“Citta, Mano, Vinnana—A Psychosemantic Investigation”
by Rune E. A. Johansson
*University of Ceylon Review*
Volume 23, Nos 1 & 2, April-October 1965 pp. 165-215
Citta, Mano, Vinnana—a Psychosemantic Investigation

In this report, an attempt will be made to clarify the psychological contents of the above Pali terms. The approach is psychological rather than linguistic.

Citta is most commonly translated by: thought(s), mind, heart, mood, emotion, idea, reasoning, attitude, consciousness.

Mano: mind, thought, inner sense.


Many of the English terms are very vague. The reason may be either that the corresponding Pali terms are equally vague or that the exact meaning of them is not known. Some of the English terms for the same Pali terms have a very different meaning (e.g. “mind” means an independent psychological agency; “thought” is probably intended to mean conscious processes of a predominantly cognitive character, “heart” an emotional, evaluative center in human personality; if we then, for instance, find the passage in S II 273: “Ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ saṃṭhapeti, ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ ekodiṃ karohi, ariye tuṇhībhāve cittaṃ samādahā” translated by “Establish thy mind in the Ariyan silence. Lift up thy heart therein. Plant thy thought therein” — then we may well ask ourselves whether these different meanings of citta were intended by the Pali-writer or if the translator is just careless.) Psychological passages in translations of Pali texts have often proved meaningless to me. Therefore, an investigation has seemed desirable.

Method

Passages illustrating the use of the terms included in the investigation have been collected from the following works: Digha-nikāya, Majjhima-
nikāya, Aṅguttara-nikāya, Samyutta-nikāya, Dhammapada, Suttanipāta, Udāna and Itivuttaka (the PTS editions have been used; quotations refer to pages in these, only for Dhammapada and Suttanipāta to number of stanza). It was considered that these were homogeneous enough to permit a non-historical treatment. As this is not a statistical investigation, no completeness was aimed at, but an attempt was made to include as many different contexts as possible: I aimed at semantic completeness.

The theoretical framework of this study was provided by C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, The measurement of meaning (Urbana 1957). Their method can of course not be used on historical material, but their insistence that meaning can be defined by relating a studied concept to a semantic space is a fruitful point of departure. Now the dimensionality of the semantic space of psychological terms is not known, but some sort of provisional "semantic differential" can still be constructed. I have tried to follow the intentions of Osgood by putting systematic questions to the texts and by especially studying relations between terms as expressed in the texts.

Citta

1. Superordinated concept: dhamma (e.g. A I 10) which is a vague term used mainly as a collective term for all conscious phenomena. It is used for all psychological terms, even nibbāna.

2. Entity or process?

We usually think of a machine as an entity: it has a certain structure and functions as a unit; it is limited in space and has a certain duration over time. If we, on the other hand, were unable to see the machine itself but could study its functioning and its products, then we would speak in terms of processes: we could describe certain movements, the change from raw materials to finished products. We can made the same distinction in psychological matters, and choose our words accordingly. When we use a word like "mind", we think of something rather permanent, and the momentary perceptions, feelings, impulses and imaginations are said to be produced in it. The mind has a structure, it can produce processes, and it can be used as an instrument—so it is a typical entity.

On the other hand, the difference may not be so great on the psychological plane as on the physical. If you study your conscious experiences, perhaps you will at first find only a stream of processes. But after a while,
you will discover recurrent themes and process-sequences and you will find regularities and habits of thoughts. The processes are then fitted into a structure which is seen to be more or less fixed, more or less like an “entity”. So, although most of the continuity depends on processes or structures that are not conscious and therefore “behind the curtain”, we may firmly believe in an entity like the “mind”.

In order to decide whether citta is an entity or not, we must investigate whether it is described as independent or dependent, permanent or momentary, productive or produced, initiating or passive, actor or act.

It is possible to find passages where citta is clearly said to be a product: “Mā ... akusalaṁ cittaṁ cinteyyatha” (S V 418), “Don’t think unskilled citta”.—“Samudaya-dhammānupassi vā cittasmiṁ viharati, vaya-dhammānupassi vā cittasmiṁ viharati.” (D II 299). “He keeps on seeing an arising phenomenon in citta, or he keeps on seeing a passing phenomenon in citta.” Here, citta seems to mean “thought”. Usually citta seems much more personified to an independent agency. It has a will of its own: “Bhikkhu cittam vase vatteti, no ... cittassa vasena vattati” (A IV 34), “A monk makes his citta turn according to his wish; he does not turn by the citta’s wish”. Further: “... cittena niyati loka” (S I 39), “the world is led by citta”. According to D II 36, “Vipassis ... cittaṁ nāmo dhamma-desanāya,” “The citta of Vipassi was inclined not to preach the doctrine”.—Citta is an authority that can be pleased or displeased: “... ayaṁ me puggalo cittam nāraādhethi” (M I 341), “that person does not appeal to my citta”. And: “... mayi cittaṁ pasannam” (M II 145), “your citta was pleased with me.”

Citta reacts as an emotional center according to S I 53: “Niccam utrastam idam cittam”. “This citta is always terrified”, — and S II 226 “na ca na uppanno lābhhasakkarasiloko cittaṁ pariyādāya ṭhassaṭṭi”, “and when gains, favours, and flattery come to us, they shall not take lasting hold of our citta”.

In the very numerous passages where the improvement and development of citta is described, it is often done in wordings reminding us of some instrument which is to be improved by removing obstructing particles (rāga, dosa, moha, e.g. M II 27), by cleaning (cittam parisodhethi, D I 71; cittani virajayitvā “cleansing their cittas”, D II 274), by giving it support (ādhāro, S V 20), by making it straight (cittam attano ujukam akeṇsu,
S I 26; ujum karoti, Dh 33) like a bow, or makes it luminous (sappabhāsāṁ cittaṁ bhāveti, “creates a luminous citta”, D III 223; pabhassaram, A I 10; see also A IV 86, A I 256, S V 92: Citta is compared to gold free from defilements; it can also be done luminous by concentration on light). In this way, citta is made mudu and kamaṁśa, “pliable” and “fit for work” (A IV 421; cf. S V 92 and A I 256). In other cases, the terminology used reminds rather of the taming of animals, e.g. cittaṁ ... dantaṁ guttam rakkhitaṁ saṁvutam, “the citta that is tamed, controlled, guarded and restrained” (A I 7)cittaṁ, abhinimāmeti, “he bends down his citta” (A II 211).

In all these and similar cases, citta seems to be conceived predominantly as an entity. But in perhaps the majority of the 240 passages included in this study of citta, the matter cannot be strictly decided. There seems to be a very gradual transition from the one extreme to the other. We may conclude that citta often is an entity that acts independently or as an instrumental unit but that the word on the other hand may be used for the produced processes themselves.

3. Is citta the self?

Only once is it explicitly denied that citta is the self (S II 94), while it is very often denied that viññāna and the other khandhā are the self. When H. V. Guenther in “Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidhamma” (Lucknow 1957) constructs diagrams illustrating different Abhidhamma-views on the mind, he places citta in the center of a number of concentric circles. This can only mean that he considers citta as the self around which everything is arranged. In the Nikāyas there are only indirect indications that the person identifies himself with citta. It happens, e.g., that the grammatical subject in coordinated sentences is first citta, then seemingly without any special reason becomes the person himself: “Ujugatam ev' assa tasmiṁ samaye cittaṁ hoti Tathāgatam ārabbha, ujugatācitto kho pana ... ariya-sāvako labhati atthavedaṁ, labhati dhammavedaṁ ... ” “At such time his citta is firmly fixed on the Tathāgata; with upright heart the Ariyan disciple wins knowledge of the welfare, he wins knowledge of the doctrine ... ” (A V 329). See also “Kāmarāgena ādayāmi, cittaṁ me pariṣṭhayhati”. “I am burning with desire, my citta is consumed” (S I 188). In the love-song, D II 266, it is said “Tayi gathita-citto ‘smi cittaṁ viparinamitam”. “I am provided with a citta tied to you: my citta is changed”. We find here the same change of grammatical subject, and in a case like this it becomes clear how closely related the citta sometimes is to the self. — On the other hand, it is never said that citta is the self. On the contrary, the texts usually
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

take care to distinguish between the person and his citta. A few examples will illustrate this. “Aham iminā cittena nikato vañcito paladdho”. “I have been defrauded, deceived and cheated by this mind” (M I 511). “Cittaṃ te tatthe gamenti dūre”, “They send their citta far away in that (dispute)” (SN 390). See also A IV 34, quoted above.

In conclusion: citta is not the self but it often stands for the person and the identification is then not far away.

4. The monk’s problem-child

As we have seen in some of the above quotations, the monk can certainly not identify himself with this citta — on the contrary it sometimes gives him life-long trouble. It has to be tamed, but it is dūrakkha, “difficult to guard” and dunnivāraya, “difficult to hold back” (Dh 33), dussamādaha “hard to compose” (S I 48), niggahetabba, paggahetabba, sampahamsitabba, ajjhukekkhitabba, “to be checked”, “to be exerted”, “to be gladdened”, “to be looked after” (A III 435). It is a difficult but important task to train citta, because “citte ... arakkhite kāyakammaṭṭa pi arakkhitā hoti vāci-kammaṭṭa pi arakkhitaṭṭa hoti manokammaṭṭa pi arakkhitaṭṭa hoti” (A I 261), “when citta is unguarded, bodily action is also unguarded, speech and mental action are also unguarded”, and we shall see in a later section how great the difference is between the trained and the natural citta.

5. Is citta consciousness?

It is said in Dh 37 that citta is asarira, “incorporeal”. It is often contrasted with the body. In S IV 293 f, a distinction is made between kāya saṅkhāro, “activity of body”, vaci saṅkhāro, “activity of speech”, and cittasaṅkhāro, and the latter is defined in the following way: “Saṅnā ca vedanā ca cetasikā etc dharmā cittapaṭṭibaddhā, tasmā saṅnā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāre ti” which has been translated “Perception and feeling are mental processes dependent on mind. Therefore are they called ‘the activity of mind’ ”.

No indication has been found that citta could be either a physiological or a purely behavioral entity. As we shall find later, citta is sometimes spoken of as moving in space (e.g., phandana, “trembling”, Dh 33, dūran-gama, “far-travelling” Dh 37), but it probably means non-physical movement. When describing moral and emotional traits in citta, terms are sometimes used which imply a certain type of behavior, but it is the attitude behind that seems to belong to citta.
It is more difficult to decide, to what extent sub-conscious processes in the psychological sense belong to citta. We can, of course, consider it self-evident that when traits like anger, pride, desire are ascribed to citta, it does not mean that they must be manifest all the time: the tendency, the disposition is enough. In this way, we have introduced the unconscious, but the distinction was seldom made. There is an early Pali term for latent tendencies of this type, anusaya, which is attributed to ceto, never to citta (they are more or less synonyms, see discussion below) We find a typical context in S III 13: “Rūpadhātuyā ... yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā taṇhā ye upāyupādānā cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayaḥ tesanā khayā virāgā nirodha paṭinissagā cittām suvimuttām”. “By the destruction of, the indifference to, the cessation, the giving up, the utter surrender of that wish, that desire, that pleasure, that craving, that approach and grasping, that decision, indulgence and disposition in ceto directed to the form-element, the citta is fully freed”. We shall also find later, that several of the traits, which often are called anusaya (or rather the traits to which tendencies — anusaya — are mentioned), are attributed to citta. In the main, citta must be understood as an unanalyzed conscious entity.

6. The attributes of the untrained citta.

Citta is described with a wealth of attributes. We have seen that citta can, and should, be trained, so we must distinguish between the natural and the trained citta. Generally, citta is found to be too independent and mobile (Dh 326 “... acāri caritaṃ yenicchakaṃ yathakāmaṃ yathāsukhāṃ”, “... would wander formerly as it liked, as it desired, as it pleased”), too unsteady (capala, Dh 33) and easily distracted (vikkhitta, A IV 32).

(a) Perception. We have already quoted S IV 293 f where it is said that saññā (perception) and vedāna (feeling) are dependent on citta. In S IV 125 we find that rūpa (forms) touch (phassati) citta, and only a trained citta can avoid to be influenced. In the natural state, therefore, citta is sensitive to impression, without being a center of perception.

Citta can be directed and is then an instrument of attention. In A IV 422 the phrases cittāṃ paṭivāpeti (“he turns his citta away from”) and cittāṃ upasamharati (“he concentrates his citta on”) are used in this meaning. Cf. the opposites sankhitta — vikkhitta (“attentive — unattentive”) used about citta in D I 97.

(b) Intellectual traits. In A I 9 the expression cittāṃ pāṭākkheti (“understand with citta” is used. The phrase aññācittāṃ upaṭṭhapeti, “he

170
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

applies the citta to understanding” is often found, e.g. A III 437. In A IV 402 paññāya suparicita, “well provided with wisdom” is said about citta. These are all quotations from descriptions of the developed citta, but the potentialities of intelligence are of course there from the beginning.

(c) Memory. Citta is an instrument for the recollection of former existences which is made possible through training. See M I 22 “pubbhā-nivāsānussatiṇānāya cittaṁ abhinimmāsesi”, “I directed my citta to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations”. The higher knowledge which is called abhiññā is attributed to citta (A IV 421, A I 254). Free ideas are a function of citta, as in A V 107, where citta is said to be “provided with” (paricita) ideas (sāñña) of impermanence, not-self, danger, disinterestedness and so on. What is said in Dh 326, “idam pure cittam acāri cāritam ... yathakāmaṇi ...”, “this citta would wander formerly as it liked ...” probably refers to the free imaginative function of citta.

All the functions quoted here are referred to the trained citta. The fundamental dispositions must, however, be there from the beginning, although nothing seems to be ever said about the untrained citta in these respects. We go on to describe the natural citta proper.

(d) Intellectual qualities of the untrained citta.

Two of the āsavā, namely āṭṭhāsava and avijjasava (the obsessions of false views and lack of true knowledge) are of a more intellectual character (D I 84, D II 81). Further: mohā (lack of correct judgment, D III 270), vicikicchā (doubt, D I 71), vikkhitta (unattentive, D I 79).

(e) Emotional qualities.

We must distinguish between feelings and emotions. Feeling is the evaluation from the individual point of view that normally accompanies every perception or cognitive process: we call them “pleasant” and “unpleasant”. This evaluative aspect is not so often attributed to citta, but we find, e.g. in M II 145, that citta may be “pasanna”, “pleased”, that it suffers (“pahāṁṭi”, S IV 73), that “sārīrikā dukkhā vedanā cittam na pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti” (S V 302), “painful feelings make no impression on my citta”.

By emotion proper we understand a state of affectivity or lack of balance. This side of human psychology is usually attributed to citta

paritassanā, trembling, nervousness (S III 16),
uddhaccakukkucca, excitement and worry (D I 71).
padosa, anger (D I 71).
kāmmāsava, obsession of sensual pleasures (D I 84).
sapattaka, hostile (D I 228).
savera, full of anger (D I 247).
āvila, turbid (A I 9).
utrasta, terrified (S I 53).
abhhuta, astonished (S I 178).
uddhata, unbalanced (S V 112).
līna, sluggish (S V 112).
phandana, trembling (Dh 33).
capala, unsteady (Dh 33).

(f) Dynamic qualities.

Dynamic are the traits called which lead or motivate to actions, e.g. needs and drives. The border between these and the emotional traits is, of course, never very well defined.

Tānha, the most common word for "desire", is not often ascribed to citta, but in Dh 154, citta is said to have "attained to the extinction of all desires" (cittāṁ tanhānaṁ khayaṁ ajjhaṁ). More commonly attributed to citta are abhijjha (covetousness) and lobha (greed), found together in M I 36. Very common is rāga, sometimes translated by the more emotional word "passion", sometimes by the more dynamic word "desire" (S I 185). One of the āsava is bhavasava, clinging to existence (D I 84).—Absence of dynamic qualities could be called thīnamiddha ("lethargy and drowsiness", D I 71) or pamāda ("indolence", M I 36). — The most important dynamic traits are, therefore, more or less regularly attributed to citta.

(g) Moral traits. The moral "defilements" (upakkilesā) seem all to belong to citta: Most of them are enumerated in M I 36 together with some that are mentioned already:

byāpāda, "malevolence"
upanāha, "malice"
makkha, "hypocrisy"
palāsa, "spite"
issā, "envy"
macchariya, "stinginess"
māyā, "deceit"
sāṭheyya, "treachery"
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

thambha, "selfishness"
māna, "arrogance"
atimāna, "pride"
mada, "conceit"

7. The attributes of the trained citta.

(a) Cognitive and intellectual qualities. On the highest level of the eightfold path (sammāsamādhi), the adept attains to cittassā ekaggata, "one-pointedness" (D II 217). He is not disturbed by his sense-perceptions: "Evañ sammāvimuttagcittassa ... bhikkhuno bhusā ce pi cakkhuviññeyyā rūpā cakkhusa āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, nev'assa cittaṃ pāriyādiyaṇti, amis-sikatam ev' assa cittaṃ hoti, ṭhitam ānejjappattāṇi, vayaṇ c' assānupassati". (A III 377). "If objects cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the range of vision of a monk with wholly freed citta, they do not obsess his citta, and his citta is untroubled, firm, having won to composure; and he watches it go". (The last assa seems to refer to citta; if so, citta means "conscious processes"). Temporarily he may attain to saññāvedayatirodha, and "Yo ca khvāyaṃ ... bhikkhusaññāvedayitirodhaṃ samāpanno, tassa pi kāyasankhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho vacīsankhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho cittasankhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho" (S IV 294). "In him who has attained the ceasing of perception and feeling, the activity of body has also ceased, become calmed. So also have the activities of speech and citta."

His citta has been trained to be an instrument for higher knowledge (abhiññā), for the attainment of iddhi, for hearing heavenly sounds, for understanding others' citta, for remembering his own former births, for seeing other beings pass from existence to existence, and so on (described, e.g. D I 77-84). His citta is not directed outwards (apaññhitam bahiddhā, S V, 159). He can direct his citta and he "brings it towards the deathless element" (amanīya dhātuyā cittaṃ apasaṅkarati (A IV 422). His citta is characterized by paññā (wisdom, D II 81) and aṣṭāna (knowledge, D III 53).

(b) Emotional traits. Citta becomes free from āsavā and tanhā (D II 81, Dh 154). It does not react emotionally on sense-impressions (S V 302). It is vūpasanta (calmed D I 71), samāhita (serene, D I 76), ānejjappatta (unperturbable D I 76), avera (free from anger D I 247), danta gutta rakkhita saṇīvuta (tamed, controlled, guarded, restrained A I 7), anāvila (untroubled, A I 9), sukhāvaha (bringer of happiness Dh 35). The general impression is unemotionality and stability.
Dynamic traits. The needs and desires were characteristic of the natural *citta*. The trained *citta* is, however, also motivated to action, and motivations are still to be found, although the desires have gone. This is often expressed in a negative way: “*Yam cittaṃ vitarāgaṃ vitadosaṃ viramoham — itosamuṭṭhāna kusalaśīla* (M II 27). “That *citta* which is free from desire, free from hate and free from illusion—originating from this are the skilled moral habits.” This is an interesting passage showing that the motivation to good actions is to be found in *citta* and that these purely negative expressions have a very positive meaning. It is also interesting to note that they are all considered dynamic, although *dosa* is more emotional and *moha* more intellectual.

Other dynamic words, positively expressed, are found in D III 239 where *citta* is said to “incline towards ardour, devotion, perseverance and exertion” (namati ātappāya anuyogāya sātaccāya padhānāya).

On the dynamic side, the training therefore results in a change from impulses and desires to will and determination, from immaturity to maturity, from fickleness to character.

(d) Moral traits. *Citta* is made an effective (kammāniya, mudu) instrument for skillful (kusala) action, *Citta* has been made asaṇkkiliṭṭha (pure, D I 247), avyāpanna (free from malice, D I 71), assava (obedient, S N 23), anangana (free from blemish, A II 211). One of its chief characteristics is mettā (friendliness, D III 237). At the same time it is vivekaninna vivekapabbhāra vupakaṭṭha (tending to aloofness, leaning to aloofness, inclining to aloofness, remote, M III 111), which probably indicates a certain aversion to all social activity, good as well as bad.

8. Is *citta* personal?

*Citta* could be an inner core, e.g. some sort of life-force, very much similar in all individuals, or it could be an individually formed center. The latter is true. It is naturally open to impressions from the outside (S IV 293) and it has a great number of emotional, dynamic and intellectual characteristics that give it an individual form. It can also be understood, interpreted: “*cittāni me samaṇo Gotamo jānāti*” (S I 178) “the recluse Gotama knows my *citta*” (or possibly: what I am thinking”). “Idha ... bhikkhu parasat-tānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam ṗi ādisati ... iti pi te cītta ti” (D I 213). “Here a monk tells (reads) the *citta* of other beings, of other individuals ... saying: — *so is your citta*”. — “No ce ... bhikkhu paracittapariyāya-
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

kusalo hoti, atha 'sacittapariyāyakusalo bhavissāni'ti" (A V 92) "though a monk be not skilled in (knowing) other people's citta, he can decide: 'I will be skilled in (knowing) my own citta'.

The training of citta seems to result in a greater homogeneity. But the result depends on the type of training. One-sided training, for instance, may give wrong result. So if a monk trains only samādhi, then "taṃ cittaṃ kosajjāya saṃvatteyya", "his citta will be liable to indolence", if he trains only paggāha (energy), then "taṃ cittaṃ uddhaccāya saṃvatteyya", "his citta will be liable to distraction"; and if he trains only upekṣā (equanimity), then taṃ cittaṃ na samā saṃdhiyeyyya āsavānāṃ khayāya", "his citta will not be perfectly poised for the destruction of the āsavā" (A I 256). — Even a liberated citta can still be identified, see S I 194, "tesaṃ ... cetasā cittaṃ samannesati vippamuttaṃ nirupadhim", "he intuitively discerned the citta of these as being freed, desireless". Therefore, the individuality remains, even in arahants.

9. Is citta an instrument?

We have repeatedly referred to citta as an instrument: for attention understanding, for attaining higher knowledge and certain supernatural powers. The instrument-aspect is no doubt there, but it is less conspicuous than its independence. Its development is an end in itself and for the citta's own good. Just as the training of a child may consist in making him do things, so the citta is used as an instrument for its own development.

10. The ultimate fate of citta.

What happens to citta in death? S V 370 provides an answer: "... tassa yo hi khvāyām kāyo rūpi ... taṃ idheva kākā va khādanti ... yaṃca khvassa cittaṃ digharattāṃ saddhāparibhāvatam sīla- suta- cāgā-paribhā- vītaṃ, taṃ uddhagāni hoti vīsagāmi", "though this formed body of his be devoured by crows (or other animals), — yet his citta, if longtime practiced in faith, virtue, learning and renunciation, moves upward and goes to distinction". Here we are very close to an un-Buddhistic soul-theory, according to which citta survives death. It can be found also in other passages, where it is connected with the idea of rebirth. "Avidvā manaso vitakke hūrahuraṇī dhāvati bhanta-citto" (U 37). "Without understanding the thoughts of mano he runs with restless citta from existence to existence". — "Anāvattidhammaṇī me cittaṃ kāmabhavāyā- ti paññāya cittaṃ suparicitaṇī hotī" (A IV 402) "'My citta is not of such nature that it will return to the plane of sense-pleasures'.—(knowing this) his citta is well
provided with wisdom". In these passages we find an indication that citta in normal cases is reborn. The same is implied in D III 258 "Tassa evam hoti—'Aho vatāhan kāyassa bhededhā param marañā khattiyā-mahāsālāṇañī vā brahmaṇamahāsālāṇañī vā gahapati-mahāsālāṇañī vā sahvayataṁ uppajjeyyan ti'. So tāṁ cittaṁ dahati, tāṁ cittaṁ adhiṭṭhati, tāṁ cittaṁ bhāvati. Tassa tāṁ cittaṁ hine vinuttaṁ uttarāṁ abhivitaṁ tatr' uppattiya saṁ-vattati". "He thinks, 'Ah! if only I may be reborn at the dissolution of the body after death as one amongst wealthy nobles, or brahmins, or house-holders!' This citta he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it.—His citta set free in a lower range, and not developed to anything higher, conduces to rebirth within that range." This passage is, however, a little doubtful, as citta here, at least in the middle sentence, has a clear process-meaning and therefore may be used simply for viññāna.

When, in other contexts, the process-meaning seems to be intended, e.g., in D II 299, it is stressed that citta "is something that comes to be" (samudaya-dhamma) and "something that passes away" (vaya-dhamma).

It is often said that citta is suvimutta, "liberated" or viñuccati "is liberated". What does it mean?

"Paññā-paribhāvitaṁ cittaṁ sammad eva āsavachi viñuccati scyyathi-daṁ kānāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjāsavā ti" (D II 81). "Citta, when thoroughly developed through wisdom, is set quite free from obsessions, that is to say from the obsessions of sensuality, becoming, wrong views and ignorance". Another definition is already quoted from S III 13, according to which citta is freed through the destruction of the desire directed towards the five khandhā. Still more clear is the passage S III 45: "Rūpadhatuyā (later, the whole sentence is repeated for: vedanādhatuyā, saṁñādhatuyā, sankhāradhatuyā, viññāṇadhātu, u c ... bhikkhuno cittaṁ virattaṁ vinuttaṁ hoti anupādāya āsavachi, vimuttattā ṭhīmam, ṭhittattā santussitaṁ, santussitattā na paritassati aparitassam paccattaṁeva parinibbāyatī". "If a monk's citta is unattached to the form-element (feeling, perception, the activities, consciousness) and is free from it without giving it support through the āsavā—then it is steadfast by its freedom, content by its steadfastness, through its contentment it does not crave further: and free from craving it by itself attains to parinibbāna". As freedom from the āsavā is usually mentioned as the final attainment through which arahant-ship is won, we have ample evidence that citta is thought to be that which reaches the state of nībbāna. A characteristic of Buddhist meditation is that the meditating
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

person knows through all the levels how far he has attained. When the ultimate realization has come, even then he knows that it has come and what it means. Therefore, some part of his conscious personality is left, and everything points to the fact that this function is attributed to \textit{citta}. In addition to the already quoted evidence, let us point to a passage in A I 8, where it is said: "\textit{panihi}tena \textit{cittena ... nibb\=anam sacchikarissati}”, “with a \textit{citta} that is well directed ... he will realize \textit{nibb\=ana}.” So, when the work is done, the instrument is still there, registrating the fact.

11. Abnormal states of \textit{citta}.

There are some references to abnormalities in \textit{citta}. According to S III 1, \textit{citta} may be ill (\textit{\=at\=ura}), and a certain householder is admonished, so to train himself that his \textit{citta} is healthy although his body is ill: the illness is to identify the \textit{khandh\=a} with \textit{\=atta}.

In D I 20, it is said about a group of gods called Manopadosika: “Te \textit{a\=n\=ana\=ma\=na\=n\=\=amhi padu\=th\=a-citt\=a kilantak\=a\=y\=a kilanta-citt\=a”. “Wicked-minded toward each other, they are weak-bodied and weak-minded”. It is not known what is meant here: possibly the basic idea is that a certain amount of energy is required in order to stay on a certain level of development; changes in this karmic force manifests itself in certain mental and bodily changes; if the moral behaviour is not up to requirements, the karmic force weakens and the being is reborn in a lower state.

In Dh 137 and 138 it is said that a man who inflicts pain on the innocent and harmless, will be punished by suffering, loss, bodily injury, difficult illness or \textit{cittakkhepa}; “loss of \textit{citta}”. A similar expression is found in S I 126, where it is described how the daughters of M\=ara try to seduce the Buddha and afterwards comment on their lack of success with the words: “\textit{Ya\=m hi maya\=m sam\=\=am v\=a br\=ahma\=\=am v\=a av\=\=ita\=\=r\=a\=\=gam imin\=a upakkamena upakkameyy\=ama hadaya\=m v\=\=a phaley\=y\=a, unha\=m lohitam v\=a mukhato uggacchey\=y\=a, umm\=\=a\=\=am v\=a p\=\=a\=\=pu\=\=c \=y\=a cittavikkhepa\=m v\=a.” “For if we had approached after this fashion any recluse or brahmin who had not extirpated lust, either his heart would have cleft asunder, or hot blood had flowed from his mouth or he had become crazy or have lost his \textit{citta}”. If a person has developed mett\=a cetovimutti, i.e., “mind-release through friendliness”, his \textit{citta} is not khipitabba (“to be upset”, S II 265). In S I 207 it is said: “If you do not reply, I will either upset your \textit{citta} (citt\=am khipiss\=am) or split your heart”. In this case \textit{citta} is something that can be lost, thrown away. This use of the word becomes natural, if \textit{citta} is taken to be the personal core.
of purposeful consistency, some sort of superordinated organizing agency. We have already noticed (see e.g. M III 156 cited above) that in some contexts this interpretation seems probable (although it is often implied that this superordinate force takes citta to task and induces it to development or uses it as an instrument), and we are again very close to an identification between citta and the self. In strong emotional experiences it is this normal purposefulness and organized behaviour that is upset.

12. Has citta inner organization?

We have seen that citta is conceived as individually formed and that a great number of traits, especially of an emotional, dynamic and moral character, are attributed to it. It is sometimes described as the guiding purposiveness in life. Therefore, it comes very close to the psychological concept of personality.

By personality is meant an individual organization of traits: there is a guiding purposiveness, a hierarchy of motives, a more or less consistent "style of living". Personality may change and can be "developed" and "deranged", but there is continuity and unity. It is both psychological and physical, both structural and functional.

Like personality, citta is an organizing factor and it has an individual structure: we have seen that a person's citta can be recognized and interpreted by others. We find, on the other hand, few traces of an organization of all the traits that are said to belong to it: it is often even doubtful whether the traits really are meant to form part of citta or whether they are conceived as external. If citta, for instance, gets rid of the five upakkilesā, is citta itself changed through the process? But in many cases, the formulation indicates that a real change takes place: the frequent use of bhāveti, "cultivate", "make grow", indicates that: A III 245 subhāvita, "well developed", M III 149 cittabhāvanā, "development of citta". When it is said that citta becomes one-pointed (D II 217), this can only refer to a concentration and unification of all forces within citta, a redisposition of the inner organization.

In S V 92, we find citta compared to gold with certain impurities; if these are removed, the gold becomes soft, pliable, luminous and workable: "Evaṃ eva kho ... pañcime cittassa upakkilesa, yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kammaniyāṃ na ca pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā samādhiyati āsavānaṃ khayaṇaṃ." "In the same
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

way, there are these five impurities of the citta, tainted by which citta is neither fine, nor pliable, nor luminous, nor frail, nor perfectly composed for the destruction of the āsava”. This passage may imply that citta is transformed through the impurities; but an implication that citta by itself and originally was pure as gold need not be read into it.

The development of citta consists in getting rid of bad traits and replacing them by good ones. In descriptions of this process we find that certain bad traits are more fundamental and difficult to get rid of than others: the last ones to disappear are the āsava. The traits that are developed are, among others, mettā and paññā. Therefore we find traces of an hierarchical organization in citta.

So far, citta has turned out to be rather similar to personality. But there are differences also:

(a) We may speak about “our” personality as about something outside us, but in reality, we always identify ourselves with our personality, and the psychological ego is contained in it. Citta is much more frequently placed as object of activities and conceived as “outside” the speaker (it should, e.g., be “restrained”). But as we have found, identification is also frequently implied.

(b) Citta is a more limited concept, as it mainly covers only conscious phenomena. The individual differences are not much elaborated upon in the Nikāyas.

(c) The instrumental aspect, common in citta, is not frequent with regard to personality.

(d) Citta is often said to be independable and to change quickly. Personality may also change and it may be “unstable”, but continuity is

We may conclude that citta rather may be called a center within personality a conscious center for activity, purposiveness, continuity and emotionality. The vague term “mind” may, after all, be the best translation, although it does not cover the emotional and moral aspects.

A note on ceto

Ceto is a derivation of the root cit just as citta, but it is much more limited in use. It is to be found only in genitive and instrumental case, and
in compounds, and it seems to be used in a rather limited number of contexts. The following observations are based on material mostly collected from D and M.

Ceto is often consciously and intentionally treated as a synonym of citta. In S III 232, the need and desire produced through the senses is called cittassa upakkileso but in the following sentence it is referred to as cetaso upakkileso. In S IV 125 it is said that rūpā touch citta again and again but: cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti, “without completely taking hold of citta”. This is then summed up with the expression cetaso apariyādānā, “by their failure to take hold of ceto”.

In A V 207 vigatābhijjhena cetasā is immediately followed by abhijjhāya citta parisodheti.

The following comparisons give also an impression of the close relations between ceto and citta.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceto</th>
<th>Citta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cetaso ekodibhāva,</td>
<td>cittaṃ ekodihotīti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D I 74</td>
<td>A I 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mettāsahagatena cetasā</td>
<td>mettā-cittam bhāveti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D I 251</td>
<td>D I 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cetovimuttī</td>
<td>cittam suvimuttam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M III 146</td>
<td>S III 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parisuddhena cetasā</td>
<td>citte parisuddhe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M III 94</td>
<td>D I 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cctosamādhistī</td>
<td>cittasamādhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M III 108</td>
<td>S IV 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceto-panidhi</td>
<td>paṇīhitena cittena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D III 259</td>
<td>A I 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cctasopakkilese</td>
<td>cittassa upakkileśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D III 49</td>
<td>S V 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cctaso pariyādānā</td>
<td>cittam pariyādāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S III 16</td>
<td>S II 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cetasā averena, avyāpajjhena</td>
<td>avera-citto, avyāpajjhabitto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D I 251</td>
<td>D I 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cetovimuttī paññāvimuttim</td>
<td>cittam paññāñca bhāvayam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D III 78</td>
<td>S I 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We find that *ceto* at least to some extent is just a synonym of *citta*: the upakilesa are attributed to both, and also some emotional traits. Both must be concentrated and both attain liberation. Further, both are engaged in supernatural perception, e.g., mind-reading (*cetasā ceto paricca vidito*, “by my *ceto*, of ... is known to me” M I 210, and frequently; compare A I 170, “evam pi te mano, ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti”, “thus is your mano, such and such is your mano, thus is your *citta*; in some contexts *citta* and *ceto* are combined, e.g. S I 194, “... *cetasā cittam sammanesati vippamuttam ...* “he discerned with his *ceto* the *citta* of these as being freed ...”

*Ceto* has a number of traits (cognitive, emotional, dynamic, and moral) of the same type as those attributed to *citta*. We find, for instance, the five *ceto-khilā*, “the obstructions of *ceto*”: doubt about the master, about the doctrine, about the order, about the training, and anger towards the fellow-monks (D III 237 f). And further, the five *cetaso vinibandhā*, “bondages”: desire for sensual pleasures, for the body, for visual things; excessive eating and sleeping; living a religious life for rebirth as a god (D III 238). The group adhiṭṭhāna, abhinivesa andanusaya (decision, indulgence and disposition) is consistently attributed to *ceto* (e.g. M III 32). In D III 259 we find *ceto-pañḍhī*, “aspiration of *ceto*”. In M III 50, we are told that *akusalā dhammā* follow if somebody lives with *abhijjhasahagatena cetasā*, vyāpadasahagatena *cetasā* and vihesasahagatena *vetasā* (*ceto* given over to covetousness, malevolence, harmfulness): they are all called *cittuppāda*, “creation of *citta*”. All this makes *ceto* appear as a dynamic center, not very unlike *citta*.

In some special aspects, *ceto* has a profile of its own.

1. The instrumental aspect is much more pronounced, especially for knowledge, thinking and concentration, “... dhamma *cetasā anuvitakketi anuvicareti ...” (D III 242), “he reflects and meditates over the doctrine in his *ceto*”, “... *mama cetasā cetoparivitakkaṃ aṭṭhāṇā*” (M I 168), “... who knew with his *ceto* the reasoning in my *ceto*”, “... *addassāṃ Bhagavantaṃ ... Māgadhake paricārake ārabba aṭṭhikatvā manasikatvā sabba-cetaso samannāharitvā nisinnam: ‘Gatiṃ tesāṃ jānissāmi abhisamparāyaṃ, yaṃgatikā te bhavanto yamabhisamparāyati’”. (D II 207). “I saw the Lord ... sitting down to think over, to cogitate upon, to concentrate his whole *ceto* upon the deceased Magadhese adherents: “I will know their fate, their future; where these people are going, what their future will be.”

181
This stress on concentration and supernatural knowledge becomes especially prominent in contexts where the ways to liberation are described. Very often we find the combination ceto-vimutti pañña-vimutti, usually translated "freedom of mind and freedom through intuitive wisdom". It is often (e.g. M I 73, D III 78) said to depend on the destruction of āsavā and is therefore the same process as described in D I 84 "kāmāsavā pi cittān vimuccati bhavāsavā pi cittān vimuccati avijjāsavā pi cittān vimuccati. 'Vimuttasmiṁ vimuttam' iti niñama hoti", "citta is freed from the influx of sensual pleasure, from the influx of rebirth, from the influx of ignorance; he knows: 'in liberation it is freed'". Cetovimutti is analyzed into five types in M I 296-298:

(a) adukkhamasukhā cetovimutti which is attained in the fourth jhāna.

(b) animittā cetovimutti: the monk does not pay any attention to any signs (conditions) and enters on animittān cetosamādhiṁ, the concentration that is signless.

(c) ākiñcaññā cetovimutti: the monk passes quite beyond the plane of infinite consciousness and thinks 'There is nothing at all'.

(d) suññatā cetovimutti: the monk meditates "suññamidam attena vā attaniyena vā", "this is void of self or of what pertains to self",

(e) appamāṇā cetovimutti: the monk suffuses the whole world with a ceto that is mettā-sahagata, karuṇā-sahagata, muditā-sahagata, upekkhā-sahagata, "filled with friendliness, compassion, joy, equanimity".

We find that all these belong to different levels of meditation. The appamāṇā cetovimutti is an idea that returns quite often and is unique for ceto: the conscious processes of a meditating person are here conceived as a sort of energy that can be directed and fill the whole world "just as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard", D I 251) and is probably thought to have beneficial influence on its objects. In the 4th jhāna the monk is said to suffuse his whole body "parisuddhena cetasā pariyodatena", "with utterly clean and pure ceto" (M III 94), just as somebody might wrap up his whole body with a white cloth.

To sum up: Ceto is a synonym of citta but is used especially for its instrumental, cognitive, meditative, and supernatural functions.
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

Mano.

Mano seems to be much easier to grasp than the other concepts discussed in this paper. Its essential function, as inner sense, is the same as is commonly met with in earlier Indian psychology.

1. Is mano consciousness?

In for instance D I 70 mano is described as an instrument for knowledge of dharmā: “manasā dhammaṁ viññāya”, “when he cognizes a phenomenon with his mano ...” Mano is generally found mentioned as one of the senses, and just as the eye has rūpa as object, mano characteristically has dhamma. In D III 242, it is used with anupekkhati: “dhammaṁ ...... manasā anupekkhati”, “he contemplates the doctrine in mano”. In SN 834 we find “manasā diṭṭhitgatāni cintayanto”, “thinking over the theories in mano”. Mano is therefore a center for conscious processes.

2. Is mano an entity?

When using the word “center” above, we implied that mano has more character of entity than of process. Is that justified? By center we mean a more or less permanent although changing structure used as an instrument for producing or containing processes of a certain type: a sense is a structure transforming physical energy to signals that can be interpreted by the organism. Mano is sensitive to and a repository of dhāmmanā received from the other senses: “Imesam kho ... pañcannam indriyānāṁ nānāvisayānāṁ nānāgocarānaṁ na aṁañamaṇīṇassa gocarāvijayaṁ pacchanubhontānaṁ mano paṭisaraṇam, mano ca nesāṁ gocaravijayaṁ pacchanubhoṭiti” (M I 195). “Of these five senses, different in range, different in field (=modality), not reacting to the field and range of each other, mano is the refuge (center?), and mano reacts to their field and range”. Mano is, therefore, a coordinating center for the other senses, and perhaps an instrument for recollecting past events (=memory).

The same idea of an instrumental center returns, for instance, in SN 1142. “Passāmi naṁ manasā cakkhusaṁ va”. “I see him with mano as with my eye”. Similarly in SN 1005 “manasā puchite paṁhe vācāya vissajessati”, “he will answer in words the questions you have asked in mano”. Cf. M I 191 “Ajhattiko ce ... mano aparibhimo hoti ... ” “If the internal mano is unbroken ... ” and S I 197 “... vanoṁ paviṭṭho, atha me mano niccharati bahiddhā”, “(I have) gone into the forest, but my mano goes astray outside”. I have not found any passage where mano is used
with a clear process-meaning, but there are very many contexts, where a process-meaning could well be implied. *Mano* in S I 197 just quoted, seems to be personified and objectified, but a meaning “thought”, “imagination” is not excluded. In all the cases where *manomaya* is used, it may mean “produced by the *mano*” or “consisting of a mental image”, which in reality could be the same thing. The question may be more or less artificial but I conclude that *mano* is primarily thought of as an entity.

3. Is mano an instrument?

We have already quoted passages proving that *mano* is an instrument of ideation. As a matter of fact, the instrumental meaning clearly domi­nates all other usages. It can be seen in some very frequently occurring compounds, e.g. *manasāṅkāra* (activity of *mano*), *mano-vitakka* (thoughts of *mano*), *mano-sucarita* (good action by means of *mano*).

There are, however, also indications of a more independent meaning.” Sabbaloke ca me mano nābharamissati, sabbalokā ca me mano vutṭhahissati” (A III 443). “My *mano* shall find no delight in any world; my *mano* shall rise above every world”.—“Haranti maṁfe mano vanāni samādhiṁ alabhamaṁnassa bhikkhuno” (M I 16) — “I think forests distract the *mano* of a monk who does not attain samādhi”.—“Na brahmaṇaṇass’ etad akiṁci seyyo yaṁ nisedho manaso piyehi” (Dh 390) “It is no slight benefit to a brahmīn when he holds his *mano* back from the pleasures of life”.

In sum, the word *mano* is used for some conscious agency, mainly instrumen­tal to the purposes of other agencies, but sometimes used without instrumental implications.

4. Functions of mano.

We have stressed that *mano* is chiefly conceived as an inner center with a predominantly instrumental function. We shall now investigate the areas of function more closely.

(a) Perception. In M III 216, 18 applications of *mano* (manopavicārā) are mentioned: “Cakkhuna rūpaṁ disvā somanassaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati domanassaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati, upekaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ rūpaṁ upavicarati; sotena saddāṁ sutvā—pe—; ghānena gandhaṁ ghā yitvā—pe—; jivhāya rasaṁ sāyitvā—pe—; kāyena phoṭṭhabbaṁ phusitvā—pe—; manasā dammaṁ viṁṇāya somanassaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ dammaṁ upavicarati domanassaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ dammaṁ upavicarati upekaṭṭhāṇīyaṁ
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

dhammam upavicarati”. “Having seen a form with the eye, one experiences the form as (standing on—) connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling. Having heard a sound with the ear, — having smelt a smell with the nose, — having tasted a flavour with the tongue, — having felt a touch the body, — having become conscious of a dhamma with mano, one experiences a mental state connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling.” Here, two functions of mano are clearly indicated: the function of knowing or cognizing mental states, ideas and so on, which are referred to above, and the function of receiving and experiencing the impressions directly from the other senses. According to Buddhist way of thinking all perception involves an immediate evaluation from the individual point of view: perception and feeling together belong therefore to the manopavārā. In M I 191 it is stated that if the internal mano is intact and external dhammā come in focus and there is an appropriate contact, then the appropriate part of viññāṇa will appear. (“Tato ... ajjhattiko ce mano aparihinnno hoti bāhirā ca dhammā āpātham āgacchanti tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, evam tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti”). This seems to be a good description of a perceptual process: if we are to be conscious of something, a functioning sense-organ is required; this must be focussed on the object; and there must be proper contact (contact probably refers to the physical impingement of the object on the sense-organ by which the primitive sensations are produced). The dhamma is in this case described as external; so it may be be used as a comprehensive term for all external stimuli.

(b) Attention. In S II 24 we find the exhortation: “suñātha sādhukam manasi karotha bhāsissāmiti”, “listen, give your mano thoroughly, and I will speak. The phrase manasi-karoti is used in many forms to express attention, e.g. in the frequently found formula: “ātappaṁ anvāya padhānam anvāya anvaya anuyogaṁ anvāya appamādam anvāya sammā-manasikāraṁ anvāya tathārūpaṁ ccto-samādhīṁ phusati yathā samāhite citte anekavihitaṁ pubbe nivāsam anussarati”, “by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of vigilance, of highest attention, he attains such concentration of mind that he, with concentrated citta remembers his various existences in the past”. We may conclude that attention and concentration are connected with mano.

(c) Intelligence and thinking are also clearly functions of mano. See SN 834, “Atha tvam pavitakkam āgamā, manasā diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto” “Then you started to speculate, reflecting on the views in your mano. Mano is often combined with vitakka, “reflective thought”: “ito samuṣ-
thāya manovitakka ... snehā attasambhūtā ...” “hence spring the reflective thoughts of mano: born of love and arisen in self” (S I 207). The already quoted passage in SN 1005 gives an instance of mental questioning, which we would call a thought-process.

(d) Memory and ideation. Memory is not directly attributed to mano, but as the “repository” of the other senses (S V 218) and the center of all kinds of ideational activity, memory must be very much involved in its activities. In D II 176 it is said about a lady: “manāsa pi no aticāri, kuto pana kāyena”, “she was never, even with her mano, unfaithful, how much less with the body”, and here evidently that type of ideation that we call imagination is referred to. The same imaginative function we have already met in S I 197: “(I have) gone into the forest, but my mano goes astray outside”. A little more vague is an interesting passage in SN 1144: “jīnassā me dūbbalathāmakassa ten’ eva kāyo na paleti tattha, saṃkappayattāya vajāmi niccāṁ, mano hi me ... tena yutto”. “Because I am old and feeble, my body does not go there, but in my intentions I always go there, for my mano is joined to him”. Saṃkappa is here used for the planning and longing thought-activity; mano could refer to a daydreaming function or to emotional attachment. The word manomaya is frequently used about images created by mano. “Puna ca param ... akkhātā mayā sāvakānāma paṭipāda, yathā paṭipannā me sāvakā imaṁhā kāyā aññām kāyam abhinimminanti rūpin manomayaṁ sabbanda-paccangīm abhinindriyam”. (M II 17). “And again, a method has been described by me for disciples, practicing which disciples of mine from this body produce another body, with form and made by mano, having all its major and minor parts, not deficient in any sense. The origin of these images was probably the ability to create clear mental images: but it is evident from, for instance, A III 122 that the pictures so created were believed to have independent reality, filling space although without material body: “kālaṅkato aññataraṁ manomayam kāyam upapanno, tassa evāriyo attabhaṅgataṁ abhihoti, seyyathā pi nāma dve vā tiṇi vā Māgadhikāni gāmakkhettānī” ... “when he died he was reborn in a body made by/of mano, and the form that he took was such that it filled two or three Magadhan village fields”.

(e) Feelings and emotions

M III 216 was quoted above, where the 18 manopaviciirā were given and which proves that the feelings also were considered as felt by mano. Cf. S V 74 “Manāsa dharmam viṇṇāya manāpaṁ ...”, “with mano cognizing a pleasant phenomenon ...”, and “Agati yattha Mārassa, tattha me
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

nirato mano”, “Out of reach of Māra my mano is pleased (S I 133). — “Padhānāya gamissāmi, ettha me rañjati mano” (SN 424). “I will go and exert myself, in this my mano delights jhāna”. — “dandhaṃ hi karoto puñṇaṃ pāpsmim ramaṭi mano” (Dh 116), “If a man is slack in doing good, his mano delights in evil”.

Even emotions are sometimes attributed to mano: “Ayam eva mahattaro kali, yo sugatesu manam padosaye” (SN 659) “This is a greater sin: to make mano angry towards the happy ones”, — “manopakopaṃ rak-kheyya” (Dh 233) “let one be watchful of irritation in mano” — “santaṃ tassa manaṃ hoti” (Dh 96), “his mano is calm”.

It is clear from these passages that mano can feel pleased or displeased, irritated or calm.

(f) Needs, purposiveness and will.

Dynamic traits are often attributed to mano. See, for instance, D II 275 “Puccha ... manaṃ panhaṃ Yam kiñci manas’ icchasi”, “Ask me whatever question you wish in your mano”. — D I 18: “Iti manaṃ ca mano-panidhi, ime ca sattā itthattam āgata”, “So was my mano’s wish, and these beings came there”. — D III 103: “Yathā imassa bhoto mano-saṁkhārā pañihitā, tathā imassa cittassa anantarā anumā nāma vitakkaṃ vitakkessati”, “Just as this good man’s mano-activity is directed, so will he later direct the thought of this citta”. — SN 228: Ye suppayuttā manasā dālhana nikkāmino Gotama — sāsanamhi ... “Those who have applied themselves well with a firm mano to the discipline of Gotama and are freed from desire ...” — We also often find the compound mano-saṅcetana (e.g., D III 228) meaning “will” or “purposiveness”.

Mano is generally conceived as an active agency, not only as a sense, content with passively receiving impressions and passing them on. We need only point to the frequent occurrence of expressions for actions performed by mano, kāya and vācā: “Pañcahi thānehi kula-puttena uparimā disa samaṇa-brāhmaṇa paccupaṭṭhabbā: mettena kāya-kammena, mettena vāc-kammena, mettena mano-kammena ...” (D III 191), “In five ways should a clansman minister to recluses and brahmins as the zenith: by friendly acts in behaviour, speech and mano ...” — “Parisuddho no mano-samācāro bhavissati ...” (M I 272). “Our conduct in mano shall be perfectly pure ...”
We conclude, that active attitude is one of the aspects of mano. This leads us naturally over to the question of the moral implications of the thoughts and acts of mano.

(g) Mano as moral agency

Mano can perform good and bad actions. “Manoduuccarita=false, manas=r sucarita=false care” (Dh 233). “Having abadoned the bad actions of mano he should practise good actions with mano”. Khattiyo ... k=4=yna duccarita=false cariy=4=v, v=4=4=4=4=v duccarita=false cariy=4=v, manas=r duccarita=false cariy=4=v ... (D III 96) “a khattiya who has led a bad life in deed, word and mano ...” In M I 373 it is said that a mano-kamm=5= more blamable if it is bad, than works of body or speech. It follows that the evil purpose is felt to be the only real evil and that it is attributed to mano. This connection between purpose and the activity of mano perhaps lies behind the compound padu=4=8=ma=4=sa=4=mkappo in M III 49: “Vy=4=pannacitto kho pana hoti padu=4=ma=4=sa=4=mkappo: Ime satt=4=c=4=ha=4=n=4=ntu=v vajjhantu=v uchijjantu=v vinassantu=v m=4=a=4=h=4=e=4=hu=v v i=4=t=4=v evaru=4=pa=v mansam=4=ca=v ram sevato akusal=4=a dham=4=m=4=a abhiva=4=d=4=dh=4=nti=k usala=4=dham=4=m=4=a pari=4=ha=4=y=4=nti.” “He is malevolent in his citta, corrupt in mano and intentions (or: intentions of mano ?), and thinks: ‘May these beings be killed or slaughtered or annihilated or destroyed, or may they not exist at all’. If this kind of conduct of mano is followed, unskilled states of mind grow much, skilled states of mind decrease”.

5. Is mano personal?

The answer to this question is yes, because everything that comes in through the senses passes through mano: it must therefore be individually formed. There is also direct evidence. According to A I 170, both mano and citta are interpreted in thought-reading: “Katama=5=n ca ... a=5=desan=5=p=5=ti=h=5=riya=5=n? Idha ... ekacco nimittena adisati, eva=5=n pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te citta iti”. “And what is the marvel of thought-reading ? In this case somebody can declare by means of a sign: ‘Thus is your mano. Such and such is your mano. That is your citta’.”. From this follows also that mano must have some interior organisation, but nothing is ever said directly about this matter.

6. The fate of mano.

Mano is described as changing and ephemeral. “Mana=5=ica p=5=ti=5=ca dhamme ca uppa=5=jati mano=5=vin=5=na=5=a=5=n=5=am; mano anicco vipari=5=na=5=m=5=i a=5=n=ath=5=a=5=bh=5=vi; dhamma=5=anicca vipari=5=na=5=m=5=ino a=5=n=ath=5=a=5=bh=5=avino” (S IV 69). De-
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

dependent upon mano and mental states, mano-viññāṇa arises. Mano is impermanent, changing, becoming something different. The mental states are impermanent, changing, becoming something different." — Cf. S I 116 “'Tav' eva pāpīma mano tava dhammā tava mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanānā; yattha ca kho pāpīma naththi mano naththi dhammā naththi mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam agati tava tattha pāpīma ti”. “To you, O evil one belong (the senses and their objects and) mano, the mental states, and the field of consciousness created by contact with mano. But where there is no mano, no mental states, no field of consciousness created by contact with mano, there is no access for you, Evil One”. — Mano is therefore normally subject to change and death, but there is another possibility: to calm mano by training (in Dh 96, it is said about the arahant: “santāṇi tassa manaṇī hoti”, “his mano is calm”).

7. Can mano be influenced and trained?

There are many indications in the texts that mano is to be trained and plays an important part in meditation. “Manasā saṁvuto siyā” (Dh 233). “May he practice restraint of mano”. — “Na brāhmaṇass etad akiñcī seyyo yadā nisedho manaso piyehi” (Dh 390) “It is no slight benefit to a brahmin, when he holds his mano back from pleasures”. — “Yad āvilaṭṭaṁ manaso-vijaññā, ‘kaṇhassa pakkho’ ti vinodayeeyya”. (SN 967) “What he recognizes to be disturbance of mano, may he drive that off as an associate of Mara” — We find that mano should be concentrated, turned from outside things and “developed” (mano-bhāvanīyā bhikkhū, “monks who are developing mano”, D III 36). But it is also said, that one should not restrain mano from everything but only from what is evil: “Na sabbato mano nivāraye; na mano sayatattam āgatam; yato yato ca pāpakam, tato tato mano nivāraye” (S I 14) “One should not restrain mano from everything: not when mano has attained self-control. Whatever is evil, one should restrain mano from that”. Mano plays in this respect a purely instrumental part: it has to do its work and then stay in the background. It is never said that mano attains liberation or that it survives death.

Vinnāṇa

General characteristics.

Vinnāṇa is a more complex concept than the two others discussed in this paper, and its unity has sometimes been denied. Here we shall first test the hypothesis that it may have been conceived as a unit. After that, we shall compare it with the other two concepts by confronting it with the same questions as we used earlier. We start by quoting some crucial passages suitable as corner-stones for a coming definition:
1. Kittāvata nu kho viññāṇan-ti vouccatīti. — Vijānāti vijānātīti kho, tasmā viññāṇan-ti vouccati, kiṁ-ca vijānāti: sukhan-ti pi vijānāti, dukkhan-ti pi vijānāti, adukkham-asukhan-ti pi vijānāti (M I 292). “In what respect it is called viññāṇa?” “It is called viññāṇa because it notices, it notices (vijānāti: discriminates, becomes aware). And what does it notice? It notices pleasure, pain and neutral feeling”.

(In a similar definition, S III 87, a number of tastes are given as examples).

Viññāṇa therefore definitely has something to do with consciousness.

2. This is further elaborated upon in numerous passages like D III 243: “Cha viññāṇa-kāyā. Cakkhu viññāṇaṁ, sotagāṇa-, jivhā-, kāya-, mano viññāṇaṁ.”

“(There are) six manifestations of viññāṇa: visual, auditory, olfactory, sapid, tactual and mental (belonging to the inner sense).”

Viññāṇa is, therefore, awareness of inner processes coming from the senses (perceptual processes) or from memory (ideational processes).

3. In S III 103 viññāṇa (just as the other khandhā) is called anicca dukkha viparināmadhamma, “impermanent, painful, liable to change”, and in the same context a way of escaping from viññāṇa (viññāṇassa nissaraṇam) is mentioned. Viññāṇa is, therefore, certainly a process, not an entity.

4. Through its inclusion in the pāṭiccasamuppāda, between sankhārā and nāma-rūpa (see e.g. S II 3 f), viññāṇa is understood to be conditioned and itself a condition.

5. “Viññāṇāhāro āyatim punabhāvabhīnibbattiyā paccayo.” (S II 13 “The type of food called viññāṇa is the support (cause) of renewed becoming, of birth in the future”. Viññāṇaṁ ... mātu kucchiṁ na okkanissathā, api nu kho nāma-rūpaṁ mātu kucchismiṁ samucchissathatī?” (D II 63) “Were viññāṇa not to descend into the mother’s womb, would nāma-rūpa arise therein?” (rhetorical question).

We can conclude that viññāṇa is, in some way or other, the important agency in the Buddhist conception of rebirth.
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

6. In M I 256, the view is refuted that "tad-ev’ idāṁ viññāṇaṁ sandhāvati saṁsārati, anaññānti”, “this viññāna itself runs on, fares on, nothing else", by referring to what the Buddha had said, “paṭiccasamuppāpannaṁ viññāṇaṁ”, “viññāna arises through condition”.

Although viññāna is the agency of rebirth, it is not itself reborn: it is not some sort of permanent soul that migrates through a number of existences (the view that viññāna is attā, i.e. a permanent self, is frequently refuted, e.g. M III 18).

The background

In order to visualize a concept like this, we must keep the following considerations in mind:

1. The universe as conceived by the Buddha is governed by ethical laws. All individual life can be compared with waves of energy running through time but without material unity, consisting of individual organisms, each working its way, and by means of its activity, which is always viewed from the aspect of its ethical effectiveness, forging its own future. Although the individuals, at any chosen moment of time, are considered as separate, and although the ethics of Buddhism is not purely social, they are much closer to each other and dependent on each other than is commonly held in Western psychology: ethics is all-important. The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something than can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This “wave of energy” is called viññāna.

2. We would expect that the idea of an agency of rebirth would be shaped under the impression of certain introspective observations. We would expect that certain mental contents that seemed to indicate or explain the function of kamma in an ethical universe and, at the same time, give a foundation to the Buddhist doctrine of liberation, would have been collected to form the concept of viññāna. Observations of this type were maybe:

(a) the continuity of the conscious processes, (e.g. the laws of association)

(b) the inner causality, the experience of inner force (drives, needs) which are felt to be causes of actions,
UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

(c) the accumulating function of memory, the ability to recollect, earlier experience, our continuous change,
(d) the moral judge in consciousness (of forgotten origin which makes it seem a universal law) making our actions seem good or bad,
(e) the inner freedom of imagination in dreams and daydreams,
(f) the possibility of stopping the whole mental process.

An hypothesis
We formulate the hypothesis that the concept of viññāna is a unitary and empirical concept formed under the influence of observations of this type. If this is true, we would expect viññāna to be:
1. a continually flowing process (not a static structure),
2. principally dynamic, experienced as force,
3. principally conscious, but with a subconscious component, because most of the content is not always present (former existences are rarely remembered; the act of rebirth is not conscious); it should be able to remember former existences,
4. transmitter of karmic effects, modifiable by experiences,
5. a free-moving force, not bound in time and space (e.g., connected with dreams and free imaginations),
6. an explanation of rebirth in terms of consciousness,
7. a process that can be stopped and thereby the whole karmic process.

The hypothesis tested
1. Is viññāna a process?
We have already seen that viññāna is produced through the work of the senses and that it is perishable, changeable and conditioned. It was, therefore certainly not conceived as static. This view is confirmed in M I 259, "cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjate viññāṇat, cakkuviññāṇan-t' eva sāṅkham gacchati", "if viññāna arises dependent on eye and forms it is known as visual consciousness". In D III 105, viññāna is compared to a stream: "purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṁ paññāti ubhayato abbocchinṇam idhaloke patiṭṭhitaṁ ca paraloke patiṭṭhitaṁ ca", "he understands a man’s viññāna-stream as uninterrupted at both ends and supported both in this world and in the other world". Here, viññāna is visualized as a stream flowing through a string of existences, in time. What constitutes a stream is not the water-particles, which may be endlessly rearranged and even replaced by some completely different type of particles, but the energy and the momentary form.
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

There are other metaphorical descriptions of viññāṇa which seem to suggest a more static structure. See e.g. A I 223: "kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇanāṃ bijaṃ tānāḥ sineho avijjā-varanāṃ sattanāṃ tāṇhāsaṃyojananāṃ hināya dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitam". "Kamma is the field, viññāṇa the seed, tāṇhā the moisture. Of beings that are hindered by avijjā, fettered by tāṇhā, viññāṇa gets support in low conditions". The seed is of course changing, but still an entity. — In a parable, S IV 195, viññāṇa is personified and called the lord of the city (nagarasāmi). — In S I 122, Māra is looking for the viññāṇa of Godhika who had died. But Godhika was parinibbuta, and therefore his viññāṇa was appatīṭhīta, i.e. "without support", but it is taken for granted that, had it not been so, viññāṇa would have survived as an entity and therefore an easy prey to Māra. As belonging to the popular pulpit style, this should certainly not be taken too literally: usually it is emphatically stressed that khandha, of which viññāṇa is one, are dissolved at death; here viññāṇa has been used as citta is used in many similar contexts.

2. Is viññāṇa dynamic?

Viññāṇa is not described as principally dynamic, as demanded by hypothesis no. 2. This follows already from the above-mentioned definition M I 292 and from passages like D III 243, where it is given a purely cognitive and ideational function. Dynamic traits can, however, also be found. In M III 226, viññāṇa is given the attribute anusāri, "striving after". In S III 9 f, viññāṇa is said to be rāga-vinibaddha ("tied with desire") to rūpadhātu, vedanādhātu, saṃsādadhātu, and sankhāradhātu, which are called the home (oka) of viññāṇa. This must mean that rāga is experienced through viññāṇa. Cf. S III 103, "yo viññānasmiṃ chandarāgavinayo chandarāgapahānaṃ", "the restraint of wish and desire, the removal of wish and desire which are in viññāṇa", which probably refers to the confrontation of chandarāga with a counterforce within viññāṇa. — "Tassa tam upekkhāṃ abhinandato abhivaññata ajīhoṣaya tiṣṭhato taṃ nissitaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ tad upādānam". (M II 265) "If he rejoices in this equanimity, approves of it and clings to it, viññāṇa is dependent on it and grasps after it". Here the function of clinging is attributed to viññāṇa. In S III 47, viññāṇa (and the other khandhā) is given the attributes “sāsava upādāniya”, "connected with asāvā and upādāna”, which could mean that these factors, as concious, work through viññāṇa. Both are at least partly dynamic qualities: upādāna means, (a) "attachment", (b) “material", "fuel". Clinging naturally arises from tāṇhā (as is said in the paticca-samuppāda-series): this conscious attachment is material for bhava; which means simply that if we want to live, we shall go on living. Cf. SN 1055:
“viññāṇam bhave na tiṇṭhe”, “do not set your viññāṇa on bhava!” i.e. “do not affect a new birth by consciously striving for it!” Of special interest in this context are the four āhārā (foods, sustenances), mentioned e.g. in MI 261: kabaliṅkāra āhāra (material food), phassa (sensory contact), manosaṅcetanā (mental striving), viññāṇa. It is said that they all arise from tanhā (ime cattāro āhārā tanhānidānā tanhāsamudaya tanhājātiyā tanhā-pabhavā) and that their purpose is to maintain creatures that have come to be, or to assist those seeking birth (“bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ thitiyā sambhasvasīnaṃ vā anuggahāya”). They are, therefore, active in the process of rebirth. S II 13 is more specific and mentions only viññāṇa as having this function, while S II 101 treats them all as equally important: as targets of tanhā, by means of which “patiṭṭhitam tattha viññāṇam virūḷham” (“viññāṇa is supported and becomes fruitful”) and then “atthi tattha nāmarūpasa avakkantu” (“there is descent of name-and-shape”).

The meaning is perhaps that tanhā operates through viññāṇa, although not really belonging to viññāṇa. Tanhā may become conscious through viññāṇa: in that case we would find active processes in viññāṇa.

On the other hand, manosaṅcetanā, which means “conscious striving”, is distinguished from viññāṇa, and therefore we must presuppose active processes outside viññāṇa. In S III 60, we find saṅcetanā identified with saṅkhāra, and the close contact between saṅkhāra and viññāṇa is well documented through the paṭiccasamuppāda-series. It can also be seen from the use of abhisāṅkhāra in S III 53 f. “Tad-apaṭiṭṭhitam viññāṇam avirūḷham anabhīsaṅkhāraṇaṃ vimuttam”, “Without that support viññāṇa has no growth, is without saṅkhāra and is freed”. According to M III 279 f, vedanā, saṅkā, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa arise because of phassa (mano-samphassa-paccayā): so they are all parallel and, at least partly, conscious.

Saṅkhāra has not been included for analysis in this study, but we can refer to a study by Jayatilleke (“Some problems of translation and interpretation”, UCR, vol. VII, 1949, p. 208-225), where it is shown that saṅkhāra is a dynamic concept, best described by words like “purposive activity”, “dispositions”, “vital impulse” and that it covers also subconscious processes. If we need not imply a time-sequence but could treat viññāṇa and saṅkhāra as complementary concepts (this will be discussed below), the two together would satisfy our search for a dynamic agency. Jayatilleke seems to imply this interpretation when he says that “... the probability is...that this part of the stream of Consciousness consisted of these dynamic saṅkhāras ...”
3. Has viññ̄a a subconscious component?

We have noted that viññ̄a in principle is consciousness and need not collect more evidence for this. But in order to explain the continuity, the influence of *kamma*, and the possibility to remember former existences, we assumed an unconscious component in viññ̄a. This is rarely mentioned. It can, however, be seen from D III 134, that viññ̄a is used in connection with recollection of former existences: “Atitam ... addhānaṁ ārabbha Tathāgatassa satānusāriviññ̄ānaṁ hoti”, “concerning the past, the Tathāgata has viññ̄a reminiscent of existences”. Concerning a possible unconscious component, we have found only one passage worth discussing. In S II 65, two factors of importance for rebirth are distinguished, “Yañca ... ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañca anuseti, ārammaṇan etaṁ hoti viññ̄aṁassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati patiṭhā viññ̄aṁassa hoti”. “That which we will and that which we intend and that which lies as dormant tendencies — this becomes a basis for a state (prevailence, duration) of viññ̄a. If the basis is there, there will be a state of viññ̄a”. A few lines further down, this group of verbs is divided into two, and it turns out that ceteti and pakappeti are not necessary as basis for the state of viññ̄a: anuseti is sufficient: “No ce ... ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇan etaṁ hoti viññ̄aṁassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati patiṭhā viññ̄aṁassa hoti”. “Even if we do not will or intend, but there still is a dormant tendency — this becomes a basis for a state of viññ̄a. If the basis is there, there will be a state of viññ̄a”. As anuseti probably refers to unconscious, i.e. latent, processes: tendencies and dispositions (the translation of Woodward misses the point), this could be taken as a proof of the close connection between viññ̄a and the unconscious.

The attempt to find an unconscious component in viññ̄a has not been very successful. One explanation could be the process-character and indistinctness of viññ̄a: the unconscious aspects may be there without being expressed. Another explanation may be found in the close association between viññ̄a and saṅkhāra: as mentioned above, saṅkhāra has an unconscious component.

4. Is viññ̄a the transmitter of karma?

The karmic effects (the karmic memory) are connected to viññ̄a. “Avijjā-gato yañ ... purisapuggalo puññ̄amu ce saṅkhāram abhisāṅkharoṭi, puññ̄upagaṁ hoti viññ̄ānamu. Apuññ̄āṇaṁ ce saṅkhaṁ abhisāṅkharoṭi, apuññ̄upagaṁ hoti viññ̄ānamu”. (S II 82) “If an ignorant man performs an act of merit, viññ̄a becomes pure (“acquires merit”). If he performs
an act of demerit, \textit{viññāṇa} becomes impure.” The same transmitting function is referred to when \textit{viññāṇa} is called anabhisanākhāra, “without \textit{sāṅkhāra},” i.e. “without accumulation of \textit{kamma}”. See further discussion under 6.

5. \textit{Is free ideation attributed to viññāṇa?}

Little is said in the Nikāyas about dreams, but free ideation is often connected with \textit{viññāṇa}. We find, for instance, the expression \textit{mano-viññāṇa}, “the \textit{viññāṇa} of the inner sense”, see e.g. M III 32: “mano-viññāṇa-viññātabbā dhammā”, “conscious processes cognizable through the \textit{viññāṇa} of the inner sense”. An example of what may be included in \textit{mano-viññāṇa} is given in M I 293: “Nissaṭṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parisuddhena mano-viññāṇena kim neyyan-ti. — Nissaṭṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parisuddhena mano-viññāṇena ananto ākāso ti ākāsānañcayatamānānā neyyaṁ, anantaṁ viññāṇan- ti viññānanācayatanānā neyyaṁ, natti kūcicīt akiñcān-ñayatanānā neyyam-ti”. “What is knowable by purified \textit{viññāṇa} of the inner sense, without use of the five sense-organs? — Thinking, ‘Space is unlimited’, the plane of unlimited space is knowable by pure (meaning “by itself” or “clear”) \textit{viññāṇa} of the inner sense without use of the five sense-organs; thinking, ‘\textit{Viññāṇa} is unlimited’; the plane of unlimited \textit{viññāṇa} is knowable; thinking, ‘There is nothing at all’, the plane of emptiness is knowable”. Here we find examples of purely conscious activity without direct support from the senses. Probably all such “free” activity is a function of \textit{viññāṇa}. This interpretation seems to be confirmed in S III 68, where different types of \textit{viññāṇa} are enumerated (the formulation indicates that the enumeration is intended to be complete): “Yam kūci viññāṇam atittānāgatapaccuppannam aṣṭhaṁ dhāmaṁ vā bhājattaṁ vā olārikāṁ vā sukhumāṁ vā hināṁ vā pāṇītaṁ vā, yam dure santikā vā ...” “Every \textit{viññāṇa} whatever, be it past, future or present, be it inward or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near ...” This enumeration is strange if it were to mean the different types of \textit{viññāṇa} found in different people rather than the changing conscious contents, e.g., ideas concerning the past, ideas concerning the remote, concerning low things, external things, and so on.

We conclude that free mental activity is a function of \textit{viññāṇa} and that our hypothesis is satisfied on this point.

6. \textit{Can viññāṇa explain rebirth?}

Essential for rebirth are, according to A I 223, already quoted, \textit{kamma}, \textit{avijjā}, \textit{tanha}, and \textit{viññāṇa}. “We note the presence of the dynamic factor
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

tañhā here. More often, the three factors saṅkhāra, viññāna and nāma-rūpa are said to constitute the mechanism of rebirth (cf. D II 63 quoted above). Saṅkhāra corresponds to kamma in the former enumeration.

There is an affinity between kamma and the next existence: “kamma dāyādā sattā ti vadāmi” (M I 390), “I say: creatures are heirs to actions”. For instance, a person who performs aggressive acts of body, speech and thought is reborn in an aggressive world (savyāpajjhāṁ lokam uppajjati): there he is affected by aggressive phassā, and from them aggressive vedanā arise (A I 122, M I 389).

The conscious wish for rebirth plays an important part in the rebirth-process. One of the āsavā is bhavāsava. This wish comes to expression through viññāna, and you can “set viññāna on becoming”, with the phrasing used in SN 1055 quoted above. In other cases, citta is used in this context: “Tassa evaṁ hoti: Aho vatāham, kāyassa phāremmahārāṇa khattiya-mahāsālānaṁ sahavyatam uppajjeyyan ti. So taṁ cittaṁ dahati, taṁ cittaṁ adhitthāti taṁ cittaṁ bhāveti; tassa te saṅkhāra ca vihāro c’evam bhāvita bahulikatā tatr’ uppattiya saṁvattanti. Ayaṁ ... maggo ayaṁ paṭipada tatr’ uppattiya saṁvattati”. (M III 99 f). “It occurs to him: ‘O that at the breaking up of the body after dying I might arise in companionship with the nobles’. This citta he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it. These aspirations (saṅkhārā) and this insisting of his, developed thus, zealously practiced, conduce to rebirth there. This is the way, this is the course that conduces to rebirth there”. Cf. the similar passage in D III 258 and D I 20, both already quoted. The actions of a person may also bear fruit in this life: Āṅgulimāla, for instance (M II 97–105) was a robber who became an arahant. This did not save him from being severely wounded by sticks and stones that were not aimed at him. The Buddha explained it as a fruit of his kamma.

Rebirth is to Buddhism not a metaphysical theory but an empirical fact. An adequately trained person can recall his former existences and even those of other persons. The general idea of mental causality was probably common at the time of the Buddha, and he had only to stress that it functions according to strict ethical rules. Its functioning can often be observed in the present life, where many happenings seem to be rewards and punishments. As the law of kamma is causal and moral and works through consciousness by means of affinities, it is well known and can be manipulated. Consciousness was felt to be the medium of this law, pro-
bably of the following reasons: (a) The actions (behaviour, speech, thoughts) are, or can become, conscious. (b) They are automatically judged in consciousness as good or bad (or, more scientifically, as *kusala* or *akusala*). (c) Consciousness is felt to change through the influence of dynamic factors, and of impressions from the outside. (d) Consciousness is felt to be able to influence matter and transcend matter; (e) Consciousness can be changed through training.

As *viññāṇa* is in its rebirth-aspect felt to be empirical and to consist of processes only, without much inner unity, there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual *viññāṇa* and rebirth-*viññāṇa*. These are the following positive reasons for *not* doing so: (a) When *viññāṇa* in paticcasamuppāda-context is analyzed, it is done according to sense-fields (S II 3 f). This may not mean that *viññāṇa* consists of these parts, but only that any conscious process may be seen from these aspects. (b) *Sanikhāra*, which in some contexts is analyzed into bodily, verbal and mental activity (S II 3 f), in other contexts according to sense-fields (S III 60), can influence *viññāṇa* through ordinary sense-channels. (c) As we have already seen, *viññāṇa* is connected with and influenced by *upādāna* and *tanha* which are both ordinary conscious processes, said to condition rebirth. (d) Rebirth can partly be directed through conscious wishes as described above. (e) In *nibbāna* the rebirth-*viññāṇa* has ceased. This is expressed in the following way in S I 116: “Tav’ eva pāpima mano tava dhammā tava mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyaqatanāṃ. Yattha ca kho pāpima natthi mano natthi dhammā natthi mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyaqatanāṃ agati tava tattha pāpima ti”. “Yours, O Evil One, is only mano, the mental content and the field of *viññāṇa* produced through contact with *mano* (the other sense-fields mentioned before in the same way). But where none of them exist, there is no access for you, Evil One.” — A person who has attained *nibbāna* is therefore free from perception-*viññāṇa* and free from Māra. So the two types of *viññāṇa* are quite clearly considered as identical.

Sometimes *viññāṇa* is found twice in the same context, and it may be difficult to decide, whether the same meaning is intended or not. See, e.g., M III 260: “Na viññānaṃ upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññāṇanissitaṃ viññānaṃ bhavissati”. “I will not grasp after *viññāṇa* and so will have no *viññāṇa* dependent on *viññāṇa*”. The same is said about a large number of cognitive factors and the other khandhā. That is, to say, that there is a form of *viññāṇa* dependent on cognitive processes, and probably *viññāṇa* in its rebirth-aspect is intended, as the context deals with meditation. As
the factors mentioned are mostly perceptions and ideas without much mystery about them, rebirth-\textit{viññāna} probably also simply is ordinary consciousness. It would be strange to maintain, e.g., that a metaphysical \textit{viññāna} could arise from the cognitive \textit{viññāna}: they must both consist of similar conscious processes.

This explanation can apply also to passages as the following. “Yo \textit{viññāne chanḍarāgavinayo chanḍarāgapahānaṁ, idaṁ \textit{viññāne nissaraṇaṁ}” (M III 18). “The removal and rejection of need and desire for \textit{viññāna} is an escape from \textit{viññāna}”. The rebirth-aspect is probably intended in the second place. But a simpler explanation is that it is possible to get rid of \textit{viññāna} (in all aspects) (just as the other \textit{khandha}) simply by not needing it. The same idea is more elaborately expressed in S III 53: “(Rūpadhātuyā ..., Vedanāya dhātuyā ..., Saññādhātuyā ..., Sañkhāradhātuyā ...) \textit{Viññāna-dhātuyā} cc ... bhikkhuno rāgo pahino hoti, rāgassa pahāna vacchijjata-rammaṇaṁ patiṭṭhā \textit{viññānassa} na hoti”. “If desire for (body, feeling, perception, activities and \textit{viññāna} be abandoned by a monk, by that abandonment of desire its foothold is cut off, and there is no support for \textit{viññāna}.” This could mean that through freedom from the sense-perception-\textit{viññāna} (together with the other \textit{khandha}), \textit{viññāna} (in its rebirth-aspect) is without support and — as the text continues — becomes \textit{anabhīṣaṅkhāra} (free from \textit{kamma}-accumulations) and \textit{parinibbāyati} (attains \textit{parinibbāna}). This is an interesting attempt to connect the \textit{khandha}-series with the \textit{paññiccasamuppāda}-series.

A way of attaining this cessation of \textit{viññāna} (with reference both to the \textit{khandha}-context and its \textit{paññiccasamuppāda}-context) is perhaps hinted at in D I 223, where it is asked where the elements find no footing. The answer is: “\textit{Viññānaṁ anidassanam anantaṁ sabbato pahaṁ}. Ettha āpo ca paṭhavi tejo vayo na gāḍhati. Ettha dighaṁ ca rassaṁ ca anuṁ thūlaṁ subhāsubhaṁ. Ettha nāmaṁ ca rūpaṁ ca asesaṁ uparujjhati. \textit{Viññānassa nirodhena etth’ etam uparujjhati}”. “\textit{Viññāna} is without attributes, endless, drawing back from everything. Here earth, water, fire, and wind, and long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and unpleasant find no footing. Here \textit{nāma} and \textit{rūpa} are destroyed without trace. By the cessation of \textit{viññāna} all this also ceases to be”. According to the commentary \textit{viññānassa} nirodha means \textit{niḥbāna}. In the first line a special level of meditation seems to be intended (the limitless \textit{viññāna}, where no specified objects are experienced. This practice may end up in the cessation of \textit{viññāna}: that is, rebirth-\textit{viññāna} is made to cease by means of emptying the empirical \textit{viññāna} — because they are identical).
7. Can viññāna be stopped?

Because of its prominent part in the mechanism of rebirth, viññāna is a central concept in the process of liberation. “Yaṁ kīci dukkhaṁ saṁbhoṭi, sabbāṁ viññāna-paccaya (SN 734), “Whatever pain arises, is all in consequence of viññāna: A way to become free from suffering is to calm viññāna: “Etam ādīnavam ōvatā dukkhaṁ viññānapaccaya’ viññānapasamā bhikkhu nīcchāto parinibbuto” (SN 735). “Knowing this evil consequence that suffering is born of viññāna, the monk after calming viññāna is free from desire and attains parinibbāna”. — “Bahiddhā ... viññāne avikkhitte avisaṇe sati ajjhattam asanāthite, anupādāya aparittassato āyatāṁ jātijāramaraṇa-dukkhasamudaya-sambhavo na hoti” (M III 223). “If viññāna is undistracted and unbound externally and free internally, then for him who thus does not crave and grasp, there will be no origin or rise of the suffering connected with birth, old age and death”. The calming of viññāna is here described as freeing from craving and grasping.

In other contexts, the frequently occurring word nirodha, “cessation”, is used: “Ajjhattaṁ ca bahiddhā ca vedanāṁ nabhīnandato, evaṁ satassa carato viññānam uparujjhati” (SN 1111). “For him who both inwardly and outwardly does not delight in vedanā (sensation, feeling), for him who thus lives mindful, viññāna ceases”. — “Ye ca kho keci ... samāna vā brahmaṇā vā evaṁ viññānaṁ abhiññāya evaṁ viññānasamudayaṁ abhiññāya evaṁ viññānanirodham abhiññāya evaṁ viññāṇa-nirodhaṅgāminī paṭipadaṁ abhiññāya viññāṇassa nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupāda vimutta te suvimutta.” (S III 61) “Moreover, whatsoever recluses or brahmins, by thus fully understanding viññāna, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing by the disgust, at by the fading out of, by the ceasing of viññāna are liberated without grasping, — they are truly liberated”. As pointed out in connection with D I 223, there may not be any fundamental contradiction between calming and cessation.

In, for instance, S III 61 and M I 53, the way to the cessation of viññāna is indicated: the noble eightfold way (“Ayaṁ eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo viññānanirodhaṁmini paṭipadaṁ”). Most important in this connection are the exercises belonging to saṁādhi, where viññāna frequently is mentioned See, for instance, M I 293, referred to above, where three of the higher levels of meditation are attributed to viññāna: the level of unlimited space, of unlimited viññāna and of emptiness. We find frequently a more complete description of the different levels, where however the experiences are
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

said to be achieved by means of saññā. To sum up the sequence, we find that separate ideas first are gradually expelled from consciousness, starting with the cognitive ideas: feelings remain but give way to a general experience of equanimity; by expelling all cognitive ideas of separate objects, it is possible to visualize the empty and infinite space. (D I 183: bhikkhu sabbaso rūpaśaññānaṁ samatikkamā patigha-saññānaṁ atthagamā nānattasaññānaṁ amanasi-kārā ‘ananto ākāso ti ākāsānaṁcāyatanam upasampajja viharati’, ‘the monk, by passing beyond the perception of form, by putting an end to sense-reaction, by paying no attention to perceptions of diversity thinks: “The space is infinite”, and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite space’.) This experience is then made still more abstract and contentless by being directed inwards and changed to a visualization of consciousness (always: viññāna) as infinite. Here, the distinction between internal and external has gone (D I 183 f: “bhikkhu sabbaso ākāsānaṁcāyatanam samatikkamma ‘anantam viññānaṁ’ ti viññānaṁcāyatanam upasampajja viharati”, “the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite space thinks: ‘consciousness is infinite’ and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite consciousness”). Then the monk tries to get rid also of the visualization of viññāna and replaces it with the experience that neither this endless consciousness nor anything else exists: he is then above both objects and their names and visualizes endless emptiness (D I 184: “bhikkhu sabbaso viññānaṁcāyatanam samatikkamma ‘na’atthi kiñciti’ ākiñcanaṁcāyatanam upasampajja viharati”, “the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite consciousness, thinks: ‘nothing exists’, and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of nothingness”).

The normal function of consciousness, to present information in images and symbols, is now nearly thrown out of gear by letting one single image, which is so vague it is nearly no information at all (“nothing is”), fill the whole consciousness. Through its very vagueness, the image is close to abolishing itself; and with it, consciousness in the ordinary sense also goes. This is what happens in the next stage, a transitional stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (S IV 217: “nevasaññānaṁsaññāyatanam samāpannassā ākiñcanaṁcāyatanasaññā niruddhā hoti”, “when one has attained the mental state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the consciousness of nothingness has ceased”). Then the summit is reached:

“So kho ahām Ānanda apareṇa samayena sabbaso nevasaññānaṁsaññāyatanam samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharāmi, paññāya ca me disvā āsavā parakkhayam agamanaṁsu.” (A IV 448). “And presently, Ananda, passing wholly beyond the mental state
of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, I entered and abode in the cessation of perception and feeling and I saw by wisdom that the obsessions were completely destroyed”.

The last passage describes a state of trance where the ordinary, everyday consciousness does not function (further description follows). It is of special interest to note, that this experience here is said to be accompanied by the knowledge that āsavā are destroyed. This usually means that the person has attained nibbāna.

This passage may be compared with M III 32, a part of which has been discussed already. It is said that when the desire (tanha, among others) for all the sense data has been stopped — “then I know that my citta is freed”. And the whole passage is summarized in the following words: “Evaṃ kho me ... jānato evam passato imapu aṣṭāniṣṭhāniḥ āyatanāni anupādāya āsavāci cittaṃ vimuttan ti”. “So, as I know thus and see thus in respect of these six internal and external sense-fields, I can say that my citta is freed from the āsavā without grasping”. Here, the experience of liberation is put in direct connection with the facts of sense-perception and sense-viññāna: liberation is attained by stopping the need for them.

So far, it seems that saññāvedayitanirodha is identical with viññāna-nirodha. There is nothing impossible in that interpretation, as consciousness (in the ordinary sense) certainly is made to stop in the summit of meditation, and when consciousness goes, the desires that work through it, and the feeling of pain must also go. Viññāna is sometimes identified with saññā and vedanā: “Ya ca ... vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññānaṃ ime dharmā samsattāḥ no visamsattāḥ, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dharmānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujītvā nānakarāṇanā paññāpetum” (M I 293). “That which is feeling and that which is perception and that which is viññāna — these states are related, not unrelated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analyzed them again and again”.

According to D III 228 (to be discussed later), on the other hand, viññāna depends on saññā.

In M I 296, a dead man is compared with a man who has attained saññāvedayitanirodha:

(a) The living body has:
   āyu, vitality
   usmā, heat
   viññāna.
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

(b) In the dead body:
   kāyasāṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
   vacīsaṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
   cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
   āyu parikkhīṇo, the vitality is destroyed
   usmā vūpasantā, the heat is calmed
   indriyāni viparibbhinnāni, the sense-functions are broken asunder.

(c) In the person who has attained saṅnāvedayātanirodha:
   kāyasāṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
   vacīsaṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
   cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
   āyu aparikkhīṇo, the vitality is not destroyed
   usmā avūpasantā, the heat is not calmed
   indriyāni vipassannāni, the sense functions are purified.

We find that the question about the fate of viññāna is evaded. The expression “indriyāni vipassannāni” seems rather to imply that the chances of fine and accurate perceptions have become better. On the other hand it would, strictly speaking, follow from the cessation of the three saṅkhāra that viññāna also has ceased.

From this discussion, the conclusion cannot be drawn that saṅnāvedayātanirodha could be identified with nibbāna and nibbāna therefore be some sort of unconsciousness. The saṅnāvedayātanirodha is a state of short duration, and it does not seem to have been much cultivated. But the levels below this have been highly estimated as workable means to get rid of desires and worries (dissolve them, not "repress" them) and to deprive sense—objects of their interest. The ideal was perhaps to make consciousness permanently free from attributes and limits (D I 223). So, even conscience would stop working (Dh 267) and the monk would not be aware of any karmic consequences of his acts.

A systematic summary

We shall now try to define viññāna by asking the same questions as used earlier in this paper.

1. *Is viññāna consciousness?*

We have already quoted evidence for a positive answer (M ' 292, D III 243). There is small evidence for an unconscious component (S II 65).
UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

2. Is viññāṇa an entity?

It is possible to find passages, e.g. S IV 195 and S I 122, already quoted, which could favour an entity-theory, but in general, viññāṇa is described in process-terms. It arises as a product: “cakkhuñca paṭiccara rūpe ca uppa- 

atī viññāṇam, cakkhuvīññāṇan-ṭ’eva saṅkhaṁ gacchāti” (M I 259), “if viññāṇa arises dependent on eye and forms, it is called eye-viññāṇa”; and so on for the other senses. It depends on the body: “Ayaṁ kho me kāyo rūpi ..., idāñ ca pana me viññāṇam ettha sitaṁ ettha paṭibaddhaṁ” (D I 76). “This body of mine has form ...; and therein is this viññāṇa of mine bound up, on that does it depend”. It appears and disappears depending on conditions: “Saṅkhārasamudaya viññāṇasamudayo, saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho, ayam-eva ariyo aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo viññāṇa-nirodha gāminī paṭipada” (M I 53), “From the arising of activities viññāṇa arises; from the stopping of activities, viññāṇa stops; from the stopping of activities, viññāṇa stops; the way leading to the stopping of viññāṇa is this noble eightfold path”.

3. Is viññāṇa an instrument?

When viññāṇa is described in process-terms, an instrumental function is usually not pointed out. However, as consciousness, it has the function of “making things known” to the person (M I 292, quoted above). This is said quite clearly in M III 242: “Athāparaṁ viññāṇaṁ yeva avasissati parisuddhaṁ pariyoḍitaṁ, tena viññāṇena kīcī jānāti. — Sukhan ti pi vijānāti; dukkhan ti pi vijānāti; adukkham-asukhan ti pi vijānāti”, “Thereupon viññāṇa alone will be left which is quite pure and clean. With that viññāṇa he knows something: he becomes aware of pleasure, he becomes aware of pain and he becomes aware of neutral feeling.”

4. Functions of viññāṇa

(a) Perception. Viññāṇa has a perceptive function and its processes are classified according to senses. In M I 293, quoted above, it is stated that it is not possible to lay down any difference between vedanā, saññā and viññāṇa. According to D II 338, the body (kāya) can perceive things through the senses and become aware of mental states through mano (manasā pi dhammaṁ vijānāti), only if it has life, heat and viññāṇa. — In M III 32 a distinction is made between (need for) “cakkhusmiṁi ..., rūpe, cakkhu-

vīññāṇe, cakkhuvīññāṇa-viññātabbesu dhammesu” and so on down to “manasmiṁ ... dhamme manoviññāṇe manoviññāṇa-viññātabbesu dhammesu”. “Eye, form, visual viññāṇa, ideas cognizable through visual viññāṇa
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

... mano, idea, mano-viññāṇa, ideas cognizable through mano-viññāṇa”. What is meant here is probably:

For the five senses:

- sense-organ
- object, stimulus
- perceptual images
- mental images

For mano:

- the inner sense
- ideas, mental images
- conscious manipulation. (Cf. M I 293)
- images of memory, imagination, etc.

To every sense-field belong dhamma, i.e. mental images, which can be experienced and “understood” through the viññāṇa of that field, and, as dhamma, constituting the field also of mano. Mano receives the perceptual images belonging to the senses; they are interpreted and manipulated (for instance, in thinking) by manoviññāṇa; but mano has also dhamma of its own, namely the images produced in memory and imagination; these may be referred to here as manoviññāṇaviññātabba dhamma.

Saññā and vedanā could perhaps be called part-functions of viññāṇa, although by viññāṇa is understood mainly the end-product of the perceptual process: the resulting images and ideas, and has perhaps an interpreting, understanding and manipulating function. It is therefore further removed from the real objects than the two other functions. Mano is here described as especially concerned with the images of memory, imagination and thinking. It is doing the basic work for viññāṇa, just as the other senses, but is, according to modern ways of viewing these matters, on a higher level as it is working with material that has probably already been conscious in one form or another or formed in the “subconscious”.

Further support for the view that viññāṇa is in some way based on saññā and vedanā is provided by the following two passages. In D III 228 are mentioned the four supports of viññāṇa, among them: “Saññūpāyaṃ vā ... viññāṇam tiṣṭhamānaṃ tiṣṭhāti saññārammaṇanāṃ saññāpattitaḥ saññāpadesanā yuddhīṃ virūḍhīṃ vipallamī āpajjati”. “Viññāṇa is firmly supported by means of saññā, with saññā as object, with saññā as support, it attains to happiness, growth, increase and full development”. In S III 9 f, rūpadhātu, vedanādātu, saññādātu and sañkhāradhātu are called the “home” of viññāṇa. — It should on the other hand not be forgotten that saññā often is used for “higher” mental functions than perception.
This view about *sāṇā* and *viññāṇa* does not agree with a passage in E. R. Sarathchandra, “Buddhist psychology of perception” (1958), where it is said: “In the Nikāya formulas of sense-perception *sāṇā* is said to occur after *viññāṇa*, and ... we might infer that *sāṇā* meant a later stage in the process ...” (p. 16). He bases this view on M I 111 f: “cakkhuhā cā paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇanāṁ, tīṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassa-paccayā vedanā, yaṁ vedeti taṁ saṁjñāti, yaṁ saṁjñāti taṁ vitakketi”. “Dependent on the eye and forms arises visual perception, the concurrence of the three is contact, dependent on contact is feeling (and sensation), what one feels one recognizes and what one recognizes one thinks about”. If a temporal sequence were implied here, *sāṇā* would come after *viññāṇa*. But as Professor Jayatilleke has pointed out (“Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge”, London, 1963, p. 435 f), *vedanā, sāṇā* and *viññāka* could be meant to occur simultaneously with *phassa*. Grammatically, “tīṇṇam ... vitakketi” can be taken as an appositional expansion of “cakkhuviññāṇanāṁ”, explaining the whole *viññāṇa*-process.

(b) Higher intellectual functions

Attention is not usually attributed to *viññāṇa*, but as every conscious function it can be disturbed. “Tatha tathā ... bhikkhu upaparikkheyya, yathā yathā upaparikkhato bhaddhā cassa viññāṇanāṁ avikkhittaṁ hoti avisaṭṭhaṁ ajjhattaṁ asaṅhitam anupadāya aparitassato āyatāṁ jātijarā-maranañadukkhasamudayasambhavo na hoti”. (I 93 f). “A monk should investigate (things) in such a way that his *viññāṇa*, as he investigates, is not scattered and rambling externally and also not unconcentrated internally. And without grasping, as he is without craving, there shall be no arising in the future of suffering resulting from birth, old age and death”. What is referred to here, is not so much attention in connection with perception but in connection with intellection. This free ideational activity is often attributed to *viññāṇa*, as already mentioned (M I 293, S III 68). As to memory, it is said that *viññāṇa* remembers former existences (D III 134), but *viññāṇa* does not operate through the ordinary memory.

(c) Feelings and emotions

We have already shown that feelings belong to *viññāṇa* (M III 242, M I 292). Emotions are never mentioned in connection with *viññāṇa*.

(d) Dynamic and moral traits

We refer to a previous discussion which shows that *viññāṇa* to some extent has a dynamic side. It is rarely mentioned in connection with the moral side of man’s behaviour.
A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

5. Is viññāṇa personal?

Viññāṇa must be personal as so great a part of the conscious life of the person is contained in it. It is also sometimes — against the general trend — personified to some sort of personality (S IV 195, S I 122, as quoted above). Usually it is stressed that viññāṇa should not be identified with the self: “na viññāṇam attato samanupassati, na viññāṇavantaṃ vā attānaṃ, nāttani vā viññāṇam, na viññāṇasmiṃ vā attānam”. (M III 18) “He does not regard viññāṇa as self, nor self as having viññāṇa, nor viññāṇa as in self, nor self as in viññāṇa”. And S III 68 “... sabbam viññāṇanānetaṃ mama neso’ham’asmi na nesō attāti evam etam yathābhūtāni sammappāññāya datthabbaṃ”. “All viññāṇa must be thus regarded, as it really is, by right insight: “this is not mine; this is not I; this is not my self”. Its inner organisation is of course effectively masked through its subdivision according to sense-fields, and therefore its personal uniqueness can be denied as thoroughly as is done here. Still, the viññāṇa that is effective in the process of birth is entirely personal.

6. Can viññāṇa be influenced or trained?

As viññāṇa has nothing to do with emotions and the moral behaviour of man, it need not be trained in the same way as citta. The process of meditation, however, is much concerned with viññāṇa. As we have already seen, the purpose of these exercises is to stop and tranquillise the conscious processes, and then empty the internal space and break its limitations. In this way, calmness and detachment can be effected. Finally, consciousness temporarily can be made to cease completely. A rich variation of methods has been devised for this purpose.

Comparisons

Table 1 is a semantic differential offered as a summary of our findings. It is constructed as a quantitative rating-scale: to the left we find the variables which we have considered in this work, and the columns correspond to the degree in which the concepts are endowed with the attribute.

Column O: no trace of this attribute has been found in connection with the concept, or, a clear statement is found that this attribute is lacking.

", 1: doubtful references to the attribute are found in connection with the concept.

", 2: It is fairly certain that the attribute can be ascribed to the concept.

", 3: It is clearly and unequivocally stated that the concept has this attribute.
A rating-scale is meant to be exact and looks very quantitative and reliable, so it must be clearly stated that a good deal of subjective judgement is involved in it. To make it easier for the reader to form his own judgement (and perhaps make his own ratings), we append a few references which can be looked up in this paper.

In some cases, a concept has been given two ratings, namely, when clear statements for both can be found. There is then a contradiction in the concept itself.

From the chart we find that all our concepts are conscious (including or consisting of conscious processes), changing, personal and complex (in the sense that they have many functions and are not described without contradictions).

None of them corresponds to our concepts of personality and the ego, although both citta and viṇṇāṇa are very central concepts (i.e. have central functions, essential for the person, and therefore close to identification with the ego). They are all more or less empirical concepts, although metaphysical aspects are mentioned in connection with viṇṇāṇa and citta. Mano seems to be more instrumental, more like a center with defined functions than the other two: it is just given, like the other senses, and is never said to be caused or conditioned: it seems to be an organ like eyes and ears and therefore given in birth; whether it can be changed or improved by training is also doubtful.

As to the functions, the chart gives a fairly clear picture. Mano is the center for perception (to which also feeling belongs), attention, ideation, memory, and thinking, so far clearly a cognitive center. It has also an active and directive side, but engaged only in the higher directive processes, in which the original needs are less important than planning, consistency, will and character: it is therefore important as a moral agency.

Citta is sensitive to information and can be developed more than the others. It can be made an instrument for thought processes and especially super-knowledge. But originally it is afflicted with all the primitive and morally objectionable emotions and selfish needs. It can be trained to stability and purposive energy and plays then a more central part in the moral behaviour than mano.

Viṇṇāṇa is less active than the other two. It is engaged in perception (and feeling) and ideation but plays no prominent part in the higher cognitive processes. Except for its karma-transmitting functions (about which very little is said and in which perhaps saṅkhāra plays a more important part), it would have been simply a name for perceptive and ideative processes.
# Chart 1. SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

| # | Entity     | Process | Conscious          | Subconscious | Active | Independent | Surviving | Changing | Caused   | Instrument | Can be trained | Attains liberation | Personality | Self                  | Personal |
|---|------------|---------|--------------------|--------------|--------|-------------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------|---------------------|----------|
| 1 | Entity     | v       |                   |              |        |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     | c m v    |
| 2 | Process    | m       | c v                |              | v      |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 3 | Conscious  |         |                   | m            | c v    |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     | c m v    |
| 4 | Subconscious| m c v  |                   |              | v      |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 5 | Active     |         |                   |              | v m    |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 6 | Independent| v       |                   |              | v c m  |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 7 | Surviving  | m v     | (v)               | c           |         |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 8 | Changing   |         |                   |              | v c m  |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 9 | Caused     | m       |                   |              | c v    |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 10| Instrument |         |                   |              | m c v  |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 11| Can be trained| m |           |              | v c    |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 12| Attains liberation | m v | (v)               | c           |         |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 13| Personality | m v |                   | c           |         |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |
| 14| Self       | m v     |                   | c           |         |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     | c m v    |
| 15| Personal   |         |                   |             | c m v  |             |           |          |          |           |               |                   |              |           |                     |          |

### Functions

- Perception (c m v)
- Super-knowledge (m v c)
- Attention (v c m)
- Memory, ideation (c c)
- Intelligence, ideation (c m)
- Feeling (c m)
- Emotion (v m c)
- Needs, drives (m v c)
- Will, purposiveness (v c m)
- Activity, initiative (v c m)
- Moral traits (v c m)

### The concept

- Empirical (v) c m v
- Complex (c m v)
- Central (m) c v
A. citta


B. mano


C. viññāṇa

A PSYCHOSEMANTIC INVESTIGATION

Relations

1. Viññāṇa forms part of both the khandha-series: rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sañkhāra, viññāṇa, and the paṭiccasamuppāda-series. The former is the factors constituting personality or the aspects under which it may be seen. The latter is a similar but much more elaborate series of psychological factors, arranged in a sequence of dependence. It has sometimes been called a causal nexus, but positive correlation rather than causal necessity is implied in paṭicca. Therefore, the series should primarily be taken as a series of correlative interdependences: a time-sequence is certainly implied in some cases but in principle all the links may well be simultaneous. The purpose of the series seems to have been to explain man’s natural state of dukkha (bhava, jāti, jarā-maraṇa etc.) and show a way to overcome it. The starting point is sometimes said to be avijjā, sometimes viññāṇa, and it is usually stressed that dukkha can be eradicated by the cessation (niruddha) of these and the other factors.

A strict time-sequence cannot have been intended, as different arrangements can be found, and an interdependence is sometimes stressed. In M I 261, for instance, it is said “cattāro āhārā taṇhāsamudayā taṇhājāti kā taṇhāpabhavā”, “the four types of provision (to which phassa, manosāñcaetanā and viññāṇa belong) have thirst as the provenance, thirst as source, thirst as birth, thirst as origin”. In the paṭiccasamuppāda-series, taṇhā comes later than viññāṇa. And according to S II 13 “viññāṇāhārō āyatim punabhavābhinibbattiya paccayo”, “the consciousness-provision is the condition of renewed becoming and birth in the future”: only after that, the six sense-fields and contact are mentioned. In D II 32 and 63 it is stated that nāmarūpa depends on viññāṇa, which itself depends on nāma-rūpa. — In M I 261 we find the sequence phassa—vedanā—taṇhā—viññāṇāhārā. — In S II 3 ff, sañkhāra is analyzed into kāya-, vac- and citta-sañkhāra (of which the last-mentioned in S IV 293 is analyzed into saññā and vedanā). — Nāma is divided into vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phassa and manasikāra. The result is, that vedanā comes to be contained three times in the series, saññā twice and phassa twice. The interpretation of avijjā and sañkhāra as belonging to a previous existence is impossible, as it would make nibbāna unattainable in this life: nibbāna is the cessation of dukkha which is effected through the cessation of avijjā. But it is impossible to eradicate the avijjā of a former existence. It must be maintained that the present dukkha depends on a present avijjā: that is the condition for making them both cease. We conclude that interdependence rather than a strict time-sequence was intended.
Both the khandha-enumeration and the paticcasamuppada-series can be seen as an analysis of personality. The emphasis is different, and they are constructed for different purposes, but the contents are the same in principle. All the khandha can be found at least once in the paticcasamuppada-series as explained in S II 3 ff. The correlational aspect can be found also in the khandha as viññāna is said to depend on the other khandha (S III 55). In the following formulations the common ground of the two series is stressed: “n’ attī khandhādisā dukkha” (Dh 202), “there is no pain like khandhā”; “paticcasamuppāna ... pañc’-upādānakhandhā” (M I 191) “the origin of the five khandhā is conditioned”, “ime ... upādānakkhandhā chandamūlākā” (M III 16), “these khandhā have desire as root”. In the last quotation citta is used for “desire”, but its meaning is not far removed from tanhā which we find in the paticcasamuppada-series. Citta is freed by loosing interest in the khandhā (M III 30), that are dissolved only in death (M I 49, “khandhāna bheda ... idam vuccati marañjan’’). In S III 59-61, on the other hand, the cessation of the khandhā is aimed at: “Ayam eva arivo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo rūpa-(vedana-, saññā-, saṅkhāra-, viññāna-) nirodhagāmini paṭipada”, “this noble eightfold path is the way to the cessation of form (feeling, perception, purposive activity, viññāya).”

It is interesting to note that viññāna in some cases is said to depend on tanhā, in other cases on saṅkhāra, as these are the two active, dynamic factors in the paticcasamuppada-series, partly because we here find the dynamic counterpart to viññāna which itself is conceived as rather passive, partly because we are reminded of the current psychoanalytic theory that consciousness has originated as vicarious satisfactions of frustrated needs.

2. It is a distinctive feature of the processes belonging to mano (M III 216), saññā (A III 413), phassa, vedanā, viññāna, tanhā (S II 3 f), that when analyzed, they always have been broken up according to the six sense-fields (saḷāyatanām). By breaking them up in this abstract way, their unity can be denied and their identification with the self be prevented. Only citta is never analyzed in this way. Table 2 is an attempt to show the relations between the concepts treated in this paper. A few explanations follow. (a) The general outline of the chart has been derived from M III 32, where the crucial concepts are put in relation to each other. In this passage, which has already been discussed, it is said that citta through tanhā is bound to the senses, their objects, the perceptions and the perceptual images (also included in the dhamma), and further to mano and its functions. Citta is freed from the āsavā through the ending of tanhā. Therefore citta is placed to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical stimuli</th>
<th>Sense organ</th>
<th>Sensation</th>
<th>Perception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rūpa</td>
<td>cakkhu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sadda</td>
<td>sota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gandha</td>
<td>ghāna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rasa</td>
<td>jivhā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phoṭṭhabba</td>
<td>kāya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{Saññā} + \text{Vedanā} = \text{citta-sankhāra} \]

1. {somanassa, domanassa, upekkhā}
2. {somanassa, domanassa, upekkhā}
3. {somanassa, domanassa, upekkhā}
4. {somanassa, domanassa, upekkhā}
5. {somanassa, domanassa, upekkhā}

\[ (1) \rightarrow (5) \text{ khandhā} \]

(1) → (5) khandhā
right; connected by the “adhesive tape” of tanhā to the perceptual and ideational functions which here are subdivided according to sense fields. (b) To the extreme left we find the physical stimuli. It sometimes seems doubtful if the words rūpa, sadda, etc., are meant to refer to the physical stimuli or the perceptual image they produce in the observer: rūpa, e.g., is sometimes translated by “body”, “matter”, sometimes by “form”. Guenther (op. cit. p. 151) tries to avoid the dualism by offering the translation “Gestalt” for rūpa. This is, however, not possible, as Gestalt in psychology is a subjective term meaning “mental form,” and is used to stress that the experienced form may not correspond to the material form (it can also equally well be used for all sense-fields). In the Nikāyas, the distinction has been made, but the two concepts have not always been kept apart: the same words are used for both. In M I 190 f, rūpa, and so on, including dhamma, are called bāhirā, “external”, in contrast to the senses which are called ājjhattika, “internal” or “personal”. And when it in S IV 68 is said that cakkhuviññāna originates from cakkhu and rūpa, there is no doubt that the external objects are referred to. In D II 110, a clear distinction between external and internal rūpa is made: “Ājjhattam rūpasanāṇī eko bhiddhā-rūpāni passati...”. “When a man who perceives forms internally, sees external forms ...” The same distinction is made in M I 138 f: “yaṁ kiṁci rūpam atītānāgata-paccuppannaṁ, ājjhattam ā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṁ vā sukhumāṁ vā, hīnaṁ vā paṁitaṁ vā yaṁ duṁ saṁtike vā ...”, “whatever form, past, future, present, internal or external, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, far or near ...”. By ājjhattam the forms are referred to as conscious mental images in contrast to the objects as physical facts. — The rūpa included in the paṭiccasamuppāda-series (in nāmarūpa) must refer to the internal form, otherwise it could not be conditioned by the purely psychological viññāna and not disappear in nibbāna.

For the internal rūpa, cakkhuviññāna may sometimes be used, but this term covers the feelings as well and may refer to non-perceptive images. We therefore need rūpa, sadda etc. in two places in our chart.

(c) In M I 191 it is said that there will be no perception without proper contact (samannāhāra, more often called phassa or samphassa): this is therefore to be placed between the two rūpa, sadda etc.

(d) Dhammā are of two types: the perceptual dhammā, which are the perceptual images produced through the perceptual process, and the ideational dhammā consisting of memory images and new productions through imagination and thought. Mano is a center of both perception and free
ideation, and it perceives, stores, and manipulates both types of dhammā. Here, the sensations are given their feeling-tones, and therefore, both saññā and vedanā may be functions of mano, (as indicated in M III 279 f). The enumeration of the 18 mano-upavicārā (M III 216) has been followed here.

(e) It is not possible to lay down a definite order between mano-upavicārā and the processes of viññāṇa: they may be more or less the same, and it is also stated that no difference can be laid down between vedanā, saññā, and viññāṇa. For reasons already mentioned, viññāṇa has, however, been put to the right of the processes of mano.

(f) Citta is here not conceived as an end-product of the other processes but as an agency influenced by and normally interested in the activities sometimes described as performing them. This is in agreement with the general trend, expressed, for instance, in S III 46: “thāmase parāmase asati rūpasmiṃ (vedanāya, saññāya, šaṅkhāresu, viññānasmiṃ) cittaṁ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi”. “As there is no more stubborn perversity in him, his citta turns away from form (feeling, perception, activities, viññāṇa) and is released by not grasping at the āsavā”. Here the khandhā are clearly conceived as factors outside citta. — Saññā and vedanā sometimes (e.g., S IV 293) called citta-saṅkhāra, “activities of citta”.

In as far as the process-meaning of citta is implied, the processes of viññāṇa, especially mano-viññāṇa, must be included, but also some special activities, particularly the higher cognitive processes and dynamic processes.

(g) We may note that all the five khandhā are mentioned in the chart; only kāya-saṅkhāra, “bodily behaviour”, and vaci-saṅkhāra, “verbal behaviour”, to which also thought-processes are counted (an extreme behaviourism before Watson!) are not there. It is, however, outside the scope of this work to pursue the problem of relationships between our concepts and the khandhā any further.

While all perceptive functions, most ideative functions, feelings and most dynamic processes are included in the chart, many vital parts of the human psyche are left outside. Of the dynamic traits only the natural inborn needs are mentioned: where should we place motivations for good actions? Where is the will? Where is the moral judge? And where are the channels through which the normal qualities influence viññāṇa? And how could we fit in the rest of the paṭiccasamuppāda-factors? Only further research can complete the picture.