translate Buddha-womb or seed from the original Sanskrit was made.

Be that as it may, the term fo-hsing, like the English term Buddha-nature, suggests an ontological essence more than a term like Buddha-womb or Buddha-seed would. By its very connotation, fo-hsing as used by the Chinese Buddhists implied an almost ādīma-like quality. Although the Mahāparinirvāṇa sutra itself had been known to have been highly “Hinduized” in outlook, yet repeatedly the sūtra took care to define the attribute of Buddha-womb or -seed as the “seed or the cause (hetu) leading towards enlightenment.”

Buddha-nature, strictly speaking, has a dynamic or latent characteristic pointing toward eventual enlightenment. A key passage in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra illustrates best its more basic usage:

[Buddha-nature is the seed leading to enlightenment]. ... the cause is the twelve chains of causation, the cause of cause is wisdom, the result is the highest enlightenment and the result of result is the great final liberation.

Following this fourfold classification, Chinese Buddhist scholars of the Nirvāṇa school had, not unfaithfully, spoken of Buddha-nature in terms of “basic cause,” “auxiliary cause,” “result cause,” and “result of result cause.” In other words, Buddha-nature, seen as a cause (hetu) to enlightenment, was defined within a causative scheme and not as an ontologically a priori reality. Man has Buddha-nature, that is, a seed that can flower in time to become enlightenment, but man as such is not already a Buddha. The Zen phrase, chien-hsing-ch’eng-fo, recognize your nature and become enlightened—immediately—is not applicable to the original setting in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra. In the sūtra, buddhahood is potentiality, not actuality. In order that the mature Zen position could be, a
subtle change in the understanding of fo-hsing is required. This change was
applied by a group of radical sinitic figures, who associated Buddha-nature with
li, Principle, a word closely associated with Tao.

The usage of li began probably very early; it played a central role in the
thought of Chih-tun; it was inherited by the first expert in the Nirvāṇa school,
Tao-sheng. However, the Buddhist monk who truly identified Buddha-nature
with li was Fa-yao who utilized the concept of li that was earlier favored by the
substitutes Tao-sheng and Chih-tun. Fa-yao defined the Buddha-nature as the
“principle (li) by which sentient beings become enlightened.” Fa-yao came
after the “sudden versus gradual” enlightenment debate between Tao-sheng and
Hui-kuan. In associating Buddha-nature with li, the One absolute, he drew
upon the tradition of the substitutes. In underlining the idea “become,” he endorsed
the position of Hui-kuan. Fa-yao synthesized both extremes and was possibly
influenced by the Śrīmālā sūtra. He articulated a theory of the Buddha-nature
that is uniquely Chinese in flavor:

Sentient beings have the principle by which to become enlightened.
The Buddha-nature’s principle will ultimately be used (yung, functioned)
by the mind, despite the fact that [the mind] is being hidden by
defilements. People who receive the teaching hear of the doctrine of the
Buddha-nature and attain faith-understanding [adhimukti]. This is
because there is already this superior principle inside them which
allows them to attain extraordinary insight.
The permanent principle being manifested, one knows the meaning of
the teaching previously revealed.

A grand-disciple of Fa-yao, Seng-tsung, gave even more radical expression to
the relationship between li and the Buddha-nature in man:

The Buddha-nature is li, principle.
The essence-principle (hsing-li, nature-principle) never varies; it only
differs in the degree of manifestation.
To be one with the principle is the dharma that transcends the world.
The principle of the Buddha-nature lies at the heart of all transforma-
tions and is beyond life and death (sheng-mieh, samsāra) itself.
The essence-principle is permanent, and it is only hidden because sen-
tient beings are deluded.
Not part of matter: the principle is beyond all form or color.

In most of the passages cited above, the word “Tao” can easily be substituted for
“li.” Like the Tao, li is the absolute principle behind, in, or above phenomenal
changes. The Buddha-nature defined in terms of li is, therefore, an essential,
transcendent entity, and, unlike the Sanskrit gotra or hetu, it is a priori, perfect,
and complete.
Chi-tsang\textsuperscript{40} (A.D. 549–623) of the San-lan school was alert to this innovative use of the term \textit{li} by Seng-tsung.

This interpretation [by Seng-tsung that identifies Buddha-nature with the principle] is most ingenious but it is not based on proper lineage transmission. It is important that all doctrines have traceable roots. I would like to know on what \textit{sūra} and on whose authority is the theory that "the Buddha-principle is the basic cause of Buddha-nature" based?\textsuperscript{40}\textsuperscript{41}

T'ang Yung-t'ung\textsuperscript{41} commented on Chi-tsang's observation:

This passage [from Chi-tsang] is most noteworthy. This is because the \textit{Chou F\textsuperscript{k}} (I Ching, Book of Changes) had the idea of "exhausting the principle (\textit{li}) and fulfilling one's nature (\textit{hsing})." In the Chin period, the philosophers based themselves on this tradition and used the word "\textit{li}" to designate a thing's essence. Among the Buddhist scholars like Tao-sheng, the term was also appropriated. With Fa-yao, the use of the term was developed and quite a few followed in his tradition. ... This development is extremely significant in the history of Chinese thought and demands investigation.\textsuperscript{41}

Actually the association of \textit{li} and \textit{hsing} by Fa-yao and Seng-tsung anticipated the Neo-Confucian "\textit{hsing-li}" philosophy of Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130–1200).

Equally, if not more, important is the Buddhist association of \textit{hsing} (nature) and \textit{hsin} (mind), which, in turn, anticipated the development in Wang Yang-ming. The choice of the word \textit{fo-hsing} has been influenced, no doubt, by Mencian usage. Mencius in his own writings has aligned \textit{hsing} and \textit{hsin}, especially in the chapter on \textit{Chin-hsin}\textsuperscript{41}, Exhausting or developing to full the mind: "To exhaust one's mind is to know one's nature."\textsuperscript{42} It would not be surprising to find therefore that the Buddhists in the fifth and sixth centuries, probably under Mencian influence, picked out selectively the \textit{Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra}'s idea of the Innately Pure Mind and developed various theories of mind as the Buddha-nature. T'ang Yung-t'ung has looked into this issue in some detail, so I will only cite the key personages (a clear majority) who held a theory of a mind-nature identity: \textsuperscript{43}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Pao-liang\textsuperscript{42}m \hfill The innately pure mind is the Buddha-nature
  \item Liang Wu-t'ien\textsuperscript{44} \hfill The spirit or mind is Buddha-nature
  \item Fa-yun\textsuperscript{40} \hfill The \textit{tathāgatagarbha}'s impulse to desire bliss and avoid suffering is the Buddha-nature
  \item Fa-an\textsuperscript{41} \hfill The indestructable mind that transmigrates is the Buddha-nature
  \item Ti-lun\textsuperscript{31} masters \hfill The \textit{ālayavijñāna} pure mind is Buddha-nature
  \item She-lun\textsuperscript{40} masters \hfill The untainted, \textit{amalavijñāna}, is Buddha-nature
\end{itemize}
The choice of the mind as the abode of Buddhahood is natural because of the long tradition of hsin-related speculations in China. Hsin is so central a word that a whole section of Chinese vocabulary has it as a radical. The same could hardly be said of the word shih, consciousness. The triumph in China of hsin (citta) over shih (vijñāna) (almost synonymous in India) is "fated."

The ultimate Chinese source of the mind-only philosophy: Chuang-tzu

Yet more important than the Mencian idea of a moral mind is perhaps Chuang tzu's notion of a mystical mind, the Hsu-ming ling-chueh hsing, the vacuous, luminous, spirited, alert mind. Chuang-tzu (between 399 and 295 B.C.) was a philosopher keenly aware of the workings of the mind. He described the "scheming, plotting, restless mind" of the "little man" or the "everyday man." He was acutely aware of the tension between the self and objects and is reputed to have propounded the final dissolution of self and object, identifying the two as one. On the one hand, he was the poet of despair, lamenting the corruptibility of the mind that decays along with the body. On the other hand, he was the euphoric dreamer of roving cosmic freedom, the fantasy-builder of the immortal hsien tradition.

I shall quote a line from T'ang Chun-i's study of the concept of mind in Chuang-tzu to illustrate a point:

The mind discovered by Chuang-tzu is the mind that has momentarily ceased to respond to external matters and ceased to acknowledge outside affairs. This mind has turned inward upon itself and come to recognize its own [absolute, independent] existence as such.

As Chuang-tzu lamented the mind that was bewildered by and drawn into the interchanging colors of the world outside, he also celebrated this discovery of a luminous, spirited mind. This self-sufficient mind is compared to a mirror that shines forth in a strange "dark" light, illuminating passively without beholding consciously either self or object. It is precognitive as well as supracognitive. It is this mystical concept of mind that influenced much of Chinese spiritualism. The Chinese Buddhists merely inherited this tradition and blended it with the Indian understanding.

In contrast to the Indian Buddhist tradition, which went into elaborate details in its analysis of the mind, its functions, and the various aspects and levels of consciousnesses, the Chinese concept of mind remained comparatively compact. What is often differentiated in the Yogācāra philosophy remains undifferentiated in the Chinese scheme. For example, the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is largely a repository of bijas (seeds). The ālayavijñāna does not cognize objects nor itself, since the discriminative (subject-object) knowledge, based on a false sense of self-nature (svabhāva) applied to self and
others, "resides" with the seventh viññāna, the manas. In normal everyday cognition, (false) self and (false) object exist interdependently; the five senses (first five consciousnesses) and their corresponding sense-realms "feed" on each other. To attain wisdom, the ideal is to put an end to this endless flow of impressions from without and misguided habitual thoughts from within. The cessation of "subject" and "object" is therefore desirable for an enlightenment into the anātman insight. Compared with this Indian scheme, Chuang-tzu's concept of mind has a certain charming simplicity. Hsin (mind, heart) is "precognitive" in its pristine state, "object-cognitive" through its involvement with the world of objects, and "transcognitive" or self-enlightened when it returns to its roots. It includes within itself functions that the Yogācāra philosophy would delegate to the manas (hsin, like manas, can cognize itself and objects) and perhaps the manovijñāna (hsin, like manovijñāna, synthesizes the impressions received by the senses).

Here we find an element in the Chinese notion of Mind that is decidedly foreign to the Yogācāra tradition in India, but which is precisely the distinguishing mark of Śaṅkara's Vedānta. The Yogācāra philosophy is an epistemological philosophy analyzing how knowledge comes to be. In denying a notion of the ātman, self, Yogācāra only affirms the process of knowing but denies the existence of a knower (since the knower, like the known, is an interdependent false construct). A natural or logical question—not necessarily a proper question—them is: who or what knows the knowledge? or is the subject-object knowledge (of things) immediately self-conscious or known (that is, it knows its own knowing)? Śaṅkara solved this key problem in Yogācāra epistemology ("Who knows knowing?") by positing the ātman as the self that knows (reality) and knows that it knows. The self is both the knower (of things) and the self-knower; it cognizes objects just as it also witnesses its own existence. Śaṅkara's notion of the self is what Paul Hacker has characterized as the lumen intellectuale, and it corresponds to Chuang-tzu's notion of the absolute, vacuous, mysteriously alert, self-knowing mind. The direct parallel to Śaṅkara's ātman would be the Chinese notion of shen-ming (the luminous and enlightened spirit) used by one member of the Nirvāṇa school, Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty.

The Taoist concept of mind is therefore more monistic, comprehensive. Subject and object are not denied but positively affirmed in the Taoist theory of "equalization of all things." The Taoist mind is even free from the paradox of the Indian concept of the Innately Pure Mind mysteriously polluted by accidental defilements. The Taoist mind is, when compared with the ālayavijñāna, more "active" and can know itself. It is noumenal and pure.

The Chinese association of mind with nature (Mencian in inspiration: "To exhaust the mind is to know one's nature") and mind with the absolute (Chuang-tzu's transcendent mind) is what was responsible for the Chinese selective and creative reading of comparable (though never exactly the same) concept of mind (that is, the innately pure mind) in Indian Buddhist thought. It is also responsible
for the Chinese discriminative distinction of the tathāgatagarbha (ju-lai-tsang hsin) from the less perfect ālayavijñāna. The emergence of a Mind-Only philosophy was then propelled by such native predispositions and considerations. The subtle transformation of Buddha-seed or -womb from the original Sanskrit in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, through the translated form of fo-hsing (Buddha-nature), to the notion of a nature associated with li, Principle, meant the absolutization of this Buddha-essence into an a priori, full-grown entity. Thus, for example, the term li-fo-hsing\textsuperscript{ax} was used in the circle of Hui-yuan.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, too, the term chen-ju-fo-hsing\textsuperscript{ay,49} thusness Buddha-nature or thusness as Buddha-nature, was used by Pao-liang. The structure of the conceptual relationship that emerged then within the Nirvāṇa school was something like the following:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Buddhahood/Absolute} \\
\text{(Chen-ju)} \\
\text{chen-ju fo-hsing} \\
\text{hsin chen-ju} \\
\text{Buddha-nature} \\
\text{(fo-hsing)} \\
\text{ju-lai-tsang} \\
\text{hsin} \\
\end{array}
\]

A naive reading of this triad of correlationships into Sanskrit would yield:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{tathāta} \\
\text{Suchness} \\
\text{[synonyms]} \\
\text{Buddhata, Buddha-ness} \\
\text{citta tathāta} \\
\text{citta, mind} \\
\text{bodhicitta} \\
\end{array}
\]

However, as we have seen, the structure is more Sinitic than Indian. The absolute, phrased in terms of li, recalls the Tao, and even the Chinese choice of the term chen-ju is very likely under the influence of the Taoist notion of īzu-jan\textsuperscript{az}, “naturalness.” The implicit structure is therefore this:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Li, chen-ju} \\
\text{fo-hsing} \\
\text{hsin} \\
\end{array}
\]

This structure, we have tried to show, really goes back to the Mencius-Chuangtzu matrix of Chinese thought:
The Zen identification of mind, (Buddha)-nature and Buddhahood in the line “Point directly to the mind, recognize your nature and become enlightened” (with which we began our discussion on Mind-Only) would follow from the ‘triad’ structure explained earlier. The northern Zen school, as depicted in the Platform Sutra, is said to insist on wiping the dust off the mirror (the mind). In so insisting, it still retained somewhat the early Buddhist notion of a “radiant mind polluted by accidental defilements.” The southern Zen school seems to follow more faithfully the notion of mind discovered by Chuang-tzu: an innately pure, vacuous, radiant mind without any defilements, shining forth like the light from a candle. This Sinitic divergence eventually precipitated the conflict in Lhasa, Tibet.

Summing-up

The “Mind-Only” philosophy in Chinese Buddhism asserts that the Mind is immediately Buddha and that it even “creates” all phenomena. This philosophy is a uniquely Chinese development. The Indian Buddhist philosophy generally holds the opinion that the illusion of the world corresponds to a deluded, tainted consciousness, seldom ever asserting that the phenomenal world and the mind are “by nature” good. For inheriting the more Indian position, the school of Hsüan-tsang known as Wei-shih, or Consciousness-Only, was attacked and erased in T'ang China. To the Chinese Buddhists who opposed Hsüan-tsang, the latter’s idea of the ālaya-vijñāna (“tainted consciousness”) was not yet the “final” or “ultimate” spiritual core. There was a higher, purer, and absolute mind without even the accidental defilements (āgutakleśa). That mind was seen as superior to the storehouse-consciousness. It then followed that “Mind-Only” was also superior to “Consciousness-Only.” The Chinese then created a distinction that did not exist in Indian Yogācāra and that was only vaguely suggested by the Indian scriptural traditions. The present essay’s rather involved arguments can be summed up in the following:
Diagram 3 Path-analysis of factors leading to the Chinese Dissociation of Mind-Only from Consciousness-Only (much simplified).

Notes

1 The term “Mind-Only” (in Japanese, **yuishin**) had become popularly used probably after Murakami Senjo’s modern reclassification of the various Buddhist schools in the Meiji period. However, historically, the category was implicit in Fa-tsang’s understanding of the **Hua-yen sutra**, and his elevation of the “**tathāgatagarbha causation**” school above the **Wei-shih fa-hsiang** school, the Consciousness-Only school of

2 The full four lines describing the essence of Zen, as translated in Heinrich Dumoulin's *A History of Zen Buddhism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 67, are:

A special tradition outside the scriptures;
No dependence upon words and letters;
Direct pointing at the soul of man;
Seeing into one's own nature, and the attainment of Buddhahood.

The verse is attributed to Nan-chuan P'u-yuan (748–834); see ibid., p. 299.


4 This opinion created in China is still repeated today; see for example, Takakusu Junjiro, *Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 1947), p. 82: "For several reasons this school is considered to be still within the range of the formalistic, realistic Hinayana. It aims at an analysis of the phenomenal world, and is called Quasi-Mahayana."

5 The Hua-yen school's concept of mind will be explained in the essay. The T'ien-t'ai school's concept was based on a liberal reading of the *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (Mahāprajñā-paramitā sastra ascribed to Nāgārjuna) by Chih-i; see Leon Hurvitz, "Chih-i, "Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhistes" 12 (Brussels, 1960–1962), p. 274, footnotes 2, 3. The Ching-tsu school took the notion of the "Three Mind" from the *Amitā-buddha-meditation sūtra* (commonly referred to as the *Kuan-ching*); see Jōdo sanbukyō, trans. Nakamura Hajime et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1963), 2, p. 63. On the metamorphosis of the Sanskrit term ekacittaprasamanna into the Chinese popular reading of it as i-nien hsinhsin, see Fujita Kōtatsu, *Genshi Jōdo shisō no kenkyū* (Tokyo, Iwanami 1970), pp. 576–618. The term "an-hsin," mind of peace, assurance and repose, is not "scriptural," but it played an important role in Zen and Pure Land schools; see Mochizuki Shinkō ed. *Bukkyō Daiten* (Tokyo, 1909–1916), 1, pp. 82b–83b.


8 My translation from the Chinese in T. 12, p. 222b. The *Śrīmālā sūtra* has been translated into English by Alex and Hideko Wayman as *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); see p. 106.

9 Passage cited in Takasaki Jikidō, op. cit., p. 198; see a similar passage from the *Chinese Fo-hsing-lun* in T. 31, p. 796a.

10 In his early work, *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* (1907), Suzuki followed the traditional and natural Chinese reading and interpreted *p'u-t'i-hsin* (bodhicitta) substantively as the mind of enlightenment. In his later study on the *Gandavyuha*, after a diligent study of the Sanskrit phrases "anuttarāyām saṃyaksambodhau cittasya upāh" and "cittotpāda," he came to a different conclusion and was able to correct the traditional Chinese and Japanese understanding of "fa p'u-t'i-hsin" as "awakening the mind of enlightenment," that is, the misconception that "there is a special mental equality to be called "enlightenment-mind" ... or that this mind itself is enlightenment." Suzuki was able to show that the "cherishing the desire for enlightenment" marks the beginning of
THE MEANING OF "MIND-ONLY" (WEI-HSIN)

the career of a bodhisattva's compassion and wisdom, but that this act is nothing like the instant attainment of Buddhahood that oriental Buddhists had made it out to be. Suzuki, who himself came out of the Mind-Only tradition and misread the meaning in 1907, gave us personally and in critical scholarship an insight into the problem I am addressing. See D. T. Suzuki, "The Gaṇḍavyūha," in his On Indian Mahayana Buddhism ed. Edward Conze (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 208–211.

11 Bodhiruci was largely responsible for this translation, see T. 26. p. 169a; T. 9. p. 558c; T. 10. p. 514c.
14 See Tamaki, ibid., p. 358, and the T’ang translation of the same line in T. 10. p. 194a, p. 533a. Tso was dropped, but ‘one (Mind)’ was added in the T’ang version: ‘What the three worlds possess, is One Mind only.’
15 Tamaki, ibid., p. 359.
18 Tamaki, however, reverses his own critical finding and rationalizes or defends the traditional Mind-Only position but the argument, in my judgment, is apologetic instead of truly concrete; Tamaki, op. cit., pp. 345–356.
19 T. 44. p. 527b.
20 See Fukaura Seibun, Yuishiki gaku kenkyū (Kyoto: Nagato Bunshōdō, 1954), 1, pp. 188–208.
21 See note in Hakeda, op. cit., p. 47.
24 Ibid., p. xxvi.
25 Traditionally it is said that there were three main positions held in China during the Sui-T’ang period concerning the status or nature of the ālayavijñāna: Bodhiruci and Ratnamati held the view that it is pure, Paramartha proposed a theory of a mixed (true-and-false) ālayavijñāna, while Hsuan-tsang supported a theory of a “deluded” ālayavijñāna. The ideology-free description of the nature of the ālayavijñāna has been given in lucid Chinese by Shih Yin-shün, I fo-fā yen-chiu fo-fā (Taiwan, 1961), pp. 301–361.
26 My translation from the Chinese version that came from the hands of Bodhiruci; see T. 16. p. 556bc.
27 Ibid.
28 Takasaki, op. cit., p. 198.
29 The ālayavijñāna, being a depository of “seeds” and a reservoir of past and present impressions, does not actively participate in the “rising and falling” stream of consciousness.
30 I am indebted to Masatoshi Nagatomi for finding and pointing out as well as for the translation of the passage in Nanjo Bunyu, ed., The Lankāvatāra Sūtra Gombun Nyuryorakō (Kyoto, Otani University Press, 1956).
31 See Ōgawa Ichijō, Nyoraizō, Busshō no Kenyō (Kyoto, 1969), pp. 43–68.
32 See my "The Awakening of faith in Mahayana," pp. 102–106. The etymology of the Chinese word “hsing” as “what pertains to birth” justifies eventually the ingenious choice of fo-hsing to translate buddha-garbha or gotra.
33 See T. 12. p. 538c and passim.
37 Fa-yao, according to the Kao-seng-chuan², was one of the first to specialize on the Śrīmālā sūtra.
38 T'ang, ibid., pp. 687–688.
39 Ibid., p. 688.
40 Ibid., p. 698f.
41 Ibid., p. 690.
42 Mencius, 7.A.1.
43 T'ang, ibid., pp. 681–712.
44 Chuang-tzu, 2.
45 T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan lun² (Hong Kong: New Asia College Press, 1966), 1, p. 102.
46 Ibid.
47 “Compact” is used in opposition to “differentiated,” following the sociological usage in, for example, Robert Bellah’s article “Religious Evolution,” in his Beyond Belief (New York: Harper and Row 1970).
48 T’ang Yung-t’ung, Fo-chiao-shih, p. 716.
50 Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism met in a controversy in Tibet; see Paul Demieville’s classic, Le concile de Lhasa (Paris: Impr. nationale de France, 1952) or short excerpt in Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Scriptures (Middlesex: Penguin, 1959), pp. 214–217. The Chinese held that there was a “pure, a priori, Buddha-nature mind without klesa (defilements) requiring only immediate recognition.”

天

村上專精

法藏

馮友蘭

中國哲學史

大智度論

智頴

觀閩

浄土三部經

中村元

一念信心

原始浄土思想の研究

安心

望月信亨

佛教大辞典

佛性論

優習提心

唯心の追求

華嚴思想

緣起と唯心

唯識學研究

釋印順

以佛法研究佛法

如来藏佛性の研究

高僧傳

中國哲學原論
The universality of Buddha-nature is a doctrine accepted by all Chinese schools of Buddhism. The Wei-shih⁴ (Fa-hsiang⁵, Vijñaptimātratā) school of Hsüan-tsang⁵, for reviving the notion that the icchantika is agotra, devoid of this seed of enlightenment, had been summarily dismissed as “Hinayānist” for that reason. The idea of “the enlightenability of the icchantika” is associated with the later-named “Nirvāṇa School,” a group of scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420–589) that chose to specialize on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Mahāyāna scripture narrating the last day and teaching of Śākyamuni on earth. The person credited with discovering this doctrine, before even the full sūtra was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu Tao-sheng⁶ (375?–434), perhaps better known for his stand on “sudden enlightenment.” The school as such flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502–557); but because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing on the Ch’eng-shih-lun⁷ (Satyasiddhi?) by Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter was denounced as Hinayānist in the Sui dynasty. It is usually said that the T’ien-t’ai⁸ school, based on the Lotus Sūtra, superseded the Nirvāṇa school by incorporating many of its ideas, while the Ch’eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the attack of Chi-tsang⁹ of the San-lun¹⁰ (Three Treatise or Mādhyamika) school at the same time. Henceforth, the Nirvāṇa school faded away while its old association with the Ch’eng-shih tradition was judged an unnecessary mistake.¹ This article will introduce three moments from the history of this Nirvāṇa school, showing the main trends of development and, somewhat contrary to traditional opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into Harivarman’s scholarship. Emphasis will also be put on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and the native traditions.
The founding of the school: Tao-sheng and Hsieh Ling-yün

The Nirvāṇa Sūtra, from which the school drew its inspiration, was first translated by Fa-hsien, the pilgrim who brought it back from India, and Buddha-bhadra in 416. This shorter and earlier recension already introduced the idea of "universal Buddha-nature", but as surely it also stated that the icchantika was destitute of this seed of enlightenment. A later and longer version readmitting the icchantika into the lot of the enlightenable was rendered, in Liang-chou, by Dharmakṣema with the help of Tao-lang in 421, but unfortunately this full text would not arrive at the southern capital until a decade later, in 430. With only the Fa-hsien version at hand, it was only natural that the southerners regarded the exclusion of the icchantika to be the canonical position. For someone to openly go against the words of the Buddha should, indeed in that context, be punishable, according to the preceptual code, by banishment from the community. That was the fate at first for Tao-sheng who somehow intuited that one day even the icchantika should be de jure (that is, tang-lai: in the natural course of time) given this seed of enlightenment. Hui-kuan petitioned the king for Tao-sheng's removal in 428-429, and Tao-sheng left the capital for Lu-shan, only to be vindicated the next year when the full text arrived from the north.

It is not clear when Tao-sheng first intuited this "enlightenability of the icchantika," but Hui-kuan's reaction was both sharp and apparently quick, such that it is advisable to date it close to 428 itself. This is supported by a letter written by Fan T'ai to the pair, Hui-kuan and Tao-sheng, circa 426-428, at which time the two were on speaking terms though already divided over gradual versus sudden enlightenment. (This other controversy warranted no expulsion of a heretic, because the scriptures themselves show no decisive stand, unlike the explicit exclusion of the icchantika in the then-available Nirvāṇa Sūtra.) Because later in Ch'an (Zen), the doctrine of sudden enlightenment was predicated upon the idea of an innate Buddha-nature, it has been assumed that Tao-sheng also arrived at the subitist position by way of the universality of Buddha-nature. However, nowhere in Tao-sheng's surviving writings do we find the formula, chien-hsing ch'eng-fō, "upon seeing one's (Buddha) nature, be [suddenly] enlightened." That formula first appeared in Pao-liang who is however judged a gradualist because of his Ch'eng-shih leanings (see infra). Thus "sudden enlightenment" and "universal Buddha-nature" were originally two separate issues, discovered by Tao-sheng independent of one another.

In a separate investigation, I discovered that Tao-sheng proposed sudden enlightenment even before he knew of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. The idea came to him probably at Lu-shan in the last decade of the fourth century when he was apprenticed under the Sarvāstivādin Sanghadeva and the famous hermit Hui-yüan. Sanghadeva translated the Abhidharmahrdaya in 391 and chapter five of this text specified that "the last act in training"—the vajrasamādhi (diamond trance)—leading to enlightenment involves a one-step awakening, not any gradual progression. Hui-yüan himself took a cue from this, and in his essay
San-pao-lun⁸ (On Three Modes of Retribution) in 395 already so suggested a nonkarmic (that is, noncausative) enlightenment.⁹ This then formed the basis for the twin theories of Tao-sheng which should be read together, namely, “The [nirvanic] Good admits no [karmic] retribution” for indeed it is through “sudden enlightenment that one attains Buddhahood.” It is only later that Tao-sheng further grafted this Hinayāna-based argument for sudden enlightenment to items he learned in his next phase of scholarship under Kumārajīva: the Emptiness philosophy of Mādhayamika and the Ekayāna doctrine of the Lotus Sūtra. He and Hui-kuan parted company then over suddenism and gradualism as related to these two Mahāyāna doctrines.⁹ The doctrine of Buddha-nature was known to both, but was not regarded as having any bearing, pro or con, on that controversy. The proof lies in Hsieh Ling-yūn’s defense of Tao-sheng in his Piensung-lun⁹ dated 423. Nowhere in this classic defense is Buddha-nature rallied to the side of suddenism. In fact, the only time it is mentioned was by an opponent in support of the gradualist’s cause.¹⁰ These facts, however, can only be documented on a separate occasion.

Although sudden enlightenment was not derived originally from the universality of Buddha-nature, the two did come together eventually and do represent a key contribution in the founding days of the school. The argument for suddenism based on the innateness of Buddha-hood (without as yet accepting the icchantika, the exception) was first presented, as far as surviving documents go, by Hui-ju (alias Seng-ju¹¹) in his Yü-i-lun¹¹. This work is not dated but I prefer to put it after 423. Hui-ju notes:

The (Nirvāṇa) sūtra says, “Nirvāṇa is non-extinction; the Buddha does have a self. All sentient beings have Buddha-nature and will, upon completion of cultivation, become enlightened.” ... Nirvāṇa lasts forever because it corresponds to the mirroring (chao³) element in men. The Great Transformation will not cease and so the true basis [Buddha-nature] has to be. Still there are those who doubt only the more, settling for gradual enlightenment and criticizing the true (suddenist) understanding.¹¹

These stubborn ones were compared to the icchantikas.¹² Finally, Tao-sheng after his vindication and at the invitation of Hui-kuan to contribute a preface to the southerners-edited text, offered this succinct statement:

The true principle is naturalness itself (chen-li izu-jan⁷). Enlightenment is just being mysteriously in tune to it. What is true permits no variance, so how can enlightenment permit any change? The unchanging essence is quiescent and forever mirroring (chao). If a person out of delusion goes counter to it, then enlightenment indeed appears to lie beyound. If he with effort seeks it out, he would reverse the delusion and return to the Ultimate.¹³
Although the word Buddha-nature is not mentioned (in this or any other prefaces)\(^1\) and although sudden enlightenment is absent too, the implication is clear: the direct uncovering of this innate, natural, unchangeable, mirroring essence has to be sudden and total. For such cutting simplicity, Tao-sheng has been loved by many, past and present.

The charm of his thesis notwithstanding, it must be judged as reflecting a certain freedom, even license, in the founding days of the Nirvāṇa school. There is a certain Neo-Taoist innovation in his reading of the "real" intention of the text, a meaning he regarded as lying behind the tools (the "rabbit snare") of the language. Edward Conze well notes how the gradual versus sudden was never that divisive an issue in India:

In fact, Indian Buddhist had made a distinction between "gradual" and "sudden" enlightenment, but had regarded the second as the final stage of the first and nobody had thought of taking sides for one or the other. Tao-sheng now argues that since the absolute emptiness of Nirvāṇa is absolutely and totally different from all conditioned things, the enlightenment which mirrors [chao] it must also be totally different from all mental stages which are directed at other things. In consequence, enlightenment, if it is to be achieved at all, can be achieved only in its totality, and not in a gradual or piecemeal fashion.\(^1\)

The logic might appear to be derived from Mādhyamika, but I am told both the Mādhyamika and the Tathāgatagarbha tradition in India were inclined toward what Tao-sheng would have considered as gradualism.\(^1\) Moreover, if we stand back and look at the short quote from Tao-sheng given earlier, we would have to say that the psychology of this mirroring faculty, chao, like the metaphysics of the invariable, unceasing, one true principle, tells more of native Taoist psychology and ontology than things immediately Indian.\(^1\) The very language used by Tao-sheng, such words as tzu-jan (nature, spontaneity, as-is-ness) and pu-t\(^a\) (the nonchanging), belies a monism that is less obvious than what is found in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra.\(^1\)

The native proclivity in Tao-sheng's thesis was actually acknowledged by Hsieh Ling-yun himself. Instead of seeing his Pien-tsung-lun as an interesting excursion into "comparative religion" in the fourth century, we should see it as an implicit concession on Hsieh's part that, after reviewing the on-going debate between the two camps, the suddenist cause was justifiable more by Chinese proclivity than by Sanskrit scriptural authority. Hsieh's work is as much a hymn to the Chinese genius as it is a confession that Tao-sheng's position was ill-supported by the mainstream in Indian Buddhist reflections (including the authority of Kumārajīva and Seng-chao\(^b\)\(^\)\(^1\)). Hsieh writes:

In the discourses of Śākyamuni, though the Way of the Sage is remote, by accumulated learning one may reach it;

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but only when the bonds are exhausted and illumination is born, will one gradually become enlightened. In the discourses of Confucius, since the Way of the Sage is subtle, even Yen" (Hui) only approximated it; but when one embodies Nonbeing and illumination is universal, then all principles revert to the One Ultimate. Of late, a man of the Way [Tao-sheng] said, “The passive comprehension is fine and subtle and permits no gradation. Accumulated learnings have no end, how will that ever terminate itself?” Thus I will reject gradual enlightenment in Śākyamuni’s teaching but retain his accessibility. I will cast out the idea of approximation in the Confucian tradition and take in its One Ultimate.20

In other words, for Hsieh, India provided the gradualism of the effective means, while China the suddenism of the uncompromising end.

The Sinitic input cannot be denied; but the unique nature of the synthesis should not be overlooked either. Something unprecedented in both Indian Buddhist and Chinese native tradition was forged. Apropos the latter, it should be remembered that although Mencius said every man might become Yao or Shum (Sages) or that Hsun-tzu rooted Goodness in acquired learning itself, such rational humanism was eclipsed largely in the Han period. The consensus was that Confucius was a Sage, but then Sages were rare beings indeed. His leading disciple was Yen Hui, called distinctly a hsi (virtuous one). As hsi, Yen Hui at best approximated Sagehood; he could never and should never aspire to be a Sage. Yen Hui loved learning (ai-hsüeh), but it is not until Sung that finally this learning could be called sheng-jen chih hsüeh, Sage Learning (meaning learning conducive to the creating of sagehood in oneself). For one thing, among the Neo-Taoists, it was agreed that the learning provided by the Classics was only the “trace” of Sagehood, not the “essence” which is forever ineffable and inimitable. The Neo-Taoists might speak of renouncing the trace and aspire directly for the essence, but they, too, stooped to the mystique that Sages were somehow simply “born” and not “achieved.” (The Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove are, strictly speaking, hsi and not sheng as the English might mislead one to believe.) In light of this, namely, the inaccessibility of Sagehood, so total and sudden as to exclude all known means, the incorporation of Buddhist learning as the gradual path to that end should be seen as a new and significant departure pointing ahead to the Sung Neo-Confucian educational revolution to come. As T’ang Yung-t’ung puts it, prior to Hsieh Ling-yun and Tao-sheng, the Sage (sheng-jen) is neither “learnable nor available” (p’u-k’o-hsüeh, p’u-k’o-chih); with the pair, now it is learnable by Indian means but not available gradually (k’o-hsüeh, p’u-k’o-chih); after them, in Sung Neo-Confucianism, Sagehood is finally learnable and acquirable through learning itself (k’o-hsüeh, k’o-chih).21
The flowering of the Nirvāṇa school: the Ch’eng-shih synthesis

Considering the radical nature of Tao-sheng’s theses, many observers are disappointed with the eventual direction of the Nirvāṇa school. Why should its scholars align themselves with the Ch’eng-shih-lun, a text structured by the Hinayānist Four Noble Truths and wherein universal Buddhahood would have no place. It seems more logical and definitely more preferable to continue the line of thought initiated by Tao-sheng, a synthesis of the Nirvāṇa, the Lotus and the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. That, however, was not to be. The next phase, the flowering of the Nirvāṇa school, went hand in hand with the flourishing of the Ch’engshih scholarship.

Yet, in that historical context, there were reasons why this new alignment occurred the way it did: (i) there are indications that purist Mādhyaṃka defenders would not accept the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, whereas (ii) the Ch’eng-shih-lun was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as endorsing a similar positive gospel compatible with the sūtra’s endorsement of a Buddha-self or essence. Apropos (i), there was at first a Seng-kao of the Chung-hsing temple who “accepted the larger Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and rejected the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, charging the latter with not being the words of the Buddha.” So heated was the debate that Seng-jui would like to remember Seng-kao as one “growing more stubborn with age . . . finally dying with his (blasphemous) tongue showing first the signs of decomposition.” The Wei-shih remembered him differently. Seng-kao was known also as a renowned Abhidharmist who introduced no less than the Ch’eng-shih-lun to the North.22 Seng-kao’s reservations about Buddha-nature are understandable. After all, the Buddha denied any idea of a substantial ‘self’ and Nāgārjuna had well exposed universal emptiness. In view of all that, to reintroduce this quasi-ātman was judged by him to be untrue to the teachings. Seng-kao could not have been alone in this, because even in the San-lun tradition of She-shan (where Chi-tsang ultimately came from), there was recorded a refusal to digress into the then-popular Nirvāṇa Sūtra. It was under the continual urgings of his students that Seng-ch’üan finally lectured on this sūtra. His successor, Fa-lang, then tapped the asūnyatathāgatagarbha (the not-empty embryonic buddha) ideology in the Śrīmālā Sūtra to ease the śūnyavāda (emptiness) transition of She-shan into a rapprochement with the Nirvāṇa Sūtra.23 Chi-tsang was Fa-lang’s student who then championed this orthodox linkage against the misguided one he saw in the Nirvāṇa/Ch’eng-shih school. In short, it took some time for purist or critical Mādhyaṃka followers in the Southern dynasties to come to terms, successfully, with the renewed ātmavāda trend found in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. In contrast to this and apropos the second reason (ii), the Ch’eng-shih group somehow was more receptive to this Buddha-self concept. But why? Here we cannot look at what Harivarman actually said, because objectively speaking, his Ch’eng-shih-lun should not support the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature. We must look at what the Chinese perceived the work to be endorsing.
Firstly, there was emerging a consensus about the teleology of the Buddha's teachings, how it began with the Āgamas and ended in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. This scheme was codified as Hui-kuan's p'an-chiao\(^a\) system (tenet classification of sūtras). The logic is already implied in Tao-sheng's theory of the Four Dharma-Wheels found in his Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra. Even though the format given below—in a p'an-chiao fashion—is not intended by Tao-sheng,\(^{24}\) it may nonetheless serve to illustrate the teleology:

The Four Dharma-Wheels are (1) the Pure Teachings in Hinayana for transcending samsāra; (2) the Prajñā teachings exposing all as empty; (3) the Lotus teaching establishing the one real truth of Ekayāna; and (4) the Nirvāṇa teaching of the permanently abiding (Buddha-nature)\(^{25}\).

In this sequence, Hīnayāna is usually accredited with seeing the samsāric particulars; the Prajñāpāramitā corpus with emptying them; the Ekayāna with positing one Ultimate; and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra with a positive doctrine of permanence—a permanent nirvāṇa and an abiding essence in men. Since positivism in (4) reverses the judgments in (2), the disjunction could not be easily smoothed over. In fact, the disciples of Kumārajīva were a little embarrassed that their master who taught them Emptiness did not foresee that reversal to come. To find a continuity, Seng-jui would say that the Lotus Sūtra's concept of the Buddha's omniscience anticipated the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's idea of universal Buddha-nature.\(^{26}\) He probably made up a legend involving Hui-yüan's foresight and Kumārajīva's prophesy of the coming of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra.\(^{27}\) The point for us here is that neither Seng-jui nor others could see the link between śūnyatā (emptiness) and this new mahātman (great self). On the surface, they seemed indeed opposite to one another.

Just as many turned to the Lotus Sūtra for a justifiable continuity, many turned to Harivarman's Ch'eng-shih-lun for a śāstric defense of this Buddha-self. The Lotus Sūtra established one true reality (ch'eng i chen-shih\(^a\); see earlier) meaning Ekayāna, the real goal behind the expedient Triyānas. Can it be just a coincidence that Harivarman's treatise is titled, in Chinese, as Ch'eng-shih-lun, the Treatise to Establish the Real? Considering the fact that the opening gāthā (verse) in this work refers to itself as the Cheng-chih-lun\(^b\), the Treatise of the Noble Wisdom, I am led to think that the current title "To Establish the Real" was imposed upon it either by Kumārajīva or his followers to underline, for some reasons, the 'positivist' tone allegedly found in this text. That the text was perceived as espousing more than Hīnayānist particularism as well as more than Prajñāpāramitā's obsession with negation is proven by this preface written in Liang.

Harivarman ... noticing how the misguided debate of his time ... authored this work. Ch'eng means that it is grounded upon wen\(^\text{wén}\) (the scriptures). Shih means that it will illuminate the Principle. One uses
Ch’eng to oppose the practice of huai⁷⁴ (mere negation). One sides with shih to oppose the hsüw⁷⁵ (mere vacuity, emptiness).⁲⁸

The treatise completes (ch’eng) the meaning of the sūtras, as the opening gāthā so claims.²⁹ However, the Chinese further saw it as endorsing a real Principle (shih-li⁷³) that is clearly beyond mere destructive huai dialectics, assuredly reversing the Emptiness philosophy of hsü. Now, “right or wrong” is a separate issue; the scholars then saw it that way.

What is this “real Principle” that cannot be denied or destroyed? In the Satyasiddhi, this is associated with the third of the Four Noble Truths, nirodha. Unlike the other three, namely, the truths of suffering, its cause, and the way out, which pertains not illogically to the samsaric state (even the path, mārga, leads from samsāra), the truth of nirodha (cessation, nirvāṇa) is opposed to this illusion of a world. For that, Harivarman called it the real truth, even the One Truth and the paramārthasatya. This highest truth is set against the other three as mundane truths.³⁰ Likewise, we find, in the Chinese translation of this text, the adjective shih (the real, the concrete) as being applied to the item that secures one’s attainment of this transmundane reality. What is real (shih) while all else is illusory is wisdom, prajñā. Thus by a coincidence—however improper this might be by later standards and modern philosophical ones—it was thought that Harivarman also endorsed a “permanent nirvāṇa” and a “substantive Prajñā-nature.” The Ch’eng-shih-lun was taken at the time as therefore going beyond mere Emptiness, beyond the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and Mādhyamika, to under-scoring a higher reality (ch’eng-shih). This I believe is the reason this text was heavily relied on by members of the Nirvāṇa school, especially in its heydays in the Liang dynasty.³¹

Having explained the reason for this “detour” into Harivarman, let us examine how Harivarman helped the Sinitic speculations on the nature of this Buddha-essence. For that, we have selected Pao-liang, the first to successfully wed the two systems. A grand master, protégé of the Liang Emperor Wu, he influenced the thinking of this era.

Pao-liang (d. 509) on the Middle Path Buddha-nature. There are many problems confronting a theoretician of Buddha-nature, and Pao-liang had tackled these in his exegesis of the sūtra. However, one basic issue is (a) where to locate this Buddha-essence, and (b) how to reconcile this ‘self’ with the earlier doctrine of ‘no-self’ or anātman. The sūtra has variously defined the Buddha-nature as seed of, or cause of, enlightenment; as Buddhaseed (gotra), Buddha-womb (garbha); as wisdom (prajñā), buddha-realm (dhātu), Dharmakāya; as synonymous with anātman, ātman, mahātman, and dialectically as neither ātman nor anātman; as empty, not-empty, likewise dialectically as neither empty nor not-empty; as paramārtha (the highest truth), paramārtha-sūnyatā (Emptiness of the highest truth); as the Middle Path and so on. Pao-liang’s position on Buddha-nature, in response to the preceding, has located the Buddha-nature in the mind, the innately pure mind, the embryonic buddha (tathāgata-garbha: womb of the
Tathāgata) which he called the *shen-ming miao-it*\(^2\), the mysterious essence of divine illumination. He also associated it with suchness (*tathatā*), *paramārtha,*\(^3\) the middle path and, perhaps most intricately, with a union of the Two Truths. Essentially, Pao-liang located Buddha-nature, said to be possessed by all sentient beings, in the core of sentiency, the mind, seeing in this “mysterious essence” the function or ability to bring about liberation, a liberation rooted in the attainment of suchness and the appreciation of the symmetry of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.

We can see Pao-liang’s basic argument in the following:

There are four kinds of Buddha-nature, that is, the basic-cause, the conditioned-cause, the result and the result-of-result Buddha-nature. These four aspects subsume the whole (process of enlightenment) and leave nothing out. The basic and the conditioned-cause Buddha-natures pertain to the way of the divine aspiration (in the mind). This is because (in terms of the aspiration) to avoid pain and to seek after peace, the fool and the wise man are alike. However in accordance with the “essential” and its functioning, we distinguish the two aspects (of the basic and the conditioned cause). We take as the basic cause that aspect that has, from beginning to end, been always enlightened and never suffers increase nor decrease (in its substance). There is not one split second in which this liberating essence is not functioning (to deliver the person from ignorance); it is only that it would cease being active upon attaining Buddhahood. Thus we know that the (natural) tendency (in men) to avoid pain and seek bliss is this liberating function and that this would be active (in the fool as in the wise man) irrespective of the karmic good or evil that might or might not stimulate it. This is what the *Śrīmālā Sūtra* designates as “the innately pure mind” or what the Lion’s Roar chapter (in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*) calls “the one Middle Path.” Because this functioning (aspiration) is not contrary to the great Principle, therefore how can it not be the basic-cause (Buddha-nature)? As to the conditioned cause, it has as its substance the myriad good (con-tributing to its fruition). Anything above a thought to do good would contribute to that excellent fruit. As it is aroused pending such conditions, it is called the conditioned-cause (Buddha-nature). As this liberating aspect dwells in the aspiring mind yet never eternally, something that rises at one point and (as a contributing good) never since ceases to be, it is different from the (changeless) basic cause. However, if there is not the aid offered by these conditions, then the person would abide with (his present) nature, never changing his way (for the Good). For that reason, these two causes must go hand in hand. Now if the function of the conditioned cause is fulfilled and the meaning of the basic cause is replete, then the two activities would be perfected and life and death (*samsāra*) would end. Omniscience is what
is attained after the vajrasamādhi (Diamond trance) stage. It transforms the cause into the result; this is known as the result Buddha-nature. As to the result-of-result (Buddha-nature), this is set up against life and death. To give it a comprehensive name above the myriad good, we call it the mahānirvāṇa (great nirvāṇa). Because it is put as a result above the result, it is called result-of-result (Buddha-nature). It is not that the two (results) involve any time gap; the distinction is logical (not chronological).33

Buddha-nature is here dynamically conceived under (i) a changeless, enlightened basic core, (ii) a tireless aspiration accumulating merits, (iii) a final liberation and wisdom, and (iv) for emphasis and distinction, the grand nirvānic state at the end of the pilgrimage. Such detailed causative analysis of the four Buddha-natures, absent as far as we know from Tao-sheng and other early thinkers, is characteristic of this peak period.34

Although metaphorically Pao-liang would locate the Buddha-nature in the mind (heart), this is not the mind faculty in man. He avoided that ontic fallacy by qualifying it as lying outside the standard elements:

Although Buddha-nature is within the skandhas, the dhātus and the āyatana, it is not subsumed under them. The reality of divine illumination is the unity of the Two Truths of the mundane and the highest truth. It is only the mundane side that is always within the skandhas etc.; the transmundane side is forever nirvanic (wu-wet⁵⁸). Because the latter is so, therefore the Buddha-nature may, while being within the skandhas, lie outside it. The essence is unchanging and the function never diminishes. Because its function never diminishes, therefore it is called the basic cause (Buddha-nature). If there is not this mysterious essence acting as the basis for the spirited functions, then it would not be said that Buddha-nature is within and yet not subsumed under the skandhas etc. thus we know this has to be true.³⁵

Buddha-nature encompasses both the samsaric skandhas and the nirvanic enlightenment; it is in but not of this world. Pao-liang could point to the authority of the Śrīmālā Sūtra, wherein it is said that “all sentient beings are dependent on the tathāgatagarbha”—never the other way around.³⁶ Pao-liang followed the Nirvāṇa Sūtra in ruling out Buddha-nature for nonsentient objects. Things are part of suchness (tathātā) too, but lacking mind and consciousness, their life (sheng⁶⁶, sentiency) has been terminated. Things without life are without nature (hsing⁶⁶).³⁷

The unity of the Two Truths which constitutes Buddha-nature is realized by the person upon his liberation.

The essence of the basic cause is the Principle of suchness’ nature residing in sentient life for the establishing of both the highest and the
mundane truth. Why? Because unless there is no mind (hsin), there must be suchness. Upon its nature (hsing), there is life.

It should be noted that in Chinese, hsing is written as life (sheng, sentiency) with a mind (hsin
\(^{38}\)) radical.

The essence acts as the basic cause to suchness attaining an equilibrium. The mundane truth is suffering and impermanence; the highest truth is identity with emptiness. Finding the mean between the two is the function of this suchness nature even as suchness transcends the two.\(^{38}\)

The unity of the Two Truths is explained as a necessary coincidence.

In the early teachings, there was the one-sided obsession with samsāra and with the self as real. Now this sūtra reveals the mysterious essence of divine illumination (shen-ming miao-t’i) and sees suchness as real (shih). Upon passing beyond the vajrasamādhi, one indeed realizes that all is suffering, empty and impermanent. The resultant Buddhahood is always permanent, blissful, with self, and pure. If one can understand it this way, then one would realize the real meaning on both sides and walk the middle path. The reason for this is that life and death (samsāra) is essentially empty. From the very beginning, (the samsāric reality and the essential emptiness) are not two and never different. Likewise, nirvāṇa is essentially suchness; it too has no form. This is the experiential way to understanding the real form of the various realities; what the middle path sees is this one Way.\(^{39}\)

The unity of the Two Truths is taken to be the middle path, the one Way, the coincidence of samsāra and nirvāṇa. Samsāra is “empty reality”; nirvāṇa is “Real Emptiness.” By this semantic juxtaposition, the two coincided in a “positive mean.” This is a typical maneuver of the Ch’eng-shih masters in their understanding of the Two Truths. It will be flawed later by Chi-tsang, for mistaking the pair to pertain to reality (yüeh-li\(^{38}\)).

The idea of a “positive mean” is in part indebted to a native understanding of life (sheng), mind (hsin) and nature (hsing) as rendered in the Doctrine of the Mean. There, nature is larger than life and rooted in the mind just as Pao-liang would say Buddha-nature is larger than sentiency and functions through the mind. There the middle path is a mean derived from equilibrium and harmony:

Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused, it is called equilibrium. When the feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony. ... When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.\(^{40}\)
Perhaps we can see shades of this in Pao-liang: the Buddha-nature is the prearoused *hsing*, functioning to achieve the harmony of opposites in a middle path that is a positive Confucian mean.

**The eclipse of the school: the prāsaṅgika critique**

The synthesis of the Nirvāṇa and the Ch‘eng-shih scholarship in the Liang dynasty soon came under attack in the Sui era. From a more purist Mādhyamika perspective, Pao-liang’s explanation of Buddha-nature would be judged as too positive and too realistic, thereby missing the negative dialectics, the emptiness at the heart of wisdom that is the Buddha-nature. Pao-liang’s use of causality has failed to question the rationale of cause and effect itself. Pao-liang’s explanation of Buddha-nature as “in but not of the skandhas” is more a case of rationalizing Both/And, instead of a critical Neither/Nor. Pao-liang’s understanding of the Two Truths is dangerously ontological, aligning the pair so easily with *samsāra* and nirvāṇa as if we are dealing with two realities instead of two ways of knowledge. In the end, Buddha-nature is something inconceivable (*acintya*) and beyond predication (*avikalpya*) and the art of talking about it is not so much explaining what it is as what it is not. It is not through reason but rather the dismantling of it that we may be psychologically freed to catch a glimpse of it. This in short is what Chi-tsang would do to the system built up by the Nirvāṇa school.

Chi-tsang technique of prāsaṅgika, destructive dialectics, through which the true might be pointed at, is best demonstrated in the following persistent antithetical stand to any definition of Buddha-nature:

Always it is necessary to oppose any definition of Buddha-nature. If someone says there it is, say there it is not. If sentient beings are said to be the basic cause, say nonsentient beings are instead. If he says the six elements are the basic cause, say the non-six elements are instead. If he says the highest truth is the basic cause, say the non-highest truth is instead. If he says the mundane truth is the basic cause, say the non-mundane truth is instead. [Whatever is said, negate accordingly.] Therefore it is said that the Middle Path—where there is neither even the highest nor the mundane truth—is the basic cause. As one applies the cure according to the ills perceived, so the negations are employed.

The medicine is to cure, but if the person is to be liberated, he must also be made to see beyond the *upāya* (expediency) in that antidote. Only so may he be pointed toward the truth. Thus Chi-tsang went on to say:

It is not that “non-sent beings” etc. are the basic cause either. If what-is-so is shown to be not-so, then why talk of sentiency as opposed to
nonsentient? We speak of the sentient vs. the nonsentient (as a language convention), but can the sentient be said to be real? Unreal? Both real and unreal? Neither real nor unreal? If you can understand [the antinomies involved in] sentiency, what further reason is there to wonder if 'it' is the basic cause or not? The same applies to (the other items above). Understanding this (dialectics), you have replete in you that basic cause Buddha-nature.\footnote{41}

Buddha-nature is ultimately not 'something' you know. It is rather the knowledge penetrating the emptiness pertaining to any and all 'thing'.

In that spirit, Chi-tang dismantled the Nirvāna school’s various stands one by one in the section on Buddha-nature in his Ta-ch'eng hsüan-lun\footnote{46}. An abridged translation is offered below without comments because more important than any annotations and corrections at the moment is the train of logic employed in this intentionally destructive enterprise.

Traditionally ... there are eleven schools of opinions on Buddha-nature. ... The first regards sentient beings to be the basic cause Buddha-nature for the sūtra has said, “The basic cause is sentient being; the conditioned cause are the six pāramitās.” ... The second school regards the six elements to be the basic cause for the sūtra says, “Buddha-nature is neither same as nor different from the six elements.” ... The third school takes the mind as the basic cause Buddha-nature for the sūtra says, “Those with mind will inevitably attain the highest wisdom. Beings with mind and consciousness are different from sentient things such as wood or stone. By cultivation, they can attain Buddha-hood.” ... The fourth school regards the incorruptible element within rebirth to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. This is different from the one above. Why? Because this understands the mind as having an incorruptible element and takes this function to be the basic cause. The fifth school regards the impulse to avoid pain and preference for bliss to be the basic cause. The Śrīmālā sūtra says, “Were there not the tathāgatagarbhā, there would not be the desire for nirvāṇa and the abhorence of pain and pleasure.” ... The sixth school regards the true spirit to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. If there is not the true spirit, how can there be true enlightenment? ... The seventh school regards the ālayavijñāna and the innately pure mind to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. ... The eighth school regards the future result (in enlightenment) to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. ... The ninth school regards the principle by which one gains enlightenment to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. ... The tenth school regards paramārtha as the basic cause Buddha-nature. ... The eleventh school regards paramārthaśūnyatā to be the basic cause Buddha-nature. ... It is necessary to negate these, one by one ...
The sūtra says, “If the bodhisattva still harbours the idea of a self... he is not a bodhisattva,” and “when the Buddha discourses on sentient beings, he is not discoursing on sentient beings.” ... It may be said that sentient beings possess Buddha-nature but never that sentient beings are Buddha-nature. ... The sūtra clearly says that Buddha-nature is neither same nor different from the six elements.” (So why say it is same as the six?) As to the next five schools, the first three regard the mind as the basic cause Buddha-nature. But the sūtra only says, “Beings with mind will be enlightened.” ... Where does it say that mind itself is Buddha-nature? To guard itself from misunderstanding, it clearly says “the mind is impermanent; Buddha-nature is permanent.” So the mind cannot be Buddha-nature. ... The next two schools come under the same critique. ... And where does the sūtra speak of an incorruptible element? ... When the Śrīmālā Sūtra speaks of “desiring nirvāṇa etc.” It is talking about the attribute of the tathāgatagarbha ...; where does it ever designate that impulse ... as the basic cause Buddha-nature? ... The tathāgatagarbha is already a priori buddhahood, so why (would the sixth school) regard future enlightenment as the tathāgatagarbha? ... The ālayavijñāna cannot be the Buddha-nature because the Mahāyāna Samgraha says it is the mother of ignorance and root of samsāra. ... Apropos the eighth and ninth schools’ theses on the principle of future enlightenment, this principle pertains only to the mundane truth (which cannot be Buddha-nature). Apropos the tenth and eleventh on paramārtha and paramārthasūnyatā, the principle here pertains to the highest truth. However, the sūtra, immediately after identifying Buddha-nature with the paramārthasūnyatā, goes on to say that it is the perception of both the empty and the non-empty (alone) is Buddha-nature. The Middle Path and not Emptiness itself is Buddha-nature. As to paramārtha ..., what scripture and authority so call it Buddha-nature? ... The theory of future enlightenment ... implies incipience ... and karmic action; these, being impermanent, cannot be regarded as Buddha-nature. ... The thesis that the principle by which one becomes enlightened is the Buddha-nature ... is the best ... but on what scripture and by what authority is this taught?

In this way, Chi-tsang demolished the achievements of the Nirvāṇa school, offering his own much more critical and alert reading for Buddha-nature instead. The onticization of Buddha-nature was avoided. That point is well taken by subsequent theorists, but since Chi-tsang’s rather stringent dialectics did not sit well with the Chinese, the mode of thinking found in the Nirvāṇa school actually survived him. Even as the school and its sūtra were superseded by other movements and other works, the legacy of its ideals lived on. The universality of Buddha-nature, the heart of the school’s message, became indeed credal for Sinitic Mahāyāna ever since.
Notes

1 The most detailed work on this school is Fuse Kōgaku, Nekanshū kenkyū in two volumes (Tokyo: Sōbun, 1942).
2 Materials on Tao-sheng's life based largely on T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han-Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao Fo-chiao-shih (Peking reissue: Chung-hua, 1955) ch. 16, pp. 601-676. I will only note any disagreements I might have.
3 See ibid., pp. 637-638; there is some confusion about whether Tao-sheng did not argue for pen-yu⁷ (a priori possession of Buddha-nature) instead of tang-yu (future possession) as he was later charged. T'ang defends the former, but it is conceivable that Tao-sheng at one time proposed the latter in a lost treatise known as Fo-hsing tang-yu lun⁸. At any rate, the sharp distinction between pen-wu and shih-yu⁴ (incipient possession) is a Sui dynasty creation; all members of the Nirvāṇa school subscribed to pen-yu (a basic category in their exegesis) even as they accepted the gradual, incipient maturing of this seed of enlightenment (buddhagotra).
4 T. (Taishō Daizōkyō) 52, p. 786c.
5 T'ang, p. 658 so assumed; Edward Conze's short review (see 15) did not.
7 In English see Charles Willemen trans., The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmaḥdaya (Brussels: 1975), p. 82.
8 T. 52, p. 34b.
9 After Kumārajīva's death (if dated in 409; Kumārajīva was never consulted on this issue as he was on others) but before Seng-chao's Nirvāṇa is Nameless (now authenticated, dated 413; he reported on both positions).
10 Hui-lin recalled Confucius' ideal of “changing hsing” (T.52, p. 226bc) and Hsieh then noted the Buddhist parallel in Buddha-nature (p. 227a).
11 T. 55, p. 41c.
12 One reason for putting this work before 428.
14 Ibid. Only Pao-liang hinted at it.
16 By Prof. Luis Gomez (Michigan University, Ann Arbor) during a conference on sudden and gradual enlightenment at the Institute of Transcultural Studies, Los Angeles, sponsored by the ACLS, 1981.
17 Not that similar metaphors are absent in India, but the matrix is different.
18 Tzu-jan had been used to translate tathāta; the invariable is implied.
19 Both, in their exegesis of the ten bhūmis, accepted progress after initial enlightenment.
20 T. 52, pp. 224c-225a. Translation indebted to Prof. Richard Mather, who has a full translation of this text in manuscript form.
21 This, I believe, is from his Wei-Chin hsūan-hsūeh lun-kao (not available to me at the moment), with slight changes, ex. sudden enlightenment is characterized by T'ang as pu-hsūeh erh-chuì⁸ instead.
22 T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 617-18.
24 Originally intended for internal analysis of the Lotus Sūtra.
25 Compare Seng-jui's Yu-i-hun: “The Tripiṭaka drives off hindrances; the Prajñā texts eliminate vacuous illusions; the Lotus reveals the one Ultimate; and the Nirvāṇa shows the real transformations” (T. 55, p. 41 be).

27 Yu-i-lun: Hui-yüan supposedly wrote a Fa-hsing-lun⁶⁷ saying “What attains the Ultimate has as its nature the unchanging/what possesses nature has as its principle the embodiment of the Ultimate”; and Kumārajīva sighed at this intuition of the (permanent) principle prior to the (Nirvāṇa) sūtra’s arrival. T’ang accepted this as true (p. 632).

28 T. 52, p. 244b. The last line reads “... to praise shih and oppose hsi̇’ after emending hsing (form) to hsi̇ng⁶⁸ (punish).

29 This is accepted by Chi-tsang and is one reason why Harivarman has been classified at times as Sautrānika.


31 The traditional reason given for the Chinese interest in this text is that they knew no better or Harivarman did criticize the Abhidharma. I do not think that can explain the alignment of the two schools here. Compare Tao-lang, the aide to Dharmakṣema and an authority accepted by Chi-tsang, was insistent on not emptying prajñā itself when he said “The myriad dharmas are empty but the essence of wisdom is not empty” (T. 38, p. 142b). The Satyasiddhi as the Cheng-chih-lun was indeed regarded in the South as the companion piece to Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamikakārīkā, then also known as the Cheng-fa-lun⁶⁹. The former affirms the reality of wisdom (chih) as the latter empties the illusion of dharmas (fa). Even Seng-chao agrees with Yao Hsing that there must be a Sage to understand Emptiness, an essence somewhere within man. The Southerners needed a positive sāstra.

32 T’ang, p. 693, wonders if Chi-tsang in attributing paramārtha Buddha-nature to Pao-liang had not mistaken chen-ju⁷⁰ (tathāatā, suchness Buddha-nature) as chen-ti⁷¹ (para-mārtha). But T’ang’s own citation on p. 695 of Pao-liang can easily be taken to support a paramārtha Buddha-nature: “The mundane truth involves multiples and to the perverted, it is there always. However, to the delusion-free, it is empty and has never been. From the Buddha’s perspective, there is only one truth, known only to the enlightened. What to sentient beings is a (real) dream is to the Buddha something that never was. There, being and nonbeing do not apply; only peace and formlessness. Thus as far as the Buddha is concerned, there is only paramārtha.”


34 See Hirai, op. cit., pp. 623–624. Both Chi-tsang and Hui-yüan revolted against the causative scheme by creating a new category called “neither cause nor effect Buddha-nature,” However, that category was actually recognized by Liang Emperor Wu in his preface (T. 52, p. 242c)!

35 Cited by Fuse, p. 353.

36 T’ang, p. 698.

37 T’ang, p. 694.

38 T’ang, citing from Chun-cheng’s⁷² Ssu-lun hsüan-i⁷³ as attributed to Pao-liang, pp. 693–694.

39 T. 37, p. 460c, noted by T’ang, p. 694 and Fuse, p. 348.


41 T. 45, p. 37a.

SINITIC SPECULATIONS ON BUDDHA-NATURE

唯識
法相
玄奘
道生
成実論
天台
吉藏
三論
性経
法頴
成都
道朗
當來
慧觀
盧山
范泰
禪
見性成佛
寶光
慧遠
三報論
辨宗論
慧(僧)叡
喻疑論
照
真理自然

不易
僧肇
頜回
如是
賢
愛學
聖人之學
聖
湯用彤
不可學不可至
可學可至
中興寺僧嵩
魏書
僧詮
法朗
判教
成一真實
正智論
文
壞
盧
實理
梁武帝
神明妙體
無為
生
性
心
約理
大乘玄論
本有(佛性)
佛性當有論
始有(佛性)
不學而至
法性論
形刑
正法論
真如
真諦
均正
四論玄義
THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA-NATURE IN THE MAHĀYĀNA
MAHĀPARINIRVĀṆA-SŪTRA

Ming-Wood Liu


I. Introduction

In the Buddhist Canon, there are two main corpuses of texts which go by the name Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (henceforth abbreviated to MNS) and have as their main concern the recounting of the events and dialogues of the last days of the Buddha. The first, presumably of earlier origin, is a comprehensive compendium of Hinayāna ideas and precepts. It exists today in its Pāli, Sanskrit and Chinese versions, and for its attention to factual details has been resorted to as the principal source of reference in most standard studies of the Buddha’s life. As for the second, only its Chinese and Tibetan translations are still extant.1 While it also relates some of the well-known episodes of the final months of the Buddha Śākyamuni, notably his illness and the last meal offered by Cunda, such narrations are treated in the work merely as convenient spring-boards for the expression of such standard Mahāyāna ideas as the eternal nature of Buddhahood and expediency as method of instruction. Both in style and content, this corpus exhibits the disregard of historical particulars and the fascination with the supernatural and the ideal which characterize Mahāyāna writings in general. As a Mahāyāna sūtra, it is of rather late date, for it mentions such influential “middle Mahāyāna” works as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra and the Śūraṃgama-masamādhi-nirdeśa in its text, and so could not have been compiled before the second century A.D.2 It is this Mahāyāna version of the MNS which we are going to examine in our present study.

At present, there are three extant Chinese translations of this Mahāyāna version of the MNS, the earliest being the one completed by the famous pilgrim Fa-hsien 法顯 and Buddhahadra (359–429) in the southern capital of Chien-k’ang 建康 in 418. The second translation, undertaken almost simultaneously by Dharmakṣema (385–431) in the northern kingdom of Pei Liang 北涼, was finished in 421. Comparison of the two translations shows that Fa-hsien’s version
corresponds in the main with the first five chapters of Dharmakṣema’s version, and since the MNS is known to have existed in separate parts, posterity often calls Fa-hsien’s translation and the first five chapters in Dharmakṣema’s translation the “first portion” (ch’ien-fen 前分). The third Chinese version appeared in the South around 436, and as a consequence is often referred to as the “Southern edition,” in contradistinction to which Dharmakṣema’s version is usually designated as the “Northern edition.” Compiled by the monks Hui-yen 慧嚴 (363–443) and Hui-kuan 慧觀 (？–453) and the poet Hsieh Ling-yun 謝靈運 (385–433), this Southern edition is not a new translation, but is a stylistic revision of the Northern edition. Since the Sanskrit original was not consulted in making the changes, the Southern edition, despite its great popularity, is a less reliable source in the study of the MNS than the Northern edition. Thus, we shall base our discussion of the MNS on Dharmakṣema’s version of the text.³

The MNS attracted immediate attention on its introduction into China, and it was so widely discussed and commented on in the period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (fifth and sixth century) that historians speak of the existence at that time of a Nirvāṇa School, which had as its main concern the exposition and the propagation of the teachings contained in the MNS.⁴ Even though study of the MNS rapidly declined with the advent of the T’ang Dynasty (7th century), a number of ideas and sayings of the MNS had by that time become so deeply ingrained in the minds of Chinese Buddhists that they remained permanent furniture of the Chinese Buddhist world, and continued to exert enormous influence. A good example is the doctrine of the Buddha-nature. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the MNS has provided the historical starting-point as well as the chief scriptural basis for enquiry into the problem of the Buddha-nature in China, and it would be difficult if not impossible to grasp the significance of the concept and its subsequent evolution in Chinese Buddhism without a proper understanding of the teaching of the MNS on the subject.⁵

There are three questions which Chinese Buddhists most frequently ask when they approach the problem of the Buddha-nature, and these questions provide a convenient framework for investigating the teaching on Buddha-nature in the MNS:

1. What is the Buddha-nature?
2. What does the sūtra mean when it speaks of sentient beings “having” Buddha-nature?
3. Do all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature?

Since answering the last question would require exhaustive inquiry into the position of the MNS on the problem of the icchantika, i.e., the problem of whether there exist sentient beings who are deprived of the roots of goodness and so will never attain enlightenment, I prefer to postpone discussion of it to another article.⁶ Meanwhile, I take for granted the orthodox view that the MNS teaches
that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature, and will examine the answers of the *MNS* to the first two questions on that understanding.

II. What is the Buddha-nature?

1. **Buddha-nature is one of the central themes of the MNS**

Speaking of the advantages of having virtuous friends, the author of the *MNS* explains what it means by “really listening to the Dharma”:

Really listening to the Dharma means listening to and accepting [the teaching of] the *MNS*. Since one learns from the *MNS* that [all sentient beings] possess the Buddha-nature and the tathāgata does not enter the final nirvāṇa, one is said to be listening to the Dharma with one mind [when one listens to the *MNS*].

In this passage, the author claims the *MNS* to be the paragon of Buddhist Dharma, and the reason given for the claim is that the sūtra teaches the eternal nature of the tathāgata and the presence of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings. Indeed, the two theses of “the eternal and immutable nature of the tathāgata” and “the universal presence of the Buddha-nature” are repeatedly mentioned as the most fundamental tenets of the *MNS*. Thus, the *MNS* exults its readers to “apprehend perfectly the meaning and flavour” of the *MNS*, which consists in comprehending that “the tathāgata is eternal, immutable and perfectly blissful,” and that “sentient beings all possess the Buddha-nature.” One of the benefits of following the instructions of the *MNS*, according to its author, is the “hearing of what one formerly has not heard,” among which are the doctrines that “All sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature” and “All Buddhas do not enter the final nirvāṇa and are eternal and immutable.” Finally, its preaching of the idea of the Buddha-nature is given as the chief mark of excellence of the *MNS*:

Again, good sons! Just as all rivers flow to the sea, all sūtras and all forms of meditation lead ultimately to the *MNS*. Why? Because it expounds in the most excellent manner [the doctrine that all sentient beings] possess the Buddha-nature.

Thus, it is abundantly clear that “Buddha-nature” is one of the central themes of the *MNS*.

2. **Buddha-nature means “the nature of the Buddha”**

We find the following definition of “Buddha-nature” in the *MNS* after an exposition on the importance of understanding the truth of dependent origination:
THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA-NATURE

Good sons! That is why I teach in various sūtras that if a person perceives the twelve links of the chain of dependent origination, he sees the Dharma. To see the Dharma is to see the Buddha, and [the term] "Buddha" [alludes to] the same [thing] as [the term] "Buddha-nature." Why? Because all Buddhas have [the Buddha-nature] as their nature.12

When it is said that the term "Buddha" alludes to the same thing as the term "Buddha-nature" because all Buddhas become Buddhas in virtue of "Buddha-nature," "Buddha-nature" is evidently taken to mean what constitutes a Buddha, or the nature of a Buddha. That the MNS often uses the term "Buddha-nature" this way is attested by a number of concepts which are often cited in the sūtra as synonymous with "Buddha-nature," among which are "the realm of the tathāgatas" and "the most perfect enlightenment":

Good sons! In case there are people who can comprehend and fathom the meanings of the MNS, it should be understood that they perceive the Buddha-nature. The Buddha-nature is inconceivable. It is the realm of the Buddhas and tathāgatas, and cannot be known by śrāvakas and pratye-kabuddhas.13

Those who really comprehend the meaning [of Dharma] know that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. By Buddha-nature, we mean the most perfect enlightenment.14

Since one cannot become a Buddha without attaining "the realm of the tathāgatas" and "the most perfect enlightenment," both represent the essential conditions of being a Buddha, to which the term "Buddha-nature" refers. Furthermore, since liberation from the realm of samsāra and readiness for entrance into nirvāṇa are also characteristic features of Buddhahood, the MNS also regards them as part of the significance of the term "Buddha-nature":

"Buddha-nature" is equivalent to "tathāgata." "Tathāgata" is equivalent to "all the distinctive characteristics [of the Buddha]." "Distinctive characteristics [of the Buddha]" is equivalent to "liberation." "Liberation" is equivalent to "nirvāṇa."15

Besides such general definitions, the MNS also associates the "Buddha-nature" with a number of more specific attributes generally considered to be the marks of a Buddha. For example, it speaks of the six and seven aspects of "Buddha-nature":

How do bodhisattvas know the Buddha-nature? The Buddha-nature has six aspects. What are these six? [They are:] first, to be eternal, secondly, to be pure, thirdly, to be real, fourthly, to be virtuous, fifthly, to be discerned in the future [by everyone], and sixthly, to be true. It also has seven aspects: the first is "being attainable [by everyone]," while
the remaining six are the same as [the six aspects listed] above. [When bodhisattvas recognize these aspects of the Buddha-nature,] we say that they know the Buddha-nature.  

Furthermore, the Buddha-nature is equated in the MNS with the ekayāna (one vehicle), “the state of supreme excellence,” and the Śūraṃgama-samādhi, “the mother of all Buddhas.” In one passage, “Buddha-nature” is regarded as the proper designation of a series of attributes, including “the great compassion and the great pity,” “the great joy and the great abandonment,” “the great faith,” “the stage of [perfect love, in which one treats all beings like one’s] only son,” “the fourth of the ten powers,” etc., all of which are features peculiar to the tathāgata. In a similar manner, the sūtra associates the Buddha-nature with the ten powers, the four forms of fearlessness, and “mindfulness under all three conditions,” all being perfections of the Buddha.

Besides relating to us what the Buddha-nature is, the MNS also informs us what the Buddha-nature is not, and what it teaches in this respect also serves to indicate that in the MNS, the Buddha-nature is often taken to mean the essence of being a Buddha. Thus, we are told that when the tathāgata talks about the Buddha-nature, he takes heed of what it has as well as what it does not have:

As for what [the Buddha-nature] has, [they include] the so-called thirty-two marks and eighty noble characteristics [of the Buddha], the ten powers, the four forms of fearlessness, mindfulness under all three conditions, the great compassion, the great pity, the infinite Śūraṃgama-samādhi, the infinite Vajra-samādhi, the infinite Upāya-sa-mādhi, and the infinite Pañca-jītānāti-samādhi. These are known as what [the Buddha-nature] has. As for what [the Buddha-nature] does not have, [they include] the so-called good, bad, and neither good nor bad karmas and their fruits, defilements, the five skandhas and the twelve links in the chain of dependent origination. These are known as what [the Buddha-nature] does not have.

In short, what the Buddha-nature has are the distinctive marks of a Buddha, and what it does not have are the features of the realm of samsāra. In connection with the non-samsāric character of Buddha-nature, the MNS repeatedly notes that the Buddha-nature is not “a kind of conditioned being” (samskṛta dharma), and that “Those who see the Buddha-nature are no longer sentient beings.” Negative terms are frequently used in order to emphasize the transcendent nature of the Buddha-nature:

Good sons! The Buddha-nature is matter, non-matter, and neither matter nor non-matter. It is with marks, without marks, and neither with marks nor without marks. It is one, not one, and neither one nor not one. It is neither permanent, nor impermanent, nor neither permanent
nor impermanent. It is being, non-being, and neither being nor non-being. It is finite, infinite, and neither finite nor infinite. It is cause, effect, and neither cause nor effect...²⁶

In another instance, Buddha-nature is compared to space, which “neither is born nor originates, is neither made nor created, and is not a conditioned being.”²⁷

III. Buddha-nature and sentient beings

In the previous section, we have seen that the MNS takes “Buddha-nature” chiefly to mean the nature of the Buddha. However, the MNS also frequently applies the term “Buddha-nature” to sentient beings, and speaks of all sentient beings having Buddha-nature. Since sentient beings are by definition beings of the realm of samsāra, it is unlikely that the sūtra would maintain that all sentient beings are in actual possession of the essence of Buddhahood. Thus, in the MNS, the term “Buddha-nature” must carry a peculiar connotation in relation to sentient beings, and it is the purpose of this section to uncover this special connotation as well as to explore its general significance.

I. With respect to sentient beings, to have the Buddha-nature means to be able to attain the nature of the Buddha in the future

In explaining what it means by sentient beings having the Buddha-nature, the MNS distinguishes three different ways of understanding the term “to have,” namely, to have in the past, to have at present, and to have in the future:

Good sons! There are three ways of having: first, to have in the future, secondly, to have at present, and thirdly, to have in the past. All sentient beings will have in future ages the most perfect enlightenment, i.e., the Buddha-nature. All sentient beings have at present bonds of defilements, and so do not now possess the thirty-two marks and eighty noble characteristics [of the Buddha]. All sentient beings had in past ages [deeds leading to] the elimination of defilements, and so can now perceive the Buddha-nature [as their future goal]. For such reasons, I always proclaim that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature ... Good sons! It is just like a man who has coagulated milk at home. If someone asks him, “Do you have butter?” he will reply, “I have.” Butter strictly speaking is not milk. [Nevertheless,] since using the proper method, one will definitely obtain [butter from milk], the man answers that he has butter, [even though all he has is milk]. The same is true of sentient beings, all of whom are endowed with a mind. Since whoever is endowed with a mind will definitely attain the most perfect enlightenment, I always proclaim that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature.²⁸
Since the above passage identifies sentient beings’ ways of having Buddha-nature with the third way of having, i.e., having in the future, it is apparent that in preaching the doctrine that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature, the MNS is not entertaining the idea that sentient beings are at present endowed with all the features and excellences of the Buddha. Indeed, as given in the above quotation, the doctrine is no more than the Mahāyāna way of presenting an insight which was already present in early Buddhism in the form of the last two of the four noble truths, i.e., there is cessation of suffering and there is a way leading to this cessation, so that all beings with life (“capable of thinking”), provided that they are willing to follow the way, will sooner or later achieve final deliverance. That “to have the Buddha-nature” in the case of sentient beings means “to have the nature of the Buddha in the future” is a point the MNS returns to again and again throughout its exposition. To cite another example:

Good sons! Since the tathāgata is eternal, we describe it as the self. Since the dharmakāya of the tathāgata is boundless and all pervasive, never comes into being nor passes away, and is endowed with the eight powers [arising from the knowledge of the pāramitā of being personal], we describe it as the self. Sentient beings are actually not in possession of such a self and its [attending] properties. Nevertheless, since [all of them] will definitely attain the most supreme form of emptiness [in the future], we designate them [with the term] “Buddha-nature.”

The Buddha uses the term “Buddha-nature” to describe sentient beings not because he thinks that all of them have already achieved the characters and powers of the tathāgata, but because with their ability to learn and with his own incessant effort to teach, every one of them eventually “will definitely attain the most supreme form of emptiness,” i.e., the true wisdom of the Buddha.

Another proof that the MNS has the hereafter rather than the present in mind when it speaks of all sentient beings having the Buddha-nature is the vehement criticism it levies against those who interpret the doctrine of the presence of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings as the teaching that all sentient beings have already achieved enlightenment, and think that, as a consequence, religious practice is no longer necessary:

Suppose someone declares that he has already attained the most perfect enlightenment. When asked for the reason, [he replies,] “It is because [the tathāgata teaches that all sentient beings] have the Buddha-nature. Since whoever is in possession of the Buddha-nature should have already attained the most perfect enlightenment, [I declare] that I have attained enlightenment now.” It should be understood that such a person is guilty of the pārājikas. Why? It is because even though [the Buddha teaches that all sentient beings] have the Buddha-nature, they
have not yet cultivated various beneficial means, and so still have no vision of [the Buddha-nature which they are going to have]. Since they still have no vision [of the Buddha-nature], they have not attained the most perfect enlightenment.  

The practising of various beneficial means is necessary in order to bring the Buddha-nature into view, because even though the Buddha, with his compassionate heart, profound wisdom and infinite power, is certain that he will sooner or later bring all sentient beings into his realm, and attributes the Buddha-nature to every one of them on that basis, the actual possession of the Buddha-nature in the case of sentient beings is still a matter of the far-away future; and to assure that this glorious future is not postponed forever, initiative on the part of sentient beings themselves is absolutely essential. That is why the sūtra affirms that “Even though all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, they can perceive it only if they keep the rules of discipline.” The MNS abounds in illustrations which tell of the need of exertion on the part of sentient beings despite the universal presence of the Buddha-nature. Typical are the following comparisons:

If you say that sentient beings need not practise the holy paths [because all of them have the Buddha-nature], that is not true. Good sons! It is like a man travelling in the wilderness who approaches a well when thirsty and tired. Even though the well is dark and deep and he cannot catch sight of any water, he knows that there must be water [at the bottom]. And if with various opportune means, he gets hold of a can and a rope and draws the water up, he will see it. The same is true of the Buddha-nature. Even though all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, they have to practise the non-defiled and holy paths before they can perceive it.

Good sons! When we have hemp seeds, [we know that] we shall see oil; and yet without [applying] various opportune means [to the hemp seeds], we shall never perceive oil. The same is true of sugar cane [and sugar]. ... Just as sentient beings cannot see the roots of grass and underground water because they are hidden in the ground, the same is true of the Buddha-nature, which sentient beings cannot perceive because they do not practise the holy paths.

One may wonder if the MNS is misleading its readers when it asserts that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, although they are not yet in actual possession of it. The reply of the MNS is that in everyday conversation, we do frequently employ the term “to have” to indicate “to have in the future,” so that in speaking of sentient beings having the Buddha-nature in the sense of having it in the future, it has not actually departed from the common usage of the term. We have already seen the cases of the coagulated milk and butter, the thirsty traveller and the water in the well, and the hemp seeds and oil, when people
speak of “A having B” without B being actually at hand or even in existence. Another example which the sūtra cites is the way we use the terms “beings of hell” or “beings of heaven” to call other people. When asked whether there is further need for sentient beings to follow the rules of conduct, when it is understood that the Buddha-nature refers to the realm of the Buddha and it is further understood that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature, the MNS explains that just as we sometimes do call a bad person “a being of hell” and a good person “a being of heaven” considering that they will fall into hell and ascend into heaven respectively in the future, we may also call sentient beings who have not yet got the thirty-two marks and eighty noble characteristics of the tathāgata “beings with the Buddha-nature,” considering that all of them will attain Buddhahood one day. On the other hand, the MNS agrees that we may also maintain that sentient beings do not have the Buddha-nature, if we restrict the sense of “to have” to mean “to have at present.” Thus, in connection with sentient beings, we can assert in one breath that the Buddha-nature is both existent and non-existent, i.e., existent with respect to the future, and non-existent with respect to now. This, according to the author of the MNS, is an instance of the truth of the middle way:

Thus, [we maintain that with respect to sentient beings,] the Buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent, [or] is both existent and non-existent. Why do we say that the Buddha-nature is existent? Because all [sentient beings] will have it [in the future]. Since sentient beings will continue [to pass from one life to another] without interruption like the flame of a lamp until they achieve the most perfect enlightenment, we say that [with respect to sentient beings, the Buddha-nature] is existent. Why do we say that the Buddha-nature is non-existent? We say that [the Buddha-nature with respect to sentient beings] is non-existent, because all sentient beings do not yet have [the excellences of] being eternal, blissful, personal and pure, characteristic of all Buddha dharmas. The union of [the two aspects of] existence and nonexistence is the middleway.

2. The Buddha-nature qua cause and effect

As the Buddha-nature indicates the realm of the Buddha, it is not an entity of our everyday world of conditioned existence. So, strictly speaking, the category of cause and effect is not applicable to it. Nevertheless, as the Buddha-nature is not yet realized by sentient beings, and sentient beings are beings of the realm of cause and effect, the MNS often resorts to the terms “cause” and “effect” in discussing the fulfillment of the Buddha-nature in sentient beings. Thus, it talks of two types of causes of Buddha-nature when the Buddha-nature is considered with respect to sentient beings:
The Doctrine of the Buddha-Nature

Good sons! With respect to sentient beings, the Buddha-nature also consists of two types of causes: first, direct cause (cheng-yin 正因), and secondly, auxiliary cause (yüanyin 緣因). The direct cause [of Buddha-nature] is sentient beings, and the auxiliary cause is the six pāramitās. The MNS explains what it means by “direct cause” and “auxiliary cause” with an analogy:

Good sons! There are two types of causes: first, direct cause, and secondly, auxiliary cause. Direct cause is like milk which produces cream, and auxiliary cause is like warmth and yeast [which are added to milk to form cream.] Since [cream] is formed from milk, we say that there is the nature of cream in milk.

Since we can never obtain cream without milk, it is said that milk is the direct cause of cream. However, since milk will never turn to cream without being processed with warmth and yeast, we call warmth and yeast the auxiliary causes of cream. A similar relation exists between sentient beings, the six pāramitās and the Buddha-nature. Since nothing other than sentient beings who are “endowed with a mind” can embody the Buddha-nature, we describe sentient beings as the direct cause of the Buddha-nature. Yet, this possibility of all sentient beings’ becoming the Buddha will never be realized unless every one of them follows the holy paths, such as the six pāramitās. Thus, we call the six pāramitās the auxiliary causes of the Buddha-nature.

Also significant to the later development of the Buddha-nature doctrine in China is the analysis in the MNS of the Buddha-nature into “cause,” “cause vis-à-vis cause,” “effect” and “effect vis-à-vis effect” in connection with its attainment by sentient beings:

Good sons! the Buddha-nature has [the aspects of] cause, cause vis-à-vis cause, effect, and effect vis-à-vis effect. The cause is the twelfold chain of dependent origination, the cause vis-à-vis cause is wisdom, the effect is the most perfect enlightenment, and the effect vis-à-vis effect is the supreme nirvāṇa.

The reason for naming the twelfold chain of dependent origination “the cause” and wisdom “the cause vis-à-vis cause” of the Buddha-nature is hinted at in an earlier passage, where it is pointed out that just as we sometimes refer to cucumber as fever on the ground that consuming cucumber is conducive to fever, we may also refer to the twelfold chain of dependent origination as the Buddha-nature, since the wisdom arising from meditation on the twelfold chain of dependent origination is “the seed of the most perfect enlightenment.” Now, both the “twelfold chain of dependent origination” and the “wisdom” arising from the meditation on it are factors contributing to the realization of the
Buddha-nature in sentient beings, and so more exact analysis speaks of them as the causes of Buddha-nature rather than generally as "Buddha-nature." Furthermore, since "wisdom" only arises with "the twelfeold chain of dependent origination" as its object, wisdom is a cause (i.e., cause of the Buddha-nature) which itself stands in need of another cause (i.e., the twelfeold chain of dependent origination). That is why the sutra designates "wisdom" as "the cause vis-à-vis cause" of the Buddha-nature, while alluding to the twelfeold chain of dependent origination simply as "the cause." The same principle can be applied to explain why the MNS draws a distinction between "the most perfect enlightenment" and "the supreme nirvāṇa" in referring to the former as "the effect" and the latter as "effect vis-à-vis effect." As has been shown earlier, the MNS often identifies "the most perfect enlightenment" and "nirvāṇa" with the Buddha-nature, and when so understood, neither of them can be called "effect," as the Buddha-nature in itself is not an effect. Nevertheless, when viewed with respect to their fulfilment in sentient beings, both are the fruits resulting from meditating on the twelfeold chain of dependent origination, and so both may be regarded as "effect." Furthermore, since it is common practice to consider "nirvāṇa" as the final consummation of "the most perfect enlightenment," the former is given the appellation of "effect vis-à-vis effect," as it is an effect deriving from another effect (i.e., the most perfect enlightenment), whereas the former is simply presented as "the effect."

Despite its frequent association of the Buddha-nature with the concepts of "cause" and "effect," the MNS is careful to observe that such analysis is only applicable to "Buddha-nature with respect to sentient beings" (chung-sheng fohsing 衆生佛性), whereas the Buddha-nature in itself, understood as the essence of the Buddha, is not a mundane object susceptible of such categorization. The following remarks are found right after the afore-quoted exposition of the Buddha-nature as cause, cause vis-à-vis cause, effect and effect vis-à-vis effect:

Good sons! "To be cause and not effect" is like the Buddha-nature [considered with respect to sentient beings]. "To be effect and not cause" is like the supreme nirvāṇa. "To be both cause and effect" is like dharmas arising from the twelfeold chain of dependent origination. As for "to be neither cause nor effect," it is what is known as the Buddha-nature.42

The Buddha-nature considered with respect to sentient beings is "cause and not effect," for the Buddha-nature remains an abstract possibility yet to be realized in the case of sentient beings. The supreme nirvāṇa is "effect and not cause," for nirvāṇa indicates the complete annihilation of all defilements, when the bases of future rebirths finally come to an end. Dharmas arising from the twelfeold chain of dependent origination are "both cause and effect," for as entities in the realm of samsāra, they are conditioned by past events as well as serving as the support for the formation of future events. Finally, the Buddha-nature,
considered in itself, is "neither cause nor effect," for as the ultimate ideal, it is ontologically distinct from the samsāric world of interdependent existence, and its perfection is not contingent upon its being fulfilled by sentient beings.

3. Why all sentient beings will eventually possess the Buddha nature: an examination of a number of similes

If the MNS teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature because all of them are capable of achieving Buddhahood in the future, and moreover describes them as "the direct cause" of the Buddha-nature on that ground, it appears relevant to inquire on what basis such thoughts are entertained. Thus, we may ask if this belief in the future enlightenment of all sentient beings in the MNS is a conclusion drawn from a particular theory of their ontological structure, or if the doctrine is primarily soteriological in intent, taught out of religious rather than out of philosophical considerations.

In demonstrating how sentient beings come to realize the Buddha-nature, the MNS often resorts to similes; and so far as these similes are concerned, the sutra seems to incorporate several diverse answers to the above question. One of the best known of the similes in the MNS with respect to the problem of the Buddha-nature is the pearl of the strong man:

Good sons! Just as there was in the royal family a very strong man who had an extremely hard pearl between his eyebrows. When he was wrestling with another strong man [one day], the other strong man struck his brow with his head, and as a consequence, the pearl sank under his skin and vanished. When a boil [began to] develop on the spot, the strong man called for good doctors to cure it. At that time, there was a clever doctor well skilled in diagnosing diseases, and he knew that the boil was caused by a pearl which had entered the body and was concealed under the skin. So the doctor asked the strong man, "Where has the pearl on your brow gone?"

In great alarm, the strong man replied to that king of doctors, "Is the pearl on my brow lost? Where is the pearl now? Has it disappeared into thin air?" And [so speaking, he began to] wail in anxiety and sorrow.

Then the good doctor consoled the strong man, "You need not be in such great sorrow! The pearl had entered your body when you were fighting, and is now dimly perceivable under the skin. Since you were in an angry and malignant mood when fighting, you did not notice even when the pearl had sunk into your body."

At that time, the strong man did not trust the doctor's words, [and he demanded,] "If the pearl is [hiding] under the skin, why didn't it come out with the bloody pus and [other] impurities? If it is inside the muscle, you would not be able to see it. Why do you try to deceive me?"
Then the doctor took a mirror and showed the strong man his face; and there, the pearl appeared distinctly in the mirror. When the strong man saw it, he was greatly surprised, and a thought of wonder arose in his mind.

Good sons! The same is true of all sentient beings. Since they do not cherish virtuous friends, they cannot perceive the Buddha-nature even though [all of them] possess it...

Good sons! Just as the good doctor showed the strong man the hard pearl [under the skin], in the same manner the tathāgata teaches that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Sentient beings, due to the superimposition of myriad defilements, fail to realize the Buddha-nature [which they have]. When all defilements come to an end, they will be able to discern it perfectly, just as the strong man recognized the precious pearl distinctly in the bright mirror.\(^{43}\)

Since the precious pearl was initially part of the constitution of the strong man, and was never lost, even though it had disappeared under the skin, the comparison of the Buddha-nature with the pearl seems to imply that the Buddha-nature is an inborn essence of sentient beings, even though sentient beings are ignorant of it at present due to the superimposition of myriad defilements. The simile calls forth in our mind the doctrine of the intrinsically pure consciousness found in the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun 天乘起信論 and taught by masters of the Tilun School 地論宗 and the She-lun School 地論宗 in the Northern and Southern Dynasties.\(^{44}\) According to that doctrine, there is immanent in every sentient being from the beginningless past a pure mind, or the tathāgatagarbha, and so everyone is destined for enlightenment—just as the strong man was born with a precious pearl between his eyebrows, which remained his property forever. However, due to the permeation of ignorance, sentient beings do not realize this nature of enlightenment which they originally possess—just as the strong man fought with another strong man in “an angry and malignant mood,” and did not notice that the precious pearl had sunk under his skin. Religious awakening, when interpreted in the framework of this theory, would mean the coming into awareness of the intrinsic pure essence inherent in all living beings, just as the strong man, when given a mirror by the king of doctors, came to perceive the precious pearl he had deemed lost. Indeed, there is no lack of indications in the MNS that the attainment of the Buddha-nature by all sentient beings in the future is understood as the rediscovery of something with which everyone is initially endowed, and attainment is considered possible also on this ground. Besides the simile of the precious pearl of the strong man, the comparisons in the MNS of the Buddha-nature with the gold mine and the diamond buried underground also appear to carry similar connotation.\(^{45}\) Repeatedly, we encounter in the sūtra the remark that all sentient beings are in actual possession of the Buddha-nature, but they fail to notice it because it is hidden by defilements.\(^{46}\) And, if the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun says that the pure mind of sentient beings is “eternal and
immutable,” but “being defiled by ignorance, a defiled [state of mind] comes into being.”\textsuperscript{47} we also find in the MNS the statement that the Buddha-nature is “not a dharma newly created, but is kept from view due to [the presence of] adventitious defilements.”\textsuperscript{48}

Nevertheless, if it is not difficult to cite passages which support the allying of the concept of Buddha-nature in the MNS with the idea of the intrinsically pure consciousness in the Ta-ch’ eng ch’i-hsin lun and in the teachings of the Ti-lun and She-lun masters, it is also easy to produce excerpts from the sūtra which prove the contrary. For instance, right after the last quotation, we find the sūtra comparing the Buddha-nature with flowers blossoming on the tusks of elephants:

All elephant tusks send forth flowers when clouds and thunders gather in the sky, and without [the quaking of] thunders, no flowers will appear, not even their images. The same is true of the Buddha-nature with respect to sentient beings (chung-sheng fo-hsing), which remains always out of view due to the superimposition of all forms of defilements. For this reason, I teach that sentient beings are without self. [However,] if they have the chance to listen to the profound scripture which is the MNS, they will perceive the Buddha-nature, just as flowers [will blossom] on elephant tusks [when roused by thunders].\textsuperscript{49}

In this passage, a parallel is drawn between the relation of the Buddha-nature to sentient beings, and the relation of flowers to the elephant tusks on which they blossom. Just as elephant tusks send out flowers when roused by thunders, sentient beings achieve the Buddha-nature when coming under the beneficial influence of the teaching of the MNS. However, unlike the precious pearl, which is originally the property of the strong man, flowers are clearly not part of the intrinsic made-up of elephant tusks. At most, we can only say that elephant tusks contain the potency to produce flowers. When this simile is applied to the interpretation of the relation of the Buddha-nature to sentient beings, the conclusion would be that the Buddha-nature does not pre-exist in sentient beings in the manner in which the pure mind pre-exists in all men, as expounded in the Ta-ch’ eng ch’i-hsin lun and the works of the Tilun and She-lun masters. The most we can infer from this comparison is that there is immanent in all sentient beings the potential to develop the nature of the Buddha when the right occasions arise. That the MNS conceives of the possession of the Buddha-nature by all sentient beings in the future as the actualization in the future of a latent faculty is strongly suggested by its frequent use of the seed metaphor to illustrate the Buddha-nature. Thus, the Buddha-nature is once referred to in the sūtra as “the seed of the middle-way, which is the most perfect enlightenment of all the Buddhas.”\textsuperscript{50} On another occasion, the Buddha is reported to have claimed that he had inside his body “the seed of the Buddha-nature.”\textsuperscript{51}

However, if we accept the above exposition as exemplifying the general
position of the MNS, we should be greatly puzzled when we come across later in
the sūtra the story of the king and the lute, the overt objective of which is to con-
trverse any pretension to base the idea of the future enlightenment of sentient
beings on a particular understanding of their metaphysical made-up:

Good sons! There was a king who on hearing the clear and melodious
sound of a lute was deeply attracted; and he enjoyed and longed for it
so much that he could not get it off his mind. So he asked [one of his]
ministers, “Where does such melodious sound come from?”

The minister replied, “Such melodious sound comes from a lute.”

Thereupon, the king ordered [the minister], “Bring me the sound.”

So, the minister brought a lute right away; and placing it before the
king, he announced, “Your Majesty! Here is the sound you want.”

Thereupon, the king addressed the lute, “Speak out! Speak out!”
However, the lute remained silent. [In a fit of impatience,] the king cut
the strings [of the lute], but still no sound was produced. And even
though the king [proceeded] to break the cover and frame [of the
lute] in order to get at the sound, he still could not obtain [what he
wanted]. Then the king [stared] angrily at the minister [and demanded],
“Why do you cheat me?”

The minister explained to the king, “Your majesty! This is not the
way to get the sound. The lute will only give out sound when all
[needed] conditions [are fulfilled] and when it is played in the proper
manner.”

[Good sons!] The same is true of the Buddha-nature with respect to
sentient beings. It abides nowhere, and is apprehended when one prac-
tices the opportune means. On apprehending it, one will attain the most
perfect enlightenment.52

This story draws a parallel between the sound produced by a lute and the
Buddha-nature. The lesson it attempts to convey is that just as it is foolish to try
to get at the clear and melodious sound of a lute by breaking down its cover and
frame, it is also futile to analyse sentient beings in order to arrive at a meta-
physical principle (be it in the form of a latent potentiality or in the form of
an intrinsically pure consciousness) with which their eventual attainment of
Buddhahood can be explained. The central theme of the story is summed up
in the concluding declaration that the Buddha-nature “abides nowhere,” i.e., is
not immanent in some form in sentient beings, just as sound is not immanent
in any part of the lute. In the same manner as sound is produced when all neces-
sary conditions are satisfied, the Buddha-nature will reveal itself to sentient
beings when they practice in earnest the way to enlightenment prescribed by the
tathāgata.
4. Why all sentient beings will eventually possess the Buddha-nature: the purpose of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature

Our cursory examination of a number of similes in the MNS relating to the problem of the Buddha-nature has disclosed at least three possible responses to the question of why all sentient beings will eventually possess the Buddha-nature:

a. Because all of them are endowed with an intrinsically pure essence, which they will become fully aware of when they have brought to an end the working of ignorance.

b. Because all of them embody the potency or “the seed” of Buddhahood, which will send out fruit, when all necessary conditions are satisfied.

c. Because the way to enlightenment is open to all to follow, and one can be certain of achieving Buddhahood if one follows this way.

Such metaphysical speculations as (a) and (b) are irrelevant to the actual fulfilment of the Buddha-nature in sentient beings in the future.

Our next task will be to determine which of the three replies is most representative of the overall standpoint of the MNS. While granting that all three positions have some textual support in the MNS, (c) should be given preference for the following reasons:

i. It is more akin to the general anti-metaphysical tone of the MNS. The MNS repeatedly enjoins its listeners to steer clear of metaphysical speculation and to concentrate their minds on the search for final deliverance. Thus, it is said that the Buddha-nature will not be perceived by bodhisattvas who harbour specific views regarding dharmas.\textsuperscript{53} The well-known indeterminate questions, such as “whether the world is eternal or non-eternal,” “whether the world is finite or infinite,” “whether the tathāgata exists or does not exist after death,” etc., appear several times in the MNS, and are dismissed for being conducive to attachment rather than to cessation of ills.\textsuperscript{54} Further, non-attachment to views is pictured in the MNS as the distinctive mark of the sage\textsuperscript{55} and the tathāgata\textsuperscript{56}, and is further equated with the “ultimate nirvāṇa,” “the supreme form of emptiness” and “the most perfect enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{57}

ii. In the MNS, we find statements openly refuting the idea that the Buddha-nature is an entity immanent in sentient beings.

Good sons! If it is said that the Buddha-nature abides in sentient beings [it is wrong]. Good sons! Dharmas which are eternal abide nowhere. If a dharma abides anywhere, it is not eternal [in nature].\textsuperscript{58}

Again, it is observed:

Good sons! If someone maintains that all sentient beings definitely possess the Buddha-nature which is eternal, blissful, personal and pure, [and further maintains that the Buddha-nature] is neither produced nor
born, but is not perceived by sentient beings due to the presence of
defilements, it should be understood that he has slandered the Buddha,
the Dharma and the saṅgha.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{iii.} Besides the story of the king and the lute, we find in the \textit{MNS} miscella-
neous remarks and similes indicating strong opposition to any attempt to
ground man’s future enlightenment on the existence in him at present of a
dormant principle. A well-known example is the comparison of the cream
obtained from milk and the Buddha-nature to be attained by sentient beings:

Good sons! Only the ignorant will speak as you have argued: that if
milk does not have the nature of cream, it cannot produce milk, just as
if banyan seeds do not have the nature of being five \textit{chang} \textsuperscript{60} from the
ground,\textsuperscript{60} it cannot produce concrete \textit{[trees]} five \textit{chang} tall. The wise
will never speak that way. Why? For \textit{[they understand that things]} do not
have \textit{[definite] nature}.

Good sons! If milk already has the nature of cream, it would not
need the support of various conditions \textit{[to produce cream]}.

Good sons! Milk will never turn into cream when mixed with water
even if we allow it to stand for one month, but if we add one drop of
the juice of the \textit{p’o-chiu} \textsuperscript{61} tree to it, \textit{cream} will be formed right
away. If milk already has \textit{[the nature of]} cream, why is it dependent on
\textit{[such] conditions} \textit{[as the juice of the \textit{p’o-chiu} tree to produce cream]}?\textsuperscript{61}
The same is true of the Buddha-nature with respect to sentient beings
\textit{(chang-sheng fo-hsing)}. The Buddha-nature is apprehended \textit{[by sentient
beings]} at the fulfillment of various conditions \textit{…} Since \textit{[sentient
beings]} attain the Buddha-nature dependent on various conditions, they
do not have any \textit{[definite] nature}; and since \textit{[sentient beings]} do not
have any \textit{[definite] nature}, they can attain the most perfect enlighten-
ment.\textsuperscript{62}

Seeing that milk, when properly processed, turns into cream, common sense
usually infers that there must reside in milk the nature of cream, which explains
its tendency to be transformed into cream. It is this common-sense attitude that
the \textit{MNS} is attempting to challenge, when it declares that “things do not have
definite nature,” and points out that if milk already possessed the nature of
cream, it would not require the support of external conditions before its transmu-
tation into cream could take place. When this argument is applied to the
Buddha-nature with respect to sentient beings, it speaks against the tendency to
infer from the eventual attainment of Buddhahood by sentient beings to the
existence in them at present of an ontological disposition to assume the
characteristics of the Buddha. Just as the transformation of milk into cream
should not be understood as the actualization of the nature of cream in milk, the
realization of the Buddha-nature in sentient beings also should not be construed
as the coming to fruition of an inborn faculty in sentient beings. And if the necessity of the agency of the juice of p’o-chiu trees is a proof against the presence of the nature of cream in milk, the existence of such prerequisites of the attainment of the Buddha-nature as the observance of monastic rules and the listening to the teaching of the MNS also militates against attributing to sentient beings an innate essence to become a Buddha.\textsuperscript{63}

This comparison of the Buddha-nature with cream is supplemented by a series of other similes, all of which convey the same lesson. What follow are some of the most prominent examples, the significance of which can easily be inferred following the line of reasoning outlined above:

Good sons! If there is [the nature of] cream in milk as you have maintained, why do milk-sellers ask for the price of milk only, and not the price of cream as well? Why do mare-sellers ask for the price of the mares only and not the price of colts [which will be born from the mares] also? A man of the world asks for the hand of a woman because he is without offspring; and once a woman gets pregnant, she would no longer be called a girl. Now, if it is said that a girl gets married with the nature of a child in her, that would be wrong. Why? For if she had the nature of a child, she would also have [the nature of] a grandchild; and if she had [the nature of] a grandchild, [her child and her grandchild] would be brothers. Why? Because both of them owe their existence to the same belly. Therefore, I assert that girls do not possess the nature of the children [to whom they will give birth]. If there is the nature of cream in milk, why can’t we detect in it simultaneously the five tastes [of milk, cream, curd, butter and ghee]? If there is the substance of a banyan tree five feet tall in the seed, why can’t we observe [in the seed] at once the miscellaneous forms of sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers and fruit? Good sons! Milk differs [from cream] in its colour, taste and products, and the same is true of ghee. How can we say that there is the nature of cream in milk? Good sons! Just as [it is absurd to maintain that] a person who will eat curd to-morrow gives out a bad smell today, equally [absurd is it to maintain that] there exists definitely the nature of cream in milk. Good sons! A person writes words with a brush, paper and ink, when there was initially no word on the paper. It is because there was at first [no word] on the paper that [we say that] words are formed dependent on conditions [such as brush and ink]. If there were originally words on the paper, why would they need [the presence of] various conditions to be formed? We mix the colours blue and yellow together to form the colour green. It should be understood that the two [colours blue and yellow] do not embody originally the nature of greenness. If [the nature of greenness] already exists [in the colours blue and yellow], why do we have to mix [the colours blue and yellow] together to form [the colour green]? Good sons! Sentient
beings are kept alive with food, but there is actually no life in food. If there is life in food initially, food would be life even before it was consumed. Good sons! All dharmas are without [definite] nature.\textsuperscript{64}

iv. The MNS seldom alludes to the inherent ontological structure of sentient beings when it gives its reason for believing in their eventual enlightenment. Rather, it often satisfies itself with the general observation that as sentient beings are different from non-sentient objects such as stones and walls, which are incapable of the thought of enlightenment and so can never assume the characteristics of a Buddha, the Buddha-nature is attributed to them by way of contrast. So the MNS asserts:

Good sons! I speak of “nirvāṇa” due to [the existence of conditions] contrary to nirvāṇa. I speak of the “tathāgata” due to [the existence of conditions] contrary to the tathāgata. I speak of the “Buddha-nature” due to [the existence of things] contrary to the Buddha-nature.

What are [the conditions] described as contrary to nirvāṇa? They include all dharmas which are defiled and conditioned. The destruction of these defiled and conditioned [dharmas] is known as “nirvāṇa.” As for [the conditions] contrary to the tathāgata, they range from [the state of] the icchantika up to [the state of] the pratyekabuddha. The cessation of [the state of] the icchantika up to [the state of] the pratyekabuddha is known as the “tathāgata.” As for [things] contrary to the Buddha-nature, they include walls, tiles, stones and all non-sentient objects. Apart from such non-sentient objects, we can apply the name of “Buddha-nature” [to the rest].\textsuperscript{65}

Thus, when it is said that sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, our attention is drawn to the fact that sentient beings, unlike non-sentient objects like walls and tiles, can win Buddhahood by means of proper religious practices. This way of thinking is perfectly illustrated by the familiar story of the blind men’s attempt to describe an elephant, found in the MNS.\textsuperscript{66} The blind men have no conception of the form of an entire elephant. Nevertheless, they have some ideas of the shapes of some of its parts; and if they recover their power of vision, they can surely report in full the appearance of a complete elephant. In the same way, sentient beings, due to their ignorance, are strangers to the Buddha-nature. That does not, however, preclude them from having some vague inkling of what the Buddha-nature is like at present, and from gaining a perfect conception of the Buddha-nature in the future, when their mind’s eye is opened. It is based on this belief that sentient beings, unlike walls, tiles and stones, “are not by nature resistant to the Buddha-nature”\textsuperscript{67} and so are forever susceptible to the influence of the salvific work of Buddhas and bodhisattvas (rather than on speculation of their ontological structure) that the MNS propounds the idea that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature.\textsuperscript{68}
v. The MNS stresses very much the practical implication of the teaching of the presence of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings. Thus, it explains why bodhisattvas preach the concept of the Buddha-nature:

Even though bodhisattvas perceive the evil deeds and errors of sentient beings, they never dwell on them. Why? They are afraid that this will lead to the arising of [further] defilements [in sentient beings]. With the arising of [further] defilements, sentient beings will fall into the evil modes of existence. 69

On the other hand, bodhisattvas, on perceiving the least sign of goodness in sentient beings, praise them. What do we mean by good? It is the so called Buddha-nature. Bodhisattvas laud the Buddha-nature so that sentient beings will develop the thought of the most perfect enlightenment. 70

Of similar import is the story of the Buddha’s encounter with five hundred brahmins, in which the Buddha declares explicitly that the Buddha-nature is in fact not the self, but is called the self only for the sake of instructing sentient beings:

Good sons! Once, I was bathing in the Nairāṇjanā River . . . At that time, five hundred brahmins also came to the riverside, and approaching where I was, they talked among themselves, “What has [Gautama] done to achieve the diamond body? If Gautama has not taught that life ends with death, we shall follow him and receive the rules of discipline [of the Buddhist order].”

Good sons! At that time, I, with my power to discern others’ thought, knew what the brahmins had in mind. So I spoke to these brahmins, “Why do you say that I teach that life ends with death?”

The brahmins replied, “Gautama, you have taught in various sūtras that all sentient beings are without self. If you preach [the idea of] no-self, how can you maintain that [you have not taught that] life ends with death? If there is no self, who keeps the rules of discipline, and who trangresses them?”

The Buddha answered, “Surely, I have not preached that all sentient beings are without self. [On the other hand,] I always proclaim that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. What else can the Buddha-nature be if not the self? Thus, I have never taught that life ends with death . . .”

When the brahmins heard that the Buddha-nature is the self, there immediately arose in their minds the thought of the most perfect enlightenment; and soon, they left the household life to practise the path of enlightenment. All birds of the air and animals of the land and the sea [who were present at this discourse] also resolved to attain the
supreme enlightenment, and with the arising of such thought, they soon abandoned their [animal] form.

Good sons! The Buddha-nature is in fact not the self. For the sake of [guiding] sentient beings, I described it as the self.71

When so viewed, the tenet of the eventual Buddhahood of all sentient beings is essentially a soteriological doctrine, the primary significance of which lies in its efficacy in developing "the thought of the most perfect enlightenment" in man. As the tenet is not the outcome of a systematic investigation of the nature of reality, any wholesale attempt to interpret the Buddha-nature taught in the MNS as entailing either (a) a pure essence or (b) a potency, should be looked upon with some suspicion.

Notes

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3 A very comprehensive study of the various Chinese translations of the MNS has been done by Fuse Kōgaku 布施浩岳 in his Nehanshū no kenkyū 涅槃宗 no 研究, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: 1973), vol. I. In this work, Mr. Fuse has made an elaborate comparative study of the three Chinese translations of the MNS, and has found only minor discrepancies in content. Also consult T'ang Yung-t'ung 湯用彤 Han Wei Liang-Chin Nanpei ch'ao fo-chiao shih 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史, 2nd ed. (Peking: 1963), pp. 601–610 and Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道 Nyorai-zō shisō no keisei 如來藏思想 no 形成 2nd ed. (Tokyo: 1974), pp. 128–131.


5 For an erudite study of the historical transformation of the concept of the Buddha-nature in India, China and Japan, refer to Tokiwa Daisō 坂本大造, Busshō no kenkyū 佛教性 no 研究 (Tokyo: 1944). Also consult Shina bukkyō no kenkyū 支那佛教 no 研究 vol. 3 (Tokyo: 1943), pp. 247–300, by the same author.

6 Discussion on this problem will lead to the problem of the textual development of the MNS. See Tokiwa Daisō, Busshō no kenkyū, pp. 36–66 and my paper "Do All Sentient Beings Possess the Buddha-nature?—The Problem of the Iechantika in the
Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra” (presented at the Fifth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 1982).

7 T, vol. 12, p. 511a, 11.16–18.
8 Ibid., p. 399a, 11.5–7.
9 Ibid., p. 487a, 11.15–18. For similar passages, refer to p. 472b & p. 553c.
10 Ibid., p. 414c, 1.29–p. 415a,1.2
11 Due to limited space, we will not enter into the difficult problem of the Sanskrit original of the term “Buddha-nature” and its synonyms. For information on this much discussed subject, see Mizutani Kōshō 水谷幸正 “Busshō ni tsuite 佛性にについて,” Indogaku bukkōgaku no kenkyū 印度學佛教學 no 研究 2p94,2 (1956), pp. 550–553, Okawa Ichirō 小川一濱, “Busshō to buddhatva 佛性と佛菩提,” Indogaku bukkōgaku no kenkyū 11,2 (1963), pp. 544–545 and Takasaki Jikidō, op. cit., part I, chap. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 524a, 1.28–b, 1.1
13 Ibid., p. 526a, 1.28–b, 1.2
14 Ibid., p. 463c, 11.21–22.
15 Ibid., p. 576a, 1.29–b, 1.1. Also refer to p. 395c.
16 Ibid., p. 513a, 11.3–5.
17 Ibid., p. 524c.
18 The ten powers are concrete manifestations of the omniscience of the Buddha, who has perfect knowledge of (1) what is right or wrong in every situation; (2) what is the karma of every deed, past, present and future; (3) all stages of samādhi and liberation; (4) the faculties and powers of all beings; (5) the desires and aspirations of all beings; (6) the nature and deeds of all beings; (7) the direction and consequence of all conduct; (8) the previous existences of all beings; (9) the birth, death and destinies of all beings; and (10) the destruction of the āsravas of all beings. Consult Mochizuki Shinkō, Bukkyō daijiten, 佛教大辞典 vol. 3 (Tokyo: 1933), pp. 2402–2404.
19 The four forms of fearlessness are (1) fearlessness arising from the attainment of the most perfect enlightenment, (2) fearlessness arising from the abandoning of all defilements, (3) fearlessness regarding all anti-Buddhist teachings, and (4) fearlessness arising from the cessation of all sufferings.
20 The Buddha remains undisturbed whether (1) all creatures believe in his teaching, or (2) do not believe in his teaching, or (3) some believe and others do not believe in his teaching.
22 For a detailed list of these marks and characteristics, refer to Leon Hurvitz, op. cit., pp. 353–361.
24 Ibid., p. 461b, 1.19.
26 Ibid., p. 526a, 11.2–6.
27 Ibid., p. 447c, 11.9–12.
28 Ibid., p. 524b, 1.25–c, 1.10.
29 The eight powers are: (1) the power of self division, (2) the power of self expansion, (3) the power of flying, (4) the power of manifesting in countless forms in one time and at one place, (5) the power of using one physical organ for the functions of all the others, (6) the power of achieving all things while remaining unattached, (7) the power of preaching for countless kalpas by expounding just one stanza, and (8) the power of being all-pervasive like space. See Ibid., p. 502c–p. 503a.
30 Ibid., p. 556c, 11.11–14.
31 The pārājakas refer to the most serious transgressions of monks and nuns, such as
sexual immorality, stealing, murder and false speaking, which entail expulsion from
the sangha.
33 Ibid., p. 405a, 11.19–20.
34 Ibid., p. 555b, 11.9–18.
36 Ibid., p. 572b, 11.18–23.
37 Ibid., p. 530c, 11.15–17.
38 Ibid., p. 530b, 11.26–29. Refer to n.62 below.
39 See n. 28 above.
40 Ibid., p. 524a, 11.5–8.
41 Ibid., p. 523c, 1.26–p. 524a, 1.5.
42 Ibid., p. 524a, 11.12–15.
43 Ibid., p. 408a, 1.9-b, 1.11.
44 The Ta-ch‘eng ch‘i-hsin lun (Awakening of Faith) is one of the most influential Bud-
dhist texts in China, and has been translated into English several times. The orthodox view
is that the work was composed by Aśvaghoṣa, and was translated into Chinese by
Paramārtha in 550, but both claims have been challenged in recent years. Mochizuki Shinkō
suggests in his Bukkyō kyōten naritatsu-shi ron that the work was the compila-
tion of a Ti-lun master living in the second half of the sixth century. See op. cit., pp.
532–641. For a list of titles of classic studies on the problem of the authen-
ticity of the Ta-ch‘eng ch‘i-hsin lun, consult Yoshito S. Hakeda, trans., The
119–122. The teachings of the Ti-lun and She-lun schools represented the initial
Chinese interpretation of Yogācāra Buddhism when the latter was first imported
into China in the sixth century. While the two schools disagreed with each other
on many points, both agreed that there exists in every sentient being an instrinsically
pure consciousness, which serves as the ontological basis of enlightenment as well
as the metaphysical ground of the phenomenal world. Even though both schools gradu-
ally died out in the second half of the seventh century, their concept of the pure
mind was passed on through the Ta-ch‘eng ch‘i-hsin lun as well as the teachings of
the Hua-yen school 華嚴宗 and certain sects of the Ch‘an school 禪宗, and con-
tinued to exert enormous influence on the development of the Buddha-nature doctrine
in China.
46 For example, see ibid., p. 462c, 11.1–2.
47 Yoshito S. Hakeda, trans., op. cit., p. 50.
49 Ibid., p. 411c, 11.1–5.
50 Ibid., p. 523c, 11.1–2.
51 Ibid., p. 410c, 11.13–14.
52 Ibid., p. 519b, 11.6–17.
53 Ibid., p. 521b.
54 Ibid., pp. 596c–597b.
55 Ibid., p. 413a, 1.17.
56 Ibid., p. 503a, 11.8–9.
57 Ibid., p. 464b.
58 Ibid., p. 555c, 11.27–28.
60 “Chang” is a Chinese unit of length equivalent to 3½ metres.
61 I still cannot find out the Sanskrit original of the name “p‘o-chiu.”
62 T, vol. 12, p. 519b, 1.22–c, 1.3.
The argument above would certainly appear inconclusive to those who are sympathetic with views (a) and (b), for they also believe that the fulfilment of the Buddha-nature in sentient beings in the future requires the satisfaction of various conditions, but that has not deterred them from investigating the metaphysical basis of sentient beings' eventual deliverance. However it may be, this analogy between cream and the Buddha-nature is significant for our present purpose, for it displays in the most emphatic fashion the aversion to speculation on the ontological source of enlightenment, characteristic of the MNS. Several pages later, this simile of milk and cream is again picked up for similar purpose:

The Buddha explained, "I have never maintained that there is [the nature of] cream in milk. When people say that there is [the nature of] cream in milk, it is because [they see that] cream is produced from milk."

[The Bodhisattva Simhanāḍa asked,] "World-honored one! Everything produced surely must have its occasions."

[The Buddha replied,] "Good sons! When there is milk, there is no cream, and there is also no curd, butter and ghee. . . . If there is [cream in milk], why don't we give milk the double name [milk-cream], just as we call a person skillful in [making] both [articles of gold and iron] gold- and black-smith? . . . Good sons! There are two types of causes: first, direct cause, and secondly, auxiliary cause. Direct cause is like milk which produces cream, and auxiliary cause is such as warmth and yeast [which are added to milk to form cream]. Since [cream] is formed from milk, we say that there is the nature of cream in milk."

The Bodhisattva Simhanāḍa asked, "World-honored one! If there is not the nature of cream in milk, there is also not the nature of cream in horns. Why isn't cream formed from horns?"

[The Buddha replied,] "Good sons! Cream is also formed from horns. Why? I have mentioned two auxiliary causes of cream: first, yeast, and secondly, warmth. Since horns are warm in nature, they can produce cream."

[The Bodhisattva] Simhanāḍa asked, "World-honored one! If horns can produce cream, why do people who want cream look for milk and not horns?"

The Buddha replied, "Good sons! That is why I teach that there are [two types of causes: ] direct cause and auxiliary cause.

(Ibid., pp. 530b, 1.20–c, 1.6)

In this interesting dialogue, the bodhisattva Simhanāḍa represents the position of the ordinary man, who sees the need of postulating "occasions" to account for the production of cream from milk. Thus, it is asked, if there is nothing in the composition of milk which is especially conducive to the formation of cream, why do people who want cream look for milk, and not some other things such as horns? The Buddha, on the other hand, consistently refuses to view the matter this way. He declares that the everyday assertion that there is cream in milk should not be taken literally as indicating the presence of the nature of cream in milk, but rather as a loose way of relating the fact that cream is always formed from milk. As for the question why people look for milk instead of horns when they need cream, the Buddha answered by classifying causes into two categories: direct and auxiliary. Milk is the first thing to come to our mind in case we need cream because it is the direct cause. Furthermore, horns, being warm in nature, can serve as the auxiliary cause of cream. So it is not totally wrong-headed if a person wanting cream asks for horns, because warmth, as the auxiliary cause, is as necessary to the formation of cream as milk. This falling back on the idea of two types of causes in the reply again will not satisfy questioners like the
bodhisattva Śimhanāda, for they can continue to beg for the principle behind the division of causes into direct and auxiliary, as well as the ontological ground for regarding certain causes as direct and other causes as auxiliary. It would take us too far afield to follow the intricate and often quite unpromising discussion which follows the above quotation, but if the two parties appear to be arguing at cross-purposes all the time, that alone suffices to demonstrate how strongly antipathetic the MNS is to the form of reductive reasoning exhibited in the interrogation of the bodhisattva Śimhanāda.

67 The story of the blind man and the elephant are preceded by the following remarks:

   Good sons! As sentient beings are not [by nature] resistant to the Buddha-nature, we declare that they have [the Buddha-nature]. As sentient beings are heading straight for [the Buddha-nature], as they will some day possess [the Buddha-nature], as they will definitely attain [the Buddha-nature], and as they will definitely perceive [the Buddha-nature], we thereby say that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature.

   (*Ibid.*, p. 556a, 11.6–8).

68 Of course, to those who are accustomed to look for an explanation for everything, it would seem necessary to go on to inquire for the metaphysical basis of this peculiar propensity of the sentient to participate in the essence of the Buddha, which is not shared by the non-sentient. Furthermore, they would question the MNS for repeating the obvious, for is it not common knowledge that only beings with life and consciousness can be taught and so only they can apprehend the Buddha-nature? We have seen that the MNS has inherited the anti-metaphysical attitude inherent in the doctrine of the middle way and the discussions on the indeterminate questions in early Buddhism, and so tends to view all searches for underlying ontological principles with suspicion. As for the criticism of repeating the obvious, the reply of the MNS would be that what is obvious may still be of great significance, especially in the realm of practical religious life. See (v) below.

69 Of the five modes of existence in the realm of samsāra, those of animals, hungry ghosts and beings in hell are considered evil.

70 *T*, vol. 12, p. 517c, 1.29–p. 518a, 1.4.
Le présent article est la version revue et augmentée d'une conférence prononcée devant le groupe vaudois de la Société romande de philosophie, à Lausanne, le 23 janvier et le 6 mars 1970. Il ne renferme pas de vues originales; il est tributaire, presque à chaque ligne, des travaux de M. Erich Frauwaller. Les travaux de M. Etienne Lamotte ont été aussi largement mis à contribution, en particulier pour l'étude des antécédents de l'école idéaliste au sein du bouddhisme. Que ces deux grands maîtres des études bouddhiques veuillent bien accepter l'hommage qui leur est dû.

Du IIIe au VIIe siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda (doctrine de la connaissance). Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du IIIe siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au Vᵉ siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le présent exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique.

Les catégories qui gouvernent la pensée philosophique en Occident s'appliquent mal, en général, à la pensée indienne. Pourtant on peut admettre, sans trop forcer les choses, que le Vijñānavāda est un idéalisme. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens de ce dernier terme, qui en a beaucoup. Il s'agit de l'idéalisme entendu comme «la tendance philosophique qui consiste à ramener toute existence à la pensée»1. Nous verrons que le Vijñānavāda peut être considéré comme tributaire de cette tendance.
1. Antécédents et sources scripturaires

Le bouddhisme est d'essence plus pratique que philosophique; mais il comporte la possibilité d'attitudes philosophiques très diverses, dont l'idéalisme. Celui-ci a été présent en germe dès les débuts, mais il ne s'est épanoui en un système cohérent que beaucoup plus tard. Aussi conviendra-t-il, avant de retracer l'histoire du Vījñānavāda, d'examiner quels ont pu être ses antécédents au sein du bouddhisme.

Le bouddhisme est avant tout une doctrine du salut ou de la délivrance; il veut assurer à l'homme une certaine autonomie à l'égard du monde et de lui-même. Pour atteindre ce but, il utilise certaines techniques d'accent nettement psychologique, qui visent à contrôler les processus mentaux en méditant sur eux. Dès le début, le bouddhisme attribue une importance considérable aux processus mentaux: ce sont eux qui nous maintiennent dans une situation de dépendance, ou qui, au contraire, lorsqu'ils sont convenablement maîtrisés et orientés, nous assurent la liberté.

Plus encore que cet accent psychologique général, la pratique de la méditation, qui est la discipline essentielle du bouddhisme, est susceptible de déboucher sur un idéalisme philosophique. La méditation a en effet deux résultats: elle exténue l'objet, qui finit par disparaître du champ de conscience; elle désencombre ce dernier, et assure à la conscience une limpidité, une simplicité, une homogénéité, une universalité, une souveraineté telles qu'elle peut fort bien passer pour l'ordre supérieur de la réalité.

Dans les sūtra² anciens, dont diverses recensions nous sont parvenues en pâli, en sanscrit fragmentairement, et dans des traductions chinoises, le vījñāna, cette «connaissance» ou «conscience» en quoi le Vījñānavāda verra la nature profonde de la réalité, est une des données ou un des éléments du réel parmi d'autres. Mais dès cette époque, il est affecté d'une importance particulière. C'est ainsi que, parmi les divers facteurs de la production en consécution (prātiya-samutpāda), dont la formule explique le devenir du complexe psychophysique tout au long de la transmigration, vījñāna joue un rôle important: il fonde la vie psychologique de l'individu et même, dans une certaine mesure, son être physique. Dans le prātiya-samutpāda classique, à douze termes, vījñāna occupe une place intermédiaire, la troisième ou la dixième, suivant le sens où l'on prend la formule. Mais le Mahā-nidāna-sutta (Texte des grandes occasions) donne une formule à neuf termes³ qui paraît bien représenter un état plus ancien que celle des douze termes. Le vījñāna y tient la place initiale (ou finale). Il s'y trouve en relation réciproque de cause à effet avec le «nom-et-forme» (nāmarūpa), c'est-à-dire avec les composants psychologiques et physiques de l'être humain. Il y a ainsi un cercle vicieux entre l'être humain essentiellement composite, et la conscience: celle-ci donne à l'être humain une apparence d'unité; toute l'expérience de cet être s'organise dès lors en fonction de cette fausse unité, et ses contenus psychologiques ne cesseront d'alimenter le vījñāna et par suite le sentiment d'unité.
D’autres textes canoniques insistent sur l’importance du citta «pensée», donnée toute voisine du vijñāna. Pratiquement, citta et vijñāna sont synonymes; ils désignent le même objet. La synonymie s’étend à un troisième terme, manas, qui désigne exactement l’«organe mental», et que l’on rend assez souvent par l’équivalent imprécis mais commode d’«esprit». Ainsi constituée, l’identité citta = manas = vijñāna deviendra une donnée essentielle de la scolastique bouddhique⁴.

Or, une strophe dont on possède des recensions pâliennes, sanscrites et chinoises nous assure que: «Le monde est conduit par la pensée, est manœuvré par la pensée: tout obéit à cette seule donnée, la pensée⁵.» Telle que nous la trouvons dans les textes anciens, cette parole signifie peut-être seulement que les facteurs psychologiques sont déterminants dans la vie humaine: en effet, le terme traduit par «monde» (loka) peut très bien signifier aussi «les gens». Il n’y aurait alors là pas beaucoup plus qu’une évidence, d’ailleurs non négligeable et bien digne d’être soulignée par les bouddhistes qui ont toujours beaucoup insisté sur l’importance de la maîtrise des états psychologiques pour parvenir à la libération. Mais le Vijnānavāda ne manquera pas d’y voir une justification de sa doctrine que la pensée est véritablement au principe de toute existence.

Un autre passage souligne l’importance de la pensée dans le processus de souillure et de purification des êtres: «Par la souillure de la pensée, les êtres sont souillés; par la purification de la pensée, ils sont purifiés⁶.» Or, ce processus est un point essentiel du bouddhisme; il remonte aux quatre vérités saintes promulguées par le Buddha dans le sermon de Bénarès, dont les deux premières se rapportent à la souillure et les deux dernières à la purification. Tout le Vijnānavāda classique, comme nous le verrons par la suite, se bâtira sur ce diptyque.

Les deux premières strophes du Dhammapada⁷ réunissent en quelque sorte les deux thèmes: celui de la prééminence de la pensée (ou de l’esprit), et celui de la souillure et de la purification. On sait l’importance de ce texte dans le bouddhisme populaire, son ancienneté, sa large diffusion. On voit donc que l’idée d’une certaine prééminence de la pensée par rapport aux autres données du réel se rencontre aussi bien dans le bouddhisme populaire que dans le bouddhisme savant.

Un passage de l’Aṅguttara Nikāya reprend l’idée de la souillure et de la purification, en la liant à un thème qui prendra de grands développements dans le Vijnānavāda ancien, celui de la luminosité de la pensée: «Lumineuse est cette pensée, mais parfois elle est souillée par les passions secondaires adventices; parfois elle est libérée des passions secondaires adventices⁸.» Cette thèse sera déjà élaborée par certaines écoles du bouddhisme ancien⁹, qui diront que la pensée est originellement et naturellement lumineuse, mais qu’elle peut être souillée par les passions, ou libérée des passions. Ces dernières, n’étant pas nature originelle de la pensée, sont qualifiées d’«adventices» (āgantuka).

Les passages que nous venons de citer appartiennent à la tradition ancienne du bouddhisme. Mais, comme on le sait, dès le début de l’ère chrétienne environ, apparaît dans le bouddhisme une tendance nouvelle, qui se donnera à

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elle-même le nom de Grand Véhicule ou Grand moyen de progression (Mahāyāna), parce qu'elle fait parvenir à la libération un beaucoup plus grand nombre d'êtres que le bouddhisme dans sa pratique ancienne, à laquelle les tenants du Mahāyāna appliqueront parfois l'épithète de Hinayāna, Moyen de progression restreint ou limité. Les origines du Grand Véhicule sont obscures et sujettes à controverse; elles paraissent en tout cas avoir comporté une longue gestation dans la tradition ancienne. Il suffira pour notre propos de relever deux caractères: tout d'abord, que le Grand Véhicule a donné l'essor à des spéculations philosophiques d'une ampleur très remarquable, alors que le bouddhisme ancien n'avait donné lieu qu'à une scolastique, détaillée, ingénieuse et subtile certes, mais qui, en dernière analyse, est avant tout débrouillard et mise en ordre, d'ailleurs indispensables, des données canoniques anciennes. Ensuite, que le bouddhisme du Grand Véhicule, avant l'apparition des systèmes, a commencé par s'exprimer dans toute une littérature de sūtra, donc de textes consignant des discours attribués au Buddha lui-même. Ces Mahāyāna-sūtra sont en fait apocryphes, puisqu'ils ne paraissent guère remonter qu'au 1er siècle avant Jésus-Christ, pour les plus anciens d'entre eux; néanmoins tous les adeptes du Grand Véhicule, et singulièrement les docteurs qui élaboreront les deux grands systèmes, Madhyamika et Vijñānavāda, les tiendront pour authentiques et se référeront à leur autorité. Littérature énorme en volume, aussi peu «littéraire» que possible, mais qui, par ses répétitions obsédantes, sa puissance visionnaire, sa folie des grands nombres, son détachement presque constant à l'égard de la vie ordinaire, son irréalisme délibéré, qui visent à renforcer chez les adeptes le pouvoir des images cultivées en méditation, constitue une des productions les plus singulières des grandes civilisations issues de l'âge néolithique.

Dans le foisonnement des Mahāyāna-sūtra s'esquisse les spéculations les plus diverses. Une des plus marquantes est la spéculaion sur la nature de la réalité profonde. Toute réflexion de cette sorte avait été récusée par le Buddha. Mais, les siècles s'ajoutant aux siècles, les bouddhistes n'ont pu s'empêcher de se demander quelle était la nature du nirvāna, de l'«extinction», ce statut existentiel mystérieux auquel parvient l'être qui s'est affranchi de la transmigration; on n'en peut rien dire en termes de transmigration, mais il apparaît, à tout le moins, comme un être plus plein que l'être imparfait et douloureux qui est imparti à cette dernière, et fera bientôt figure d'absolu en face du relatif de ce monde. On s'est aussi demandé ce que pouvait être la nature du Buddha, homme à n'en pas douter, mais aussi porteur d'une vérité transcendante qu'il a actualisée par son Eveil (bodhi) et en laquelle il s'est immergé lors de son extinction (nirvāna).

Les plus anciens Mahāyāna-sūtra ne comportent guère d'éléments idéalistes; ce qui domine, en particulier dans les textes dits de «Perfection de la Sagesse» (Prajñā-pāramitā), c'est une conception quasi-nihilistique de l'absolu, qui sera élaborée et systématisée plus tard par l'école Madhyamika. Pourtant, ces textes contiennent des allusions au thème de la pensée naturellement lumineuse, déjà présent, comme nous l'avons vu, dans les écritures anciennes, et qui se présentera fréquemment dans les Mahāyāna-sūtra de toute époque. Cette idée d'une
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pensée restituée à sa vraie nature, et transcendant jusqu'à un certain point le donné empirique, sera reprise par certains maîtres de l'école idéaliste.

« La nature de la pensée est lumineuse », nous dit la Perfection de la Sagesse en 8000 stances\(^\text{13}\), qui est la plus ancienne recension des textes de Prajñā-pāramitā qui nous soit parvenue\(^\text{14}\). Une autre recension en 25000 stances explique que la luminosité de la pensée consiste en ce qu'elle « n'est pas associée avec les passions, sansétrenon plus dissociée d'elles »\(^\text{15}\). De telles formules contradictoires apparaissent fréquemment dans les Prajñā-pāramitā et dans les ouvrages Madhyamika; elles s'y réfèrent toujours au rapport sui generis qui existe entre la vérité empirique et la vérité absolue. Dans le cas particulier, la pensée (citta) peut être associée, en vérité relative, avec les passions qui, rappelons-le, sont « adventices » (āgantuka), c'est-à-dire existent exclusivement sur le plan du relatif. Mais, en vérité absolue, l'autonomie de la pensée, sa limpitude, sa luminosité, sont parfaites. On retrouvera dans le Vījñānavāda ce double point de vue, appliqué au vijñāna.

La pensée lumineuse apparaît aussi dans une stance du Samādhīraja-sūtra: « Mais si une synthèse intellectuelle (samjñā) subtile fonctionne au sein du composé psycho-physique (nāma-rūpa) de quelqu'un, la pensée (citta), perdant son avidité à l'endroit du composé psychophysique, devient lumineuse »\(^\text{16}\). Le rapport que cette stance établit entre citta et nāma-rūpa nous ramène très près du cercle vicieux nāma-rūpa ↔ vijñāna dans la formule archaïque du praṇītva-samutpāda que donne le Mahā-nidāna-suttaṇta. Comme le relève M. Constantin Regamey, la relation entre samjñā et nāma-rūpa d'une part, citta de l'autre, est si étroite que cette strophe établit déjà une citta-mātratā, un « rien-que-pensée », un idéalisme\(^\text{17}\). Mais elle montre aussi comment le citta se détache de la contingence et se restaure dans sa luminoise pureté. L'agent de ce détachement est une « synthèse intellectuelle » (samjñā) « subtile », c'est-à-dire dégagée d'éléments passionnels. D'habitude, samjñā est plutôt une fonction organisatrice de l'expérience quotidienne en ce qu'elle a d'illusoire. Ici, le pouvoir de synthèse qu'elle représente est orienté vers la découverte de la réalité profonde. Le changement d'orientation s'accomplit par exténuation des éléments passionnels qui faussent le plus souvent cette synthèse en la rapportant au moi illusoire. Les passions sont essentiellement rāga, dveṣa, moha, l'attirance, l'aversion et l'erreur; mais alors qu'elles apparaissent en général comme trois données distinctes, ce passage du Samādhīraja, ou à tout le moins son commentaire, les assimile à samjñā: elles sont « les trois mauvaises samjñā »\(^\text{18}\); elles orientent dans le mauvais sens cette faculté de synthèse qu'est samjñā. L'« avidité » de la pensée à l'endroit du composé psycho-physique, sa tendance à l'organiser en un moi illusoire, ou, si l'on veut, sa tendance à l' « appropriation » (upādāna), qui était alimentée par les passions, disparaît lorsque la samjñā devient « subtile » et cesse de se confondre avec elles.

Le Daśabhūmika-sūtra mentionne de même la luminosité de la pensée\(^\text{19}\). Mais surtout, on y trouve la proposition suivante: « Le triple monde n'est que pensée »\(^\text{20}\) (c'est-à-dire: l'ensemble du monde phénoménal, dans sa nature réelle, n'est que pensée). On ne saurait être plus catégorique, et c'est à bon droit que les
Vijñānavādin se prévaudront de ce logion. Tout comme les Prajñā-pāramitā citées plus haut et le Samādhirāja, le Daśa-bhūmika est un texte ancien (on peut le dater du 1er siècle de notre ère); il fait autorité chez les Mādhyaṃika, que cette proposition n’a pas manqué d’embarrasser; Candrakīrti cherche à l’interpréter comme une négation de l’existence d’un agent.

Les autorités canoniques du Vijñānavāda resteraient bien fragiles si elles se limitaient à ces quelques passages. Mais en fait, outre les tendances générales relevées au début du présent article, l’école idéaliste se fonde avant tout sur deux ou trois sūtra qui, d’une manière plus ou moins systématique, exposent à la vérité un Vijñānavāda avant la lettre.

Le plus ancien de ces textes, et l’un des plus importants, est le Saṃdhī-nirmocana-sūtra. L’original sanscrit est perdu, sauf des citations, mais nous disposons d’une traduction tibétaine, de deux traductions chinoises complètes, et de trois traductions chinoises partielles. On rend assez souvent le titre par «Texte du déliement des nœuds», mais cette traduction est peu rigoureuse, car saṃdhī signifie «jointure» ou «articulation», mais non pas «nœud». Le titre se réfère plutôt à une signification figurée du mot saṃdhī, celle d’«intention cachée», qui est en rapport étroit avec l’idée que les bouddhistes mahāyānistes se font de la relation entre les Mahāyāna-sūtra et la tradition antérieure. Selon eux, en effet, l’enseignement du Buddha, tel que l’ont recueilli les textes anciens, est partagé avec des intentions cachées; il est neyārtha, «de sens à interpréter», et cette interprétation est donnée dans les Mahāyāna-sūtra, qui, eux, sont «de sens explicite» (niśāliha), soit qu’ils enseignent la vacuité, soit qu’ils enseignent l’existence de la pensée-sans-plus (cittamātra) ou de la connaissance sans-plus (vijñāna-mātra). Toutefois, pour l’école idéaliste, la doctrine de la vacuité fait encore partie du «sens à interpréter», tandis que, pour les Mādhyaṃika, partisans de la vacuité, l’idéalisme est une hérésie, une doctrine fausse. L’une et l’autre école revendique, ainsi le «sens explicite», chacune pour son compte.

Le Saṃdhī-nirmocana-sūtra est donc le «Texte qui explique les intentions cachées»; texte capital, pour plus d’une raison. Tout d’abord, il est un des quelques Mahāyāna-sūtra qui, tels le Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, l’Upāli-pariprcchā, réunissent des qualités qui font en général cruellement défaut à ce genre de textes: proportions raisonnables, ni trop vastes ni trop restreintes; composition claire et rigoureuse; idées distinctes, articulées, exprimées avec pertinence et sans trop de répétitions. Ensuite, il marque une transition des Prajñā-pāramitā au Vijñānavāda. Ses quatre premiers chapitres, en effet, ne sont ni plus ni moins qu’une Prajñā-pāramitā; en son milieu, il expose les thèses principales du Vijñānavāda, avec une clarté et une ordonnance qui font de cet exposé une véritable epitome de l’idéalisme bouddhique; dans ses derniers chapitres, il développe une scolastique vijñānavādin, compliquée mais importante, énumérant de nombreuses catégories et groupes de catégories, selon le génie de la scolastique orientale en général et bouddhique en particulier. Enfin, sa date en fait le premier texte idéaliste authentique. «Il semble» en effet «que le Saṃ dhinirmocana s’est constitué par pièces et morceaux au cours du second siècle, et
qu’il a été fixé dans son état actuel au début du troisième. On peut même s’étonner qu’un idéalisme aussi conscient, aussi conséquent, aussi cohérent, ait pu s’exprimer avec autant de vigueur et de netteté à une date aussi ancienne. Il est vrai que, même dans sa partie plus proprement philosophique, le texte ne fait guère plus que de poser les thèses maîtresses de l’idéalisme, sans les élaborer ni les justifier. Mais c’est cette sobriété même qui m’a engagé à choisir certains passages du *Samādhi-nirmocana* pour l’une des bases du présent exposé. Car, pour le public de langue française, ce texte présente un dernier avantage qui n’est pas le moindre : il a été édité, dans sa version tibétaine, et traduit en un français élégant, limpide et précis, par M. E. Lamotte, dès 1935. Le stock a brûlé pendant la guerre, ce qui fait de ce précieux volume une rareté bibliographique qui méritait une réédition.

L’autre autorité majeure de l’école idéaliste, le *Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, «Texte de la descente à Ceylan», est l’antithèse même du *Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra*. Cet ouvrage, qui doit son titre à une affabulation sur laquelle je n’ai pas à m’étendre ici, est un des plus confus parmi les Mahāyāna-sūtra, et ce n’est pas peu dire. Il n’est pas moins un des plus importants, sans doute plus connu et plus célèbre que le *Samādhi-nirmocana*. L’original sanscrit est conservé ; il y a une traduction tibétaine et trois traductions chinoises. La compilation du texte paraît s’étendre sur deux siècles au moins, le IIIe et le IVe; les parties les plus anciennes seraient à peu près contemporaines du *Samādhi-nirmocana*. Les thèses idéalistes y reviennent constamment, mais dans le plus grand désordre.

On peut encore mentionner deux sūtra souvent cités par l’école idéaliste : le *Śrīmālā-devī-simhanāda-sūtra* «Texte du rassasiege du lion de la reine Śrīmālā», et le *Ghanavyūha-sūtra* «Texte de l’ornementation secrète». Ils sont moins bien connus en Occident que le *Samādhi-nirmocana* et le *Lāṅkāvatāra*, parce qu’ils n’ont pas encore été traduits en langue occidentale.

Le *Śrīmālā-devī-simhanāda-sūtra* est au moins contemporain du *Lāṅkāvatāra*, qui le cite. C’est un texte bref, qui a pour protagoniste la reine Śrīmālā «Guirlande de majesté», fille du roi Prasenajit, contemporain du Bouddha, et épouse du roi d’Ayodhyā, la vieille capitale des rois indiens de race solaire, citadelle du brahmanisme. Devenue fervente bouddhiste, la reine, bien que laïque et femme, exposa la Loi avec autant d’autorité qu’un Bouddha. Dans cette affabulation s’exprime la tendance du Mahāyāna à revaloriser les laïcs vis-à-vis des moines, et le sexe féminin en opposition avec la misogynie traditionnelle du bouddhisme; cette dernière tendance se fait jour plus souvent sur le plan mythique que sur le plan humain: les interventions de déesses sont nombreuses dans les Mahāyāna-sūtra, alors que des exemples comme celui du *Śrīmālā-devī-simhanāda-sūtra* restent rares.

Outre des citations de l’original sanscrit, le *Śrīmālā-devī-simhanāda-sūtra* est conservé en une version tibétaine et deux versions chinoises. Il mêle des doctrines purement idéalistes comme celle de la connaissance-réceptacle (ālaya-viśnā) aux doctrines du Véhicule unique (eka-yāna) et de l’Embryon de Tathāgata (Tathāgata-garbha)
Quant au Ghana-vyūha, conservé également en une traduction tibé-taïne et deux traductions chinoises, c'est un texte tardif et syncrétique, riche d'éléments divers: théorie de la connaissance-réceptacle, théorie de l'Embryon de Tathāgata; doctrines de Terre pure: le «Ghana-vyūha» qui donne son nom à l'ouvrage est une Terre pure; éléments tantriques: cette Terre pure est régie par le Bouddha Vairocana; l'interlocuteur du Bouddha est le Bodhisattva Vajragarbha; la deuxième traduction chinoise est due au grand maître du tantrisme en Chine, Amoghavajra.  

2. Esquisse historique

Après l'exposé des sources scripturaires du Vijñānavāda, j'aborde maintenant l'histoire du système à proprement parler. Le travail de l'historien, sur l'Inde ancienne, est toujours difficile et décevant. Seules les époques où l'Inde a été en contact avec des civilisations étrangères, grecque ou chinoise en particulier, fournissent des repères sûrs; pour tout le reste, on en est réduit à des résultats plus ou moins conjecturaux. L'histoire du Vijñānavāda n'échappe pas à cette incertitude. Les seules dates assurées sont données par les traductions chinoises de textes indiens, et par quelques relations qui nous sont parvenues de voyages de pèlerins chinois en Inde. Le plus ancien de ces pèlerins, Fa-hien, visita l'Inde de 399 à 413, donc peu après une période où, selon la chronologie la plus communément admise, l'école idéaliste avait brillé d'un vif éclat, avec les deux maîtres Asaṅga et Vasubandhu. Mais Fa-hien, moine de bonne culture, était par ailleurs plus curieux de traditions et de légendes, ou de règles disciplinaires, que de subtiles exégèses doctrinales. Il ne paraît pas avoir eu de contact avec l'école d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu. Deux siècles et demi plus tard, l'illustre Hsiian-tsang, lors de son voyage en Inde, de 627 ou 629 à 645, visita les universités de Valabhi et de Nālandā et fréquenta les érudits de l'époque; mais, pour l'école idéaliste à proprement parler, l'ère des grands docteurs était déjà close, et leurs héritiers ne purent vraisemblablement fournir au pèlerin chinois qu'une chronologie très approximative.

Les travaux modernes, en particulier ceux de M. Frawallner, ont cependant établi une chronologie que je suivrai dans le présent exposé, sans oublier qu'elle demeure pour une bonne part conjecturale, et que l'histoire du Vijñānavāda pose encore quelques problèmes difficiles, et qui sont loin d'être résolus: problèmes de Maitreya, de Vasubandhu et, à un moindre degré, problème de l'auteur du Ratna-gotra-vibhāga.

La série des ouvrages philosophiques du Vijñānavāda s'ouvre par une somme de dimensions énormes, connue sous plusieurs titres très voisins les uns des autres, et dont le plus communément retenu est Yogācāra-bhūmi-sāstra «Traité des terres de la pratique du yoga»). Ce titre requiert une exégèse qui sera utile à notre propos. En effet, Yogācāra, la pratique du yoga, signifie aussi «celui qui pratique le yoga». Dans ce dernier sens, il s'applique aux tenants de l'école idéaliste: aussi et plus souvent que Vijñānavādin, on dit Yogācāra. Cette
dernière désignation est même probablement plus ancienne: elle doit remonter à l’époque où Yogacāra désignait une école de contemplatifs adonnés avant tout à la pratique du yoga. Ce n’est que par la suite, lorsque l’école éprouvait le besoin de faire la théorie de ses pratiques, qu’elle devint un Vijñānāvāda, une doctrine de la connaissance ou de la conscience, et c’est la réflexion sur la nature des états obtenus par le yoga qui l’amena à systématiser ce primat de la conscience qui, nous l’avons vu, était au moins virtuellement présent dans le bouddhisme dès les origines. La discipline du yoga, dans l’Inde, est universelle; qu’une désignation aussi générale se soit appliquée à une école en particulier, montre bien l’importance que cette école attacha aux pratiques en question. Aussi, lorsqu’on étudie le Vijñānāvāda, il convient de garder constamment présent à l’esprit que ses thèses idéalistes s’étudient et se comprennent le mieux lorsqu’on se place dans la perspective de la pratique du yoga, qu’elles sont tributaires d’une dynamique psychique. Je rappelle ici comment il est bon d’interpréter ce terme yoga que l’on s’abstient trop souvent de traduire, ce qui l’entoure d’une aura d’imprécision et d’incertitude. Plutôt que d’une «jonction» de l’homme et du divin ou de l’absolu, il s’agit d’un «ajustement intérieur», surtout dans le bouddhisme qui ne reconnait pas de transcendance positive; le terme yoga dérive de la racine YUJ-, qui a pour sens primitif «atteler», «mettre sous le joug», et qui peut signifier non seulement «joindre», mais aussi, très souvent, au passif, «être ajusté», en anglais «to fit».

Pour en revenir au Yogacāra-bhūmi-sāstra, les bhūmi «terres» sont les étapes de développement spirituel par où passe celui qui pratique le yoga, et dont l’ouvrage décrit la carrière avec un luxe de détails extra-ordinaire. L’idéalisme n’y est point encore très apparent, sinon que le Śāstra cite dans son entier le Samdi-nirmocana-sūtra. Le Yogacāra-bhūmi-sāstra était traditionnellement attribué à Asanga, mais on incline maintenant à penser qu’il s’agit d’une compilation de l’école Yogacāra à ses débuts; les parties les plus anciennes pourraient être contemporaines du Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra, ou même légèrement antérieures, et donc dater de la fin du IIe ou le début du IIIe siècle; les plus récentes ne sont pas postérieures au IVe siècle.

Au Yogacāra-bhūmi-sāstra, œuvre collective, succèdent des ouvrages individualisés, auxquels on peut attribuer un auteur. La première œuvre philosophique individuelle à tendance idéaliste est celle de Sāramati, figure longtemps indécise, mais que des travaux surtout japonais ont contribué à fixer d’une manière plus précise35. Il parait avoir «fleuri» vers le milieu du IIIe siècle. Son ouvrage principal porte le titre de Ratnagotra-vibhāga-mahāvīna-uttara-tantra «La doctrine supérieure» du Grand Véhicule, qui est la discrimination des précieuses familles spirituelles». C’est en fait un titre double: Uttara-tantra fut d’abord le plus généralement adopté par l’érudition moderne, mais c’est plutôt un sous-titre, à valeur plus ou moins générique, et on lui préfère maintenant Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, qui est véritablement le titre propre de l’ouvrage en question37. Comme la plupart des traités philosophiques indiens, il se présente sous la forme de vers didactiques (kārikā) constituant l’«ouvrage
fondamental» (mūla, littéralement la «racine») et accompagnés d’une exégèse (vyākhya)38.

Dans la tradition bouddhique, le titre générique de Tantra désigne le plus souvent une catégorie de textes bien déterminée, qui décrivent principalement des rites magiques, et qui font autorité dans la dernière venue des formes du bouddhisme, qui a des antécédents anciens, mais se manifeste et se développe surtout à partir du VIIe siècle, et qui porte justement, entre autres noms, celui de «bouddhisme tantrique». L’Uttara-tantra ou Raina-gotra-vibhāga de Sāramati n’a rien à voir avec cette tradition. Il se rapproche davantage de l’idéalisme du Śaṅdhī-nirmocana-sūtra, d’Asaṅga, de Vasubandhu et de Hiuans-tsang; mais il représente en fait une école indépendante39. Sāramati professe un monisme teinté d’idéalisme, où la pensée immaculée et lumineuse (amaḷaṃ prabhāṣvarāṃ cittam) apparaît comme une entité suprême, affectée d’un caractère positif accentué, qui la rapproche de l’âme universelle du Vedānta; nous sommes loin, ici, du quasi-nihilisme des Prajñā-pāramitā40 et du Mādhyamika, bien qu’on ait parfois rattaché le Ratna-gotra-vibhāga à cette dernière école41. On retrouve chez Sāramati la doctrine des passions adventices qui affectent la pensée; et l’un au moins des synonymes par lesquels il désigne la nature véritable des choses sera repris et conservé par l’idéalisme classique, bien qu’il n’ait pas véritablement un import idéaliste; il se trouve d’ailleurs déjà, et en belle position, dans le Śaṅdhī-nirmocana-sūtra; il s’agit du terme tathātā, «nature de ce qui est ainsi», «siccéité», «ainsitê».

Mais la principale doctrine du Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, celle qui lui appartient en propre, est la théorie du tathāgata-garbha «embryon de Tathāgata», selon laquelle la nature de Buddha est présente à l’état virtuel chez tous les êtres animés: tout être porte en lui la possibilité, qui s’actualisera tôt ou tard, de parvenir à l’Eveil (bodhi). Sāramati a exercé une influence notable sur l’école idéaliste à ses débuts, notamment sur Maitreya, mais plutôt par l’idée de la luminosité de la pensée que par la doctrine de l’Embryon de Tathāgata, qui paraît avoir connu en Inde, pendant plusieurs siècles, une sorte d’éclipse42, et qui, au demeurant, n’est pas plus idéaliste, en elle-même, que la notion de tathātā.

La tradition indo-tibétaine a attribué le Ratna-gotra-vibhāga à Maitreya pour la kārikā, à Asaṅga pour la vyākhya43, alors que la tradition sino-japonaise conservait l’attribution à Sāramati. Les érudits occidentaux ont d’abord suivi les Tibétains, tout en s’étonnant après eux44 d’une œuvre qui tranche aussi nettement le reste de l’œuvre d’Asaṅga, si variée que parût d’ailleurs celle-ci. Ce n’est que peu à peu, sous l’influence, notamment, de l’érudition japonaise, qu’ils ont rendu justice à Sāramati; la question se compliquait du fait que, d’une part, la plupart des exégètes modernes voulaient distinguer deux Sāramati, et que, d’autre part, les noms de Sāramati et de Sthiramati peuvent se traduire de manière très proche en chinois—d’où des confusions entre le ou les Sāramati et le philosophe Sthiramati, beaucoup plus tardif, chef de l’école idéaliste de Valabhi45. Actuellement, la controverse est en train de s’apaiser: le double Sāramati a encore ses
partisans, mais la confusion avec Sthiramati est définitivement dissipée\(^{46}\), et personne ne songe plus à attribuer le *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga* à Asaṅga.

M. Frawallner\(^{47}\) rattache à l’école de Sāramati une œuvre difficile à classer, mais célèbre, qui a eu une influence énorme sur le bouddhisme d’Extrême-Orient. Il s’agit d’un bref traité conservé en chinois seulement, mais dont le titre chinois se prête à une «restitution» sanscrite: le *Mahāyāna-sraddhoptāda-sāstra*, en chinois *Ta tch’ eng k’i sin louen*. Le Canon chinois l’attribue à un Āsvaghoṣa. Or, ce nom est celui d’un célèbre poète bouddhiste du I\(^{\text{er}}\) ou du II\(^{\text{e}}\) siècle de notre ère. De là à lui attribuer le *Sraddhoptāda* et à voir dans celui-ci la production d’un Mahāyāna encore à l’état d’enfance, aux thèses multiples et prenant des directions variées, le pas fut franchi. Mais, très tôt, les catalogues du Canon chinois classent le *Sraddhoptāda* parmi les œuvres douteuses; et le caractère de la synthèse qu’on y trouvait, à la fois habile et vigoureuse, donnait à penser qu’il ne s’agissait pas là d’un ouvrage primitif. On admet à peu près unanimement, à l’heure actuelle, qu’il s’agit d’un apocryphe chinois, composé peut-être vers le milieu du VI\(^{\text{e}}\) siècle, et qui présente une synthèse ingénieuse et même géniale des principales thèses mahāyānistes qui étaient parvenues en Chine à cette époque, et parmi lesquelles des théories idéalistes telles que celles de la connaissance-réceptacle (*ālaya-vijñāna*), de la siccité (*tathātā*), des imprégnations (*vāsanā*), jouent naturellement un rôle considérable\(^{48}\).

C’est aussi une synthèse, mais celle-là authentiquement indienne, et véritablement au principe du Vijnānavāda classique, que présente Maitreya ou Maitreya-nātha dans le *Mahāyāna-sūrālāṃkāra*, «Ornement des sūtra du Grand Véhicule». Ce texte, écrit en vers didactiques (*kārikā*), estaccompagné d’un commentaire (*bhāṣya*) en prose dû à Vasubandhu\(^{49}\).

La personne et l’œuvre de Maitreya-nātha soulèvent des problèmes historiques compliqués, en relation d’ailleurs avec celles d’Asaṅga qui sera après lui le maître le plus marquant du Vijnānavāda à ses débuts. Il sera plus commode de les traiter en parlant d’Asaṅga. Pour l’instant, on se bornera à relever quelques données relatives au titre du *Mahāyāna-sūrālāṃkāra*, qui passe à bon droit pour l’œuvre maîtresse de Maitreyaṇātha. Il existe un texte intitulé *Sūrālāṃkāra* «Ornement des sūtra», attribué à Āsvaghoṣa, comme le *Mahāyāna-sraddhoptāda* dont il a été question plus haut, et beaucoup d’autres ouvrages; il y a tout un cycle d’Āsvaghoṣa, qu’a étudié notamment Sylvain Lévi\(^{50}\). Ce texte fut traduit en français sur sa version chinoise, vers le début de ce siècle, par un orientaliste suisse, le Lucernois Edouard Huber, membre de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient, qui, après un brillant début de carrière, mourut des fièvres dans la jungle indochnoise, en 1914 à l’âge de 35 ans\(^{51}\). L’«Ornement des sūtra», qui pose aussi des problèmes d’histoire littéraire qui sortent de notre propos, n’est nullement un ouvrage philosophique, mais un recueil de contes édifiants. Il est facile de confondre le *Sūrālāṃkāra* d’Āsvaghoṣa et le *Mahāyāna-sūrālāṃkāra* de Maitreyaṇātha, d’autant plus que, par une habitude paresseuse mais consacrée, ce dernier est très souvent désigné, par abréviation, sous le titre de *Sūrālāṃkāra*.
Le terme alāṃkāra «ornement» est un terme important dans l’histoire littéraire de l’Inde. Dans la littérature sanscrite classique, il désigne en gros les figures poétiques et les figures de style en général, et la discipline qui s’en occupe, soit à peu près la rhétorique. Comme il arrive assez souvent, la tradition bouddhique l’a employé dans des sens plus ou moins détournés. Dans le titre du Sūtrasālamkāra d’Aśvaghoṣa, sa signification reste assez proche de celle qu’il a dans la tradition littéraire classique: il s’agit d’une sorte de paraphrase des sūtra, rédigée en un style plus littéraire, ce qui n’est pas difficile. En ce qui concerne le Mahāyāna-sūtrasālamkāra de Maitreya-nātha, alāṃkāra désigne un ouvrage versifié où l’auteur cherche à compléter et à systématiser des données qu’il trouve dans certains textes qui font autorité et qu’il utilise, en général assez librement, comme base de son propre travail52. C’est ainsi que le Mahāyāna-sūtrasālamkāra se rattache à un des plus importants chapitres du Yogaśāra-bhūmi-sāstra, la Bodhisattva-bhūmi53, tandis qu’un au-tre ouvrage de Maitreya-nātha, l’Abhisamayālamkāra «Ornement de la pleine compréhension», cherche à systématiser, non sans artifice, la Pañcavimsati-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā «Perfection de la sagesse en 25 000 stances»54.


Les deux auteurs principaux d’ouvrages attribués à Maitreya-nātha sont l’Abhisamayālamkāra «Ornement de la pleine compréhension»62, déjà mentionné, et le Madhyānta-vibhāga «Discrimination du moyen et des extrêmes»63. Le premier ne nous retiendra guère; on y chercherait en vain de l’idéalisme64. Le second contient une interprétation idéaliste de la doctrine de la voie moyenne,
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commune à tout le bouddhisme, mais dont le Mādhyaṃka s’était fait le héraut, et de la doctrine de la vacuité, elle aussi essentielle au Mādhyaṃka. On peut donc voir dans le Madhvāṇa-vibhāga une tentative d’interpréter la doctrine Mādhyaṃka dans les termes de la doctrine Vijñānavāda ; interprétation que son excessive subtilité rend difficile à saisir et à suivre.

Nous arrivons maintenant au personnage qu’on a longtemps considéré comme le véritable fondateur de l’idéalisme bouddhique : Asaṅga. Ce maître illustre a eu la mauvaise fortune de se voir battu en brèche, dans son œuvre et dans son rôle, et non sans de bons arguments. Parmi nombreuses ouvrages qu’on lui attribue, plusieurs lui ont été contestés. Tout d’abord, comme nous l’avons vu, le Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, que M. Frauwallner et son école tiennent pour une œuvre collective, à cause de ses dimensions énormes, alors que M. Wayman maintient l’attribution à Asaṅga ⁶⁵.

La tradition tibétaine attribuait à Asaṅga en propre un certain nombre d’œuvres, dont les deux principales sont l’Abhidharma-samuccaya « Sommaire de la scolastique » ⁶⁶, et le Mahāyāna-saṁgraha « Somme du Grand Véhicule » ⁶⁷ ; et à Asaṅga inspiré par le Bodhisattva Maitreya cinq ouvrages : le Mahāyāna-sūtra-lakāra, le Madhyānta-vibhāga, le Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga, l’Uttara-tantra, l’Abhisamayālaṃkāra ⁶⁸ ; plus le Yogā-cāra-bhūmi-śāstra en sixième. Maitreya, l’« Amical », est un des plus célèbres parmi les personnages surnaturels, Buddha et Bodhisattva, que révère le Mahāyāna. Il sera le Buddha de la prochaine période cosmique, celle qui suivra la nôtre, dont le plus récent Buddha a été Gautama Śākyamuni. Pendant la période présente, Maitreya est Bodhisatta, « Etre à Eveil », nom sous lequel on désigne les futurs Buddha ; comme tous les Bodhisattva dans leur dernière existence avant de devenir Buddha, il réside au quatrième des quelque vingt-deux cieux que compte le bouddhisme (le compte varie suivant les écoles), et, de là, veille sur les créatures. La légende ⁶⁹ racontait qu’Asaṅga, après l’avoir longuement imploré de lui accorder des lumières, avait été enfin exaucé ; Maitreya l’emmena au quatrième ciel et lui récita le Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, puis les cinq traités numérotés ci-dessus, que la tradition tibétaine appelle, pour cette raison, les « cinq doctrines de Maitreya » ⁷⁰.

On a tenté de cette légende une interprétation historique, et voulu faire de Maitreya un personnage historique, qui aurait été un docteur mahāyānisté, maître d’Asaṅga. Le nom complet de ce personnage aurait été Maitreya-nātha « celui qui a Maitreya pour protecteur », abrégé couramment en Maitreya, d’où confusion avec le Bodhisattva du même nom, intervenue de bonne heure puisque la légende d’Asaṅga inspiré par Maitreya a cours dès le VIe siècle. Il n’y a en principe rien d’invraisemblable à cette thèse : Maitreya-nātha et même Maitreya peut très bien être un nom d’homme ; inversement, on trouve accolée au nom du Bodhisattva Maitreya l’épithète de nātha « protecteur » ; le composé Maitreya-nātha signifie alors, bien entendu, « Maitreya le protecteur ». M. Frauwallner ⁷¹, un des principaux tenants de la thèse du Maitreya historique, relève à juste titre une considérable différence de ton et même de doctrine entre les œuvres « maitreyennes », principalement le Mahāyāna-sūtra-lakāra, auquel
on peut ajouter le Madhyānta-vibhāga, et les œuvres proprement «asangiennes», Mahāyāna-samgraha et aussi Abhidharma-samuccaya. Il observe que les premières comportent une métaphysique et ce qu’il appelle une «scolastique de la délivrance», c’est-à-dire une énumération très détaillée de toutes les modalités et de toutes les étapes du chemin de la libération, mais que la métaphysique reste peu élaborée et n’intègre nullement les doctrines très articulées du bouddhisme ancien sur la physique, la psychologie, la cosmologie, l’acte, la causalité, etc., alors que c’est précisément leur développement considérable sur tous ces points qui caractérise le Mahāyāna-samgraha et l’Abhidharma-samuccaya, et qui d’ailleurs en fait des œuvres d’accès difficile. Pour M. Frauwallner, à un Maitreya métaphysicien et tout occupé d’une sotériorologie transcendantale, s’opposerait un Asanga dont l’apport majeur a été d’introduire dans les doctrines idéalistes, jus-qu’alors peu élaborées, non pas seulement une scolastique de la délivrance, mais la scolastique de l’ancien bouddhisme dans son ensemble, moyennant les aménagements jugés nécessaires, et qui furent considérables, à tout le moins dans la terminologie; tâche à laquelle Asanga était d’autant mieux préparé que, selon une tradition qu’il n’y a pas lieu de mettre en doute, et qui lui est d’ailleurs commune avec d’autres maîtres du Mahāyāna, il appartient d’abord à une école du Petit Véhicule et passa par la suite au Grand. Quant aux autres ouvrages attribués à Maitreya, le Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga et son commentaire par Vasubandhu ont fait l’objet de plusieurs travaux japonais, mais sont encore mal connus en Occident. L’Abhisamayālaṃkāra se place très à part: scolastique, il l’est au suprême degré, mais il agit uniquement d’une scolastique de la délivrance. L’Uttara-tantra, de même que le Yogācāra-bhūmi-sāstra, sont de toute manière hors de cause, puisque ni l’attribution à Asanga, ni l’attribution à Maitreya ne sont plus retenues, sauf exceptions.

La controverse autour de Maitreya-nātha n’est pas éteinte. M. Demiéville est parti en guerre avec énergie contre la thèse historicienne. M. Schmithausen rappelle brièvement l’essentiel de la querelle et annonce son intention d’y revenir à une autre occasion, cependant que M. Frauwallner confirme sa position dans la dernière édition de sa Philosophie des Buddhismus. M. Ruegg expose le problème dans toute sa complexité; il conclut qu’en somme, le Maitreya des Cinq Enseignements ne fut vraisemblablement pas le maître humain d’Asanga», mais qu’il faudrait peut-être distinguer, dans l’œuvre d’Asanga, les textes dont il est véritablement l’auteur, tels que le Mahāyāna-samgraha ou l’Abhidharmasamuccaya, et ceux où il ne serait guère plus que le compilateur de matériaux plus anciens, rapportés à une tradition qui se réclamait du Bodhisattva Maitreya. Cette solution a l’avantage de rendre compte ingénieusement de la diversité vraiment exceptionnelle des ouvrages attribués à Asanga.

Le plus illustre docteur du Vijñānavāda avec Asanga, son frère cadet Vasubandhu, pose également un problème historique épineux. La tradition admettait que ce personnage, après avoir appartenu pendant presque toute sa vie au Petit Véhicule et avoir déployé pour sa défense et illustration une activité considérable, composant notamment une somme intitulée Abhidharma-kośa.
«Trésor de la scolastique» qui présente une brillante synthèse critique des doctrines du bouddhisme ancien principalement dans ses écoles du nord et du nord-ouest de l'Inde, s'était finalement converti au Mahāyāna, sous l'influence de son frère Asaṅga, à l'âge de quatre-vingts ans, et, malgré cet âge avancé, avait encore écrit plusieurs ouvrages d'inspiration mahāyāniste et idéaliste. Mais la critique occidentale et japonaise ne tarda pas à relever dans cette tradition des incohérences difficiles à réduire. M. Frauwallner a repris le problème sur nouveaux frais il y a une vingtaine d'années; il conclut à l'existence de deux Vasubandhu, qui tous deux se convertirent du Hinayāna au Mahāyāna, le premier vers le milieu de sa vie, le second dans sa vieillesse. On n'a pas manqué de trouver cette similitude surprenante; mais, répond M. Frauwallner, d'une manière à la fois plausible et ingénieuse, le fait n'est nullement improbable, à une époque où les écoles du Hinayāna déclinaient en face d'un Mahāyāna en plein essor; et même, on y peut voir une raison supplémentaire à la confusion des deux Vasubandhu.

Le premier d'entre eux, que M. Frauwallner appelle Vasubandhu l'ancien, est le frère d'Asaṅga; l'autre, Vasubandhu le jeune, vécut un siècle plus tard. Quant aux œuvres, l'attribution n'en est pas toujours aisée. L'Abhidharma-kōsa est en tout cas de Vasubandhu le jeune, de même que trois ouvrages de logique aux titres très proches les uns des autres (Vāda-vidhāna «Établissement de la dialectique», Vāda-vidhi «Règles de la dialectique», Vāda-sāra «L'essentiel de la dialectique»), où l'auteur systématisa la dialectique bouddhique tout comme il avait fait la dogmatique dans le Kośa. Certains commentaires sur des Mahāyāna-sūtra, et surtout sur les œuvres d'Asaṅga (ou de Maitreya) reviennent assez naturellement à Vasubandhu l'ancien. Mais, pour d'autres traités mahāyānistes, l'attribution s'est avérée plus délicate. C'est le cas notamment de deux ouvrages capitaux pour l'école idéaliste, la Viṃśatikā Viṃnapti-mātratā-siddhi «Démonstration, en vingt strophes didactiques, du fait que la nature des choses est une activité qui fait connaître, sans plus»; ce titre sera éluclidé plus loin; et la Trīṃśikā Viṃnapti-mātratā-siddhi, même «démonstration», mais en trente strophes: après avoir longtemps suspendu son jugement, M. Frauwallner incline maintenant en faveur de Vasubandhu le jeune.

La Viṃśatikā est une sorte d'introduction au système, plutôt critique que constructive. La kārikā est accompagnée d'un commentaire (vyrtti) dû également à Vasubandhu. Avant d'exposer en détail sa propre doctrine de l'idéalisme absolu, l'auteur s'attache à réfuter les objections de principe qu'on peut lui présenter à l'intérieur du bouddhisme lui-même, en particulier sur le rôle de l'object dans la connaissance; puis il s'attaque à la théorie atomique, professée par l'un des systèmes (darsana) brahmaniques, le Vaiśeṣika, et adoptée par une des plus importantes écoles du bouddhisme ancien, celle des Sarvāstivādin «réalistes intégraux». Sa critique est restée classique pendant des siècles; elle est fondée, pour l'essentiel, sur l'antinomie entre l'insécurité des atomes et leur possibilité de se grouper pour former des conglomérats et finalement les objets du monde sensible.
Quant à la Triṃśikā, c'est véritablement l'exposé du système; c'est elle qui constitue le fondement du Vijñānavāda classique, et qui sera l'une des bases de l'aperçu doctrinal qui va suivre.

L'œuvre de Vasubandhu le jeune ferme la série des grands traités originaux du Vijñānavāda. Elle sera suivie d'une littérature de commentaires, dont certains sont de grande valeur et même géniaux. Une seule école ouvre des voies nouvelles: l'école des logiciens, fondée par Dignāga au VIe siècle. Elle se rattache à l'idéalisme, mais les travaux de Dignāga et de son principal successeur Dharma-kiṃti sont des œuvres originales et donnent à l'école une individualité assez marquée pour qu'on puisse la traiter pratiquement en école indépendante, qui a suivi ses destinées propres et dont l'étude sortirait du cadre du présent exposé.

Quant à l'idéalisme proprement dit, il connaît, parallèlement à l'école des logiciens, une brillante floraison; il se scinde en deux écoles principales, qui présentent des différences sensibles sur divers points, notamment sur la nature de la connaissance en tant que réalité absolue. L'une est l'école de Valabhi (actuellement Vala, dans la péninsule de Káthiāvar, au nord-ouest de Bombay); elle a pour principal représentant Sthiramati, dont les deux ouvrages les plus notables, le sous-commentaire (jīkā) du Madhyānta-vibhāga, et le commentaire (bhaṣya) de la Triṃśikā, conservés l'un et l'autre en sanscrit, ont été mentionnés plus haut. L'autre école, celle de Nālandā, eut une destinée brillante et devint le plus important centre d'études bouddhiques dans les derniers siècles du bouddhisme indien. Nālandā se trouve dans la basse vallée du Gange, au sud-est de Patna, non loin de Rājagṛha (actuellement Rajgir), l'ancienne capitale du royaume de Magadha, qui correspond à la moitié sud de l'actuel État de Bihar et qui fut toujours la terre d'élection du bouddhisme. Depuis l'indépendance, le gouvernement indien a installé à Nālandā une université nouvelle vouée particulièrement aux études bouddhiques. - Dharma-panā est le représentant le plus illustre de l'école de Nālandā; il semble avoir été un penseur égal à Sthiramati, sinon supérieur, mais il mourut très jeune, et son œuvre s'est mal conservée; aucun des quelques ouvrages qui subsistent ne nous est parvenu dans l'original sanscrit. - Pour Sthiramati, seule subsiste en réalité absolue la tathāta «siccéité»; pour Dharma-panā, la connaissance subsiste sous toutes ses formes, moyennant une transmutation radicale. Sthiramati reste tributaire, à quelque degré, des doctrines de la pensée naturellement pure et lumineuse, qui, sur le plan du relatif, est souillée par les passions adventices, mais retrouve son intégrité en réalité absolue. Dharma-panā et après lui Huan-tsang ne retiennent pas cette doctrine: d'une part elle est trop dualiste; de l'autre elle pose un absolu. Le processus de la souillure et de la purification sera plutôt décrit comme inhérent à la pensée ou à la connaissance.

C'est sur un ouvrage chinois que se clôt la grande époque de l'idéalisme bouddhique indien: le Tch'eng wei che louen de Huan-tsang. Les trois premiers caractères de ce titre traduisent exactement le sanscrit Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, et c'est en fait sous le titre sanscrit de Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi que La Vallée Poussin a publié sa traduction de l'ouvrage de Huan-tsang. Mais le texte
de cet ouvrage ne repose nullement sur un original sanscrit; il est écrit directement en chinois par un Chinois; si l’auteur se donne pour un simple traducteur, et attribue la paternité de l’ouvrage à Dharmapāla et aux autres philosophes indiens dont il s’est inspiré, c’est par une modestie d’autant plus méritoire qu’en fait Huiuan-tsang (602–664) a été le plus savant et le plus illustre de tous les bouddhistes chinois, célèbre par son long et périlleux pélerinage in Inde et par les nombreuses traductions de textes sanscrits qu’il a publiées en plus de son œuvre originale. Sa Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi (car nous reprenions, malgré l’équivoque qu’elle comporte, la désignation adoptée par La Vallée Poussin et maintenant consacrée par l’usage) est un commentaire de la Trimsikā de Vasubandhu, qui portait aussi, comme nous l’avons vu, le titre de Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, de même que la Vimśatikā; finalement, il s’agit là d’une sorte de titre générique; nous y reviendrons par la suite. Huiuan-tsang a composé son ouvrage d’une manière assez curieuse. Il le rédigea dans les dernières années de sa vie, après son retour en Chine, sur la base des textes qu’il avait rapportés, mais plus encore des notes qu’il avait prises, et qui couvraient tout l’éventail des écoles et des tendances du Vijñānavāda telles qu’il avait pu les observer pendant son séjour en Inde. Au sujet des divers problèmes que traite la Trimsikā, Huiuan-tsang cite les opinions d’une dizaine de maîtres qui tous l’avaient commentée. Il ne les cite pas tous à chaque question, bien entendu; en fait, les opinions qui dominent sont celles de Sthiramati, ou plus exactement de l’école de Valabhi d’une part, et celles de Dharmapāla et de l’école de Nālandā de l’autre; et Huiuan-tsang adopte toujours, en dernier ressort, la doctrine de Nālandā, moyennant, au besoin, des aménagements minimes. Sa Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi offre donc au premier abord l’aspect d’un chaos d’opinions divergentes et souvent même contradictoires, et présente ainsi un tableau assez suggestif de ce qu’a pu être le Vijñānavāda de la grande époque, avec le foisonnement de ses écoles et leur bouillonnement intellectuel; mais, à une lecture plus attentive, il s’en dégage une doctrine suffisamment cohérente. Cet ouvrage, qui marque en somme le point final des développements du Vijñānavāda indien, se place d’autre part au principe d’une immense littérature en chinois et en japonais; le bouddhisme idéaliste en Extrême-Orient finit toujours par renvoyer au Tch’eng weï che louen, et cela d’autant plus que les enseignements qu’aurait pu apporter un éminent prédécesseur de Huiuan-tsang, le moine indien Paramārtha (500–569), originaire de l’Inde de l’ouest, tributaire, semble-t-il, de l’école de Valabhi, arrivé en 546 en Chine, où il demeura jusqu’à sa mort, furent d’abord contrecarrés par les circonstances adverses et les troubles graves qui agitèrent la Chine du sud à l’époque où il s’y établit, et ensuite systématiquement supprimés par Huiuan-tsang et son école comme étant périmés.

3. Aperçu doctrinal

Après avoir ainsi donné du devenir historique du Vijñānavāda une indispensable esquisse, je vais maintenant exposer les points essentiels de la doctrine. Je me
fonderai pour cela sur un passage du *Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra* qui m’a paru résumer d’une manière frappante les principaux éléments du système en ce qu’il a précisément d’idéaliste (car il comporte nombre de thèses, certaines fort importantes, qui n’ont rien de particulièrement idéaliste au sens que j’ai défini au début du présent exposé⁹⁵). J’analyserai passage du *Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra* et en développerai le contenu selon les lignes de la Trimsikā de Vasubandhu et de son commentaire par Hiuan-tsang. Entre le sūtra d’une part et les traductions de ces deux auteurs de l’autre, il y aura parfois des divergences que je signalerai au passage.

Je citerai tout d’abord le *Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra*, en suivant la version de M. Lamotte, avec de menus aménagements. Cet échantillon donnera un aperçu du style des sūtra, chargé de répétitions, lent et patient, se développant parallèlement aux méandres d’un fleuve. Encore, je le répète, le *Samdhī-nirmocana* est une «bon» sūtra; dans beaucoup d’autres, ces caractères de style s’exagèrent au point d’en être difficilement supportables.

Voici donc le passage en question⁹⁶:

«Alors le Bodhisattva Viśālamati interrogea le Bienheureux: «Le Bienheureux a parlé de Bodhisattva versés dans les secrets de la pensée, de l’esprit et des connaissances. Que faut-il pour qu’ils soient des Bodhisattva versés dans les secrets de la pensée, de l’esprit et des connaissances?» Et voici l’essentiel de la réponse du Bouddha: «Dans cette transmigration, ..., d’emblée, la pensée munie de tous les germes s’approprie deux choses: les organes matériels avec le corps, et les imprimés... En s’appuyant sur cette double appropriation, la pensée mûrit, grandit, prend de l’ampleur et du développement...»

Cette connaissance est aussi appelée «Connaissance appropriatrice», car c’est par elle que ce corps est saisi et approprié. Elle est aussi appelée «Connaissance-réceptacle», parce qu’elle se joint et s’unit à ce corps dans une commune sécurité et dans un risque commun. Elle est aussi appelée «Pensée» (*citā*), car elle est entassée (*ā-citā*) et accumulée (*upa-citā*) par la forme, le son, l’odeur, la saveur et le tangible.

«Ayant la connaissance appropriatrice pour base et point d’appui, naissent les six groupes de connaissance: connaissance de l’œil, de l’oreille, du nez, de la langue, du corps, et connaissance mentale...»

Suisent deux comparaisons importantes: «On peut comparer ceci à un grand courant d’eau. Si la condition pour la production d’une seule vague s’y présente, aussitôt une seule vague se produit. Si la condition pour la production de deux ou de plusieurs vagues s’y présente, aussitôt plusieurs vagues se produisent. Cependant l’eau du fleuve ne souffre dans son courant ni interruption ni épuisement. – On peut encore comparer ceci à la surface polie d’un miroir. Si la condition pour la production d’une seule image s’y présente, aussitôt une seule image se produit. Si la condition pour la production de deux ou de plusieurs images s’y présente, aussitôt plusieurs images se produisent. Cependant, la surface du miroir ne se transforme pas en image et ne souffre aucun dommage. – De même ici, la connaissance appropriatrice joue le rôle du cours d’eau et du
miroir. Si, avec elle pour base et point d’appui, la condition pour la production d’une seule connaissance visuelle se présente, aussitôt une seule connaissance visuelle se produit. Si la condition pour la production de même cinq groupes de connaissances s’y présente, aussitôt les cinq groupes de connaissances se produisent.»

Ce chapitre du Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra se termine par une de ces stances qui souvent concluent un exposé ou sont prononcées dans un état d’exaltation: «Alors, en cette occasion, le Bienheureux dit ces stances: La connaissance appropriatrice, profonde et subtile, comme un courant violent, procède avec tous les germes. Craignant qu’ils n’imaginent qu’elle est une âme, je ne l’ai pas révélée aux esprits enfantins.»

Le Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra pose donc une «pensée munie de tous les germes» (sarva-bījaka-citta), qu’il appelle aussi «connaissance appropriatrice» (ādāna-vijñāṇa) ou «connaissance-réceptacle» (ālaya-vijñāṇa); toutes ces expressions sont synonymes. Cette «connaissance-réceptacle» est à la base de toute activité cognitive, et même de toute l’existence phénoménale, de toute la «transmigration», comme disent les penseurs indiens. Il nous faut maintenant examiner ce qu’elle est, et comment elle fonctionne: car, comme toujours dans le bouddhisme, cette donnée du réel, la connaissance, est essentiellement dynamique, elle ressemble à un fleuve; elle est même créatrice, à tout le moins sur le plan du phénomène.

Pour définir et décrire la «connaissance-réceptacle», le mieux est encore de glosser les termes mêmes du Samdhī-nirmocana-sūtra, qui nous font pénétrer d’emblée au cœur de la terminologie technique du bouddhisme. Le Bodhisattva Viśālamati demande qu’on lui explique «les secrets de la pensée, de l’esprit et des connaissances». Ces trois vocables, pensée, esprit, connaissance, traduisent respectivement les termes sanscrits citta, manas et vijñāṇa, réputés synonymes ou mieux équivalents dès les couches anciennes de la littérature bouddhique, comme nous l’avons déjà vu plus haut; équivalence reconnue aussi bien par le Grand Véhicule que par le Petit. Ils désignent le même objet, mais vu sous des aspects différents; ils n’ont donc pas absolument interchangeable, et l’école-déaliste, notamment, s’efforcera d’établir des nuances d’emploi et d’usage.

Tout d’abord, la «pensée», citta. Ce terme désigne le contenu intellectuel de la vie psychologique, pris en général. Mais, dans la psychologie bouddhique, le citta n’existe jamais isolément; il est toujours accompagné d’autres données psychologiques, de nature soit intellectuelle aussi, soit volitive, soit affective, qui se groupent autour de lui comme d’un noyau et lui sont étroitement associées, et le citta n’est pas sans évoquer la «chose qui pense» définie par Descartes dans les Méditations métaphysiques; mais, bien entendu, la «chose qui pense», dans le bouddhisme, est en son essence strictement impersonnelle; et le doute n’y occupe pas la place éminente que lui assigne Descartes.

Si le citta est le noyau de toute la vie psychologique, le manas, «esprit», est en fait un «organe mental». Il correspond au «sens commun» aristotélicien (χορήγησις) et scolastique (sensorium commune). Il a, dans la
psychologie indienne en général, deux fonctions: appréhender directement celles des données de l’expérience qui sont de nature psychologique, et faire la synthèse des données physiques et psychologiques, organiser les sensations en perceptions.

«Connaissance», enfin, traduit viññāna, terme dont la signification n’est pas facile à cerner. On peut dire qu’il désigne en général toute activité de «cognition» ou d’intellection, en tant qu’elle est différenciatrice ou discriminatrice. Cette interprétation ressort de la formation même du terme viññāna, où la racine jñā-«connaître» est associée au préfixe vi-qui exprime précisément la séparation, la dispersion, et notamment les séparations et discriminations opérées par l’esprit. Il n’y a pas contradiction avec manas, parce que la perception organisée par ce dernier, si d’une part elle est synthèse (et sous cet aspect elle s’appelle samjñā, terme quasimentantithétique de viññāna, avec le préfixe sam- qui indique le rassemblement, la concentration), est d’autre part discrimination: discrimination des objets entre eux, discrimination des objets en face du sujet; et c’est surtout cet aspect discriminateur qui a été mis en relief par les théories indiennes de la perception. Plus le viññāna s’épure, plus son coefficient discriminateur se réduit; nous verrons ce qu’il advient au terme.

On trouve assez souvent viññāna traduit par «conscience», et il est vrai que le viññāna comporte le plus souvent conscience; dans sa nature, lorsqu’elle n’est pas oblitérée, il est même pure conscience. Il y a pourtant des cas, notamment dans l’existence intermédiaire entre deux vies, où le viññāna est «engourdi», et n’est plus qu’un subconscient. L’ālayavijñāna, «connaissance-réceptacle» ou «conscience-réceptacle», est de même un subconscient. De plus, le terme «conscience» ne rend peut-être pas suffisamment le dynamisme du viññāna dans la doctrine idéaliste.

Citta, manas et viññāna désignent bien un même objet sous ses différents aspects, selon le point de vue des penseurs indiens: il s’agit de la vie psychologique, en tant qu’elle a pour base l’intellection, la prise de conscience, bien que cette opération puisse dans certains cas particuliers être suspendue; citta est le contenu, manas l’organe ou la faculté, viññāna l’opération ou la fonction.

À ces trois synonymes, l’école idéaliste en ajoutera même un qua-trième: c’est le terme de viññāpti, qui figure déjà dans le Saṃdhī-nirrocana-sūtra, et qui ne se distingue guère de viññāna. Si l’on veut établir une nuance, il faut remarquer que viññāpti a un sens «causatif» ou factitif: c’est une activité psychologique qui fait connaître, qui constitue un objet de connaissance; c’est le viññāna en acte. Mais que constitue-t-elle en objet de connaissance? Rien d’autre qu’elle-même: c’est la viññāpti, ou le viññāna, qui développe, à partir de facteurs contenus en elle-même, tout un monde objectif qu’elle appréhende et se représente; la connaissance du monde, dans le viññānavāda, est, à la lettre, une «re-présentation», que la connaissance se fait à elle-même, de données qu’elle a tirées d’elle-même, et qui n’existent véritablement qu’en elle-même. Et elle ne développe pas seulement un «côté objectif», si je puis dire, mais aussi un «côté subjectif». Le viññānavāda classique distingue, au sein de la connaissance, trois «parties» (bhāga)101 constitutives. L’une est la «partie-vision» (darśana-bhāga),
la vision étant prise ici, par synecdoque, pour l’activité cognitive en général. L’autre est la «partie-indice» (nimitta-bhāga): pour désigner l’objet, l’école emploie un terme assez inattendu; c’est que les objets ne sont, à proprement parler, que l’indice qu’il y a là de la connaissance sous forme objective. Enfin, il y a une troisième partie, dont l’existence est d’ailleurs sujette à controverse: la «partie-conscience» (sva-saṁvitti-bhāga), dite aussi «partie ayant trait à la nature propre» (svābhāvika-bhāga): la nature propre de la connaissance, pour autant qu’elle en ait une, est pure conscience, sans dynamisme, analogue au miroir qui reflète les objets mais ne les produit pas.

Il convient maintenant de décrire le processus du développement du vijñāna, d’examiner comment et pourquoi il projette le réel selon la dichotomie en une «partie-vision» et une «partie-indice»; nous reviendrons par la suite à la «partie-conscience».

Ce n’est pas, comme on l’aura remarqué, la connaissance ou la pensée tout court qui se trouve au principe du développement, mais la «pensée munie de tous les germes», ou la «connaissance-réceptacle». Considérons donc, en un point quelconque du devenir, la pensée munie de tous les germes ou la connaissance-réceptacle. Que sont ces germes dont la pensée est munie, ou dont la connaissance est le réceptacle? Ce sont toutes les impressions introduties dans le courant de conscience par tous les faits physiques et psychologiques dont se tisse le devenir. On les appelle «germes», parce qu’elles sont chargées d’un dynamisme et tendent à fructifier; «imprégnations», parce qu’elles imprègnent la connaissance-réceptacle à la manière d’un parfum qui imprègne une étoffe. C’est ainsi que, par exemple, un mouvement de colère, lui-même résultat d’une fructification antérieure, va imprégner la connaissance-réceptacle qui est à la base de la vie psychologique de celui qui l’éprouve, et tendra à produire des effets qui se manifesteront dans un avenir plus ou moins éloigné.


Dans le vijñānavāda classique, la 6e connaissance (connaissance mentale, mano-vijñāna), assume les fonctions qui sont celles du manas, telles que je les ai mentionnées plus haut. Quant au manas, le Samdhī-nirmo-cana-sūtra le mentionne seulement comme synonyme de citta et vijñāna en général. En revanche, dans le vijñānavāda classique, le manas constitue une 7e connaissance, qui joue un rôle tout spécial: elle a pour objet la connaissance-réceptacle, qu’elle prend pour un moi; elle est donc l’agent de l’illusion du moi, qui, en déclenchant les
mécanismes de l’appropriation des objets au mo, contribue puissamment à renforcer le dynamisme des germes et à maintenir le cycle de la transmigration.

La 8ème connaissance enfin, n’est autre que la connaissance-réceptacle elle-même, ālaya-vijñāna, appelée aussi citta, par une fausse étymologie. La connaissance-réceptacle n’existe pas d’une existence continue, et ne constitue pas la base d’une personne identique à elle-même, d’un sujet psychologique, encore moins d’un sujet métaphysique. Elle est instantanée, mais sérielle; elle se renouvelle à chaque instant, de même que les germes qu’elle porte, par la force projective des actes antérieurs. La succession est si rapide qu’elle peut donner l’illusion de la continuité, d’un moi permanent. C’est cette série immensément longue d’ālayavijñāna successifs qui constitue le devenir d’un être individuel dans la transmigration, avec ses nombreuses morts et naissances. Il y a donc autant de séries d’ālaya-vijñāna qu’il y a d’êtres individuels: la connaissance-réceptacle est individuelle, non universelle.

Les sept premières connaissances constituent la «partie-vision» de la huitième. Mais celle-ci développe aussi une «partie-indice». Pour le vijñānavāda, comme pour la pensée bouddhique mahāyāniste en général, le monde extérieur n’a pas d’existence objective, de réalité indépendante, dante, autonome. Mais alors que le Mādhyamika tend à récuser aussi bien le monde intérieur que le monde extérieur dans une inconsistance généralisé, le Vijnānavāda rapporte le monde extérieur à la connaissance. Pour démontrer l’irréalité du monde extérieur indépendamment de la connaissance-réceptacle, Vasubandhu utilise principalement la réfutation de l’atomisme, mentionnée plus haut. Plus profondément, l’idée de l’irréalité du monde extérieur est tirée de l’expérience de la méditation, où il paraît s’abolir; or, les états obtenus par méditation ont souvent valeur de critère ultime du degré de plénitude ontologique.

Le monde extérieur se développe à partir de la connaissance-réceptacle. Il en est la partie-indice, où Huián-tsaang distingue deux éléments principaux: le monde extérieur au sens strict, et le corps propre. L’apparence du monde extérieur se développe à partir de germes qui sont communs à toutes les connaissances-réceptacles; ainsi se trouve résolu un des problèmes qui se posent à tout idéalisme, à savoir: pourquoi le monde extérieur apparaît-il sous le même aspect, ou à peu près, à toutes les consciences? Les textes ne nous renseignent guère sur ce que sont ces germes «communs». On peut admettre que tous les êtres engagés dans la transmigration ont un certain nombre d’expériences qui sont semblables, et qui, par conséquent, laissent des imprégnations ou des germes semblables et qui fructifieront à peu près de la même manière chez toutes les séries personnelles. (Cette analogie s’applique aussi en ce qui concerne le développement de la «partie-vision».) — Quant à l’apparence du corps propre, elle se développe pour une part à partir de germes communs, et pour une autre à partir de germes particuliers à chaque connaissance-réceptacle.

Bien entendu, de même que l’ālaya-vijñāna, tous ces développements, tant «partie-indice» que «partie-vision», ne sont pas des êtres continus, mais des séries de données instantanées qui se succèdent; cette succession étant
conditionnée par le dynamisme, la «force de projection» des germes qui se trouvent à son origine\textsuperscript{111}. Les germes eux-mêmes sont instantanés et se renouvellent. La mort s’explique par l’épuisement de la force de projection de certains germes; la naissance, par l’actualisation d’effets d’autres germes, restés latents jusqu’alors.

Pour chaque conscience, le caractère intérieur de la connaissance est absolu. La pluralité des ālaya-vijñāna, posée en principe, permet d’éviter le solipsisme. Mais il reste difficile d’expliquer comment les diverses consciences peuvent entrer en communication les unes avec les autres. Faut-il rapporter à des germes «communs» la possibilité de la communication avec autrui?

Par leurs expériences multiples et variées, les connaissances-en-acte, développées par la connaissance-réceptacle, y déposent à leur tour des germes, et le cycle se referme. Quant à l’origine du processus, il n’y en a pas: la transmigration est sans commencement.

Avant de quitter la théorie du développement du monde empirique à partir de l’ālaya-vijñāna, je traiterai encore brièvement de la «connaissance appropriatrice» (ādāna-vijñāna) qui, de même que la «pensée munie de tous les germes» (sarva-bījaka citta), est synonyme de la connaissance-réceptacle dans le passage du Saṃdhī-nirmocana-sūtra cité plus haut. «La pensée munie de tous les germes, disait le sūtra, s’approprie deux choses: les organes matériels avec le corps, et les impriqnations.» Autrement dit, la connaissance-réceptacle s’approprie le corps, et les germes qui sont déposés en elle, et c’est cette opération, accomplie sous l’empire de la force de projection des germes eux-mêmes, qui aboutit à la constitution du moi illusoire: le psychisme de base, dans chaque série personnelle, considère comme lui appartenant en propre le corps qu’il a développé, et toutes les dispositions latentes qui se sont déposées en lui au cours des vies antérieures.

On peut se demander si cette théorie n’entre pas en conflit avec celle qui assigne au manas le rôle d’organisateur de l’illusion du moi. En fait, le Saṃdhī-nirmocana-sūtra, comme nous l’avons vu, ne mentionne pas le manas en tant que 7\textsuperscript{e} vijñāna. Mais Vasubandhu, dans la Trīṃśikā, tout en conservant à propos de la connaissance-réceptacle la notion d’appropriation, admet le manas comme 7\textsuperscript{e} vijñāna. Au niveau de l’ālaya-vijñāna, en effet, l’appropriation reste subconsciente et fruste; ce n’est qu’au niveau du manas qu’elle se cristalliserà en tant que notion d’un moi illusoire\textsuperscript{112}.

Mais toute cette théorie du développement de la connaissance-réceptacle, telle que je viens de l’exposer, c’est la théorie de l’ālaya-vijñāna orienté vers la transmigration et susceptible de «souillure» (saṃkleśa). Or, comme nous l’avons mentionné plus haut\textsuperscript{113}, à la souillure s’oppose la purification (vyavadāna). Il n’existe pas seulement des germes défavorables, «de souillure»; il en existe aussi des favorables, «de purification», dont certains même sont «primitifs», se trouvent depuis toujours dans la connaissance-réceptacle. Il est possible de cultiver les germes de purification; lorsque leur culture est menée à bonne fin, elle aboutit à restituer la connaissance-réceptacle dans sa nature véritable, qui est
vijñapti-mātratā. La nature de la connaissance-réceptacle, qui est la nature même des choses puisque la connaissance-réceptacle est à la base de tout, est vijñapti-mātra, «une activité qui fait connaître, sans plus». En ajoutant à vijñapti-mātra le suffixe -tā, on obtient le dérivé vijñapti-mātratā, «nature de vijñapti sans plus», que nous avons vu figurer dans des titres d’ouvrages: une Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi est une «démonstration» ou un «établissement» de la vijñapti-mātratā, autrement dit, du fait que la nature des choses est une activité qui fait connaître, sans plus, c’est-à-dire sans objet spécifique. Par exemple, une donnée (dharma) telle qu’un mouvement de colère (krodha), si on la soumet à la méditation, fait connaître, en dernier ressort, que, au delà de la détermination «colère», il y a «quelque chose» d’autrement indéterminé que possible, et dont la seule détermination est de n’être pas néant; c’est ce que les vijñānavādins appellent tathātā «siccité». Cette «activité qui fait connaître» est impersonnelle: sujet et objet s’y confondent; vijñapti-mātratā et tathātā sont une seule et même chose.

Par la culture des germes de purification, on peut arrêter le flux de la connaissance-réceptacle et dégager, de ce flux, la nature véritable de cette connaissance, qui est vijñapti-mātratā. C’est toute la technique du chemin qui mène à se délivrer de la transmigration, technique psycho-physiologique, mais où domine le psychologique, la culture de dispositions mentales favorables qui, sans arrêter la transmigration – car pour une connaissance-réceptacle dont le flux s’épuise, il y en a d’innombrables qui continuent à se développer en consciences-actes, monde extérieur, etc. – permettent à celui qui les cultive avec succès de l’arrêter pour lui-même, de n’être plus touché par elle, de n’en plus souffrir. Je n’insisterai pas sur les détails, qui sont toujours extrêmement compliqués; la description de cette technique est difficile, en outre, parce qu’elle repose sur des pratiques et sur des états intérieurs dont nous n’avons pas d’expérience et qui, de toute manière, se prêtent mal à la description. Mais je rappellerai qu’elle porte un nom bien connu: c’est le yoga, entendu comme une technique de l’ajustement intérieur, et les vijñānavādins sont aussi appelés Yogācāra, «ceux qui pratiquent le yoga». Le yoga des Yogācāra vise à réduire la distinction entre le sujet et l’objet, à-dégager, des deux premiers bhāga, darśana-bhāga et nimitta-bhāga, le troisième: car le sva-samvitti-bhāga, c’est précisément, dans l’ālaya-vijñāna, la vijñapti-mātratā. Ainsi la connaissance-réceptacle, même si elle s’entend et s’engourdit, dans certains épisodes de la transmigration, au point de devenir sub-consciente ou même inconsciente, est essentiellement pure conscience.

Le chemin est jalonné de plusieurs «révolutions du point d’appui» (āśraya-parāvṛtti), phénomène clef de la psychologie vijñānavāda. Il s’agit d’une complète réorientation de l’organisme psycho-physique, «point d’appui» de la connaissance-réceptacle, qui s’oriente désormais non plus vers le monde empirique, mais vers la vijñapti-mātratā que lui-même et le monde sont en réalité. Ces révolutions successives aboutissent soit au nirvāna «extinction», soit à la bodhi «Eveil». A ce terme, nous touchons à la vérité absolue, ce qui se manifeste, sur le plan de l’expression, par deux faits complémentaires: l’un, que la
vérité absolue, étant équivalence de toutes choses, les divers noms qui la désignent, et qui expriment divers points de vue pris sur elle, sont tous considérés comme synonymes; l'autre, que tant qu'on désigne la vérité absolue, tant qu'on en parle, on est encore en vérité mondaine; la vérité absolue, en son essence, est au-delà de toute pensée discursive, et par conséquent inexprimable. En outre, dans l'absolu, réalité et vérité se confondent: l'ordre ontologique et l'ordre gnoséologique se rejoignent.

La vérité absolue est, comme nous l'avons vu, vijñāpti-mātrata. Celleci est identique pour tous les ālaya-vijñāna: l'idéalisme individualiste se résout en idéalisme absolu. Paradoxalement, le maintien du préfixe vi-semble indiquer que subsiste, au sein même de l'absolu, un élément de discrimination; mais l'objet, dans ce cas, est entièrement intériorisé; il est lui-même vijñāpti-mātra.

La vérité absolue est nirvāṇa «extinction». Le vijnānavāda classique définit quatre modes de nirvāṇa. Le nirvāṇa, non-existence du monde empirique en tant qu'absolu, est «essentiellement pur, sans commencement» (anādi-kālīka-prakṛti-suddha); il existe de tout temps en tant que tel, comme d'ailleurs la vérité absolue en général. C'est là le premier mode. Mais en tant qu'il semanfeste au terme du chemin de la délivrance, ou, si l'on veut, du yoga, il se définit comme l'arrêt des développements de la connaissance-réceptacle. Cet arrêt peut n'être pas définitif: il peut encore subsister, dans la connaissance-réceptacle, des germes qui ont une force projective suffisante pour porter leurs fruits; du moins l'ascète sait-il que cette force n'agira pas au-delà de la vie présente. Pour le reste de cette dernière, il est en nirvāṇa «avec restes» (sopadhi-śesa); à son terme, il entrera dans le nirvāṇa «sans restes» (nirupadhi-śesa), qui, lui, est un arrêt définitif des développements de la connaissance-réceptacle. Quant au quatrième mode de nirvāṇa, l'«extinction non fixée» (apraśṭhita-nirvāṇa), j'en parlerai par la suite.

La vérité absolue est bodhi «Eveil». On sait que tout le bouddhisme se centre autour de la bodhi, cet événement capital qui intervient dans la vie du Buddha historique, et aussi, pour la Mahāyāna, dans la carrière des Buddha «mythologiques» ou «métaphysiques», tels qu’Amitābha, Bhaisajyaguru, Vairocana, Prabhūtaratna; etc., et qui précisément les constitue dans leur nature de Buddha. La bodhi, en quoi le vijnānavāda reconnaît rétrospectivement une exemplaire āśraya-parāvṛtti, consiste en la compréhension de la nature véritable des choses, qui est leur absence de nature propre. Elle est de nature à la fois intellectuelle et spirituelle, et d'ordre métaphysique: la compréhension intuitive et directe de la nature des choses ne se distingue pas de la nature des choses elle-même. Il faut sans doute voir là une des racines de l'idéalisme bouddhique; mis en syllogisme, cela donne à peu près la formule suivante: la bodhi est la nature des choses; la bodhi est de nature intellectuelle; donc la nature des choses est d'ordre intellectuel. Bien entendu, au niveau où nous sommes, et dans le mode de penser indien, les éléments de cette inférence se telescèpent, pour ainsi dire, en une intuition globale. De même que le nirvāṇa, la bodhi est sans commencement, et, une fois réalisée, continue sans interruption pour toujours. Mais tandis
que le nirvāṇa est pure absence, la bodhi présente un élément positif: le Buddha historique, et les Buddha métaphysiques, continuent d’exister en quelque manière bien après que tous les germes contenus dans leur connaissance-réceptacle ont été épuisés.

La vérité absolue est buddhatā, nature-de-Buddha, «boudhité». La bodhi fait la buddhatā: c’est par l’Éveil qu’on devient un Buddha. Mais en tant qu’absolu, la buddhatā, comme la bodhi, comme le nirvāṇa, existe de tout temps. L’Éveil, et la nature-de-Buddha, qu’il instaure, ont été depuis toujours, dans la transmigration sans commencement, le statut authentique, la vraie nature des êtres: en vérité absolue, tous les êtres sont Buddha.

La vérité absolue est tathatā. Ce terme désigne la vraie nature des choses, non plus sous son aspect de pensée, mais sous un aspect plus neutre, plus indéterminé, bien qu’encore positif. La tathatā, c’est le fait que, en vérité absolue, les choses sont «ainsi», que leur véritable nature consiste en l’absence de toute détermination autre qu’un pur être-là. On pourrait dire que si le nirvāṇa est absence pure, la tathatā est présence pure: deux points de vue diamétralement opposés sur la même vérité absolue. L’anglais et l’allemand disposent pour ce terme d’équivalents commodes («suchness», «Soheit»); le français est moins favorisé: Oltramare115 a proposé «siccité», qui est un peu trop recherché pour un terme aussi courant; Sylvain Lévi116 s’est arrêté à «ainsité», qui manque cruellement d’élégance. Parmi les termes dont l’école idéaliste désigne la vérité absolue, tathatā est le plus neutre, le moins chargé d’implications gnésologiques ou sotériologiques. Il n’a par lui-même aucune connotation idéaliste, mais il est resté associé à l’école idéaliste tout au long de son développement historique117.

Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier que l’ālaya-vijñāna lui-même, tout en étant le support de la transmigration, est dans sa nature intime vijñāpti-mātra.

Quittons maintenant ces considérations sur la vérité absolue, et demandons-nous quel est le résultat pratique de la «révolution du point d’appui», de cette réorientation de l’organisme psycho-physiologique, qui le met désormais en contact permanent avec la vérité absolue. S’il s’agit de l’extinction, simplement la délivrance de la transmigration. S’il s’agit de l’Éveil, le résultat va beaucoup plus loin. Les Buddha continuent à exister en quelque manière, après que l’Éveil s’est en eux manifesté, et après que leur connaissance-réceptacle a épuisé son flux et ne se développe plus. Prenons l’exemple du Buddha historique, et interprétons-le selon les données de l’idéalisme. Par une formidable «révolution du point d’appui», le Buddha réalise l’Éveil. Sa vie se poursuit, car il reste encore des germes qui doivent fructifier. Arrive l’extinction. Mais l’extinction du Buddha, d’après le vijnānavāda, est une extinction d’une espèce spéciale, la quatrième mentionnée tout à l’heure. On l’appelle «extinction non fixée», parce que, disent les textes, le Buddha, qui l’obtient, ne se fixe ni dans la transmigration, ni dans l’extinction; autrement dit, tout en n’étant plus assujetti au monde, il ne s’engloutit pas dans cette pure absence qu’est le nirvāṇa sans restes. Tout comme l’Éveil, l’extinction non fixée dure sans interruption pour toujours. Le
Buddha subsiste donc à jamais, et sous une forme bien définie: celle de la Loi qu’il a enseignée, et qui est son essence la plus intime. Ce Buddha transmué en sa Loi, c’est ce qu’on appelle le dharma-kāya, «corps de la Loi». Mais, de même que le bodhi et la buddhatā, le dharma-kāya existe depuis toujours: la Loi du Buddha, qui rend compte avec exactitude et vérité de la nature des choses, est elle-même la nature des choses: lorsque les choses, ou si l’on veut les données du monde empirique, qui s’appellent aussi dharmas (au pluriel), sont établies dans leur vraie nature grâce à la prédication et à la pure compréhension de la Loi (dharma, au singulier), elles s’identifient à cette dernière. Le terme de dharma-kāya est encore une désignation de la vérité absolue, qui a des implications intellectuelles et éthiques, puisque le dharma est à la fois le vrai et le bien.

Il y a plus encore: non seulement le Buddha subsiste en son «corps de la Loi», mais il est doué, après avoir réalisé l’Eveil, de quatre «savoirs» (jñāna) qui lui permettent d’agir efficacement en ce monde pour le salut de tous les êtres. Ils sont obtenus par la révolution ou la conversion (parāvṛtti) des huit vijñāna qui appartiennent au «point d’appui», c’est-à-dire à l’organisme psychophysique. Les jñāna constituent donc l’envers, ou mieux l’endroit, des vijñāna; les «connaissances» discursives se transmutent en «savoirs» intuitifs.

Le premier de ces quatre savoirs, le «savoir du miroir» (ādarśa-jñāna), est obtenu par la conversion de la 8e connaissance, donc de la connaissance-réceptacle elle-même. C’est en somme l’ālaya-vijñāna établi dans sa véritable nature, qui est celle d’une activité qui fait connaître, sans plus (vijñāpti-mātratā). Le savoir du miroir reflète toutes les apparences que développent les autres connaissances-réceptacles encore chargées de germes, sans plus rien s’approprier pour son compte, et sans plus se développer en quoi que ce soit.

Le «savoir de l’égalité» (samatā-jñāna) résulte de la conversion de la 7e connaissance (manas), qui, on se le rappelle, avait pour objet la connaissance-réceptacle et la prenait faussement pour un moi, une personne continue, existant d’une manière durable. Une fois révolutionnée, elle conserve le même objet, mais le considère d’une manière complètement inverse: elle en voit la nature véritable, qui est tathatā; et au lieu de répartir en «moi» et en «miens», comme faisait le manas, les données que développe le 8e vijñāna, le savoir de l’égalité en voit la foncière «égalité» (samatā), puisque toutes elles sont tathatā en vérité absolue.

Le «savoir de rétrospection» (pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna) est obtenu par la conversion de la 6e connaissance, Car elle avait pour objet, directement, les données psychologiques, et, indirectement, les données matérielles; donc, en gros, les données, dans leur diversité qu’elle organisait en une connaissance empirique. Le savoir de rétrospection redescend et se retourne, comme l’indique son nom sanscrit, vers le monde des apparences. Il voit lui aussi les données dans leur diversité, mais sans plus prendre celle-ci pour réelle; il la rapporte à la vérité absolue, qui est tathatā.

Le «savoir d’efficacité» (kṛtyānusāha-jñāna) résulte de la conversion des cinq premières connaissances. Il représente véritablement l’Eveil en acte dans le monde des apparences. On pourrait dire que tous les actes accomplis par le
Buddha au cours des quarante-cinq années de son ministère, entre l’Eveil et l’extinction, manifestent son savoir d’efficacité. Même pour un Bouddha, tant qu’il demeure en ce monde, l’acte (karman) demeure la loi de la vie ; mais cet acte, qui s’était transmué en quiétude au niveau des trois premiers savoirs, devient au niveau du quatrième un acte parfaitement «dépolarisé» 19, qui n’est plus rapporté à un moi illusoire.

Les quatre savoirs sont à leur plénitude chez le Bouddha ; mais, à part le premier, qui ne se constitue qu’au moment de la suprême āsraya-parāvṛtti, c’est-à-dire de l’Eveil, ils apparaissent déjà à diverses étapes du yoga, s’affirment et s’affinent peu à peu jusqu’à atteindre leur perfection. Ils se retrouvent ailleurs dans le bouddhisme, notamment dans les quatre premières des «cinq sagesses» du bouddhisme tibétain. On voit que le yoga des Yogacāra, comme tous les yoga, n’est pas pur retrait des apparences ; il se double d’un mouvement de retour aux apparences, après qu’elles ont été connues dans leur véritable nature. Chez le Bouddha, ce «savoir» de la véritable nature est parfait, et permet dans le monde une action invariablement efficace, et entièrement affranchie de tout rapport avec un moi quelconque. Chez le yogin, l’action est efficace à proportion du degré de possession des savoirs. L’école Tch’an en particulier, qui fonde sa pratique de la méditation sur la psychologie du Vijñānavāda, insiste avec force sur cette possibilité d’un retour aux apparences et d’une action juste au sein des apparences, qui, plus encore que le savoir, constitue le terme dernier du yoga.

Explication des titres d’ouvrages cités en abrégé dans les notes


a. o. = and others.
BHSD: voir Edgerton, BHSD.
Daśabhūmika, éd. J. Rahder. Louvain, 1926.
Frauwallner, Date. Voir note 76.
Hattori, Dignâga, On Perception = Dignâga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignâga’s Pramânasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions translated and annotated by Hattori


K. = Abhidharmakosā.


kār. = kārikā, vers ou strophe didactique.


Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana. Voir note 27.


Lamotte, Vkn = L’Enseignement de Vimalakirti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa), traduit et annoté par Étienne Lamotte. Louvain, 1962. (Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 51.)


N.S. = nouvelle série.


The Pañcavināsatisāharsrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. by Nalinaksha Dutt. London, Luzac, 1934. (Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28.)


td. = traduction.


Tōhoku = Chibetto Daizōkyō Sōmokuroku. A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Sendai (Japan), Tōhoku Imperial University, 1934, 2 vol.

TP = T’oung Pao. Leyde, 1890 et suiv.

Trimsikā, éd. Lévi et td. Lévi. Voir note 82.


Vimsātikā, éd. Lévi et td. Lévi. Voir note 82.

Wayman, Analysis. Voir note 34.

WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.


Addendum


Notes

1 André Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 9e édition, Paris, 1962, p. 435.

2 Le terme sūtra signifie originairement « fil ». Dans le bouddhisme, il désigne tout texte considéré comme étant parole authentique du Buddha. Il y a dans l’emploi bouddhique de ce terme une image analogue à celle qui explique l’emploi du mot « texte », et on peut traduire sūtra par « texte ». On peut aussi lui préférer un équivalent moins général, tel que celui de « discours », qui se réfère alors au contenu des sūtra, sans égard à l’étymologie.

3 Nidāna « occasion » est précisément la désignation technique des termes du pratītya-samutpāda.

Dīgha ii 56. 28–32: kimpaccayā viññānan ti? iti ce vadeyya, nāmarūpa-paccayā viññānan ti ipp assa vusacanīya, iti kho ānanda nāmarūpa-paccayā viññānam, viññāna-paccayā nāmarūpam ... sambhavanti. « Que si l’on demande quelle est la condition de la conscience, il faudra répondre qu’elle a pour condition l’être psycho-physique. Oui, ānanda, la conscience se produit avec l’être psycho-physique pour condition; l’être psycho-physique se produit avec la conscience pour condition. » — Cf. I. Cl. II § 2283.

4 Ānanda ii 95. 1–2: yaṃ ca kho etam bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññānam iti pi ... « ce qu’on appelle, moines, pensée, esprit ou connaissance ... ». Même formule, Dīgha i 52: yaṃ ca kho idam vuccati cittam iti vā mano ti vā viññānam iti vā. — K. ii, kār. 34, éd. Pradhan, p. 61. 20: cittan mano ‘tha viññānam ekārtham; td. Hiuan-tsang T. XXIX 1558 iv 21c18; td. Paramārtha, T. XXIX 1559 iii 180c3; td. La Vallée Poussin, ii 176: « Pensée (citta), esprit (manas), connaissance (viññāna), ces noms désignent une même chose. » — Cf. Lamotte, Vkn, p. 52. — V. ci-dessous, p. 304.

5 Ānanda i 39.10–11 (cité Atthasālinī 66. 20–21):

cittena nīyati loko, cittena parikissati,
cittassā ekadharmassā sabbeva vasam anvagūti.

Parallèles chinois, T. II 99 xxxvi 264a 26–27, T. II 100 xii 459b 14–15. — En sanscrit, Abhidharmaśāstra, éd. Wogihara, p. 95. 22–23:

cittena nīyate lokaś cittena parikṣyate
ekadharmasya citasya sarva-dharmā vaśānugū ti.


1. manopubbangamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā;
manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā
iato nam dukkham anveti ca kakkam va vahato padaṃ.

2. manopubbangamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā;
manasā ce pasannena bhāsati vā karoti vā
iato nam sikkham anveti chāyā va anapāyini (var.: anapāyini).


Traduction: «Les données relèvent de l’esprit, c’est l’esprit qui est leur mieux, c’est l’esprit qui les constitue. Si on parle ou agit avec un esprit souillé, alors la douleur vous suit comme la roue suit l’attelage. – Les données relèvent de l’esprit; c’est l’esprit qui est leur mieux, c’est l’esprit qui les constitue. Si on parle ou agit avec un esprit pur, alors le bonheur vous suit comme l’ombre accompagne.»

On peut comprendre manopubbangamā en épithète («les données relevant de l’esprit, Dhammarama) ou en prédicat («les données relèvent de l’esprit), Lévi, Radhakrishnan). La tendance idéaliste apparaissait plus nettement dans la deuxième interprétation, qui est assez bien soutenue par la version tibétaine, Tib. Trip. 39 992 103.2.7–8, 119 5600 73. 1. 5–6 chos kyi sron du yid’ gro ste «l’esprit va en tête des données» – Matsunaga, Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation, p. 66.

8 Aṅguttara i 10.5–8, 10–11, 14–15: pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam tān ca kho āgantukhi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭhan ti (cité Atthasālinī 68.23, 140.25). pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam tān ca kho āgantukhi upakkilesehi vippamuttan ti. – Lamotte, Vkn, p. 52.


12 Ruegg, p. 412.

13 Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, éd. Vaidya, p. 3.18: prakṛtiḥ cittasya prabhāsvarā. Cf. Ruegg, p. 413. Les textes de Prajñā-pāramitā sont en prose; mais, de très bonne heure, la tradition S’est établie d’évaluer leur longueur en «stances», c’est-à-dire en unités de 32 syllabes: c’est le nombre de syllabes que compte le vers classique de la littérature sanscrite (śloka).

14 Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 9; Lamotte, Vkn, p. 57, n. 41.

15 Pañcavimsātasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, éd. Dutt, p. 121.14–122.3 (cf. Lamotte,
Vkn, p. 57 et n. 42): prakṛti cittasya prabhāṣvarā. Śāriputra āha: kā punar āyuśman Subhūte cittasya prabhāṣvaratā? Subhūtir āha: yad āyuśman Śāriputra cittam na rāgeṣa samyuktām na visamyuktām na dveṣṣa na mohena na paruyathānaḥ na nāvaramaiḥ na nāmaṃvaśaiḥ na samyojanaḥ na drśīkṛtaḥ samyuktaḥ na vi samyuktaṃ iyam Śāriputra cittasya prabhāṣvaratā. «La nature de la pensée est lumineuse. – Śāriputra dit: En quoi consiste donc, vénérable Subhūti, la luminosité de la pensée? – Subhūti dit: La luminosité de la pensée, Śāriputra, c’est qu’elle n’est pas associée à l’attirance et n’en est pas non plus dissociée; elle n’est pas associée à l’aversion, à l’erreur, aux irruptions, aux obstructions, aux résidus, aux entraves, aux vues fausses, et n’en est pas non plus dissociée.»

16 Samādhīrāja, éd. Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts, II, 2, p. 300.9–10:

yasya co mṛduki sanjñā nāmarūpasmi vartate, agrdhram nāmarūpasmi cittam bhoti prabhāṣvaram.


17 Three Chapters from the Samādhīrāja, n. 202 bas, p. 92.

18 Regamey, op. cit., p. 55, strophe 28: tīṣrō ... pāpiśāḥ sanjñāḥ(h); td. p. 92, et n. 204.


22 Lamotte, Samādhīnirmocana, p. 8–11.


24 Ed. td. P. Python, en préparation.

25 Lamotte, Samādhīnirmocana, p. 25.

26 Ci-dessous, p. 301 et suiv.

27 Saṃdhīnirmocana-sūtra. L’explication des mystères. Texte tibétain édité et traduit par Étienne Lamotte. Louvain, Paris, 1935. (Université de Louvain, Recueil de travaux publiés par les membres des Conférences d’histoire et de philologie, 2e série, 34e fascicule.)

30 D'où le titre de l'ouvrage: la prédication du Bouddha est souvent désignée comme simhanāda, «rugissement du lion» (Lamotte, Vkn, p. 98, n. 4).


35 Cf. Lamotte, Vkn, p. 92 et n. 2.


40 Cf. Takasaki, op. cit., p. 54.


42 Cf. Ruegg, p. 34–35.
45 V. Lamotte, Vkn, p. 92 et n. 2; sur Sthiramati, ci-dessous, p. 298.
46 Ruegg, p. 42 et n. 6.


52 Frauwaller, p. 296.
53 Éditée par Wogihara Unrai, v.n. 34 ci-dessus.
54 Frauwaller, p. 297.
55 Ib., p. 298.
56 Mahāyāna-sūtrālakāra XIII. 19: citam prakṛti-prabhāsvaram, «la pensée est lumineuse par nature».
57 Ib., IX. 22, 37, 56, etc.; v. Nagao, Index, s. v. tathātā.
58 Ib., VI. 7, 8, 10, XIII. 11, XIV. 30; cf. Nagao, Index, s. v. dharma-dhātu.
59 On le trouve aussi dans les sūtra anciens, mais avec une autre acception. – V. Edgerton, BHSD, s. v. dharma-dhātu; Siddhi, p. 751–754.
60 Mahāyāna-sūtrālakāra XIII. 19: tad āgantuka-dośa-dūṣhitam: «elle (la pensée) est souillée par les fautes adventices».

61 Le chapitre IX du Mahāyāna-sūtrālakāra traite longuement de la nature-de-Buddha.
62 Texte sanscrit et version tibétaine édités par Theodore Stcherbatsky et Eugene


La kārikā n’existe pas isolément dans l’original sanscrit, mais bien en version tibétaine (Tib. Trip. 108 5522) et en version chinoise (T. XXXI 1601).


64 Stcherbatsky, Abhisamayālaṃkāra, p. v: «Another peculiarity of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra is that it expounds the theory of Salvation without alluding to the typical tenets of the Yogācāra school». Sur l’appartenance doctrinale de l’Abhisamayālaṃkāra, v. ib.; Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 100; Ruegg, p. 70.
LA PHILOSOPHIE BOUDDHIQUE IDÉALISTE


V. n. 49, 63, 73, 38, 62, 69. Ruegg, p. 43.

Ruegg, p. 43.


P. 6–7, 296.

Ruegg, Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam, p. 155–156.


Cf. Frauwallner, p. 424; Schmithausen, Yogācāra-bhūmi, p. 12; Ruegg, p. 39–41, 427 n. 4; Yamada, Bongo butten, p. 127.

Demiéville, BEFEO, XLIV 2, p. 381 n. 4, 434 n. 9; Schmithausen, Yogācāra-bhūmi, p. 19 et n. 14; Frauwallner, p. 423; Ruegg, p. 39–45, 50–55. – Outre les références données par MM. Demiéville, Schmithausen, Frauwallner et Ruegg, rappelons que dans son édition de la Madhyānta-vibhāga-fūkō (ci-dessus n. 63), p. xv–xvii, M. Yamaguchi, dès 1934, suggérait une solution proche de celles de M. Ruegg et de


78 Frauwallner, Landmarks, p. 131.

79 Plus exactement, M. Frauwallner propose les dates suivantes: Maitreya-nātha, vers 300 ap. J.-C.; Asāṅga, vers 315–390; Vasubandhu l’ancien, vers 320–380; Vasubandhu le jeune, vers 400–480. Voir: Date, p. 54–56; Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 76, 296, 326, 327, 350; Landmarks, p. 130–131. La date de Maitreya-nātha dépend de celle de son disciple Asāṅga.


81 Frauwallner, Date, p. 55: «To his Mahāyāna works belong a commentary to Āryadeva’s Satasāstra, a commentary to Maitreyaṇātha’s Madhyāntavibhāgā, and several works on Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Daśabhūmikāśāstra, the Saddharma-pundarikapādaseṣa and the Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, as well as the Bodhicittotpādanasāstra.»


2 Commentaire (bhāṣya) du Madhyānta-vibhāga: ci-dessus n. 63.

3 Daśabhūmikā-śāstra: version chinoise, T. XXVI 1522; td. japonaise, Kokuyaku Issaiyō, Shakyōron-bu, VI.

4 Saddharma-pundarikapādaseṣa: deux versions chinoises, T. XXVI 1519, 1520.

5 Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra. Voir Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part I, Section I, p. 3–171, Roma, Istituto per il medio ed estremo
Oriente, 1956 (Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 9).—Le titre Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sāstra (ou "śūtra-sāstra, Tables du Taishō Issaikyō, n° 1510, 1511, 1513, 1514") est restitué du chinois.


b T. XXV 1510 consiste en deux recensions d’un commentaire écrit directement sur la Vajracchedikā, et qu’il convient d’attribuer non pas à Aṣāṅga (cf. Tables du Taishō Issaikyō), mais à Vasubandhu (Tucci, p. 18, 19). Ce commentaire existe également dans l’édition de Derge du Canon tibétain (Tōhoku, n° 3816), mais il manque dans celles de Narthang (Tucci, p. 8) et de Pekin (Tib. Trip.).


On aurait donc, de Vasubandhu le jeune, deux ouvrages hīnayānistes, l’Abhidharma-koṣa et le Karma-siddhi-prakarāṇa (Frauwallner, p. 425, et v. ci-dessous); et une série d’opusculæ mahāyānistes, d’une importance, pour plusieurs, sans rapport avec leur brīvēte: Pañca-skandhaka; Vāda-vidhāna, Vāda-vidhi, Vāda-sāra; Vīṃśatikā et Trīṃśikā.

Abhidharma-koṣa: ci-dessus, n. 75.


Pañca-skandhaka: version tibétaine, Tib. Trip. 113 5560; version chinoise, T. XXXI 1612; Frauwallner, p. 110.

Vāda-vidhāna: fragments sanscrits édités par E. Frauwallner, Zu den Fragmenten


83 I. Cl., § 2263; Barceau, Sectes, p. 282. – Les Sarvāstivādin sont ainsi nommés parce qu’ils admettent que les choses passées et futures existent réellement, aussi bien que les choses présentes (K., td. La Vallée Poussin, v 51).

84 Frauwaller, p. 360.

85 Ruegg, p. 431: les logiciens «sont considérés comme des doxographes comme des tenants du Cittamātra qui n’admettent pas l’ālaya (viṃśita)». Cf. Obermiller, Sublime Science, p. 99: distinction entre «Yogācāras or Viṃśatavādins basing upon Scripture (hui gi rjes ‘bran’s sens tsam pa = dagāmanusārino viṃśatavādin)» et «Logician Viṃśatāvādin (rigs pa’i rjes ‘bran’s sens tsam pa = nyāyanusārino viṃśatavādin).»


88 Rappelons que le nom même du Bihar vient du sanscrit viṭhāra, qui désigne un monastère bouddhique.


92 T. XXXI 1585. Td. française de Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Viṇṇaptimārātāsiddhi:

93 Cf. Tables du Taishō Issaiyō, n° 1585; T. XXXI 1585 i 1a5.

94 J. Cl. II, § 2086; Frauwallner, Amalavījñānam und Alayavījñānam, p. 148–149.

95 C’est ainsi que je ne traiterai pas de la théorie des trois natures, imaginaire, dépendante et accomplie, bien qu’elle appartienne en propre au Vijnānavāda; elle n’offre en effet aucun élément de nature véritablement idéaliste. M. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 300, fait observer que chez Maitreya-nātha en tout cas, elle a quelque chose de superfétatoire: «ein Zugeständnis an die Überlieferung der Schule».


97 Siddhi, Index, s.v.; Schmithausen, Yogacāra-bhūmi, p. 130.


99 Ci-dessus, p. 268.

100 Méditation deuxième: «Qu’est-ce qu’une chose qui pense? C’est une chose qui doute, qui entend, qui conçoit, qui affirme, qui nie, qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi et qui sent».


102 Il n’y a dynamisme qu’en vérité pratique (vyavahāra-satya), au niveau de la transmigration; en dehors, nous ne trouvons qu’une réalité absolue (paramārtha-satya). — La théorie des deux vérités, qui a été développée dans le bouddhisme ancien, a été maintes fois réexaminée et améliorée dans le bouddhisme moderne, avant d’atteindre la situation actuelle, mais n’est pas nullement absente du vijnānavāda; v. Siddhi, p. 547–553. — De ce point de vue, les images du fleuve et du miroir s’opposent: l’une est dynamique, l’autre statique.

103 Le rapport des germes et de la connaissance-réceptacle est, en fait, indéfinissable. Siddhi, p. 100: «Les Bijas, par rapport au Vijnāna, ... ne sont ni identiques, ni différents.» Cf. ib., p. 434.

104 Sept dans le vijnānavāda classique; six dans le Samdhinirmocana-sūtra.

105 Ci-dessus, p. 304–305.

106 Où citta est rapporté à une racine CI- «entasser», «accumuler», alors qu’il faut le rattacher à la racine CIT- «observer». A la vérité, cette dernière n’est qu’un élargissement de l’autre racine CI-, qui signifie également «observer» (Mayrhofer, Wörterbuch, s.v. ceati). Les deux racines CI- ont tendu à se confondre en sanscrit classique.

107 Du moins chez Asanga et dans le Vijnānavāda classique; mais le Mahāvīra-sraddhatad-pāda la considère comme universelle (Siddhi, p. 756).

108 Ci-dessus, p. 297.

109 Voir p. ex. Regamey, Tendances et méthodes de la philosophie indienne comparées
110 Siddhi, p. 135, 138.
111 Siddhi, p. 139.
112 Trimśikā, strophes 3ab, 5b–8a: éd. Lévi, p. 13, 18–19; td. Lévi, p. 72.
113 Ci-dessus, p. 269.
114 Siddhi, p. 670–671.
115 Théosophic bouddhique, p. 304.
116 Dans les Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra (ci-dessus, n. 82) et le Hōbōginrō.
THE SPIRITUAL PLACE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION IN BUDDHISM

E. Steinkellner


It is now just about a hundred years since the Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic (pramāṇavāda) entered, as such, the view of the scholarly world. After the serious research-efforts of — roughly speaking — three generations of scholars, we are slowly entering into a new phase of research, which I wishfully think of as the phase when the great remaining philological tasks will be taken up, and when the individual theoretical achievements of the tradition’s masters will finally be understood and judged in their value as contributions to the finding and solving of the relevant philosophical problems in detail. This, then, is a suitable moment, not only to survey and put in good order work done so far — and organize and prepare for future enterprises, but also to reflect in a more general sense on the validity and correctness of the hitherto gained concepts regarding this particular tradition’s meaning within the context of Buddhist and Asian culture.

My following remarks are an example of such a reflection. The question I shall use as a leitmotiv — the question for the “spiritual place” — has already been answered, I think: but the scholarly development of this answer (the difficulties in seeing what was always there, the sometimes forcible misinterpretations etc.), its “prehistory” is a dramatic diagram showing the course of the reaction of the so-called “Western”, or as I prefer to say “modern”, scholar to a specific Buddhist cultural phenomenon.

Within its relatively smaller cultural significance for the history of modern scholarly emancipation, this case-history is certainly comparable to the only other one that has been studied so far, i.e. the history of understanding the concept(s) of nirvāṇa in Western scholarship.²

That I present this case to a learned Japanese audience has good reasons. The significant progress of our knowledge of the epistemological tradition during the last two or three decades is largely due to the effort of a few outstanding
Japanese scholars. Without their work we could not hope today for any substantial further promotion of knowledge in the field. Some major studies have been written in this country in the last twenty years, and — what is equally important — an academic tradition has grown: a considerable number of young Japanese scholars seems to be devoted to the study of the epistemological tradition.

I am honoured and moved to have been given the chance to work with these colleagues and discuss my problems among them. And I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japanese authorities and the University of Kyōto who made this visit possible, and to my colleagues and friends, above all to Prof. Kajiyama Y., Prof. Mimaki K., and Dr. Yuyama A., who took upon themselves all the troubles that accompany such an invitation.

A final preparatory remark seems appropriate: As to the main points, you will not find many new facts or aspects in my lecture. Most of the facts and interpretational ideas will be known to the specialists. It's the reconsideration, the attempt to state clearly how far our understanding of this tradition's cultural meaning has come, that will hopefully receive the honour of your kind interest.

I

One of the causes for difficulty in understanding the features of particular cultural phenomena seems to be the situation that a scholar finds in his object of research something which he does not like to find. The evaluation of the long and fully developed tradition of Buddhist epistemology and logic has been marred by considerable interpretational injustice done by indological research, for the very reason that the appearance of the object and its context was not to the liking of the concerned scholars.

Nearly all Indian philosophical traditions after about the second century A.D. show a more or less distinct interest in epistemological problems. In the second phase of the great theoretical period of Brahmanical, Jainist, and Buddhist philosophy from about the fifth to the twelfth century A.D. these problems and their solutions provided the main directions and tasks of philosophical work. Within Buddhism it is Dignāga who, in the first half of the 6th century, founded a distinct tradition of epistemology. Henceforth this tradition acted an important part in the development of Indian philosophical thought by being partner sometimes, often model, and mostly opponent to similar Brahmanical and Jainist traditions throughout the second half of the millennium, and it became extinct in India only with the disappearance of Buddhism. While there is no real continuation of the tradition in Chinese Buddhism, the Tibetans have become its heirs and keepers. For the main stream of Tibetan Buddhism the categories and theories of the tradition are still valid today.

The presence of such a tradition with its primary interest in analysis of cognition and its tendency to apply the epistemological results to the ontological level of the systems has puzzled its modern interpreters. This is mainly because of the apparent contradiction that was assumed to exist between this analytical
approach and the clearly practical goal of all Indian speculation, particularly of Buddhist philosophy, which systematically and historically understands philosophical theory as a rational complement to the progress towards liberation.  

In short: It seemed to be incompatible that the Buddhist philosopher with his basically practical and religious goal would waste his efforts on investigations of seemingly purely theoretical, non-religious problems, such as the possibility and nature of perception, truth and falsity of cognition, logic, the meaning of words.

This seeming contradiction resulted in the peculiar fact that the question of whether this tradition assumed a spiritual status within Buddhism — if asked at all by scholars concerned — has usually been answered quite negatively. And the common denominator of these various negative attitudes is the opinion that the problems, intentions, work, and accomplishments of the tradition are essentially unbdhistic, heterogeneous to the teachings of the Buddha, and that, with the development of such a tradition, “worldly” interest had gained a footing within a religion that aims for liberation and is of meditational practice.

In terms of the motive mentioned for a misinterpretation we can roughly distinguish two kinds of wrong, or at least heavily one-sided, evaluations of this Buddhist tradition’s nature, both of which finally result in a misunderstanding of the tradition historically — within its context — and with regard to its spiritual function within the larger frame of Buddhism and then also of Asian culture in general. Both kinds of interpretations have been propounded by most eminent scholars in publications widely read and relied upon — which is a further reason why we should deal with this topic.

1. For a scholar such as Edward Conze, who understands and explains Buddhism with an emphasis on its practical, religious ideas, the phenomenon of a Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic has the distinct meaning of being a sign of a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic ideas and values of Buddhism during the last phase of Buddhism in India. It seems that he would rather not deal with this product of Buddhist culture at all; but, he says as he introduces the chapter “The later logicians” of his influential book Buddhist Thought in India, London 1962: “Both because of their theoretical importance, and the current interest in logic, we must briefly allude to the principles of Buddhist logic as developed by the school of Dignāga, Dharmakirti and Dharmottara . . .” (264).

Conze’s deprecating approach towards the tradition is conspicuously revealed by his later statements, e.g.: “At variance with the spirit of Buddhism, it can indeed be tolerated only as a manifestation of ‘skill in means’. Logic was studied ‘in order to vanquish one’s adversaries in controversy’, and thereby to increase the monetary resources of the order.” (265), and later: “The importance, validity and usefulness of Buddhist logic is circumscribed by its social purpose, and the works of the logicians can therefore exhibit the holy doctrine only in a distinctly truncated form.” (267).

This is the judgement of a scholar troubled by the historical fact of an epistemological tradition, because it does not fit into his picture of Buddhism.
2. We also have, however, the other, positive approach of Indological research to this tradition, but on the basis of the same estimation of the tradition as being unbuddhistic. This approach even culminates in celebrating the tradition as the philosophical achievement of India, but remains more or less uneasy about the fact that these philosophers did not try to shed their religious "adornment", that they were Buddhists after all.

It all started with Theodor Stecherbatsky. Stecherbatsky gave the first general philosophical interpretation of the tradition — in details obsolete, but as such still unsurpassed — in the four times¹ reprinted first volume of his Buddhist Logic, Leningrad 1932. The gist of his interpretation springs clearly from statements like: "The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons (hetuvidyā) or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge (pramāṇavidyā) or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge (samyagjñānavyupādanam). It is a doctrine of truth and error. In the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation. It claims to be the natural and general logic of the human understanding." (2), and: "As a religion Buddhism remained in this period much the same as it has been in the preceding one. Some changes were introduced in the theory of Nirvāṇa, of the Buddha, and of the Absolute in order to bring it in line with the idealistic principles of the system. The greatest men of this period seem to have been free thinkers." (13f.)

With Stecherbatsky the principal achievement of the tradition consisted in the development of a kind of liberal theory, emancipated from the religious background, although historically connected with it, and the basic ideas even of Buddhism in general seemed to him to be very near to modern world-views on scientific bases.

Stecherbatsky's attitude is representative of a period, when — until about 1928⁶ — leading Buddhist circles in the Soviet Union were still convinced of among the religions of this world. Thus Stecherbatsky's emphasis on the dialect was considered as a sufficient reason to grant to Buddhism an exceptional position among the religions of this world. Thus Stecherbatsky's emphasis on the dialectical and logical, and — in his opinion — "positive" tradition of Buddhism was therefore a timely one.

A similar attitude is extant in more recent interpretations with a background in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophies which have taken the perspective of not accepting as "philosophy" anything that is not analytical and critical philosophy. Such interpreters are not particularly troubled by the "religious" component of our tradition for the simple reason that within the limits of the self-adjusted focus on their research-object they do not deal with this aspect at all.

A clear-cut proponent of this attitude is A.K. Warder in his Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Delhi 1971.⁷ Lovers of our tradition should rejoice over such an attitude's advantageous effects on the interest and literary space reserved for it — de Jong in his review⁸ weighs nine lines for Śaṅkara against sixteen pages for
Dignāga in Warder’s book —; but this emphasis is for the wrong reasons, as I shall show. It therefore produces an unbalanced historical picture, and is thus in the long run rather an impediment to propagating a true understanding of the tradition’s aims.

3. This positive approach is of course not limited to “Western” scholars; we find it with “Indian” scholars too. A good example is Sukumar Dutt who shares Stcherbatsky’s opinion of the epistemological tradition in his book *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London 1962, showing, however, a different motivation for his interpretation which I am tempted to term “nationalistic”.

Dutt takes the epistemological tradition totally at face value, i.e. as the theoretical basis of Buddhist success in learned and polemical disputations. Beyond that he considers epistemology and logic to be one of the main characteristics of the period of the decline of Buddhism. The essential change of Buddhist monastic culture during the second half of the first millennium A.D. was a progress “from ‘Study for Faith’ to ‘Study for Knowledge’” (319). “A phenomenon, increasingly evident in the decline of Buddhism, is the gradual modification of the purely conventional character of the monasteries. From being seats of monk-life and monk-culture, they grew into centres of general learning and liberal scholarship.” (319). The centres of this development are those big monasteries (*mahāvihāra*) that are usually called “universities”. Dutt understands these establishments mainly as places for general education: “This traditional learning of the monasteries had been at its beginning a cloistered pursuit-learning in canonical lore for the benefit and use of monkhood. But it was progressively liberalized — extended and enlarged in its scope and contents and made available not to monks alone, but to all seekers after knowledge.” (319), “The monasteries, having grown up as seats of liberal learning, . . . . . . They seem to have partaken of the character of *studia generalia*.” (325), and “Some of the monasteries which had grown into seminaries of learning . . . developed an organization entitling them to be classed as ‘universities’.” (327).

In short: Dutt tries to transform these Buddhist monasteries into old Indian universities. But although the development of a university character is quite distinct — e.g. participation of laymen in the general education —, Dutt’s emphasis on phenomena of secularization in general and on the purely secular utility of our tradition’s achievements in particular is biased in accordance with his aims.

All these “secularistic” interpretations take the superficial appearance and practical function of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as the sole basis for an interpretation of its cultural meaning. They praise it highly for the very reason that it is assumed to present a development of rational secularization within Buddhist monastic culture, or — to put it in an exaggerated way for clarity’s sake — for the reason that it presents dawning of “modern, Western” progress within the “dark ages” of traditional religious India. On the other hand, scholars with inclinations towards the religious, practical, and mystical components of Buddhism tend to scorn this same tradition for the very same reasons.
The assumption common to all these approaches is that the epistemological tradition presents an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism. And the methodical fault common to all these approaches is that none of them raises the question of the tradition’s self-understanding.

But precisely this self-understanding, the tradition’s awareness of its own character, aims, and motivations, is clearly formulated from the very “beginning” of the tradition, i.e. the composition of the Pramanasamuccaya, and it has not only never been lost by Dignāga’s followers, but has rather been developed and deepened. A historical and critical answer to the question of the spiritual place and cultural function of the epistemological tradition within Buddhism, therefore, has to take its cue from the specific answer given by the tradition itself.

II

This answer can be found in the Maṅgala-verse of Dignāga’s Pramanasamuccaya. It was conceived with a stroke of genius around 530 A.D., and can be considered the cornerstone that marks the historical border between the dialectical and the truly epistemological period of our tradition. Its importance is not only underlined by the literary masses written as a commentary to it, but also by the attitude toward it in later Buddhist history. The verse, together with Dignāga’s own explanation, is well known thanks to Prof. Hattori’s brilliant philological work, the edition, translation and explanation of the whole first chapter. With gratitude I take advantage of his work and would like to refer to the Appendix II which shows the logical structure of the first half of the verse in accordance with Prof. Hattori’s scheme of p. 74 and his translation.

Let me first quote the translation of the verse, which deviates only slightly from Prof. Hattori’s, since I prefer to translate the term pramāṇabhūta in its technical meaning:

“Saluting Him, who has become a means of valid cognition, who seeks the benefit of all living beings, who is the teacher, the sugata, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the (Pramāṇa-)samuccaya, uniting here under one head my theories scattered (in many treatises).”

Dignāga explains the meaning of the Buddha’s attributes in the verse’s first part as follows: The fact that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition is the result of the development of certain qualities to perfection. These qualities are further differentiated as perfections in cause (hetu) and perfections in effect (phala), where the two terms “cause” and “effect” bear the meaning they have as categories of describing the career of a Bodhisattva. There is a causal relation between these qualities and the status of having become a means of valid cognition (hetuphalasampattiyā pramāṇabhūtavā). The first two perfections, his
perfection in intention (āśayasampad) and his perfection in practice (prayogasampad), guarantee that the Buddha does not teach anything that is deceitful and wrong; that means, he does not lie, and what he has seen himself he transmits to other beings without distortions. The second two perfections, his perfect attainment of his own objectives as well as of those of other beings (svaparārthhasampad), guarantee that what he has seen is of value for others; for he has not only gone the whole path, but he also knows exactly the needs of all other living beings. These qualities together constitute the fact that the Buddha’s words are not only valid, but also valuable.

Due to the lack of pre-Dharmakīrti commentaries on the Pramāṇasamuccaya, we have, I think, no way of knowing for sure whether Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the causal relation between the qualities of perfection in cause and effect on the one side, and the Buddha’s having become a means of valid cognition on the other side, as a logical relation is in accordance with Dignāga’s original intentions. Or, in other words, whether it is true that Dignāga’s intention was to conceal a veritable inference or proof in the garb of a series of five successive attributes in the dative. A reader unbiased by the later understanding would take the meaning to be that Dignāga emphasizes pramāṇabhūla as a new attribute, adding to it the causes for this quality summarized in the four other attributes. He then would say Dignāga’s purpose in writing the book is to establish the means of valid cognition, to explain what a means of valid cognition is, how many there are, and so on. On the other hand, this problem is minor, since we must take the understanding of the later tradition as the decisive one; and that understanding has been shaped by Dharmakīrti.

This first part of the verse, then, has been interpreted as a proof in the commentarial tradition shaped and determined by Dharmakīrti. The Buddha, subject of the proof, is said to be an authority, a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). The logical reason is twofold, consisting on the one side of his self-acquired knowledge of the final goal and of the path towards it, and on the other side of a certainty — itself due to his perfect compassion — that he does not deceive other beings in mediating this knowledge of the goal and the path to them. The first elaborate explanation of the verse as such a proof is to be found in the chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika which is entitled “establishment of the means of valid cognition” (pramāṇasiddhi).

The import of this proof of the Buddha’s being a means of valid cognition, or, in other words, of the authority of the Buddha’s words, for a Buddhist theory of valid cognition seems evident. But the relation between the theory of valid cognition as such and the words of the Buddha hidden in this verse and its commentaries has to be determined as precisely as possible if we suspect some general cultural significance in it.

In a recent article Prof. Nagatomi quotes the introductory general statement of Prof. Hattori in the latter’s notes on this verse. According to Prof. Hattori Dignāga shows himself to be a true heir of the “critical attitude” of the Buddha: “Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority
of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid.” (my spacing). While this statement is certainly correct with regard to Dignāga in its general terms, it cannot be taken — and was not intended to be taken, I think — as a statement referring to the relation between the validity of the means of valid cognition and the words of the Buddha.

If it is taken as an interpretation of this relation, wrong conclusions will be drawn. The possible source of such misinterpretation is the expression “critical test”. For “critical test” in this context can have two meanings: It can be understood as a critical test of the assumption that the Buddha’s words are valid, i.e. as an investigation and finally an argumentative establishment of their validity, a “pramāṇasiddhi”; or it can be understood as a critical test of the validity of the Buddha’s words, i.e. a process to judge whether these words are true or false.

Prof. Nagatomi took it in this latter meaning, and develops the following scheme: “The testing of the validity of the Buddha’s words requires a tool which was for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the pramāṇa, the valid means of cognition. Such a tool, at least in principle, may be expected to be one which is universally acceptable to all and free from dogmatic premises and presuppositions . . . . . . . We must note, however, that the final authority by which they claimed the validity of their pramāṇa system was none other than the Buddha’s words which they accepted as authentic by faith. Thus the Buddhist pramāṇa system and the authenticity of the Buddha’s words stood, in reality, in a reciprocal relation: the structuring of the former was done within the limits of the latter, and the latter was meant to be supported by the former.”

Nagatomi rightly concludes that the epistemological methodology of Dignāga was intended “to articulate the nature of the Buddhist ways of knowing by translating their prototypes drawn from the Buddha’s words into the vocabulary of epistemology, logic and semantics.” He also has the right feeling about a reciprocity of the relation in question, but his interpretation of this reciprocity remains on the surface, and his statement that they, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, accepted the Buddha’s words as authentic by faith comes as a considerable shock to the reader who has just been informed by Hattori’s words and Nagatomi’s paraphrase that these philosophers did not accept an unconditional authority of the scriptures. Thus according to Nagatomi’s explanation there is in fact no real reciprocity in the relation between “the Buddhist pramāṇa system and the authenticity of the Buddha’s words”. For his scheme means that a tool, the pramāṇa, is used to test the validity of the Buddha’s words. But this testing is not taken seriously: Since the validity of the tool is derived from the Buddha’s words, Prof. Nagatomi thinks that these are only “meant to be supported by the former” (ibid.), their real authority being accepted by faith.

In short, this conception of the relation between the theory of valid cognitions and Buddhist revelation is insufficient. Is there a better one? Yes. Even though another scholar, L.W.J. van der Kuijp, regrets in the beginning of another recent article that “the Pramāṇavārttika and its position within the continuum of
Buddhist philosophy which, despite the efforts of a handful of scholars, have not been adequately treated up to the present day" (6) and that "the position of logic within Buddhist philosophy and the answer to the question whether it should play a role in Buddhism at all has been ignored by Western scholars..." (6; my spacing), this is not true at all.

Not only have there been clear answers as I tried to show in the beginning — without, for various reasons, — also asking the question — but a fully acceptable explanation of our problem has been elaborately presented by Tilmann Vetter in his book of 1964, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti.

III

Vetter’s explanation, of course, is one of Dharmakīrti’s “profound re-elaboration” (loc. cit., 9) of Dignāga’s position. If Dharmakīrti, however, decided to develop a theory of valid cognition taking his stand on Dignāga’s Māṇgala-verse,22 and if the following tradition considers itself as being determined by this interpretation, we have to take this interpretation of Dharmakīrti as the source for an understanding of the answer to the question we are asking; an answer that must be admitted to be — with respect to our possibilities of a critical, contextually secured interpretation — enigmatically hidden in this Māṇgala-verse for lack of pre-Dharmakīrtian sources commenting upon it.

The two paragraphs of Vetter’s explanation most important for our context are translated in the appendix I to this paper. I would like to repeat his results in accordance with the structural lines given by our problem:

Valid cognitions (pramāṇa, samyagjñāna) are a necessary presupposition of meaningful human action.23 The Buddhist’s actions are orientated towards the goal of emancipation. This goal and the path leading towards it have been shown by the Buddha. The Buddha thus offers a goal and guidance for human activity that cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition, i.e. perception and inference. However, that he is an authority for this has to be proven, for faith alone is an insufficient motive to be a Buddhist. The words of the Buddha can be accepted as an authority only when it has been demonstrated that they are words of somebody who shows through his conduct that he does not lie, and who because of the development of his experience has something to tell us that cannot be mediated to us in another way. For the last goal of human actions, which also is the only point of orientation for everyday human practice, has to be indicated by such an authority, since it is never immediately present — or it would not be a “last goal”. This is the gist of Vetter’s explanation.

The structural scheme of these ideas of Dharmakīrti turns out to be a true circle: The decisive defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is the demand that it must stand the test of meaningful practice (avisamrādāna), and connects it with the Buddha as the one on whose authority one knows what meaningful practice is. The reciprocity then is brought about by the need to prove this authority of the Buddha. For the words of the Buddha
(āgama), as such, have neither guarantee for their truth nor for success on following their advice. Their validity must be accounted for, and it is accounted for by the Buddha himself: “The statement that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition is proven through reference to the means by which he has become one.”

This is the program of Dignāga as expounded by Dharmakīrti. It offers the answer to our question of the spiritual place of an epistemological tradition within Buddhism. Dignāga’s program contains the idea of a philosophical foundation of Buddhism, understood as human practice orientated by the words of the Buddha. Historically this means nothing else but that Buddhism, too, takes its part in that general philosophical development in India, from about the 3rd and 4th century A.D. onwards, that is characterized by an ever increasing interest in problems of dialectics, logic, and general epistemology.

The motive for such interest essential to our context can be found for the first time in the epistemology of the Sāṃkhya-teacher Vṛṣagana from the beginning of the 4th century A.D., according to Frauwalner. Vṛṣagana seems to have been the first in India not only to consider epistemology as a prerequisite for the elaboration of his systematic philosophy, but also to establish his system methodically on, and by means of, this epistemology by creating a theory of inference which was such that the actual inferences used as a philosophical tool permitted the argumentative derivation of the system’s metaphysical principles.

Already this case of Vṛṣagana shows what is valid for all other epistemological traditions, too: that the respective epistemology is developed, being linked up with the philosophical system. That — in other words — there is in India no emancipation of epistemology from the respective systematic ideas, and that epistemology nowhere becomes a “positive science” in the sense of Th. Stcherbatsky.

The Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic thus presents another clear example of the relativity of epistemological thought. Buddhist epistemology turns out to be related to a certain order of the values and goals that govern human practice; it therefore cannot be investigated and evaluated without reference to this order, as if it were separated from it. The epistemological achievements of this Buddhist tradition thus not only have their truly deserved position in the general history of Indian philosophy, and so of the history of the human mind, but also in the history of Buddhism as a religion.

Appendix I: A translation of T. Vetter,
Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien 1964

p. 27: “The means of valid cognition have to procure cognition for action. The definition that something new is cognized by these (PV II 5c) raises perception to the primary source of cognition. The definition that cognitions have to hold good (avisamvādana. PV II 1) puts the truth of every cognition to the test of success in action, and offers the opportunity to designate the Buddha as a means
of valid cognition, although nothing new is cognized through words as such. The Buddha, however, is not equated with perception and inference. He is considered as a means of valid cognition, because his authority legitimates the authenticity of perception and inference. For the Buddha gives goal and guidance of action, which perception and inference cannot give, and which would be disposed of only by a superficial rationality (flache Aufklärung). That he is an authority on this has yet to be proven. For nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust. This results in a historical-factual circle, which Dharmakirti has rightly not avoided.”

p.31f.: “When inference has been made available, the question of the Buddha as a means of valid cognition can be asked. Not in anyway is the transmitted word of the Buddha, as such, to be considered as an authority only because somebody who passes for holy uttered it, or because it is considered by many as an authoritative transmitted record (āgama). Not until it is shown that these words originate from somebody who proves through his conduct that he does not lie and who has something to say that is not at everybody’s disposal, not until then, can he be accepted as a means of valid cognition. The highest goal of action has to be given by such an authority; for it is not immediately present, or it would not be the highest goal, since as soon as the highest goal has been reached there is no need for any further activity, except if one aims for the highest goal of other beings too.

The Buddha is the subject of which it is predicated that it knows this goal, and that it acts (= makes known) only for the sake of others. The reason for this is its conduct. Only a conduct that is pervaded by the possession of the highest goal can be of a kind as the Buddha’s. But that alone would not be sufficient. The Buddha is also the subject of which it is predicated that it knows the means that lead towards this goal. The reason for this is the process of its development.

The second chapter (pramāṇasiddhi) of the PV mainly deals with this proof of the Buddha’s authority. Through his authority, in turn, the authenticity of perception and inference are legitimated. If in this way a Buddhist system expresses in full awareness where it takes its foundations from, it is able, on the other hand, to modify these foundations by a logical procedure, measuring these foundations with the measure of reason.”
Appendix. II: Causal/logical scheme of PS I. lab

result/thesis: *bhagavat = pramāṇabhūta*

(the Ven. has become a means of valid cognition)

causes/reasons:

hetusampad (perfection in cause)

cause/grounds:

āsayasampad

(perf. in intention)

pravṛttagasampad

(perf. in practice)

phalasampad (perfection in effect)

cause/grounds:

svārthasampad

(perfect attainment of his own objectives)

parārthasampad

(perf. attainment of the objectives of others)

cause/grounds:

jagatādhitaśāti

(taking as his purpose)

śāstra

(being the true teacher)

the benefit of all

living beings

Notes

1 This lecture has been delivered during the Spring-semester 1982 at the University of Tōkyō, of Kyōto, of Kyūshū, and at Waseda University.


7 Cf. his “preliminary definitions” p.1 f.; J.W.de Jong in his review (*IJ 16*, 1975, 147–149) rightly stresses the incongruity of Warder’s approach.

8 loc.cit. 148.

9 Concerning the motives of these monasteries’ promotion through the Gupta kings he says: “To build monasteries and provide for their upkeep was regarded more as a service rendered to the cause of learning and culture than to the cause of Buddhism.”(331)

10 For the purpose of explaining the educational position of the “science of logic (hetu-vidyā),” e.g., he makes use only of sources that present it as one of the traditionally secular sciences (323f.): the two Chinese records, and Bu-ston who follows the secularist interpretation of the early Sa-skya-pa. He then explains what I-tsin describes as the first, general level of the dialectical and logical education (transl. Takakusu, 176f), but does not deal with the “higher level” of these studies at all (cf. *ibid.*, 186), unaware, however — or leaving us uninformed — of any such differentiation.

11 cf. the legendary report of its composition in Bu-ston’s history (transl. Obermiller, 150).

First drawn by M. Nagatomi (cf. note 22), 266.

In accordance with Hattori’s note 1.3.


However, I have not seen so far a real formulation (prayoga) of this proof, or a series of such formulations – comparable, e.g. with the formulations in dGe-lugs-pa-exegeses of the pramāṇa-siddhi-chapter (cf. my paper: Tshad ma’i skyes bu. Meaning and Historical Significance of the Term, Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium Velm-Wien, Wien 1983, n.19) - earlier than the “commentarial” text from the appendix to the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti, 521, 5–13 (cf. T. Kimura, Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi-shō ni tsuite. Tōhoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai. Ronshū 2, 1970, 64ff.


loc. cit. 246; the quotation is from Hattori, loc. cit., 73.

loc. cit., 246

ibid.; cf. Vetter, loc. cit., 33, where he refers to Dharmakirti’s derivation of the truth about the means of valid cognition from the words of the Buddha in the four concluding verses of the pramāṇa-siddhi-chapter (PV II 282–285).


Cf. the introductory sentences in Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti (ed. Gnoli) 1.8f., and Pramāṇaviniścaya I (ed. Vetter) 30, 12f.

Vetter, loc. cit., 32.

ON SAPAKSA

Tom J.F. Tillemans

Since Dharmakirti, Buddhist epistemologists have generally held that a reason (hetu; linga) is valid when it satisfies three characteristics (rupa): (a) the pakṣad-harmatā, the fact that the reason qualifies the subject (pakṣa; dharmin) (b) the anvayavyāpti, or the reason’s occurring in only “similar instances” (sapakṣa); (c) the vyatirekavyāpti, or the reason’s complete absence from the “dissimilar instances” (vipakṣa).1 Although this much is by now thought to be fairly standard material for us, the second characteristic, or the anvayavyāpti, is in fact far from clear in much of our secondary literature, rendering surprisingly complex our general picture of the trairūpya theory of valid reasons and that of the fallacy of asādharaṇānaikāntikahetu or “uncertain reasons which are [too] exclusive”. The culprit is, as you have no doubt surmised, sapakṣa.

It should be of some consolation to us to know that many of the problems with which we are struggling on these questions were also hotly debated among Tibetans, in particular among the epistemologists of the dGe lugs pa and Sa skya pa schools. And indeed, I think that it is fair to say that many authors in the secondary literature, such as Stcherbatsky, Kajiyama, Tachikawa, Gillon and Love, and others, hold a position which, in its essentials, is not far from that of Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251) and the followers of the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter. In that sense, one could credibly maintain that the Sa skya pa position embodies quite well what is for us the received view, or the “orthodox scenario” on the matter. The dGe lugs pa position, by contrast, seems startling at first sight, and even among Tibetans, Nag dbaṅ bstan dar (1759–1840) lamented that it appeared to be rarely understood.2 It may, then, be useful for someone to play the role of the devil’s advocate and explain this heterodox position. That is what I intend to do. But first of all we need to have the background.

A. The orthodox scenario

Here then, in broad outlines, is the Sa skya pa position as it is to be found in the Rigs gter literature of Sa pan and Go ram pa bSod nams sen ge (1429–1489),3 and as it is portrayed by the opposition, namely the dGe lugs pa writer Se ra rje
bsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1478–1546). (The latter author’s work, rNan ‘grel spyi don, is a commentary on the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, and in particular on rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s (1364–1432) commentary, rNam ‘grel thar lam gsal byed.)

(1) Sapakṣa are those items which are similar (sa = samāna) to the subject in possessing the property to be proved (sādhyadharma). Vipakṣa are all those items which do not possess this latter property.

Corollary: Sapakṣa cannot be identical with the subject, i.e. they cannot be the subject. Thus, sound is not a sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence, but a vase is; sapakṣa are all those items which have the sādhyadharma, except the subject.

(2) The terms sapakṣa and vipakṣa also designate respectively the “homologous example” (sādharmyadrśtānta) and the “heterologous example” (vaidharmadṛśtānta) on the basis of which the anvaya and vyatirekavyāpti are established.

(3) When a reason is co-extensive with the subject, then it cannot occur in sapakṣa, which must by principle (1) be outside the extension of the subject. To take one of the standard cases, audibility (śrāvanatva), which is co-extensive with sound, cannot occur in sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence; such sapakṣa do not exist, as they would have to be both audible and non-sounds. Alternatively, we can say, in keeping with (2), that there is no sapakṣa qua example on the basis of which the vyāpti could be ascertained. Of course, audibility is also absent from the vipakṣa, or the non-impermanent items, with the result that this type of reason will be said to be asādharanānaikāntika — a special fallacy which is incurred when a reason is neither present in sapakṣa nor in vipakṣa.

Now certainly points (1) and (2) are not without support in Indian texts. Dignāga, in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, had defined a trirūpalīrīga (“triply-characterized reason”) as a reason which is present in the inferendum (anumeya) and in what is similar to it, and is absent in what is not [similar to it].

(Note that here anumeya designates the subject.) And Mokṣākaragupta in his Tarkabhāṣā had explained:

Sapakṣa are instances which are similar (samāna), that is to say, subjects which are examples (drśtāntadharmin) that are similar to the pakṣa [i.e. to the subject].

(Note the use of the term drśtānta in this context.) There are also, of course, some important passages from Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu — but these will be taken up later on.

Although the two quotations given above do not explicitly state the corollary
of (1) that sapakṣa cannot also be the subject, it can probably be thought of as simply implied by the word samāṇa — a point which Gillon and Love (1980) make in their study on the Nyāyapravēśa. The Sa skyā pas, however, argue for this corollary in a variety of ways. Sa paṇ himself in his Rigs gter ran 'grel devotes almost half a dozen folios to arguing against an opposing view which maintained that sapakṣa and vipakṣa are directly contradictory (dḥos 'gal), or in other words, that whatever is a sapakṣa is not a vipakṣa and vice versa. This position, according to Sa paṇ, held that all knowables (śes bya) were determined (kha tshon chod) as being in one of the two pakṣa (phyogs), i.e. sapakṣa or vipakṣa, these being defined respectively as what does or does not possess the sādhyadharmā (bsgrub bya'i chos dañ īdan mi īdan).

To this, Sa paṇ offers a number of counter-arguments, some of which might seem somewhat arcane, but the main ones for our purposes are as follows:

(a) If the pakṣa (i.e. the subject) were also determined, or ascertained (nīs pa), as being in the sapakṣa or vipakṣa, as the opponent’s position would imply, then there could be no enquiry (śes 'dod = jijñāsā) as to whether it does or does not possess the sādhyadharmā. In that case, the definition of pakṣadharmata, with its provision that the subject be something about which the opponent enquires, will become problematic. States the Rigs gter:

Because he does not accept something enquired about as being the subject (phyogs = pakṣa), the first basis of reliance (ltos gzi) [viz. the pakṣa of the pakṣadharmā] would be non-existent. For one who does not accept this first basis of reliance, the pakṣadharmata’s definition will be problematic.

(b) The opponent would be unable to term homologous examples (mthun dpe = sādhyadharmyaḍṛṣṭānta) “sapakṣa”, because the latter would also include the subject — and the subject is a fortiori not a homologous example. (We have here a version of point (2). In fact, Sa paṇ is citing this version of (2) in support of the corollary of (1).) States the Rigs gter ran 'grel:

If the basis of debate (rtsod gzi) [i.e. the subject] is determined as being in [one of] the two pakṣa, then one will be unable to call homologous examples “sapakṣa”; for the basis of debate will also be a sapakṣa.

Sa skyā Pandita’s adherence, then, to the view of a tripartite universe of pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa stands out clearly. What is also remarkable is that the opposing view which he describes, and which Go ram pa attributes to “various early scholars” (sìön gvi mkıras pa īnams), is in fact very close to the position of the dGe lugs pas. We shall return to this point later on, but for the moment let us without further ado look at some aspects of the dGe lugs view.
B. Sapakṣa taken etymologically and sapakṣa properly speaking

'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa’i rdo rje Nag dbāṅ brtson ’grus (1648–1721), in his rTags rigs textbook, introduces a distinction between sapakṣa taken in the etymological sense (sgra bṣad du ’jug gi mthun phyogs) and sapakṣa proper. Sapakṣa taken etymologically are those items which are similar to the subject in possessing the sādhyadharma, while vipakṣa taken etymologically are all those items which are not similar from this point of view. In effect, then, the sapakṣa spoken about in the above quotes from the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Tarkabhāṣā could — following ’Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa’s views — be taken as showing sapakṣa explained in its etymological sense. For that type of sapakṣa, the corollary of (1) might very well follow, although ’Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa himself does not say anything either for or against.

At any rate, sapakṣa properly speaking, which is what must figure in the definition of the anvayavyāpti, is something quite different. Taking the sound-impermanent reasoning as a basis, he defines sapakṣa as what is not void (mi ston) of the sādhyadharma, and vipakṣa as what is void. He then goes on to say that sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence is co-extensive (don gcig) with impermanence, whereas vipakṣa for this proof is co-extensive with non-impermanence (mi rtag pa ma yin pa). Later dGe lugs pa logic manuals, such as that of Yoṅs ’dzin Phur bu lcog byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1825–1901), have similar definitions. Yoṅs ’dzin rtags rigs, for example, states:

The definition of sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence is: What, in keeping with the proof mode (bsgrub tshul) for establishing sound’s impermanence, is void of impermanence.

“Proof mode” here simply refers to the yerbs yin (yin bsgrub) or yod (yod bsgrub). Thus, for example, if one is establishing that fire exists (me yod), then the sapakṣa will be all those places where fire exists (yod) rather than all cases which are (yin) fire.

We can, then, summarize ’Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa and Yoṅs ’dzin Phur bu lcog’s characterization of sapakṣa and vipakṣa proper as follows:

For all x: x is a sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence if and only if x is impermanent. For all x: x is a vipakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence if and only if x is not impermanent.

Now, given this view of sapakṣa proper, ’Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa clearly does not agree that sapakṣa must exclude the subject. And moreover this type of (proper) sapakṣa will bear only limited resemblance to the sapakṣa of points (1) and (2), viz. sapakṣa taken etymologically. In fact, ’Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa and Yoṅs ’dzin Phur bu lcog both devote a number of pages in their rTags rigs texts
to show that the two types of sapakṣa stand in a “three point” (mu gsum) relationship.²² What this comes down to is that “sapakṣa taken etymologically for proving [some proposition] P” (de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs kyi sgra bṣad du 'jug pa) is a proper subset of “sapakṣa for proving P” (de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs). (Here it might be useful to remark that Tibetan logic texts have means to express individual and propositional variables: khyod (“you”) can be used in a manner similar to our individual variables x, y, z, etc., whereas de (“that”) is used as a variable ranging over propositions or states of affairs, much in the same way as P, Q, R, etc. are used in formal logic. This is why I have translated de sgrub kyi ... as “... for proving P”, rather than a strictly literal “... for proving that”.)

Let us, then, represent the relationship between the two types of sapakṣa for proving P by means of the following diagram, all the while stressing that P can be any proposition one wishes so long as it is the same in both cases.

A = the class of sapakṣa taken etymologically for proving P; B = the class of sapakṣa (proper) for proving P.

The question naturally arises as to what Indian textual support, if any, can be found for this dGe lugs pa view on sapakṣa proper. It is interesting to see that in this context 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa cites a well-known line from the Nyāyabindu (NB II, 7), one which also occurs in the Nyāyapravēśa.²³ The Sanskrit and Tibetan are as follows:

<sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno 'rthah sapakṣah // mthun phyogs ni bsgrub par bya ba 'i chos kyi spyi daň don mthun pa'o //³⁴

The usual interpretation of this verse — as we see, for example, in Stcherbatsky (1930), Tachikawa (1971) and Gillon and Love (1980) — is to read the instrumental sādhyadharmasāmānyena as meaning “through ...” or “by ...”, or “insofar ...”. I might remark in passing that although these authors prefer to take sāmānya here in its sense of “sameness”, it would seem to me better to take it as meaning “universal”, in the technical sense of the noun, all the more so because Dharmottara clearly contrasts it with viśeṣa:

Now, what is to be proved is not a particular (viśeṣa), but rather, a universal. Thus, here, he says that it is a universal which is to be proved.²⁵
If, following Dharmottara, we take the compound sādhyadharmasāmānyena as a karmadhāraya, it would then be better translated as something along the lines of "on account of the universal which is the sādhyadharmā", and with this amendment the translation of NB II, 7 would become:

*Sapakṣa are things which are similar [to the subject, i.e. the pākṣa] on account of [possessing] the universal which is the sādhyadharmā.*

So taken, NB II, 7 would seem like a perfect specification of what the dGe lugs pa have been calling "sapača taken etymologically" — however, that is not what 'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa seems to take it to mean at all. Here the divergence of interpretations is understandable if we compare the Sanskrit and its Tibetan translation. The Tibetan has (instead of the instrumental) ... dan don mthun pa, which can only be translated as "an object similar to ..." Thus, translating the Tibetan of NB II, 7 we get:

*Sapakṣa are objects which are similar to the universal which is the sādhyadharmā.*

'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa, using the technical language of debate and mtshan nid, argues that this verse shows that sapakṣa (proper) includes both the “exclusion-universal” (spyi ldog) of the sādhyadharmā and all that is similar to it, viz. the “exclusion-bases” (gzi ldog). These are technical terms in dGe lugs pa philosophy, and although a satisfactory explanation would necessitate an excursus into apoha theory, for our purposes the point can be expressed in simpler terms: sapakṣa includes the sādhyadharmā universal itself and everything which is similar to, or which has, this universal. The subject can also be a sapakṣa.

But basically, though, to make a long story short, I do not think that we can easily side with 'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa in interpreting NB II, 7. Although there is nothing in Vinītadeva’s commentary on the Nyāyabindu which would exclude such an interpretation (the Sanskrit is not extant, and the Tibetan naturally speaks of ... dan don mthun pa), Dharmottara’s commentary does not support it; in fact, Dharmottara clearly justifies a translation such as that of Stcherbatsky, et al., duly amended. In short, although 'Jam dbyāns bṣad pa himself seems to find his textual grounding in NB II, 7, I think that we will have to look elsewhere.

Curiously enough, it is Sa skyā Paṇḍita who provides the clue as to the Indian precedents for the dGe lugs pa position. (I say “curiously” because the dGe lugs pa are of course post-Sa pan.) Recall that earlier on, when we were discussing Sa pan’s position, we spoke of a view which held that sapakṣa and vipakṣa are directly contradictory, that all existents are classifiable as either one or the other, and that sapakṣa and vipakṣa are respectively to be defined as what does or does not posses the sādhyadharmā. Now, in the Rigs gter rañ 'grel, Sa skyā Paṇḍita explicitly states that these definitions of sapakṣa and vipakṣa — and hence also
the other two points, which follow from such definitions – were accepted by “certain people who followed the teacher Śāntipa” (= Ratnākaraśānti, a 10th–11th century thinker who formulated the position of “intrinsic entailment” (antarvṛtyāpti)).

Indeed it is true that Ratnākaraśānti himself did put forward these particular definitions; they can be found in his Antarvṛtyāptisamarthana. Moreover, it turns out that the dGe lugs pa definitions, along with their consequences, are identical to those of the Antarvṛtyāptivādins. Although Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa and Yoṅs ‘dzin Phur bu leog had phrased things a little differently, using the terms “non-voidness” and “voidness”, it does come down to the same position. And interestingly enough, a few lines further on in the Rigs gter raṅ grel, we see that Sa paṅ himself speaks about certain people who took sapakṣa as being what is not void of the sādhyadharma, and vipakṣa as being what is void: he says flatly that this is nothing different from the other formulation (de ṇid las ma ‘das so).

It can be determined with reasonable certainty that some post-Sa paṅ thinkers, such as Na dpon Kun dga’ dpal, did subscribe to Ratnā-karaśānti’s views on Antarvṛtyāptivāda. Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan quotes passages from the Na fikā – which is most likely Kun dga’ dpal’s now lost commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika – where the latter author endorses Ratnākaraśānti’s views. However, concerning the pre-Sa paṅ Antarvṛtyāptivādins, whom Go ram pa characterizes as “various early scholars”, I am unable to ascertain who they were.

What is noteworthy, though, is that while the Antarvṛtyāptivāda definitions of sapakṣa and vipakṣa seem to have found their way into the dGe lugs pa school, the cardinal tenet of antarvṛtyāpti did not. Ratnākaraśānti had argued that for the intelligent examples were not necessary to ascertain the anvayavṛtyāpti – it could be ascertained in the subject – and similarly, the fallacy of asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu was only for dullards. Now, the dGe lugs pa do not subscribe to that. In fact, as can be seen from a passage from rGyal tshab rje which I have translated and included as an appendix, the dGe lugs pa came down squarely on the side of the traditional view of “extrinsic entailment” (bahirvṛtyāpti), which maintained that examples were necessary and that the fallacy of asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu was inescapable in the case of certain types of reasons. It is probably fair to say that as a unified, coherent system, Antarvṛtyāptivāda caused no more than a few ripples in Tibet. While some thinkers before and after Sa paṅ probably did consider themselves Antarvṛtyāptivādins, they were, it seems, the exception. The Sa skya pa generally did not endorse it, and the dGe lugs pa only subscribed to its views on sapakṣa and vipakṣa, which, as we shall see, they managed to harmonize with a version of the asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu.

C. Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan on the asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu

Let us look at a few passages in rNam ‘grel spyi don where Chos kyi rgyal mtshan debates with the Rigs gter ba, the followers of the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter.
ON SAPAKṢA

First of all, Chos kyi rgyal mtshan presents Sa skyā Paṇḍita’s fourfold classification of the different forms of this hetu,35 the first of the four being the sound-impermanent-audible case, where, in true orthodox fashion, Sa pañ maintained that the reason was completely absent from both the sapakṣa and the vipakṣa. Chos kyi rgyal mtshan then argues that such an asādhāraṇaṅkaṅkikaheṭu just does not exist. Why? I quote:

Because if something is an asādhāraṇaṅkaṅkikaheṭu (thun moṅ ma yin pa’i ma nes pa’i gtan tshig) for proving sound’s impermanence, it must be present in only sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence.36

With a bit of reflection we can see that this does in fact follow from the dGe lugs pa notion of sapakṣa (proper): if something is co-extensive with sound, then it must be exclusively present in impermanent things, i.e. in the sapakṣa (taken dGe lugs pa-style).

Next, we get the Rigs gter ba reply:

To that, the followers of the Rigs gter say: “There is a reason for saying that audibility is both completely absent in the sapakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence and is also completely absent in the vipakṣa.

For audibility is both completely absent from sapakṣa [such as] vases for proving sound’s impermanence, and it is also completely absent in vipakṣa [such as] space. Therefore, all the preceding consequences [such as, inter alia, the non-existence of such a type of asādhāraṇaṅkaṅkikaheṭu,] do not refute [our position]. For, ‘sapakṣa (mthun phyogs) for proving sound’s impermanence’ and ‘valid homologous example (mthun dpe yan dag) for proving sound’s impermanence’ are co-extensive (don gcig), and ‘valid heterologous example (mimithun dpe yan dag)’ and ‘vipakṣa for proving sound’s impermanence’ are also co-extensive. And [furthermore] if [one says that] there does not exist an uncertain reason (ma nes pa’i gtan tshigs = anākaṅkaṅkikaheṭu) for proving sound’s impermanence which is absent in the respective sapakṣa and is also absent in the respective vipakṣa, then there would be the fault that the text [i.e. the Pramāṇasamuccaya] which says, ‘the paksadharma is present or absent in the sapakṣa’ and so on, could not be accepted literally.”37

To this Chos kyi rgyal mtshan offers two rejoinders. Firstly, the equation between homologous examples and sapakṣa is faulty. If they were the same, then it would follow [absurdly] that a rocky mountain, which does not arise from effort, would be a valid homologous example for proving a conch sound’s impermanence through the reason, ‘arisen from effort’, because it is a sapakṣa in such a proof.
After all, a rocky mountain is a *sapakṣa*, because it possesses the sādhyadharma, impermanence, but it cannot be a homologous example, as it is not an instance of the property which is cited as the reason, viz. “arisen from effort”.

Secondly, when Dignāga in the *Hetucakra* and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* says that a reason such as “audibility” is completely absent in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, what he means, according to Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, is that the opponent who ascertains the paksādharmatā cannot, in this case, establish that audibility is present in the *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*. The point is that audibility is in fact there in exclusively the *sapakṣa*, but the opponent cannot know this without an example, and in this case an example is not forthcoming. Thus, we have the fallacy of an uncertain reason (*maṅ pa’i gian tshigs = anaikānti-kahetu*) in that the anvayavyāpti cannot be ascertained (*pa = niścīla*) by one of the parties in the debate.

Accordingly, the key moves in the dGe lugs account of the asādhāraṇānakāntakahetu are that they make a split between their (redefined) notion of *sapakṣa* and that of homologous examples, and then they “psychologize” Dignāga’s statements about existence and non-existence as meaning “... knows that ... exists/does not exist”. They can then argue that in certain special cases, such as the sound-impermanent-audible reasoning, where there is no example which differs from the subject, it is impossible (i.e. epistemically impossible) that the opponent ascertains the presence of the reason in the *sapakṣa*. (A fortiori he will not ascertain its presence in the *vipakṣa*, because it is in fact not there.) In this context, we should also stress that this interpretation of “existence”/“non-existence” or “presence”/“absence” is certainly not just an invention on the part of Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, et al., but finds some support in Dharmakīrti’s *svavṛtti* to kārikā 28 of the *Pramāṇavārttika’s Svārthānumāna* chapter. (The *svavṛtti* passages are given in bold-face; the rest is Karnakagomin’s commentary as found on p. 84 of Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition.)

kathan tarhyy asādhāraṇāvatāc chrāvaṇatvam nityāṇityayor nāṣṭity ucyaata ity āhā kevalan tv ityādi/nityāṇityesu śrāvaṇatvasya bhāvanīcyāhābhāvāti/śrāvaṇatvam nityāṇityayor nāṣṭity ucyaat “Now then how is it that audibility is said to be absent in both permanent and impermanent [things] because it is an exclusive [attribute]? [Dharmakīrti] answers: But it is just ... etc. [It is just] because audibility is not ascertained as being in either permanent or impermanent [things] that audibility is said to be absent from what is permanent or impermanent.”

Finally, as we shall see in the appended passages from rGyal tshab rje, the essential points of the dGe lugs account can be expanded and developed also to refute the Antarvyāptivādin – i.e. even if one dispenses with examples altogether, the opponent will still be incapable of ascertaining both the paksādharmatā and the anvayavyāpti. The basic line, though, remains the same: instead
of asking factual questions as to whether or not the reason is present in sapakṣa, one inquires about what the opponent can or cannot reasonably know or think — in effect, the asādhaṇānānakāṅkṣikahetu has been transformed into a problem of epistemic or belief logic.

D. Some brief remarks on the formal issues at stake

All the preceding may still seem like a series of bizarre moves to one who is accustomed to the received scenario, but it is not, I think, without its merits, especially formal logical merits. (I cannot attempt a very detailed exposition here — only some guidelines — but the main arguments will be fleshed out in formal logic in the notes.)

Firstly, it can be argued, as does S. Katsura (1983), that at an earlier stage in the development of Buddhist logic, anvaya and vyatireka jointly served as a type of inductive procedure, but that with the addition of the particle eva to the formulation of the trairūpya — following Katsura this occurs already with Dignāga’s Pramānasamuccayavṛtti — and the requirement that there be a necessary connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the sādhyadharma, this inductive logic was gradually replaced by notions of entailment which were more formal in character.40 It seems to me that the orthodox model of sapakṣa and vipakṣa and the asādhaṇānakāṅkṣikahetu would apply quite well to such an inductive logic; one “observes” that the reason is present in a number of examples/sapakṣa, and absent in various counterexamples/vipakṣa, and one then induces that a new and different case, viz. the subject, will also have the property in question.

However, applied to a trairūpya with eva, it can be shown that the orthodox model presents serious formal problems, not the least of which is that the anvaya and vyatireka are not logically equivalent.41 Indeed it demands a most acute effort of logical acumen to see how the conclusion could be entailed at all.42 The main advantage, then, of the dGe lugs pa interpretation of sapakṣa and vipakṣa — whatever might be its textual and historical grounding — is that it does overcome those formal problems. And moreover, in contradistinction to the Antarvyāptivāda approach — which would also avoid the formal pitfalls, but which would have to sacrifice the role of the example and the fallacy of asādhaṇānakāṅkṣikahetu — the dGe lugs pa can and do still keep these important elements of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s logic.

E. Appendix: from rgyal tshab rje’s rnam ’grel thar lam gsal byed

[Opponent:] It does follow that the vyatirekavyāpti is established in proving that sound is impermanent by means of [the reason] audibility. For, audibility exists in only impermanent things and never in what is permanent. If it were otherwise, then sound too would not be established as impermanent.
[Reply:] Now then, does a reason make [something] understood like a butter-lamp, i.e. by its mere competence, or does it depend on the ascertainment of a necessary connection (‘brel ba = saṃibandha; pratibandha) in the example [between it and the sādhayadharma]?

Taking the first [hypothesis], it would then follow [absurdly] that one could understand a sādhya simply by having a reason such as “produced” come to be an object of the mind; for, it would make [the sādhya] understood in the same manner as a butter-lamp, which, by merely coming to be an object of the mind, clarifies forms. If [the opponent] agrees, then [we reply that] it would follow [absurdly] that no-one would be confused about selflessness (bdag med = nairātmya), and that [all] would, hence, be effortlessly saved.  

But taking the second [hypothesis], then “audibility” could not be established as both the paksadharma proving sound’s impermanence together with the vyatirekavyāpti. This is because it is impossible to ascertain the necessary connection in the example before establishing the sādhya.

[Objection of the Antarvāptivādin:] To demonstrate the necessary connection to a dullard one does depend on an example. But the intelligent, even without an example, will remember the connection as soon as they see the reason, as they have previously established the entailment (khyab pa = vyāpti) by means of direct perception (mnon sum = pratyakṣa). And given this [recollection], they will understand impermanence in [the subject] sound. So although an extrinsic entailment (phyi'i khyab pa = bahirvyāpti), which depends on an example, would not be ascertained, an intrinsic entailment (naṃ gi khyab pa = antarvyāpti) would; hence, audibility will be a valid reason.

[Reply:] This is incoherent. For, if [the opponent] ascertains that things audible are impermanent, then he must also ascertain that sound is impermanent [in which case he could no longer doubt the truth of the sādhya, as the criteria for the paksadharmatā require].

[Objection:] But then it would follow [absurdly] that audibility is not the defining characteristic (mtshan ńid = lakṣaṇa) of sound [as it should be possible to ascertain a defining characteristic and not ascertain its definiendum (mtshon bya)].

[Reply:] This is not a problem. In general it is so that the two [viz. sound and audibility] have differing degrees of difficulty of ascertainment. But unless one discerns what the subject, sound, is through a means of valid knowledge (tshad ma = pramāṇa), it will be impossible to prove the paksadharma [tā], namely, that audibility is established in [sound] in keeping with the mode of presentation (’god tshul). So if audibility is not a paksadharma, then it cannot be a valid reason. But when it is a paksadharma, then one cannot fail to ascertain sound once one has ascertained audibility. And then, even if audibility might make the sādhya understood, it is not possible that one [i.e. the opponent] fails to ascertain that sound entails impermanence when he has ascertained that audibility entails impermanence. [Hence, he cannot have the necessary doubt of the sādhya].
ON SAPA KSA

F. Tibetan text


mān byas sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa la Idog khyab grub par thal / mān bya mi rtag pa kho na la gnas kyi rtag pa la nam yaṅ med pa'i phyir / gzan du na sgra yaṅ mi rtag par mi 'grub par 'gyur ro že na / 'o na gyan tshigs mar me bzin du run ba tsam gyis go byed du 'gyur ram / dpe la 'brel ba ŋes pa la bltos /

dan po ltar na gyan tshigs byas pa sogs blo yul du soň ba tsam gyis bsgrub bya go nus par thal / mar me blo yul du soň ba tsam gyis gzugs gsal bar byed pa dan / go byed kyi tshul mtshuṁs pa'i phyir / 'dod na /'gro ba 'ga' yaṅ bdag med la rmoṅs pa med pas 'bad pa med par grol bar thal lo//

phyi ma ltar / mān bya sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i phyogs chos dan / Idog khyab gnis ka tshogs pa ma grub par thal / bsgrub bya ma grub pa'i snar 'brel ba dpe la ŋes pa mi srid pa'i phyir /
gal te rmoṅs pa la 'brel ba ston pa dpe la bltos pa yin gyi mkhas pas ni dpe med par yaṅ / snar khyab pa mān sum gyis grub nas rtags mthoṅ ma thag 'brel ba dran nas de'i rjes su sgra la mi rtag pa go bas dpe la blots pa'i phyi'i khyab pa ma ŋes kyaṅ naṅ gi khyab pa ŋes pa yod pas mān bya rtags yaṅ dag tu 'gyur ro že na /
mi rigs te / mān bya mi rtag par ŋes na sgra yaṅ mi rtag par ŋes dgos pa'i phyir ro//

'o na / mān bya sgra'i mtshan ŋid ma yin par thal lo že na /
skyon med de / spyir de gnis la ŋes dka' sla yod kyaṅ / chos can sgra tshad mas gtan la ma phebs par mān bya de la 'god tshul ltar grub pa'i phyogs chos grub pa mi srid pas / phyogs chos su ma soň na rtags yaṅ dag mi srid la / phyogs chos su soň ba'i tshe mān bya ŋes nas sgra ma ŋes pa mi srid la / de'i rjes su bsgrub bya go bar byed na yan mān bya la mi rtag pa'i khyab pa ŋes nas sgra la mi rtag pa'i khyab pa ma ŋes pa mi srid pa'i phyir ro //

Notes

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1 For the different uses of “paksā” (i.e. thesis, subject, sapakṣa/vipakṣa), see Staal (1973). The question if Dignāga also subscribed to this type of formulation of the trairūpya with the particle eva (“only”) is dealt with in Katsura (1983). For an
ofcited formulation from Dharmakirti, see NB II, 5: trairūpyam punar āṅgasyānum-
-eye sattvam eva spakṣaiva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam.
2 See his commentary on Dignāga’s Hetucakra, p. 9a (p. 151 in gSūn 'bum Vol. ka): de isam go mktan dkon par snai noi.
3 For Go ram pa, I am relying on his two commentaries on Sa pa’s Rigs gter: the Rigs gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa = sDe bdun mdo daṃ bcas pa’i Dégo pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa iṣhad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, and the Rigs gter gyi dka’ gnas = Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par brad pa sde bdun rab gsal. Cf. in particular the chapters on ran don rjes dpag (svārthānunāna), pp. 91b2–19a5 and pp. 223a3–278b4 respectively.
4 Cf. the quotations from Dignāga PS and Mokṣākaragupta given below. For the substitution of sa for samāna, see Kajiyama (1966) n. 165 and Durvekamiśra’s DP ad NB II, 7 pp. 97–98.
5 Cf. Note 29 below.
6 Cf. e.g. Tachikawa (1971) p. 135, n. 33: “Both the sapakṣa and the vipakṣa must be different from the pakṣa.” Gillon and Love (1980), p. 370: “That substratum in which superstratum S is and which is different from pakṣa is sapakṣa.”
7 Cf. the quotation from Rigs gter raṅ 'grel below (Note 16). Note that point (2) is also reflected in modern authors; Mimaki (1976), for example, systematically translates sapakṣa by “l’exemple homogène.”
8 Kajiyama (1958) p. 363 writes: “If the reason belongs exclusively to the minor term, as in the case of audibility which is supposed to prove momentariness of sound (minor term), no homologous cases which are audible and momentary are variable. In this case we cannot ascertain validity of the major premise, ‘Whatever is audible is momentary’. ‘(Kajiyama specifies that he means sapakṣa by “homologous cases” and vipakṣa by “heterologous cases”).’ Stcherbatsky (1930) p. 208 n. 1 and Tachikawa (1971) n. 33 p. 135 have similar formulations.
11 Tarkabhāṣā (Mysore ed.) p. 25: samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣaḥ / pakṣena saha sadṛṣṣa dṛṣṭānādharminy arthāḥ/
12 Gillon and Love (1980) p. 370: “Also, it is reasonable to assume that the word “samāna” (“similar”) restricts any two things to be regarded as samāna (i.e., similar, as opposed to identical) to non-identical things.”
13 Rigs gter 18b4–19a4, SKB 5, pp. 163–164. Raṅ 'grel pp. 132b–137b (For the Rigs gter raṅ 'grel, references are to the first set of page numbers appearing on the front side of the folios.), SKB 5, pp. 233–235.
15 Rigs gter 18b6–19a1, Raṅ 'grel 134b5–6: šes 'od phyogs su mi 'od phyir // ltos gzi daṃ po med par 'gyur // ltos gzi daṃ po mi 'od pa // 'di la phyogschos mthshan nīd dka' // For the requirement that the anumeya (= ākhaṁ) be enquired about, cf. PVin II ed. Steinkellner p. 30. Both the Sa skya pa and the dGe lugs pa incorporate this requirement into their definitions of the paksādharmas, by using the term šes 'od chos can (“subject of enquiry”) (cf. Rigs gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa p. 96b5–6) or šes 'od chos can skyyon med (“faultless subject of enquiry”). This latter dGe lugs pa term is defined in Yoṅs 'dzin rtags rigs (p. 17 ed. S. Onoda) as: khyod byas pa’i rtags kyi sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa’i rtsod gzi brui ba yan yin / khyod byas par tshad mas nes nas / khyod mi rtag pa yan min la šes 'od žugs pa’i gan zag srid pa yan yin pa’i gzi mthun par dmgis pa / . The essential point, then, which this definition makes is that it must be possible (srid pa) to ascertain that the subject is qualified by the reason (e.g. that sound is a product) and still doubt or wish to know whether the
subject is qualified by the śādhyadharma (e.g. whether or not sound is impermanent). Go ram pa and Yōns 'dzin Phur bu lcog alike say that for the pākṣadharmatā to be satisfied, the reason must qualify such a “subject of enquiry”. They both also speak of “bases of reliance” (ltos gzis) of the three characteristics (tshul = rūpa), the “subject of enquiry” being the basis for the pākṣadharmatā(tā), and sapakṣa and vipakṣa being the bases for the anvaya and vyatirekavāyāpti respectively (Cf. Go ram pa op. cit. pp. 95a6–95b2; Yōns 'dzin rtags rigs p. 17 and p. 19). Finally, I cannot help remarking that Sa pan’s argument could probably be answered without too much difficulty by a dGe lugs pa: although it is true, he could answer, that in general (spyir) the subject is determined as being in one of the two pākṣa, the opponent himself does not determine that fact, and so can preserve his doubt.

16 Ran 'grel p. 135a3–4: rtsod gzis phyogs gnis su kha tshon chod na mthun dpe la / mthun phyogs zes brjod mi nus te / rtsod gzis an mthun phyogs yin pa'i phyir ro llos.
Note that rtsod gzis is another term for the subject (chos can = dharmin).

17 Rigs gter gyi dka' gnas p. 227b2, SKB 12, p. 114.

18 For the section on sapakṣa (mthun phyogs) and vipakṣa (mi mthun phyogs), see pp. 6b–13a (pp. 190–201 in collected Works of Jam dbyangs bzad pa vol. 15 (ba)). Cf. also Yōns 'dzin rtags rigs pp. 19–22. The fact that this question of the two ways of construing sapakṣa and vipakṣa is usually discussed in rTags rigs texts, which are introductions to pramāṇa studies for young monks, shows that this was an often debated topic in the dGe lugs curriculum. For vipakṣa, cf. also Note 29.

19 p. 8a (p. 191, Collected Works). Yōns 'dzin Phur bu lcog (p. 19) phrases the relationship in terms of yin khyab mīnam (“equal entailment”). Don gcig and yin khyab mīnam are not exactly the same notions – although for our purposes the difference can be overlooked here. For yin khyab mīnam, see Yōns 'dzin bsdus grwa chuh, in particular the third lesson (rnam bzag), ldog pa nōs 'dzin. Don gcig is discussed in Nag dba'i ni ma's bsdus grwa brjed tho p. 36. At any rate, whether we speak of F and G being yin khyab mīnam or being don gcig, it will follow that (x) (Fx ↔ Gx) i.e. for all x: x possesses F if and only if x possesses G.

20 sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i bsgrub tshul dan mthun par mi rtag pas mi stōn pa / sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i mthun phyogs kyi mtshan niid / (p. 19).

21 Cf. 'Jam dbyangs bzad pa'i rtags rigs p. 7b. 'Jam dbyangs bzad pa also uses 'god tshul ('mode of presentation”) and speaks of yin 'god and yod 'god in the context of sapakṣa and vipakṣa, which is perhaps slightly unusual, as these terms in other rTags rigs texts are more often reserved for the definitions of the three characteristics (tshul gsum). At any rate, the idea is the same: one is explicitly eliminating possible confusions between the Tibetan verbs yin and yod.

22 'Jam dbyangs bzad pa'i rtags rigs pp. 8b–9a; Yōns 'dzin rtags rigs, pp. 20–21. (Yōns 'dzin’s heading (sa bcad) sgra bsdad 'jug gi mu bzi risi ba must be an error.) Following 'Jam dbyangs bzad pa’s presentation, the three points are: (a) something which is a sapakṣa for proving P and which is also a sapakṣa taken etymologically for proving P (de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs yin la / de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs kyi sgra bsdad du yod pa'i mu /). For example, a vase, when one is proving that sound is impermanent. (b) something which is a sapakṣa for P but is not a sapakṣa taken etymologically for P (de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs yin la / de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs kyi sgra bsdad du med pa'i mu /). For example, unconditioned space (‘dus ma byas kyi nam mkha’), when one is proving that sound is permanent. It is a sapakṣa for such a proof, because it is permanent. But it is not a sapakṣa taken etymologically because “it and sound are not both similar in being permanent. Why? Because it is permanent and sound is impermanent.” (khyod dan sgra gnis rtag par chos mi mthun pa'i phyir te / khyod rtag pa yin pa gan zib / sgra mi rtag pa yin pa'i phyir /). (c) something which is neither (gnis ka ma yin pa'i mu). For example, a rabbit’s horn. For an explanation of mu gsum, mu
bzi, don gcig and such structures in Tibetan debate logic, see Onoda (1979). Finally, it
should be noted that both 'Jam dbya’ns bzad pa and Yo’ns ’dzin Phur bu lcog also
sketch out a three point relationship between vipakṣa for P and vipakṣa taken
etymologically for P.

23 NP 2.2 in Tachikawa (1971).

24 For the Tibetan, see the edition of de la Vallée Poussin, p. 3.

25 NBT ad NB II, 7: na ca viśeṣaḥ sādhyāḥ, api tu sāmānyaṃ / ata iha sāmānyaṃ
sādhyāṃ uktam/.

26 Cf. NBT ad NB II, 7: sādhyāḥdharmaṃ cāsau sāmānyaṃ ceti... See also DP. It would
seem that Gillon and Love (et al.) have taken the compound as an instrumental tatpur-
usa. Cf. their denominization: “[Tasya] sādhyādharmāḥ [pakṣasya] sādhyādharma-
mena samānah iti anena [pakṣena] samānah arthaḥ sapakṣah.” (p. 370). Cf. also
Stcherbatsky’s translation (p. 59): “A similar case is an object which is similar
through the common possession of the inferred property.” Vinñātadeva can be read as
taking the compound as a genitive tatpurusa: ... bsgrub par bya ba’i chos te / de’i
spyi ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos kyi spyi o / (p. 57).

27 rTags rigs, pp. 10b6–11a2. For these terms see the ldog pa nos ’dzin chapter of Yo’ns
’dzin bSud grwa. Tsön kha pa, in sDe bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel,
p. 40, defines ldog pa (= vyāvṛtti) as: rtog pa la rigs mi mthun las log par snan ba’i
chos gnas zig / dnos po ma yin pa / rtog pa la gzugs su snan ba lta bu / (“A dharma
which appears to conceptual thought as excluded from [all] kinds which are dissimilar
to it, and which is not a real entity. For example, what appears as form (= rūpa)
to conceptual thought.”)

28 NBT ad NB II, 7 (p. 98): sādhyādharmaṃ cāsau sāmānyaṃ ceti sādhyādhar-
masāmānyaṃ samānah pakṣena sapakṣa ity arthaḥ //. Cf. se 59a2–3: de ni bsgrub
par bya ba’i chos kyi yan la / spyi yan yan te / bsgrub par bya ba’i chos kyi spyi
phyogs dañ mthun pa ni mthun pa’i phyogs yin no žes bya ba’i don to. // Note that in
the Tibetan too, phyogs dañ mthun pa (samānah pakṣena) renders unambiguous the
meaning of NB II, 7. (I should mention that ’Jam dbya’ns bzad pa’s rTags rigs, in the
edition which I have, reads ... spyi’i don mthun pa ... for NB II, 7, which must
simply be an error.)

29 Note that in NB II, 8, Dharmakīrti defines asapakṣa (= vipakṣa) as what is not
sapakṣa (na sapakṣo ’sapakṣaḥ), and here Durvekamiśra glosses on NBT as follows:
sapakṣa yo na bhāvatiś sādhyādharmaṁ yo na bhāvatī arthaḥ (DP p. 98). Moreover,
in NB II, 2.2 we find vipakṣo yatra sādhyāṃ nāsti, which along with Durvekamiśra’s comment on NB7, suggests that all and only those things which do
not possess the sādhyādharma are vipakṣa. This seems like what the dGe lugs pa are
terminating vipakṣa (proper). Certainly vipakṣa taken etymologically is different from
this, as we can see from ’Jam dbya’ns bzad pa’s and Yo’ns ’dzin’s arguments that they
have a three point relation (mu gsum) Cf. Note 22. (Tachikawa p. 117 gives quite the
same etymological explanation of vipakṣa as the Tibetan authors, saying: “vipakṣa
means anything dissimilar to the pakṣa insofar as it does not possess the sādhyā.”) All
this could, then, provide a certain amount of ammunition for a dGe lugs pa argument
that there are notions of sapakṣa and vipakṣa proper in Dharmakīrti.

30 Ran ’grel p. 132b4–5: kha cig slob dpon šanti pa ’i rjes su ’bras nas bsgrub bya’i
chos dan ldan pa mthun phyogs/ mi ldan pa mi mthun phyogs žes zer la /. For
antarvyāpti, see Kajiyama (1958), Mimaki (1976).

31 Antarvyāptisamarthana (ed. H. Shāstrī) p. 112, line 17–18: sādhyādharma-yuktaḥ
sarvah sāmānya-sapakṣaḥ, atadyuktaś cāsāpakṣa iti /

32 Ran ’grel p. 130a1: kha cig bsgrub bya’i chos kyi ston mi ston la ’dod na’an de ſid
las ma ’das so /

33 rNam ’grel spyi don p. 81b2–4: de ltar ron na ſikā las / chos bram ze gnis kyi sman
bya sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa'i rtags yan dag ma yin par bsad / rgyal dban blo dain santi pas rtags yan dag tu bsad do // zes dain / yan Na tika las mksam grub santi pa* yan rmois pa la dpe dgos / mksam pa la mi dgos pas mhan bya sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa'i rtags yan dag yin par mksam pa rnam las ni / rgyan tshigs 'ba' zig brjod par zad ces pas bstan zes na gi khyab par** bsad de / legs sam shan mo zes bsad // *Should be santi pas (?) **The text has khyab par. ("In this vein, too, the Na tikā states: 'Dharmottara and the brahmin [Sankarananda] both explained that audibility was not a valid reason for proving that sound is impermanent; Jine

For what little information there is on Na dgon (i.e. the nephew of a certain Na dge bses), see van der Kuijff (1983) n.360, who bases his information largely on a mention of this author in A khu Ses rab rgya mtsho's Tho yig no. 11851. Na dgon Kun dga' dpal, whom van der Kuijff dates as circa 1300-1380, played an important role in the Sa skya pa lineage of the Pramāṇavārttika, and is also mentioned in Tāranātha's lineage of the Profound "Other-voidness" teachings (zab mo gzhan ston dbu ma'i brgyud 'deb) (ibid. pp. 118 and 41).

Of interest is the fact that Na dgon mentions Jineンドraduddhi as holding that audibility was a valid reason for proving sound's impermanence. (Chos kyi rgyal mtshan p. 81a seconds this.) In fact, it seems that Na dgon and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan were probably right on this score. In Jineンドraduddhi's commentary on PS II 5cd (PST re 105b3-5) we find the following suggestive passage: de ltar na yan minan par bya ba niid kyan mi rtag pa'i gtan tshigs la tshul gsam pa niid du bsgrubs par 'gyur te / rnam pa gzhan du na ma yin te / de la de dan mtshuns pa la yod par gyur pa niid yod pa ma yin pas so // rjes su 'gro ba ni yod de / rjes su 'gro ba'zes bya ba ni rtags la rtags can yod pa kho na ste / de yan minan pa bya ba niid la yan yod do // de ltar ni gan du minan par bya niid yin pa der mi rtag pa niid du 'gyur ba kho na ste / rnam pa gzhan du na minan par bya ba niid kho na yan mi 'byun bas so'zes rtags par byed par 'gyur ro //. Thus, it seems that we should also probably consider Jineンドraduddhi as a predecessor of Antavyāptivāda, or at least as tending in that direction.

34 Cf. the appended passages from rGyal tshab rje.

35 Raṅ 'grel p. 154a6-154b2. Sa paṅ characterizes the first sort as: de la rtags gnis ka la med nas ma mthon ba / dper na sgra mi rtag ste minan bya yin pa'i phyir zes pa lta bu'o / ("Here, there are cases where the reason is not seen in either of the two [pakṣa] as it is not there, e.g. sound is impermanent because it is audible."). Cf. rNam 'grel spyi don pp. 45b5-46a3.

36 Ibid., p. 47a1: sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i thun mo'n ma yin pa'i ma ries pa'i gtan tshigs yin na / sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa'i mthin phyogs kho na la yod dgos pa'i phyir /.

37 Ibid. p. 47a4-7: de la rigs gter ba rnam na re / minan bya sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa'i mthin phyogs la yan gan med / mi mthin phyogs la yan gan med du bsad pa'i rgyu mtshan yod de / minan bya sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i mthin phyogs bum pa la yan gan med / mi mthin phyogs nam mkha' la yan gan nas med pa'i phyir / des na goṅ gi thal 'gyur de thams cad gnod byed du mi 'jug ste / sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa'i mthin phyogs daṅ / sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i mthin dpe yan dag don geig /
sgra mi rtog par sgrub pa'i mi mthun dpe yan dag dan / sgra mi rtog par sgrub pa'i mi mthun phyogs don geig pa'i phyir dan / sgra mi rtog par sgrub pa'i mthun phyogs la yan gtan med / sgra mi rtog par sgrub pa'i mi mthun phyogs la yan gtan med pa'i sgra mi rtog par sgrub pa'i ma 'nes pa'i gtan tshigs med na phyogs chos mthun phyogs yod med dan 'zes sogs kyi gzi'u sgra ji bzin du khas bla'i du mi ru'n ba'i skyon yod pa'i phyir /

Cf. PS III, 8: phyogs chos mthun phyogs yod med dan // rnam gnis re re dag la yan // rnam gsun mi mthun phyogs la'ani // yod med rnam pa gnis phyir ro //. (“The pakṣadharma is present or absent in the sapaḳṣa or both [present and absent]. To each of these there are three, as there is also presence, absence and both [presence and absence] in the vipakṣa.”) Thus, we get the nine reasons of the Hetucakra.

38 Rnam 'grel spyi don p. 47b4–5: rtos* mi byun gi brag ri chos can / rtos byun gi rtags kyis dun sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i mthun dpe yan dag yin par thal / de'i rtags kyis de sgrub kyis mthun phyogs yin pa'i phyir /. *Text has rtos byun gi brag ri, which is impossible!

39 Cf. Yons 'dzin rtag rigs definition of the asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu (pp. 53–54): kyod de sgrub kyi ma 'nes pa'i gtan tshigs gan žig / kyod de sgrub pa la phyogs chos can du son ba'i gan zag giš / kyod de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs la yod par ma 'nes pa yan yin / gan zag des kyod de sgrub kyi mthun phyogs la yod par ma 'nes pa yan yin pa'i gzi mthun pa de ' / x is an uncertain reason for proving P, such that the person for whom the pakṣadharma is destined in the proof of P both does not ascertain that x is present in the sapaḳṣa for such a proof, nor does he ascertain that x is present in the vipakṣa for proving P.”) I prefer to translate the mtshan ūṇ expression ... yan yin ... yan yin pa'i gzi mthun pa non-literally by “both ... and/or ...” instead of the cumbersome “common basis” idiom.

As the Rigs gter ba had remarked, the dGe Hugo pa interpretation of sapaḳṣa, vipakṣa, and the asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu would necessitate a different, and non-literal, interpretation of the Hetucakra. And this is forthcoming, as we see in such works as Nāg dbaṅ bstan dar’s commentary on the Hetucakra (Cf. in particular pp. 7a and 7b = 147, 148).

40 Katsura, pp. 541–540. By using the words “formal in character”, I do not want to lend support to the fairly widespread view that the trirūpālinga can be assimilated to a Western formal logic structure, in particular, the syllogism. First of all, the trairūpya is better seen as a set of second order criteria used to evaluate an informal, ordinary language structure, A is B because of C. Secondly, although the pakṣadharmaṭa and vyāpti, when fleshed out as the two members of a paraṭhātanumāna, do (formally) entail the proposition to be proved, there is much more at stake in the Buddhist notion of “validity” than just validity in a formal logic sense. Specifically, there is a cognitive element, viz. that both parties in the debate must also ascertain and accept the three characteristics. This provision is implicit in the word nīcīta occurring in the definitions. (Cf. Note 1) These and other questions of a similar nature are dealt with in my article, “Sur le paraṭhātanumāna en logique bouddhique”, Études Asiatiques XXXVIII 1984, fasc. 2.

41 Bearing in mind the cautions of n. 40, it is still true that the provisions of at least the Dharmakīrtian trairūpya should imply the (necessary) truth of certain formal logic sentences. Let me adopt the notation of Mates (1972). Also, I would prefer to take the pakṣa (“subject”) as a general term representable by a predicate letter, rather than by an individual constant. (If the subject is an individual such as Devadatta, this is no problem: proper names can become predicate letters à la Quine.) This accords better with the avagyavacchada use of eva in the pakṣadharmaṭa definition. Cf. Gillon and Hayes (1982). Hx will be interpreted as “x has the hetu in question”, Sx will be “x has the sādhyadharmā”, and Px, “x has the pakṣa”. Revising slightly Gillon and Love
(1980)'s formulation of the supposed equivalence between anvāya and vyātiṇe so that the pākṣa becomes a general term, we get:

\[(x) (Hx \rightarrow (Sx \& \sim Px)) \iff (x) (\sim Sx \rightarrow \sim Hx)\]

As Gillon and Love point out, this is not a necessary truth. But the situation is even worse than they depict: it should be apparent that \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow (Sx \& \sim Px))\] is, under our types of interpretation, usually false, with the embarrassing result that on the orthodox scenario the anvāvyāpāṭī will rarely hold. This seems to me inescapable on the orthodox scenario if we view anvāvyāpāṭī statements as implying universally generalized material implications, as I think we probably must for the "post-inductive" stage of the taitāpya, where eva occurs.

From \[(x) (Px \rightarrow Hx)\] and \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow (Sx \& \sim Px))\], viz. the pākṣadharmaṇa and anvāya on the orthodox view, we could derive the sādhyā \[(x) (Px \rightarrow Sx)\]. But we could also derive \[(x) \sim (Px)\], which would be the absurd statement that nothing is the pākṣa! Taking pākṣa as an individual constant \(p\), we would fare no better: \(Hp\) and \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow (Sx \& x \neq p))\] imply \(Sp\: p \neq p\), hence the unwanted consequence that \(p \neq p\), the pākṣa is not identical with itself.

Katsura op. cit. n.16 has an interesting suggestion as to how to make the anvāya and vyātiṇe logically equivalent (on the orthodox scenario): "In my opinion, pākṣa should be excluded from the universe of discourse, so that the two rūpas are logically equivalent in the domain consisting of sapakṣa and vipakṣa." Unfortunately, if "logically equivalent" means that the biconditional must be necessarily true by virtue of its logical form, then this biconditional should be true under all formal semantic interpretations, no matter what the domain. To hold that the equivalence statement between anvāya and vyātiṇe is only true on certain appropriately circumscribed interpretations is to credit Dharmakirti et al. with no formal perspective or insight at all concerning this equivalence.

Finally, note that all these problems are avoided on the dGe lugs pa and Antavyāpāṭīvaśa view of sapakṣa and vipakṣa. \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow Sx) \iff (x) (\sim Sx \rightarrow \sim Hx)\] is necessarily true, and \[(x) (Px \rightarrow Sx)\] can be derived from \[(x) (Px \rightarrow Hx)\] and \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow Sx)\]. Representing the pākṣa by the constant \(p\), \(Sp\) can obviously be derived from \(Hp\) and \[(x) (Hx \rightarrow Sx)\]. No logical gymnastics, or even acumen, are required.

43 Simply hearing or reading about a reason for selflessness would immediately bring about an understanding.

44 Cf. Note 15.

45 For some explanation on the Tibetan development of the theory of the defining characteristic (mtshan ŋid), deśiniendum (mtshon bya) and exemplification (mtshan gzi) see Yoins' dzin bsus grwa brin's chapter on mtshan ŋid and mtshon bya, or van der Kuijp op. cit. pp. 65–68. Cf. also my review article on this latter book, "On a Recent Work on Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology", Etudes Asiaticques, XXXVIII, 1, 1984 pp. 59–66.

46 Cf. Note 21.

**Abbreviations and bibliography**

DP: Dharmottarapradīpa of Durvekamiśra.

JIBS: Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.

JIP: Journal of Indian Philosophy.

NB: Nyāyabindu of Dharmakirti.

NBT: Nyāyabinduṇīka of Dharmottara.

NP: Nyāyapravēśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin.


Durvēkamīśra. Dharmottarapرادīpa. See Nyāyabindu.


Go ram pa bSod nams sen ge (1429–1489). Rigs gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa = sDe bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa’i dgors pa phyin ci ma log par ‘grel pa tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa. SKB Vol. 11.

Go ram pa bSod nams sei ge. Rigs gter gyi dka’ gnas = Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par bṣad pa sde bdun rab gsal. SKB Vol. 12.


Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1478–1546). rNam ’grel spyi don =rGyas pa’i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi don ’grel rgyal tshab dgoṅs pa rab gsal žes bya ba le ’u daṅ po’i dka’ ba ’i gnas la dogs pa gcod pa. Blockprint, textbook (vig cha) of Se ra byes monastic college, Byalukuppe, Mysore, India 1977.


Appendix: author’s remarks added in June 1989

The present article was written in Hiroshima in 1984 and was destined for the proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös congress in Visegrád, Hungary. Unfortunately, however, the Hungarians ran into various financial problems which delayed publication for a number of years, and in the interim — as frequently, happens in these situations — I found some other relevant material on the problems at stake. In particular it turned out that Dharmakīrti, in Pramāṇavārttika IV (Parārthānūmāna), supported the dGe lugs pa interpretation of sapakṣa and asādāharaṇānāikāntikahetu much more clearly than I had initially imagined when I wrote ‘On sapakṣa’ in 1984. In an article entitled ‘Some Reflections on R.S.Y. Chi’s Buddhist Formal Logic’, published in 1988 in the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Vol. 11, no. 1. pp. 155–171), I discussed Dharmakīrti’s position in Pramāṇavārttika IV k. 207–259.

Now, ‘On sapakṣa’ has had a certain circulation in samizdat form in Japan and some Japanese colleagues and friends have urged me to publish it as is. This, then, is what I have done, although I am conscious of the article’s inadequacies in treating Dharmakīrti’s position. Probably the best and least disruptive way to balance the dossier which I presented in ‘On sapakṣa’ is to quote some passages from pages 160–161 of my 1988 article. The reader will see that when in 1984 I said that “this [dGe lugs pa] interpretation of ‘existence’/‘non-existence’ or ‘presence’/‘absence’ is certainly not just an invention on the part of Chos kyi rgyal mtshan et al., but finds some support in Dharmakīrti”, I was being overly cautious. Here then are the relevant passages:

[Pages 160–161] “… Dharmakīrti, in Pramāṇavārttika IV’s long discussion of the asādāharaṇahetu, does not support the orthodox scenario, but rather comes up with a version (similar to the dGe lugs) which would interpret this fallacy as being essentially a problem of an epistemic and intensional logic in that it involves contexts such as ‘X knows that…”...

Kārikās 207–259 of the parārthānūmāna chapter of Pramāṇavārttika form part of a larger section loosely treating of Dignāga’s Hetucakra, and specifically concern the refutation of the Naiyāyika’s argument that living bodies have selves (ātman) because they have breath and other animal functions (prāṇādi). Although Dharmakīrti does not discuss the sound-(im)permanent-audibility example very much, he does explicitly state in kārikā 218 that the asādāharaṇānāikāntikahetu, ‘breath, etc.’, is completely logically similar to the example found in the Hetucakra (śrāvaṇatvena tat tulyam prāṇādi vyābheṣārataḥ). Here are some of the key verses along with extracts from commentaries.

Context: In k. 205 and 206, Dharmakīrti has been putting forth the recurrent theme that the certainty of the reason’s being excluded from the dissimilar instances depends upon there being a necessary connection (avinābhāva) between it and the property to be proven. Such a connection will guarantee the pervasion (vyāpti), i.e. the concomitances in similarity (anvaya) and in difference (vyatireka). Thus, given such a connection, the reason would be
excluded from the dissimilar instances, but in the case of the asādhāranahetu, such a connection cannot be established; hence there is no such definitive exclusion.

Devendrabuddhi’s introduction to k. 207: [Objection:] If in this way the Master [Dignāga] did not exclude (ldog pa ma yin na) the special case [i.e. the asādhāranahetu] [from the dissimilar instances], then why is it said that it is excluded from the similar and dissimilar instances?

Dharmakīrti’s k. 207: [Reply:] It is just from the point of view of merely not observing [the reason among the dissimilar instances] that he spoke of it being excluded. Therefore [i.e. since the vyatireka is uncertain when it is due to merely not observing the reason], [the Master said that the reason] is uncertain. Otherwise [if there were the certainty that it is excluded from the dissimilar instances], [the reason] would be demonstrative (gamaka).

k. 220: By saying that [the sādhana] is excluded just from the contrary of what is to be proven (asādhya) [viz. the dissimilar instances], it is asserted [by implication] that it is present in what is to be proven (sādhya) [viz. in the similar instances]. Therefore, it was said that by means of one [viz. the vyatireka or the anvaya], both will be demonstrated by implication.

The point of k. 207, then, is that Dharmakīrti wants to interpret ‘absence in the vipakṣa’ metaphorically: it does not mean that breath, etc. are in fact completely absent from what does not have a self, but rather that the debaters do not observe that breath, etc. occurs in things which have no self. But, although the debater might not see something, that does not necessarily mean that it is not there. In that sense, the debater does not ascertain absence, for indeed, as k. 220 makes clear, if breath, etc. were really absent in the dissimilar instances, then the vyatirekavyāpti would hold; hence, the anvaya would hold too, and the reason would be valid!

So in brief, ‘exclusion’ or ‘absence’ is to be interpreted metaphorically as meaning ‘non-observation’. And precisely because non-observation is not probative, the essential point of the asādhāranahetu, according to Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of Dignāga, is that the debaters do not know or ascertain vyāpti, be it the reason’s absence in vipakṣa or its presence in sapakṣa.”

Note that this interpretation of “absence in the vipakṣa is slightly different from what Dharmakīrti had given in the svavṛtti passage which I had quoted in the body of my article (Section C). There Dharmakīrti argued that the reason, “audibility”, was “not ascertained as being [present] (bhāvanīscayabhāva)” in the vipakṣa. (This svavṛtti passage seems to be reflected also in Yoṅs ’dzin rtags rigs. See Note 39.) In short, this view apparently construed “absence in vipakṣa”
as meaning “no ascertained presence”. In Pramāṇavārttika IV, however, Dharmakīrti is explaining the asādhāranānaikāntikahetu’s “absence in vipakṣa” as being an uncertain absence. The two explanations are not completely identical, although undeniably they do complement and reinforce each other.

Finally we might add the following philological observation in connection with k. 220 which would seem to support the view that Dharmakīrti is rejecting the “orthodox scenario” in favour of sapakṣa and vipakṣa along the lines of Antarvāyāptivāda. If we examine the Sanskrit of k. 220, we see that Dharmakīrti uses the terms sādhyā and asādhyā — Manorathananandin and Devendrabuddhi (cf. Pañjikā 312b6–7) gloss these words as sapakṣa and vipakṣa respectively. In other words, sapakṣa would seem to be everything which has the property to be proved and vipakṣa would be everything which lacks this property.

Notes

a From the sDe dge edition of Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, reproduced in sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka, bsTan 'gyur Tshad ma, Tōkyō 1981 ff., 310a3: gal te 'di ltar slob dpon gyis khyad par ldog pa ma yin na / ji ltar mthun pa'i phyogs dan mi mthun pa'i phyogs las de ldog pa yin no žes bṣad ce na /.

b aḍṛṣṭimāram ādāya kevalaṃ vyatirekiṭā / uktā 'naikāntikas tasmād anyathā gamako bhavet ///.

My additions in pāda c and d have been made on the basis of Manorathananandin’s Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (ed. R. Sānkṛtyāyana, Patna 1938–40): tasyādarsanamātreṇa vyatirekāniścayād anaitkāntika āryekotkāh / anyathā vipakṣād vyatirekaniścaye gamako hetur bhavet /. Note, however, that with regard to pāda a and b, this latter commentator strangely glosses sapakṣād vyatirekitoktā, whereas following Devendrabuddhi’s line of thought, as well as the general thread of the argumentation, vipakṣād vyatirekitoktā would seem more logical. I have essentially followed Devendrabuddhi here. Cf. Pañjikā 310a4: gaṅ gi phyir mi mthun pa'i phyogs la de mthoṅ ba med pa tsam gyis ldog pa yin la / de'i phyir na ma ŋes pa yin no ///.

c asādhyād eva viccheda iti sādhyā 'sittocyate / arthāpattvā 'ta evoktām ekena dvayadarśanam /. For additions, see Manorathananandin ad k. 220.