Disputed Dharmas
Early Buddhist Theories on Existence

An Annotated Translation
of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought
from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra

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Tokyo
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Abbreviations


Ch.—Chinese.


Abbreviations


Kaidō—Abidatsumakusharon hōgi. T 64 (2251). Kaidō.


O—in translation, attribution of position to an opponent.

P—Peking number.


Abbreviations

S—in translation, attribution of position to Saṅghabhadrā.
SAHŚ—*Sānyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra [Tsa a-p’i-t’an hsìn lun]. T 28
SAKV—Unrai Wogihara, ed. Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The
Work of Yasomitra. Tokyo: The Publishing Association of the Abhi-
dharmakośavyākhyā, 1932.
ŚAŚ—*Śāriputrābhidhāmaśāstra [She-li-fu a-p’i-t’an lun]. T 28 (1548).
Trans. Dharmayaśas, Dharmagupta.
Shen-t’ai—Chü-she lun shu. Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō. 1.83.3-4. Shen-t’ai.
Skt.—Sanskrit.
Mahākauṣṭhila (Skt.), Śāriputra (Ch.), trans. Hsüan-tsang.
Sth—in translation, attribution of position to Sthavira, or Śrīlāta.
T—Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaikyoku eds., and Ono Gennyō
1924-1932.
Tan’e—Abidatsumakusharon shiyōshō. T 63 (2250). Tan’e.
Tō—Tōhoku number.
TSŚ—*Tattvasiddhiśāstra [Ch’eng shih lun]. T 32 (1646). Harivarman,
trans. Kumārajīva.
TSP—Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. Tattvasangraha of Ācārya Shānta-
rakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalāśīla. 2 vols.
with continuous pagination. Bauddha Bharati Series 2. Varanasi:
Bauddha Bharati, 1982.
V—in translation, attribution of position to Vasubandhu.
VB—*Vibhaṣāśāstra [Pi-p’o-sha lun]. T 28 (1547). Trans. Saṅghabhūti
(or Saṅghabhadrā ?), Dharmanandin, Buddharaḵṣa, Min-chih.
Society, 1904.
Devāsaram, trans. Hsüan-tsang.
VSŚ—*Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgitiśāstra [Tsun p’o-hsū-mi p’u-sa so-
chi lun]. T 28 (1549). Attrib. Vasumitra, trans. Saṅghabhadrā (or
Saṅghabhūti ?), Dharmanandin, Saṅghadeva, Chu Fo-nien.
Yüan-yū—Shun cheng-lü lun shu-wen chi. Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō. 1.83.3.
Yüan-yū.
Abbreviations

Preface

Abhidharma is like a vast ocean, a towering mountain, an unbounded plain, and endless space. It encompasses all unlimited noble factors. Now I will strive to present it briefly.¹

This opening verse from the Dharmapārśva, a northern Indian Abhidharma text, expresses both the elevated purpose and the contradiction inherent in all Abhidharma treatises. Despite the objectives stated in this verse, brief exposition of the Abhidharma, which claims to be the repository for all of Buddhist teaching, would seem to be, and indeed, was proven to be impossible. Unable to control the extended corpus of voluminous and divergent Abhidharma treatises, prospective interpreters tend either to focus on one treatise as representative of the whole, and thus ignore the diverse viewpoints and frequent contradictions, or to discount the entire Abhidharma tradition as a scholastic exercise, even an aberrant deviation from the supposedly simple religious goal of the Buddha. Both of these tendencies, attested within the Buddhist tradition and occasionally mirrored in contemporary Buddhist scholarship, are shortsighted and lead to an inevitable distortion of both the variety within the Buddhist tradition and its complex development. Abhidharma demands careful study, not because it was an extended prelude, interlude, or episode, in the history of Buddhist thought, but because it was a period of indispensable historical importance: the focus for the religious life of the intellectual elite of much of the monastic community for over six hundred years and the foundation of virtually all later doctrinal developments within Buddhism.

Although one of the most prolific, doctrinally innovative, enduring, and influential sects of northern Indian Buddhism, the Sarvāstivādins and their vast Abhidharma literature have been given only minimal attention in contemporary Western scholarship. In Japan, Abhidharma has been a central topic not only in the traditional curriculum of Buddhist training but also in the contemporary scholarly field of Buddhist studies. However, to
date, in both Japan and the West, studies of the northern Indian Abhidharma treatises have focussed on Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośakārikā* and *Bhāṣya*. This emphasis follows from the traditional popularity of the *Abhidharmakośa* as the preeminent instructional manual of fundamental Buddhist doctrine. Vasubandhu’s lucid style and organized presentation of complex doctrinal points and arguments make his work a preferred source for what otherwise might appear to be an impenetrable mass of obscure doctrinal analysis. Also, as the only northern Indian Abhidharma treatise extant in Sanskrit or Tibetan, the *Abhidharmakośa* is generally the most accessible text for Western scholars of the Indian Abhidharma traditions. However, the later popularity and influence of the *Abhidharmakośa* testifies not only and perhaps not primarily to the importance of the work itself, but rather to Vasubandhu’s own significance within the Indian Mahāyāna scholastic traditions. For despite its later importance as the text representative of northern Indian Abhidharma, one cannot assume that the *Abhidharmakośa* is an original work that represents the culmination of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāśika thought. Certainly, the *Abhidharmakośa* is a monument to Vasubandhu’s genius in organization, critical analysis, and clear exegesis. But the structure that Vasubandhu adopts bears the influence of earlier digests and the views that he expresses, whether his own, those of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāśikas, or those of other masters, are usually traceable to the *Vibhāṣa* compendia. Therefore, the role as representative or as the final determinant of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāśika orthodoxy should more appropriately be accorded to the *Vibhāṣa* compendia, or to the works of Vasubandhu’s opponent, Saṅghabhadra.

Analysis, or, in particular, the buddhistically informed analysis of experience into its ultimate constituent factors (*dharma*), is the hallmark of all Abhidharma thought. The manner of existence of all constituent factors and the existential status of particular factors became fundamental issues that underlie and direct the often doctrinally specific discussions in Abhidharma treatises. These ontological issues also shaped the differences demarcating different sectarian groups and schools. Specifically, Saṅghabhadra characterized the orthodox Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins as maintaining that factors exist as real entities in the three time periods of past, present, and future. Vasubandhu and the Dārṣṭāntikas before him, rejected this assertion and maintained that many of the factors isolated by the Sarvāstivādins do not exist as real entities (*dravya*), but rather exist simply as provisional designations (*prajñāpti*).

One group of factors whose existential status was the subject of heated debate among the various schools is the category of the conditioned forces dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuktasarūskāra*). A study of this category of dissociated forces offers an excellent way not only to examine and
illustrate these Abhidharma investigations of the existential status and nature of recognized constituent factors but also to unravel the intricate web of specific doctrinal issues that provide the context and indeed the impetus for virtually all controversies. In the study presented here, particular attention is devoted to the sectarian controversies that the dissociated forces spawned and to the larger doctrinal implications of these controversies. The context for this study is a fifth century A.D. debate—Vasubandhu’s refutation of these forces as presented in the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* and Saṅghabhadra’s counter-refutation of Vasubandhu’s criticism and reestablishment of these forces as discrete real entities as presented in the *Nyāyānusāra*.

Notes

1 *DS* 1 p. 453c1ff.
Part I

Historical Introduction
Chapter 1

Abhidharma

1.1 Character and Function of Abhidharma

By the fifth century A.D., there was, in addition to the collections of doctrinal discourses (sūtra) and disciplinary codes and discourses (vinaya), a vast corpus of early Buddhist treatises classified as Abhidharma. In composing the *Nyāyānusāra, Saṅghabhadra was thus contributing to a massive and highly complex genre, which ostensibly served merely to organize and explain doctrines presented in a relatively unstructured form in the sūtra discourses. Actually, however, Abhidharma texts had become the vehicle for the philosophical elaboration and transformation of selectively emphasized doctrinal issues. They also provided the arena for doctrinal debate, and, thereby, became the medium by which various Buddhist masters and schools evolved their own distinctive positions through the creative stimulus of argument with other Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

The original meaning of the term abhidharma is still a matter of much dispute. Scholarly opinion has generally been divided between two options, both of which find ample support in extant canonical materials. These options hinge upon the interpretation of the prefix abhi: (1) abhi as uttama “highest” or “further,” and dharma as “teaching” or “doctrine,” and (2) abhi as “with regard to,” and dharma as “teaching” or “doctrine.”

Though the first interpretation as ‘highest’ or “further” is preferred by later Pāli commentators, the second interpretation as “with regard to the teaching” comes to represent the northern Indian Buddhist understanding of the term. There is, however, evidence of a variety of interpretations of the term abhidharma even among the northern Indian Abhidharma texts. For example, the early *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra offers six interpretations of the function of abhidharma: (1) it enables one to discriminate
the meaning or nature of dharma as presented in the sūtras; (2) it enables one to cultivate the four noble truths; (3) it is that through the cultivation of which one attains nirvāṇa; (4) it enables one to realize the twelve members of dependent origination and dependently originated factors; (5) it expounds the meaning of the eightfold noble path; (6) it is that which analyzes and describes the causes of the various factors instrumental in the complete cessation of defilements. The *Mahāvibhāṣā compendia acknowledge a variety of possible interpretations of the term abhidharma including both the two interpretations of the prefix abhi cited previously as well as additional interpretations of the final member dharma. The twenty-four interpretations of abhidharma offered by the *Mahāvibhāṣā can be classified in the following groups: (1) it enables one to discriminate and analyze factors according to their generic or particular inherent characteristics—that is, according to their intrinsic nature; (2) it enables one to suppress non-Buddhist or false Buddhist doctrines and establish the true teaching; and (3) it enables one to remove defilements and progress along the path. Vasubandhu offers a single interpretation of the prefix abhi as “directed toward,” but interprets the final member dharma as referring either to the single factor nirvāṇa or to the multiplicity of individual factors (dharma) constituting experience. In other words, abhidharma is itself a discrete factor that is directed toward the ultimate factor, nirvāṇa, or toward the characteristics of individual factors. Saṅghabhadra also supports the interpretation of the prefix abhi as “directed toward,” but offers as possible interpretations of the final member, dharma, either “the nature of individual factors” or “the sūtras” that present the Buddha’s teaching or dharma. Finally, the ambiguity of the prefix abhi is evident even in the Chinese translations of the term abhidharma: whereas the earlier Chinese translators and authors prefer a translation that reflects the interpretation “highest” (wu-pi-fa, ta-fa), Hsüan-tsang in his translation favors “directed toward” (tui-fa).

In contrast to these variant opinions concerning the meaning of the term abhidharma, the interpretations of its function presented in northern Indian Abhidharma texts show much greater consistency. In its opening verses, the Vijñānakāya extolls abhidharma as the light of the true doctrine, without which no one would be able to destroy the darkness surrounding what is to be known by knowledge. Abhidharma functions as the pure eye within the mind or as the basis of all knowledge; it is the sun illuminating the forest of things to be known or the sword that destroys heretical texts; it constitutes the authority for those who open the eyes of sentient beings and is the womb of the Tathāgatas; it is the illumination in the three realms or the path of the eye of insight; it is the light of all factors and the ocean of the Buddha’s words; it is able to issue forth highest insight and remove all doubts. The *Mahāvibhāṣā declares the function of Abhidharma texts
to be that of assisting sentient beings. That is to say, Abhidharma treatises are composed with the intention of allowing sentient beings to receive, energetically pursue, consider, evaluate, and correctly investigate the Buddha’s teaching. Thereby, they enable one to avoid both the innumerable defilements and evil conduct that lead to bad rebirth states and to realize the deep nature of all factors.9 Explaining this function through a series of similes, the *Mahāvibhāṣā compares abhidharma to a light that banishes the darkness of ignorance—in it the image of non-self is reflected countless times as in the mirror-like face of a finely ground jewel; it supports those seeking along the religious path like a raft; it illuminates the meaning of the sūtras like a light that allows one to discern shapes; it enables one to distinguish all factors like a jeweler who can recognize any stone.10 These similes suggest that abhidharma is a tool or a requisite condition that furthers religious praxis; it is neither the primary cause of religious attainment nor an end in itself.11

This soteriological function of enabling sentient beings to avoid defilements that lead to an undesirable rebirth state and to realize the deep nature of all factors is reflected also in the definition of the essential character of abhidharma offered by the *Mahāvibhāṣā, a definition that is accepted by the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdayaśāstra, Vasubandhu, and Saṅghabhadra: that is, abhidharma, in the ultimate sense, is the controlling faculty of insight not tending toward the fluxes.12 Even though the term abhidharma is used in the sūtras with a range of connotations, its essence is, in all cases, insight not tending toward the fluxes. The term abhidharma can then also be used conventionally to refer to that which furthers, is associated with, or contains this insight not tending toward the fluxes.13 For example, the name abhidharma is also given to that conventional insight attained through cultivation, reflection, audition, and rebirth, precisely because it acts as a preliminary to the acquisition of insight not tending toward the fluxes. Finally, those treatises that describe this insight not tending toward the fluxes also receive the name ‘Abhidharma.’

In their interpretations of the term abhidharma, later Abhidharma texts clearly follow the pattern set by the Vibhāṣā compendia. The *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya begins with a discussion of the meaning and function of abhidharma, which is first described as the exposition and classification of the meaning of the ultimate and conventional sense of the Buddha’s teaching. Abhidharma is able to clarify the meaning of the sūtras like the light of a lamp, and, as in the Vibhāṣā compendia, its nature is defined as the controlling faculty of insight.14 Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra also repeat the definition of abhidharma found in the Vibhāṣā compendia: abhidharma is immaculate insight (prajñā ’malā) together with its attendant factors (sānucarā) that are simultaneous with that insight: namely, the simultane-
ous thought and thought concomitants, conditioned forces dissociated from thought, and unmanifest form. Finally, *abhidharma* also includes those types of insight that tend toward the fluxes and those treatises that contribute toward the attainment of immaculate insight. This immaculate insight is defined as the investigation of factors, but this is not an end in itself. For, as Vasubandhu explains: “Aside from the investigation of factors, there is no means by which defilements are extinguished, and through defilements the world is lost in the ocean of rebirth. For this purpose, they claim (*kila*) [the Abhidharma] was expounded by the teacher.”

In this verse defining *abhidharma*, Vasubandhu registers his disagreement with the Sarvāstivādin position that the Abhidharma was taught by the “teacher,” or the Buddha himself, by adding the term *kila*, rendered by the phrase ‘they claim.’ Saṅghabhadrā attributes Vasubandhu’s skepticism concerning the authorship and, thereby, the authority of the Abhidharma corpus to three reasons: (1) the traditional ascription of Abhidharma treatises to disciples such as Kātyāyanīputra, and not to the Buddha himself; (2) the fact that the Buddha’s advice to Ananda, “you should take the scriptures as your reliance (*pratisarāṇa*), not a person,” and so on, mentions as a reliance only *sūtras*, and does not explicitly include Abhidharma treatises; and (3) the fact that Abhidharma treatises of the various schools present different, often contradictory positions.

In his efforts to establish the authority of the Abhidharma corpus, Saṅghabhadrā counters each of these reasons in turn. In response to the first reason, Saṅghabhadrā merely suggests that the Abhidharma is sanctioned by the Buddha because he uses the term *abhidharma* in numerous scriptural passages; as a consequence, Abhidharma treatises should be accepted as the Buddha’s words. The second reason requires more extensive refutation. The scriptural passage—“you should take the scriptures as your reliance, not a person”—became significant when used by the later Sautrāntikas as scriptural authority for their rejection of the Abhidharma and their exclusive reliance upon the *sūtra* collection. Saṅghabhadrā counters the Sautrāntika reasoning by noting that the disciplinary codes and discourses (*vinaya*) also are not mentioned in this passage among the four reliances (*pratisarāṇa*) that determine authentic scripture; accordingly, they too should not be accepted as the authentic teaching of the Buddha. In any case, an argument could be made to include *abhidharma* among the four reliances, since it is defined as immaculate insight and can, therefore, be subsumed within the knowledge reliance (*jñānapratisarāṇa*). Similarly, the term *sūtra* in this passage should not, Saṅghabhadrā suggests, be interpreted as referring simply to the *sūtra* collection, but rather to the teachings (*dharma*) of the Buddha in the widest sense, teachings that encompass the Abhidharma. Indeed, since, for Saṅghabhadrā, the *abhidharma* collection
consists of statements that in no way contradict the Buddha’s teachings, it
comes to constitute the authority by which the true meaning of the sūtras
is determined. In a practical sense, the Abhidharma functions as the stand­

ard (pramāṇa) by which one can distinguish between sūtras having explicit
meaning (nītārtha)—that is, those consistent with the Abhidharma—and
those having implicit meaning (neyārtha)—that is, those that contradict
the Abhidharma. Therefore, even though Ānanda is exhorted to rely upon
the sūtras in this passage, he is exhorted ultimately to rely upon Abhi­
dharmā.

To the third reason for Vasubandhu’s skepticism concerning the at­
tribution of the abhidharma to the Buddha himself—the fact that Abhi-
dharmā treatises of different schools present different, often contradictory
positions—Saṅghabhadra responds simply that one might reject the au-
thenticity of the sūtras for the same reason. The collections of sūtras pre-
served and transmitted by various schools differ and even the same or sim­
ilar sūtras will contain divergent wording or different titles. Significantly,
Saṅghabhadra contends that doctrinal differences should be traced precisely
to these divergent collections of sūtras, and not merely to differing inter­
pretations. Saṅghabhadra concludes that Vasubandhu’s reasons for doubting
the authenticity of the abhidharma are baseless. The Buddha’s ultimate
authorship of Abhidharma treatises must be accepted and their authority
as a determinant of authentic teaching stands unchallenged.

1.2 Origin of Abhidharma Texts

Traditional descriptions of the origin and development of the corpus of inde­
pendent Abhidharma treatises are found in accounts of the first council.22
According to most accounts, an abhidharma collection was recited at the
first council by Ānanda, but, according to the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivā­
dins, the reciter is identified as Mahākāśyapa. Moreover, the various ac­
counts differ in their description of the structure and character of the Abhi-
dharmā texts recited. For example, the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya declares
the Abhidharmā to be a matrix, or categorizing list (mātrkā), that includes,
in addition to other factors, the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment.23 The
Sarvāstivādavinaya also identifies the Abhidharmā with teachings that are
presented in list form: for example, the Buddha presents the Abhidharmā
when speaking of five fears, five evil actions, and so on.24 Other accounts
of the first council characterize the Abhidharmā as containing a given number
of sections. For example, the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka sect describes
the Abhidharmā as consisting of four or possibly five sections.25 These
four or five sections closely resemble both the four sections into which the *Śāriputrābhīḍharmasāstra is divided as well as an Abhidharma in five sections mentioned in the Vinayamātrkā, which is thought to represent the Haimavata school. Similarly, the preface to the Dīrghāgama, considered to belong to the Dharmaguptaka sect, describes the Abhidharma as consisting of four sections and five recitations.

Attempts to explain the historical origin and development of independent Abhidharma treatises have focussed on two divergent expository tendencies grounded in two distinctive structural characteristics of the genre. First, most Western scholars contend that Abhidharma treatises evolved from the practice of formulating matrices, or categorizing lists, (mātrkā) of all topics of the teaching arranged according to both numeric and qualitative criteria. As the second option, most Japanese scholars suggest that the origin of Abhidharma is to be found in dialogues concerning the doctrine (abhidharmakathā), or monastic discussions in catechetical style characterized by an exchange of questions and interpretative answers intended to clarify complex or obscure points of doctrine.

Supporting the first option are formulaic references in the sūtra and vinaya collections to the threefold list, dhamma, vinaya, and mātikā, which have been interpreted as anticipating the triad, sūtra, vinaya, and abhidharma. Saṅghabhadra in his discussion of the characteristics of Abhidharma, also cites this very threefold formula, including the term mātrkā, and thereby acknowledges, in his opinion, an historical connection between mātrkā and abhidharma. Further, in a discussion of the twelvefold typology of genres of Buddhist literature, Saṅghabhadra defines the class of upadesa as explanations of the doctrine, specifically of the deep meaning of the teaching presented in the sūtra, and explicitly identifies this upadesa with both mātrkā and abhidharma. However, the term mātikā in the threefold formula of dhamma, vinaya, and mātikā, also permits an alternative interpretation. That is to say, it could be interpreted not as an independent third category of scripture that represents an incipient form of Abhidharma, but as a distinct subcategory of both dhamma and vinaya. This would yield a fourfold classification of dhamma, vinaya, dhammamātikā, and vinayamātikā. Indeed, this interpretation is supported by texts extant in Chinese translation that contain the phrase vinayamātrkā in their titles. In the case of these Vinaya texts, mātrkā does not refer to the list of disciplinary rules, or prātimokṣa, but rather to a method of systematic analysis whereby disciplinary rules are clarified by defining key terms, listing varieties of each type of activity, and delimiting the scope of each activity through contrast with its opposite. Given this interpretation, mātrkā would not represent Abhidharma in particular, but rather would refer to a method of exegesis that could be applied to either dhamma or vinaya.
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The second option—that Abhidharma treatises evolved from catechetical discussions concerning the meaning of the doctrine—is supported by examples in the śūtras of such discussions in which monks clarify the teaching through an exchange of questions and answers. This option would also perhaps be indirectly supported by the definition of vyākaraṇa, one of the twelve genres of Buddhist literature, in terms of an exchange of questions and answers and by the association of this category of vyākaraṇa, or veyvyākaraṇa in the ninefold typology adopted by the Theravādin tradition, with Abhidharma.

The tendency toward organization represented by mātrkā and that toward discursive explanation represented by abhidharmakathā together constitute the exegetical method characteristic of mature Abhidharma analysis, and both tendencies are found in incipient form in Abhidharma treatises from the earliest period onward. Indeed, the śūtra collection provides numerous examples of texts that exhibit either tendency. The first organizational tendency in accordance with mātrkā is suggested by the frequent use of lists to summarize the Buddha’s teaching. Though this method of enumerative summary obviously serves the practical purpose of aiding memorization, the śūtras themselves clearly utilize the list form to establish the essence of the Buddha’s teaching and to preclude other opinions. For example, in the Sāmagāmasutta, which addresses the issue of community discord and methods of resolving disagreements, the Buddha establishes the essence of his teaching in the following list: the four applications of mindfulness, the four right exertions, the four bases of magic powers, the five controlling faculties, the five forces, the seven limbs of enlightenment, and the eightfold noble path. Similarly, in response to the death of the Jaina teacher, Nigāṇṭha Nātapputta (Nirgrantha Jñāṭīruputra), and the resulting schism within the Jaina Nirgrantha sect, the Saṅgītaśutta summarizes the Buddha’s teaching through a list of primary topics arranged according to sets of factors having the same number of members from one to ten. Other individual śūtras also are organized, as a whole, according to either topical or numerical format. The Bahudhātukasutta gathers together a variety of types of elements, or dhātu, discussed separately elsewhere in the doctrinal discourses. The Dasuttararasutta intersperses a topical classification according to ten categories within a numerical arrangement from one to ten; the result is a classification of each set of factors according to a matrix of two categories. Numerical and topical arrangements also dictate the structure of entire collections of śūtras. For example, the Aṅguttaranikāya adopts a numerical arrangement in which entire śūtras are classified according to the number of items represented by their primary topic. The Saṁyuttanikāya, on the other hand, adopts a topical arrangement, collecting śūtras on the same topic: for example, dependent origination, the elements, or feelings.
Even though these modes of organization may indicate antecedents in the sūtra of structural procedures that were to fully develop in the Abhidharma literature, it must be kept in mind that they may also reflect, in individual cases, the influence of Abhidharma upon the sūtra collections themselves. For the final redaction of the sūtras certainly does not entirely precede but also overlaps the composition of Abhidharma works.

The second tendency toward discursive exegesis through catechetical exposition is represented, for example, by the Vibhaṅgasutta of the Majjhimanikāya.⁴¹ Here the Uddesavibhaṅgasutta is of particular interest.⁴² The sūtra begins with a brief doctrinal statement (uddesa) by the Buddha, each point of which is then analyzed in full by Mahākaccāna through a process of catechetical exposition. This format closely resembles the method adopted by the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Vibhaṅga, which are structured according to uddesa, or statements from the suttas, and niddesa, or analytical exposition of those statements.⁴³

The transition from rudimentary lists and brief exposition—whether in sūtras exhibiting Abhidharma tendencies or in those betraying the influence of early Abhidharma—to the complex analysis characteristic of the self-identified Abhidharma texts was a gradual one.⁴⁴ Both the early structural innovation of arrangement according to numerical or topical lists and the more detailed exposition and interpretation of doctrinal points are gradually expanded in successive Abhidharma treatises. Indeed, scholarly attempts to determine the chronology of Abhidharma treatises depend primarily upon internal structural criteria and assume a growing complexity of structural organization and exegetical method.⁴⁵

1.3 Methods of Abhidharma Exegesis

Mature Abhidharma exegesis incorporates both these methods of taxonomic organization through lists or matrices and catechetical exposition through extended discussions of doctrine. The world of experience, which is understood to be constructed from the efficacious interaction of discrete factors (dharma), is analyzed into its constituent components through the enterprise of Abhidharma. Each experienced event is investigated to determine its requisite factors and, most importantly, to clarify the conditioning efficacy of each factor. In particular, attention is devoted to distinguishing those factors that contribute toward the continuation of suffering in the process of rebirth from those that contribute toward its termination. Through religious praxis, one can then abandon the factors that ensnare and cultivate those that lead to liberation.
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In the later Abhidharma texts, the first method of the taxonomic discrimination and classification of all factors reaches a high level of complexity and doctrinal sophistication. All factors are first investigated (pravicaya) in order to determine their intrinsic nature. Then they are repeatedly classified in mutually exclusive categories in accordance with specific criteria, or sets of qualities. Not all criteria or qualities can be applied to all factors, but instead the categories into which a particular factor can be classified are delimited by that factor’s spatial, causal, or temporal range of possible occurrences. Most frequent are classifications of factors into categories of two or three:

- conditioned and unconditioned (saṁskṛta, asaṁskṛta)
- tending toward the fluxes and not tending toward the fluxes (sāsrava, anāsrava)
- included among factors constituting sentient beings and included among factors not constituting sentient beings (sattvākhyā, asattvākhyā)
- virtuous, unvirtuous, or indeterminate in moral quality (kusa-la, akuśala, avyākṛta)
- belonging to one neither in religious training nor beyond religious training, belonging to one in training, or belonging to one beyond training (naivasaikṣa, sāikṣa, aśaikṣa)
- to be abandoned by the path of vision, by the path of cultivation, or not to be abandoned (darsanamiirgaheya, bhāvanāmārgaheya, aheya)
- being an effect of uniform outflow, an effect of maturation, or an effect of accumulation (naiśyandika, vipākaja, aupacayika).

Fourfold classifications are also not uncommon:

- connected to the realm of desire, the realm of form, the formless realm, or not connected to any realm (kāmāpta, rūpāpta, arūpāpta, anāpta)
- having manifestation of matured effect in the present lifetime, in the next lifetime, in the third lifetime or after, or having undetermined maturation (drṣṭadharma, upapadya, aparaparyāya, aniyata).
The character of a particular factor in its various possible occurrences can be specified in accordance with each of these categories. The result is a complex matrix in which each experienced factor is characterized in accordance with every taxonomic possibility. Through this exercise of completely describing the character of each factor in every instance of its occurrence, the factors of which experience is composed can be seen as they actually are, the misconceptions obscuring our perception of experience can be discarded, the factors obstructing and ensnaring us can be abandoned, and the factors contributing toward liberation can be isolated and cultivated.

Mature Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma analysis also developed a method of classifying factors abstractly in accordance with their distinctive intrinsic natures (svabhāva), quite apart from any given specific spatial, causal, or temporal occurrence. In the previously described system, each factor can be placed in several categories depending upon the perspective from which it is analyzed and the conditions of its occurrence. For example, a particular instance of a given factor, conception (saṃjñā), can be virtuous in moral quality, included among factors constituting sentient beings, connected to the realm of desire, and so on. Another instance of that same factor, conception, can be unvirtuous and connected to the realm of form. However, since every particular factor is characterized by only one intrinsic nature, when classified according to intrinsic nature, each factor is placed within only one category. The later Sarvāstivādin texts classify all existent factors in an abstract fivefold taxonomy traced by the tradition to the master Vasumitra and introduced in Sarvāstivādin literature by texts attributed to him. The first four categories—form (rupa), thought (citta), thought concomitants (caitīta), and conditioned forces dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktasaṁskāra)—constitute all conditioned factors (saṁskṛta): that is, factors that participate in causal interaction, or are subject to production and destruction. The fifth category comprises the unconditioned factors (asaṁskṛta), which neither arise nor pass away. The number of factors placed within each category differs among the different Abhidharma traditions and, indeed, even within Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, but the later commentarial tradition interpreting the Abhidharma-kosābhaṣya enumerates seventy-five factors as follows: form—eleven; thought—one; thought concomitants—forty-six; dissociated factors—fourteen; and unconditioned factors—three.

Intrinsic nature not only provides the basis for a factor's abstract classification but also functions as the determinant of its existential status: any factor characterized by intrinsic nature is determined to actually exist as a real entity (dravya); all other experienced phenomena exist as aggregations of these real entities and, as aggregations, are said to exist only provisionally (prajñāpatti). Thus, the fivefold taxonomy of seventy-five factors represents
a definitive list of all possible categories of entities recognized to exist as real entities. However, it should be remembered that these seventy-five abstract categories are the fundamental, or elemental, genera represented in actual experience by individual instances of factors that become manifest in accordance with certain specific conditions; taken together, the myriad of individual instances of factors belonging to these fundamental genera make up all varieties of experience. For example, even within the experience of one sentient being, innumerable moments of thought, feelings, conception, and material form—all recognized as discrete dharmas—arise and pass away successively. Hence, a virtually unlimited number of discrete factors having thought as their intrinsic nature must be allowed to exist; each thought factor arises and passes away in its own moment due to a specific set of causes and conditions. Though the character of each occurrence of a thought factor as virtuous or unvirtuous, and so on, differs, all such moments of thought, regardless of their particular qualities, can be placed within the same general category of thought through an identity of intrinsic nature. Thus, the taxonomic schema of seventy-five factors represents seventy-five categories of intrinsic nature, each of which occurs phenomenally in innumerable instances.

The second method of Abhidharma exegesis involving catechetical exposition and extended explanation is intricately interwoven through the taxonomic categories described above. In the earliest Abhidharma texts, the catechetical aspect is more pronounced and is presented with only minimal additional explanation. In later texts, increasingly complex polemical debate leads to the intricate elaboration of doctrine through the development of all-inclusive structures, through the preservation, juxtaposition, and even merging of doctrinal tenets of different periods, origins, and objectives, and, finally, through the isolation of certain general issues that come to direct future investigations. The comparatively long history of the internally referential Abhidharma corpus of the Sarvāstivādin school provides a continuous record through which the development of hermeneutical consciousness expressed through specific exegetical techniques—a development characteristic of any scriptural tradition—can be traced.

Though the texts of both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, precede the development, from the sixth century onward, of rigorous techniques of argumentation and proof, they provide ample evidence of already established techniques of argument that direct their discussions and, indeed, furnish the background necessary to understand the particular character of the later logical traditions. The central problem for any scriptural tradition becomes one of establishing authority for ever expanding interpretation, especially where interpretations by various groups of the same material differ. In the case of all Buddhist traditions, ultimate authority resides in
the enlightenment experience of the Buddha himself, which is then either replicated through the similar experiences of his disciples, or is preserved in the sanctioned textual traditions. For the continuing scriptural tradition, of which the Abhidharma scholastic tradition was the primary early representative, the problem of authority became focused on the issue of determining authoritative texts rather than verifying authoritative experience. Specifically, the Abhidharma texts were recognized by the schools that preserved them to be the words of the Buddha himself and, therefore, were considered to possess authority equal to if not greater than that of the doctrinal discourses (sūtra). As noted previously, Abhidharma texts were considered to be explicit in meaning (nītārtha) and the interpretations presented in them were accepted as the authoritative standard by which the sūtras, which were only of implicit meaning (neyārtha), were to be interpreted. Despite the lofty position accorded Abhidharma texts, the sūtras were not ignored or discounted. Indeed, doctrinal discussions utilized a dual technique of appealing to the co-equal authorities of both scripture (āgama) and reasoned argument (yukti). All arguments were required to proceed from scriptural authority, which would then be elaborated through discursive argument founded on solid doctrinal reasons. Despite this need to ground interpretation in scriptural, that is, sūtra, authority, it is questionable whether or not the authors of mature Abhidharma texts, such as Saṅghabhadra or Vasubandhu, in all cases actually referred to the sūtras collection. The scriptural passages and the structure of the reasoned arguments cited in certain discussions follow exactly analogous discussions in the Vibhāṣā compendia and would, therefore, suggest that these later treatments simply relied upon the Vibhāṣā compendia without consulting the sūtras themselves.

This first technique of appealing to scriptural authority demanded that the tradition develop some criteria by which to appraise the authenticity of sūtras offered as proof and resolve contradictions among the various textual sources recognized as authoritative. The section from the *Nyāyānusāra on the dissociated forces offers several examples of arguments that hinge upon the failure of all groups to accept the same sūtras, or upon contradictions among the various textual sources accepted. Perhaps the most frequent form of contradiction occurs where a topic raised in an Abhidharma interpretation is not attested in the sūtras. This contradiction is resolved by demonstrating that the “new” topic is indeed implied in certain sūtras, or by suggesting that the authoritative sūtra source has been lost. In contrast to this practice of grounding each doctrinal point in an authoritative scriptural passage, certain Abhidhārmikas would suggest that no sūtra source is required; instead, each doctrinal position is to be judged by its consistency with the Buddha’s teaching—again, as captured most di-
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rectly in Abhidharma texts themselves—and not through direct precedent in sūtra.\(^5^2\) Overt contradictions or discrepancies among the sūtras, between Abhidharma texts and the sūtras, or among Abhidharma texts are resolved through several interpretative strategies. Frequently, hierarchies are established among the contradictory texts whereby one set of texts—usually the Abhidharma texts—are determined to present the direct, explicit, definitive, or absolute interpretation and are declared authoritative.\(^5^3\) Perhaps the most common such strategy is simply to attempt to demonstrate, often through contorted reinterpretation, that the passage in question is "implicative" or "allusive" and has an implicit, suggested, or deeper meaning, which is consistent with the doctrinal assertion under discussion. These deeper meanings must be extracted through interpretation of the "implicative" statements, often producing a reinterpretation radically different from the passage's apparent meaning.\(^5^4\)

Despite the hermeneutical difficulties which the insistence upon scriptural attestation produced, even for the mature Abhidharma texts of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, reasoned argument could not stand alone in the proof of doctrinal points. Quite the contrary, proof by recourse to and reanalysis of scriptural passages (āgama) continued, even in the later Abhidharma materials, to occupy the predominant position in doctrinal debate. Nevertheless, doctrinal discussions, or, more specifically, reasoned arguments (yukti), were also subject to the non-scriptural tests of avoiding faults of self-contradiction, absence of causal justification, errancy, categorical faults, and others.\(^5^5\) In reasoned arguments, perhaps the most frequent technique used is a form of negative conditional; that is, an attempt is made to demonstrate that if the position suggested is not accepted, untoward effects will result. Usually these "untoward effects" take the form of a contradiction of universally accepted doctrine.\(^5^6\) In another frequent pattern of reasoned argument, the opponent's position is declared unacceptable because it leads to an untenable position usually expressed in the form of two mutually exclusive options, both of which are unacceptable.\(^5^7\)

By intricately interweaving these two techniques of the citation of scriptural authority and reasoned arguments, Abhidharma texts restructure the scriptural tradition and create an ever expanding and ever more complex doctrinal edifice. This continually transforming doctrinal edifice created in Abhidharma texts then itself becomes the larger context of "tradition" within which any specific point of doctrine must be interpreted. This "tradition" is constituted by several factors: the scriptural heritage of both sūtras preserved and cited in later texts and later scholastic or commentarial restructuring; specific doctrinal points; and general interpretative issues or tendencies. All three of these constitutive factors grow and shift in reciprocal dependence. Specific doctrinal points, such as the forces dissociated
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from thought, as well as the larger doctrinal issues that they both reflect and stimulate must be examined with due awareness of the specific historical context from which they were crystallized and the textual context in which they were developed. In other words, they must be examined with a full awareness of the distinctive characteristics, or both the limitations and opportunities presented by the Abhidharma genre.

Notes


2 Sakurabe (1969a) 17–22. On the basis of her investigation of the usage of abhidharma juxtaposed to abhivinaya in Pāli materials, I.B. Horner suggests that the two interpretations are not contradictory. See Horner (1941) 293ff. However, Sakurabe Hajime, using the same evidence, argues convincingly for the historical priority of the second interpretation.

3 VSS 2 p. 733a16ff.

4 MVB 1 p. 4a12ff.; AVB 1 p. 3c4ff.; VB 1 p. 418a1ff. There is variation among the Vibhāṣā compendia in the attribution of these various interpretations to specific Abhidhārmikas.

5 AKB 1.2b p. 2.10–11. SAKV p. 9.18ff. tad ayānā paramārthadharmaṁ vā nirvāṇaṁ dharmaṁ lokaśaṅgam vā pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmaḥ.

6 NAS 1 p. 330b23ff.

7 For wu-pi-fa, see Ta-ch'eng i chang T 44 (1851) 1 p. 468a27 by Hui-yūan, and the San-tun hsūn-i T 45 (1852) p. 2b13ff. by Chi-tsang, both late 6th century A.D., as well as the preface to the *Śāriputrābhidharmāśastra (ŚAŚ 5 p. 525a6) by Tao-piao. For ta-fa, see Tao-an's preface to the translation of the *Abhidharmāśastra by Dharmapriya, Saṅghadeva, and Chu Fo-nien T 26 (1543) p. 771a6). Cf. Ch'u san-tsang chi chi T 55 (2145) 10 p. 72a10. For tui-fa, see HTAKB 1 p. 1b20, passim.

8 VK 1 p. 531a10ff.

9 MVB 1 p. 2a12ff.; AVB 1 p. 2a25ff.; VB 1 p. 416c9ff.

10 MVB 1 p. 2b16ff.; AVB 1 p. 2b27ff.; VB 1 p. 417a22ff.

11 MVB 1 p. 2a22ff.; AVB 1 p. 2b5ff.; VB 1 p. 416c15ff.

12 MVB 1 p. 2c23; AVB 1 p. 2c27ff.; VB 1 p. 417b3ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā and *Abhidharmaśastra cite numerous scriptural passages containing the term abhidharma, which are interpreted as referring to specific senses or aspects of its essential character as insight not tending toward the fluxes.

13 MVB 1 p. 3b6ff.; AVB 1 p. 3a25ff.; VB 1 p. 417b7ff.

14 SAHŚ 1 p. 869c29ff.

15 AKB 1.2a-b p. 2.3ff. praññā 'mālā sānucarā 'bhidharmaḥ tatprāptaye yā 'pi ca yac ca sāstram. SAKV p. 8.10f.; NAS 1 p. 329a29ff.

16 AKB 1.3 p. 2.20ff. dharmānāṁ pravacayam antareṇa nā 'sti klesānāṁ yata upaśāntaye 'bhupāyāḥ klesāsī ca bhramati bhavāṁcave 'tra lokas taddhetor ata uditaḥ kilai 'ṣa śāstrā.
It should be noted that Vasubandhu does not explain the implication of his use of the term kila in this verse. Yasomitra (SAKV p. 11.24ff.) interprets Vasubandhu's doubt as arising from the Sautrantika position that only scriptural dialogues, or doctrinal discourses (sūtra), and not treatises (śāstra) are authoritative. For a review of four uses of the particle kila—note in particular, categories A and B—see van Daalen (1988); for an analysis of the traditional interpretations of kila as used in the Abhidharmakośaśārikā and in this verse, see Katō Junshō (1989) 17ff.

The Viśhaṣā compendia devote much attention to this first point and claim that even though the Abhidharma represents the words of the Buddha, tradition identifies Kātyāyanaśūtra as the author of the Jñānapusthāna because he received and organized the Buddha's teaching. Or, disciples such as Kātyāyanaśūtra ascertain the true teaching of the Buddha through a transtemporal intuition resulting from the power of their vows (prāṇidhāya), by which they are able to perceive past or future events. The disciples then merely restructure this teaching of the Buddha in treatise form. The Viśhaṣā compendia do not, however, identify those who reject the Buddha's ultimate authorship of the Abhidharma and, therefore, its authority. Opposition to the Abhidharma corpus is not explicitly identified until the Abhidharmāvatārāsāstra (AAŚ hisa p. 989a13ff.) and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. For example, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 7.11d p. 397.18–19) attributes the following view to the Westerners (pāṣcātyya): "It is better that the treatises be contradicted, and not the scriptures." varāḥ śāstravirodho na sūtravirodho. Yasomitra (SAKV p. 621.19–20) comments that the intention underlying this statement is that Abhidharma treatises are not spoken by the Buddha. abuddhoktam abhidharmāśāstram ity abhiprāyaḥ.

For a description of the references to Abhidharma in the various accounts of the first council, see Lamotte (1958) 198ff.; see also Bareau (1955a) 21ff. Mūlasarvāstivādinayakṣudrakavastu T 24 (1451) 40 p. 408b7ff. Cf. *Āsokāva-dāna T 50 (2042) 4 p. 113c3ff.; *Āsokāvadāna T 50 (2043) 7 p. 152a15ff. For a review of the sources for these various lists, see Lamotte (1958) 198ff.


See *Śārimputraḥdharmanāsastra T 28 (1548). See also Kimura (1937) 81ff.; Bareau (1950) 84ff.; Bareau (1952) 8ff.; Frauwallner (1956) 38.

*Vinayamātṛka T 24 (1463) 4 p. 818a28ff. See also Przybuski (1926) 179, 353ff.; Bareau (1932) 2–3.


See Sakurabe (1969a) 23ff. Those who find the origin of Abhidharma in mātrkā include Étienne Lamotte (Lamotte (1958) 197) and Erich Frauwallner (Frauwallner (1964) 59ff.). The second option, or abhidharmakāthā, is supported by Kimura Taiken (Kimura (1937) 5ff.). This second option might be favored by Japanese scholars be-
cause mātrkā do not occupy the prominent place in the overt structure of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts that they hold in Abhidhamma texts of the Theravādin school. See Hirakawa (1974) 1:194ff.

30 For example, see MN no. 33 Mahāgopālakasutta 1: 223. ye te bhikkhū bahussutā āgatīgamā dhammadharā vinayadhharā māttikādharā.

31 NAS 1 p. 330b7ff. Saṅghabhadra next refers to Mahākāśyapa's recitation of the mātrkā at the first council and declares the mātrkā recited by him to be the content of the Abhidharma. See Mulasarvāstivādavinayakaśyukrakavastu T 24 (1451) 40 p. 408b2ff. Cf. Sarvāstivādavinaya T 23 (1435) 60 p. 449a19ff.

32 NAS 44 p. 595a29ff. Cf. Sarvāstivādavinayamatrka T 23 (1441); Vinayamatrka T24(1463), which, according to Jean Przyluski, belongs to the Haimavata school, Przyluski (1926-1928) 316. See also Mulasarvāstivādanidamātrka T 24 (1452).


34 See Sarvāstivādavinayamatrka T 23 (1441); Vinayamatrka T 24 (1463), which, according to Jean Przyluski, belongs to the Haimavata school, Przyluski (1926-1928) 316. See also Mulasarvāstivādanidamātrka T 24 (1452).

35 MN no. 32 Mahāgosingasutta 1: 214, 218; AN 6.18 Maccha-bandhasutta 3: 302. See also EA 29 no. 3 p. 711a6ff.

36 See Lamotte (1958) 158ff. For the definition of vyākaraṭṭa, see MVB 126 p. 659c28ff.; TSS 1 no. 8 p. 244c27ff.; NAS 44 p. 595a6ff. The *Tattvasiddhisastra (TSS 1 no. 8 p. 245a4ff.) also implies a connection between the exegesis of vyākaraṭṭa and Abhidharma.


38 DN no. 33 Sāṅgītisutta 3: 207ff.; DA 8 no. 9 p. 49b27ff.; *Sāṅgītisūtra T 1 (12) p. 226c7ff.; Hoernle (1970) 16–24; Sāṅgītisārya, Stache-Rosen (1968). It is interesting to note that, as in the case of the Śāmaṃgamaśutta, the list of doctrinal topics that constitutes the Sāṅgītisutta is presented in an attempt to quell potential dissention within the community.


40 DN no. 34 Dasuttarasutta 3: 272ff.; DA 9 no. 110 p. 52c18; *Dasottarasūtra T 1 (13) p. 233b26ff.; Dasottarasūtra, Mittal (1957); Dasottarasūtra, Schlingloff (1962).

41 MN nos. 135–142 3: 202ff.; MA nos. 162–164, 171. For example, see MN no. 136 Mahākammavibhāṅgasutta 3: 207ff.; MA 44 no. 171 p. 706b12ff.


43 Paṭisambhidāmagga, Taylor (1905–1907); Vibhārīga, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1904).

44 For a study of this transition, see Bronkhorst (1985).


46 For the traditional attribution to Vasumitra, see SAKV p. 167.22; *Pañca­vastukavibhāṣāśāstra [Wu shih p’i-p’o-sha lun]. T 28 (1555) p. 998b2. For the fivefold taxonomy, see PP (1541) 1 p. 627a9ff., (1542) 1 p. 692b23ff.; *Pañca­vastukavastu [A-p’i-t’an wu fa hsiung ching]. T 28 (1557) p. 998c9–11; *Pañca­vastukavastu [Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shih lun]. T 28 (1556).

47 For an extended review of the development of these exegetical techniques in Abhidharma treatises, see Cox (1992c).
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50 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 411c22ff.

51 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405c10ff.

52 See MVB p. 236b20ff.; AVB 25 p. 182a8ff.


54 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397a13ff., 13 p. 403a26ff.

55 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 400b11ff., 13 p. 406c19, 13 p. 408c12ff., 14 p. 412c15ff., passim.

56 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397a15ff., passim.

57 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b24ff.
Chapter 2

Sectarian Buddhism

Opposing forces tending toward harmony or toward discord were present within the Buddhist community of disciples from its inception. There are records of factionalism even during the lifetime of the Buddha,¹ and most traditional accounts of the first council relate the story of Purâna who dissented from the consensus through his refusal to accept the version of the canon as recited at that council.² By the time of Aśoka (c. 270–230 B.C.), groups with distinct identities had begun to form within the as yet developing and still loosely organized Buddhist community. Thereafter, the proliferation of various Buddhist sects and schools was accompanied by the gradual formation of rival canons, the evolution of the Abhidharma, and the expansion of Buddhism throughout India.

The history of this early period of Indian Buddhism and of the emergence of distinct sects and schools is central to an understanding not only of early Buddhist practice and doctrine but also of the development of later Indian, specifically, Mahāyāna Buddhism. Unfortunately, this period remains largely obscure and the task of its clarification is particularly difficult. First, the relative scarcity of historical documentation—either traditional or extra-traditional—limits one’s understanding of the history of all Indian religious groups of the pre-modern period. Second, the interpretative models offered by scholars are based primarily on textual sources and, indeed, often on an uncritical acceptance of one facet of this single source.³ Third, all sources for the history of this period, other than the limited witness of certain inscriptions, are themselves products of the phenomenon of sectarian fragmentation under study, products that have their own purposes, and therefore, their own interpretative agenda. In any attempt to interpret this period, one must, therefore, consider all varieties of available historical evidence and reexamine these sources carefully both to develop more inclusive

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and contextually sensitive models and to determine the types of questions that the sources can fruitfully address.

Of fundamental importance to this question of sectarian fragmentation is the difference in perspectives between, on the one hand, the traditional accounts sanctioned in various periods by the emerging groups themselves and, on the other, an approach that seeks seemingly objective historical fact. Both perspectives have value in clarifying significant aspects of the history of the Buddhist community, but each proceeds from fundamentally different assumptions, and neither should be accepted as obviating the other. A basic interpretative reconsideration of both sources and perspectives has begun only recently in Buddhist Studies and even if it does not immediately yield new conclusions, it will, at the very least, transform the assumptions from which our investigations proceed.

The sources for this study of the development of Indian sectarian Buddhism include accounts of significant historical events contained in canonical texts, traditional descriptive histories of sects, lists of patriarchs, records of translators and the diaries of Chinese pilgrims, inscriptions, textual fragments, and archaeological evidence. Non-historical portions of the canonical texts themselves can also yield additional clues for the historical emergence of and relations among specific groups: as, for example, through close structural or terminological textual analyses and comparisons, and through the examination of sectarian doctrinal or disciplinary positions recorded in these texts. Inevitably, the identification of causes that contribute to sectarian differentiation or fragmentation reflects the diversity of these sources, where each source emphasizes different factors. For example, possible causes would include: geographical separation and the consequent divergent development of monastic communities; selective patronage; influence by non-Buddhists; varying degrees of laxness regarding or active disagreements over disciplinary codes; the absence of a recognized supreme authority or unifying institutional structure; lineage loyalties to specific teachers; specialization by various monastic groups in differing segments of Buddhist scripture; and doctrinal disagreements.

In the scholarly investigation of these various historical sources, certain major topics emerge. These include the historicity of and the significance within the Buddhist tradition of the councils, reasons for and conditions surrounding the so-called first schism, and evidence for the secondary emergence of smaller sects or schools from the initial divisions within the monastic community. Underlying these specific topics are the more general questions of the criteria by which the various groups were distinguished from one another, and whether, in the context of early Indian Buddhism, one can determine certain groups to be primary "sects" and other groups to be secondary "schools." The character of early Buddhist religious life, the
formative impact of monastic and lay activities, and the relative importance to sectarian self-definition of either differences in ordination lineage or doctrinal controversies also all become significant issues in one's investigation of the phenomenon of sectarian fragmentation.\(^\text{17}\)

The Buddhist textual corpus also provides, if not an initial cause, at least a tool in the later sectarian definition, proliferation, and self-identification. The Buddha’s injunction to preach, *sakāya niruttīyā*, if taken to mean “in one’s own dialect,” could be interpreted as imparting a fundamental and inherent tendency to the Buddhist teaching to adapt, modify, and ultimately change linguistically.\(^\text{18}\) Similarly, the progressive expansion of the Buddhist scriptures for centuries after the Buddha’s death could be interpreted as a result of the openness reflected in what was assumed to be the Buddha’s reluctance to enjoin a Vedic mode of preserving his sermons or to prescribe metaphysical positions.\(^\text{19}\) The reliance on oral tradition for a long period of time and over ever increasing distances coupled with the growth of scriptural collections beyond the retentive power of individuals would inevitably lead to divisive specialization, and would eventually foster sectarian identification along the lines of textual lineage.\(^\text{20}\) This sectarian textual identification could then be strengthened through the emendation of inherited scripture, the composition of exegetical works, and the compilation of teaching digests accredited by each group. The Abhidharma corpus was particularly significant in this sectarian self-definition. Though they were claimed to represent the teaching of the Buddha himself, Abhidharma texts were almost certainly compilations or compositions contemporaneous with the sectarian fragmentation and they provided the means by which the position of one group could be defined and defended against the divergent interpretations and criticisms of others. Thus, the history of sectarian developments within Buddhism can, in part, be traced through an examination of the popularity and fortunes in transmission of influential texts.

2.1 The Sarvāstivādins

The causes and pattern of the emergence of distinct groups within the developing Buddhist community continue to be the subject of much scholarly disagreement. Nevertheless, despite variation in the traditional sources as to the date of what is generally accepted as the initial division between the Mahāsāṅghika and the Sthavira nikāyas, most scholars would agree that even though the roots of these earliest recognized Buddhist groups predate Aśoka, their actual separation did not occur until after his death.\(^\text{21}\)

The Sarvāstivādin sect emerged at a later point from within the Sthavira
group, and therefore, represents the phase of the secondary proliferation of sects and schools. This secondary proliferation undoubtedly resulted from a variety of conditions, different in each case, including external social conditions or geographical separation, as well as internal reasons such as differences in disciplinary codes or doctrinal interpretation. The traditional reason given for the recognition of the Sarvāstivādins as a distinct sect is their doctrinal position that “everything exists,” a position reflected in their name that distinguishes the Sarvāstivādins from other groups.22

Inscriptions that mention the names of recognized Buddhist sects and schools date from the first century B.C. to the fourth century A.D.,23 and scholars have proposed the second or first century B.C. as the date for the emergence of the Sarvāstivādins as a distinct group.24 The earliest inscription that refers to the Sarvāstivādins by name is the Mathurā lion capital, which dates from the beginning of the first century A.D.; therefore, a Sarvāstivādin group in some sense must have existed at the latest by the end of the first century B.C.25 This date would not, of course, preclude the possibility that a certain faction having Sarvāstivādin tendencies existed within the Sthavira group from an earlier period. Sarvāstivādin tradition, as reported by Hsüan-tsang, connects the revision of the canon and the composition of a Vibhāṣā compendium with the reign of Kanis̄ka.26 If accepted as containing an element of historical truth, then this legend could provide an important reference point for reconstructing Sarvāstivādin history, in particular for the chronology of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature. Unfortunately, the value of this legend is vitiated by the disputes concerning the historical association of Kanis̄ka with either this council or the Vibhāṣā composition and concerning the date of Kanis̄ka himself.27

As echoed by the legendary association of the Sarvāstivādin sect with Kanis̄ka, archaeological and inscriptionsal remains show that by the time of the Kuśāṇa empire the Sarvāstivādin sect was well established throughout northern India and central Asia as one of the largest and most successful Buddhist sects. And given both the range and size of the Sarvāstivādin community as well as the relative absence of early historical information, it is understandable that inquiries into the place of origin of the Sarvāstivādins are complicated from the outset by the possibility of multiple Sarvāstivādin groups. Inscripternal evidence would place Sarvāstivādins in both Mathurā and Kaśmīra at the latest from the first century A.D.28 Of particular interest both for the origin of the Sarvāstivādin sect and its later textual development is the identity of the various groups that the Sarvāstivādins comprise, specifically those mentioned in the later Abhidharma treatises: those referred to by the terms “Sarvāstivādin” and “Mūlasarvāstivādin;” the various presumably Sarvāstivādin groups such as the Westerners, the Outsiders, the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīra or of Gandhāra; and, finally,
the various masters such as Ghošaka, Dharmatrāta, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva.

The distinction between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins raises the issue of the character of Buddhist groups and the criteria upon which they were identified. Given the existence of two separate disciplinary codes, it is clear that the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins were distinct from one another, at least at some point, in ordination lineage. However, it is not clear whether they should also be distinguished on the grounds of non-disciplinary textual lineage and doctrinal interpretation. No extant Abhidharma text self-avowedly represents a Mūlasarvāstivādin perspective. Can the Mūlasarvāstivādins be understood to represent a sect in the sense that they used separate texts and adopted a doctrinal perspective different from that of the Sarvāstivādins? Or, it is possible that they represent simply two phases in the development of a single sectarian stream? According to Erich Frauwallner, in his investigations of the early vinaya collections, the Mūlasarvāstivādins and the Sarvāstivādins were two distinct communities. The Mūlasarvāstivādins “represent an independent older branch of the Sthavira” centered in Mathurā, while the Sarvāstivādins derive from later missionary activity of the Aśokan period in Kaśmīra and Gandhāra. Though the sects later converged dogmatically into a single school, Frauwallner maintains that “they never completely lost their individuality.” Shizutani Masao agrees that Sarvāstivādins existed in Mathurā from an early period, but claims that one cannot assume, simply because they adopted the name “Mūla-Sarvāstivādins,” or “Root-Sarvāstivādins,” that they represent an older group than the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīra. For Shizutani, the distinction between the two groups would appear to be geographical and chronological: while the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīra were influential in an earlier period, the Sarvāstivādins of Mathurā became powerful at a later point and referred to themselves as “Mūla-” indicating their self-image as representing the original Sarvāstivādin perspective.

Of interest here is the fact that Hsüan-tsang, in the record of his travels in India, does not mention the Mūlasarvāstivādins, but instead refers only to the Sarvāstivādins. By contrast, I-ching, who traveled in India fifty years after Hsüan-tsang, refers only to Mūlasarvāstivādins. One might draw the unlikely conclusion that the Mūlasarvāstivādins emerged as a distinct group only in this fifty year period of the latter half of the seventh century. Or, the Mūlasarvāstivādins might simply have been a sub-group of the Sarvāstivādins, not a distinct sect, and hence not observed by Hsüan-tsang. Shizutani proposes that this difference in their observations might be explained by the fact that Hsüan-tsang was not particularly concerned with the Vinaya and, therefore, was oblivious to a distinction based upon
differences in ordination lineage. However, none of these interpretations would explain why I-ching fails to mention the Sarvāstivādins.

Shizutani's interpretation would imply that the Mūlasarvāstivādins did not diverge from the Sarvāstivādins on matters of doctrinal interpretation. However, the possibility of such divergence has been investigated by several scholars. J.W. de Jong, through an examination of a group of six sūtras, Sanskrit fragments of five of which have been discovered in Turfan, broached the question of whether or not the Mūlasarvāstivādins can be determined to have used Sarvāstivādin sūtra collections. This issue of distinct Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin sūtra and possibly abhidharma collections is pursued further by Lambert Schmithausen. Building upon his earlier research on recensions of the Udānavarga, Schmithausen investigates the sectarian affiliation of the Chinese translations of the sūtra collections and proposes that the two Chinese translations of the Saṃyuktāgama be aligned with the Mūlasarvāstivādin recension and the Madhyamāgama with the Sarvāstivādin, though not with the standard Central Asian Sarvāstivādin recension. The investigation of textual affiliation becomes more complex in Schmithausen's investigation of Abhidharma texts, specifically, the recensions of the Vibhāṣā compendia. Schmithausen finds evidence of the amalgamation of an older Sarvāstivādin tradition, represented by the Madhyamāgama, with what he identifies as a Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition, represented by the Saṃyuktāgama. On the basis of these investigations, Schmithausen concludes that the Mūlasarvāstivādins had not only a distinct vinaya but also a separate sūtra and kṣūraka, or miscellaneous collection, distinct from those of the Sarvāstivādins of both India and Central Asia. Schmithausen also proposes a complex history of interaction between the Mūlasarvāstivādins and the older Central Asian Sarvāstivādin groups and concludes that even though the Mūlasarvāstivādin recensions were shaped by the older Sarvāstivādin recensions, they also later exerted their own influence upon Indian Sarvāstivādin texts probably as a result of their later dominance within India.

Undoubtedly, a sect as large and geographically dispersed as the Sarvāstivādins would be likely to split further over time. That this occurred, at least in part, also doctrinally can be confirmed by the literary record of the debates of Sarvāstivādin groups. Whether these various groups were independent sects in terms of the criterion of independent Vinaya and ordination lineage or schools distinguished by differences in doctrinal interpretation cannot be determined with equal certainty. In the case of the Mūlasarvāstivādins and Sarvāstivādins, given the absence of any inscriptive record or explicit literary remains of the Mūlasarvāstivādins from the period contemporaneous with the Sarvāstivādins, the differences and similarities and, hence, the sectarian attributions of specific texts or po-
positions must be detected and reconstructed on the basis of comparisons between identified texts: for example, between the earlier central Asian remains of Sarvāstivādin materials and the versions definitively assignable to the Mūlasarvāstivādins—namely, the Gilgit finds of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya. In the absence of earlier definitive Mūlasarvāstivādin material, the possibility remains that the Mūlasarvāstivādins were a later renamed surviving and regnant branch of the Sarvāstivādins and never explicit opponents and rivals. Thus, sectarian affiliation in textual analysis remains tentative in individual instances, given the uncertainty as to whether differences and similarities are truly sectarian, or are a result of other factors—geographical, temporal, linguistic or an entire range of intra-sectarian motives.

In addition to the Mūlasarvāstivādins, other presumably Sarvāstivādin groups mentioned in the Abhidharma Vibhāṣa compendia include the Westerners, Outsiders, and masters of Kāśmīra or of Gandhāra. Attempts to identify each of these groups have focused on the comparative study of the multiple Chinese translations of what have been shown to be recensions of Abhidharma texts. Of particular importance in this study are the two recensions of the text considered by the later Sarvāstivādin tradition to be the cardinal statement of Sarvāstivādin doctrine and the multiple recensions of the Vibhāṣa commentary upon it: that is, the Jñānaprasthāna and the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra. The complex analysis of these texts and the speculation on their geographical affiliation have been carried out primarily by Japanese scholars including Nishi Giyū, Yamada Ryūjō, Watanabe Baiyū, and Kawamura Kōshō.

Nishi Giyū examines the Jñānaprasthāna and the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra and notes numerous differences between them in doctrinal interpretation. He also observes that in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, which he understands to represent the lineage of the Jñānaprasthāna recension, the interpretations found in the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra are described as “another view,” a “separate reading,” and so on. Nishi concludes that the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra must represent a Sarvāstivādin lineage separate from the Kāśmīra tradition of the Jñānaprasthāna.

Yamada Ryūjō concentrates on one prominent structural difference between the Jñānaprasthāna and the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra: the organizational mātyākā according to ten divisions and forty sections characterizing the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra, or ten divisions and forty-two sections characterizing the Jñānaprasthāna. Noting that the *Vibhāṣāśāstra (T 28 (1547)) also adopts the structure of ten divisions and forty sections and that its translator is associated with Gandhāra, Yamada concludes that the separate non-Jñānaprasthāna Sarvāstivādin lineage represented by the *Abhidharmaśāstakandhaśāstra and the *Vibhāṣāśāstra should be associated
with Gandhāra.

Watanabe Baiyu, using primarily the recensions of the *Vibhāṣa compendia but also referring to other later Sarvastivādin Abhidharma texts, examines in detail points of doctrinal disagreement among four Sarvastivādin groups: that of Kaśmīra, of Gandhāra, the Outsiders, and the Westerners. He concludes that a comparison of these doctrinal points suggests that both the *Mahāvibhāṣa and the *Vibhāṣāstra represent the Kaśmīra lineage.

Kawamura Kōshō continues this investigation, particularly with regard to the positions of the Jñānaprabhāśa and the *Abhidharmāśāṭaskandhaśāstra and, like Watanabe, concludes that both these texts represent the same Sarvastivādin lineage. Kawamura also examines in detail the relationship among the three Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣa compendia and draws several conclusions. First, the three Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣa compendia represent different recensions, and not merely different translations of the same root text. Second, the *Vibhāṣāstra (T 28 (1547)) should not be associated with the lineage of the *Abhidharmāśāṭaskandhaśāstra. Third, the numerous differences between the two more similar recensions—the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāstra (T 28 (1546)) and the *Mahāvibhāṣa (T 27 (1545))—should be investigated in more depth. Finally, one should not ascribe differences only to sectarian distinctions but should also look to the time interval dividing these texts as a possible reason for the differences among them.

Finally, the *Vibhāṣa compendia also contain references to Abhidhārmikas such as Ghoṣaka, Dhammatrāta, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva. The sectarian or geographical identification of these masters also poses a difficult problem, not simply due to the relative absence of independent historical witnesses but primarily due to the multiple occurrence of these names and the frequent practice of attributing a text or a view to a prominent figure. For example, not only are these masters cited frequently as Abhidhārmikas in the *Vibhāṣa compendia, but they are also recognized as authors of significant northern Indian Abhidharma texts: a “Vasumitra” is acknowledged as the author of the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvavasūgitiśāstra and of several Sarvastivādin canonical texts; a “Dhammatrāta” is recognized as the author of the *Samyuktabhidharmahrdayaśāstra and the *Pāncavastukavibhāṣāśāstra and as the compiler and commentator on the Udānavarga; and a “Ghoṣaka” is declared the author of the *Abhidharmāṃḍarasaśāstra. In scholarly attempts to determine the sectarian or geographical identification of these masters, as in the case of textual materials, the primary issue is their affiliation with a non-Kaśmīra Sarvastivādin lineage or their association with the incipient Dārṣṭāntika faction within the Sarvastivādin school.

These preliminary considerations suggest that any attempt to clarify the
history of an early Indian Buddhist sect or school demands reconsideration of several key issues. These include first our understanding of or assumptions concerning the character of the early Buddhist community and of the various types of divisions that were present or emerged within it. Indeed, we are perhaps not justified in seeing the Buddhist community in this early formative period as a homogeneous whole within which an initial schism emerged resulting in subsequent fragmentation. Instead, it might be best to adopt a model of a more loosely organized “community” in which natural variation in doctrine or in disciplinary codes was interpreted by the later tradition as incipient fragmentation and the foundation of emergent sects and schools. Second, we must examine the range of sources available, making explicit the differing interpretative perspectives each supports and questioning the possible agenda or purposes of the sources. In particular, we must become sensitive to the limitations of each source, clarifying the types of questions that each source will enable us to pursue. Finally, we must attempt to develop methods by which we can make judicious use of these sources to answer the particular questions to which they are suited, keeping in mind that our goal should not be limited to “historical reconstruction” but should also include the vision of the tradition’s history fostered by the traditional interpreters, a vision that, as reformulated in successive periods, becomes the historical data of subsequent interpreters and, indeed, comes to constitute the tradition itself.

Sarvāstivādin Texts

The Sarvāstivādin sect is known primarily from their surviving literature. They possessed a canon in four sections containing śūtra, vinaya, abhidharma, and kṣudraka collections and, among these, emphasized and valued most the exegesis of the Abhidharma. Much of the voluminous corpus of northern Indian Abhidharma literature, including Sarvāstivādin texts as well as those from several other schools, is well preserved in Chinese translation.

In the absence of direct evidence for dating texts, attempts to organize this literature chronologically have generally relied upon internal and comparative formal criteria that presume an increasing complexity over time in both form and content. Stylistically, the Abhidharma genre moves from a strict śūtra dialogic format toward a freer exegetical style where, independent of a narrative or even of a commentative frame, there is the recognition of contending positions, the appearance of argument, and the refinement of taxonomies. Doctrinally, development is manifest in the growing complexity of analysis and the creation of new terminology and structures that
preserve and integrate the older categories within the new. Periodizations assume an evolutionary model in which the simple invariably precedes the complex, and thus presume a neat intellectual development that the actual literary chronology, if recoverable, would doubtlessly confound.

Periodization of Texts

Such a periodic classification of Abhidharma literature might divide the texts broadly into four basic groups. The first group would include simple expository texts that function as extended presentations of doctrine from the sutra; they are structured according to a relatively simple topical arrangement and do not provide any evidence of sectarian disagreements. The two earliest of the seven Abhidharma canonical texts that came to be associated with the Sarvāstivādin school texts—the Śāṅkītipāryāya and the Dharmaskandha—would represent this group. Among the Theravādin Abhidhamma texts in Pāli, the Vibhaṅga demonstrates its obvious relation to the sutta through its threefold structure: namely, the suttantabhājanīya, or “that which is classified as sutta,” which contains a reference to the sutta on a particular topic; the abhidhammabhājanīya, or “that which is classified as abhidhamma,” which contains further exegesis of this sutta passage; and the paññāpucchaka, or “asking questions,” which further analyses the topic of the sutta passage through classification according to various matrices, or categorizing lists (mātikā). The topical divisions of the first two sections of the *Sūryāmatībhidharmasūtra, a non-Sarvāstivādin northern Indian Abhidharma text, are markedly similar to those of the Vibhaṅga and both resemble the Dharmaskandha. Therefore, despite some advances in doctrinal complexity, the *Sūryāmatībhidharmasūtra can also be assigned to this earliest period. All texts of this early period are characterized by a simple expository or catechetical format. There is, however, considerable development throughout the period in the degree of complexity of doctrinal exposition. With the possible exception of the Vijnānakāya, texts of this early period do not as yet present self-consciously sectarian positions.

The second group would include texts that no longer function as commentary on sutra passages, but instead adopt more abstract principles of organization. In content, they mark a development in the complexity of doctrinal analysis, an expanded elaboration of technical terms, and a recognition of differences in doctrinal interpretation and factional alignments. This stage would include all the remaining early Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādin school culminating in the Jñānaprasthāna.

The third group of texts would include polemical texts, notably the dialectical compendia or Vibhāṣā, that recognize and enumerate the positions
of contending groups without controverting these rival positions in debate fashion. Texts of this third period clearly recognize sectarian alignments and give evidence of developing methods of argument and refining doctrinal positions through the challenge presented by rival positions.

Finally, the fourth group of texts would contain the dialectical expository treatises or pedagogical digests that attempt to cogently summarize salient doctrinal positions and yet also refute, point by point, positions thought to represent rival groups: for example, interim texts such as the *Abhidharmahṛdaya, and the later treatises such as the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra, the Abhidharmaśāstra, the *Nyāyānusāra, and the Abhidharmanāṭipā. In contrast to the earlier Abhidharma literature, these texts adopt an organization of topics that attempts to present all aspects of the teaching according to a well-reasoned structure presented in summary verses with accompanying prose auto-commentary. In content, they are overtly polemical, mature products of single authors, arguing the positions of their established doctrinal schools in a sustained, complex, and coherent fashion that may reflect their intended use as instructional reference manuals for their respective schools.

The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma canon of seven texts would be included within the first and second groups. These seven Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts do not correspond to the seven Abhidhamma texts in Pāli of the Sthavira or Theravāda sect.54 Though the various sources agree on the titles of the seven Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, they disagree on their order and authorship. The following list follows the order of Yaşomitra’s description in his commentary on the Abhidharmaśāstra but also includes the attributions of the Chinese tradition:55

1. Jñānaprabhāṣa, attributed to Kātyāyanaputra (Skt. Ch.)
2. Prakaraṇaśāstra, attributed to Vasumitra (Skt. Ch.)
3. Vijñānakāya, attributed to Devaśarman (Skt. Ch.)
4. Dharmanakṣanda, attributed to Śāriputra (Skt.) Mahāmaudgalyāyana (Ch.)
5. Prajñāptaśāstra, attributed to Maudgalyāyana (Skt.), Mahākātyāyana (Ch.)
6. Dhatukāya, attributed to Pūrṇa (Skt.), Vasumitra (Ch.)
7. Saṅgītipariprāsya, attributed to Mahākauśṭhila (Skt.), Śāriputra (Ch.)

This Abhidharma canon of the Sarvāstivādin came in the tradition to be referred to collectively as the “Abhidharma with six feet” (satpadābhidharma).56 Yaşomitra explains the relationship among the Sarvāstivādin
canonical Abhidharma texts as follows: the Jñānaprasthāna constitutes the body, which has six feet, namely, the other six Sarvāstivādin texts. The origin of this designation ‘Abhidharma with six feet’ is unclear, but it is important to note that it does not appear in the Vibhāṣā compendia. Indeed, the Dhātukāya, which is included among this group of six texts, is neither cited nor referred to in the Vibhāṣā compendia. This would perhaps suggest that the group of seven texts had not yet been constituted as a unit by the time of the composition of the Vibhāṣā. A reference to the “Abhidharma with six feet” appears in a postscript to the translation of the *Abhidharmāśṭakāṇḍhaśāstra (T 26 (1543)) dated 379 A.D. The designation also appears in Kumārajiva’s translations of the *Māhāprajñāpāramitāsūtropadeśa and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra.

The Jñānaprasthāna is traditionally recognized as the most significant of the seven early Sarvāstivādin texts, not because it is the oldest, but rather because it represents the position of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins who came to be recognized as the orthodox Sarvāstivādin lineage. Stylisitic criteria and complexity of exposition are once again helpful in distinguishing stages among these seven texts. The Saṅgītiśāstra and the Dharmāśṭakāṇḍha are generally recognized as the earliest. The Saṅgītiśāstra is an extended commentary on the *Saṅgītaśūtra, which belongs to a class of sūtras structured according to a progressive numerical ordering—in this case from one to ten—of topics constituting the Buddha’s teaching. The Dharmāśṭakāṇḍha is not structured as a commentary on a single sūtra, but rather contains excerpts from various sūtras topically arranged with commentary on each. It begins each section according to a traditional sūtra format, recounting first the circumstances under which a particular discourse was delivered by the Buddha, followed by the contents of the discourse and a brief exegetical analysis of these contents. The topics treated in the Dharmāśṭakāṇḍha can be divided into two sections. Chapters one through fifteen examine matters related to religious praxis and the path; this emphasis upon the exposition of the path of praxis is typical of texts of the early period. Chapters sixteen through twenty-one reflect the influence of the developing Abhidharma taxonomies, in this case including chapters on defilements, the controlling faculties, the sense spheres, the aggregates, the elements, and dependent origination.

The remaining early Sarvāstivādin texts are similar to the Saṅgītīśāstra and the Dharmāśṭakāṇḍha in the absence of overt sectarian self-consciousness and their use of a simple expository or catechetical style. However, they can be considered more advanced because they are not linked either stylistically or in their exposition to a specific sūtra or selection of sūtras; therefore, they exhibit more abstract principles of organization. They also evince marked development of certain characteristics typical of
later Abhidharma texts: for example, the increasing development of both the taxonomy and analysis of existent factors; greater complexity in doctrinal analysis; further specification and elaboration of technical terms; and the suggestion of implicit cosmological, ontological, or psychological issues either as organizing principles for or as driving forces underlying doctrinal interpretation.

Each of these remaining texts has its own salient characteristic. The *Prajñāptiśāstra focuses on cosmological speculation and examines the topics of the worlds (*loka), action (*karman), and causation or reasons (*kāraṇa).*64 The *Dhātukāya is noted for its analysis of mental processes, specifically, for its enumeration of mental components or thought concomitants. The *Prakaranaṇāpāda is almost certainly a compilation, combining some original chapters perhaps drawn from an independent source with other chapters that closely resemble sections of other Abhidharma texts.*65 In view of the organizational schema adopted by the later commentarial tradition, the *Prakaranaṇāpāda is noteworthy among the canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts for the fivefold taxonomy of all factors with which it begins: that is, the classification according to form, thought, thought concomitants, dissociated forces, and unconditioned factors.*66 The *Vijñānakāya, unlike any of the other early Abhidharma texts, gives evidence of rival sectarian positions and records doctrinal disagreements organized according to a number of abstract ontological or psychological issues. Indeed, in certain sections, the author adopts a polemical style, explicitly defending his own views against those of an opponent. The *Vijñānakāya also utilizes a complex taxonomy or matrix of categories for the specification of factors, particularly those factors that function in the path of religious praxis. Finally, the *Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhaśāstra or Jñānaprasthāna, acknowledged to be the foundational text for the Sarvāstivādin school, is considered to be the most recent of the seven texts and has been dated to the middle of the first century B.C.*67 Significantly, the text begins from an examination of one stage in the path of religious praxis: that is, the stage after which one becomes a noble one. The remainder of the text could thus be interpreted as an extended exposition of topics central to that path of religious practice.*68 In structure, the *Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhaśāstra and the Jñānaprasthāna present a radical departure from the other early Sarvāstivādin texts in their use of the matrix of ten divisions and either forty or forty-two sections, respectively.*69

The third period of Abhidharma literature is represented by the *Vibhāṣā, which, according to tradition, was compiled at a council of 500 monks called by the Kuśāṇa king, Kaniska, in order to further explicate the *sūtra, vinaya, and abhidharma collections.*70 However, since the date of Kaniska, as mentioned previously, is still controversial, this traditional legend, even
if accepted, is of little help in dating the three extant recensions of the Vibhāṣā. The Abhidharma Vibhāṣā compendia mark a departure from the earlier texts in several significant respects. Though they are commentaries on the *Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhaśāstra or Jñānaprasthāna, a close comparative analysis reveals that in many sections the Vibhāṣā compendia contain entirely new doctrinal categories and interpretative positions. The Vibhāṣā compendia adopt a complex polemical style: each section of the Jñānaprasthāna is explained or justified as an attempt to present “correct principle” or as an implicit response to the faulty theories of other schools, which are listed in turn, but usually not refuted. In all chapters, the Vibhāṣā compendia add much detail in the form of both sutra references and doctrinal positions or even reasoned arguments, which not only extensively elaborate doctrinal points but also present a variety of different interpretations frequently attributed to specific groups or masters. Often several interpretations of a passage are deemed acceptable, interpretations that, in many cases, undoubtedly represent different strains of the Sarvastivādin school distinguished by teaching lineage or geographical distribution. The title of these compendia may also reflect this guiding compositional intention to assemble alternative interpretations; in grammatical literature the term vibhāṣā can mean option, as when different syntactic but equivalent semantic constructions can be freely substituted for one another. Though the Vibhāṣā compendia also present a range of alternative views on most points of doctrine, not infrequently, a Vibhāṣā text will select through its “arbiter” one interpretation as preferred. In the case of the *Mahāvibhāṣā, the arbiter represents the position of the Kāśmīra Sarvastivādins.

Clearly, the Vibhāṣā compendia were compiled in a period of sectarian debate and tremendous growth in both doctrinal interpretation and techniques of argument. As the definitive statement of one of the significant, possibly the dominant lineage of Abhidharma interpretation, the Vibhāṣā compendia lent their name to the Sarvastivādins of Kāśmīra, which are thenceforth referred to by the derivative appellation ‘Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāṣikas’ or simply ‘Vaibhāṣikas.’ The Vibhāṣā compendia constitute a determinative stage in the development of Indian Buddhist sectarian consciousness and doctrinal analysis; indeed, theories and entire discussions, including even the supporting scriptural citations and reasoned arguments, presented in later Abhidharma texts can often be traced to Vibhāṣā texts. The Vibhāṣā compendia are a repository for a wide range of views on any given doctrinal point and, therefore, for the modern scholar, provide an invaluable record of early Indian worldviews.

The fourth group of Abhidharma texts would include the *Abhidharmahrdaya, *Abhidharmāṅṛtatarasāstra, and the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītīśāstra, which precede immediately or are contemporaneous with
the Vibhāṣā compendia, as well as all post-Vibhāṣā Abhidharma texts such as the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayastra, the non-Sarvāstivādin *Tattva-siddhiśāstra, the Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra, the later Abhidharmakośakārikā and its Bhāṣya, the *Nyāyānusāra, and the Abhidharmadīpā and its Vṛtti. Dharmasūri’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya is not only the first Abhidharma treatise to use both summary verse and prose commentary but it also introduces an innovative structure that was followed by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya. It is the first in a new genre of doctrinal digests, including also Upāśānta’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya, and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayastra, that attempt to present all aspects of Buddhist teaching and theoretical analysis according to a topically coherent structure. This genre culminates in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya and Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra. In marked contrast to the fivefold taxonomy of all factors as suggested in the Prakaraṇapāda, the *Abhidharmahṛdaya adopts a structure of ten chapters: that is, the seven major topics of the elements, forces, action, defilements, noble ones, knowledge, and concentration, to which are added three appendices. The popularity and influence of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya is indicated by the number of commentaries written on it and their repeated translation into Chinese. The influence of this *Abhidharmahṛdaya lineage of texts is also proven by their role as the model for Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya. Indeed, the topical structure and many of the specific doctrinal discussions, especially those from the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayastra, are adopted by Vasubandhu with little change.

The final texts within this fourth group of Abhidharma texts include Harivarman’s *Tattva-siddhiśāstra, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra, and the Abhidharmadīpā with the Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti. They all incorporate and expand tendencies found in earlier treatises. For example, they all give evidence of keen awareness of doctrinal distinctions among the various schools and adopt sophisticated methods of argument to establish their own positions and refute at length the views of others. Organizationally, these texts attempt to include all aspects of the teaching according to an overall systematic structure and, at least in the case of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, serve as pedagogical manuals of Buddhist doctrine.

The *Tattva-siddhiśāstra marks another stylistic development in the composition of Abhidharma texts. It is a polemical text that both records and refutes at great length the positions of its opponents, primary among which are the Sarvāstivādins who must be presumed to have been dominant at the time of its composition. For its presentation, the *Tattva-siddhiśāstra adopts a multilevel structure. First, the text is divided into five chapters including an introductory chapter and one on each of the four noble truths.
On the next level, the material in each chapter is arranged according to major subdivisions: the introductory chapter contains sections on the three jewels and ten points of doctrinal controversy; the chapter on the truth of suffering, subdivisions on each of the five aggregates; the chapter on the origin of suffering, subdivisions on action and defilements; the chapter on the truth of the cessation of suffering does not contain major subdivisions; and, finally, the chapter on the truth of the path contains subdivisions on concentration and knowledge. Finally, each subdivision contains sections that often resemble the mātrkā categories in earlier Abhidharma texts. These sections examine the components of the larger topic of the subdivision or investigate controversial issues stemming from that larger topic.

In its organizational structure, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhasya follows the lineage of the *Abhidharmahrdaya, but in its frequent citation and sustained criticism of rival interpretations, it represents a stage of development at least equal to that of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra. Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra as well as the Abhidharmadīpa and Vṛtti continue this combination of doctrinal exegesis and sectarian polemics. Saṅghabhadra’s lengthy presentation of rival views and detailed refutations provide both a remarkably complete record of rival sectarian positions and an invaluable example of developing techniques of argumentation. All of these later Abhidharma texts, including those of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, are clearly indebted to the doctrinal analyses initiated in the Vibhāṣa compendia. Indeed, the discussion of almost all doctrinal points can be traced often in their entirety to the Vibhāṣa, with Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra frequently adopting different interpretations given there. However, the overtly polemical character of the later texts testifies to an environment of increasing sectarian identity and competition. Employing a more thorough method of refuting the views of opponents, these later texts not only cite rival views and judge them unacceptable but they also refute them in point by point fashion using both the requisite and increasingly stylized techniques of scriptural authority and reasoned argument. The result is an elaboration upon and an inevitable transformation of doctrinal interpretations, a transformation especially evident in Saṅghabhadra’s extended refutations of Vasubandhu and defense of Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas positions. Ultimately, for the later Buddhist tradition, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhāṣya came to occupy the position of an unsurpassable summa, virtually synonymous with Abhidharma itself. Consequently, the production of Abhidharma literature was reduced to a series of commentaries and digests intended to aid the interpretation and study of this work. The perspective of the dominant school of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas represented more faithfully in Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra and in the Abhidharmadīpa and Vṛtti was to languish, only appearing in occasional
2.2 Dārśāntikas and Sautrāntikas

From the standpoint of both the virulence of attack and the frequency of citation, the primary opponent of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā is the Dārśaṇtikas. By contrast, the term 'Sautrāntika' appears only twice. In the later *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasubandhu this proportion is reversed; the Dārśaṇtikas are cited only three times and the Sautrāntikas, almost twenty. For Saṅghabhadra, however, the apparent trend toward the use of 'Sautrāntika' appears to be reversed once again: he uses the term 'Dārśāntika' almost three times more often than the term 'Sautrāntika.' This irregular variation over time in the use of the terms 'Dārśaṇtika' and 'Sautrāntika' would challenge the view of traditional commentators that the Dārśaṇtikas and the Sautrāntikas refer to the same group and that the difference between the two is simply chronological, with the earlier term 'Dārśaṇtika' being replaced by the term 'Sautrāntika' in the later period. Particularly, in view of Saṅghabhadra's frequent use of the term 'Dārśaṇtika,' this traditional view must be reexamined. Should the traditional view of their identity be accepted, and if so, what then do the different terms connote; in particular, why did Saṅghabhadra use the term Dārśaṇtika? Or, do the terms refer in some sense to distinct groups either as sects characterized by separate ordination lineages or as sub-schools of the Sarvāstivādins distinguished from one another and from the Sarvāstivādins only on doctrinal grounds?

In a study of the history and doctrinal interpretations of the Sautrāntikas, Katō Junshō pursues these questions through an examination of Abhidharma references both to the Dārśaṇtikas and Sautrāntikas and to their teachers, in particular, Śrīlā. From the outset, all attempts to clarify these issues are complicated by the fact that the origin of the term 'Dārśaṇtika' is interpreted differently by different commentators. K'ueich'i, whose opinion became definitive in the Chinese and Japanese commentarial traditions, suggests that it derives either from comparisons — dṛṣṭānta drawn between Kumāralāta, the reputed founder of the Dārśaṇtikas, and the light of the sun, or from the name of his text, the *Dṛṣṭānta-paṅkti. Yasomitra also explains the name 'Dārśaṇtika' as indicating their practice of employing examples (dṛṣṭānta). To test the validity of these traditional explanations that link the Dārśaṇtikas with the use of examples, Katō examines the earliest references to the Dārśaṇtikas, that is, in the *Vibhāṣā compendia. Of the eighty-six references to the Dārśaṇtikas
2. Sectarian Buddhism

in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, only twenty-five employ examples; nevertheless, this represents a significantly larger percentage than in the case of references to other groups. Therefore, the name ‘Dārśāntika’ would indeed appear to have been connected to the use of examples. Katō next examines the connotation of the term ‘Dārśāntika,’ by focussing on three references in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. In these three cases, the Dārśāntikas are explicitly criticized for relying upon everyday worldly examples as their authority rather than upon the Buddha’s teaching as preserved in the canon. Specifically, the Dārśāntikas are criticized for using conventional discourse to challenge the noble teaching as correctly “re-”presented in the Abhidharma. ‘Dārśāntika,’ therefore, appears to be a pejorative term used in contempt by an opponent—in the case of the *Mahāvibhāṣā, by the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins—to refer to those who rely incorrectly upon the invalid authority of conventional examples. Further, since other schools also are cited as employing examples, the term ‘Dārśāntika,’ Katō suggests, must have been used not in generic reference to the use of examples, but rather specifies a certain perspective or group, which must have originated comparatively late, after the other groups had already acquired names.

The early evidence for the Sautrāntikas is even more difficult to interpret. Only two references to the Sautrāntikas appear in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, possibly suggesting that they were, as yet, a relatively new and restricted group. However, after comparing these references with analogous passages in the other recensions of the Vibhāṣā compendia, Katō draws different conclusions. One view attributed to the Sautrāntika in the *Mahāvibhāṣā is attributed in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāsāstra simply to “those who recite the sūtra;” the other reference in the *Mahāvibhāṣā is not associated with any specific group in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāsāstra. Katō thus concludes that the term ‘Sautrāntika’ in the *Mahāvibhāṣā is the result of Hsūan-tsang’s translation or interpolation and should not be taken as evidence of the existence of a distinct Sautrāntika school at the time of the composition of the Vibhāṣā compendia. Similarly, the term ‘Sautrāntika’ that appears in Hsūan-tsang’s translation of the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (T 49 (2031)) is, Katō suggests, a result of Hsūan-tsang’s own incorrect assumptions concerning the implications of the original term ‘Sūtravāda’ or ‘Sūtrāntavāda.’ This term in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Katō contends, should not be understood to refer to the same group that was to be identified later by Vasubandhu as the Sautrāntikas, nor should it be equated with the Dārśāntikas as cited in the Vibhāṣā compendia. Therefore, the earliest reference to the Sautrāntikas as a distinct group would be in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

Katō next examines the references to the Sautrāntikas and Dārśāntikas in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and their corresponding treatment in the
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*Nyāyānusāra.* He first notes that Vasubandhu’s own views almost always accord with those attributed to the Sautrāntikas. After examining the three references to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Katō observes that, in all three cases, Vasubandhu disagrees with the view cited and would, therefore, appear to continue the pejorative connotation of the term ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ evident in the *Mahāvibhāṣā.* As a result of these investigations, Katō corroborates the view of Jean Przyluski that the terms ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ and ‘Sautrāntika’ simply represent different perspectives from which the same group can be seen: the term ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ has a negative connotation and is used by opponents, such as the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins, to suggest the group’s reliance upon the invalid authority of conventional examples; the term ‘Sautrāntika’ has a positive connotation and is used by the group itself to refer to its own views. This explanation would then account for both the predominant use of ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ in the Vibhaṣa compendia, which are critical of the Dārṣṭāntika perspective, and for the shift to the term ‘Sautrāntika’ by Vasubandhu, who is sympathetic to many of their positions. Though Saṅghabhadra’s predominant use of ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ would also fit this pattern given his stance critical of their position, it should be noted that he refers frequently to the Sautrāntikas as well. Katō suggests that Saṅghabhadra is the first to identify the two terms with one another, a practice also found several centuries later in Yasomitra’s commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. However, in the case of Yasomitra, no negative connotation whatsoever appears in the explicit identification of the Sautrāntikas as Dārṣṭāntikas.

If we accept this fundamental difference in connotation between the terms ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ and ‘Sautrāntika,’ what specifically do the terms imply? The definitive characterization of the Sautrāntikas as “those who take the sūtra as the standard, or the valid authority (pramāṇa),” does not appear earlier than the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Indeed, Katō finds no explicit evidence of opposition to the view attributing the Abhidharma to the Buddha and consequently no challenge to the authority of the Abhidharma until the Abhidharmavatārāṇastra. Katō, therefore, proposes that this identifying Sautrāntika declaration and the perspective of opposition to the Abhidharma to the Abhidharmavatārāṇastra. Specifically, he attributes the formulation of this Sautrāntika perspective to the master, Śrīlāta—the master whom Katō identifies with the master, Sthavira, cited frequently by Saṅghabhadra.

The comparatively late use of the term ‘Sautrāntika’ to refer to a particular interpretative perspective of relying upon the sūtra in opposition to the Abhidharma would also explain, Katō suggests, the fact that the specific doctrinal positions associated with the Sautrāntika perspective, at least
in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, are as yet relatively unfixed. Katō notes that there are passages attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that do not agree with Śrīlāta’s own views.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, Katō concludes that it is best not to construe the appellation ‘Sautrāntika’ as entailing either a distinct ordination lineage or a defined set of doctrinal positions. Instead, it indicates a reliance only upon the Buddha’s verified teaching in the *sūtras that ensures consistency with correct principle in contrast to the faulty reasoning that it is assumed undermines Abhidharma treatises. Doctrinally, the Sautrāntika perspective can be characterized only by a rejection of the definitive Sarvāstivādin position that factors exist in the three time periods. Therefore, the appellation ‘Sautrāntika’ could have been used to encompass a broad range of individual opinions that conform to these general guidelines, rather than to a defined and delimited set of doctrinal positions.

This model does indeed capture the primary dynamic of Saṅghabhadra’s arguments in the *Nyāyānusāra against the Dārśāntikas and the Sautrāntikas and against particular teachers associated with them, such as Vasubandhu or Śrīlāta. Saṅghabhadra uses the term ‘Dārśāntika’ and the fallacious examples with which it is associated to represent opposition in general terms to the Abhidharma and to the correct principle that the Abhidharma contains.¹⁰⁵ This dynamic is reflected in Saṅghabhadra’s frequent appeal in arguments to consistency with correct principle and, indeed, in the name of his text, “*Nyāyānusāra” or “Conformance to Correct Principle.”¹⁰⁶ Despite their claims, the specific interpretations associated with the Sautrāntikas, Saṅghabhadra maintains, are contrary to the *sūtras. Instead of following the *sūtras, the Sautrāntikas are characterized as arrogantly following their own individual opinions, which are not grounded in any valid authority.¹⁰⁷

What then does the tradition tell us concerning the origins of the Dārśāntikas and Sautrāntikas and the masters with whose teachings these schools would be associated? The founding of the Dārśāntikas (and Sautrāntikas if they are identified with one another) is traditionally attributed to Kuṭmāralāta, described as an influential early Buddhist teacher who lived one hundred years after the Buddha’s final nirvāṇa and composed one or more texts.¹⁰⁸ However, by analyzing positions attributed to Kuṭmāralāta, Katō concludes that the Kuṭmāralāta who is associated with the Dārśāntikas must have lived after the *Mahāvibhāṣā. In that case, the traditional identification of Kuṭmāralāta as the teacher of Harivarman, the author of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra, is plausible.¹⁰⁹ However, admitting this late third century A.D. date for Kuṭmāralāta leaves the origins of the Dārśāntika group cited in the *Vibhāṣā obscure. Nevertheless, it would appear that they emerged just prior to the composition of the *Vibhāṣā compendia not as a distinct ordination lineage or sect, but rather as a dogmatically distin-
guished group or school that objected to Sarvāstivādin doctrinal interpretations.\textsuperscript{110}

Traditional descriptions portray Śrīlāta as the second Sautrāntika master; he is credited with the composition of a "Sautrāntikavibhāṣā" and is identified with the Sthavira cited frequently in Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra.\textsuperscript{111} If one accepts the identity of Sthavira as Śrīlāta, the frequent and lengthy citations of this Sthavira in the *Nyāyānusāra not only verify the existence of some source text, but also provide a detailed, and indeed the only account of its contents.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, these citations in the *Nyāyānusāra would suggest that Sthavira's text was itself a detailed exegetical treatise that, despite Sautrāntika claims to the contrary, must have been at least stylistically similar to Abhidharma texts. By noting the biographical comments in the references to Sthavira in the *Nyāyānusāra, Katō concludes that Śrīlāta was from a region to the east of that of Saṅghabhadra. This would suggest that in Saṅghabhadra's period, the area of primary opposition to the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins had shifted from the west, as it had been several centuries earlier, to the east. Given the often personal nature of Saṅghabhadra's criticisms, Katō also concludes that Śrīlāta must have been an older contemporary of both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. Concerning the relation among these roughly contemporaneous figures, Katō suggests that Kumāralāta was the teacher of both Harivarman and Śrīlāta and that Śrīlāta was the direct teacher of Vasubandhu.\textsuperscript{113}

Regardless of whether or not one accepts the identification of Śrīlāta and Sthavira and this tentative reconstruction of the relation between Śrīlāta and Vasubandhu, the frequency of the citations of Sthavira's views in the *Nyāyānusāra testifies to his importance in shaping later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma interpretations.\textsuperscript{114} These citations of Sthavira's views are juxtaposed with references either to the Dārṣṭāntikas\textsuperscript{115} or to the Sautrāntikas,\textsuperscript{116} thereby reinforcing the impression that Saṅghabhadra does not distinguish the Dārṣṭāntikas from the Sautrāntikas. Unfortunately, this identification does not help to clarify the historical origins of either term or the character of the possible groups to which they refer. Other masters, in addition to Śrīlāta, could possibly be associated with a Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika perspective: a Buddhadeva and a Dharmatrāta mentioned in the Vibhāṣā compendia; a Bhadanta mentioned in the Vibhāṣā compendia who has been variously identified with Buddhadeva or Dharmatrāta; Harivarman, the author of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra; and Bhadanta Rāma mentioned in Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra.\textsuperscript{117}

Notes
See Lamotte (1958) 20, 22, 572.

See Przyluski (1926–1928) 195ff.

Étienne Lamotte (Lamotte (1958) 606) remarks that the textual sources are so overlaid with various schemata from different historical periods that, in the end, trying to unravel on the basis of texts the filiation of Buddhist sects is a futile enterprise.

These include, for example, the references to the Buddhist councils contained in the vinaya collections of various sects. See Przyluski (1926–1928); Hofinger (1946); Demiéville (1951). See also the discussion of Mahādeva in MVB 99 p. 510c23ff., or the reference to Kaniska, MVB 114 p. 593a15ff.


See Kao-seng Fa-hsien chuan T 51 (2085) by Fa-hsien; Ts T'ang hsi-yü chi T 51 (2087) by Pien-chi and Hsüan-tsang; Nan-hai chi-kuei nei-fa chuan T 54 (2125) by I-ching.


For fragments of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, see Waldschmidt (1965), and subsequent volumes in the series Sanskrit Handschriften aus den Turfanfunden; Sengupta (1975); Takasaki (1965); Dietz (1984); Lévi (1932); Demiéville (1961); Pauly (1960); Yuyama (1981); Yuyama (1987).

See Bechert (1973) 7ff.

For example, for a study of the structural similarities between the Vibhaṅga and the *Śāriputrabhidharmasūtra, see Kimura (1937) 67ff.; or among the Vibhaṅga, the *Śāriputrabhidharmasūtra, and the Dharmasandha, see Yamada (1959) 70ff. For studies of Vinaya terminology, see Roth (1968); Bechert (1973) 7ff.; von Simson (1985); Sander (1985). For detailed studies of doctrinal terminology, see Schmithausen (1987a); Schmithausen (1987b). For sectarian characterization based on recorded doctrinal positions, see Bareau (1955b). The structural, substantive, terminological, and linguistic comparative and internal analyses of canonical and post-canonical literature uncover a history of developmental relationships that have had multiple causes. These range from the mechanical and formal to the intellectual and sectarian and include everything from faulty textual transmission leading to unintentionally innovating emendation to conscious, dogmatically motivated revisions. See Schmithausen (1987b) 304, passim. These textual changes occur in an intra–as well as inter-sectarian context. At no time can a version of a text be assumed to have a privileged stability, as demonstrated by the differences between successive translations of the “same” Buddhist text. Compounding these difficulties are the divergences introduced by linguistic recasting and or translation, and the absence of or the mere accidental or fragmentary preservation of works in their “original” or translated form. Thus, enormous difficulties complicate the pursuit of this kind of textual analysis and restrict it to provisional results.

See Bareau (1955b) 42ff.; Shizutani (1978) 52. Among the reasons for sectarian fission, geographical separation can be considered perhaps the most important cause of natural or voluntary division. See Lamotte (1958) 533ff. For references to modern examples of the consensual division of monastic groups due to geographical distance, see Bechert (1985) 27.
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13 See Franke (1908); Bareau (1955a); Przyluski (1926–1928); Hofinger (1946); Demiéville (1951); de La Valée Poussin (1905); N. Dutt (1959); Frauwallner (1952); Prebish (1974); Fukuhara (1965) 35ff; Nattier and Prebish (1977).


16 Heinz Bechert suggests that the salient criterion upon which distinct Buddhist groups (niṇāya) are established is one of discipline, and not one of doctrine. One can then meaningfully use the term sect (niṇāya) only to refer to differences of ordination lineage (upasampada), and not to differences of doctrinal interpretation. For groups identified according to doctrinal position that may share the same ordination and live in the same monastic community, the label 'school' is suggested. Acknowledging his dependence upon Erich Frauwallner (Frauwallner (1956) 6ff., 153ff.), Bechert claims that the initial divisions in the monastic community involved matters of discipline; the dogmatic schools developed at a later time from within the earlier Vinaya sects. Bechert also argues for the priority of Vinaya in both the maintenance of sect identity and the formation of new sects on the basis of contemporary Buddhist practice. However, as noted by David Seyfort Ruegg (Ruegg (1985) 120) the early sources for sectarian history give priority to dogmatic differences in discussing the origin of sects.

17 See S. Dutt (1957) 123ff.; Bechert (1955–1957); Bechert (1961); Bechert (1973) 7ff; Bechert (1982).

18 See Bechert (1985) 22ff. Heinz Bechert follows the interpretation of John Brough (Brough (1980)). For another interpretation—“according to one’s [that is, the Buddha’s] own explanatory glosses”—and further discussion of these phrases, see esp. Norman (1980) 61ff. For a useful summary of opinions on the interpretation of these phrases, see Ruegg (1983) 653–654.

19 See Bechert (1985) 21ff. It has been suggested that, for the early Buddhist community, any material that did not contradict already preserved canonical matter could be considered the Buddha’s word and incorporated in the canon. See Bechert (1955–1957) 320 note 2.

20 See Bechert (1985) 21ff. To ensure the validity and continuity of monastic ordination, uniformity is required at least in the recitation of the upasampada kammavācā. Thus, the conflict between the tendency of the Buddhist oral transmission to change linguistically and otherwise and the demand for a constant ordination formula would result in repeated sectarian splitting along Vinaya lines. See, on this point, von Hinüber (1989) 352. As Oskar von Hinüber notes, (von Hinüber (1989) 355–356) a terminological analysis of a textual tradition in order to establish sectarian provenance should begin with the vinaya collection, where linguistic exactitude and standardization are to be expected. Changes in terminology and language would then spread from the vinaya to the sūtra collection and to other genres of even extra-canonical texts. Such changes could occur either on a collectively ratified basis at a council or perhaps through a gradual process, whether deliberate or non-deliberate—for example, reflecting the habits of scribes, and the like.

21 For the difficulty of determining the date of this initial schism between the Mahāsāṅghika and Sthaviravādins, see Shizutani (1978) 5ff.; Hirakawa (1974) 1: 126ff.; Lamotte (1958) 312ff. The fundamental problem that must be addressed at the outset is the distinction between the long and the short chronology. The long chronology, adopted by the Theravādin tradition, dates Aśoka to 218 years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa; the short chronology, adopted by the northern Indian sources, places 100 years between Aśoka and the Buddha’s nirvāṇa. See Lamotte (1958) 14ff. Heinz Bechert has argued in favor of the short chronology, by demonstrating that the long chronology is a secondary
construct of Sinhalese origin that has become a faute de mieux standard in much of Buddhist studies. Similarly, he argues that the "Dotted Record" is not an independent source, but is also dependent upon Sinhalese tradition. See Bechert (1986) 137[11]ff.

Shizutani Masao (Shizutani (1978) 113ff., esp. 116.) discusses the development of their distinctive doctrinal position in the context of competition with the Mahāsāṅghikas, who are credited with the view that only present factors exist. He then considers the complex issue of the possible origins of the Sarvāstivādins in either Mathurā or Kaśmīra-Gandhāra. Cf. Samayabhедoparacanakāra, Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1974) 34. Continuing his view of the primacy of Vinaya in the formation of sects, Heinz Bechert (Bechert (1985) 44) hypothesizes that the name Sarvāstivādin must be a dogmatic designation originating in a later period for the purpose of characterizing an earlier group, which had developed around its own identifying Vinaya tradition.


For the second century as a possible date for the emergence of the Sarvāstivādins as a distinct group, see Hirakawa (1974) 1: 143. For a later date from the end of the first century, see Shizutani (1978) 48ff. Étienne Lamotte (Lamotte (1958) 581) suggests that the Sarvāstivādins were well established in both Mathurā and Kaśmīra by the turn of the millennium.


Lamotte (1958) 648ff.

P.H.L. Eggermont (Eggermont (1958), (1968) 87ff.) may be taken as representative of the scholarly position supporting the association of the Sarvāstivādins and their council with the reign of Kaniška. In contrast, for evidence against accepting as more than legend the association of Kaniška with a Sarvāstivādin council or with the composition of the Vībhāṣā, see Zürcher (1969) 357ff. Whereas Eggermont accepts the standard date of 78 A.D. for the reign of Kaniška (which is still defended, for example, by Gérard Fussman (Fussman (1974) 43ff.)), many scholars accept a somewhat later date in the second century A.D. (for example, Lamotte (1958) 648, who places his reign in 128–151 A.D.), and, on the basis of the available numismatic evidence, Robert Göbl (Göbl (1984) 61, passim) presents a chronology of the Kuśāna rulers with the reign of Kaniška I from 232–260 A.D. Obviously, until a consensus supersedes the current conflicting results of various scholars and of different disciplines, the dating of the Sarvāstivādins cannot be significantly aided by recourse to this particular external evidence.

The earliest inscription from northwest India that mentions the Sarvāstivādins is from Kalawan (Taxila) and is dated from the later half of the first century A.D. See Shizutani (1978) 122ff.

For a comprehensive survey of the extensive literature on the canonical Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, see Yuyama (1979) 1ff.; and on the Mūlasarvāstivādins, Yuyama (1979) 12ff.

See Frauwallner (1956) 24ff., 37ff. Sakurabe Hajime shares the view that the Sarvāstivādins originated in Mathurā and that, at a later point, the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīra became more important. Sakurabe suggests that the name 'Mūlasarvāstivādin' was then adopted by the Sarvāstivādins of Mathurā at a later time. See Shizutani (1978) 115ff. Lamotte (Lamotte (1958) 195ff.) rejects Frauwallner's ideas about the origin of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya.


This would imply, contra the thesis represented by Heinz Bechert, that Vinaya distinctions, at least at this period, were not necessarily the sole criterion for delimiting sectarian identity, but rather that, in some cases, doctrinal positions were constitutive
in the demarcation of monastic groups.


35 See Schmithausen (1970). Here Lambert Schmithausen proposes that there is evidence of two recensions of the Udāna-śāra, independent but related in so far as they draw upon a shared source of earlier material; one recension represents the Sarvāstivādins of Central Asia, and another, consistent with the Yogācāra-buddhismātra (on which, see also Enomoto (1988b) 21ff.), represents the Mūlasarvāstivādins.

36 For studies of the sectarian affiliation of the sūtra collections, see Akanuma (1939) 191; Mayeda (1964) 619ff.; Mayeda (1985); Fukuhara (1965) 85ff.; Waldschmidt (1980), Enomoto (1986). The Chinese translation of the Madhyāmāgama (T 1 (26)) and the two translations of the Sarvyātāgama (T 2 (99, 100)) have traditionally been associated with the Sarvāstivādin sect. It is possible, however, that the Sarvyātāgama should be associated with the Mūlasarvāstivādin group. See Schmithausen (1987b) 306, 337ff.; Enomoto (1980); Enomoto (1984); Enomoto (1986); Enomoto (1988a) 13ff.; Enomoto (1988b) 21ff.

37 Lambert Schmithausen (Schmithausen (1987b) 379ff.) argues that even though no consensus has yet been reached about the relationship between the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins, the simplest explanation for systematic differences and similarities in their literature is to assume that they were separate but interacting groups with their own progressively revised and mutually influenced collections.

38 In the period during which the Sarvāstivādin order flourished, between the areas of their prevalence—between Mathurā on the one hand and the Northwest of the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia on the other—a wide range of historical, archaeological, etc., evidence documents a continual, active, and frequent socio-cultural circulation and, to a degree in the Kusāna period, political integration: Tentatively, therefore, Oskar von Hinüber suggests that this might argue for the possible temporal and geographical co-existence of Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin groups and for the consequent explanation of some textual variants as sectarian. See von Hinüber (1985) 71. Similarly, concerning the language used by various Sarvāstivādin groups, while there is some evidence that the Sarvāstivādins employed Northwest Prakrit or Gāndhārī in their transition from an earlier common Buddhist Middle Indic to the successively more standard Sanskrit of their later canon, the close cultural interchange with Mathurā, which was the likely center of the early use of Sanskrit in Buddhist inscriptions and texts, makes it difficult to postulate a clear-cut Gāndhārī stage and Northwest locus in the development of the Sarvāstivādin canon. See, on the subject of the sectarian languages, von Hinüber (1989) esp. 353–354. Even if the Sarvāstivādins of the Northwest did employ Gāndhārī for their texts, since linguistically Gāndhārī is the Middle Indic most amenable to reformulation in Sanskrit, the identification and reconstruction of a Gāndhārī substratum in this Sarvāstivādin textual tradition intent on Sanskritization is very difficult. See Fussman (1989) 441–442. Further, bilingualism is possible even within a single sect depending on the cultural level of the monks and scribes and the genre of text or linguistic activity. See von Simson (1985) esp. 54.

39 In addition to the views examined here, Shizutani Massao (Shizutani (1978) 138) suggests that even though it is not clear whether or not the Westerners should include the Sarvāstivādin lineage of Gāndhārā, the term 'Westerners' clearly does not refer to the region of Mathurā. It is also uncertain what area the Outsiders represent, but it would undoubtedly be some area outside Kaśmīra. André Bareau (Bareau (1955b) 133) tentatively identifies both the Westerners and the Outsiders with the lineage of Gāndhārā. See also Schmithausen (1987b) on possible Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin components of the Viṃśā versions.
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43 Watanabe (1954) 111ff. These later texts include the *Sāryanuktaḥbhidharmakṛṣṇayāsāstra, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyā, the *Nyāyānusāra, and the *Abhidharmasaṃayapradīpikā. Watanabe Baiyū also observes that there are references to Gāndhāra Westerners (MVB 127 p. 665c7), or to Westerners of Gandhāra (MVB 191 p. 955b9).
44 See Watanabe (1954) 122–123. Watanabe Baiyū associates the *Āryavasumitra-bodbhīṣatvasaṅgītīsāstra, both Dharmārī’s and Upaśānta’s *Abhidharmahṛdayas, and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyā with a non-Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin lineage. See also Lin (1949) 12–14 and notes, with reference to Przyluski (1923) 146ff.
45 Kawamura (1974) 25ff., esp. 36ff. Kawamura Kōshō focuses on the disagreement between the Jñānapraṣṭhāna and the *Abhidharmāstakandaḥāśāstra concerning the stages in the path of vision (dārsanamārga): the Jñānapraṣṭhāna allots fifteen stages while the *Abhidharmāstakandaḥāśāstra allots sixteen. The *Mahāvibhāṣā attributes the view that there are sixteen stages to the Outsiders.
47 These four masters are particularly important within the Sarvāstivādin tradition as representing four different interpretations of the cardinal Sarvāstivādin doctrine that factors exist in the three time periods. See infra, introductory commentary, “The Four Characteristics.”
48 For discussions of these masters, see Lin (1949) 314ff. (on Dharmatrāta); Yamada (1959) 391ff. (on Vasmitra and Dharmatrāta); Shizutani (1978) 130ff.
50 For general examinations of northern Indian, particularly Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature, see Takakusu (1905a); de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) introduction 31ff.; Malalasekera (1961–1979) 1: 64–54; Banerjee (1957); Lamotte (1958) 197ff.; Yamada (1959) 61ff.; Frauwallner (1964) 70ff. For their dating, see Frauwallner (1971a) 103ff. For doctrinal development, see Frauwallner (1973). For a summary of Erich Frauwallner’s views, see Frauwallner (1971b); Fukuhara (1965) 102ff.; Sakurabe (1969a) 41ff.; Lamotte (1970) xivff.; Hirakawa (1974) 1: 179ff. For a detailed analysis of specific technical problems in dating and comparisons of the various texts, see Kimura (1937); Watanabe (1954); Kawamura (1974).
51 The scholarly periodizations of Abhidharma texts differ depending upon the criteria upon which the classification is based. For example, see Watanabe (1954) 135ff.; Yamada (1959) 69ff.; Frauwallner (1964) 59ff.; Fukuhara (1965) 75ff.; Sakurabe (1969a) 41ff.
52 The Patisambhidamagga, though not included among the seven canonical Theravādin Abhidhamma texts, is, like the Vibhaṅga, organized according to passages from the suttas with further commentary upon each passage. On this work, see Frauwallner (1972) 124ff.
53 For the difficulty in determining the sectarian affiliation of the *Śāriputrābhidharmasāstra, see Kimura (1937) 81ff., 140–160; Yamada (1959) 69, 79ff.; Bareau (1950); Mizuno (1966); Frauwallner (1972) 133ff.; Nishi ([1954] 1975f) 112ff. Though most would agree that the *Śāriputrābhidharmasāstra is early, the dating of the text is, as yet, uncertain. For a chart comparing the organization of these three treatises see
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Yamada (1959) 70-71. See also Watanabe (1934) 9-10 and Kimura (1937) 67ff.

Possible historical relations have been investigated, in particular among the Dharmaskandha, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, and the Vibhaṅga. See Kimura (1937) 67ff.; Yamada (1959) 69ff.; Frauwallner (1964) 73ff., (1971) 107ff., (1972) 133ff.

P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 1 p. 8b24ff.) and Fa-pao (Fa-pao 1 p. 466b8ff.) adopt the following order, which reflects a chronological arrangement: Saṅgītisparīyāyā, Dharmaskandha, Prajñāpādīśāstra, Vijñānakāya, Prakasaṇopāda, Dhātukāya, and Jñānapraṣṭhāna. The first three are attributed to direct disciples of the Buddha, the fourth to the first century after his death, the fifth and sixth to the beginning of the third century after his death, and the last to the end of the third century after his death. Cf. K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao lu T 55 (2154) 13 p. 620a25ff.

55 P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 1 p. 8b24ff.) and Fa-pao (Fa-pao 1 p. 466b8ff.) adopt the following order, which reflects a chronological arrangement: Sarigftiparyaya, Dhar­maskandha, Prajiiaptisastra, Vijiianakaya, PrakaraT}apada, Dhatukaya, and Jiianapra­sthana. The first three are attributed to direct disciples of the Buddha, the fourth to the first century after his death, the fifth and sixth to the beginning of the third century after his death, and the last to the end of the third century after his death.


57 See SAVK p. 9.12ff. Here, YaSomitra is commenting on Vasubandhu's definition of abhidharma.

58 See Watanabe (1954) 85ff.


60 See MPPS 2 p. 70a6; TSŚ 8 no. 104 p. 297c7ff., 8 no. 110 p. 300b28, 10 no. 132 p. 318c12, or 10 no. 135 p. 320a14, which uses the phrase 'body of the Abhidharma' to refer to the Jñānapraṣṭhāna. Cf. Watanabe (1954) 36ff.

61 For a Sanskrit reconstruction of the lost Sanskrit original from the Chinese, see Śānti Bhikṣu ŚāstrI (1955).

62 There is disagreement concerning whether the Saṅgītisparīyāyā or the Dharmaskandha is earlier. References to the Dharmaskandha appear in the Saṅgītisparīyāyā (for example, SP 1 p. 369c9ff., 1 p. 370a11, 3 p. 378b25, passim) and, therefore, the Dharmaskandha has been assumed to be prior. See Yamada (1959) 70ff., 376ff.; Fukuhara (1965) 108. However, as Watanabe Baiyu (Watanabe (1954) 166-167 note 3) points out, these references to the Dharmaskandha could have been added in the process of translation. Indeed, the Dharmaskandha was translated first by Hsüan-tsang in 659 A.D. and would have been familiar to Hsüan-tsang and his assistants when the Saṅgītisparīyāyā was translated from 660-663 A.D. See also Watanabe (1954) 36ff.

63 See Saṅgītisparīyāyā, Stache-Rosen (1968); DA 8 no. 9. p. 49b27ff.; *Saṅgītisūtra T 1 (12); DN no. 33 Saṅgītisūtra 3: 207ff. Cf. Daśottarasūtra, Mittal (1957); Daśottarasūtra, Schlingloff (1962); DA 9 no. 10 p. 52c18ff.; Daśottarasūtra T 1 (13); de Jong (1979b); DA 9 no. 11 p. 57b26ff.; Waldschmidt (1967) 258ff.; Weller (1987) 231ff.; Tripathī (1985).

64 See Kimura (1937) 161ff. The Praṇāptiśāstra is the only early Abhidharma text not translated by Hsüan-tsang, and it is doubtful that the partial Sung Chinese translation corresponds to the Sarvāstivādin recension of the text. See Kimura (1937) 168ff.; Lin (1949) 47. Nevertheless, the importance of the Praṇāptiśāstra within the early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma corpus is indicated by the fact that it was the second most frequently cited text in the *Mahāvihārā. See Watanabe (1954) 83. It is also the only Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma text extant in Tibetan translation: T5 4086-4088, P 5587-5589. However, the configuration of the early pre-Vibhaṣā Praṇāptiśāstra is uncertain. Whereas the Sung Chinese translation consists of only a single chapter that treats the topic of causation or reasons, the Tibetan translation contains three chapters on worlds, action, and causation or reasons. On the basis of the length of the Praṇāptiśāstra as cited in Chinese catalogues, Kimura Taiken (Kimura (1937) 194ff.) suggests that the original text must have contained chapters in addition to the three of the Tibetan translation: for example, chapters on defilements, knowledge, concentration, and miscellaneous topics. For fragments of the Lokapraṇāpti preserved in Japan, see
2. Sectarian Buddhism


The possibility that the Prakaraṇapāda is a compilation was recognized in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (MPPS) 2 p. 70a16ff.). For connections between the Prakaraṇapāda and the Dhātukāya, see Yamada (1959) 91ff.

See PP (1541) 1 p. 627a9ff., PP (1542) 1 p. 692b23ff. This classification, particularly associated with the master, Vasumitra, also serves as the basis for the organization of other early Abhidharma texts: for example, *Pañcavastukā /A-p’i-t’an wu fa hsing ching/ T 28 (1557); *Pañcavastukavibhāṣāśāstra [Wu shih p’i-p’o-sha lun] T 28 (1555); Imanishi (1969); *Pañcavastukā /Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shih lun/ T 28 (1556). Cf. Yamada (1959) 97ff. On the innovation represented by this fivefold classification, see Frauwallner (1963).

See Shizutani (1978) 112ff. For a date of the second century B.C., see Ui (1932) 1965; Yamada Ryūjō (Yamada (1959) 109, 406ff.) suggests that since the doctrine of the existence of factors in the three time periods is not mentioned in the Jñānaprasthāna, and since it is this doctrine that serves as the origin for the name 'Sarvāstivādin,' the Jñānaprasthāna must predate the formation of the Sarvāstivādin sect. Instead, the Sarvāstivādin sect per se should begin with the Vībhāṣā compendia, in which this definitive doctrine is developed.

Yamada Ryūjō (Yamada (1959) 96, 102ff.) proposes that differences in interpretation between the Jñānaprasthāna, on the one hand, and the other six texts, on the other, might support the view that the Jñānaprasthāna originated in Kāśmīra while the other six bear a close relation to another region, namely, Gandhāra.

See Fukuhara (1965) 172ff. This new matrix of ten divisions and forty-two sections also constitutes the locus for the most extensive doctrinal development in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. See Yamada (1959) 108ff.

See Lamotte (1958) 648.

Yamada Ryūjō (Yamada (1959) 104–105, 108) has compared the Jñānaprasthāna with the *Mahāvibhāṣā and has carefully charted those chapters in which the *Mahāvibhāṣā develops its own interpretation.

For lists of the various groups or masters cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, see Watanabe (1954) 83ff., 373ff.; Yamada (1959) 84ff.; Shizutani (1978) 136ff.

On vībhāṣā in grammatical literature, see Wezler (1975) 6ff. The mahā- 'great' in the title *Mahāvibhāṣā is used to distinguish this work as a larger revision of earlier Vībhāṣā compendia; the title, therefore, is not to be construed as directly taken from the grammatical term, mahāvibhāṣā, explained (see Wezler (1975) 7) as an option that has great, that is, comprehensive validity.

For a French translation of the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra, see van den Broeck (1977). For a Sanskrit reconstruction from the Chinese, see Śānti Bhikṣu Śāstrī (1953). Sakurabe Hajime (Sakurabe (1969a) 57ff.) places the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra between the Jñānaprasthāna and the *Mahāvibhāṣā. José van den Broeck (van den Broeck (1977) 81) sees the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra as consciously modelled on, or as an adaptation of, Dharmārṣī's *Abhidharmahrdaya and suggests a dating contemporaneous with, or slightly after the *Mahāvibhāṣā. Cf. Frauwallner (1971a) 71; de Jong (1980a). For a review of Japanese scholarly opinions concerning the relative dating of the *Abhidharmahrdaya and the *Mahāvibhāṣā, see Kawamura (1974) 39ff.

For a character and possible sectarian affiliation of the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvaśāstra, see Kawamura (1974) 39ff. As connected with the Sarvāstivādin sect, possibly a non-Kāśmīra lineage, see Watanabe (1954) 16ff.; 48ff.; Yamada (1959) 401ff., 413ff.; Sakurabe (1969a) 54, 87ff. For its dating see Watanabe (1954) 205, 215, 245ff. For structural and topical similarities of the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvaśāstra to the Jñānaprasthāna and the possibility that it represents the same or a slightly later stage of development,
2. Notes


For a translation of the Chinese translation, see van Velthem (1977). For a study and translation of the Tibetan translation, see Sakurabe (1975b). For Uigur fragments, see Kudara (1974); Kudara (1980). Whereas the Tibetan tradition leaves this text anonymous, the Chinese translation is attributed to a Se-chien-ti-lo (Skandhila 7): K'ai-yuan Shih-chiao lu T 55 (2154) 8 p. 557bl. P'u-kuang and Fa-pao (P'u-kuang 1 p. 11a20ff.; Fa-pao 1 p. 457c26ff.) report that Vasubandhu, after slipping into Kaśmīra under an assumed name, studied under this Se-chien-ti-lo who was Saṅghabhadra's own teacher. Despite the uncertainty of this tradition, Sakurabe Hajime (Sakurabe 1975b 123ff.) suggests that the Abhidharmavatārasāstra precedes, or is roughly contemporaneous with, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

76 For translations of Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya, see Willemen (1975); Armelin (1978); review by de Jong (1980b). The title has been reconstructed either as *Abhidharma-sāra (de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) introduction liii; Frauwallner (1971a) 71ff.), or as *Abhidhara-hṛdayā (Nanjio (1883) no. 1287, no. 1288, no. 1294 p. 283; Kimura (1937) 282; Willemen (1975)). For a summary of various views concerning the dating of Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya, Upāsānta's *Abhidharmahṛdaya, and Dharmatrāta's *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra relative to the Viibhāṣa compendia, see Kawamura (1974) 40ff.; Willemen (1975) vff.; de Jong (1980b) 152ff. Contrary to the view of the tradition, Yamada Ryūjō suggests that Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya is not a summary of the Viibhāṣa, but rather anticipates and, therefore, precedes it. He also notes that the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra gives evidence of familiarity with or influence from a Viibhāṣa. Kawamura Kōshō (Kawamura (1974) 42ff., esp. 50), after a comparative study of key doctrinal points in the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra and Hsūn-tsong's translation of the *Maḥāviibhāṣa, concludes that the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra, if it was indeed familiar with and therefore succeeded a Viibhāṣa, must have depended upon a Viibhāṣa other than the *Maḥāviibhāṣa translated by Hsūn-tsong. See also Yamada (1959) 428ff. This question is significant in determining whether the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra, like Dharmaśrī's and Upāsānta's *Abhidharmahṛdayas, represents the Kaśmīra or a non-Kaśmīra, possibly Gāndhāra, Sarvāstivādin lineage. See Kimura (1937) 299ff.; Watanabe (1954) 135; Yamada (1959) 83, 113, 429.

77 See Willemen (1975) xxivff.


80 Other Abhidharma style texts in Chinese translation would include: *Loka-pra-jñāntyabhidharma T 32 (1644); *Catuhṣatuṣṭayāsāstra T 32 (1647); *Sammatījñāntikayāsāstra T 32 (1649) (see also Venkataramanan (1953)). For a listing of texts, which are no longer extant, from the Ch'u san-tsang chi chi, see Kawamura (1974) 20. Cf. Fukuhara (1965) 518ff.

81 For a study and translation of sections of the *Tattva-siddhiṣṭāstra, as well as a discussion of its sectarian affiliation, see Katsura (1974); see also Fukuhara (1969). For a reconstruction of the original Sanskrit from the Chinese and an English translation of that reconstruction, see Aiyaswami Sastri (1975), Aiyaswami Sastri (1978). For the Sanskrit title of the text as *Tattva-siddhiṣṭāstra or *Satya-siddhiṣṭāstra, see Katsura (1974) 1.


83 For a discussion of techniques of argument in Abhidharma, see Cox (1992b).

84 See Yamada (1959) 84; Katō Junshō (1989) 68ff., 98.

85 See Hirakawa (1973) 181, 406.

86 This view is expressed in the Chinese tradition by K'uei-chi who identifies the Dārṣṭāntikas as a sub-group of the Sautrāntikas; the Sautrāntikas, he claims, take the Dārṣṭāntika position as their accepted doctrine. He states that the Sautrāntikas
simply did not exist in the early period of the master, Kumāralāṭa, whom he dates to a period one hundred years after the Buddha's final nirvāṇa. Instead, K'uei-chi claims, the Sautrāntikas emerged only four hundred years after the Buddha's final nirvāṇa. See *Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu-chi* T 43 (1830) 2 p. 274a13ff. P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 16 p. 252b19) uses the two terms appositionally and, therefore, suggests their identity. He (P'u-kuang 2 p. 35c4ff.) also identifies Kumāralāṭa—according to K'uei-chi, the founder of the Dārśāntikas—as the founder of the Sautrāntikas. Yāsomitra (*SAKV* p. 400.17, p. 392.21) identifies the Dārśāntikas as a variety of the Sautrāntikas. Cf. Katō Junshō (1989) 97ff.

87 See Katō Junshō (1989), which also includes articles published previously. See also a review by Fukuda (1989).
88 See *Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu-chi* T 43 (1830) 2 p. 358a9ff.
89 See *SAKV* p. 698.10ff.: evam dṛṣṭāntam upanysya dārśāntikam upadarśayann āha.
90 See Katō Junshō (1989) 70ff.
91 See Katō Junshō (1989) 73.
94 Certain scholars interpret the appearance of sutamitka, sutatika, or sutatikini in inscriptions from Bharhut and Sāfci dating from the second century B.C. as evidence of the existence of the Sautrāntika school in this early period: for example, Kawamura (1974) 16ff. Étienne Lamotte (Lamotte (1958) 164, 582; see also Shizutani (1978) 46), however, suggests that these terms simply indicate those who specialize in the collection of sūtras. A reference to the Sautrāntikas is similarly rejected by the editors of the Bharhut inscriptions. See Liiders (1963) 33 note 8.
95 See Katō Junshō (1989) 74ff.
96 See Katō Junshō (1989) 78ff. The agreement is clear in twelve of seventeen cases and can be easily demonstrated in another four. In only one case is Vasubandhu's view left completely unclear, and in that case Vasubandhu registers his skepticism concerning the Sarvāstivādin view through his use of the term kila.
97 See Przyluski (1931–1932) 18; Przyluski (1940) 250.
98 See *NAS* 1 p. 332a18ff., esp. p. 332a24ff.; Katō Junshō (1989) 98. In this passage, Saṅghabhadra first attributes a position to the Dārśāntikas and then criticizes them for not accepting all sūtras as authoritative. He concludes with the rhetorical question: “How can they (presumably the Dārśāntikas just criticized) be called Sautrāntikas—[that is, since they do not accept the sūtras that I have just quoted as authoritative]?” Though Katō cites this passage as simply one example of the identification of Dārśāntikas with Sautrāntikas in the *Nyāyānusāra*, I am unable to find another case. Another possible source for this conclusion that Saṅghabhadra identifies the Dārśāntikas and the Sautrāntikas would be Saṅghabhadra’s juxtaposition of Sthavira’s views with references to either the Dārśāntikas or Sautrāntikas. See infra, the discussion of Sthavira in this section.
99 See *SAKV* p. 400.17, p. 392.21.
100 See *AKB* 3.32b p. 146.3ff.; *SAKV* p. 307.17, who identifies the speaker in this passage as Śrīlāṭa; *NAS* 34 p. 538a29ff. See also *SAKV* p. 11.29ff., where the Sautrāntikas are defined as follows: “Those who take the sūtra as the standard, or the valid authority (pramāṇa), not the śāstra, they are Sautrāntikas.” ye sūtrapramāṇikā na śātrapramāṇikāḥ te sautrāntikāḥ. Here also Yāsomitra states that though the Sautrāntikas do not accept the sūtras as a standard or a valid authority, they can nonetheless be said to have an abhidharma collection—that is, texts that are declared to be varieties of sūtra, such as the *Arthaviniścayasastra*, in which the characteristics of factors are described. See also *NAS* 1 p. 329c 20ff., 1 p. 332a23ff. P'u-kuang 2 p. 35c6ff.
2. Notes


103 For the probable identity of Sthavira as the Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika master, Śrīlāta, see Katō Junshō (1989) 52ff., and his earlier articles, Katō Junshō (1976), Katō Junshō (1980).


105 See, for example, NAS 22 p. 463b11ff., esp. 22 p. 463b29ff. See also infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403a12ff., 13 p. 406b1ff.

106 For what would appear to be Sanghabhadra’s reference to his own text, see ABPS 1 p. 777a1ff.


108 On Kumāralāta and his works, a subject of considerable scholarly controversy, see Hahn (1985) 255–256, Hahn (1983), which refers to earlier studies.


110 Lambert Schmithausen (Schmithausen (1987b) 370–371, and note 307) doubts that the Sautrāntikas ever existed as an independent sect, defined as a Vinaya group. For major doctrinal points upon which the Dārṣṭāntikas are opposed to the Sarvāstivādins, see Yamada (1959) 430; Katō Junshō (1976a) 188.


114 Fukuda Takumi (Fukuda (1989) 48–49) questions whether the creation of this Sautrāntika perspective opposed to Abhidharma should be attributed to Śrīlāta and whether Śrīlāta should be identified as Vasubandhu’s teacher. The passage (NAS 25 p. 483a5) that Katō Junshō uses to support his thesis juxtaposes a criticism of Sthavira, or Śrīlāta—“Sthavira’s statement is completely unreasonable”—with the following statement: “Further, the Sūtra master relates his own teacher(s)’s interpretation of the two-part [dependent origination formula]....” Katō then identifies Vasubandhu’s “own teacher(s)” with the immediately prior Śrīlāta. However, Fukuda suggests that these two should be distinguished. Indeed, Saṅghabhadra’s reference to Śrīlāta here concludes his attempted demonstration of the unreasonableness of Śrīlāta’s interpretation that began earlier in this passage (NAS 25 p. 482c14ff.). This reference to Śrīlāta would then appear to be definitely connected to the prior and only possibly to the subsequent discussion. Further, Saṅghabhadra’s subsequent (NAS 25 p. 483a10ff.) description of the views of these “teacher(s)” is the same as that attributed to the acāryāḥ in the Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya (AKB 3.28a–b p. 139.12ff.), who are then identified by Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 298.18ff.) as pūrvacāryāḥ. In the analogous passage in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu (AKB 3.28a–b p. 139.15ff.) attributes a different interpretation of the two-part formula of dependent origination to “others” (apare), whom Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 298.23ff.) identifies as Bhadanta Śrīlāta. In the course of the prior argument in the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 25 p. 482aff., 25 p. 482ff.) still two other interpretations are attributed to Śrīlāta. The interpretation associated with Śrīlāta by Yaśomitra is attributed to his followers in the prior argument in the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 25 p. 482c3) and to Śrīlāta himself elsewhere in the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 15 p. 419a8ff.). Given the difficulty presented by these various, sometimes conflicting attributions, it would then appear that this passage alone does not constitute sufficient evidence to identify Śrīlāta.
as Vasubandhu's direct "teacher."

115 See NAS 3 p. 347b6ff., 11 p. 390a14ff., esp. 11 p. 390b21, 14 p. 412c9, esp. 14 p. 412c24, 18 p. 441a25ff., 25 p. 482c1. It should be noted that Sanghabhadra recognizes variation in opinion among the Dārštāntikas. For example, he refers to "one group of Dārštāntikas." NAS 66 p. 703a5. There is also evidence of differences between Śrīlāta's views and those attributed to the Dārštāntikas—for example, on the question of the nature and number of thought concomitants, or the theory of seeds and the theory of the subsidiary element proposed as explanatory models for causation or action. See Katō Junshō (1989) 198ff., 245ff.


Chapter 3

Vasubandhu and Sañghabhadra

3.1 Vasubandhu and Sañghabhadra

Tradition directly links the life of Sañghabhadra to that of Vasubandhu because of the direct dependence of Sañghabhadra’s only compositions upon Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa. Thus, the scholarly controversy surrounding the identity and dates of the early Indian Buddhist master who composed the Abhidharmakośa also inevitably affects our knowledge of Sañghabhadra.¹ This controversy is sparked by contradictory evidence for the dating of Vasubandhu, evidence that would support either a fourth or fifth century A.D. date.² Some scholars have attempted to resolve this contradiction by suggesting that there were two Vasubandhus: one, the brother of Asaṅga and reportedly a convert to Mahāyāna, who lived in the fourth century; the other, an Ābhidhārmika who wrote the Abhidharmakośakārīka and Bhāṣya and lived in the fifth century.³ Others, however, would preserve the traditional view of a single Vasubandhu.⁴ Since there is, as yet, insufficient evidence to settle this controversy, it seems best to accept tentatively a date for Vasubandhu in the late fourth or early fifth century A.D. Sañghabhadra, as Vasubandhu’s contemporary would then be dated to approximately the same period.

Biographical information concerning Sañghabhadra and his two works is found in the biography of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha, the records of Hsüan-tsang’s and I-ching’s travels to India, the biography of Hsüan-tsang, and Tibetan histories.⁵ These sources represent three basic versions: that of Paramārtha, that of Hsüan-tsang, and that of Bu-ston. According to Paramārtha’s biography of Vasubandhu, the Abhidharmakośakārīka was
written one verse a day in conjunction with Vasubandhu's study of and lectures on the *Vibhāṣā* while at home in Ayodhya. Upon completing six hundred verses, Vasubandhu sent them to the Ābhiddhārmikas of Kāśmīra, who received his composition in verse with approbation but also requested a prose commentary. Vasubandhu then composed a commentary—the *Bhāṣya*—but in it he frequently criticized Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin positions. Paramārtha next relates that a grammarian, Vasurāta, living in Ayodhya attacked the composition of the *Abhidharmakośa* on grammatical grounds; this attack prompted a counter refutation by Vasubandhu of a grammatical treatise. Vasurāta then sent for Saṅghabhādha, who was living in central India, and invited him to come to Ayodhya to refute Va­subandhu. Saṅghabhādha composed two treatises: the *Kuang san-mo-yeh lun* ("Illumination of the Doctrine") in 10,000 verses, through which he intended simply to clarify the doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā*; and the *Sui shih lun* ("In Accordance with the Truth") in 120,000 verses, through which he attempted to establish the doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā* by refuting Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Saṅghabhādha next requested a debate with Vasubandhu, who, secure in the correctness of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, declined pleading lack of interest and old age.

Hsüan-tsang records that Saṅghabhādha was a Kāśmīra monk, learned in the Sarvāstivādin *Vibhāṣāśāstra*. After Vasubandhu wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in which he criticized the *Vibhāṣā* compendia, Saṅghabhādha read it and resolved to refute it. He spent twelve years writing a *Chü-she pao lun* ("Hail Stones upon the Abhidharmakośa") in 25,000 verses or 800,000 words. He then requested that his disciples take his treatise and go with him to refute Vasubandhu. When Vasubandhu, then in Śākala, heard of the approach of Saṅghabhādha and his disciples, he left claiming that the Buddhist masters in Śākala were not of sufficient knowledge to serve as judges in a debate on intricate points of doctrine. Soon after arriving in Śākala, Saṅghabhādha fell ill and, being unable to pursue Vasubandhu further, wrote a self-effacing letter asking only that Vasubandhu not destroy his treatise, the *Chü-she pao lun*. Saṅghabhādha then died at a small monastery south of Śākala, and his remains were placed in a burial mound (*stūpa*) built adjacent to the monastery. Vasubandhu received Saṅghabhādha's letter and treatise and confident of the superiority of his own treatise, the *Abhidharmakośa*, granted Saṅghabhādha's request. However, Vasubandhu claimed that Saṅghabhādha's treatise actually served to clarify the position of his own school and renamed it the *Shun cheng-li lun*, or "Conformance to Correct Principle."

According to Bu-ston's history, Vasubandhu studied Abhidharma texts under Saṅghabhādha in Kaśmīra and became a master of the Abhidharma. After leaving Kaśmīra, Vasubandhu returned to Nālandā where his brother,
3.2 Their Works

Asaṅga, lived. Saṅghabhadra approved the verses of Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośakārikā*, but requested that Vasubandhu write an explanatory commentary. When Saṅghabhadra received Vasubandhu’s *Bhāṣya* he felt compelled to respond with his own refutation. Upon hearing of Saṅghabhadra’s refutation, Vasubandhu, thinking it unwise to confront his former teacher, left for Nepal. Saṅghabhadra went to Nālandā with a large group of disciples, but died soon after his arrival.⁹

These accounts of the relationship between Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu, though differing considerably in details, share certain points. All three versions agree that Saṅghabhadra was a native of Kaśmīra while Vasubandhu was not, that both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra were knowledgeable in Abhidharma, that Vasubandhu composed a work, which was, at least in part, critical of the *Vibhāṣā*, and that Saṅghabhadra wrote a refutation of Vasubandhu’s work. These very general common points conform to the textual record that remains, even though it is not yet possible to verify these or other points in any of the accounts.

3.2 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *Nyāyānusāra*, and the *Abhidharmaśāmyapradīpikā*

According to the traditional biographical accounts, Vasubandhu composed at least the verses of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* as a compendium of Kaśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine. Indeed, Vasubandhu concludes the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* with the declaration that he has presented these Abhidharma doctrines from the perspective of the Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣika masters.¹⁰ It is then in his prose explanation—the *Bhāṣya*—that Vasubandhu often diverges from Kaśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika positions in order to present his own views. Saṅghabhadra’s two texts then represent an attempt to reestablish what he understands to be Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy by refuting what he judges to be erroneous interpretations in Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary. Saṅghabhadra’s purposes and method are described in his introduction to the *Abhidharmaśāmyapradīpikā*:

By means of extensive explanations that conform to correct principle, I will counter the accepted positions of other schools and manifest the fundamental meaning.

When the *Sūtra* master’s statements conform to reasoned argument and scriptural authority, I will reproduce them as they are and not attempt to refute them.
[However,] if they contradict the basic purport of the Abhidharmakosa or the sūtras in any way, I am determined to scrutinize them further and vow to purge them.

The treatise I have already composed is entitled "Conformance to Correct Principle;" it is to be studied by those who delight in meticulous analysis.

Due to the prolixity of its style and the subtlety of its investigations, it cannot be understood without considerable effort.

In order to condense it and make it easy to understand, I have written this brief treatise entitled "Illumination of the Doctrine." I will preserve the verses of my former treatise, taking them as the foundation, but I will omit the extensive judgments in the reasoned arguments.

In contrast to the Sūtra master's erroneous explanations, I will present the correct interpretation and will manifest the true and extraordinary meaning of the accepted doctrines of our school.

Thus, in both texts, Saṅghabhadra intends to "correct" Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhāṣya by indicating those sections that deviate from the fundamental teaching of the Abhidharma, which, for Saṅghabhadra, is determined by the Vibhāṣa compendia. However, the *Nyāyānusāra and the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā differ in their approach. In both texts, Saṅghabhadra follows Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośakārikā, adopting its verses with minimal emendations. However, the *Nyāyānusāra is almost three times longer than the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and contains lengthy refutations of doctrinal interpretations offered by Vasubandhu and others whether or not they are cited in Vasubandhu's text. By contrast, the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā omits these explicit refutations and, thus, can be understood as Saṅghabhadra's own exposition of what he considers to be orthodox Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

In the *Nyāyānusāra, Saṅghabhadra refers to Vasubandhu by the appellation ching-chu, literally, "Sūtra master." Some have suggested that this reflects Saṅghabhadra's identification of Vasubandhu as a Sautrāntika. However, a quotation from the *Nyāyānusāra in Sthiramati's commentary on the Abhidharmakośa suggests that the Sanskrit equivalent is Sutrakāra. This could refer to Vasubandhu's role as author of the sūtra, in this case the kārikā of the Abhidharmakośa, or it could be used with sarcasm, suggesting Vasubandhu's lack of familiarity with Buddhist scripture.
The *Nyāyānusāra also gives evidence of sophisticated methods of argumentation in refuting the views of Vasubandhu and others. Those commentarial sections in which Vasubandhu simply elaborates upon the kārikās in accordance with Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka interpretations are often reproduced verbatim without comment. However, Vasubandhu’s interpretations that deviate from Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka positions are treated quite harshly. After quoting the objectionable passage, Saṅghabhadra uses two methods to challenge Vasubandhu’s position. The first is the citation of passages from scripture (sūtra, āgama) that either support the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka position or contradict Vasubandhu’s own interpretation. Scripture is acknowledged to be an independent authority in argument. As a result, a simple mention in scripture of a factor or a doctrinal point is sufficient to ensure its validity and demand its acceptance; any contradiction of scripture in argument or rejection of something mentioned in scripture is inadmissible. Despite this insistence that scripture—meaning the texts of the sūtra or āgama—is an authority, the sūtra references cited in many passages from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and counter-arguments in the *Nyāyānusāra can be traced to sections on the same topic in the Vibhāṣā compendia. This indicates the significance of the Vibhāṣā compendia as a definitive and complete doctrinal source and suggests that perhaps neither Vasubandhu nor Saṅghabhadra consulted the sūtra collection itself for their authoritative scriptural references. There is also ample evidence in the *Nyāyānusāra that not all schools accepted the authenticity of the same scriptural or sūtra collection or of Abhidharma in general in this period. This variety of rival sūtra collections would appear to undercut or at least challenge the efficacy of attempts to buttress interpretations through an appeal to scriptural authority.

The second method used by Saṅghabhadra to challenge Vasubandhu’s position is reasoned argument (yukti). Such reasoned arguments appear in several different forms including attempted demonstrations of contradiction with scripture or of self-contradiction. Most frequent, however, are arguments in negative conditional form asserting that certain accepted doctrines would be undermined if the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka position were not accepted or, conversely, Vasubandhu’s interpretations were accepted. The difficulty of the *Nyāyānusāra lies in the difficulty of its reasoned arguments, which presume familiarity with the entire system of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka doctrine and often hinge upon a subtle distinction or an obscure doctrinal detail. The arguments are convincing as long as the Abhidharma framework within which they operate is understood and provisionally accepted. Though the specific arguments themselves may seem obscure and often trivial, the underlying themes are fundamental to the Buddhist world view. The themes to which Saṅghabhadra’s arguments always return in-
clude the nature of mental processes, the explanation of and justification for experienced continuity in the context of the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, the nature of causal relations, modes of existence and, finally, the nature of real existence and reliable methods of determining it.

Though the primary object of Saṅghabhadra’s criticism in the *Nyāyānusāra is Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, others such as the Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika master, Sthavira, figure significantly among his opponents. Thus, the *Nyāyānusāra is not simply a refutation of the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, but rather is a broad-based attempt to defend Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine against the objections of all opponents. Though Saṅghabhadra’s interpretations are generally consistent with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position, specifically as presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, he is influenced by Vasubandhu’s criticisms and attempts to re-formulate many Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika positions in response to them. Saṅghabhadra’s examination of the conditioned forces dissociated from thought offers several key examples of his innovations. For example, his explication of the dynamics of the possession and abandonment of defilements in the discussion of possession (prāṇa), his determination of the criteria of existence and his theory of activity (kārītra) and of capability (sāmarthya) in the discussion of the four characteristics of conditioned factors, and his theory of the interdependency of conception (saṁjñā) and name (nāma) in the production of language all illustrate Saṅghabhadra’s creativity in interpretation. In methods of argumentation also, Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra, though influenced by the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, represents a distinct advance over previous Abhidharma texts. For these reasons, Saṅghabhadra’s works mark a turning point in the development of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika thought; as a result, Saṅghabhadra is acknowledged as the inaugurator of the so-called “neo-Vaibhāṣika” period.

The Works of Saṅghabhadra

Paramārtha’s biography of Vasubandhu and Hsuan-tsang’s records refer to Saṅghabhadra’s two works under four different titles. The Chiū-she pao lun, or “Hail Stones upon the Abhidharmakośa,” the Shun cheng-li lun, or “Conformance to Correct Principle,” and the Suī shih lun, or “In Accordance with the Truth,” all apparently correspond to the *Nyāyānusāra. This *Nyāyānusāra is not extant in Sanskrit and was apparently not translated into Tibetan; only the Chinese translation by Hsuan-tsang is extant. However, citations from the *Nyāyānusāra in Sthiramati’s, Pūrṇavardhana’s, and Yaśomitra’s commentaries on the Abhidharmakośa, as well as in the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā preserve some of the original Sanskrit. The re-
constructed title, *Nyāyānusāraśāstra, is suggested by Nanjio and is supported by Kudara Kögi on the basis of fragments of a Uigur extract. The fourth title among works attributed to Saṅghabhadra, the Kuang sanmo-yeh lun, or "Illumination of the Doctrine," undoubtedly corresponds to Saṅghabhadra’s shorter text also extant only in Chinese translation. The original Sanskrit title of this work is still debated. The title offered by Hsüan-tsang is A-p'i-ta-mo hsiien tsung lun. The phrase sanmo-yeh in Paramārtha’s reference would appear to be a transliteration of the Sanskrit samaya, meaning, in this case, “accepted doctrine” and corresponding to tsung in Hsüan-tsang’s title. Identifying the equivalent of kuang in Paramārtha’s title or of hsiien’ in Hsüan-tsang’s is more difficult. Takakusu Junjirō, following Wogihara Unrai’s suggestion, proposes pradrīpikā and gives the original Sanskrit title as Abhidharmapiṭaka-(A-p'i-ta-mo tsang)-samayapraḍīpikā-(hsien tsung)-śāstra-(lun). Louis de La Vallée Poussin suggests prakāśa or dyotana as equivalents for hsiien’. Nanjio Bunyiu, however, offers the title Abhidharmapiṭakapraṇaraṇaśāstra. The determination of the Sanskrit title is complicated still further by a Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit work attributed to a Saṅghabhadra, entitled Abhidharmakośakārikāśāstraḥ. Though initially assumed to be Saṅghabhadra’s shorter work, this Tibetan commentary would appear to be simply a brief summary of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośaḥ and Bhāṣya.

The Works of Saṅghabhadra—Chinese Translations

Both Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra and his *Abhidharmasamayapraḍīpikā were translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang, who also translated many other Sarvāstivādān Abhidharma texts. Among the texts translated by Hsüan-tsang are Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya, which had been translated previously in 563 A.D. by Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang began his translation of both the *Abhidharmasamayapraḍīpikā and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 651 A.D. Completing his translation of the *Abhidharmasamayapraḍīpikā in 652 A.D., Hsüan-tsang began the translation of the *Nyāyānusāra in 653 A.D. and finished both the *Nyāyānusāra and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 654 A.D. The multiple Chinese translations of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the existence of the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and the consistency of Hsüan-tsang’s translation of technical terms provide a basis for the study of the Abhidharma texts like the *Nyāyānusāra not extant in Sanskrit or Tibetan translation.

The method of translation employed by Hsüan-tsang was the product of several centuries of development. In the earliest period of the transla-
tion of Buddhist texts, translation involved oral recitation of a text from memory by a foreign monk who would explain (often in Chinese) the meaning to a Chinese collaborator who would then “translate” the text into Chinese. By Hsüan-tsang’s period during the T’ang dynasty, translations were produced in well-funded bureaus that could support highly specialized collaborators. Since Hsüan-tsang had studied Sanskrit, he could himself combine the roles of reciter and translator. Following the traditional method of oral translation, Hsüan-tsang translated each text aloud, but now from a written text. These oral translations were then written down by a scribe-translator (pi shou), whose tasks included not only taking dictation but also checking the meaning of the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit original and finally ensuring the intelligibility of the translation and its doctrinal consistency with Buddhist teaching. The translated text then passed through several stages of editing and correction, including primary editors (cheng i), who verified the choice of Chinese translations in order to prevent mistakes in meaning, stylists (chui wen), who refined the Chinese composition, editors of transliteration (tzu hsüeh), who checked transliterations from Sanskrit, and the Sanskrit editors (cheng fan-yü fan-wen), who ensured consistency of the Chinese translation of terms with the Sanskrit.

Among these various specialists, the role of scribe-translator (pi shou) and primary editor (cheng i) were most important; both roles demanded a thorough knowledge of Buddhist doctrine and some knowledge of Sanskrit. Among these scribe-translators and primary editors of translations of Abhidharma texts were several disciples of Hsüan-tsang who were later to write commentaries on the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and *Nyāyānusāra. P’u-kuang, a scribe-translator, Shen-t’ai, a primary editor, and Fa-pao, a disciple of Hsüan-tsang who was later to serve as a primary editor, all wrote commentaries on the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya. Yüan-yü, the primary scribe-translator for both the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and the *Nyāyānusāra, also wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyanusāra. Since Shen-t’ai, Fa-pao, and P’u-kuang worked closely with Hsüan-tsang, their commentaries undoubtedly contain interpretations of the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and *Nyāyānusāra offered by Hsüan-tsang himself and may well represent interpretations that Hsüan-tsang received in India. In an attempt to clarify the points of disagreement between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya also cite the *Nyāyānusāra frequently, often referring to Yüan-yü’s own commentary on it. Thus, they are a valuable source for the study of the *Nyāyānusāra.
Notes

1 Takakusu (1905b); Peri (1911); Takakusu (1929); Kimura (1929); Ono (1929); Frauwallner (1951); Jaini (1958b); Wayman (1961) 19ff.; Hirakawa (1973) iiff.; Katō Junshō (1989) 62ff. For a summary of this controversy, see Hall (1983) 13ff.

2 A fifth century date for Vasubandhu is supported by Paramārtha's biography, which associates Vasubandhu with the patronage of a Vikramāditya and a Bālāditya, both of whom could possibly be identified with fifth century Gupta rulers. See P'o-sou-p'an-tou Fa-shih chuan T 50 (2049) p. 189c21-22, p. 190b18-19; Takakusu (1904) 283, 288. A fourth century date is supported by the ascription of certain works translated by Kumarajīva (d. 409 A.D.) to Vasubandhu. See Frauwallner (1951) 35ff.


4 See Jaini (1958b). Still others would reject Erich Frauwallner's distinction between Vasubandhu as a Mahāyāna convert and Vasubandhu as the author of the Abhidharmakosākārikā and Bhāṣya, but accept the possibility of multiple Vasubandhus: Wayman (1961) 21; Hirakawa (1973) ix.

5 For Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu, see P'o-sou-p'an-tou Fa-shih chuan T 50 (2049); Takakusu (1904). For the record of Hsian-tsang's travels, see Ta T'ang hsi-yü chi T 51 (2087) 3 p. 887c6ff., 4 p. 891c16ff.; Beal ([1884] 1969) 160, 192ff. Hsian-tsang's biography presents the same account: Ta T'ang Ta ts'u-en ssu San-tsang Fa-shih chuan T 50 (2053) 12 p. 232c22ff. For I-ching's travels, see Nan-hai chi-kuei nei-fa chuan T 54 (2125) 4 p. 229b15ff., 4 p. 229c19. For Bu-ston's history, see Obermiller (1931-1932) 142ff. See Kate Junshō (1989) 7ff. See also P'u-kuang 1 p. 11a20ff.; Fa-pao 1 p. 457c26ff.

6 The Kuang san-mo-yeh lun corresponds to the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā [A-p'i-ta-mo tsang hsien tsung lun] T 29 (1563), and the Sui shih lun to the *Nyāyānusārāśāstra [A-p'i-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun] T 29 (1562).

7 See P'o-sou-p'an-tou Fa-shih chuan T 50 (2049) p. 190b5ff.; Takakusu (1904) 287ff.

8 See Ta T'ang hsi-yü chi T 51 (2087) 4 p. 891c16ff.; Beal ([1884] 1969) 192ff.; Ta T'ang Ta ts'u-en ssu San-tsang Fa-shih chuan T 50 (2053) 12 p. 232c22ff. Hsian-tsang's account in these sources should be supplemented with the account of Vasubandhu's life preserved by Hsian-tsang's disciples, P'u-kuang and Fa-pao: P'u-kuang 1 p. 11a20ff.; Fa-pao 1 p. 457c26ff.

9 See Obermiller (1931-1932) 142ff.


12 *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā [A-p'i-ta-mo tsang hsien tsung lun]/ T 29 (1563).

13 See ASPŚ 1 p. 777a10ff.

14 See K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao lu T 55 (2154) 13 p. 621a1ff., which acknowledges that both of Saṅghabhadra’s texts share the same verses with the Abhidharmakośaśārikā, but offer different commentaries. For examples of verses from the Abhidharmakośaśārikā that Saṅghabhadra changes, see Sakurabe (1979) 303.

15 See de La Vallée Poussin (1936-1937a) 2, 34, passim.


18 For a review of these methods, see Cox (1992c).

19 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403b3ff., 13 p. 406c3ff.

20 See, for example, infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 411c27ff., 14 p. 413b23-24.
21 See infra, translation, *NAS* 12 p. 396c19ff.; infra, introductory commentary, "Possession and Non-possession."

22 See infra, translation, *NAS* 13 p. 405c1ff.; infra, introductory commentary, "The Four Characteristics of Conditioned Factors."

23 See infra, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 412c27ff.; infra, introductory commentary, "Name, Phrase, and Syllable."


25 For Sthiramati's *Abhidharmakośasāstra-tattvārthaśāstra*, see *Tō* 4421, P 5875; the Uigur translation has been published in facsimile by Sinai Tekin (Tekin (1970)) and partially translated by Kudara Kōgi (Kudara (1987)). Only fragments found at Tun-huang remain of the Chinese translation from which the extant Uigur translation was evidently made: see Tekin (1970) xiii, xvii–xviii, and Kudara (1987) 57. For two commentaries attributed to Pūrṇavardhana, both entitled *Abhidharmakośākāśāstra-nārāyaṇaśāstra*, see *Tō* 4093, P 5594; *Tō* 4096, P 5597. For Yasomitra's *Sphutārtha Abhidharmakośadvākāśāstra*, see Dwarikadas Shasti (1982). For a list of Yasomitra's citations from the *Nyāyānusāra*, see Sasaki (1958) 349–350. For a series of studies of Sthiramati's references, see, for example, Matsunami (1982); Matsunami (1984); Matsunami (1985). See also Katō Junshō (1989) 15.


27 See Takakusu (1905c) 158; Takakusu (1905a) 134.


29 See Nanjio (1883) no. 1266 p. 278.

30 *Tō* 4091, P 5592. See Cordier (1909, 1915) 394–395, where this text is attributed to either Vīnātabhadra or Saṅgamabhadra.


35 *A-p'i-ta-mo chü-shie lun T 29* (1558). For the kārikās alone also translated by Hsüan-tsang, see *A-p'i-ta-mo chü-shie she lun pen sung T 29* (1560).

36 *A-p'i-ta-mo chü-shie shih lun T 29* (1559). See also *K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao lu* T 55 (2154) 7 p. 545c20ff. Paramārtha's translation is very literal, following both the syntax as well as the verse and introductory divisions of the extant Sanskrit. Hsüan-tsang combines the parts of each verse, which in the Sanskrit had been interspersed with commentary, and includes summary or introductory sentences to ease transitions in the commentary from one verse section to another. He also frequently adds explanatory sentences and references that present his understanding of assumptions underlying doctrinal arguments. Despite Hsüan-tsang's deviation from the original by rearrangement and interpolation, his consistency in the translation of technical terms among different scholastic texts...
provides a basis from which we can recover, at least in part, the vocabulary of the original.

37 See Ch'en (1960) 181; Tso (1963) 266ff.; de Jong (1979c) 89ff.


39 For P'u-kuang's commentary, see Chū-shê lun chi T 41 (1821). P'u-kuang served as scribe-translator for the Vijñānakāya, the *Mahāvihāra, the Dharmaśāstra, and the Prakaraṇapāda, and many other non-Abhidharma texts: K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao lu T 55 (2154) 8 p. 557a8ff. For Shen-t'ai's commentary, see Chū-shê lun shu, in Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō 1.83.3–4. Shen-t'ai was one of only five monks to work with Hsüan-tsang throughout Hsüan-tsang's period of translation. For Fa-pao's commentary, see Chū-shê lun shu T 41 (1822). Fa-pao served as primary editor, for example, in the translation of the Lankāvatārasūtra and, later under I-ching, of vinaya texts: K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao lu T 55 (2154) 9 p. 566a25, 9 p. 568c5.

40 For Yüan-yü's commentary, only partially extant, see Shun chêng-li lun shu-wen chi, in Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō. 1.83.3.
Part II

Introductory Commentaries
Chapter 4

Conditioned Forces
Dissociated from Thought

In the Abhidharma doctrinal analyses and taxonomies of experienced phenomena, the conditioned forces dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra) and, in particular, their nature, function, and existential status became major points of disagreement among the early Buddhist schools. The importance of the dissociated forces as a focus for later scholastic Buddhist controversies is indicated by Sañghabhadrā in the introduction to his *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā. As an illustration of the range of disagreement among the schools, Sañghabhadrā lists forty-four topics of controversy, six of which directly concern the conditioned forces dissociated from thought.¹

The isolation of each of the conditioned forces dissociated from thought as a discrete factor and the establishment of the independent category of dissociated forces contributed to significant changes in traditional Buddhist taxonomies and was instrumental in the emergence of a new classification of all factors into five groups. Though the separate category of dissociated forces is not mentioned in the sūtras, both the category of forces dissociated from thought and the individual factors belonging to that category are mentioned in the earliest northern Indian Abhidharma texts.² The two categories of “dissociated” and “associated” are also used in the twofold classificatory schemata (mahātikā) of the Theravādin Abhidhamma tradition. For example, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi classifies all factors (dhamma) as associated with or dissociated from causes (hetu), the fluxes (āsava), thought (citta), and so on.³ Though the phrase ‘dissociated from thought’ (cittavipayutta) appears in the Theravādin classifications, unlike the corresponding phrase cittaviprayukta in northern Indian Abhidharma texts, it does not de-
note a separate category of discrete factors. The Dhammasaṅgaṇī specifies cittavippayutta as follows: “Form and nibbāna—these are the factors dissociated from thought.”\(^4\) By contrast, the Prakaraṇapāda, in its own twofold classificatory schema of factors as associated or dissociated, specifies the term ‘dissociated factors’ as denoting not only form and the unconditioned factors, which are dissociated from thought, but also the separate category of conditioned forces dissociated from thought.\(^5\) The explanations of ‘dissociated factors’ in these two texts indicate that in Theravādin texts cittavippayutta signifies dissociation from thought alone and, in contrast to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma tradition, does not also imply the possibility of dissociation from both thought (citta) and form (rūpa). These explanations also demonstrate that it was only within northern Indian Abhidharma texts that the conditioned forces dissociated from thought were extended from a simple descriptive classification to a distinct category of discrete factors.

This newly established category of discrete factors dissociated from both thought and form presented a challenge to the traditional methods of classifying all experienced phenomena. The traditional lists of the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve sense spheres (āyatana), and name and form (nāmarūpa) were ill-suited to incorporate factors that are neither thought nor form, nor associated with either. For example, the Dharmaskandha subsumes the factors dissociated from thought within the forces aggregate (saṃskāraskandha) by dividing it into the two subgroups of associated and dissociated.\(^6\) The traditional sense of the forces aggregate (saṃskāraskandha) as referring to mental factors, predominantly volition (cetanā), was thus expanded through the addition of the non-mental dissociated factors.\(^7\) The inclusion of these dissociated forces within the saṃskāraskandha contributed to a certain tension in the meaning of the term saṃskāra evident in later Abhidharma discussions of the term, which the translation chosen here of ‘forces’ attempts to reflect.\(^8\)

The challenge presented by these discrete dissociated forces contributed significantly to the creation of new taxonomies: specifically, the new fivefold taxonomy of form (rūpa), thought (citta), thought concomitants (caitta), dissociated forces (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra), and unconditioned factors (asaṃskṛtadharma). Unlike the earlier classifications according to the five aggregates or the twelve sense spheres, which appear to have been motivated by an attempt to demonstrate non-self and impermanence, this new fivefold taxonomy reflects a concern for completeness, an interest in classification for its own sake, and a desire to demonstrate the individual, distinctive characteristic of each of the factors classified.\(^9\) This fivefold taxonomy is traced by the tradition to the Abhidhārmika, Vasumitra,\(^10\) and indeed, it is the first
4.1 Name ‘Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought’

The name ‘conditioned forces dissociated from thought’ (cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra) was interpreted differently by the various early Buddhist schools and texts. As noted previously, Theravādin Abhidhamma texts understood the term cittavippayutta to refer to form, or to form and nibbāna; in other words, the term was descriptive referring simply to those factors that were not associated with thought. For the northern Indian Abhidharma texts, cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra was not simply a negatively descriptive category representing those factors other than thought, but rather referred to a discrete set of separately existing factors apart from both thought and form. The *Abhidharmahṛdaya makes this clear by referring to conditioned forces dissociated from thought as “not form and not associated:” “They are not form because they are not included within form; they are not associated because they are without an object-support (ālambana); they are conditioned forces because they are constructed by conditions.” Similarly, Vasubandhu states: “These conditioned forces are called ‘dissociated from thought’ because they are not associated with thought and they do not have form as their intrinsic nature.”

Saṅghabhadra presents both a general and a specific interpretation of the name ‘conditioned forces dissociated from thought’ (cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra). First, according to the general interpretation, the conditioned forces dissociated from thought include those factors that are not associated with thought, that do not share the same sense basis or the same object-support as thought, and do not arise associated with either thought or thought concomitants. In the second specific interpretation, Saṅghabhadra explains the significance of each of the members of the name cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra using a method of definition by exclusion typical of Abhidharma texts. The first member citta ‘thought’ signifies that these forces are of the same category as thought in the sense that they are not form. Since thought concomitants would also be classified as of the same category as thought,
the second member viprayukta ‘dissociated’ is added in order to exclude thought concomitants, which, by definition, are associated with thought. The unconditioned factors are of the same category as thought in the sense that they are not form and yet they, like the dissociated forces, are not associated with thought. Therefore, in order to exclude unconditioned factors, the final member saṁskāra ‘conditioned forces’ is added. Thus, the name cittaviprayuktasaṁskāra can be interpreted either as an abbreviation for rūpacittaviprayuktasaṁskāra ‘dissociated from form and thought’ or, as in Saṅghabhadrā’s interpretation, simply as (cittaviprayuktasaṁskāra), in which the initial member citta ‘thought’ can itself be understood to exclude form, thereby, obviating the need to supply rūpa ‘form’ as the first member of the compound.

4.2 Variant Lists of the Dissociated Forces

Though the category of conditioned forces dissociated from thought is attested in northern Indian Abhidharma texts of all periods, the specific factors included within the category vary. This variation is indicated by the phrase ‘and [other factors of] that type’ (ca), which is appended to the lists of conditioned forces dissociated from thought in the Dharmaskandha and the Prakaraṇapāda, and which is even found as late as the *Nyāyanusāra.18 Among the early northern Indian Abhidharma texts, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra does not include a list of factors explicitly identified as dissociated, but includes, in a list of factors that compose the factors sense sphere (dharmāyatana), several factors that are identified explicitly as dissociated forces in lists offered by other texts: namely, birth (jāti), senescence (jarā), death (marāṇa), vitality (jīvita), the equipoise of non-conception (asamjīnīsamāpatti), and the equipoise of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti).19 The Dharmaskandha presents a list of sixteen factors explicitly acknowledged to be dissociated forces, which are also found in both translations of the Prakaraṇapāda, in the Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shīh lun, and in the A-p’i-t’an wu fa hsing ching.20 These include:

1. possession (pṛāpti)
2. equipoise of non-conception (asamjīnīsamāpatti)
3. equipoise of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti)
4. state of non-conception (āsamjīnika)
5. vitality (jīvita)
6. homogeneous character (sabhāgatā)
4.2 Variant Lists

7. acquisition of the corporeal basis (*āśrayapratilābha) or acquisition of the substratum (*upadhipratilābha)

8. acquisition of the given entity (*vastuprāpti)

9. acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatanaprāpti)

10. birth (jāti)

11. senescence (jarā)

12. continuance (sthiti)

13. desinence (anityatī)

14. name set (nāmakāya)

15. phrase set (padakāya)

16. syllable set (vyañjanakāya).

In the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra, Ghoṣaka includes accompaniment (samanvāgama) rather than possession (prāpti) and adds one factor—the nature of an ordinary person (prthogjanatva)—to this list of sixteen. Dharmārī's and Upāṣanta's *Abhidharmahrdayas as well as the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdayasāstra propose fourteen factors; like the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra, these texts omit the three specific varieties of acquisition from the previous list of sixteen and add the nature of an ordinary person. The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra omits homogeneous character and adds non-possession, and instead of the fourfold group of birth, senescence, continuance, and desinence, includes birth or arising (utpāda), passing away (vyaya), change in continuance (sthityanyathātva), old age (jarā), and death (maranā). Finally, the Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya enumerate fourteen factors:

1. possession (prāpti)

2. non-possession (aprāpti)

3. equipoise of non-conception (asamjñāsamāpatti)

4. equipoise of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti)

5. state of non-conception (āsamjñīka)

6. vitality (jīvita)

7. homogeneous character (sabhāgatā)
8. birth (jāti)
9. continuance (sthiti)
10. senescence (jarā)
11. desinence (anityatā)
12. name set (nāmakāya)
13. phrase set (padakāya)
14. syllable set (vyañjanakāya),

Sāṅghabhadra accepts these fourteen factors, but claims that factors other than these fourteen should also be admitted. The additional factors may either be admitted to exist separately as discrete factors, or they may be subsumed within one of the established fourteen. As an example of the first type, Sāṅghabhadra recognizes complete assemblage (sāmagrī) as a discrete factor, thereby bringing the total number of conditioned forces dissociated from thought to fifteen. Unfortunately, Sāṅghabhadra does not indicate which of the various connotations of complete assemblage he intends. For example, sāmagrī can be used to refer to an assemblage of conditions required for the production of a given factor or to refer to the cause of the cognition of any composite object as a whole or to refer to the basis of concord in the monastic community. Whatever Sāṅghabhadra’s original intention, the commentators interpret sāmagrī in this list of dissociated forces as referring to the basis for concord in the monastic community.

As an example of the second variety of additional factors, which are not considered to exist separately but rather should be subsumed within one of the established fourteen conditioned forces dissociated from thought, Sāṅghabhadra offers varieties of possession or acquisition: namely, acquisition of the aggregates (*skandhapratilābha), and so on. The commentators indicate that acquisition of the aggregates is one of a group of three including acquisition of the elements (*dhatupratilābha), and acquisition of the sense spheres (*ayatanapratilābha). These correspond to three varieties of acquisition included in early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma lists of conditioned forces dissociated from thought: namely, acquisition of the corporeal basis (*āśrayapatilābha, *upadhipratilābha), acquisition of the given entity (*vastupratilābha), and acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatanapratilābha). Though the precise meaning of these three varieties of acquisition is unclear, they appear as a set in discussions of the process
4.3 Rationale for the Category

of rebirth and refer to those forces by which one is said to acquire the corporeal basis, elements, or sense spheres characteristic of a particular rebirth state. The term *pratilābha* is used with this sense in the *sūtra*. For example, acquiring a mode of personal existence (*atabhāvapaṭilābha*) is used as a standard idiom to describe the process of rebirth. Or, in the definitions of the twelve members of the dependent origination formula, birth (*jāti*) is explained as the appearance of the aggregates (*khandhānam pāṭubhāvo*) or the acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatanānam paṭilābho*). The Chinese translation of the *Saṁyuktāgama* as well as the *Arthavinīcāyasūtra* include in their explanations of birth the acquisition of the aggregates (*skandhapratilambha*), elements (*dhātupratilambha*), and sense spheres (*āyatanānam pratilambhaḥ*), as well as the arising of the controlling factor of vitality (*jīvitendriyasyo 'dbhavah*). Regardless of their original meaning or later function, for Sanghabhadra, these three types of acquisition are not to be recognized as separately existing forces, but rather are to be subsumed within the larger category of possession.

4.3 Rationale for the Category of Dissociated Forces

The activities of the conditioned forces dissociated from thought are extremely varied, ranging from providing a basis for homogeneity within a grouping of sentient beings to constituting the medium of syllables, names, and phrases, through which meaning is conveyed. Often for different doctrinal reasons in the case of each force, a dissociated force is proposed and its existence is accepted in order to account for some experientially accepted or doctrinally necessary activity. Furthermore, specific doctrinal constraints, again often different in each case, prohibit that force's association with either form or thought. Given the diversity of activities explained and doctrinal constraints satisfied, the category of dissociated forces appears to be a derivative category with no single integrating principle. Instead, it is a miscellany containing functionally unrelated factors that are unified only by their successful operation demanding their separation from both form and thought.

Though there is textual evidence of disagreements among the various schools on the character and activity of particular dissociated forces, the central controversy underlying and directing these discussions concerns the existential status of the individual forces, and more generally, the acceptance of the class of dissociated forces as a whole. Like all factors (*dharma*) enumerated by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiṣṇavas, the dissociated forces were
Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought

claimed to exist as real entities (dravya) by virtue of their own unique intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The existence of these factors is proven through inference from the particular activity that each performs. Each of the dissociated forces corresponds to some doctrinally required or to some generally recognized, commonly experienced activity. However, the attribution of a specific activity to a particular factor and the existential status of that discrete factor continued to be subjects of heated controversy in early northern Indian Abhidharma texts long after the dissociated forces were first proposed. For example, in the case of certain dissociated forces, even though their activities were generally acknowledged, their existence was, by some schools, considered provisional and by others, notably the Sarvāstivādins, considered real. In the case of other dissociated forces, their supposed activities were attributed to still other generally accepted factors, thereby obviating any need to posit the discrete existence of a new dissociated factor.

The category of dissociated forces, as the category of factors added most recently to the traditional taxonomies of all existent factors, provides significant clues to the development of Buddhist doctrine and the evolving importance of certain areas of doctrinal inquiry. In particular, investigations into the individual character and existential status of each of the dissociated forces can help to clarify the controversies that these dissociated forces resolved or stimulated and to reveal the logic underlying specific directions of doctrinal analysis. Such investigations can also help to indicate clearly the degree and nature of doctrinal divergence among early Buddhist exegetes as well as the religio-philosophical issues current in the larger pan-Indian sectarian context. As will become evident in Saṅghabhadra’s treatment, doctrinal elaboration of the dissociated forces represents a significant stage in the development of Buddhist psychological and soteriological models and, in particular, in the variety and complexity of Buddhist ontological and causal speculation.

Notes

1 ASPŚ 1 p. 778b12ff. These six topics are: (1) the conditioned forces dissociated from thought do not exist as discrete real entities; (2) conditioned forces dissociated from thought abide for several moments; (3) the equipoise of non-conception and the equipoise of cessation are both characterized by present thought; (4) those who die within the heaven of non-conception all fall into bad rebirth states; (5) all sentient beings lack untimely death (a controversial point raised in the discussion of vitality); (6) those who obtain factors connected to the four stages of penetration (nirvedhabhiigavya) do not fall into bad rebirth states (a controversial point raised in the discussion of the nature of an ordinary person (prthagjanatva), which is identified as a variety of non-possession).
4. Notes


3 DhS Dukamātikā p. 2–6. See also Vbh Abhidhammadāpanīya p. 12ff.

4 DhS p. 254: ṛūpaṁ ca nibbānaṁ ca ime dhāmmanā cittavippayutta. See also KV p. 447; Vbh p. 12.

5 PP (1542) 6 p. 716b8–9, (1541) 4 p. 648c29ff. See also PP (1542) 6 p. 714a24ff., (1541) 4 p. 647a5ff., where conditioned factors dissociated from thought are defined as including “form, thought, conditioned forces dissociated from thought and the unconditioned,” since thought cannot be associated with itself. See TSS 2 no. 18 p. 252a8ff., which offers both the twofold classification of factors as associated with and dissociated from thought and the threefold classification of form, thought, and factors dissociated from thought.

6 DS 10 p. 501b16ff. Similarly, the Sarīgītiparīyāya (SP 1 p. 396c6ff.) places the three unconditioned factors within the category of name in the twofold taxonomy of name and form. The Dharmaskandha (DS 10 p. 500c20ff.) includes the dissociated forces and the unconditioned factors within the factors sense sphere (dharmayatana). Cf. Vbh pp. 67, 79, 97.

7 For an examination and refutation of the view, attributed to Śrīlāta, that the samskāraskandha is limited to cetanā, see NAS 2 p. 339b14ff.

8 See MVB 25 p. 127a6ff.; VB 6 p. 458a11ff. The connotation of sarīskāra also differs depending upon its context of use. It can be used to refer to the motivations aggregate (sarīskāraskandha), in which case it includes both the thought concomitants and the dissociated forces. It can also be used to refer to all conditioned factors, including factors that are form and not form, associated and dissociated.

9 Yamada (1959) 97ff. suggests that lists of the five aggregates and the twelve sense spheres were not intended as taxonomies of all phenomena, but rather were intended to establish non-self. See also Sakurabe (1969a) 65ff.; Yamada (1959) 397ff.; Watanabe (1954) 156ff.

10 SAKV p. 167.22; *Pañcavatstukavibhāṣāstāstra T 28 (1555) p. 989b2. Among the many traditional references to a “Vasumitra” the most significant for this topic of the fivefold taxonomy include: (1) the master cited frequently in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (2) one of the four Sarvāstivādin masters who proposed interpretations of the phrase sarvam asti; (3) the author of the Prakaraṇapāda (T 26 (1541), T 26 (1542)); (4) the author of the Dhātukāya (T 26 (1540)); (5) the author of the *Pañcavatstuk; and (6) the author of the *Āryavasumitmsaavatstītiśāstra (T 28 (1549)). For discussions of these various Vasumitras, see de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) intro. p. xliiff.; Watanabe (1954) 194ff.; Yamada (1959) 391ff.; Lin (1949) 42–52; Demiéville (1958) 423–425.

11 PP (1541) 1 p. 627a9ff., (1542) 1 p. 692b23ff. See also *Pañcavatstuk [A-p‘i-t’an uwu ha hsing ching] T 28 (1557) p. 998c9–11; *Pañcavatstuk [Sa-p‘o-to-tsung uwu shih lun] T 28 (1556); and *Pañcavatstukavibhāṣāstāstra T 28 (1555), Dharmatātā’s commentary on Vasumitra’s *Pañcavatstuk (see Imanishi (1969)). The status of the Prakaraṇapāda as a compilation and its relation to other works attributed to Vasumitra such as the *Pañcavatstuk and the Dhātukāya are still unclear. However, the existence of the *Pañcavatstuk [A-p‘i-t’an uwu ha hsing ching] (T 28 (1557)), which was translated by An Shih-kao in the second century, suggests that a text espousing this fivefold analysis at some time circulated independently apart from the present Prakaraṇapāda. See Yamada (1959) 395ff.; Demiéville (1958) 425; Frauwallner (1963) 20ff.; and Ui Hakujū’s study and translation of many of the works of An Shih-kao (UI [1961] 1971) 380ff.

12 Though this fivefold taxonomy was considered the characteristic Sarvāstivādin classification of factors in China and Japan, it was only one of many methods of classification and textual organization used in Indian Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts. For
example, virtually all northern Indian Abhidharma texts employ the three categories of the aggregates, sense spheres, and elements. The *Jñānaprabhātipani and the *Vibhāṣā compendia also give evidence of a system of textual organization into forty-two sections with ten perspectives (*JP (1543) 8 p. 802b7ff., (1544) 5 p. 943b5ff.; *AVB 37 p. 270b11ff.; *VB 4 p. 439a7ff.; *MBV 46 p. 236c12ff., 71 p. 366a11ff., 90 p. 466a17ff.). The *Dhātukāya examines in great detail the relation between the category of dissociated forces and the classifications by aggregate, sense sphere, and element and presupposes the fivefold taxonomy throughout its discussion. *DK chung p. 617b18ff. See also Sakurabe (1969a) 73; Yamada (1959) 108ff.  


14 *AHS-D 4 p. 830c25ff., *AHS-U 6 p. 866a8ff. See also *SAHS 9 p. 943b6ff.  

15 *AKB 2.36a p. 62.14–15. ime sanśkārā na citta na saṁyuktā na ca rūpasvabhāvā iti cittaviprayuktā ucyate.  


17 Fa-pao (Fa-pao 4 p. 535b19ff.) offers arūpa-acittaviprayuktasamskāra as the full expansion of the compound. See also Tan’e 4 p. 860c9ff.  

18 See infra, translation and notes to *NAS 12 p. 396c11. Despite the later classification of seventy-five factors supposedly enumerated within the *Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, Vasubandhu himself refers, at points, to at least fifteen dissociated forces. See *AKB 4.98 p. 260.17ff., for discord within the monastic community (sari.ghabheda) as a dissociated force.  

19 *SAŚ 1 p. 526c6ff., 21 p. 663a17ff. Embedded within this list of apparently dissociated factors are two factors—chīeh and te-kuo—whose equivalents are unclear. The text (*SAŚ 21 p. 663a24–b1) interprets chīeh as bonds (*samyojana) and te-kuo either as the realization or attainment of the fruit (*phalādhiṣṭāna, *phalaśamapati); or as the fruit of realization (*adhiṣṭanaprameya). Kimura Taiken (Kimura (1937) 147) explains chīeh as equivalent to homogeneous character (*sabhāgata) and interprets the compound, te-kuo, as referring to the three varieties of possession—acquisition of the corporeal basis (*āsrayapratilābaḥ, *aparātipratilābaḥ), acquisition of the given entity (*vastuipratilābaḥ), and acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatanapratilābaḥ)—that appear in the *Dharmaskandha, *Prakaraṇaṇāda, and other early Sarvastivādin Abhidharma texts. Watanabe Baiyü (Watanabe (1934) jō 13 note 33) divides the compound, te-kuo, into possession (prapti) and fruit (phala) and interprets fruit as the effect of the equipoise of non-conception, that is, the state of non-conception (asamjñāka). If we accept the meaning of chīeh as “bonds” and assume that this partial list does indeed refer, implicitly, to dissociated factors, then the *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra may be adopting the view that contaminants (anusāya), or bonds, are dissociated from thought. See Sakamoto (1981) 385; Sasaki (1975) 104ff. The meaning of “attainment of the fruit” for te-kuo would be consistent with the primary use in early Sarvastivādin Abhidharma texts of prapti in relation to praxis and the abandonment of defilements.  

20 *DS 10 p. 500c20ff., 10 p. 501b20ff.; *PP (1541) 1 p. 627a18, (1541) 1 p. 628c13ff., (1542) 1 p. 692c5ff., (1542) 1 p. 694a19ff.; *Pañcavastuka [Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shih hun] T 28 (1556) p. 995c10ff., p. 997c18ff.; *Pañcavastuka [A-p’i-t’an wu fa hsing ching] T 28 (1557) p. 998c23ff., p.1001a16ff. The *Sāṅgītāparyāya refers individually to most of the factors included in this list, but not to them as a group: jūvita SP 1 p. 368c18; asamjñāsamapati, nirodhasamapati SP 3 p. 377c1; sabhāgata and the three varieties of prapti SP 11 p. 415c25, prapti SP 18 p. 442c28ff., and nāmaśūkya, and so on. SP 14 p. 425a1. The editors of the Taishō edition of the *Vibhāṣādāśtra (VB 6 p. 458a16ff.) list sixteen factors substituting death (maruṇa) for continuance (sthāti), while the three
editions of the Sung, Yuan, and Ming, and the old Sung edition list fifteen factors omitting death. The *Mahāvibbāsā and *Abhidharmavibbhāsāstātra do not provide a list of dissociated forces, but identify at least nineteen factors as conditioned forces dissociated from thought. These include, in addition to those listed here, the nature of being an ordinary person (*prthagjanatva), retrogression (*parthāṇi), restraint of the sense organs (*indriyasamvara), lack of restraint of the sense organs (*indriyasāmvara), and so on. See Nishi ([1933] 1975b) 420–423. The proliferation of factors claimed to be dissociated forces is arrested by identifying certain factors as varieties of others: for example, the state in which the roots of virtuous factors have been eradicated (*samucchinnakusalamāla) is identified as a variety of non-acquisition (asamanvāgama). See MVB 35 p. 182c4ff.

21 AARŚ hsia p. 979b27ff.
22 AHS-D (1550) 4 p. 830c20ff.; AHS-U (1551) 6 p. 866a3ff.; SAHS 9 p. 942c24ff.
23 TSS 7 no. 94 p. 289a21ff. See also Katsura (1974) 86ff.

25 Both śāmacṛī and asāmacṛī are included among the twenty-four dissociated factors enumerated by the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (YBS 3 p. 293c7ff.), and sāmacṛī is there defined as the complete assemblage of causes or conditions capable of producing factors: YBS 52 p. 587b29ff., 56 p. 608a3ff. The same definition appears in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and Bhāṣya (Abhidharmasamuccaya, Gokhale (1947) 19; cf. Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pradhan (1950) 11): sāmacṛī katamā. hetuphalaparyayaśamavadhāne sāmacṛī ‘ti prajñaptiḥ; (Abhidharmasamuccayabhasāśya, Tatia (1975) 10–11): tadyathā viyānākhyāya hi hetuphalasye ‘ndriyāparibheda viṣayābhāsagamanām taj jñānān manas-kāraṇapratyapastāhān ca ‘ti. evam anyatra ‘pi yejtatvam. In accordance with the *Mahāvibbāsā (MVB 60 p. 313b1ff., 116 p. 602b6ff.) and the *Sānyuktabhāddharmādayāsāstra (SAHS 3 p. 889c19ff.), the Abhidharmakosābhasāśya (AKB 4.98 p. 260.17ff.) defines discord within the monastic community (saṅghahādana) as non-complete assemblage (asāmacṛī) and declares this to be a dissociated factor, thereby indicating that, even for Vasubandhu, the number of dissociated forces is not strictly limited to fourteen. The Chinese commentators debate whether or not any conditioned forces dissociated from thought other than the fourteen listed here should be accepted, and note that according to some, sāmacṛī should be considered a variety of homogeneous character, and asāmacṛī, a variety of non-possession. See Yuan-yü 9 p. 343c11ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 317a18ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 84b11ff.; Fu-pao 4 p. 535c2ff.; Shūshō 7 p. 155b22ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 134a15ff.; Kaidō 4 p. 88a5ff.

26 As an assemblage of conditions, see MVB 108 p. 561b25. As the cause of the cognition of composites, see MVB 21 p. 109b25ff.; NAS 4 p. 350c29ff., 8 p. 372c22ff. For a discussion of saṅghahādana, discord within the monastic community, which is identified with asāmacṛī and included among the conditioned forces dissociated from thought, see MVB 60 p. 313b1ff., 116 p. 602b6ff.; NAS 43 p. 587b8ff.; SAKV p. 142.29.
28 Yuan-yü 9 p. 343c12ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 317b15ff.
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this case is *pratilābha, and not prāpti. See also the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 172 p. 865b12–13) where *āśraya(upadhi)–, *vastu–, and *āyatanaupratilābha are identified, respectively, with *dhatu–, *skandha–, and *āyatanaupratilābha. For a different interpretation of these three varieties of acquisition, see Watanabe (1936) 314 notes 99–101. See also YBS 10 p. 323c8ff., 84 p. 769a14ff.


31 SN 19.1.1 Aṭṭhisutta 2: 256; SA 19 no. 508 p. 135b8. See also Schmithausen’s extensive discussion of the term, Schmithausen (1987a) 552ff. note 1477.

32 SN 12.1.2 Vibhaṅgasutta 2: 3.

33 SA 12 no. 298 p. 85b12; Arthaviniścayasūtra, Samtati (1971) 12–13. The Nibandhana (Arthaviniścayasūtra, Samtati (1971) 149) on the Arthaviniścayasūtra explains the three varieties of acquisition of the aggregates, elements, and sense spheres as referring to three aspects of one’s mode of personal existence (atmabhāva): that is, the stream of the aggregates, of the elements, and of the sense spheres.

34 Saṅghabhadra suggests that homogeneous character (sabha gaṭa) can also be known through yogic direct perception: see infra, translation NAS 12 p. 400b11.
Chapter 5

Possession and Non-possession

5.1 Definitions of Possession and Non-possession

In early Buddhist sūtras, the term 'possession' (prāpti) is not used with the technical meaning that it acquires in later Abhidharma texts. Instead, it refers to the simple act of attaining or acquiring: as, for example, to attain qualities or religious fruits through the practice of the path; or to attain a particular meditative state.\(^1\) The sense of continued possession or non-possession is conveyed by the terms 'accompaniment' (samanvāgama) or 'non-accompaniment' (asamanvāgama), which are used primarily with regard to virtuous or unvirtuous qualities.\(^2\)

Evidence for a distinction in the usage of the terms prāpti and samanvāgama is found in early Abhidharma texts. For example, the Dhammaskandha and Prakaraṇapāda use prāpti in their lists of dissociated forces, while the *Abhidharmāmrta-rasaśāstra uses samanvāgama.\(^3\) The Vijñānakāya implies a distinction between prāpti and samanvāgama in its frequent references to the attainment (prāpti) or discarding (tyāga) of one's accompaniment (samanvāgama) or non-accompaniment (asamanvāgama) of certain varieties of thought.\(^4\) Finally, the *Mahāvibhāṣā also appears to recognize a distinction in usage between prāpti and samanvāgama. It uses samanvāgama in lengthy descriptions of qualities characterizing either various types of sentient beings or various states of praxis, particularly in reference to qualities that can be said to be present before one (saṁmukhiṁbhāva). These factors "present before one" of which one has accompaniment may or may not be in "present operation" (saṁudācāra); thus, one can have accompaniment of a given quality that is latent, whose future arising is only a possibility.\(^5\) The term prāpti, by contrast, is reserved either for discus-
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sions of the possession or the acquisition of religious fruits (*phalaprāpti, *phalapratilābha) through the noble path or for explicit references to the dissociated force, possession. The śūtra passages cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā to support the technical sense of possession as a dissociated force employ the terms ‘acquisition’ (pratilambha) or ‘accompaniment’ (samanvāgama), and not ‘possession’ (prāpti). Indeed, the choice of the term prāpti for the new technical sense of possession in Abhidharma texts as a dissociated force would appear to be, at least in part, a function of its infrequent use in the śūtras. Abhidharma elaborations of possession would, thereby, be relatively free of the need to reconcile potential conflicts in the use of the term prāpti with the authoritative śūtras. It is then also not surprising to find both the senses of acquisition (pratilambha) and accompaniment (samanvāgama) subsumed within the developed Abhidharma theory of possession (prāpti) as a force dissociated from thought.

Among the early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, only the Prakaraṇapāda includes an explicit definition of possession (prāpti) as a dissociated force: that is, as the simple possession or attainment of factors. The *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītisāstra presents and criticizes a variety of definitions of accompaniment as production, as non-cessation, as physical acquisition, as the non-discarding of factors, or as simultaneous or continued acquisition. It begins its discussion of accompaniment by rejecting the suggestion that one cannot have accompaniment of any factor, since all factors are void; this position, it claims, would contradict the scriptural passages that refer to accompaniment by virtuous factors. Thereby, the *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītisāstra indicates its own acceptance of accompaniment. Other early Abhidharma exegetical treatises contain cursory definitions of possession, but do not clearly discriminate possession, accompaniment, and acquisition. For example, the *Abhidharmānṛtarasāstra identifies possession as that “dissociated force acquired simultaneously when one acquires a given factor.” In Dharmaśrī’s *Abhidharmahrdaya, possession (prāpti) means “to be accompanied by factors and not to discard them,” and in both Upaśānta’s *Abhidharmahrdaya and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahrdayaśāstra, possession and accompaniment are given the same meaning: that is, “to acquire factors.”

Systematic definitions of possession and non-possession begin with the *Mahāvibhāṣā. Referring to the Prajñāptisāstra, it explicitly identifies possession, acquisition, and accompaniment with one another:

What is possession? It is acquisition and accompaniment. What is acquisition? It is possession and accompaniment. What is accompaniment? It is acquisition and possession. Although the sounds of the words are distinguished, the meanings are not
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Later Abhidharma treatises, including the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyaśāstra*, accept this identification and maintain that possession is a general category that subsumes both the specific aspects of acquisition and accompaniment.

Although possession, acquisition, and accompaniment are identified in later Abhidharma texts, the residual influence of an earlier distinction between acquisition and accompaniment is suggested by a transitional passage in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* that illustrates the relative complexity of the new theory of possession. This passage claims that even though possession (*prāpti*) or acquisition (*pratilābha*) and accompaniment (*samanvāgama*) do not differ in nature, they are, nevertheless, distinguished. 13 Seven theories concerning the character of this distinction are offered: (1) the distinction is merely one of different names; (2) attainment of what has not yet been attained is acquisition or possession and attainment of what has already been attained is accompaniment; (3) initial attainment is acquisition or possession and subsequent repeated attainment is accompaniment; (4) accompaniment of that toward which one had not yet had accompaniment is acquisition or possession and accompaniment of that toward which one has already had accompaniment is accompaniment; (5) the connection with that to which one has not previously been connected (*pratibaddha*) is acquisition or possession and the connection with that to which one has previously been connected is accompaniment; (6) initial attainment is acquisition or possession and the not severing of what has already been attained is accompaniment; and (7) initial acquisition is acquisition or possession and the non-loss of what has already been possessed is accompaniment. Whereas the first of these seven theories claims that the distinction is merely terminological, the remaining six suggest more substantive differences, which reflect two alternative interpretative models. The first model distinguishes acquisition or possession from accompaniment in terms of stages or moments in the temporal process of a given instance of possession: for example, the initial attaining of a factor is acquisition and its possession for the second and subsequent moments is accompaniment. The second model locates this distinction in the status of a particular factor vis-à-vis one's prior attainment or accompaniment of it: for example, a factor never before possessed is, when first attained, acquired; if it is attained thereafter, that repeated attainment is accompaniment. The commentators suggest that these two models are most clearly represented by the seventh and second theories, which then form the basis of the interpretations adopted, respectively, by the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyaśāstra*. 14

The interpretations offered by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra of the op-
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Possession and non-possession illustrate the extent of the terminological specificity and the doctrinal complexity characteristic of virtually all Abhidharma investigation and hence merit consideration as examples of later Abhidharma exegetical methods. Vasubandhu’s interpretation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* follows that of the *Abhidharmāvatārāraśāstra* and presumes a distinction between acquisition and accompaniment based upon moments in the stream of one instance of possession:

Possession is of two types: (1) acquisition of that which has not [yet] been attained or of that which has been lost; and (2) accompaniment of that which has [already] been acquired. It is established that non-possession is the opposite.15

Possession is used here with regard to the first moment in which a factor is attained; accompaniment refers to one’s state of being endowed with that factor, or being endowed with the acquisition of that factor, in the second and subsequent moments until it is discarded. Even if a factor of a particular class has been attained previously, acquisition is again used to describe the first moment of the reattainment of another factor of that class, and accompaniment describes its continued possession in subsequent moments.16 Thus, according to the interpretation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, whether a factor has or has not been previously attained is irrelevant to the application of the terms ‘acquisition’ and ‘accompaniment’ to its possession. Instead, acquisition and accompaniment refer to two consecutive stages, or moments, in the process of possessing a factor, which would be repeated each time a factor is attained.

Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the operation of non-possession is less clear. As noted in the previous quotation, he states only that non-possession is the opposite (*viparyaya*) of possession, but does not specify the various analogous stages in the process of non-possession. Like possession, non-possession should include two varieties—that is, non-acquisition (*aprātlambha*) and non-accompaniment (*asamanvāgama*)—but to what stages do these two terms refer? Yaśomitra gives two interpretations:

Non-possession is of two types: (1) non-acquisition of that which has not yet been attained; and (2) non-accompaniment of that which has been attained and lost. Or, (1) the first [moment] of non-possession of that which has not been attained or has been lost is non-acquisition, (2) while the non-possession of that which has not been acquired or has been lost in the second and subsequent moments is non-accompaniment.17

According to the first interpretation, the non-possession of any factor not yet attained (such as any noble factor by an ordinary person) is referred to
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as non-acquisition. Non-accompaniment designates the non-possession of any factor that has, at some point, been attained and yet has been lost. The second interpretation relies upon distinctions in the sequence of moments within a given instance of non-possession: namely, the non-possession of any factor, whether it has been attained previously or not, would be non-acquisition in the first moment and non-accompaniment in the second and subsequent moments.\(^{18}\) Though Vasubandhu does not specify the exact sense in which non-possession is the "opposite of possession," the second interpretation offered by Yasomitra better conforms to his definition of possession.

Yaśomitra's first interpretation of non-possession resembles Saṅghabhadra's model of the operation of both possession and non-possession, which is based not upon a distinction of stages or moments in the temporal process of a given instance of possession, but rather upon the second model: that of the status of a particular factor vis-à-vis its prior attainment.\(^{19}\) If a factor has never been attained, its non-possession is referred to as non-acquisition and its initial attainment is acquisition. When a factor is attained and lost, the resulting non-possession is referred to as non-accompaniment. However, when a factor that has been attained previously is reattained, its reattainment is not referred to as acquisition, but rather as accompaniment. Similarly, when that factor is lost for a second or subsequent time, its non-possession is henceforth non-accompaniment. Thus, for Saṅghabhadra, non-acquisition is applied only to factors that have never been attained, and acquisition, to factors that are attained for the first time. All subsequent possessions and non-possessions of a factor once attained should be referred to as accompaniment and non-accompaniment.

Unfortunately, the arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣa does not choose one of the seven interpretations offered of the distinction between possession or acquisition and accompaniment, and neither Vasubandhu nor Saṅghabhadra explains the reasons for their support of different interpretations. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference in perspective indicated by these two interpretations. Vasubandhu views the distinction between acquisition and accompaniment or between non-acquisition and non-accompaniment from the perspective of the temporal distinction between the first moment in one's relationship of possession to a given factor and all subsequent moments within that particular instance, or event, of possession of that factor. The first moment in the stream of one's relationship of possession, that is, when a factor is on the point of arising, is referred to as acquisition. When a factor has been attained, one's relationship of possession in the stream of subsequent moments is referred to as accompaniment. As Fa-pao notes:

When the initial possession [of a factor] is just on the point of
arising, it is not referred to as accompaniment because the accompaniment [of that factor] within the body has not [yet] been attained. When the initial non-possession is just on the point of arising, it is not referred to as non-accompaniment because one [still] has the accompaniment of that factor within one’s body.20

By contrast, Saṅghabhadra, does not view the distinction between acquisition and accompaniment in terms of a single event of possession of a particular factor and the temporal distinctions that one might draw within the stream of moments constituting that event of possession. Instead, he adopts the perspective of a given factor or class of factors: that is, from the perspective of whether or not a given class of factors had at any point previously been attained within a given life-stream (samatāna).

These different perspectives adopted by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra also reflect a fundamental difference in their ontological models and theoretical emphases. For Vasubandhu, who rejects the existence of a given factor throughout the three time periods, it would be impossible to use a given factor as the basis from which to distinguish its initial acquisition from subsequent reacquisitions. Since the existence of a given factor is constituted only by its activity in the present moment, one cannot speak strictly of its acquisition on a prior occasion. Therefore, Vasubandhu emphasizes the perspective of the relationship between a factor and the life-stream said to possess it in each instance of possession. Further, by implying a distinction between the first and the second and subsequent moments in the possession of a given factor, Vasubandhu’s interpretation also de-emphasizes the strictly momentary character of each impermanent factor; the emphasis is instead on the stream of each individual instance of possession.

By contrast, since Saṅghabhadra maintains the existence of factors throughout the three time periods, he can meaningfully distinguish the event of a given factor’s initial acquisition from subsequent reacquisitions, which would then be referred to as accompaniment. The emphasis is on the factor or, strictly speaking, the class of factors that serve as the substratum or locus for each repeated instance of possession. The initial possession of a given factor representing a class of factors is then, as acquisition, distinguished from all subsequent possessions of instances of that class, possessions which are then referred to as accompaniment. When a given instance of a class of factors arises for the first time within the life-stream, it is connected to that life-stream through acquisition. In the very next moment, if another instance of that class of factors arises, it is said to be connected to the life-stream through accompaniment. If another instance of that class of factors arises once again even after an interruption, that reacquired factor would also be said to be connected to the life-stream through accompani-
5.2 Function

Sanghabhadra's interpretation, with its acceptance of the existence of factors in the three time periods and its use of accompaniment to refer to reacquisition, might be less compatible with a common sense view than that of Vasubandhu, but it is more consistent with an ontological model that emphasizes a factor's intrinsic nature as well as a rigorous interpretation of momentariness. In ordinary parlance, possession would describe a factor's continued connection to a life-stream, and if that factor arose after an interruption, it would be interpreted as another new event of acquisition. For Sanghabhadra, however, the apparent, continued connection of a factor to a life-stream, which would enable one to speak of a first moment and subsequent moments of possession, must be seen as a succession of distinct arisings of factors representing a particular class, all of which are characterized by a particular intrinsic nature. The first instance of a factor representing a particular class is unique; it alone should be referred to as acquisition. The arising of instances of that class of factors in the second and subsequent moments is analogous to the arising of an instance of that class after an extended interruption; both should then be referred to as accompaniment. In this way, Sanghabhadra's interpretation preserves the identity of intrinsic nature among all arisings of a given class of factors as well as the strictly momentary character of each factor's activity.

5.2 Function of Possession and Non-posses-sion

Why then was it necessary for the Sarvāstivādins to posit possession and non-posses-sion as separately existing factors? It would seem that the fact of possession, or the relationship of connection to an appurtenance, is an ordinary event in need of no further justification or explanation. However; given the fundamental Buddhist assumption that experience, properly understood, consists merely of a number of discrete factors, not unified by any central force or "possessing self," our common sense notions of connection, or "belonging to oneself," must be modified. With the development of Sarvāstivādin ontology, wherein all factors that constitute experience are separately existing, discrete, and radically momentary, accounting for the experience of connection presents a daunting challenge. Indeed, any connection between these separately existing factors would seem to be a logical impossibility. How can the apparent continuity of experience be explained? In what sense can qualities be said to characterize, or events be said to occur within the locus of a given sentient being? And, how is
the "locus of one sentient being" determined; why do separately existing factors arising in the experience of one sentient being not capriciously arise in the experience of another?

In early Buddhism, the solution to these problems was found in the principle of conditioning, expressed through the model of dependent origination (pratiṣṭhānasamutpāda). All aspects or factors constituting one's experience are understood to be connected through a relation of mutually dependent production: the continuity of the conditioning effect of these factors—that is, the necessary connection between certain factors as causes and their subsequent effects—provides both the basis for "individual" continuity and the possibility of dynamic change. In Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma theory, these various causal connections are analyzed in detail yielding a complex structure, which is described in terms of intricate interrelationships among six causes, four conditions, and five effects.21

The isolation of possession and non-possession as discrete factors in Sarvāstivādin theory can be understood as, at least in part, a response to the same problem of accounting for the experienced connection or coherence among all factors constituting the experience of one sentient being, or, in Buddhist terminology, within one life-stream (sattaṇā). That this function of connection was central to the activity of possession and non-possession is suggested by the fact that possession and non-possession are applied, among conditioned factors, only to those factors that arise in the experience of sentient beings; they, thereby, serve to delimit the experience of each sentient being from that of other sentient beings as well as from insentient matter.22 For example, one person's experience of anger or joy belongs only to that person; the outward signs of those feelings may be obvious to others, or may exert an indirect effect upon others, but the feelings themselves belong only to the person experiencing them. Similarly, the actions (karma) of one person can produce their effects only within the life-stream to which they are connected through a stream of possessions: that is, within that life-stream in which the action was originally performed. Possession itself, as a separately existent factor, must also be connected to the life-stream through some variety of possession. Indeed, the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas propose a secondary "possession of possession" (prāptiprāpti) that functions to possess the original possession.23 Though this would appear to incur the fault of infinite regress, the original possession and the secondary possession of possession function reciprocally; the original possession possesses both the factor and the secondary possession of possession, and the secondary possession of possession, in turn, possesses the original possession.

Thus, through possession, the range of factors constituting sentient beings as a whole can be distinguished from those occurring in the realm of
insentient matter, and the locus of experience of each sentient being can be clearly distinguished from that of other sentient beings. However, it could be argued that the principles of conditioning and action are sufficient to explain coherence within the experience of one sentient being and distinctions among sentient beings. These principles could also account for the distinctions between the factors included among those constituting sentient beings and those included among factors not constituting sentient beings. Conditioning and action would thus render any further theory of possession and non-possession superfluous. Therefore, to fully understand the function of possession and non-possession, one must turn to an examination both of the general ontological perspective that necessitated them and of their emergence as discrete factors in the context of specific Abhidharma doctrines.

**Ontological Perspective Underlying Possession and Non-possession**

The constituent factors into which experience had been traditionally analyzed are understood by the Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāṣika school to exist as real entities (dravya) in the three time periods of past, present, and future. As real entities, these factors are said to exist defined by intrinsic nature (svabhāva), characterized by a particular inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). However, given an appropriate assemblage of causes and conditions, these existent factors manifest a particular momentary activity (kārita). It is then the arising and passing away of this activity that defines the present moment and determines the factor’s impermanence. Given this Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāṣika ontological model, possession and non-possession do not function as conditions for the arising or passing away of a factor’s activity, but rather account for the connection of a particular factor to a given life-stream.

The need to posit possession and non-possession is especially evident in the case of one’s relationship to the unconditioned factors: cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyānirodha), and cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyānirodha). As unconditioned factors, these two cessations have no conditioned activity and thus cannot be said to arise in the present dependent upon an assemblage of causes and conditions. Nevertheless, these two factors can be said to characterize or not characterize a given life-stream, but only insofar as they are connected to a life-stream through possession or disconnected from it through non-possession. Since possession and non-possession are themselves conditioned factors, their activities arise or pass away in dependence upon specific causes.
and conditions. Accordingly, when the possession of an unconditioned factor arises within the life-stream of a sentient being, that unconditioned factor is said to apply to that life-stream; conversely, when non-possession arises, one’s connection to that unconditioned factor ceases. Therefore, through religious praxis, one can be said to have attained the cessation of a particular defilement when one conditions the arising of the possession of the cessation of that particular defilement; it is this cessation that is equated with nirvāṇa.

Emergence of Possession and Non-possession as Discrete Factors

It is impossible to determine the first text or school to recognize possession (priipti) as a separately existing discrete factor in its technical sense as a force dissociated from thought. The Kathāvatthu refers to the position of those who view possession (patti) as unconditioned and who consider this unconditioned possession as a discrete factor that functions not only with regard to meditative states and fruits of praxis but also with regard to mundane objects. Early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma treatises use priipti almost exclusively in reference to the possession of virtuous and noble factors. The presence of certain types of possession within a life-stream functions as the criterion by which one’s status at a given level of attainment in religious praxis is determined and distinguished from prior stages: specifically, the possession of certain noble factors distinguishes one’s status as a noble one from one’s prior status as an ordinary person. Accordingly, both the *Abhidharmahardaya and *Abhidharmāṇṭarasaṣṭāstra recognize one’s status as an ordinary person to be determined by a discrete factor: namely, the nature of an ordinary person (prthagjanatva). Significantly, these texts do not also acknowledge the existence of a discrete factor of “non-possession,” the factor with which this “nature of an ordinary person” is identified in later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika lists. In the Vībhāṣā compendia, the nature of an ordinary person is explained by reference to non-possession (aprāpti) or, more often, non-accompaniment (asamanvāgama), but both the nature of an ordinary person and non-accompaniment are considered distinct forces dissociated from thought. The *Tattvasiddhiṣṭāstra defines possession either as sentient accompaniment of the five aggregates in the present or as sentient accompaniment of past virtuous or unvirtuous action that has not yet produced its effect. However, it asserts explicitly that there exists no discrete dissociated factor of possession or non-possession. In the Abhidharmāvatāraṣṭāstra, non-possession replaces the nature of an ordinary
5.2.3 Function in Abandonment of Defilements

person in the list of dissociated factors and, therefore, acquires a more abstract and generalized meaning. Nevertheless, in this and later Abhidharma treatises, much attention is still given to the function of non-possession as defining the distinctive character of the ordinary person.30

These early Abhidharma texts suggest an original connection between possession or non-possession and matters of religious praxis; possession and accompaniment are explained in relation to the noble fruits and virtuous or unvirtuous qualities, and non-possession functions to define the nature of the ordinary person, or one not yet practicing the noble path. Throughout later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma treatments of possession and non-possession, their scope was extended to include virtually all aspects of sentient experience. Nevertheless, in later Abhidharma accounts, evidence for the original function of possession and non-possession, as limited to matters of religious praxis, is preserved in descriptions of their activities and in arguments for their existence as real entities. The *Mahāvibhāṣā, in its attempts to defend the discrete existence of accompaniment as a real entity, first cites several śūtra passages as scriptural authorities and then offers two reasoned arguments: first, accompaniment clearly demarcates ordinary persons from noble ones; and second, accompaniment provides the mechanism by which defilements can be abandoned.31 The first argument is central to the definition of the hierarchy of religious attainments and continues to be a pivotal topic in all subsequent discussions of possession and, more importantly, non-possession. Indeed, the focus of later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika treatments of non-possession is that special variety of the non-possession of noble factors that constitutes the nature of an ordinary person.32 The second argument, concerning the abandonment of defilements, is peculiar to the Sarvāstivādin ontology and indicates the continuing key role of possession and non-possession within the program of religious praxis.33

Function of Possession and Non-possession in the Abandonment of Defilements

It is in this Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model for the abandonment of defilements that the need for the mechanism of possession and non-possession as factors that are dissociated from thought becomes clear. Defilements, like all factors, exist as real entities in the three time periods but manifest their activity of defiling only in the present. Each defilement is said to arise in the present in relation to a particular object-support through certain causes and conditions and to be connected to a given life-stream by a simultaneously arising possession. Even when the present activity of that defilement
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and its possession cease and become past, they both continue to be connected to that life-stream through subsequent present possessions that arise successively dependent upon that original possession. These successive possessions form a stream of effects of uniform outflow (niṣyandaphala) that not only connects a life-stream to that past defilement but also serves as a cause for the arising of the possession of future defilements. Within the life-stream of each individual, these streams of possession connecting one to past defilements continue regardless of whether or not defilements are presently active; the streams can only be interrupted or terminated through religious praxis.

Since defilements exist as real entities in all time periods, they cannot be abandoned in the sense that they are destroyed. Instead, abandonment must have the sense of separation: that is to say, one severs a defilement’s possession and thereby terminates the connection between that defilement and one’s own life-stream. This severance process is described in the *Mahāvibhāṣā:

The noble path does not produce the abandonment of various defilements like a knife cutting a plant or a stone grinding incense. Rather, when the noble path is present, it causes the possession (prāpti) of the accompaniment (samanvāgama) of those defilements to cease and also causes the possession of the non-accompaniment (asamanvāgama) of those defilements to arise. At such a time, it is said that defilements have been abandoned.34

In other passages, the phrases ‘the possession of the accompaniment’ and ‘the possession of the non-accompaniment’ are replaced, respectively, with ‘the possession of connection’ (samyogaprāpti) and ‘the possession of disconnection’ (visamyogaprāpti).35 Thus, there are two steps in the procedure by which every defilement is said to be abandoned: first, there is cessation of the “possession of connection” to a particular defilement, or there occurs the non-possession of the possession of that defilement; and second, there is the arising of the “possession of disconnection” from that defilement, or there occurs the possession of the non-possession of that defilement. The first step serves as the cause for the arising of the second; the respective activities of these two steps are compared to that of throwing out a thief and closing the door or catching an insect in a jar and plugging the jar’s mouth.36 The second and final step of disconnection (visamyogaprāpti) corresponds to cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamākhyānirodha), which, for the Sarvāstivādins, is equated with nirvāṇa.37

This severance of a defilement’s possession and the possession of “disconnection” from that defilement occur as a result of the cultivation of
religious praxis through which one gives rise to counteragents \((pratipakṣa)\) that obstruct specific defilements, or rather the possession of specific defilements. The uniform outflow of the successive possessions of past and present defilements that condition the arising of future defilements is interrupted through the present operation of yet other possessions: namely, the possessions of specific counteragents \((pratipakṣa)\). Though the defilement continues to exist as a discrete factor, its connection to a given life-stream is obstructed by its counteragent. The arising of still other defilements is also prevented through the present operation of subsequent counteragents that are produced as effects of uniform outflow from prior counteragents. In this way, one progresses through the path of religious praxis and abandons defilements through a sequential process of severing the possession of and giving rise to the possession of the disconnection from each discrete defilement; that is to say, one replaces these streams of defilements with corresponding streams of counteragents that function to prevent the arising of future defilements. Thus, there are as many disconnections, cessations, or \textit{nirvāṇas} as there are defilements, or categories of defilements, to be abandoned.\(^{38}\)

This complex Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of an indirect connection to, and severance of, defilements through various stages of possession and non-possession was necessitated by their ontological and doctrinal premises. First, as has been noted, defilements, as real entities, exist in the three time periods and cannot be destroyed; one can only abandon defilements by severing one’s connection to them. Possession and non-possession then serve as mediators in this indirect process of connection and severance. Second, defilements themselves are held by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas to be factors associated with thought \((saṃprayukta)\) and can never be transformed into factors that are dissociated \((viprayukta)\).\(^{39}\) The counteragent that obstructs a given defilement is also considered to be a factor associated with thought. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model of psychological functioning demands that all factors that arise simultaneously associated with one moment of thought must be of the same moral quality; therefore, a counteragent cannot arise in the same moment as the particular defilement it opposes. As a result, a given counteragent cannot obstruct its corresponding defilement directly. How, then, can defilements ever be abandoned? Possession and non-possession provide the solution. As factors dissociated from thought, possessions or non-possessions of factors of differing moral qualities can arise simultaneously in one moment of thought. The possession of a particular defilement can arise in the same moment as the counteragent to that defilement, or, strictly speaking, in the same moment as the possession of that counteragent. In this way, the uniform outflow of successive possessions of past and present defilements can be interrupted and the arising
5. Possession and Non-possession

of future defilements can be obstructed through the presence of yet other possessions, specifically, the possessions of the counteragents (*pratipakṣa*) to those defilements. Thus, given the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika ontological premises and their model of psychological functioning, the abandonment of defilements is possible only through the mediation of successive possessions and non-possessions, all of which are dissociated from thought.

**Function of Possession and Non-possession in the Ordinary Operation of Thought**

Possession is required not only to explain the specific case of the abandonment of defilements but also to account for the ordinary operation of thought and the causal effectiveness of action. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model of psychological functioning dictates that in each moment thought arises associated with a number of thought concomitants. Each moment of thought acts as the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*) and the contiguous condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) in the arising of thought and thought concomitants in a subsequent moment. However, both the homogeneous cause and contiguous condition act as conditions in the production of factors only of a similar quality. A problem then arises in explaining the ordinary experience of a succession of moments of thought of differing quality or the arising of thought concomitants in connection with factors of a different quality. Since moments of thought can be virtuous, unvirtuous, or indeterminate in moral quality, how can a moment of thought of one moral quality function as the cause or condition for the arising of a succeeding moment of a differing moral quality? For example, if an unvirtuous moment of thought arises immediately after a virtuous moment of thought, how can its cause or condition, which must also be unvirtuous, be found in the preceding virtuous moment of thought? Further, how could an ordinary person, in whom a virtuous moment of thought arises, or a noble one, in whom an unvirtuous moment of thought arises, be considered in that very moment, respectively, ordinary or noble?

These difficulties in the ordinary operation of thought can also be resolved through the mediation of possession. According to Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory, each thought concomitant, whether virtuous, unvirtuous, or indeterminate in moral quality, is connected to the life-stream by a possession of like moral quality. However, since possession is a factor dissociated from thought, the possession of an unvirtuous factor can arise within the life-stream simultaneously with a virtuous moment of thought; virtuous and unvirtuous factors may thus be said to coexist in relation to the same life-stream within the same moment even though they are contradictory in moral quality. Even though possession does not function as the cause for
the arising of a given factor, it determines the relationship of a factor to a life-stream. It connects that life-stream to present factors of a given moral quality as well as to past factors of similar or differing moral quality. Since these past factors exist as real entities, they can serve as the cause for the arising of a subsequent factor of similar moral quality. If other conditions for the arising of a factor are present, possession then determines that it will arise within the life-stream of a given sentient being. Thus, factors of any moral quality have the potential of arising in connection with a particular life-stream until their stream of possessions is interrupted.

5.3 Theory of Seeds

For anyone accepting the Buddhist model of analytical impermanence or, in its extreme form, momentariness, both the apparent continuity of experience and causal relations, whether remote or immediate, pose critical problems demanding explanation. No constant unchanging substratum provides an underlying unity or linkage among the discrete factors constituting the experience of one sentient being and distinguishing one life-stream from another. Therefore, another mechanism is required to account for the causal efficacy evident in the abandonment of defilements and in the dynamics of ordinary mental functioning.

The theory of possession, which is consistent with the ontological and psychological premises of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka school, represents only one such mechanism. If, as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīkas claim, factors exist as real entities characterized by intrinsic nature in the three time periods, momentariness refers only to the transitory character of a factor’s activity, specifically, to the arising and passing away of a factor’s activity that defines the limits of each present moment. Even though a factor’s activity passes away and the factor is thereby said to become past, the factor continues to exist and can still be said to have the capability of acting as a cause in the production of presently arising factors. Among the infinite number of factors whose impermanent activities constitute the total array of sentient and insentient phenomena, those that occur within the streams of sentient beings arise together with a separate factor, possession. When the present factor and its possession pass away, that possession serves as the homogeneous cause for the recurrent arising of subsequent possessions, which connect that past factor to the life-stream, enabling it to serve as the cause for the arising of subsequent factors. This possession serves several functions. First and foremost, it connects a factor to the particular life-stream in which it arises. Furthermore, possession distinguishes a factor from factors arising in the stream of other sentient beings or from factors
characterizing insentient matter. Finally, the presence or absence of the possession of particular factors also serves to demarcate stages in the religious development of a given sentient being.

Vasubandhu, however, accepts a different ontological model. He denies the distinction between a factor's activity and its intrinsic nature and asserts that a factor's existence is itself constituted by its activity, which occurs only in the present. Therefore, he does not admit the existence of factors in the three time periods. For Vasubandhu the doctrine of momentariness refers to the transitoriness of the factor as a whole and implies that only the present moment exists. Causal interaction then becomes meaningful only as a relation between the present and its immediately preceding moment, and all present arising can be explained only through a stream of contiguous conditioning. As a result, Vasubandhu must reject any theory that assumes either causal efficacy on the part of past factors or the ever recurring possession of past factors. In this, he follows the position of the Dārṣṭāntikas who deny the real existence of possession, or accompaniment, as discrete factors:

> If sentient beings are not separated from a factor, [that state] is referred to as accompaniment. [Accompaniment] does not exist as a real entity, but is only provisionally established by relative discrimination. As in the case of five fingers that come together to form a fist, since, when they separate, there is no fist, [the fist as such] does not actually exist. In the same way, when sentient beings are not separated from a factor, [that state] is referred to as accompaniment. When they are separated from [a factor, that state] is non-accompaniment; therefore, [accompaniment and non-accompaniment, as such,] do not exist as real entities.\(^{42}\)

Instead of relying upon a theory of possession, Vasubandhu appeals to the operation of cause and effect to resolve these difficulties in explaining the functioning of thought and religious praxis. He claims that the successive arising of moments of thought of differing quality as well as the arising and abandonment of defilements within a given life-stream can be explained simply through the direct influence of contiguous causes or conditions, thereby obviating the need for the indirect mediation of possession and non-possession. In the case of religious praxis, Vasubandhu, would explain the difference between the status of an ordinary person and a noble one through a difference in corporeal basis (āśrayaviśeṣa), and not through the possession or non-possession of any specific factors. This “difference in corporeal basis” reflects the fact that one’s corporeal basis has been transmuted (āśrayaḥ parāvṛttah): that is, from a state of not having abandoned to a state of having abandoned defilements.\(^{43}\)
In explaining the abandonment of defilements that constitutes the transmutation of the corporeal basis, Vasubandhu adopts the theory of seeds, which he ascribes to the Sautrāntikas. In Vasubandhu's interpretation, seeds are defined as name and form: that is, the five aggregates that have the capability of producing an effect. These seeds are not separately existing factors, but rather are the very mental and material aggregates of which the life-stream consists. Their potential for development, or, in Vasubandhu's words, their power to produce (utpādānāsakti), is then identified as their seed-state (bījabhāva). Since this seed-state is a potentiality and not an actualized event manifesting definite qualities, seed-states of any moral quality can coexist in one life-stream. Like all conditioned factors, these aggregates and their potential capability as seed-states are momentary, and this potentiality is passed along through the contiguous conditioning by which aggregates are produced in each successive moment. Thus, the actualization of a seed's potential at a later time is not the direct result of the original factor or action by which the stream of that seed-state was initially implanted. Rather, the later actualization is conditioned indirectly through the successive reproduction of the efficacy of the original action in each consecutive moment in the form of a seed-state. At a certain moment, when the appropriate causes and conditions coalesce, the seed's potential is actualized. That moment is referred to as the distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream (sārūṭatēryānāmāvīśeṣa). By means of this process of successive transmission and transformation through which a seed develops and sprouts, Vasubandhu attempts to explain the causal efficacy of action, all varieties of causation whether homogeneous, heterogeneous, remote or immediate, and thereby all forms of apparent continuity within the life-stream.

Saṅghabhadra attempts to refute Vasubandhu's theory of seeds and by implication all such models that appeal to a form of latent potentiality, thereby proving by exclusion the necessity of possession. His arguments focus on two points. First, Saṅghabhadra demands that the relationship between the seed and the life-stream—specifically, a given moment of thought within the life-stream—be clearly defined: that is to say, the mental and material seeds that lie dormant within the life-stream must be either identical to, or separate from, the mental and material factors constituting the life-stream at any given moment. Saṅghabhadra contends that whether the seed is identical to, or separate from, the life-stream, a succession of morally dissimilar moments of thought cannot be explained. To respond that seeds are merely provisional potentialities that are neither identical with, nor separate from, a given moment of thought is to divest these seeds of any real capability. Second, since Vasubandhu does not recognize the existence of factors in the past or future, Saṅghabhadra points out that causal inter-
action, even between two contiguous moments, is impossible. For any given 
present moment, the previous moment is past and thus no longer exists; 
similarly, the succeeding moment, as future, does not yet exist. Since, for 
both the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and Vasubandhu, an entity that does 
not exist as a real entity cannot act as a cause, Saṅghabhadra argues that 
Vasubandhu cannot defend causal interaction even between contiguous mo­
ments unless factors are admitted to exist in all three time periods. Thus, 
Saṅghabhadra concludes, Vasubandhu’s theory of the contiguous transmis­
sion of a seed’s potential efficacy and its eventual manifestation as a dis­
tinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream is unfounded.

The theories of possession and seeds represent only two of many mod­
els used by various Buddhists schools to account for direct and indirect 
causal efficacy in the face of momentariness and the absence of a unify­
ing substratum. Other models referred to and rejected by Saṅghabhadra 
include subsidiary elements (*anudhātu), traces (vāsanā), capability (sām­
arthya), non-disappearance (avipraṇāśa), and accumulation (upacaya).50 
The Sarvāstivādin theory of unmanifest action (avijñaptirūpa) and the Vi­
bhajyāvādin, Mahāsāṅghika, and Vātsiputṛiya theory of dissociated latent 
contaminants (anusaya) should also be understood as responses to the same 
demands.51 These various models are used to explain a complex of experi­
ences that would appear to demand continuity or some medium of trans­
mission over time within the world of impermanent phenomena: that is, the 
succession of dissimilar moments of thought; the activity and abandonment 
of defilements; the efficacy of action; and memory or recollection.

Though these different models share common purposes, their specific ac­
tivities can often be distinguished by the context in which they are used. For 
example, the activities of seeds are clearly much wider in scope than those 
of possession. Their different activities are revealed in Saṅghabhadra’s re­
sponse to Vasubandhu’s assumption that possession, like seeds, must act 
as the cause of the production of factors.52 Significantly, Saṅghabhadra 
includes no reference to a generative function of possession and instead 
defines the function of possession simply as that of causing factors that 
are attained not to be lost and of constituting the object or marker of our 
knowledge of the fact that one entity belongs to another. The seed the­
ory, however, has a much broader function within the interpretative models 
of Vasubandhu and the Dārṣṭāntikas or Sautrāntikas. The model of seeds 
is appealed to in all instances of general causal production: for example, 
the efficacy of past action; the retention and recollection of memories; the 
succession of dissimilar moments of thought; the arising of defilements af­
ter an interval; and the abandonment of defilements. By contrast, the 
Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas use several other models in addition to posses­
sion and non-possession to account for these phenomena: namely, the six
causes and four conditions; the general causal efficacy of all past factors; and unmanifest action (avijñaptirūpa).

5.4 Temporal Discrimination

Possession and non-possession, like all discrete factors (dharma), can be discriminated according to various perspectives: namely, time period; moral quality; location by region or by the realm to which they are connected; their relationship to the path—that is, their character as belonging to one in training, beyond training, or to one neither in training nor beyond training; and the manner in which they are to be abandoned. Among these various perspectives, discrimination according to the three time periods is peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda-Valbhāṣikas and gives particular insight into their ontological model. In both Abhidharma treatises and their commentaries, the discrimination of varieties of possession and non-possession in accordance with temporal criteria indicates the complexity and, at times, confusion resulting from the application of Sarvāstivādin ontological premises.

In the case of the commentaries on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the confusion and disagreement on this issue of temporal varieties of possession and non-possession arise first from the ambiguity of the declaration that “factors of the three time periods each have three varieties of possession.” Does the term ‘varieties’ refer to the three time periods of past, present, or future or to the sequential stages of prior, simultaneous, and subsequent, distinguished relative to the factor possessed? The commentaries agree that here the three varieties refer to the three time periods: that is, a factor, whether past, present, or future, can be said, in principle, to have three varieties of possession that are past, present, or future. However, the specific varieties of possession that actually occur in relation to any given factor are then determined by whether or not that factor can be said to have prior, simultaneous, and subsequent possession: that is, possession that arises prior to (agraja) the arising of that factor, simultaneously with it (sahaja), or subsequent to it (paścātkāla). The determination of the temporal character of a specific factor’s possession is further complicated by the possibility that the two rubrics of time period and sequential stage do not necessarily correspond. Within the Sarvāstivādin doctrinal system, the time periods of the past, present, and future are not separately existing entities that are defined by their own intrinsic nature or particular inherent characteristic, but rather are purely relative terms determined by the arising and passing away of a factor’s activity. From the perspective of a given factor’s activity, the determination of both the sequential stages and the time periods of another factor—such
as the original factor’s own possession—would correspond: that factor’s possession is past if it arose prior to that factor, present if it arises simultaneously with it, and future if it will arise subsequent to it. However, the determination of the sequential stages and the time periods becomes more complicated if the perspective is shifted from that of the factor’s activity to that of an observer. From the perspective of an observer, a particular past factor may have possession that is prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to it, all three of which would be determined past—that is, past with respect to the time period of the observer.

Thus, the possession of any factor can be discriminated according to two temporal modes: one from the perspective of the arising of the activity of the possessed factor—the sequential stages of prior, simultaneous, or subsequent—and one from the perspective of an observer—the time periods of past, present, or future. For example, in the case of a factor that is past relative to a present observer, the past possession of that past factor, as noted above, can arise prior to it, simultaneously with it, or subsequent to it and still be determined past with respect to the time period of the observer. The present possession of that past factor arises in the actual present for the observer and consequently must arise subsequent to that past factor. Accordingly, the future possession of that past factor will arise in the future with respect to the time period of an observer and thus also subsequent to that past factor. In the case of a factor that is present relative to a present observer, the perspective of the factor and the observer would be the same: the factor’s past possession is always prior to the arising of its activity, its present possession is simultaneous with the arising of its activity, and its future possession is subsequent to the arising of its activity. In the case of a factor that is future relative to a present observer, its past and present possession are always prior to that factor; however, the future possession of a future factor can be prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to it.

The following chart represents the intersection of these two modes—sequential stages and time periods—of the temporal discrimination of a factor’s possession:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors (Possession)</th>
<th>Time Periods (Possession)</th>
<th>Sequential Stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Prior</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Simultaneous</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Subsequent</td>
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</table>
The theory that each factor can, in principle, have three temporally discriminated varieties of possession was a necessary consequence of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika ontological premise that factors exist as real entities in the three time periods. For example, every conditioned factor that falls within the life-stream of a sentient being arises in the present together with its present possession and a secondary possession of that possession (prāptiprāptī) that serves to connect that possession to the life-stream. When that factor passes away, its possession and the secondary possession of that possession, as discrete conditioned factors, also pass away; the factor as well as its original simultaneous possession and the secondary possession of possession all become past. In the next moment arise both the possession of that past factor and of its original possession as well as the requisite secondary possessions of possession. Since that factor continues to exist as a real entity in the past, it continues to be connected to the life-stream through a stream of possessions until that stream is interrupted. Unconditioned factors present a slightly different case. Though unconditioned factors do not arise themselves, they are, nonetheless, connected to a particular life-stream through a possession that is itself a conditioned factor and, therefore, arises together with a secondary possession of that possession. In subsequent moments, the unconditioned factor will continue to be connected to the life-stream through a stream of possessions.

In describing the abstract possibilities of temporally discriminated varieties of possession, the *Mahāvibhāṣā enumerates four types: (1) possession that arises prior to a factor; (2) possession that arises subsequent to a factor; (3) possession that arises simultaneously with a factor; and (4) possession that cannot be said to arise prior to, simultaneously with, or subsequent to a factor. Actually, however, certain factors are limited to certain types of possession that are prior, simultaneous, or subsequent, as dictated by the nature of their activity or by the conditions under which they are attained. The *Mahāvibhāṣā details these limitations with a list of six types of factors possessed: (1) factors that have only simultaneous possession; (2) factors that have only prior possession; (3) factors that have only simultaneous and subsequent possession; (4) factors that have prior and simultaneous possession; (5) factors that have all three types of pos-
session; and (6) factors whose possession cannot be said to be any of the three.\(^{64}\) In the case of any given factor, restrictions as to its capability of having prior, simultaneous, or subsequent possession thus determine the number of time periods to which its possession may belong.\(^{65}\)

Like possession, non-possession is discriminated according to the three time periods, but with one important qualification: the non-possession of a factor cannot arise simultaneously with that factor. If a factor is present, its possession is also present. Since possession and non-possession are, by nature, contradictory, they cannot be applied to one factor in the same moment. Therefore, present factors are necessarily without present non-possession.\(^{66}\) The *Mahāvibhāṣā thus lists in the abstract only three temporally discriminated varieties of non-possession: (1) non-possession that arises prior to a factor; (2) non-possession that arises subsequent to a factor; and (3) non-possession that cannot be said to arise either prior to or subsequent to a factor. It next details only three varieties of factors to which non-possession is applied: (1) factors that have only prior non-possession; (2) factors that can have prior and subsequent non-possession; and (3) factors whose non-possession cannot be said to be either prior or subsequent.\(^{67}\) The intersection of these two modes of the temporal discrimination of a factor's non-possession is represented in the following chart:\(^{68}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Time Periods</th>
<th>Sequential Stages</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-possession</td>
<td>Past</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Subsequent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

1 Kimura ([1937] 1968) 228. For the frequently used phrase 'attainment of what is not attained' (appattassa pattiyā...), see SA 14 no. 348 p. 98a22, SN 12.22 Dutiya-dasabala-sutta 2: 29; MN no. 118 Ānāpānasattasutta 3: 79ff. For studies of possession and non-possession, see Katō Hiromichi (1984); Katō Hiromichi (1985a); Katō Hiromichi (1985b).

3 For variant lists of dissociated factors, see supra, introductory commentary, “Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought,” notes 18–20. Note that the Dharmaśaṅkhaṇḍha and Prakaraṇaṇḍida include both prāpti and three varieties of acquisition (*pratilābha) in their lists of dissociated forces; the *Abhidharmāṃtraśāstras substitute samanvāgama for prāpti and includes the three varieties of acquisition. One might then assume that prāpti in the lists of the Dharmaśaṅkhaṇḍha and Prakaraṇaṇḍida should be understood as having the meaning of “accompaniment.” The brief definition of prāpti included in the Prakaraṇaṇḍida does not, however, permit a definitive conclusion in this regard.

4 VK 15 p. 606a13ff, passim. The Vījnānakāya devotes an entire chapter to the topic of accompaniment: VK 13 p. 593b7ff.

5 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 402a1ff. For the distinction between present operation (samudācāra) and accompaniment (samanvāgama), see MVB 52 p. 270b11ff., esp. 115 p. 599c22ff., 172 p. 865a10ff.

6 For samanvāgama, see, for example, JP (1544) 7 p. 951a17ff., (1543) 9 p. 812a28ff., MVB 93 p. 479a8ff.; JP (1544) 16 p. 1000b29ff., (1543) p. 878b6ff., MVB 156 p. 792b28. See also Nishi ([1933] 1975b) 462 note 8. For prāpti see, for example, JP (1544) 15 p. 998a17ff., MVB 155 p. 799a6ff.

7 See Sakurabe (1869a) 89–90; MVB 93 p. 479b4ff., 157 p. 796b20ff.

8 PP (1541) 1 p. 628c13, (1542) 1 p. 694a19. In the Sāṅgītāparīṣṭāya (SP 18 p. 442c28ff.), labha is defined as one of eight worldly factors (lokadharma): that is, as the possession, or the past, present, and future acquisition, of objects of the sense organs and of various everyday items. Cf. Sāṅgītāparīṣṭāya, Stache-Rosen (1968) 192. This definition of labha would, however, contradict the later Abhidharma position that prāpti operates only on factors that arise in the life-stream of a sentient being. See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 396c28ff.

9 VSŚ 2 p. 734b28ff.

10 AARS hsia p. 979c3ff.


12 MVB 157 p. 797a18ff.

13 MVB 162 p. 823a20ff. It is difficult to determine the correct equivalent of te as used in this passage. The *Mahāvibhāṣā distinguishes ch'eng-chiu or accompaniment from te, which Hsüan-tsang uses to translate a variety of terms, including both pratilābha, or pratilambha, and prāpti. Given this ambiguity, it is impossible to determine unequivocally that the referent of te here is prāpti. The character, huo, which Hsüan-tsang also uses as a translation for pratilambha, appears in the seventh theory listed here and would lend support to prāpti as the equivalent of te. However, the Abhidharmaśāstra and *Nyāyānusāra (AKB 2.36a–b p. 62.17ff.; infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 396c23ff.) discuss the distinction between pratilambha and samanvāgama using these theories and thereby lend support to pratilambha as the equivalent for te in this passage.


15 AKB 2.36b p. 62.17–18: dvividhā hi prāptir aprāptivīhānasya ca labhaḥ pratilabdhanena ca samanvāgamaḥ. viparyayād aprāptir iti siddham. Cf. AAS hsia p. 986b12ff.;
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Sakurabe (1975b) 162; cf. MVB 93 p. 480b8–9, which attributes to Vasumitra the view that accompaniment means “not to sever.”

16 SAKV p. 143.13ff.

17 SAKV p. 143.34ff.: dvividhā 'prāptir aprāptapuruvānām apratilambhaḥ. prāpta-vihnānām asamānāvagama iti. atha vā 'pratilabdhasya vihnasya cā 'dyāprāptir apratilambhah. apratilabdhenā vihnēna ca dvitīyādiṣu kṣaneṣu asamānāvagama iti. Cf. P'u-kuang 4 p. 855b7ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 536b7ff.

18 Yasomitra does not examine the obvious difficulty of defining such a “first moment” in the non-possession of a factor that has never been attained.

19 Cf. infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 396c26ff.


21 For discussions of the Sarvāstivādin causal models, see MVB 16 p. 79a16ff.; AKB 2.49ff. p. 82.19ff.; NAS 15 p. 416b7ff.

22 See AKB 2.23c p. 54.10: “Only [a factor] included among those constituting sentient beings is produced [necessarily] together with possession, not other [factors],” prāptyā saha sattvākhyam evo 'tpadyate nā 'nyad.... Cf. SAKV p. 127.12–13: kiṁcīt prāptyā saho 'tpadyate yat sattvasaṁskṛhyatāṁ. kiṁcīn na yad asattvasaṁskṛhyatāṁ.... Yasomitra (SAKV p. 127.15–16) explains that “there is no possession of factors included among those not constituting sentient beings,” because they are potentially “shared by all sentient beings:” asattvasaṁskṛhyatāyā prāptir nā 'stī 'ti kim atra kāraṇam. sarvasattvasaṁskṛhyatāt. Cf. AKB 2.36c p. 62.21; infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397a2. However, possession and non-possession can also arise with regard to the unconditioned factors—cessation resulting from consideration and cessation not resulting from consideration—which are included among factors not constituting sentient beings. See SAKV p. 144.16–17, where Yasomitra explains that “even the two varieties of cessation that are classified as factors not included among those constituting sentient beings have possession and non-possession:” pratisamkṛhyānirodhāpratisamkṛhyānirodhayor asattvasaṁskṛhyatāyor api prāptyapraṁptī bhavataḥ.

23 See AKB 2.40d p.66.27ff.; infra, translation, NAS 12 p.400a9ff.

24 Vasubandhu, in his discussion of possession, attributes this function of possession, as a cause for the arising (utpattiḥetu) of factors, to an opponent, whom Yasomitra, in the course of this lengthy argument, identifies as the Vaibhaṣikas. However, Saṅghabhadra, significantly, does not include this generative causal activity as a possible function of possession. Instead, he declares possession to be the cause of the non-disappearance of factors that have been acquired and the marker of the knowledge that “this” belongs to “that.” See infra, translation and notes to NAS 12 p.397b4ff.

25 For pratisamkṛhyānirodha, see MVB 32 p.164b12ff.; NAS 17 p.434b6ff.; de La Vallée Poussin (1930) 16ff., 292ff. For apratisamkṛhyānirodha, see MVB 32 p.161c11ff.; NAS 17 p.430a16ff.; de La Vallée Poussin (1930) 4ff., 272ff. According to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhaṣikas, both cessations are unconditioned factors, and constitute obstructions to the future arising of certain other factors. The cessation resulting from consideration, as will be discussed, is attained through religious praxis and obstructs the arising of defilements. The cessation not resulting from consideration obstructs the arising of virtually any future factor and is attained due to a deficiency of conditions necessary for that factor’s arising. The following common example clarifies this variety of cessation not resulting from consideration. According to Sarvāstivādin doctrine, only one type of perceptual consciousness operates in each moment within a given life-stream. For example, in a particular moment of visual perceptual consciousness, even though other objects of visual consciousness as well as other types of perceptual consciousness and their objects exist in the future, waiting, as it were, to arise, they will not arise because a particular visual perceptual consciousness has already arisen in that moment within the life-stream. Those other objects and types of perceptual consciousness, having missed
their opportunity to arise, are as if at a standstill; though they still exist as intrinsic nature in the future time period, they will be forever incapable of arising. One is then said to have cessation not resulting from consideration with regard to them. See infra, translation and notes to NAS 12 p. 397a4.

26 KV 19.4 p. 581ff. In the commentary, this view is attributed to the Pubbaseliyas: Kathāvatthupakaranā-āṭṭhakathā p. 181.


29 For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a). See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff.

30 For an extensive discussion of cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyanirodha) and its relation to the possession of disconnection (visamyogaprāpti) and nirvāṇa, see MVB 157 p. 796c28ff. Cf. MVB 157 p. 796c28ff.

31 For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

32 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

33 For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a). See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff.

34 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

35 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

36 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

37 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

38 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a27ff. For an examination of the process of abandoning defilements, see Cox (1992a).

39 Other Abhidharma schools, for example, the Vibhajayavādins or Vatsiputryās, propose that defilements themselves were dissociated from thought: MVB 50 p. 257b18ff., 60 p. 312a1ff.; VB 3 p. 436b17ff. See also Sasaki (1975) 104ff.; Sakamoto (1981) 382ff.


41 This is the objection found in the Abhidharmavatārasāstra: AAS hsia p. 986b2ff.; Sakurabe (1975) 162.


43 AKB 2.36d p. 63.19; SAKV p. 147.5ff. See also Fujaku 3 p. 136b13ff.

44 Though it is difficult to trace the development of the seed theory prior to its use by Vasubandhu, it does appear in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (see Nishi (1938) 1975d) and in the *Sāmyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-sāstra (SAHS 4 p. 907c14ff.) in contexts that would appear to constitute incipient stages in its development. The earliest sources that describe in detail the dynamics of the seed theory are Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosābhäṣya, and Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, and Sanghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra, which ascribes the seed theory to the Dārṣṭāntikas: AKB 2.36d p. 63.20, 5.2a p. 278.20ff., 9 p. 477.10ff.; Karma-siddhiprakaraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 783c20ff.; Yamaguchi ([1951] 1975b) 165ff.; Lamotte (1936) 166ff.; infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b7ff., 13 p. 404a8ff., 17 p. 430a23ff., 34 p. 535a25ff., 49 p. 597a2ff., 51 p. 627a19ff., 51 p. 629b2ff. For the seed theory, or similar theories as proposed by other sects, see Yüki (1935) 32–54; Samayabhedoparacanacakra
Vatsyayana, who identifies the contaminant with the subsidiary element functions as the cause to produce active defilements: Vasubandhu (1982). Kawamura Kōshō examines the seed theory presented by Vasubandhu in terms of its consistency with references to seeds in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, or with the Sautrāntika views presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Kawamura (1962).

AKB 5.2a p. 278.21ff. See also Hyōdō (1980) 69–73, who argues for a distinction in Vasubandhu’s interpretation between the seeds (bīja), or the aggregates themselves, and the seed-state (bījakāya), or the potential of those aggregates to produce an effect, a distinction not explicitly recognized by Yasōmitra or in Hsüan-tsang’s translation. This distinction, Hyōdō contends, suggests that Vasubandhu recognized the actual existence of seeds, but not of the seed-state. For those like Yasōmitra who appear to identify the seed and the seed-state, both would be merely provisional. Hyōdō also suggests that this distinction between bīja and bījakāya does not reflect the original Sautrāntika position, but rather represents Vasubandhu’s own innovation within the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, an innovation that results, Hyōdō claims, from Vasubandhu’s assumption that causes must be real entities.

See Hyōdō (1980) 76–82; Sakurabe (1979) 300. The mechanism by which a seed transmits its potential is expressed in the compound sārūtātipariṇāmanaviśeṣa. The interpretation of this compound has traditionally been the subject of heated controversy, which continues in contemporary scholarship: Yūn-yü 9 p. 236c10ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 87a5ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 537a20ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 319a2ff.; Tan’e 4 p. 862a9ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 138a4ff.; Kaido 4 p. 90b14ff.; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Saeki ([1886] 1978) 1: 183–184. Vasubandhu’s own interpretation (AKB 9 p. 477.18ff.) is as follows: “That generation of successive moments of thought preceded by action is the life-stream. Transformation is the arising of that [life-stream] in such a way that there is change. Further, that capability of producing an effect in immediate succession is the distinctive characteristic in the transformation because it has distinguished the last [moment of the] transformation.”

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, sa punar yo ‘ntarāṃ phalotpādanasmartahāḥ so ‘ntapariṇāmanaviśeṣatvāḥ parīnāmanaviśeṣaḥ. See also Sakurabe (1980) 108; NAS 35 p. 54c15ff., 51 p. 629b2ff. Hyōdō Kazuo (Hyōdō (1980) 83–85) suggests that even though bīja and sārūtātipariṇāmanaviśeṣa appear together in this definition of the seed (see AKB 2.36d p. 64.5ff.), Vasubandhu uses them in different contexts. That is to say, seed terminology is used in cases of homogeneous causation (sābhāgāhetau) in the production of effects of uniform outflow (*nīsyandaphala), as would be suggested by the seed-sprout analogy; the distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream is used in cases of heterogeneous causation, as in the arising of matured effects (*vipakaphala) from causes of maturation (*vipākahetau), or action.


See infra, translation and notes to NAS 12 p. 398b28–29, 17 p. 430a23ff., 34 p. 535a23–24, 51 p. 627a19–20. For the Viśṣṭiputriya position that contaminants are dissociated, see MVB 2 b.8b23; NAS 45 p. 599b28ff.; SAKV p. 444.3ff. For the Mahāsāṃghika view, see Vasumitra’s *Samayabhedaoparacanacakra T 49 (2031) p. 15c28ff.; Masuda (1925) 30; *Samayabhedaoparacanacakra, Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1974) 34. Cf. the position of Sthāvira, or Śrīlāta, who identifies the contaminant with the subsidiary element (*anudhiṭṭha), which then functions as the cause to produce active defilements: NAS 45 p. 597b27ff.; MVB 60 p. 313a1ff. Cf. NAS 45 p. 598c16ff. Étienne Lamotte (Lamotte (1974) 91–104) examines
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the distinction between defilements (*klesa*) and their traces (*vāsanā*) in early Buddhist and Abhidharma texts. For the view of the Sautrāntikas that *anusaya* are latent seed-states, see *AKB* 5.2a p. 278.17ff.

52 See *AKB* 2.36d p. 63.11ff. Vasubandhu attempts to criticize the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of possession on this basis.

53 For a reference to seeds in contrast to the Sarvāstivādin *avijñaptirūpa*, see *AHŚ-D* 1 p. 812c3–4. For a reference to seeds in an argument concerning the operation of defilements, see *SAHŚ* 4 p. 907c12ff.; *NAS* 45 p. 597a2ff. The *Kathāvatthu* (9.4 p. 356ff., 11.1 p. 387ff., 14.5 p. 433ff.) indicates the possible origins of the seed theory in controversies concerning the nature of defilements, or latent defilements, and their continuity within a life-stream.

54 See *AKB* 2.37a p. 64.13ff.; *infra*, translation and notes to *NAS* 12 p. 398c1ff.

55 For a detailed explanation of the differing commentarial interpretations, see Kaidō 4 p. 91b24ff. See also Yüan-yü 9 p. 239a2ff.; P'ū-kuang 4 p. 87c5ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 537c15ff.; Shūshō 7 p. 158b20ff.; Tan'e 4 p. 862b27ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 139a12ff. Cf. *SAKV* p. 150.11ff.

56 See *AKB* 2.37a 64.13; *infra*, translation, *NAS* 12 p. 398c3.

57 For these two possibilities, see Fa-pao 4 p. 537c16ff.

58 The *Mahāvibhaṣa* (*MVB* 157 p. 796a26ff.) presents a detailed analysis of the various possibilities for each of the three categories of past, present, or future factors.

59 Since future factors have not yet arisen, they are not as yet ordered, and one cannot, strictly speaking, determine priority, simultaneity, or posteriority among them. See P'ū-kuang 4 p. 87c11ff.


61 Thus, in this next moment, six possessions arise with regard to the original factor, its possession, and the possession of that possession: that is, the three subsequent possessions of the original factor, of its possession, and of its secondary possession, and the three secondary possessions of these three possessions. In the third moment, eighteen possessions would arise, and so on. This explosion of possessions required to connect any factor to a life-stream becomes one of Vasubandhu's major criticisms of the Sarvāstivādin theory of the secondary possession of possession: *AKB* 2.40d p. 673ff.; *SAKV* p. 156.8ff.

62 Since unconditioned factors do not arise, they cannot be characterized temporally; therefore, they cannot serve as the basis for a temporal discrimination of their possession as prior, simultaneous, or subsequent: *MVB* 158 p. 802a2ff.

63 *MVB* 158 p. 801c23ff.

64 The *Mahāvibhaṣa* (*MVB* 158 p. 802a4ff.) then notes that no factor has only subsequent possession, because if the possession of a factor can be described temporally (that of unconditioned factors cannot, and hence the sixth category), it has simultaneous possession when it is present. The second category of factors that have only prior possession refers to factors that are considered to be incapable of arising. See P'ū-kuang 4 p. 87c28; Shūshō 7 p. 159a21ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 140 (chart).

65 For examples, see *MVB* 157 p. 797a28ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 239b16ff.; P'ū-kuang 4 p. 88c15ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 538c4ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 320a4ff.; Shūshō 7 p. 161a6ff.; *AAŚ hst* p. 986b22ff.

66 *MVB* 157 p. 799a21ff.; *ASPŚ* 7 p. 804c29ff.

67 *MVB* 158 p. 802a5ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 143.

Chapter 6

Homogeneous Character

6.1 Homogeneous Character of Sentient Beings

Descriptions of homogeneous character (sabhāgatā, nīkāyasabhāga) in early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts provide the essential context for understanding the later interpretations of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. Even though Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra both define homogeneous character as “the mutual similarity of sentient beings” (sattvānāṁ sādṛṣyam), the earlier Abhidharma texts clearly suggest that homogeneous character does not represent merely an abstract principle of universality or homogeneity by which entities are recognized as members of the same category or class. The Dharmaskandha, Saṅgītiparyāya, and Jñānaprasthāna discuss the role of homogeneous character in reference to the rebirth process and list it among the causes that determine the specific rebirth state of sentient beings.

The role of homogeneous character in the rebirth process is expanded in later texts where homogeneous character is given the function of determining, in addition to the specific rebirth state, also the realm, mode of birth, region, family, and distinguishing physical attributes of sentient beings. Continuing this tradition, Saṅghabhadra defines homogeneous character as “the cause of the mutual similarity of the body, the appearance, the various controlling faculties, the modes of behavior, and the sustenance, and so on, or the cause of the mutually similar aspirations of the various categories of sentient beings born in the same rebirth state.” Since homogeneous character is applied to both mental and material factors, it cannot be classified exclusively within the category of either mental or material factors; further, since the Abhidharma taxonomy does not permit factors to be assigned to
more than one category, it can only be included among factors dissociated from both thought and form.

These definitions of homogeneous character, as the reason for apparent similarity among beings in a given rebirth state, clearly suggest that it applies only to sentient beings, and not to insentient matter. Sentient beings are born through a particular mode of birth, into a particular rebirth state, in a particular realm or region, with a particular caste, or as male, female, and so on; each condition is determined by a specific type of homogeneous character. Thus, each sentient being is characterized by several types of homogeneous character.

In his presentation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of the homogeneous character of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgatā), Vasubandhu lists two categories: namely, general homogeneous character (abhinna), which determines one’s status as a sentient being as distinct from insentient matter; and specific homogeneous character (bhinna), which determines the characteristic that defines the commonality of a particular group and distinguishes that group from others. These two categories of general and specific homogeneous character are significantly absent in Saṅghabhadra’s own presentation. In particular, the isolation of a discrete category of general homogeneous character indicates a level of abstraction in Vasubandhu’s conception of homogeneous character not found in earlier Sarvāstivādin texts. Purporting to represent the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position, Vasubandhu provides justification for this general homogeneous character: “If the homogeneous character of sentient beings did not exist as a non-particular real entity, there would be no notion (buddhi) nor provisional designation (prajñāpatti), ‘sentient beings’ in general, with regard to sentient beings who are specified through mutual distinctions.” In other words, without a super-category of “homogeneous character” in general, it would be impossible to conceive or utilize the specific instances of homogeneous character. Vasubandhu is clearly interpreting homogeneous character as a universal or class concept that is proposed in order to define discrete categories. He then attempts to use this supposed Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position of a “general homogeneous character” in his criticism of the existence of homogeneous character as a real entity. Vasubandhu proposes that a further universal homogeneous character would be required to provide the object-referent for all general and specific varieties of homogeneous character; that is, the notion or designation of homogeneous character in itself would require a separately existing object-referent. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of homogeneous character would then incur the fault of infinite regress.

In his definition of homogeneous character, Saṅghabhadra does not include an appeal to a general homogeneous character as the basis for the
notion or provisional designation of the category of all sentient beings nor does he accept the need for an abstract universal concept of homogeneous character. Instead, Saṅghabhadra emphasizes the discriminating function of homogeneous character as the cause for distinctions among sentient beings. The existence of homogeneous character as a discrete factor is then inferred from this causal activity and the notion of homogeneous character in the abstract arises on the basis of its discriminating function or its observed activity as the cause of similarity among things in the same category.  

Vasubandhu indicates his own rejection of homogeneous character as a real entity by presenting five objections to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśeṣika position: (1) homogeneous character is not different from the nature of an ordinary person; (2) since homogeneous character has no form and cannot be directly perceived, its activity cannot be known; (3) the homogeneous character of insentient objects should also be admitted; (4) since another homogeneous character is required to account for the similarity among all varieties of homogeneous character, infinite regress would result; and (5) homogeneous character is nothing other than the Vaiśeṣika categories of generality (sāmānyā) or of particular generalities (sāmānyaviśeṣa).  

Vasubandhu interprets the term sabhāgata used in the sūtra, not as referring to a discrete real entity, but rather as referring to “conditioned forces of a certain nature to which the designations ‘human,’ and so on, are provisionally applied much in the same way as homogeneity is applied to rice, and so on.” The wide gulf between Vasubandhu’s and Saṅghabhadra’s interpretations of sabhāgata is suggested in their interpretations of the term nīkāyasabhāga as used in the discussion of the dissociated force, vitality (jīvita). Vasubandhu defines life (āyus), a synonym of vitality, as the “momentum of the period of abiding of the nīkāyasabhāga.” However, it would appear that Vasubandhu does not use this term nīkāyasabhāga to refer to a discrete real entity, specifically; the dissociated force “homogeneous character of the group” proposed by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśeṣikas. Yaśomitra, reverting to Vasubandhu’s interpretation of sabhāgata quoted previously, glosses the term nīkāyasabhāga here as “conditioned forces of a certain nature having the aggregate of form, and so on, as their intrinsic nature.” Saṅghabhadra, no doubt considering Vasubandhu’s use of the now technical Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśeṣika term nīkāyasabhāga in the non-technical sense of “conditioned forces of a certain nature” of which a life-stream consists to be ambiguous, replaces it with a phrase better reflecting Vasubandhu’s own interpretation of the term: that is, “the six sense organs together with their basis.” Thus, Vasubandhu assumes that nīkāyasabhāga, even in its technical sense as a dissociated factor, is merely a provisional or hypotheti-
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6.2 Homogeneous Character of Factors

In the earlier Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, homogeneous character is clearly used only in reference to sentient beings. Vasubandhu, however, divides sabhāgata into two types: (1) homogeneous character of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgata); and (2) homogeneous character of factors (dharmanasabhāgata). This second type of homogeneous character of factors is explained as applying to the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve sense spheres (āyatana), and the eighteen elements (dhatu). Since external in-
sentient objects are also included within these three categories, the second type of homogeneous character of factors could indicate an extension of homogeneous character beyond the realm of sentient beings. It would no longer function to explain the process of rebirth, but would refer to an abstract notion of similarity intersecting all entities, sentient and insentient alike. Indeed, Vasubandhu’s intentions in suggesting this second type of homogeneous character of factors are not clear. Saṅghabhadra, however, in the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā, suggests that the homogeneous character of factors refers only to those aggregates, and so on, that are included among factors constituting sentient beings (sattvākhya).16

Though the earliest reference to the homogeneous character of factors (dharmasabhāgata) would appear to be in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, its origins can possibly be traced to the three varieties of acquisition enumerated in earlier Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts as discrete forces dissociated from thought: that is, the acquisition of the given entity (*vastupratilābha), acquisition of the corporeal basis (*āśrayapratilābha, *upadhipratilābha), and the acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatana-pratilābha).17 These three are also referred to, respectively, as acquisition of the aggregates (*skaṇḍhapratilābha), acquisition of the elements (*dhatupratilābha), and acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatana-pratilābha).18 In the early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, these three varieties of acquisition are mentioned immediately after homogeneous character in a list of factors that determine the characteristics of each particular rebirth state and, therefore, are instrumental in the process of rebirth. It is possible that these three were then subsumed within the immediately prior member of homogeneous character in order to represent “homogeneous character” as applied to factors (dharmasabhāgata): specifically, homogeneous character of the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve sense spheres (āyatana), and the eighteen elements (dhatu).

Notes


3 AARŚ p. 979c9ff.; AHS-D 4 p. 831a1ff.; AHS-U 6 p. 866a13-14; SAHS 9 p. 943a16ff.; AAS hsta p. 987b4ff. See also infra, translation and notes to NAS 12 p. 400a20.

4 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400a18ff.; cf. SAKV p. 159.9-11.

5 AKB 2.41a p. 67.16ff.; AAS hsta p. 987b5ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 150b12ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 97c18ff. See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 93a7ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 541a18ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 323b5ff. P’u-kuang (P’u-kuang 5 p. 93a28) suggests that these two categories of general and
specific homogeneous character should be applied to the homogeneous character of factors (dharma-sabhāgata) as well as to the homogeneous character of sentient beings (sattva-sabhāgata).

6 AKB 2.41a p. 67.19-20: yadi sattva-sabhāgata dravyam aviśeṣītaṁ na syāt anyo-
nya aviśeṣabhinneṣu sattva-sattva ity abhedena buddhir na syāt prajñāptiś ca. Cf. SAKV p. 157.18ff. Shen-t’ai (Shen-t’ai 5 p. 323c4ff.) suggests that this can be understood as a Vaibhāṣika response to a rejection of the existence of homogeneous character. That is to say, according to Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory, notions and provisional designations inevitably rely upon real entities. If the “homogeneous character of sentient beings” did not actually exist as the referent of this notion and provisional designation, the notion and provisional designation also would be impossible.

7 AKB 2.41a p. 68.3-4; SAKV p. 158.26ff.

8 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400b28ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 243c1ff.

9 See AKB 2.41a p. 67.25ff.; SAKV p. 158.8ff.; infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 405b4ff.

10 AKB 2.41a p. 68.9ff.: kā tarhi sā. ta eva hi tathābhūtāḥ saṁskārā yeṣu manuṣyā- 
dīprajñaptih śālyādiṣu saṁbhāgata-vāt. Vasubandhu may be echoing here a non-technical meaning of the term nikāya-sabhāga as the conditioned forces, or aggregates, or the homogeneous collection of components constituting one sentient being during the period of one existence. Certainly, many passages in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (AKB 4.95 p. 258.11ff.) and *Nyāyānusāra (infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 412a7ff.) suggest this non-technical sense.

11 AKB 2.45a-b p. 74.4ff.: ...nikāya-sabhāgasya sthitikālāvedah.

12 SAKV p. 168.30-31: ...ta eva tathābhūtāḥ saṁskārā rūpādiśandhasvabhāva 
īti.


14 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400a23ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 242c15ff.


17 See DS 10 p. 500c21; SP 11 p. 415c19; PP (1541) 1 p. 627a20, (1541) 1 p. 628c20ff. and (1542) 1 p. 692c7, (1542) 1 p. 694a24ff., which gloss *vastupratībhāha as *skandhapratībhāha; *Pañcavastuka [Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shih lun] T 28 (1556) p. 995c22; *Pañcavastuka [A-p’i-t’an wu fa hsing ching] T 28 (1557?) p. 998c24-25; AARS hsia p. 979c1; Imanishi (1969) 8.

Chapter 7

Non-conception and the Two States of Equipoise

The state of non-conception (āsarṣṭā) (nirdhasamāpatti) and states of equipoise without thought (acittakasamāpatti) have deep roots within early Buddhist and non-Buddhist meditative practice. 1 Evidence for the practice of states of equipoise of this type within the non-Buddhist Indian religious milieu is found in the canonical reports that the Buddha, prior to his enlightenment, learned the meditative practice of entering the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (naivasamāṇānāsāṃjñāyatana) from the wandering ascetic, Udraka Rāmaputra. 2 This sphere of neither conception nor non-conception is also assimilated into several early Buddhist cosmological and meditational taxonomies: for example, the nine stages of beings (sattvāvāsa) that include the state of non-conception as the fifth and the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception as the ninth and final stage; 3 or, the eight liberations (vimokṣa) that include the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception as the seventh liberation followed by the cessation of conception and feelings (sāṃjñāveditanirodha) as the eighth. 4 Perhaps the most frequently encountered schema is that of the four spheres within the formless realm, which are incorporated into nine successive meditative abodes (anupūrvavāthāra) also referred to as the nine successive states of equipoise (anupūrvasamāpatti): these nine states combine the four levels of trance of the realm of form, the four spheres of the formless realm, including the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, and the cessation of conception and feelings as the ninth. 5

Given their similarity as states without thought, the rebirth state of non-conception as well as the two states of the equipoise of non-conception and of cessation were elaborated analogously within the later northern In-
The primary focus of these analyses is a detailed explication of the various qualities of each state according to a standard Abhidharma taxonomy of characteristics. The characteristics considered include the state's character as cause or effect, its location, the type of practitioner who cultivates it, its moral quality, and its type of possession. In Abhidharma analysis, such a determination of the specific characteristics of a particular factor constitutes its definition, which is implemented through categorization in relation to the other factors constituting experience and through clear placement in the fabric of Abhidharma classification.

Given the similar character of these three states without thought, Abhidharma taxonomical analysis devotes particular attention to the similarities and distinctions among them. Whereas all three are similar as states in which thought is extinguished, the two states of equipoise are meditative states that are developed through application and are causes that produce an effect. By contrast, the state of non-conception is attained through rebirth and is an effect, specifically of the equipoise of non-conception. The two states of equipoise can be further distinguished from one another on the basis of the region in which they occur, their intended purpose, their specific effects, the time of the maturation of their effects, and the practitioners who cultivate them. The last point concerning the difference in practitioners is historically and doctrinally significant because it reveals where each of these states without thought stands in relation to the final soteriological goal.

7.1 States Without Thought—Controversies in Interpretation

While the northern Indian Abhidharma schools generally accepted the possibility of meditative states without thought and shared the enumeration of their specific qualities, they disagreed concerning the character and functioning of such states. These disagreements can be correlated with fundamental differences of opinion on issues of ontology, causation, and psychological modelling. The primary participants in these arguments can be divided into two groups: on the one hand, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, represented by Saṅghabhadra and, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, by Ghoṣaka; on the other hand, the Dārṣṭāntikas, who share the views of Vasumitra cited
in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the ancient masters, whom Yaśomitra identifies as the Sautrāntikas, and finally Vasubandhu.  

**Factors that Induce States Without Thought—Existential Status and Activity**

The first area of disagreement between these two groups concerns the existential status accorded states without thought. The apparent disappearance of thought, experienced in meditative practice, compelled the Sarvāstivādins to propose discrete factors with the capability of inducing this disappearance. The discrete and real existence of these factors was thus held to be proven by inference as a result of their activity, which is experienced in meditative states without thought. The Sarvāstivādins proposed three discrete factors, corresponding to each of the recognized states without thought: that is, the rebirth state of non-conception (*āsamatājñānīka*), the equipoise of non-conception (*asamatājñānasamāpatti*), and the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). Though these three factors are distinguished by their location, the practitioner who produces them, their intended purpose, and so on, they all perform the same activity of obstructing the arising of thought. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihāsikas, this activity entails the obstruction of both the single thought factor (*citta*) that demarcates each moment of the mental stream and the simultaneous and associated thought concomitants (*cāitta*) that represent the various mental events operating in each moment.

Like all conditioned factors, these discrete factors that induce states without thought arise and pass away in each moment and obstruct only the arising of thought in that particular moment. However, as long as the series of such factors projected by prior application continues within a given life-stream, thought will not arise. These discrete factors that induce states without thought are not themselves of the nature of thought; and yet, as states pertaining to the psychic stream, they are not form. Thus, they can only be classified within the category of factors dissociated from both thought and form.

Though Vasubandhu accepted the possibility of meditative states without thought, he disagreed with the Sarvāstivādin hypostatization of discrete factors that function to cause these states. For Vasubandhu, the activity of obstructing the arising of moments of thought need not be attributed to a state of equipoise or a state of non-conception postulated as a discrete factor. Instead, the function of obstruction is performed by the moment of thought immediately preceding the state in which thought does not arise. This prior moment of thought arises opposed to other states of thought and
produces a corporeal basis that is similarly opposed to other moments of thought. Successive moments of the corporeal basis continue to obstruct the operation of thought for a period of time determined by the force of that prior moment of thought. Thus, according to Vasubandhu’s interpretation, the two states of equipoise and the state of non-conception postulated by the Sarvāstivādins are simply provisional designations that describe the condition of the non-operation of thought (apravṛttimātra); they do not exist as real entities.¹¹

The Arising of States Without Thought in Religious Praxis

Saṅghabhadra devotes a long section in his discussion of the equipoise of cessation to the problem, raised in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, of when, and indeed, whether or not a noble one actually gives rise to this equipoise.¹² The problem arises from an internal contradiction in Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine. The contradiction results from the preservation by the tradition of a vast array of doctrinal interpretations that, at a later time, came into conflict with the independently growing doctrinal edifice. The discussion of this seemingly obscure doctrinal point provides an excellent example of the type of issue and the methods of argument that form the bulk and, indeed, the core of Abhidharma analyses. Despite their obvious importance in the traditional materials, the intricate doctrinal contradictions and the sometimes seemingly unconvincing methods of argument employed in this and other doctrinal analyses are often ignored in contemporary scholarship for more accessible or generalized problems that permit a simpler characterization of the “Abhidharma perspective.”

In this case, the underlying problem, simply put, is that the equipoise of cessation is held to be practiced only by noble ones—that is, practitioners in the noble path of vision (darsanamārga)—and yet the Sarvāstivādin soteriological model also maintains that one attains enlightenment in thirty-four consecutive moments from the very first moment of entering the noble path until the final stage of realizing the knowledge of the destruction of all defilements that constitutes enlightenment. How then would it be possible for a noble one, who has already begun the series of thirty-four moments, to interrupt practice in order to enter the equipoise of cessation?

This problem is raised in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, specifically in the context of the Buddha’s own acquisition of the equipoise of cessation. Unlike other practitioners, for whom the equipoise of cessation is said to be attained only through application (prāyogika), the Buddha acquires the equipoise of cessation, and indeed all qualities, through detachment (vairāgya). In interpreting the Buddha’s acquisition of the equipoise of
cessation, Saṅghabhadra utilizes the Sarvāstivādin theory of possession, and notes that, strictly speaking, one should not use the term 'acquisition' in this case, since the acquisition of this equipoise, in the technical sense of the term, occurs in the moment prior to buddhahood when one is still a bodhisattva. However, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmira, even in that moment prior to enlightenment when the equipoise of cessation is said to be "acquired," the bodhisattva does not actually enter it because the path of practice in thirty-four consecutive moments cannot be interrupted. Nevertheless, the Buddha, and by implication all practitioners who reach that final stage of bodhisattvahood, can be described as having "entered" the equipoise of cessation in the sense that they have mastery over it, or have removed their non-accompaniment of it.

Thus; even though the soteriological model of a path of thirty-four consecutive moments would preclude actually entering the equipoise of cessation, this equipoise is not discarded by the tradition. Instead, the equipoise of cessation is preserved in the array of practices constituting the attainment of a noble one, but only by recourse to the theory of possession, or here accompaniment, originally intended for other purposes.

The Arising of Thought after States Without Thought

Accounting for the activity of obstructing other moments of thought and determining whether or not various practitioners can give rise to states without thought are straightforward compared to the much greater problem of explaining how thought, once obstructed, arises once again. The solutions to this problem offered by the various schools reflect and undoubtedly contributed to the differing psychological models that each accepted. These psychological models in turn shaped each school's understanding of the specific character of the state without thought.

For all schools, the duration of the states without thought is determined by the force of the original application through which such states were produced. Schools differ, however, with regard to the direct cause or condition for the reappearance of thought. For the Sarvāstivādins, the arising of perceptual consciousness in all cases—whether under ordinary circumstances in a series of moments all characterized by thought or after an interval without thought—depends upon the presence of three requisite conditions: an appropriate sense organ, which serves as the basis (āśraya); its corresponding object-field, which serves as the object-support (ālambana); and the contiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya), that is, the prior moment of thought. However, a special problem arises in the case of states without thought. Since the mental series of contiguous conditioning is interrupted once a single moment of thought does not arise, there would appear to be
no immediately contiguous condition, and thus a necessary condition for the arising of thought would be absent. How can the third requisite condition of a contiguous moment of thought be satisfied and thought resume once again?

Saṅghabhadra, characteristically representing but expanding upon the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas position, attributes this contiguous conditioning efficacy to the moment of thought immediately prior to the arising of the state without thought. Despite the temporally intervening state without thought, that immediately prior moment of thought itself, he claims, acts as the contiguous condition for the subsequent arising of thought. Like all factors, that prior moment of thought exists as a real entity in the three time periods of past, present, and future. Even when it is past—that is, when its activity is past—it exists as intrinsic nature; as an existent factor it is capable of exerting conditioning capability. This prior moment of thought, though separated by a temporal interval from thought that arises after the state without thought, can be referred to as a “contiguous condition” because no other moment of thought nor any thought concomitant that can serve as a contiguous condition intervenes. As Saṅghabhadra explains, “contiguity” (samanantara), perhaps here better translated as “proximity,” must be distinguished from “immediate succession” (anantara). “Contiguity” or “proximity” refers simply to the fact that a subsequent factor is produced directly, without any similar intervening factor, through the power of a prior moment of thought; “immediate succession” refers to the fact that there are no intervening moments. Thus, for Saṅghabhadra, “contiguous conditioning” would apply so long as the conditioning relation is direct—that is, with no similar condition intervening—regardless of any temporal interval.

In contrast to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the ancient masters, whom Yasomitra identifies as the Sautrāntikas, and Vasubandhu suggest that the conditioning efficacy for the arising of the subsequent moment of thought lies not in the moment of thought prior to the state without thought, but rather in the successive moments of the corporeal basis that continue as a substratum throughout the state without thought. They suggest that the arising of thought after a state without thought is analogous to the arising of form after existence in the formless realm. That is to say, in the case of one reborn after existence in the formless realm, form arises once again, not from previous form, but from the mental series that continues throughout existence in the formless realm; so also for one emerging from a state without thought, thought arises once again not from thought, but from the body possessed of sense organs that provides the basis throughout the state without thought. This mutual conditioning of thought and the body possessed of sense organs is explained through an appeal to the seed
7.1.3 Subsequent Arising of Thought

theory. The body possessed of sense organs and thought are claimed to contain each others seeds; therefore, thought would arise once again after an interval without thought from its own seeds latent within the corporeal basis. Specifically, prior to the arising of the state without thought, a particular moment of thought deposits its own seeds within the body; these seeds condition the body in such a way that the arising of other moments of thought is temporarily prevented. At a later time, the mental stream arises again from still other seeds of thought lying dormant within the body.

A third solution to the problem of the arising of thought after states without thought is presented by the Dārśāntikas, whose views are represented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasumitra. According to their view, thought is not completely extinguished while in the so-called “states without thought;” instead, such states should be said to have thought (sacittaka), or to have subtle thought (*sūkṣmacitta). Therefore, upon rebirth from the state of non-conception or upon emerging from the equipoise of non-conception or the equipoise of cessation, the mental stream resumes ordinary operation, conditioned by a stream of subtle thought that continues throughout those states.

Clearly, this Dārśāntika view assumes a model of psychological functioning different from that of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. Central to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model is the claim that each moment in the mental series is characterized by a single instance of thought as well as by numerous thought concomitants, all of which exist as discrete real entities. From the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perspective, thought and thought concomitants are distinct, and yet are associated with one another (samprayukta), necessarily arising together in each moment. Thus, if thought is said to be extinguished in states without thought, all manner of thought concomitants must also cease.

It is far more difficult to characterize the Dārśāntika psychological model because several models of psychological functioning are attributed to the Dārśāntikas or to masters aligned with the Dārśāntika school. For example, the *Mahāvibhāṣā cites the Dārśāntikas in general as maintaining that mental operations, or mental forces—a general term for any type of psychological event, including all thought or thought concomitants as discriminated by other schools or masters—occur only successively, and not together in one moment. The Dārśāntikas are also cited as identifying certain of the discrete thought concomitants recognized by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas as varieties of thought: for example, initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra), or volition (cetanā) and discernment all are identified with thought. Though the *Mahāvibhāṣā does not describe the Dārśāntikas in general as equating all thought concomitants with thought, the *Nyāyānusāra cites the Dārśāntikas as rejecting any distinct
thought concomitants. In the *Mahāvibhaṣa, this more radical view that all thought concomitants are to be identified with thought is attributed to a master, Buddhadeva, affiliated with the Dārśāntika school. His view is contrasted with that of Dharmatṛata, whose views are also often similar to those associated with the Dārśāntika school. Dharmatṛata identifies thought and thought concomitants as varieties of volition (cetanā). Like the Dārśāntika view cited above that identifies both volition and discernment with thought, Dharmatṛata’s view that identifies thought and thought concomitants with volition leaves open the possibility that certain thought concomitants could be recognized to exist independently of thought. Indeed, this is precisely the position that Saṅghabhadra attributes to the Dārśāntika master, Śrīlāta, who is said to reject all thought concomitants except for three: feelings (vedana), conception (saṁjñā), and volition (cetanā). Śrīlāta is described as supporting a serial model for the operation of mental forces: specifically, that the sense organ and the object-field in the first moment condition the arising of perceptual consciousness in the second moment, and the collocation of the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness, condition the successive arising of the three thought concomitants of feelings, concepts, and volition, in the third and subsequent moments.

The Dārśāntikas are cited in Saṅghabhadra’s discussion of states without thought as raising the objection that only conception and feelings are extinguished in the equipoise of cessation. Unfortunately, the identity of this particular group of Dārśāntikas cannot be determined with certainty. This objection would appear to arise, in part, from the alternative name of the equipoise of cessation—the cessation of conception and feelings (saṁjñāvedītaniruddha). The Dārśāntikas offer four reasons for their objection. The first reason states unequivocally that there are no sentient beings who are without thought; therefore, only certain mental forces, namely, conception and feelings, are extinguished in the equipoise of cessation. The second reason suggests that if perceptual consciousness (vijñāna) were absent in these states, the practitioners would be dead; this reason clearly implies that perceptual consciousness is the quality that determines life. The final two reasons rely upon scriptural authorities that the Dārśāntikas claim preclude the possibility of perceptual consciousness being absent in these states. These four reasons would suggest that this particular group of Dārśāntikas assumes the presence of perceptual consciousness or thought in some form throughout the so-called “states without thought.”

To this Dārśāntika objection, Saṅghabhadra first offers a general response that hinges upon the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika psychological model and its assumption that thought and thought concomitants cannot arise
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separately from the other. Further, according to the Sarvāstivādin classification of thought concomitants, both conception and feelings are included among the ten mental factors that arise in every moment of thought. Therefore, it would be impossible for perceptual consciousness, or indeed any other thought concomitants to arise without conception and feelings. This Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model contrasts with the Dārśāntika model, which proposes the sequential arising of mental events. Indeed, as the argument progresses, Saṅghabhadra records the view of an opponent, presumably still a Dārśāntika, who suggests that the very thought concomitants of conception and feeling at issue here arise sequentially. 31

Saṅghabhadra next offers specific responses to the individual reasons put forth by the Dārśāntikas. In the case of the first reason that there are no sentient beings without thought, Saṅghabhadra uses a method of argument common in Abhidharma texts of making explicit certain undesirable consequences that would result if a position were accepted. Against the second reason that states without thought cannot be distinguished from death, Saṅghabhadra distinguishes life from death by appealing to another discrete factor, vitality (jīvita), recognized by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. Finally, for the third and fourth reasons, Saṅghabhadra reinterprets the scriptural passages cited by the Dārśāntikas in such a way that perceptual consciousness would be permitted to be absent. 32

The Dārśāntika objection that only conception and feelings are extinguished in the equipoise of cessation would leave open the possibility that some other thought concomitants or that a subtle variety of thought remains in these states said to be “without thought.” The latter possibility that subtle thought is not extinguished in the equipoise of non-conception or cessation is supported by the view attributed to the Dārśāntikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣa. 33 It also conforms to the view of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra that thought and thought concomitants are subtle and difficult to perceive in these states, which are, therefore, only provisionally described as “without thought.” 34 However, the opinion of the Dārśāntika master, Śrīlātā, on this point is less clear; His views are not explicitly cited in the discussion of states without thought, but elsewhere in the *Nyāyānusāra, Śrīlātā is cited as suggesting that thought and thought concomitants do not arise in states said to be without thought. 35

Saṅghabhadra’s lengthy treatment of the divergent opinions concerning the possibility of interrupting the mental stream and concerning the mechanism by which it resumes reveals the importance of these states without thought in the development of Buddhist doctrine. Indeed, it is precisely specific issues such as this that provide the catalyst for major shifts of doctrinal interpretation and the creation of new doctrinal and psychological models. In this case, the various Dārśāntika theories prefigure the later
theories of layers of mental awareness and a subtle form of thought or store-consciousness (ālayavijñāna). The detailed controversies presented in the *Nyāyānusāra offer both a more extensive treatment of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position characteristic of earlier Abhidharma sources as well as transitional material that helps to clarify the context in which the later contending models of psychological functioning arose.

Notes

1 For an examination of the relation between Buddhist and non-Buddhist "mainstream" meditative practice and, specifically, of the possibility that the four formless spheres, including the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, were of non-Buddhist origin, see Bronkhorst (1986) esp. 75ff.

2 See MN no. 26 Ariyapariyesanasutta 1: 165, no. 36 Mahāsaccakasutta 1: 240, no. 100 Sarīgāravasutta 2: 212; MA 56 no. 204 p. 776c6ff.

3 See DN no. 1 Brahmajālasutta 1: 28, no. 24 Pāṭhikasutta 3: 33, no. 33 Sarīgītisutta 3: 263; AN 9.24 Satāvāsasutta 4: 401; EA 40 no. 1 p. 764c29ff. It is possible that these nine stages of beings result from the addition of the two states without thought to the seven stations of perceptual consciousness (vijñānasthiti).

4 DN no. 34 Dasuttarasutta 3: 288, DA 9 no. 10 p. 56a14ff., Ch'ang-a-han shih pao fa ching T 1 (13) hsia p. 238a19ff., Dasottarasūtra, Mittal (1957) 92–94. As Johannes Bronkhorst (Bronkhorst (1986) 90 note 5) notes, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 77 p. 399b20ff.) states that non-Buddhists maintain four liberations, which can be correlated with the four spheres of the formless realm, including the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception as the fourth.

5 DN no. 34 Dasuttarasutta 3: 290, DA 9 no. 10 p. 56c28ff., Ch'ang-a-han shih pao fa ching T 1 (13) hsia p. 240a5ff.; Dasottarasūtra, Schlingloff (1962) 22.


7 MVB 151 p. 772b9ff.

8 The difficulty of accurately distinguishing between the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Saūtrāntikas, if such a distinction is justified, is apparent in the varying attribution of the diverse positions on these controversies concerning states without thought to either of these two groups. See, in particular, the attributions in Yasomitra's commentary to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavākyā, (SAKV p. 167.16ff.), in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, (Lamotte (1936) 168ff., 252ff., Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 784a1ff., p. 784b28ff.), and in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 151 p. 772c21ff., 152 p. 774a14ff.). See also Shūshō 9 p. 190b3ff.

9 See P'u-kuang 5 p. 95b26ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 542a16ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 324d12ff.


11 As an alternative view, Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44d p. 73.11) adds that the term 'equipoise' refers "to the production of the corporeal basis alone in that way, [that is, in
a way opposed to a state in which other moments of thought arise:


12 See AKB 2.44a p. 70.21ff.; SAKV p. 161.31ff. For an early discussion of whether or not noble ones, or bodhisattvas, enter the equipoise of cessation in the midst of their religious praxis, see VSŚ 4 p. 748c5ff.

13 For a discussion of the role of contiguous conditioning in relation to states without thought, see MVB 11 p. 52b3ff., esp. p. 52c6–19; AKB 2.62a–b p. 98.24ff.

14 See also NAS 20 p. 451b17ff.


16 The specific problem presented by the difficulty of explaining the arising of thought after states without thought can be seen as a major impetus for the development of the seed theory and later theories of subtle consciousness and the store-consciousness. The problem is discussed at length in the Karma-siddhiprakāraṇa. See Lamotte (1936) 168ff., 252ff., Karma-siddhiprakāraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 783c20ff.; Griffiths (1986). See also P'u-kuang 5 p. 100a28ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 545b17ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 329d9ff., 5 p. 330b2ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 160a7ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 104a15ff.

17 For the Dārṣṭāntika view, see MVB 151 p. 772c21ff., 152 p. 774a14ff. Cf. Karma-siddhiprakāraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 784a1ff., 784b28ff.; TSŚ 7 no. 94 p. 289b13ff. For Vasumitra, see AKB 2.44d p. 72.24ff.; SAKV p. 167.21ff. This Vasumitra is presumably to be distinguished from the Vasumitra who is cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 151 p. 772c28ff., 152 p. 774a22ff.) as offering an interpretation of the states of equipoise without thought consistent with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika view.

18 See NAS 26 p. 485c24ff., for the view of the master Bhadanta Rāma, who maintains that the mental organ sense sphere (mana-ayatana) is not destroyed in the equipoise of cessation. Cf. also Karma-siddhiprakāraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 784a7ff.

19 The associated relation (sāmāpryukta) between thought and thought concomitants is defined in terms of a fivefold equivalence (samata): equivalence with regard to sense organ or basis (āśraya); object-support (ālambana); aspect (ākāra); time of the occurrence of their activity (kāla); and their status as real entities (dravya). See AKB 2.34 a–d p. 61.22ff.; SAKV p. 141.8ff.; NAS 11 p. 394c14ff.; MVB 16 p. 80b25ff.

20 For a treatment of this issue, see Katō Junshō (1989) 198ff.


22 See MVB 42 p. 218c28ff.

23 See MVB 42 p. 216b23ff.


25 See MVB 2 p. 8c7ff., 127 p. 661c16ff. For Buddhadeva and his sectarian affiliation, see Shizutani (1978) 136, 140ff.

26 For a detailed investigation of the identity and sectarian affiliation of Dharma-rāta, see Yamada (1959) 430ff.

27 See NAS 10 p. 384b12. Cf. also NAS 2 p. 339b14ff., where Śrīlātā identifies the forces aggregate (sāṃskāravāsandha) with volition and explains all specific factors classed within the forces aggregate as varieties of volition.


29 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403a21ff. See also Yūan-yū 9 p. 249b3ff., who identifies the Dārṣṭāntikas cited in the argument as representing the group of Kumāralāta.

30 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 402c15ff., 13 p. 403a7ff.

31 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403b2ff.

32 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403c6ff.
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33 See MVB 151 p. 772c21ff., 152 p. 774a14ff.
34 TSS 7 no. 94 p. 289b13ff.
35 This statement appears in a discussion of the simultaneous cause (sahabhāketu) (NAS 15 p. 420b17ff.), where Śrīlāta claims that the thought concomitants of volition, and so on, cannot arise in the equipoise of cessation, because they have the same causes as conception and feelings (which are acknowledged not to arise in that state). Since Śrīlāta only recognizes the existence of these three thought concomitants of volition, conception, and feelings, this passage would clearly suggest that Śrīlāta rejects the possibility of any thought concomitants arising in states without thought.
36 See SAKV p. 167.5ff. For the relation between ṛlayavijñāna and the equipoise of cessation, see Schmithausen (1987) 1: 18ff., 34ff. For various Yogācāra views, see Griffiths (1986) 76ff.
Chapter 8

Vitality

The dissociated factor of vitality (*jīvita*) provides an excellent example of a factor posited as a discrete real entity in Abhidharma analyses, not for its own internal reasons, but as the result of the implications of certain technicalities involving other doctrinally accepted positions. The discussion of vitality illustrates Abhidharma methods of doctrinal elaboration and argumentation and suggests that more general doctrinal controversies pale before the effort to present an internally consistent, comprehensive, and, most importantly, scripturally grounded descriptive classification. This discussion presents ample proof that the Abhidharma doctrinal edifice developed through a process of reassigning traditional doctrinal components to new functions. This reassignment was necessitated by several factors: the preservation of virtually all traditional material; the juxtaposition and expansion of this material for new purposes; and finally the attempt to harmonize the inevitable contradictions that resulted from this scholastic manipulation. Rather than being directed by any single religio-philosophical viewpoint or interpretative principle, doctrinal innovation, as in the case of vitality, often resulted from specific instances of reassignment, readjustment, and inevitable reinterpretation.

Vitality first appears in Buddhist *sūtras* as a controlling faculty (*indriya*) within a group of three controlling faculties including also the controlling faculties of masculinity (*purisindriya*) and femininity (*itthindriya*).¹ These three are also included within the established set of twenty-two controlling faculties subsequently accepted in both the northern and southern Indian Buddhist scholastic traditions.² The controlling faculty of vitality appears frequently in *sūtra* references to death and the termination of a given lifetime, but its specific character and function are not examined.³ Early Abhidharma definitions of the controlling faculty of vitality preserve
this relation to the duration of a given lifetime. They emphasize the function of vitality as the persistence, continuation, maintenance, animation, and operation that characterize sentient beings.\textsuperscript{4} Other early Abhidharma treatises adopt a more succinct definition, identifying the controlling faculty of vitality with the life that belongs to a being in any of the three realms (\textit{trai dhātukāmā āyuḥ}).\textsuperscript{5} This early Abhidharma definition becomes the basis for the definition of vitality as a dissociated factor adopted by the later Abhidharma compendia.

8.1 The Character and Function of Vitality

The character and function of the controlling faculties are greatly expanded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā and later Abhidharma texts. Each controlling faculty is defined as having sovereign power or controlling influence over a specific aspect of sentient experience: for example, the five externally directed sense organs have power over the production of their respective type of perceptual consciousness; the mental controlling faculty, over rebirth; the masculine and feminine controlling faculties, over gender distinctions; and the remaining controlling faculties, over the processes of defilement and purification.\textsuperscript{6} Two explanations are offered for the character and function of the controlling faculty of vitality.\textsuperscript{7} According to the first explanation, it has sovereign power over two aspects of sentient experience: first, it enables one to say that one is possessed of other controlling faculties—that is, so long as vitality is present, one can say that one is possessed of controlling faculties; and second, it causes these other controlling faculties not to be terminated—that is, it causes the stream of the various controlling faculties to abide. According to the second explanation, vitality controls four aspects of sentient experience: that is, it forms a connection to the homogeneous collection of components (\textit{nikāyasabhāga}); it supports the homogeneous collection of components; it protects and nourishes the homogeneous collection of components; and, it causes the homogeneous collection of components not to be terminated.\textsuperscript{8} The basic function of vitality throughout this description in the *Mahāvibhāṣā is as that which sustains, supports, and protects the components constituting a sentient being. This sense is preserved in the definitions of vitality as a dissociated factor in the later Abhidharma guidebooks.\textsuperscript{9} Vitality is explained as “the fact that the stream of the controlling faculties and fundamental material elements, and so on, are not terminated;”\textsuperscript{10} or vitality is “life, that is, the fact that the possession of the aggregates (\textit{skandha}), elements (\textit{dhātu}), and sense spheres (\textit{ayatana}) is not destroyed.”\textsuperscript{11}

This simple definition of the controlling faculty of vitality is further elab-
8.2 Vitality as a Dissociated Force

orated in the later Abhidharma systematic analyses of factors, particularly in their discussion of vitality among the dissociated forces. One *sūtra passage, which serves as the basis for these later scholastic elaborations, clearly indicates the specific doctrinal considerations that necessitated the positing of vitality as a discrete, dissociated force.\footnote{12} Given the Buddhist analytical perspective, all entities, whether sentient or insentient, exist merely as collocations of components. However, a sentient being is characterized by the presence of three specific components within its constitutive collocation: warmth, perceptual consciousness, and life. These components distinguish sentient beings from insentient matter and life from death within the stream of one sentient being. They are mutually dependent—perceptual consciousness relies upon vitality (*jīvita), or life (*āyus), and vitality and warmth are interdependent\footnote{13} —and all three are terminated at death. Further, as the *sūtra states, they are declared to be present in the vast majority, but not all sentient states: for example, perceptual consciousness would be absent in the case of states without thought. The *Mahāvibhāṣā cites this *sūtra passage in a discussion of whether or not life (*āyus) occurs in conformity with thought (*cittānuvartin). If life occurs in conformity with thought, life would continue only when thought is present.\footnote{14} The underlying issue for the *Mahāvibhāṣā is the possibility of states without thought. In order to preserve the possibility of such states, the *Mahāvibhāṣā concludes that life does not occur in conformity with thought. Since life or vitality occurs independent of thought and, as the *sūtra passage states, vitality and warmth are interdependent, life continues in states that lack thought and the practitioner of such states can still be determined to be alive.

8.2 Vitality as a Dissociated Force

The *sūtra passage cited above concerning perceptual consciousness, vitality or life, and warmth continues to be central to the discussions of vitality in the later *Abhidharmāvatārasāstra, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and *Nyāyānusāra.\footnote{15} There are three major issues in these later treatments of vitality: first, the possibility of states without thought—specifically, the state of non-conception and the two states of equipoise of non-conception and cessation—which would lack perceptual consciousness; second, the possibility of rebirth in the formless realm, which would lack warmth; and third, the discrimination of life from death within the stream of any given sentient being. Underlying these specific issues is a fundamental disagreement concerning the existential status of vitality as a discrete factor. For Saṅghabhadrā and the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the three factors of vitality, or life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness are not in all cases
Vitality is inextricably linked; for if they were, states said to be without thought would have thought (or perceptual consciousness), and rebirth states in the formless realm would have form (or warmth).\(^\text{16}\) If life were distinguished from death only by the presence of perceptual consciousness, states without thought would be tantamount to death. Further, since beings in the formless realm lack a corporeal basis and, therefore, warmth, were it not for vitality, their thought would be without a support. As a force dissociated from both thought and form, vitality provides the basis of animation for "insentient" beings in states without thought and the basis of support for beings without a corporeal basis in the formless realm.\(^\text{17}\) Therefore, vitality must be admitted to exist as a discrete and real force capable of supporting both warmth and perceptual consciousness. What then would support vitality, especially given the fact that vitality remains when either warmth or perceptual consciousness is absent? Vitality is itself supported by previous action (\textit{karman}) and homogeneous character (\textit{sabhāgata}), both of which are also, like vitality, characteristic only of sentient beings.

Vasubandhu rejects the existential status of vitality as a discrete real entity and attributes its supposed activities of animation and support to previous action alone.\(^\text{18}\) In the section on vitality in chapter two of the \textit{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya}, Vasubandhu does not respond to these issues concerning how life is maintained in states without thought, or how thought is supported in the formless realm. However, given his appeal to seed theory in his explanation of the arising of thought after states without thought from seeds lying dormant within the corporeal basis,\(^\text{19}\) one might infer that he would maintain that death does not occur in such states precisely because the stream of mental seeds is not terminated. Vasubandhu's appeal to the Sautrāntika theory that the stream of thought has no support other than itself would also obviate any need for vitality to support thought in the formless realm.\(^\text{20}\) Vitality then, for Vasubandhu, has no intrinsic function, but becomes merely a provisional designation for the "momentum of the period of abiding of the homogeneous collection of components (or the six sense organs together with their basis), [as projected by previous] action in the three realms."\(^\text{21}\)

Saṅghabhadra counters Vasubandhu's interpretation of vitality first by pointing out that neither perceptual consciousness nor warmth can be accepted as effects of action alone, and therefore, cannot be supported by action alone; as a result, he concludes, they both require vitality as their support.\(^\text{22}\) He next criticizes Vasubandhu's definition of vitality as the "momentum of the period of abiding of the homogeneous collection of components (or, the six sense organs together with their basis), [as projected by previous] action in the three realms." Saṅghabhadra adopts a strict interpretation of the term 'momentum,' as denoting continuity of the "ho-
mogeneous collection of components," for which Sañghabhadra uses the phrase ‘six sense organs together with their basis.’ He then contends that any arising of moments of thought of dissimilar moral quality—a frequent occurrence in the lifestream of any sentient being—would interrupt this continuity. When the continuity is thus interrupted, momentum would also cease, and vitality, as defined by Vasubandhu, would be terminated. For Sañghabhadra, the activities of animation and support, which he attributes to vitality, can be attributed to no other entity; therefore, the presence of these activities constitutes sufficient reason to justify the existence of vitality as a discrete real entity. Furthermore, vitality can function as the basis for a distinction between life and death. The occurrence of animate states without perceptual consciousness and animate states without warmth demands that death be explained, not through the termination of perceptual consciousness or warmth, but through an interruption in the stream of vitality. This separate factor of life, or vitality, whose existence is proven through its activity, characterizes all states of sentient beings including states without thought and rebirth in the formless realm; as a result, vitality must be a force dissociated from both thought and form.

8.3 Causes of Death

Approximately half of Sañghabhadra’s discussion of vitality is devoted to an analysis of various types of death and their causes. Quoting an early Sarvâstivâdin text, the Prajñâptiśâstra, Sañghabhadra presents the specific possibilities in the form of a tetralemma (catu$koti): death results from the exhaustion of actions (karman) that have life (āyus) as their matured effect, or enjoyment (bhoga) as their matured effect, or from the exhaustion of both, or from an inability to avoid unfavorable circumstances. In order to clarify this last possibility, the Jñânaprasthâna is quoted to suggest that there are two categories of sentient beings: those whose life continuously operates bound to the life-stream (saṁtatyupanibadha)—that is, those whose corporeal basis can be damaged by unfavorable circumstances; and those whose life abides, having arisen once (sakrdutpanna)—that is, those whose corporeal basis is such that it cannot be damaged. Finally, the issue of damage to the corporeal basis is clarified through another tetralemma that details four varieties of acquiring modes of personal existence (ātmabhāva-pratilābha): that is, sentient beings for whom mortal injury occurs only through their own volition, only through the volition of another, possibly through the volition of either, and finally, those for whom neither type of mortal injury occurs.

This lengthy passage detailing the varieties of types of death represents
yet another attempt, characteristic of Abhidharma analyses, to clarify a given factor through comprehensive classification into mutually exclusive categories. It is assumed that by listing the various instances included in each category, answering any objections to the classification, and resolving any contradictions—in the case of vitality, a seemingly contradictory sūtra passage— the factor under discussion is thoroughly and clearly described. This lengthy discussion of the varieties of death provides, by implication, a description of the varieties of vitality to which these types of death correspond. It also suggests that the factor of vitality had become increasingly significant doctrinally as the quality that distinguishes life from death, a function not traditionally listed among its activities.

Notes

1 SN 48.22 Jīvitindriyasutta 5: 204.
2 See MVB 142 p. 728c10ff.; VBh 122ff. These twenty-two include, in addition to the three of masculinity, femininity, and vitality, the six sense organs, the five affective states of happiness, suffering, cheerfulness, dejection, and equanimity, the five praxis-oriented controlling faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight, and the three attainments of aspiring to know the unknown, perfect knowledge, and the state of having attained perfect knowledge. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 143 p. 737c1ff.) attempts to explain why certain factors are included among the traditional lists of controlling faculties and others are excluded. It suggests that only the controlling faculty of vitality among the dissociated forces can be designated a controlling faculty because it alone is included among factors constituting sentient beings (sattvasamkhyātyā), is exclusively a matured effect (vipāka), and acts as a universal support.
3 For example, see MA 7 no. 29 p. 462b18; EA 16 no. 8 p. 628a23, 22 p. 661b5.
4 See DS 10 p. 499a29ff.; SP 1 p. 368c16ff.; see also DhS 11-12; VBh 123. See MVB 38 p. 199a22ff. for a parallel definition of death.
6 See MVB 142 p. 730c26ff. Cf. AKB 2.1 p. 38.4ff.
7 MVB 142 p. 731b23ff. This second explanation is cited in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya: AKB 2.1b p. 38.18, 2.3 p. 19; SAKV p. 95.12ff., 97.10ff.
8 Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 97.10) suggests that vitality functions, as Vasubandhu states, only with regard to the continuation of the homogeneous collection of components, and not, as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas claim, with regard to the initial connection to that collection of components at conception. The sovereign power with regard to that initial connection belongs only to the mind, and not to vitality. nīkāyasabhāgasthitau jīvitindriyasyā 'dhipatyam. na tu vaiśābhaśikavat nīkāyasabhāgasambandhe. tatra mansa eva 'dhipatyāt. For the interpretation of (nīkāyasabhāga) as “homogeneous collection of components”— that is, as the components or aggregates of which a sentient being consists, and not as the dissociated factor “homogeneous character,” see supra, introductory commentary, “Homogeneous Character: The Homogeneous Character of Sentient Beings.” The interpretation, “homogeneous collection of components,” is chosen here because this second explanation is cited in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, and Vasubandhu does not accept the existence of the dissociated factor, “homogeneous character.” It is possible, however, that the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas also, in particular the
early Sarvástivādins and early Sarvástivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, use the term nikāyasabhāga with both the general meaning, “homogeneous collection of components,” and the more technical meaning as the dissociated factor, “homogeneous character.” Indeed, in the Sarvástivāda-Vaibhāṣikas treatment of vitality, it is not clear which meaning, if either exclusively, is intended for nikāyasabhāga.

9 Even though dissociated forces are not recognized as discrete factors within the Theravādin Abhidhamma tradition, vitality is enumerated among the controlling faculties. The Vibhanga (VBh 123) treats vitality as of two types: material vitality (rupajīvītindriya), which acts to support the material components; and non-material vitality (arupajīvītindriya), which acts to support the non-material mental components. For an examination of the Pāli treatment of the controlling faculty of vitality, see Jaini (1959a) 540ff.; Mizuno ([1964] 1978) 352ff., 424ff.

10 AHS-D 4 p. 831a4; cf. AHS-U 6 p. 866a17ff. See also AARS hsia p. 979c8. This definition leaves the existential status of jīvita ambiguous, but Vasubandhu (AKB 2.10a p. 43.23) echoes this definition in his gloss of jīvita, which he understands as a provisional entity: that is, as the “momentum of the period of abiding of the controlling faculties and the fundamental material elements:” ... sthitikālavedham indriyamahābhātānām.

11 SAHS 9 p. 943a28.
13 MA 58 no. 211 p. 791b20ff.
14 See MVB 151 p. 770c4ff.
15 AĀS hsia p. 987a25ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 166; AKB 2.45b p. 73.18ff.; infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b12ff.
17 See also the *Mahāvibhāga (MVB 27 p. 137a27ff.), which designates both vitality and homogeneous character (nikāyasabhāga) as the support of the stream of thought for beings in the formless realm who lack a corporeal basis. Cf. AKB 3.3c-d p. 112.9ff.; SAKV p. 256.12ff.; NAS 21 p. 456a24ff., 21 p. 458a16ff. Since this sūtra passage states that warmth and life are interdependent, it would imply that there can be no state in which living sentient beings lack warmth. This would then preclude any living state that is totally without form. Certain masters then cite this sūtra passage to prove their assertion that the formless realm has warmth and, therefore, form: see MVB 83 p. 431b4ff.; cf. NAS 9 p. 382a23ff. The Theravādin Abhidhamma tradition (VBh 123) would contend that the non-material variety of vitality (arupajīvītindriya) supports sentient beings in all states characterized by thought, while the material variety of vitality acts as their support in states without thought. See supra, introductory commentary, “Vitality,” note 9. Mizuno ([1964] 1978) 424–425.
18 AKB 2.45b p. 74.3ff.; SAKV p. 168.30ff.
19 See AKB 2.44d p. 72.22ff.
20 See AKB 3.3c-d p. 112.20ff.
21 See AKB 2.45b p. 74.4ff.: traivṛttukena karmanā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālavedhāḥ. See also SAKV p. 168.30ff.; infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b27ff.
22 See NAS 21 p. 458a16ff., where Saṅghabhadra explains that even though both vitality and homogeneous character depend upon action as matured effects (vipāka), they also perform the independent function of providing additional support for the stream of maturation of other effects of action.
23 See NAS 9 p. 382a23, where Saṅghabhadra attempts to prove that vitality is necessary in order to account for death in the formless realm. He argues against those who would attribute death to discarding or exhausting the effects of that action that led to rebirth in the formless realm. Saṅghabhadra again uses the argument that if continued
existence were only dependent upon the continued maturation of effects, the stream of
the maturation of these effects would be interrupted with the arising of a moment of
thought of dissimilar moral quality. Death would, as a result, also occur at that time.
To resolve this difficulty, certain masters appeal to a theory of traces (vāsamā), which
would support the continuous maturation of the effects of action regardless of their
moral quality. Saṅghabhadra rejects this attempted resolution because he rejects the
existence of such traces. Death in the formless realm, Saṅghabhadra concludes, can only
be explained through the termination of the stream of vitality. For various criteria by
which death was determined in later Indian Buddhist texts, see Wayman (1982) 276–278.
25 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405a26ff.
26 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b14.
Chapter 9

The Four Characteristics of Conditioned Factors

The major area of disagreement between Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu, and indeed between the Sarvāstivādins and virtually all other early Buddhist sects, concerns the doctrine that eventually came to be the hallmark position of the Sarvāstivādin school: namely, the claim that factors actually exist as real entities in the three time periods. Though disagreement on this doctrine underlies the majority of the specific points of controversy raised in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, the discussion of the four conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors (sanskṛtalakṣaṇa) provides one of the few occasions where the doctrine itself and its implications are examined explicitly.¹

The attention devoted in the traditional commentaries to the explication of the four conditioned characteristics, or characteristics that determine the nature of all conditioned factors as conditioned, testifies to their importance both in Sarvāstivādin doctrine and in wider Abhidharma sectarian controversies. Any attempt to clarify the Sarvāstivādin position as presented in these commentarial materials must confront a bewildering range of interpretations that exceeds the expected variation resulting from historical distance or atrophy of the tradition.² Even in the earliest treatises, the complex treatments of these four characteristics indicate that this doctrine was, from its inception, a focus of controversy within the Sarvāstivādin school itself. Unravelling this complexity demands clarifying Sarvāstivādin ontological premises and eliciting the implications of these premises for their interpretation of the Buddhist principles of impermanence and conditioning. Similarly, rival ontological premises, in particular those of the Dārśāntikas and of Vasubandhu, and their implications shape the specific character of
the disagreement between Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu. The role of the four characteristics, their distinctive activities, and the controversies that they stimulated must then be examined in the light of these contending ontological models.

9.1 Sarvāstivādin Ontology

“Everything Exists”

As encapsulated in the name ‘Sarvāstivādin,’ the Sarvāstivādins are characterized as maintaining that “everything exists” (sarvam asti). However, the simplicity of this ontological assertion contains the seeds of doctrinal divergence because the referent of the term ‘everything’ and the manner in which this “everything” is considered to “exist” must be specified. Certain early Abhidharma texts identify the term ‘everything’ in the declaration that “everything exists” as referring to the twelve sense spheres including the six sense organs and their corresponding object-fields. So also the *Mahāvibhāṣā, in a discussion of the twelve sense spheres, cites a sūtra passage in which the term ‘everything’ is defined by the Buddha as “precisely the twelve sense spheres from the form sense sphere (rupāyatanā) up to and including the factor sense sphere (dhyāyatanā).” Thus, according to these early texts, “everything” does not refer to gross material entities or to the conventionally understood ideas or objects of untutored experience, but rather to the ultimate products of a Buddhist analysis of experience, all of which can be enumerated among the six sense organs and their six corresponding object-fields.

In later Abhidharma texts, this simple definition of the term ‘everything’ is elaborated further in accordance with growing doctrinal complexity and an emerging ontology. The very sūtra passage that defines the term ‘everything’ as the twelve sense spheres is cited by both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra as scriptural justification for their divergent ontological positions. They differ, however, concerning the extent of the domain encompassed by “everything” and the manner in which this “everything” is understood to exist. For Vasubandhu, “everything” should be understood simply as the twelve sense spheres, which, as functioning sense spheres, occur in the present moment. This “present existence” is then defined in another sūtra passage that refers to a factor that “exists not having existed (abhūtvā bhavati), and having existed, no longer exists” (bhūtvā punar na bhavati). The sūtra passage specifying “everything” does not, Vasubandhu suggests, support the Sarvāstivādin claim that factors exist
9.1.1 “Everything Exists”

in the three time periods. Even if, like the Sarvāstivādins, one takes the three time periods as the referent of “everything” and interprets the sūtra passage as stating that factors of the three time periods exist, then these past and future factors must not be understood to exist in the same way as factors in the present. Past and future factors, Vasubandhu argues, unlike present factors, cannot be said to exist as real entities, but rather exist only provisionally; past factors can be said to exist only in the sense that they existed previously, and future factors, only in the sense that they will exist.⁹

Saṅghabhadra responds to Vasubandhu’s interpretation by noting that this sūtra passage does not explicitly limit the referent of “everything” only to present factors and that, indeed, there is no other passage that denies the existence of past and future factors.⁰ Therefore, for Saṅghabhadra, the Sarvāstivādin declaration, “everything exists,” as specified in this sūtra passage, should be understood to include factors in all three time periods as well as the three unconditioned factors. In other words, “everything” mentioned in this passage includes all factors recognized in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma taxonomy.¹¹ Though Saṅghabhadra will not accept Vasubandhu’s attempt to limit existence to the present moment, this does not mean that one must understand past and future factors to exist in the same way as present factors. As Saṅghabhadra attempts to demonstrate, the differences among factors of the various time periods are determined by the presence or absence of their activity, not by any change in their intrinsic nature. The sūtra, he argues, in using the phrases ‘exists not having existed’ and ‘having existed, no longer exists,’ is definitely not attempting to preclude the existence of past and future factors. The first phrase ‘exists not having existed’ indicates that the effect does not preexist in the cause, and the second phrase ‘having existed, no longer exists’ indicates that a factor’s activity is exerted and then disappears.¹²

There is evidence of Abhidharma ontological models other than those adopted by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. For example, Saṅghabhadra cites five interpretations of varieties of existents and of the modality of their existence:¹³ (1) those who “superimpose” (*Samāropavādin) claim that there exists a real individual (pudgala) in addition to factors in the three time periods and the three unconditioned factors; (2) those who “discriminate” (Vibhajyavādin) claim that the present and that portion of past factors that have not yet delivered their effects exist; (3) those who maintain “momentariness” (*Kṣaṇikavādin) claim that only the twelve sense spheres of the single present moment exist; (4) those who maintain existence only as “provisional designation” (Prajñāpātivādin) claim that even factors in the present time period only exist as provisional designations (prajñāpatti); and (5) those who “negate” (*Nāstivādin) claim that all factors lack intrinsic
nature, like sky flowers. The Abhidharmadīpa offers a fourfold classification of views of existence: (1) those who maintain that all exists, or the Sarvāstivādins, for whom the factors of the three time periods and the three firm (dhruva), or unconditioned, factors exist; (2) those who maintain that "part" exists, including the Vibhajyavādins and the Dārśāntikas, for whom "part" refers to factors of the present time period; (3) those who maintain that nothing exists like the Vaitulikas or the Ayogaśūnyatāvādins; and (4) those who maintain that existence is indeterminate like the Paudgalikas who claim that given entities are indeterminate (avyākṛtavastuvādin) or that the individual (pudgala) also exists as a real entity.

Past and Future Factors—Existential Status

Thus, for texts of the later Abhidharma period, a simple definition of 'everything' and a simple model of 'existence' were no longer adequate. The ambiguous existential status of many commonplace objects of experience and the manner in which the recognized primary constituent factors (dharma) could be said to exist had to be explicitly addressed. Should the existence of the composite objects of everyday experience be denied? And, what is the existential status of problematic objects such as the objects of memory and presentiment, or the products of sensory error or mistaken cognition, or certain meditative objects, dream images, reflected images, echoes, illusions, magical creations, or the seemingly nonexistent objects of certain linguistic conventions? To deny one's experience of these objects is impossible, and to ignore them in one's taxonomy of factors would deprive Buddhist doctrinal analysis of its all-inclusive character and, thereby, its soteriological efficacy. Thus, the Abhidhārmikas expend great effort in a thorough analysis and comprehensive classification of all possible factors and, by extension, in a defensible and universally applicable definition of existence by which a factor's existential status could be clearly determined.

The central problem confronting Abhidhārmikas in these systematizing efforts was the existential status of past and future factors. In presenting the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika justification for the existence of past and future factors, Vasubandhu cites two passages as scriptural authority (āgamataḥ) and two reasoned arguments (yuktītāḥ), arguments that are offered also in the Vibhāṣā compendia. According to the first reasoned argument, if the existence of past and future factors were not admitted, perceptual consciousness without an object would also have to be admitted, since perceptual consciousness of past objects through memory and of future objects through presentiment is a commonly attested experience. A given instance of perceptual consciousness is said to arise only in dependence upon two
conditions: the sense organ and its corresponding object-field. This implies that perceptual consciousness arises only in conjunction with an appropriate and existent object; perceptual consciousness of a nonexistent object or without an object is, therefore, impossible. Since mental perceptual consciousness of past and future factors does indeed occur, in order to preclude the absurdity of perceptual consciousness without an object-field, these past and future factors too must be acknowledged to exist.

According to the second reasoned argument, if the existence of past factors were not allowed, causal processes could not be explained. Since causal efficacy cannot be attributed to a nonexistent object, if past factors are allowed to act as causes in producing present factors, then past factors must be acknowledged to exist. Specifically, the causal force of past virtuous or unvirtuous actions must be explained if the power of action (karman) and the efficacy of the path are to be admitted. The fundamental Buddhist assumption that all conditioned factors are impermanent and the more radical Sarvāstivādin assumption that impermanence means discontinuous momentariness make the need to justify the existence of past and future factors even more urgent. Otherwise the whole fabric of causal interrelations that constitutes experience would disintegrate. Factors, as radically momentary, would not persist beyond the period of one moment; a factor that will arise in the subsequent moment does not yet exist when its prior cause is present. Similarly, when the subsequent factor arises, the prior moment will have passed away, and, together with it, the prior causal efficacy. How then can there be any causal interaction between a prior cause and a subsequent effect? Thus, the Sarvāstivādins conclude that the two scriptural passages and the two reasoned arguments justify the existence of factors in the three time periods.

Temporality and Atemporality

According to Sanghabhadra, the atemporal issue of the nature of existence in the abstract from the temporal issue of the mode of existence of those factors in the three time periods.

In the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika treatises, the problems of the criteria by which the existential status of factors is to be determined, the specific factors that are considered to exist, and the distinctions among the three time periods are treated together. However, the character of Sarvāstivādin ontology and the meaning of the terminology used are revealed more clearly by distinguishing these three problems. Specifically, it is useful to distinguish the atemporal issue of the existence of factors in the abstract from the temporal issue of the mode of existence of those factors in the three time periods.
existence of past and future factors. He begins with a definition of the characteristic of existence (*sallakṣaṇa, sattvalakṣaṇa*), which, he claims, if correctly understood, will demand acceptance of the existence of past and future factors.²² Saṅghabhadra first cites the view of some (like Vasubandhu himself) who define this characteristic of existence as “that which has already been produced and has not yet passed away.” This, Saṅghabhadra objects, is the distinguishing characteristic only of existence in the present time period, and not a definition of existence in general. Saṅghabhadra next offers his own definition that will not preclude the existence of past and future factors: “To be an object-field that produces cognition (*buddhi*) is the true characteristic of existence.”²³ With this definition, Saṅghabhadra follows the Buddhist assumption, as evidenced in the traditional twelve sense sphere and eighteen element classifications, that consciousness is intentional and that only that which falls within the range of that consciousness can be said to exist.²⁴ Accordingly, since past and future factors can become objects of perceptual consciousness, they can be held to exist.

However, existence is not uniform; though all objects of perceptual consciousness can be said to exist, the existential status of these objects varies. Saṅghabhadra next distinguishes two types of existence: existence as a real entity (*dravyasat*), which is equated with absolute existence (*paramārthasat*), and existence as a provisional entity (*prajñaptisat*), equated with conventional existence (*sāṁvṛtisat*).²⁵ The former category of real entities includes the ultimate constituent factors such as visible form or feelings, which produce cognition without depending upon anything else. The latter category of provisional entities includes entities such as a pot or an army, which can produce cognition only in dependence upon a real entity that serves as its basis. This dependence upon real entities may be either direct, as in the case of a pot, which depends directly upon the fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta*) of which it is made, or indirect, as in the case of an army, which depends first upon other provisional entities—that is, its human members—and secondarily upon real entities—that is, the ultimate factors of which these humans are composed.

Here, by “dependence,” Saṅghabhadra does not understand causal dependence; all conditioned factors, real entities and provisional entities alike, are causally dependent or are related through conditioning interaction. Rather, “dependence” in the case of a provisional entity refers to the possibility of further analysis; any entity that can be analyzed further into constituent elements is considered “dependent” upon those elements.²⁶ The possibility of further analysis then becomes the criterion by which conventional (*sāṁvṛtisatya*) and absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*) are distinguished. If the notion of a particular entity disappears when that entity is broken (e.g., a pot) or can be resolved by cognition into its components
9.1.3 Temporal and Atemporal Ontological Classifications

(e.g., water), that entity exists only conventionally. Entities that are not subject either to this further material or mental analysis exist absolutely. Thus, actual existence as a real entity (dravyasat) is attributed only to the ultimate constituent factors, which are not subject to further analysis.

Each such primary factor, or dharma, is determined or distinguished by an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), which is itself defined as the particular inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), or distinctive characteristic, that can be applied to that factor alone and to no other.27 Since factors are distinguished from one another through a unique intrinsic nature, the Abhidharma taxonomy of factors is built up through a process of determining and distinguishing varieties of intrinsic nature. The term 'intrinsic nature' does not indicate a factor's temporal status, but rather refers to its atemporal underlying and defining nature. Intrinsic nature thus determines the atemporal, existential status of a factor as a real entity (dravya). Nevertheless, it is precisely in this sense of intrinsic nature that factors can be said to exist at all times (svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cā 'sti); intrinsic nature, as the particular inherent characteristic, pertains to or defines a factor in the past, present, and future, regardless of its temporal status.28

Sāṅgabhadrā's analysis of existence does not consist merely of this atemporal distinction between real entities endowed with intrinsic nature and entities that exist as provisional designations. As he notes: "It is our accepted doctrine that there are many types of existence: namely, existence as intrinsic nature, as activity, as provisional designation, or as real entity."29 Temporal existence—that is, existents as sequentially experienced—also demands explanation. In other words, if the Sarvāstivādins recognize the existence of factors as real entities possessed of intrinsic nature in the three time periods, how can factors of one time period be distinguished from those of another? The Sarvāstivādin tradition recognizes four interpretations of this distinction. The master Dharmatrata attributes the difference among the time periods to a transformation in a factor's mode of existence (bhāva), as when a metal vessel is destroyed and shaped into another object. The master Ghoṣaka appeals to a change in characteristic (lakṣaṇa), whereby a factor is said to be present if marked by the characteristic of the present—that is, of having reached the state of functioning activity—but is not bereft of the other characteristics of the past or future. It is compared to the case of a man who is attracted to one woman, and yet not unattracted to others. The master Vasumitra attributes the difference between factors in the three time periods to a difference of state (avasthā), as when a counter signifies different values if located in different places. Finally, the master Buddhadeva appeals to a difference in relative dependence (apekṣā), whereby a factor is given different names as past, present, or future in dependence upon its relation to surrounding factors, as when
one woman can be referred to either as a mother or a daughter.  

Of these four views, Vasumitra's is preferred because it does not result in confusion of the three time periods, and because it best represents the difference in activity that is accepted as distinguishing the three time periods. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā makes clear, the temporal distinction between the three time periods is determined not by a factor's status as a real entity (*dravya) or as a provisional designation (*prajñapti), but rather depends upon the presence or absence of that factor's manifest activity (*kārita):

How are the distinctions between the three time periods established? The three time periods are differentiated by activity.... That is to say, a conditioned factor that does not yet have its activity is referred to as future, one that is just at the point of having its activity is present, and one whose activity has already passed away is past.

Though Saṅghabhadra also accepts activity as the basis of the distinction among the three time periods, he disagrees with the traditional criticism of Dharmatrāta as proposing a theory of transformation (*parināma) like that of the Sāṁkhya school. Instead, Saṅghabhadra suggests that Dharmatrāta's appeal to a difference in mode of existence (*bhāva) is similar to the sanctioned view of Vasumitra. Relying on Dharmatrāta's model, Saṅghabhadra proposes that a factor remains unchanged in intrinsic nature (*svabhāva), but changes in mode of existence (*bhāva) due to the arising and passing away of its activity (*kārita). Saṅghabhadra explains that a factor can exist in several such modes: that is to say, a real entity undergoes no change in its intrinsic nature, but is subject to transformation in its mode of existence. A real entity can exist either as intrinsic nature alone or as intrinsic nature that is also possessed of activity. Whereas past or future factors are characterized by intrinsic nature alone, factors characterized by both intrinsic nature and activity can only be present.

A factor can thus be said to exist as a real entity at all times, because its intrinsic nature continues with no alteration. Conditioned factors can, however, be said to have transformation, which is tantamount to claiming that they are impermanent, precisely because their activities arise and pass away. When a future factor meets an appropriate collocation of previously existent and simultaneous conditions, its activity is produced and that factor becomes present. When its activity ceases, the factor is said to "pass away," but it continues to exist as intrinsic nature even when its activity is past. Therefore, given the transformation in its mode of existence, that
factor cannot be said to be constant, but rather is impermanent.\textsuperscript{35}

Activity and Capability

This distinction between a factor’s intrinsic nature and its activity allows the Sarvāstivādins to establish their model of factors existing in the three time periods while conforming to the Buddhist principles of conditioning and impermanence. The solution offered by this distinction, however, also raises certain problems. The existence of past and future factors is asserted precisely because they, like present factors, are believed to have a kind of efficacy: namely, past and future factors act as objects in producing cognition and, further, are capable of functioning as conditions in the production of present factors.\textsuperscript{36} However, since activity is limited to a factor in the present moment, the efficacy of past and future factors cannot be referred to as “activity.” Saṅghabhadra resolved this difficulty by proposing a distinction in the mode of a factor’s operation: the term ‘activity’ (kārita) is reserved for a factor’s specific operation in the present time period; a more general efficacy, which can occur in the past, present, or future, is then referred to as capability (sāmarthya).\textsuperscript{37} Like the *Mahāvibhāṣā, Saṅghabhadra maintains that activity (kārita) characterizes a factor only in the present; in fact, it determines a factor’s status as present. However, if past and future factors are to act as objects that produce cognition, or are to function as conditions, then they too must have a kind of efficacy; Saṅghabhadra refers to this past and future efficacy as capability (sāmarthya).\textsuperscript{38}

The distinction between activity and capability stems from the need to account for the observed operation of factors in all three time periods, while, in some way, distinguishing the present from the past and future. Since even past and future factors can be efficacious, it is impossible to assert that present factors alone exert a function. And yet, this past and future functioning, or capability, must be something other than activity, which, by definition, applies only to present factors. This present activity (kārita) is explained by Saṅghabhadra as a subset of a more general power (sakti, also called sāmarthya) that includes both activity and capability (sāmarthya).\textsuperscript{39} In the discussion of the four conditioned characteristics, the question of a future factor’s efficacy becomes particularly important.\textsuperscript{40} Since the characteristic of birth (jāti) is thought to function in producing a factor simultaneous with it, this productive function can only occur when both the characteristic of birth and the factor to be produced are future—specifically when both are in the state of being about to be produced. As a result, this productive function of birth that occurs in the future must be its capability, not its activity.

Initially, the distinction between activity and capability might appear
merely semantic: the operation of a factor in the present is simply called activity in order to distinguish its operation in the present from that in the past or future, which is called capability. However, upon closer examination, the functioning of activity and capability are distinguished through two non-semantic criteria. First, they differ in the locus of their operation—that is, relative to the stream (saṁtāna) constituted by the functioning factor. Activity is considered an internal causal efficacy that contributes toward the production of an effect within a particular factor's own stream. Capability, however, is considered an external conditioning efficacy directed toward the stream of another factor; it constitutes a condition that assists another factor in the production of its own effect. A present factor must function as activity in the continuation of its own stream. When past, present, or future, that factor may also function as capability in conditioning the arising of a factor of another stream. Past and future factors, however, can function only as capabilities conditioning a factor of another stream.41

The second criterion by which activity and capability are distinguished concerns the stage that each represents within a single causal process. According to Sarvāstivādin theory, causal efficacy is divided into two stages. The first is that of projecting (ākṣipt-), or seizing (pratigrah-), the effect; this stage occurs only when the causal factor itself is present. The second stage of presenting (dā-), or delivering (prayam-), the effect can occur when the causal factor is already past. When the causal factor is present, it "projects" its own effect; when its effect arises, the cause, even if past, is said to "present" that effect. Activity can then be defined as the power of a factor to project its own effect (phalākṣeṣapaśakti), and capability, as its power to produce an effect (phalajanana).42 Every factor, when present, must function to project its own effect; this is referred to as its activity, and it is this function that determines its very status as present. A factor's capability, as the cause that stimulates the arising of the effect, is always simultaneous with the effect, but need not be exerted when the causal factor itself is present. Thus, a causal factor can exert its capability when it is past, present, or future. If the cause and its effect are simultaneous, the cause exerts its capability when it is either present or future. If the cause and effect are not simultaneous—that is, if the effect arises after the cause—the cause's capability of giving rise to the effect is exerted when that causal factor is past.43

The distinction between activity and capability is illustrated through the example of an eye in the dark, or an eye whose function of seeing is otherwise obstructed.44 Since such a seemingly non-operational eye is not performing what might be assumed to be its proper function, what then is its activity that determines its status as present? Both Saṅghabhadra
and the *Mahāvibhāṣā assert that such an eye acts as a homogeneous cause (sabhāgaḥetu) in the production of an eye in the subsequent moment, a subsequent eye that arises as an effect of uniform outflow (niṣyandaphala). Precisely this efficacy as a homogeneous cause is the eye's activity, which, when performed, defines its status as present. The eye's function as a condition for the arising of visual perceptual consciousness is, according to Saṅghabhadra, capability, and not activity. Though this capability as a condition may occur in any given present moment, it is directed toward the stream of another factor—that is, the stream of visual perceptual consciousness—and not toward its own stream. Thus, it would appear that for any factor, its present activity of projecting its own effect is its conditioning efficacy as a homogeneous cause within its own stream. Capability is a less restricted efficacy that can include any variety of causal functioning; it can also be directed toward the stream of another factor and can occur in any of the three time periods. Thus, for the four conditioned characteristics also, their function as conditioning characteristics, though occurring in the present time period, is considered capability, and not activity. Their activity is, as in the case of any factor, their function as homogeneous causes projecting a uniform effect in the next moment.

By distinguishing between activity and capability in terms of a two stage analysis of the causal process, Saṅghabhadra accounts for a factor's efficacy at times other than the present and also establishes a way by which factors in each of the three time periods can be identified.\textsuperscript{45} Saṅghabhadra's assertion that factors in the past and future have only intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is intended to suggest simply that they do not have activity, which characterizes factors only when they are present. Since past and future factors also exist as real entities, they too are able to function, not as activities, but as capabilities. Even though a factor's intrinsic nature is without variation at all times, there are differences in its mode of existence (bhāva) determined by the presence or absence of either its activity or its capability. The term "mode of existence" thus describes the temporal status of a factor relative to its functioning efficacy, and not its atemporal, existential status as a real entity (dravya) endowed with intrinsic nature (svabhāva).

Thus, Saṅghabhadra uses the three terms dravya, svabhāva, and bhāva to describe the existence of a factor that is recognized as real. However, these terms characterize a factor's reality from three different perspectives. Svabhāva refers to a factor's underlying intrinsic nature, its particular inherent characteristic that distinguishes it from all other factors. Dravya refers to any factor that exists by virtue of its own intrinsic nature, as distinct from entities that exist merely as provisional designations (prajñāpatti), lacking any intrinsic nature as such. Bhāva is used to describe a real en-
tity (*dravya*) in its various modes as manifesting activity in the present or manifesting capability in the past, present, or future.

What then is the relation between a factor's activity or capability and its intrinsic nature? Critics of the Sarvāstivāda model contend that either identifying a factor's functioning with, or distinguishing it from, its intrinsic nature results in an undesirable conclusion. If a factor's intrinsic nature and its functioning were the same, then its intrinsic nature would also change when its activity arises and passes away. If they were different, then each factor would, in effect, be two factors: one endowed with functioning, the other, with intrinsic nature. Saṅghabhadra responds that activity and intrinsic nature are neither the same nor different:

Activity is not different from the factor because the intrinsic nature [of a factor] cannot be understood apart from that [activity]. Nor is [activity] simply that factor itself because there are times when [the activity] is absent even though the intrinsic nature exists. Nor are [activity and intrinsic nature] without distinction because [the factor's] activity is absent prior [to its arising, while its intrinsic nature is never absent]. [The relation between activity and intrinsic nature should be understood] like [the case of] the stream of conditioned factors. That is to say, the uninterrupted arising of factors is referred to as a stream, and yet there is no [stream] apart from the factors because it is not apprehended as distinct from them. Nor is the [stream] simply the factors themselves because that would result in the undesirable conclusion that even one moment has the nature of a stream. Nor [can it be said that] the stream does not actually exist, because there is real existence of its activity. It is said: "The activity of the stream is accepted, but no stream is to be found [as a discrete entity]." Through reasoning in this way one should understand that the time periods are established by activity.

Saṅghabhadra summarizes the relation between intrinsic nature and activity as follows:

The real characteristic, [or intrinsic nature,] of factors is without change, but their mode of existence is not without distinction. The real characteristic and mode of existence are neither different nor the same. Therefore, the particular inherent characteristic of conditioned factors always exists, and yet their predominant capability has arising and disappearance.
Thus, though factors remain the same in their intrinsic nature and can be said to exist at all times from the standpoint of this intrinsic nature, they are also, by nature, potentially capable. Their mode of existence is determined by the presence or absence of their activity. This presence or absence of activity is, in turn, determined by the presence or absence of appropriate causes and conditions. When certain conditions assemble, a factor's activity is produced; when other conditions assemble, its activity is destroyed. However, it is fallacious to speak of the production and destruction of a factor's intrinsic nature.

To understand Saṅghabhadra's position, it is helpful to remember that intrinsic nature is used not as the determinant of a factor's temporal existential status, but rather as the atemporal determinant of a factor's existential status as real or provisional. As a factor's defining characteristic, intrinsic nature exists, or characterizes a factor, irrespective of time. Considerations of time are nothing other than considerations of causal relations, and causal relations depend upon activity or capability, not intrinsic nature. As existents that are experienced and are subject to causal forces, factors are, by nature, able both to manifest activity through the projection of their own effect and to manifest capability by assisting in the production of another factor. Though factors can exist in the past and future simply as intrinsic nature without either manifest activity or capability, because such non-functioning past or future factors are nonetheless potentially capable, they are said to be conditioned.

**Vasubandhu’s Ontology**

For Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivādin claim that factors exist in the three time periods is unacceptable, their arguments in defense of their claim, merely semantic. Vasubandhu's arguments indicate that he objects primarily to the Sarvāstivādin attempt to draw distinctions among various types of existence, specifically, between activity and intrinsic nature. How is activity related to intrinsic nature? Vasubandhu summarizes his criticism as follows:

> The intrinsic nature [of factors] exists at all times, and yet the mode of existence is not claimed to be permanent. Further, the mode of existence is not claimed to be different from intrinsic nature. Surely, this is an act of the lord.

If the Sarvāstivādins claim that a factor’s mode of existence (bhāva) and the activity (kārītra) by which that mode of existence is determined are nothing other than its intrinsic nature (svabhāva), its activity, like its
intrinsic nature, must exist at all times. If they respond that activity arises
due to a complete assemblage of causes and conditions and is, therefore,
not to be identified with intrinsic nature, since those causes and conditions,
as factors themselves, also exist as intrinsic nature in the three time peri­
ods, the activity of the factor to be produced must accordingly arise at all
times. To respond that the activity of those causes and conditions arises
in dependence upon yet other causes and conditions, Vasubandhu argues,
incurs the fault of infinite regress.\(^{52}\)

Vasubandhu would also reject any distinction among activity, capabil­
ity, and a factor’s intrinsic nature. For Vasubandhu, a factor’s activity
(kārita) constitutes its very nature, its very existence as a factor.\(^{53}\) Since
factors only exist by virtue of their activity, existence can be applied only to
the present moment in which the activity occurs.\(^{54}\) Accordingly, a moment
is defined as a factor having acquired its own nature (ātmalābha), that is
to say, its own activity.\(^{55}\) Production in the present moment is defined as the
fact that a factor “exists not having existed” (abhūtvā bhavati), and its
destruction is the fact that “having existed, it no longer exists” (bhūtvā
punar na bhavati).\(^{56}\) The past is thus defined as that which existed pre­
viously (yat bhūtāpūrvaḥ), and the future, as that which will exist when
there are appropriate causes (yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati).\(^{57}\) Factors are said
to exist in the past and future only in the sense that they “were” and “will
be;” their existence is thus simply a manner of speech and does not de­
ote note actual existence. Therefore, Vasubandhu, like the Sautrāntikas, would
not admit that past or future factors themselves function as causes in the
production of a subsequent or simultaneous effect. Instead, an effect arises
through a process of successive dependence. An initial action conditions
the arising of a subsequent factor, and so on, in serial dependence until
the final condition, in dependence upon yet other conditions, functions to
condition the arising of the effect; this final condition is referred to as the
distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream.\(^{58}\)

The Four Characteristics

Though early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma lists of dissociated factors include
the category of conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors, there is
some variation in their number. For example, the majority of the early
and later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts acknowledge four such condi­
tioned characteristics: birth (jāti), continuance (sthiti), senescence (jarā),
and desinence (anītyātā).\(^{59}\) However, other Abhidharma texts, including
certain Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, acknowledge only three; for exam­
ple, the *Āryavasumitra-bodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra the *Śāriputrabhidharma-
śāstra, the earlier translation or recension of the Jñānaprasthāna—the
9.3 Four Characteristics

*Abhidharmāśāstra—and the *Vibhāṣāstra all omit continuance. Indeed, the question of the number of characteristics as three or four remains a live issue for later Abhidharma interpreters, particularly in view of the fact that the sūtra passage cited as scriptural authority in support of the existence of the conditioned characteristics also mentions only three characteristics. In these later interpretations also, the primary problem is presented by the characteristic of continuance, which would appear to contradict the restricted definition of a moment and thereby, the Buddhist principle of impermanence.

In a general sense, the four conditioned characteristics function to distinguish conditioned from unconditioned factors. For example, the *Mahāvibhāṣā defines conditioned factors as those that “have production, destruction, causes, and effects, and are possessed of the conditioned characteristics.” Conditioned factors are then contrasted with unconditioned factors to which these conditioned characteristics do not apply.

In a specific sense, the conditioned characteristics are said to apply to all conditioned factors because they arise together with them. They serve as causes, together enabling a particular conditioned factor to exert its own activity (kārītra), or project its own effect. Each characteristic also, however, performs a distinctive function. The characteristic of birth acts as the productive cause of the particular conditioned factor with which it is simultaneous and, therefore, to which it applies. It draws out the conditioned factor from the future and enables that factor to enter the present time period. Birth acts as the predominant productive condition when a particular conditioned factor is in the state of being about to be produced; birth then functions, or exerts its capability, when both it and the factor that it characterizes are still future. The characteristic of continuance functions to enable a conditioned factor that has been produced to project its own effect, that is, to exert its own activity. The characteristic of senescence causes the conditioned factor’s activity to deteriorate, thereby weakening the factor, preparing it to pass away. Here, Saṅghabhadra follows an alternative explanation offered in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, whereby senescence is understood as the predominant condition for the transformation in the stream of conditioned factors such that subsequent moments arise as different from their predecessors. Finally, desinence functions as the predominant condition for a conditioned factor’s passing away, which consists simply in that factor having no further activity (kārītra).

The production and destruction of a given conditioned factor’s activity occurs through the influence of a complete assemblage of appropriate causes and conditions, but this assemblage would have no effect if the conditioned factor were not susceptible to its influence. This susceptibility is determined by the four characteristics which are described as immediate assisting, or
internal, conditions necessary to the process of arising and passing away. The four characteristics are, therefore, taxonomically crucial in providing a clear distinction between conditioned and unconditioned factors. Indeed, how else could the absence of arising, and thus of activity, on the part of unconditioned factors be explained? Thus, the conditioned characteristics are considered the predominant conditions among a complete assemblage of causes and conditions that enable conditioned factors to manifest their nature as impermanent, or as conditioned, through the arising and passing away of their activities.

The Four Characteristics—Controversies

The disagreements between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra on the four characteristics of conditioned factors mirror their divergent ontological perspectives. For Saṅghabhadra, the four characteristics, as conditions with evident capability, necessarily exist as discrete real entities. Further, since they characterize all conditioned factors, both material and mental, they must exist as factors dissociated from both form and thought. Vasubandhu, however, adopts the position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: namely, that the four characteristics do not exist as real entities. For Vasubandhu, the characteristics are abstractions, or provisional designations, that have no independent function. The production of each conditioned factor can be explained sufficiently through the collocation of external causes and conditions upon which it depends. The first three provisional phases of birth, continuance, and senescence, Vasubandhu suggests, need no internal cause and destruction needs no cause at all. Conditioned factors are, by nature, disposed to arise and pass away and need no additional characteristics to make them do so. Vasubandhu claims that these four conditioned characteristics are not proven to exist by any scriptural authority, they cannot be perceived directly, and their activity does not need to be inferred to account for accepted experience. Therefore, there exists, for Vasubandhu, no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa), by which they can be held to exist as real entities (*dravya). Saṅghabhadra responds to Vasubandhu’s position by offering in detail both authoritative scriptural passages (*āgama) and reasoned arguments (*yukti) in an effort to prove the existence of these characteristics as real entities.

This basic disagreement between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra on the existential status of the conditioned characteristics is integrally connected to further disagreements concerning the scope of their operation. Following the position of the Dārṣṭāntikas, Vasubandhu rejects the application of these characteristics to a single moment. Instead, like the Sautrāntikas, he proposes that the characteristics designate the arising, continuance, dete-
rioration, and passing away that applies provisionally to a life-stream as a whole. By contrast, Sañghabhadrā, like the *Mahāvibhāṣā, maintains that the conditioned characteristics exert their capability on a single factor and, therefore, characterize each present moment. This position, however, presents certain difficulties. Specifically, if the conditioned characteristics all exert their capabilities on a single factor, which is itself momentary, that factor should be produced, continue, deteriorate, and be destroyed all at the same time. The *Mahāvibhāṣā offers two solutions to this difficulty, both of which attempt to evade the contradiction by proposing a sequence in the functioning of the conditioned characteristics; that is to say, the four conditioned characteristics are said to exert their activities (*kārita) at different times. The solutions also demand careful consideration of the meaning of the term ‘momentary.’ According to the first solution, the characteristic of birth functions when both it and the characterized factor are about to be produced, that is, when both are future. The other three characteristics function when they and the characterized factor are about to be destroyed, that is, when they are present. Since a moment is understood, not as an absolute punctuality, but as the period from production to destruction pertaining to a single factor, the conditioned characteristics could still function within “one moment,” and yet there would be no contradiction of a single factor being produced and destroyed at precisely the same time. As a second solution, the *Mahāvibhāṣā suggests that the states of production and destruction as pertaining to one factor do not constitute a single moment, and yet every moment contains all of the conditioned characteristics. That is to say, birth functions in the future time period when the factor is about to be produced; the remaining conditioned characteristics function in the present time period when that factor is about to be destroyed. Here, the *Mahāvibhāṣā summarizes a position that would appear to suggest that each moment contains three characteristics—continuance, senescence, and desinence—of one factor together with the birth of the subsequent factor. In this way, the production and destruction of a single factor would not be simultaneous.

In discussing this problem, Sañghabhadrā follows the first solution. First, he claims that the four conditioned characteristics must be understood to exist as discrete real entities with their own distinctive functions quite apart from the factor that they characterize. In this way, the differing functions of the characteristics are not attributed to a single factor within one moment, and the fault of contradictory functions—specifically, production and destruction—attributed to one factor in one moment is avoided. The conditioned characteristics should be classified as internal conditions that are simultaneous with a given factor and predominant among the var-
rious internal and external conditions that assist it in exerting its activity. Though not sufficient conditions, the conditioned characteristics are nevertheless necessary conditions enabling a given factor's activity to arise and pass away, thereby determining its nature as conditioned.

However, the functioning of these discrete characteristics still appears to involve a contradiction. Even if the discrete existence of each of the conditioned characteristics is admitted, if they all characterize a single factor within a given moment, how can they not cause that factor to be produced, continue, deteriorate and be destroyed within that very moment? On this point, Saṅghabhadra expands upon the basic solution offered by the *Mahāvibhāṣā. As Saṅghabhadra explains, each factor exists in various states: either as intrinsic nature alone, as in the case of past or future factors that are not functioning as capabilities; as intrinsic nature with activity (kārītra), as in the case of present factors that are active in projecting their own effect; and finally, as intrinsic nature with capability (sāmarthya), as in the case of past, present, or future factors that act as conditions assisting other factors. The conditioned characteristics then function as capabilities assisting another factor, and they exert this capability at different times.77 Specifically, the characteristic of birth exerts its capability in the future, and the three remaining characteristics exert their capability sequentially in the present, in accordance with their conception of a moment; therefore, a single factor cannot be said to be produced and destroyed at the same time.78 The Sarvastivādin suggestion that factors can function as conditions, or, in Saṅghabhadra's terms, exert capability (sāmarthya), while still future proved to be extremely useful in explaining the causal functioning of simultaneous conditions such as the conditioned characteristics, but became a point of attack for those disagreeing with the Sarvāstivādin causal model.79

Thus, Saṅghabhadra can offer an explanation as to why production and destruction do not apply to a single factor within a single moment. But what can be done about the three characteristics of continuance, senescence, and desinence? A partial solution can be found elsewhere in the *Nyāyānapustakā, where Saṅghabhadra discusses at length various interpretations of the meaning of a moment. He first states that a moment is the shortest period of time that cannot be further analyzed into prior and subsequent stages.80 He then adds that a moment refers to the briefest state of conditioned factors and that the present moment refers to that state in which a factor has its activity. It would then appear that the limits of a moment are the limits of a factor exerting its activity. We might then conclude that a moment does not refer to the shortest possible period of time, but rather to the period it takes to exert activity—a period that we might imagine occurs in various stages, that is, of continuance, and so on.81
Despite this attempted explanation, certain problems still remain. For example, how can we account for the apparent sequence in the exertion of the capability of the three conditioned characteristics? If we admit this sequence, are we not also admitting distinctions of “prior and subsequent” within one moment and, thereby, contradicting Śaṅghabhadra’s own definition? Problems such as these do not exist only for contemporary scholars, but have been raised by traditional commentators of virtually all periods. Such problems not only give evidence of the richness and complexity of these doctrinal formulations, but also illustrate the expedient and often oblique development of doctrinal analysis, which proceeds, not in accordance with presumed religio-philosophical concerns, but rather in response to often extremely narrow questions posed in various specific textual, doctrinal, and historical contexts.

Notes

1 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405a1ff.; AKB 2.45c-dff. p. 75.19ff. See also MVB 38 p.198a8ff., 76 p. 393a9ff.

2 The four conditioned characteristics and their importance for Buddhist ontological models form the topic of numerous secondary studies: Schayer (1938); Hirakawa (1966); Sakurabe (1975a); Funahashi (1972); Sasaki (1958) 351–472; Sasaki (1974) 112–321; Yoshimoto (1982) 98–164; Yoshimoto (1979); Yoshimoto (1989a); Tabata (1979a); Tabata (1979b); Tabata (1980); Tabata (1981); Tamai (1981); Fukuda (1988a); Fukuda (1988b).


4 See VSS 9 p. 795b11ff., which devotes an independent section to the position that “everything exists.” See also TSŚ 2 no. 23 p. 256a19ff.; SAHS 11 p. 963a22ff., which explicitly identifies this position as established by the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. KV 1.6 p. 115ff.

5 MVB 73 p. 378b28ff. Cf. SA 13 no. 319 p. 91a27ff. SN 35.23 Sabbasutta 4: 15. kim ca bhikkhave sabbaṁ. cakkhum ca ‘va rūpā ca sōtaṁ ca sādā ca ghanāṁ ca gandhā ca jīvā ca rasā ca kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca mano ca dhammā ca idam vuccati bhikkhave sabbaṁ. Cf. AKB 5.27c p. 301.8.

6 The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 73 p. 378c8ff.) notes several other definitions of “everything” that still follow the same principle of an all-inclusive taxonomy. For example, “everything” refers to any of the following: the eighteen elements; the five aggregates together with unconditioned factors; the four noble truths, space, and cessation not resulting from consideration; or name and form.

7 AKB 5.27c p. 301.6ff.

8 See AKB 2.46b p. 78.3, 5.27c p. 299.15ff. Cf. SA 13 no. 335 p. 92c16ff.; MN no. 111 Anupadasutta 3: 25.

9 See AKB 5.27c p. 299.1ff.: “We also say that the past and future exist. But the past is that which existed previously. The future is that which will exist when there are causes. Taking it in this way, it is said that [the past or future] exists, but not as a real entity.” vayam api brūmo ‘stu attānāgatam iti. attāṁ tu yad bhūtakāyam. anāgataṁ yat sati hetu bhaviṣyati. evāṁ ca kṛtvā ‘stī ‘ty utyate na tu punar dravyataṁ.
9. Four Characteristics

10 NAS 51 p. 630c14ff.
11 NAS 51 p. 630c6ff.
12 See NAS 51 p. 626a17ff.
14 ADV no. 299 p. 257.1ff.
15 Padmanabh Jaini interprets *Ayoga* Sunyatavadin as those who maintain that *sūnyatā* is *ayoga*, where *ayoga* is interpreted as referring to the absence of actual conditioning activities. He then suggests that it can represent “the *sūnyavāda* of both the Mādhyamika and Viṣṇuavāda Buddhism.” See Jaini’s introduction to ADV p. 123–124. Cf. TSŚ 14 no. 186 p. 356c21, 16 no. 192 p. 365b18ff.
16 For an examination of these issues, see Cox (1988).
18 Among the reasons offered in the *Vibhāṣāstra* (VB 7 p. 464b25ff.) three are relevant here. If past and future factors did not exist: (1) cognition would not be produced with regard to past and future factors, since no cognition is produced without an object-field; (2) there would be no accompaniment nor non-accompaniment of, for example, past or future virtuous or unvirtuous factors, and the process of defilement and purification would, thereby, be undermined; (3) it would be impossible to explain conditioning in which the cause precedes the effect. The *Abhidharmaśāstra* (AVB 40 p. 293c28ff.) and *Mahāvibhāṣa* (MVB 76 p. 393a20ff.) omit the first reason concerning the arising of cognition. Cf. TSŚ 2 no. 21 p. 255b12ff.
19 The assumption that perceptual consciousness is, by nature, intentional and, conversely, that all objects, as existent—that is, as experienced—are dependent upon perceptual consciousness is evident in the early Buddhist taxonomic system of the twelve sense spheres and the eighteen elements. Since all that exists can be included in these twelve or eighteen categories, it follows, as Sanghabhadra will conclude, that only those entities that can be objects of perceptual consciousness—that is, whose effects or activities can be experienced—can be said to exist.
20 Though the need to assume the existence of past and future factors is obvious in the case of the experiences of memory and presentiment, the Buddhist analysis of the process of ordinary perception also demands that past and future objects exist. All six varieties of perceptual consciousness arise only in dependence upon their corresponding object-fields; for example, visual perceptual consciousness arises only when presented with form, and so on. Though the five externally directed varieties of perceptual consciousness depend only upon present, and therefore, simultaneously occurring objects, mental perceptual consciousness may depend upon an object of any time period. The Sarvāstivādins allow that only one type and, specifically, only one instance of perceptual consciousness arises in any given moment. Therefore, when an external object is perceived by an appropriate type of perceptual consciousness, that object can only be cognized by mental perceptual consciousness in a subsequent moment when that object is already past. For an examination of Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika models of perception, see Cox (1988) 33ff.
21 For this interpretative distinction, I am indebted to Sakurabe (1975a) 73–74 and Williams (1981) 241ff. See also Nishi ([1931] 1975a).
shores of a river, or long and short. For Sanghabhadra’s treatment of existence, see interpreted as
to a factor’s nature as belonging to a particular sense sphere
ture
existence as a real entity
three types: (1) relative dependent existence
tal material elements
the contextj for example, earth
referring to entities that can be understood as either real or provisional depending upon
personality
provisional entity
states that
cisely [their] intrinsic
ontological position. The second phrase
inherent characteristic of those who maintain that knowledge or cognition is possible without an existing object,
object-field to be known that is not known by
capable of knowing that does not know [a particular thing] to be known, and there is no
object-field to be known that is not known by knowledge.”
refuting the opinion of those who maintain that knowledge or cognition is possible without an existing object,
states that “all cognition has an actually existent object-field... There is no knowledge

The *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 44 p. 228b20ff., 108 p. 558a7ff.), in refuting the opinion
of Sanghabhadra: (1) existence through both (dvaya, ubhayathā), referring to entities
that can be understood as either real or provisional depending upon the context; for example, earth (prthivī),
when understood as one of the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta), exists in an absolute sense,
and when understood as ordinary soil, exists only in a conventional sense; (2) relative dependent existence
(suttvāpeksā), which refers to such correlative states as father/son, teacher/student, or
agent/action. The *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 9 p. 42a24ff.) includes three different classifications
of types of existence. The first includes two types: (1) existence as a real entity
(dravya), such as the aggregates (skandha) or elements (dhatu), and (2) existence as a provisional entity
(prajñāpti), such as male or female. The second classification includes
types: (1) relative dependent existence (hsiang-tai, *apekṣā), as when something
exists relative to one thing, and not relative to another; (2) existence as a composite
(ho-ho, *sāmagṛ, as when something exists in one place, and not in another; and (3)
existence in accord with temporal state (shih-fen, *avasthā), as when something exists
at one time, and not at another. The third classification includes five types: (1) nominal
existence (nāma), such as hair on a tortoise, the horn of a hare, and so on; (2) existence
as a real entity (dravya), such as all factors (dharma), each of which is defined
by intrinsic nature; (3) existence as a provisional entity (prajñāpti), such as a pot, a
cloth, a chariot, and so on; (4) existence as a composite (ho-ho, *sāmagṛ, as such as the personality
(pudgala), which is a provisional designation based on a collocation of the
aggregates; and (5) relative dependent existence (hsiang-tai, *apekṣā), such as the two
shores of a river, or long and short. For Saṅghabhadra’s treatment of existence, see
Aohara (1986b).

For a description of this process of analysis, see SAHS 10 p. 958b8ff.; AKB 6.4
a–d p. 333.23ff.; SAKV p. 524.8ff.; NAS 58 p. 666a7ff. For Saṅghabhadra’s treatment
of this issue, see de La Vallée Poussin (1936–1937b) 169ff.

See AKB 6.14c–d p. 341.11–12: “Their particular inherent characteristic is precisely [their] intrinsic nature.” svabhāva evai 'śām svalaksanam. However the particular inherent characteristic (svalaksana) need not refer to a factor’s distinctive intrinsic nature (svabhāva) as a discrete real entity (dravya), but can, in certain contexts, refer to a factor’s nature as belonging to a particular sense sphere (āyatana). See SAKV p. 472.26ff. See also MVB 13 p. 65a13ff., 27 p. 665b1ff.; SAHS 1 p. 870c7ff.; AKB 1.10d p. 7.18ff.; SAKV p. 28.10ff.; NAS 60 p. 675b4ff.

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya uses two phrases to present the ontological position of the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāṣikas: sarvakālāstitā (AKB 5.25a. p. 295.6) and svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cā 'sti (AKB 5.27c p. 298.21). In the Abhidharma traditions of China and Japan, these two phrases were combined as the definitive statement of the Sarvāstivādin ontological position. The second phrase svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cā 'sti is unanimously interpreted as “the intrinsic nature of factors exists at all times.” The first phrase sar-
vakālāstītā, however, is the focus of considerable controversy and has been interpreted in two ways: (1) "the existence of all time periods"—that is, the time periods themselves actually exist; and (2) "the existence of factors in all time periods." However, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 76 p. 393a9ff.; cf. MVB 135 p. 700a26ff.) would appear to preclude any interpretation that considers the time periods to be discrete entities apart from factors: "Further, there are three factors: namely, past, future, and present factors. Why is this doctrine presented? It is presented in order to refute the position of other sects and manifest the correct principle. There are those, like the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins, who maintain that conditioned forces and the time periods are different. They make the following statement: 'The nature of the time periods is permanent and the nature of conditioned forces is impermanent. The conditioned forces pass through the time periods like fruit in baskets. They emerge from this basket and enter into that basket. Conditioned forces are also like a group of people that emerge from this cottage and move into that cottage. From the future time period, they enter the present time period, and from the present, they enter the past.' In order to refute their opinion, we maintain that the time periods and conditioned forces are, in their nature, without distinction." Cf. VSŚ 1 p. 724b19ff.; MVB 76 p. 393c4ff., which identifies the time periods with conditioned forces. See also Nishi ([1933] 1975b) 406-409, 425-431; Sasaki (1974) 184ff.

30 See VSŚ 1 p. 724b4ff.; VB 7 p. 466b7ff.; AVB 40 p. 295c6ff.; MVB 77 p. 396a13ff., where the four views are attributed to specific masters; AKB 5.26a–b p. 296.9ff.; SAKV p. 469.20ff.; NAS 52 p. 631a12ff.; AVD no. 302 p. 260.14ff.; TSP nos. 1786–1789 p. 614ff. For a discussion of the four views as presented in the *Āryavasumitra bodhisattvasaṅgitiśāstra, see Watanabe (1954) 186ff. The *Vibhāṣāsāstra (VB 7 p. 466b19ff.) includes the example of the woman as either daughter or mother in the third alternative of difference in state.
31 VB 7 p. 466b24; AVB 40 p. 295c20; MVB 77 p. 396b5ff.; AKB 5.26c p. 297.9ff.; SAKV p. 471.4ff.; AVD no. 302 p. 259.7ff.
34 See MVB 39 p. 200a29ff.; NAS 52 p. 633a7ff.
36 See MVB 76 p. 393a20ff.; AKB 5.25a–b p. 195.7ff.; NAS 52 p. 636a22ff.
37 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b4ff.; NAS 51 p. 631c5ff.
38 Though this distinction between activity and capability is explicitly developed by Saṅghabhadra, it is possibly suggested by certain passages in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. For example, in a passage discussing varieties of transformation, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 39 p. 200a29ff.) juxtaposes a transformation in activity (*kāraṇa) and a transformation in capability (*sāmarthya), both of which are contrasted to the absence of transformation in intrinsic nature (*svabhāva). Whereas activity characterizes a factor only when it is present, capability occurs in the future time period in the case of the capability of birth, and so on, in the present time period in the case of the capability of desinenence, and so on, and in the past time period in the case of a factor delivering (prayam)– its effect. See also MVB 21 p. 105a17, 39 p. 200a23ff., 55 p. 283b25ff., 93 p. 480a26ff. Cf. Abhidharmakośabhaṅgāya, Saeki (1886) 1978 2: 837; Aohara (1986a). Tan’e (Tan’e 5 p. 868a10ff.) distinguishes between the “Old Sarvāstivādins,” for whom, he claims, activity and capability are merely synonyms, and the “New Sarvāstivādins,” namely, Saṅghabhadra, for whom “activity necessarily has capability, but capability does not
necessarily have activity due to a difference in scope." See also Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, Saeki ([1886] 1978) 1: 222; P'u-kuang 5 p. 104b29ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 548c25ff.; Aohara (1986c).

39 The term kung-neng is used both in a narrower sense of the capability that is opposed to activity, or tso-yung (kārītra), and in a wider sense of that power that includes both capability and activity. This results in ambiguity concerning its meaning in any given context and in uncertainty concerning its original Sanskrit equivalent. Sasaki Genjun, on the basis of similar passages in the Tattvasaṅgraha (TSP nos.1790–1792 p. 617) and the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 52 p. 631c5ff.), suggests vyāpāra as the equivalent for kung-neng when it is used in the narrower sense in opposition to kārītra. Other passages in the Tattvasaṅgraha could, however, be cited in support of sāmarthya as the equivalent of kung-neng in this narrower sense. See TSP nos. 1809–1814 p. 622ff., no. 1828 p. 626, no. 1834 p. 627. Cf. Sasaki ([1958] 1978) 394ff.; Aohara (1986c) 35ff. Sāmartya is also suggested as the equivalent for kung-neng by Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 172.29). Śākti is a possible equivalent for kung-neng in the wider sense including both activity and capability. Or, it is also possible that Saṅghabhadra used sāmartya in both a narrow and wide sense. See NAS 52 p. 632b11.

40 See MVB 12 p. 57a24ff.; AKB 2.46b p. 78.16ff.; infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b25ff., infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 409c24ff.; NAS 15 p. 419c2ff. For this future functioning, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 3 p. 12b4ff.) has the term tso-yung, usually the equivalent for kārītra. Here the *Mahāvibhāṣā refers to three instances of future causal functioning: internal factors such as the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānākṣānti); external factors such as the light of the sun, and so on; both internal and external factors such as the characteristic of birth (jāti-laksana).

41 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 410a3ff.; NAS 18 p. 437c6ff., 50 p. 621c29ff.


43 The six varieties of causes recognized by the Sarvāstivādins can be classified by when they exert their activity and capability. See MVB 21 p. 108c6ff., 196 p. 983a1ff.; SAHS 10 p. 954b29ff.; AKB 2.59 p. 96.11ff.; SAKV p. 226.9ff.; NAS 18 p. 437c2ff. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 18 p. 437c15–16, pāsāṃ) presents an inviolable rule concerning this causal process: a factor's causal activity of seizing or projecting its effect must occur when that factor is present; and the presenting or delivering of the effect cannot occur without first seizing or projecting it.

44 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 410a1ff.; NAS 18 p. 437a13ff., 19 p. 447a10ff., 52 p. 631c8ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 76 p. 393c27ff.) uses the same example to clarify that a factor's function in seizing its effect—or its function as a homogeneous cause—should be considered to be its activity. However, whereas Saṅghabhadra distinguishes kārītra from sāmartya, it is difficult to find unequivocal evidence for such a distinction in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. Cf. SAKV p. 471.11ff.; TSP nos.1790–1792 p. 617.


46 See MVB 76 p. 394c5ff.; AKB 5.27a p. 297.18ff.; SAKV p. 471.28; NAS 52 p. 631c22ff., 52 p. 632c7ff.; TSP no. 1793ff. p. 617ff.

47 TSP no. 1806 p. 621 (cf. NAS 52 p. 633a24ff.): na kārītraṁ dharmān anyat tadyātirekena svabhāvānupalabdhyāḥ. nā 'pi dharmamātrāṁ svabhāvāsīte 'pi kadācid abhāvāt. na ca na viśeṣaḥ kārītrasya prāgabhāvāt samtaṇāvatvā. tathā dharmamātrāṁ antaryotpattiḥ samtaṇā iti ucyate na ca 'sau dharmavyayārthika tadavbhāhagna prhya-māṇavatvāt. na ca dharmamātrāṁ ekakaṇḍasya 'pi samtaṇāvatvaprasaṅgāt. na ca nā 'sti tatkāryasadbhāvād iṭā. āha ca samatikāryarāṁ ca 'śtaṁ na vidyate sa 'pi samtaṇāḥ kācit.
tadvad avagacca yuktya kāritrenā 'dhvasaraṁsiddhīṁ iti. Cf. MVb 76 p. 394c8; NAS 51 p. 624b24ff., 52 p. 632a26ff., 52 p. 632c17ff., 52 p. 633c17ff.

48 NAS 52 p. 632c23ff.
50 Since the impermanent aspect of factors is identified as the arising and passing away of their activity, unconditioned factors, which are not characterized by activity—that is, the projection of their own effect—are not impermanent and, indeed, are not subject to any type of temporal determination. See MVb 21 p. 105c15ff., 138 p. 711b3ff.; NAS 52 p. 631c13ff. Cf. NAS 17 p. 432b6ff., which discusses intrinsic nature and activity as they pertain to the unconditioned factor, nirūpa.

51 AKB 5.27c p. 298.21ff.: svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cā 'stī bhāvo nityaś ca ne 'vyate na ca svabhāvaḥ bhāvo 'nyo vyaktaṁ iśvaračeṣṭitaṁ. Yaśomitra (SA Kv. p. 472.25ff.) notes that this Sarvāstivādin position is compared to an act of the lord because it represents mere desire (ichchāmātratvāt), and is not reasonable. Cf. Sasaki (1974) 191ff.
52 See NAS 52 p. 632a20ff.
53 The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra (TSŚ 2 no. 20 p. 255a20ff.) takes the same position: "If a factor is without activity, it is without intrinsic nature. If past fire is not able to burn, it should not be referred to as fire. Perceptual consciousness is also so: if, as past, it is not able to perceive, then it should not be referred to as perceptual consciousness. Further, it is not possible that something exists without causes; it is not tenable that past factors are able to exist without causes."
54 Accordingly, the Dārśāntānikas are described as rejecting the two states of "being about to be produced" and "being about to be destroyed," which are admitted by the Sarvāstivādins. Instead, they admit only the two states of "not yet having been produced" and "having already been produced." See MVb 27 p. 141b2ff., 183 p. 919b1ff. The Sarvāstivādins claim that it is precisely in this future state of being about to be produced that the characteristic of birth exerts its capability of production. See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b13ff.
55 See AKB 3.85c p. 176.12, where a moment is defined as follows: "What is the limit of a moment? That during which a factor acquires its own nature when there is an assemblage of conditions." samagreṣu pratyayesa yavatā dharmasya 'tmalabhāḥ. Cf. NAS 32 p. 521b17ff.
57 AKB 5.27c p. 299.1ff.; SAKV p. 472.33ff.
58 NAS 51 p. 629b2ff., 52 p. 632.2ff.; AKB 5.27c p. 300.22ff.; SAKV p. 476.16ff.
60 See VŚŚ 9 p. 796a22ff.; ŠAS 1 p. 526c, 21 p. 663a17ff.; JP (1543) 3 p. 780b17ff., translated by Saṅghadeva and Chu Po-nien; cf. JP (1544) 2 p. 926a4ff.; VB 6 p. 458a18. Scholars have suggested that the *Āryavasarmitrabodhisattvasaṅgitiśāstra, the *Āṣṭa-skandhaśāstra, and the *Vibhāṣāśāstra represent the non-Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin lineage: Watanabe (1954) 140, 245ff.; Sakurabe (1969a) 87ff. Sakurabe Hajime (Sakurabe (1969a) 87ff.) also notes that the reference in the Vijñānakāya (VK 3 p. 545b16) is ambiguous and may refer to either three or four characteristics.
61 See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405c10ff. Or, for Vasubandhu’s rejection of

62 *MV* 76 p. 392c19ff. In this passage distinguishing conditioned from unconditioned factors, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* also notes that conditioned factors "arise through birth, deteriorate through senescence, and are terminated through desinence." Continuance is undoubtedly not mentioned here because continuance can also be understood to characterize unconditioned factors. Cf. *MV* 38 p. 198a10ff., 39 p. 201a28ff.; *infra*, translation, *NAS* 13 p. 405c12ff.

63 See *AKB* 2.23b p. 54.6ff.; *SAKV* p. 127.7ff.


65 See *MV* 39 p. 199a15ff., 39 p. 201c24ff.


71 See *AKB* 2.46b p. 76.27ff.; *infra*, translation, *NAS* 13 p. 406b12ff.; *NAB* 33 p. 533c29ff. This section in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* uses the term *tsö-yung*, which Hsüan-tsang translates as *kiirta*. As will become clear, Saṅghabhadra uses the term *sāmarthya* in this context. This would suggest that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* does not recognize the clear distinction between *kārtra* and *sāmarthya* proposed by Saṅghabhadra.

72 See *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 409a6ff. Cf. *NAB* 33 p. 533c29ff. This first solution is also supported by the commentators. See *P'u-kuang* 5 p. 106b11ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 550a1ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 165b11ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 110b16ff. Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 110b26ff.) refers to the position that a moment should be delimited not by the production and destruction of the characterized factor, but rather by the activities of the four characteristics.


75 See *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 410a1ff. Prominent among these critics were Vasubandhu and the Dārṣṭāntika master, Śrīlāta: *NAS* 15 p. 419a7ff.

76 See *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 409a6ff. Cf. *NAB* 33 p. 533c29ff. This first solution is also supported by the commentators. See *P'u-kuang* 5 p. 106b11ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 550a1ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 165b11ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 110b16ff. Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 110b26ff.) refers to the position that a moment should be delimited not by the production and destruction of the characterized factor, but rather by the activities of the four characteristics.


78 See *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 409c18ff.

79 See *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 411a1ff. Prominent among these critics were Vasubandhu and the Dārṣṭāntika master, Śrīlāta: *NAS* 15 p. 419a7ff.

80 See *NAB* 33 p. 533b7ff.


82 See esp. Sasaki (1974) 129ff., where Sasaki Genjun suggests that a moment, for Saṅghabhadra, should be understood as referring to the shortest period of time that allows us to discern transformation; indeed, it is transformation alone that allows us to conceive of time or units of time such as a single moment. These four characteristics only
if taken together as a unit account for transformation and therefore constitute the limits of "a moment." Thus if one speaks of time—of sequence, or of "prior and subsequent"—one must have, at the very least, one unit of the four characteristics by which an instance of transformation is constituted. It is then on the basis of the four characteristics—or their function as defining the interval during which a factor exerts its activity—that time itself is established.
Chapter 10

Name, Phrase, and Syllable

The analysis of the nature and operation of language was a prominent concern not only for the long tradition of Indian grammatical studies, but also for both the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of classical Indian philosophy. The similarity of the issues raised and, indeed, of the interpretative perspectives adopted testifies to the ready exchange of ideas and mutual influence among Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers. The treatment of language-related issues in the *Mahāvibhāṣā and later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma texts provides an invaluable record of the development of language interpretation in Indian thought during a period for which there is relatively little evidence: that is, the period from the grammatical analyses presented in the *Mahābhāṣya to Bhartṛhari and the later Mīmāṁsaka and Nyāya commentarial traditions.

A comparison of the Abhidharma Buddhist interpretations of language with the roughly contemporaneous treatments in Śabara’s commentary on the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra and in Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtra provides ample evidence of the contact among proponents of the various religio-philosophical schools at the time. Indeed, the Abhidharma Buddhist treatments are perhaps better understood in the context of contemporaneous non-Buddhist analyses than in the context of the later Buddhist language model that is founded upon the theory of *apoha. At the very least, the Abhidharma treatments testify to the complex background and development of the later Buddhist analyses of language and the firm grounding of all Buddhist inquiry in a pan-Indian context.

These early Buddhist and non-Buddhist investigations of language consider many of the same issues and appear to be aware of the same range of possible solutions, which were then developed in characteristic fashion within each tradition. Prominent among the issues examined are the origin
of language, the nature of language in relation to sound and concept, the functional relationship among the components of language, the character of the referent of language, the mechanism by which that referent is suggested through language, and the dynamics of communication. The treatment of language in Buddhist Abhidharma materials devotes particular attention to the nature of language and to the relation between language and its referents. The major topics in this investigation include the nature of language either as sound or as name (nāma), the existential status of name, and the function of name with regard to both concept and sound, specifically in manifesting the object-referent.

The early Buddhist Abhidharma materials, however, give no evidence of several issues that were to become significant in later Buddhist and non-Buddhist analyses: for example, first, the relation among the various components of language, specifically, that between word and sentence as possible conveyers of sense; and, second, the nature of the referent of language as an object or as simple intention, or as a particular or as a universal. Nevertheless, Buddhist Abhidharma discussions are firmly placed within the larger tradition of religio-philosophical and grammatical investigations of language. In particular, by proposing the discrete existence of name as a meaning conveying entity apart from sound, the early Buddhist analyses presage later developments in the theory of sphota, though with a distinctively Buddhist flavor that emphasizes the impermanence of names by asserting the consensual origin of the association between names and their referents.

10.1 Origins of Language Analysis and the Nature of the Buddha’s Teaching

Language analysis in northern Indian Abhidharma Buddhist texts appears to have originated with inquiries into the nature of the Buddha’s teaching. One motive for this analysis was undoubtedly a desire to resolve the apparent contradiction between the belief in the nature of the Buddha’s teaching as eternal doctrine and its phenomenal expression through speech. Early Mīmāṃsaka investigations of language also begin from a concern with the character of their basic text, specifically from a desire to validate the Vedas as the infallible repository of eternal truth and ritual authority. However, unlike the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas propose that the relation between words and their referents is natural, or inborn (autpattika), and exists eternally quite apart from either sound or human formation.

In an early Abhidharma description of the Buddha’s teaching, the Sāri-
10.1 Nature of the Buddha’s Teaching

**gītīparyāya** defines the teaching (*dharma*) as the three sets of name, phrase, and syllable; that is to say, the essence of the teaching is expounded, established, clarified, and so on, by means of these three factors. Further, that which is manifested, understood, indicated, and so on, by these names, phrases, and syllables is called the referent (*artha*).\(^3\) The *Jñānaprasthāna* offers a two-faceted description of the Buddha’s teaching.\(^4\) The Buddha’s teaching is first described as the Buddha’s speech, words, utterance, voice, explanation, way of speech, sound of speech, activity of speech, or manifest speech action—that is, the manifest or outward speech sounds that belong to the Buddha. The *Jñānaprasthāna* next asserts that the Buddha’s words can be either virtuous (*kusala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) depending upon the moral quality of the moment of thought of the Buddha when he is speaking. To this, the *Jñānaprasthāna* adds a definition of the nature of the Buddha’s teaching that is similar to the interpretation of the *Sāṅgītīparyāya*: “What is that factor referred to as the Buddha’s teaching? It is that regularly ordered alignment, regularly ordered arrangement, regularly ordered combination of name, phrase, and syllable sets.”\(^5\)

In commenting on this passage from the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the *Mahāvibhaṣa* first explains the motive for this discussion of the Buddha’s teaching. It is presented, the *Mahāvibhaṣa* claims, in order to refute the view that one can give rise to Buddhist ideas from sources other than the Buddha’s own teaching. The true source of the Buddha’s teaching is his own words, and those, other than the Buddha, who promulgate the teaching, do so by relying upon or imitating his words.\(^6\) Next, the *Mahāvibhaṣa* discusses the first description of the Buddha’s teaching offered in the *Jñānaprasthāna*—that is, as manifest speech sounds.\(^7\) The *Mahāvibhaṣa* employs its usual technique of challenging the position under examination through a series of questions. It first asks why the Buddha’s teaching is identified only with a manifest speech act (*vāgvijñāpti*), and not with the unmanifest (*avijñāpti*) intentional component underlying manifestly uttered speech. Several answers are offered: for example, the teaching produces correct understanding in others, which necessarily depends only upon the manifest words, not on the Buddha’s unmanifest intention; or, the Buddha’s teaching is to be grasped by auditory perceptual consciousness, and unmanifest speech acts cannot be thus grasped.

Continuing its explication of this passage from the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the *Mahāvibhaṣa* next asks whether the intrinsic nature of the Buddha’s teaching should be considered to be the manifest speech act or the name, phrase, and syllable sets of which this speech act consists.\(^8\) Each alternative presents certain difficulties. First, if the teaching were simply the manifest speech act (*vāgvijñāpti*), then certain authoritative textual statements would be difficult to interpret: for example, the definition of the
teaching offered by the Jñānaprasthāna, which identifies the teaching with the name, phrase, and syllable sets. If, however, the teaching were identified as name, and so on, then the initial description of the teaching offered by the Jñānaprasthāna, which describes the teaching as manifest speech sounds, would be undermined. The *Mahāvibhāṣā responds that the teaching should be understood as having the intrinsic nature of manifest speech sounds. The Jñānaprasthāna’s description of the teaching in terms of name, and so on, should then be interpreted as indicating the activity of the Buddha’s teaching, not its intrinsic nature. Finally, the *Mahāvibhāṣā observes that there are those who maintain that the Buddha’s teaching takes name, and so on, as its intrinsic nature. In that case, the first description of the teaching in the Jñānaprasthāna as manifest speech sounds should be interpreted as suggesting an indirect relation of successive dependence through which speech gives rise to name and name is able to manifest the object-referent.

The intrinsic nature of the Buddha’s teaching continues to be a controversial topic in later Abhidharma treatises. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya discusses this topic in an interpretation of the “aggregates of dharmas” (dharmaskandha), which were expounded by the Buddha and can be equated with his teaching. Relying upon another passage in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya suggests that there are two interpretations of dharmaskandha—either as speech (vāc), or as name (nāman). Saṅghabhadrā cites both interpretations and concludes that the teaching is synonymous with speech, and that name and the teaching exist with separate intrinsic natures. He also notes, however, that those who identify the teaching with name support their view with the claim that the teaching occurs only in dependence upon name. They further claim that since the Buddha’s teaching specifies referents in accord with reality, and since name is able to specify the referent, the teaching must be identified with name, and, by extension, with phrases and syllables.

In commenting on the same passage from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Yaśomitra offers another interpretation. He identifies the first group of those who interpret the dharmaskandhas as speech (vāc) with the Sautrāntikas. The second group who interpret the dharmaskandhas as name (nāman), he suggests, refers to those for whom name is a dissociated factor. Yaśomitra then claims that, for the Abhidhārmikas, both speech and name constitute the intrinsic nature of the Buddha’s teaching. To support this claim, Yaśomitra refers to the previously cited passage from the Jñānaprasthāna, which he interprets as presenting two alternative positions. However, Yaśomitra’s interpretation of the position of the Abhidhārmikas conflicts with that offered by the *Mahāvibhāṣā and Saṅghabhadrā. For these two representatives of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the in-
trinsic nature of the Buddha’s teaching is speech because it is expounded overtly with the primary purpose of communicating the doctrine to others. However, the existence of name should not be not denied; indeed, it should be recognized as a discrete existent factor. The relation between name and speech and their respective roles in expression then become central points of controversy in later Abhidharma language analyses.

10.2 Name, Phrase, and Syllable—Function

Though the name, phrase, and syllable sets are recognized in early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma treatises as discrete factors dissociated from thought, they are analyzed extensively only from the period of the Vibhasa compendia onward. From the earlier attempts to determine the character of the Buddha’s teaching, the focus shifts to a more abstract analysis of the nature of language and its operation. The central problem becomes the nature of the relation between language, thought, and the world of specified referents. The detailed discussions of these issues in the later Abhidharma sources indicate familiarity with analogous treatments in the larger non-Buddhist arena.

With only a couple of exceptions, Abhidharma texts of all periods present similar definitions of the name, phrase, and syllable sets. Syllables (vyanjana) are defined as the basic components of language or as the smallest unit of articulation, and not, as the term vyanjana might suggest, as the more limited category of consonants. Syllables are then identified as phonemes (aksara), which is not to suggest that they are mere vowels, but rather that syllables include consonants with an inherent vowel. These discrete syllables or phonemes then form the basis of names and phrases, and enable sounds to convey meaning to another. Names are based upon collections of syllables or phonemes arranged in a specific order and names function to manifest the object-referent, or the intrinsic nature of the object-referent. Names bear a close relation to concepts (samjnna) and enable concepts to be communicated. Phrases are based upon collections of names and are able to bring to completion the intended object-referent or meaning.

For the Sarvastivadins, syllables, names, and phrases exist separately as discrete real entities operative on one of three levels of extension from the narrowest scope of syllables to the broadest scope of phrases. Each constitutes a mechanism by which a particular object-referent is signified or by which meaning is conveyed to others. The Sarvastivadins also assert that syllables, names, and phrases must exist as factors dissociated from both thought and form. As overtly expressed, they are closely related to
sound, and therefore, to form \( (rūpa) \), and yet as objects of thought, they are closely related to concepts \( (saṁjñā) \). However, they cannot be identified with either form or concepts. Since names, and so on, can be communicated non-verbally, they cannot be identified with form. Further, since concepts are factors necessarily associated with thought \( (saṁprayukta) \), they are confined to the individual mental perceptual consciousness in which they arise. Therefore, only a factor dissociated from both thought and form could, in all these varying circumstances, support the transmission of concepts from one perceptual consciousness to another.

**Name and Concept**

Due to its pivotal role in the relation between thought or concepts and the object-referent or meaning \( (artha) \), name receives the greatest attention in the later Abhidharma language analyses. Both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra define name in terms of concepts \( (saṁjñā) \). Vasubandhu identifies name simply as \( saṁjñākaraṇa \), which Yasomitra interprets in two ways.\(^1\) It can be understood either as a dependent determinative compound \( (tatpurusa) \): that is, “[name is] the maker of concepts,” or “that by which the mental factor, concept, is made or produced.”\(^2\) Or, the compound can be interpreted as a descriptive determinative \( (karmadhāraya) \) used exocentrically \( (bahuvrīhi) \): that is, “[name is] that of which the maker is concepts.” In other words, Yasomitra suggests a reciprocal functioning, whereby name is either the cause of concepts, or concepts are the cause of names. P’u-kuang cites both of these interpretations and adds a third, whereby name and concept are identified with one another.\(^3\) However, Yasomitra observes that name and concept must be distinct “for if name were said to be precisely concept, it would be possible for [name] to be a mental factor,” and name is, instead, classified among the dissociated factors.\(^4\)

Saṅghabhadra is not unequivocal concerning the relation between or possible identity of name and concepts. In explaining Vasubandhu’s initial gloss on the “name set” \( (nāmakāya) \) as the “collection of concepts” \( (saṁjñāsamukti) \), Saṅghabhadra explains this “collection of concepts” as “concepts that grasp \( (udgrahaṇa) \) a factor through conceptual discrimination \( (vikalpa) \) and are issued forth from phonemes that have been established in common.”\(^5\) This initial explanation would appear to identify name with those concepts that are issued forth through consensually established arrangements of phonemes. Saṅghabhadra then adds that name is “an established specification \( (kṛtāvadhi) \), which, like an echo, both manifests that which is produced by a recognized intention \( (*āśaya) \) and is able
to represent the intrinsic nature of object-fields (viśaya) that are known." Thus, name both manifests or reflects a mental intention or concept and represents or refers to the intended meaning or object-referent. Saṅghabhadra also assumes a close association between name and concept in his explanation of the role of names in expression. A speaker first "holds the intended name in thought" and only then decides to "issue forth such and such a word and express such and such an object-referent to others." The object-referent is then expressed through a series of steps. Speech first arises in accordance with one's volition, phonemes are issued forth in dependence upon that speech, and finally these phonemes issue forth names, which alone manifest the object-referent. If name were not first held in thought, articulated sound or speech alone would be unable to express the object-referent or meaning and communicate it to others.

Thus, for Saṅghabhadra, name and concept function in close connection with one another. A concept functions as an associated thought concomitant and, by definition, acts to grasp the defining mark (viśayanimittad-graha) of a perceived object-field: that is, it discriminates or determines (pariccheda) the particular state (avasthāviśeṣa) of a given entity (vastu) as blue, yellow, long, and so on. This concept then applies a particular name in accordance with the determined or discriminated mark of the object-field; one identifies the object-field with a name through the operation of defining conceptual discrimination (abhinirūpa'ñavikalpa). Saṅghabhadra refers to this process of identification of an object's defining marks in his description of the activity of name as one of according with (sui), summoning (chao), and joining with (ho) the object-referent. Name thus functions bi-directionally—that is, both internally and externally: it is both held in thought prior to speech and expressed outwardly to others through speech. When a name is uttered, that name produces a concept in the consciousness of the listener. Thus, depending upon the perspective, concepts elicit names, or conversely, names elicit concepts; names and concepts, thus, function in a circular process of identification and communication.

Name and the Object-referent

How then is the relation between particular uttered names and the internal concepts that they reflect or the outward objects to which they refer established? For Saṅghabhadra, name, like concept, exists as a real entity, a pre-existing discrete factor that has the capability of manifesting the object-referent or of conveying meaning. However, the combinations of phonemes that constitute each particular name are established specifications, (kṛtāvadhi) which are determined by consensus (saṅketa).

The *Mahāvibhāṣā cites six systems of classifying names, which indi-
cate the various methods by which certain names are established for specific object-referents. For example, the first classification comprises a secondary set of six methods by which names can be given: according to qualities, as in the case of one who recites the *sūtras, who is then referred to as a “master of the *sūtras;” according to type of birth, as in the case of one born in the city, or country, or one born of a certain caste; according to differences of time, as in the case of an infant, a child, and so on; according to desire, as in the case of the name given at birth by one's parents; according to activity, as in the case of one who paints who is referred to as a painter; and according to a distinguishing characteristic, as in the case of one who holds a staff. The final classification listed by the *Mahāvibhaṣā is particularly significant for the issue of the relation between a name and its object-referent. This sixth classification comprises two methods: names determined in the abstract, such as *Sumeru, and so on; and names that are not determined, including all worldly conventional names that are established in common. However, the *Mahāvibhaṣā also cites the opinion of those who claim that the first method of names that are determined in the abstract is untenable; even these seemingly abstract names also are established in common at the beginning of a cosmic era. Therefore, though name, as the underlying signifier of object-referents or the conveyor of meaning, exists as a discrete real entity, the specific content of any given particular name is not inherent within its object-referent, but is determined simply by consensus. Whatever its specific content, a name, once elicited, performs its own function; that is, it manifests the object-referent conventionally associated with the arrangement of phonemes of which it consists.

The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikā position presented in this model of the relation between words and their object-referents is in marked contrast to that of the Mīmāṃsakas, but shares certain characteristics with that of the Nāyāyikas and with that of the Grammarians (*Vaiyākarana). Like the Nāyāyikas, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas support the role of consensus in the determination of the relation between a particular word and its object-referent. This relation between a word and its object-referent is not one of identity or direct contact. Otherwise, the mouth would be burned in uttering “fire,” or cut in uttering “knife,” and so on. This absence of direct contact does not, however, imply that language is completely arbitrary; the specific relation between a word and its object-referent is conventional or depends upon the occasion (sāmayika)—that is, it is established by agreement in usage. Accordingly, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas would reject the Mīmāṃsaka theory of the eternal character of language—that is, the relation between a word and its object-referent or meaning (*sabdārthasambandha) is natural and infallible, not subject to human invention or to the vicissitudes of human intention. This rejection of the
Mīmāṃsaka position is indicated in the Abhidharma classification of the name, phrase, and syllable sets as included among factors constituting sentient beings (*sattvākhyā*).\(^{36}\)

On the issue of the classification of name, and so on, as included among factors constituting sentient beings, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* raises the problem of whether it is the one who expresses or the object-referent expressed that has accompaniment (*samanvāgama*) of name, and so on.\(^{37}\) Either option presents certain doctrinal difficulties. If the one who expresses has accompaniment of name, and so on, an arhat who utters the phrase 'defiled factors' would be possessed of those defiled factors, or an ordinary person who utters the phrase 'noble factors' would thereby be possessed of those noble factors. This undesirable consequence, of course, presumes a relation of identity between a name and its object-referent. If, on the other hand, the object expressed has accompaniment of name, and so on, external insentient objects and unconditioned factors also would have accompaniment of name because they too are expressed, and yet name is classified exclusively among those factors constituting sentient beings. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* concludes that accompaniment of name, and so on, belongs to the one who expresses it. However, this does not result in the undesirable conclusion that one who expresses and is, thereby, accompanied by a certain name is also accompanied by its object-referent, because a name and its object-referent are discrete entities.

**Name and Sound**

The disagreement between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra in the discussion of the name, phrase, and syllable sets focuses on the role of sound in expression and on the specific relation between name and sound. Saṅghabhadra interprets linguistic expression as involving speech, phonemes, and names in an indirect relation of successive dependence; only when speech issues forth in phonemes, and phonemes further issue forth in names, are the names then able to specify the object-referent or meaning that one desires to express.\(^{38}\) A certain arrangement of phonemes is consensually established as specifying a particular object-referent. When speakers intend to speak, they first reflect upon the established specification, and only then emit sounds that conform to that specification. These emitted sounds simply form the basis for phonemes, which then form the basis for the arising of complete names; only these names are able to specify the object-referent. Speakers and listeners participate in a consensual grid of specifying names, and thereby, are able to understand the object-referent manifested in their own speech or in the speech of others.

Vasubandhu, by contrast, maintains that names are unnecessary; speech
(vāc) or sound (sabda) is the foundation of language and objects can be referred to by speech with no intermediary.\(^{39}\) Name, phrase, and syllable are, by nature, speech or sound, and do not exist as discrete real entities. They, therefore, exist merely as provisional entities that are used to refer to specified arrangements of speech.\(^{40}\) Speech is not simply sound, but refers only to those particular articulated sounds by which the object-referent is understood. These articulated speech-sounds are consensually established by speakers as specifying a particular object-referent.\(^{41}\)

Vasubandhu argues against the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model of name, and so on, as discrete factors and claims that it is impossible to explain the dependence of a single name on a sequence of sounds.\(^{42}\) There is no complete assemblage or collocation (sāmagṛya) in one moment of the various sounds constituting a single name, and the serial production or manifestation of that single name, part by part, is not reasonable. The last syllable in the series of sounds cannot be said to produce or manifest the single name, for one should then be able to understand the name by hearing that last sound alone.\(^{43}\)

In response to Vasubandhu’s criticisms, Saṁghabhadra offers arguments to support the existence of a non-vocalized, meaning-bearing or object-referent-signifying unit—that is, name. He first notes that there are cases in which an object-referent can be transmitted without dependence upon a complete segment of articulated speech: for example, if only a portion of the uttered syllables are heard as in the case of reading lips, and so on.\(^{44}\) Next, Saṁghabhadra objects that if sounds or speech are the conveyors of the meaning, the choice of particular sounds as well as their meaning-bearing function must be determined by consensus.\(^{45}\) In that case, Vasubandhu’s position would be subject to the fault of infinite regress; consensus upon consensus would be necessary to explain one simple speech act. Finally, Saṁghabhadra turns Vasubandhu’s criticism of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position against his own view that articulated speech specifies the object-referent. Saṁghabhadra further attempts to demonstrate that the serial nature of uttered sound necessitates some non-verbal element to unify the distinct parts of each word: that is to say, given his claim that past factors do not exist, Vasubandhu cannot appeal to a series of sounds as together constituting a collocation by which the object-referent is specified. When the initial sounds in the series are uttered, the final sounds are future, and do not yet exist; therefore, the collocation is not yet constituted. However, when the final sound in the series is uttered, the prior sounds have passed away and can no longer exist to form a part of the complete collocation. As a result, the collocation of articulated sounds that, according to Vasubandhu, specifies the object-referent, can never be constituted.

Vasubandhu and Saṁghabhadra both recognize the role of consensus
in language, and neither claims that specific words are naturally and unequivocally associated with particular object-referents. However, since Vasubandhu supports speech as the meaning-bearing or object-referent-signifying element, consensus must apply only to the specification that determines the relation between particular articulated sounds and an object-referent. For Saṅghabhadra, neither the representation of object-referents within one's own consciousness nor the transmission of meaning to another could be explained through articulated speech alone. Thus, he proposes independently existing object-referent signifying or meaning-bearing units—name, phrase, or syllable—that operate at various levels of specification in all particular instances of signification or communication. In this regard, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of the name, phrase, and syllable sets shares a function similar to the Grammarians’ theory of sphota.47

Notes

1 Padmanabh S. Jaini (Jaini (1959c) 107) suggests that the absence of speculation on the nature of the Buddha's teaching in the Theravādin tradition suggests that such speculation was a later development stimulated by inter-sectarian controversies. Jaini proposes that the discussions of nānapaṭīṇātī constitute an early stage of Buddhist language analysis in the Theravādin Abhidhamma tradition.

2 Jha (1942) 97–135. For references to the Mīmāṁsaka theory of the natural (outputika) meaning of words, see Verpoorten (1987) 17.

3 See SP 14 p. 425a1ff.; Sarīgatiyāya, Stache-Rosen (1968) 149ff. This explanation is found in a discussion of the five spheres of liberation (vimuktyāyatanas), in a gloss on dharma and artha in the following phrase: ... tathā tathā tase dharmesv arthapratisānvedi bhavati dharmapratisānvedi ca.

4 See JP (1544) 12 p. 981a27ff.; and SAKV p. 52.15ff., where this passage is quoted: tathā hi Jñānaprasthāna uktaṁ. katamad Buddhavacanāṁ. Tathāgatasya yā vāg vacanaṁ vyāhāro gīr nīrūkta vāppatho vāgghoṣo vākarma vāgviññaptīḥ. Buddhavacanaṁ kuśālāṁ vaktavyāṁ. avyākṛtaṁ vaktavyāṁ. syāt kuśālāṁ. syād avyākrtaṁ. katarat kuśālāṁ. kuśalacittasya Tathāgatasya vēcaro bhāsamanāyasya yā vāg yāvat vāgviññaptīḥ. katarat avyākṛtaṁ. avyākṛticittasya Tathāgatasye ‘ti pūrvavat. punas tatraṁ ‘vā hantaram uktaṁ Buddhavacanāṁ nāma ka esa dharmāṁ. nāmakāyapadākāyavya-ātijanakāyānāṁ yā anupūrvarvacanāṁ anupūrvarvasthāpanā anupūrvasamāyoga iti. See also Mizuta (1979) 7ff.

5 The *Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasarīgatiśāstra (VSS 2 p. 733a23) uses the same description of the name, phrase, and syllable sets in a definition of the Abhidharma.

6 See MVB 126 p. 658c24ff.

7 See MVB 126 p. 659a1ff.

8 See MVB 126 p. 659a23ff.

9 See MVB 126 p. 659b3–4. Cf. MVB 126 p. 659c7ff., where the *Mahāvibhāṣā describes the three, name, phrase, and syllable sets in terms of the twelvefold typology of Buddhist literary genres (dvādasāṅgabuddhavacana). For other discussions of the early Buddhist ninefold or twelvefold typologies, see Lamotte (1958) 158ff; *Tattvasiddhisāstra 1 no. 8 p. 244c12ff.; NAS 44 p. 595a1ff.; SAKV p. 438.29ff.
See AKB 1.25 p. 17.6ff. In this section, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is considering which aggregate (skandha), among the five aggregates, should contain the dharmaskandha. It concludes that those who maintain that the dharmaskhandhas are speech would include them within the form aggregate (rupaskandha); those who maintain that they are name would include them within the forces aggregate (sarbaskaraskandha).

For vyājanya, see Renou (1957) 293–294; for akṣara, see Renou (1957) 4. Cf. AHS-D 4 p. 831a3; AARS shang p. 979c13–14, which suggest that the syllable set, or vyājana, involves extensive presentation as, for example, in the case of verses or sūtras. Cf. *Pañca-vastuka [Sa-p’o-to-tsung wu shih lun] T 28 (1557) p. 100a28ff.

The name, phrase, and syllable sets are also included among the dissociated factors recognized within the Yogācāra school; however, they are not admitted to exist as real entities. See YBS 52 p. 587c1ff., 56 p. 607c3ff.; Abhidharmasamuccaya T 31 (1605) 1 p. 665b28ff., Abhidharmasamuccaya, Gokhale (1947) 19, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pradhan (1976) 10; Abhidharmasamuccayaḥbhaṣya, Tatia (1976) 10; Abhidharmasamuccayaḥvyākhyā T 31 (1606) 2 p. 700c2ff.

The term artha denotes not only the abstract meaning of a word, but also the object to which the word refers. For example, Vasubandhu (AKB 1.9a–b p. 5.22ff.; SAKV p. 23.28–29) refers to the objects of the five, externally directed sense organs as artha, which he then glosses as viśaya, or “object-fields.” The use of artha to denote a concrete object-referent is also indicated by the argument concerning whether or not artha can be expressed directly. See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 414b17ff. Therefore, artha is here translated either by “object-referent” or “meaning,” or both, depending upon the context.

AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.14: tatra sanijñākaranaṁ nāma; SAKV p. 181.32ff. See also Usugui (1979) 28ff.

See SAKV p. 181.32–33: yena sanijñā caitasiko dharmāḥ kriyate jayate.


See SAKV p. 182.1: yādi hi sanijñā nāme 'ty ucjeta caitasiko 'pi sanibhāvyeta.

See AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.13; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413a4ff.

See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413a18ff.

See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 414b3ff.

AKB 1.14d p. 10.16ff.; SAKV p. 37.5ff.; NAS 2 p. 339a26ff.; AKB 2.24 p. 54.20–21; SAKV p. 127.24ff.; NAS 10 p. 384b1–2. Pertinent here also is the definition of sanijñā in the Abhidharmavātārāśatra (AAS shang p. 981c20ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 137), which states that “concept is able to provisionally join the defining mark, the name, and the object-referent.”

See NAS 2 p. 339b29ff. This defining conceptual discrimination (abhinirūpa-vikalpa) is unconcentrated (asamākīta) insight (prajñā) that is associated with mental perceptual consciousness and is produced through hearing (śrutamayā) or through reflection (cintāmaya), and not through cultivation (bhāvanāmayā). It operates on an
object-field in relative dependence upon its name (nāmāpekṣā). See MVB 42 p. 219b7ff.; AVB 23 p. 169b5; AKB 1.33a–b p. 22.19ff.; SAKV p. 65.5ff.; NAS 4 p. 350b5ff.

28 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413a23ff.
29 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413a18ff., 14 p. 414b24ff. See also MVB 15 p. 73a18ff., 15 p. 73c18ff.
30 See MVB 15 p. 73b7ff.
31 See MVB 15 p. 73c18ff.
32 See Biardeau (1964) 203ff.
36 See MVB 15 p. 72b1ff.; AKB 2.47c–d p. 82.3ff.; SAKV p. 188.6ff.; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 416a4ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 111b19ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 555b10ff. Shen-t’ai (Shen-t’ai 5 p. 342a6ff.) contrasts the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāṣika view with that of other schools and that of non-Buddhists who claim that name resides in the object-referent and belongs not to the one who expresses, but to that which is expressed.
37 See MVB 15 p. 72b11ff.
38 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413b22ff., 14 p. 414a5ff., 14 p. 414a15ff. Cf. MVB 15 p. 73a23ff., where Vasumitra is cited as maintaining a successive dependence of speech and phonemes, in which phonemes manifest the object-referent.
39 See AKB 2.47a–b p. 81.6ff.; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 414a25ff. Here, Vasubandhu criticizes the model of successive dependence, whereby speech issues forth in name and name manifests the object-referent. He demands that this relation of “issuing forth” (pravṛt-) be clarified as one either of producing or of manifesting, and points out the undesirable conclusions to which each option leads.
40 See AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.24ff.; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413c11ff.
41 See AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.27ff.; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 414a11ff.
42 See AKB 2.47a–b p. 81.13ff.; infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 415a25.
43 For a similar Mīmāṃsaka critique of sphota theory, see D’sa (1980) 78ff.
44 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413c23ff.
45 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 414c1ff.
46 See infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 415b3ff.
47 For the theory of sphota, see Brough ([1951] 1972a), Brough ([1953] 1972b); Biardeau (1964) 359ff., esp. 391ff.; Kunjumi Raja (1963) 95ff. Especially provocative is the theory of eight varieties of sphota put forth by the later Grammarians, three of which are varnasphota, or letter sphota, padasphota, or word sphota, and vākyasphota, or sentence sphota. See Brough (1972b) 411. The Abhidharmadīpa (ADV no. 143 p. 111.6ff., no. 146 p. 112.16ff.) attempts to distinguish the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāṣika theory from the theory of sphota by emphasizing the impermanence of name, and so on.
Part III

Translation
Chapter 11

Translation—Critical Apparatus

Translating Abhidharma texts is a problematic enterprise, beset with the difficulties, often admitting of only compromise solutions, familiar to all scholars of Sanskrit śāstra literature. In the case of Abhidharma materials, the inherent complexity of śāstra literature is accentuated by the degree to which analysis was extended. As for much of Buddhist studies, these difficulties of literary genre are compounded by lost originals and the additional set of problems brought about by the necessity of working from secondary translations into markedly different languages. Nonetheless, a close examination of the content and style of Abhidharma texts is essential for an understanding both of the historical development of Buddhism and of the problems and methods directing pan-Indian religion and philosophy. In view of the need to make northern Indian Abhidharma literature more accessible to a larger audience of Buddhist scholars, and in consideration of the sheer size of the most important works of this genre, translation of integral and sustained sections of particular doctrinal importance remains the best way for scholars of this material initially to proceed.

Accordingly, the present work offers a translation of the section on the conditioned forces dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktamasāskāra) as found within the second chapter of the Chinese translation of Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusārasāstra.1 Both Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra and his *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā are extant only in Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translations.2 Though some fragments of a Uigur translation of the *Nyāyānusāra from the Chinese translation have been found, no fragments of the original Sanskrit or of translations in any other language have yet been discovered.3 The English translation presented here follows Hsüan-tsang's
Chinese translation of the *Nyāyānusāra as included in the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō edition of the Buddhist canon. The Chi-sha edition of Hsuan-tsang’s translation has also been consulted and any significant variants not recorded in the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō edition of the text are referred to in the notes to the translation.

Even though the *Nyāyānusāra is not extant in Sanskrit, the Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya, which are extant in the original Sanskrit, in Tibetan translation, and in two Chinese translations by Paramārtha and by Hsuan-tsang, provide an invaluable resource for the study of other translations by Hsuan-tsang. The consistency of Hsuan-tsang’s translations of technical terms allows one to reconstruct, with some measure of confidence, Sanskrit equivalents for Chinese translations in texts for which the Sanskrit is not available. This is especially true in the case of the *Nyāyānusāra, which, for the major topics of discussion, follows the Abhidharmakośa closely. Despite the confidence that Hsuan-tsang’s consistency of translation inspires, in the present English translation the citation of Sanskrit equivalents has been reserved for those terms attested in analogous passages in the Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośakārikā or Bhāṣya. In the few cases in which the term is not attested but the equivalent is deemed significant, the proposed Sanskrit equivalent is marked with an asterisk. An asterisk is also used to indicate uncertain readings in quotations from texts as well as those Indian text titles whose Sanskrit reconstruction is uncertain.

Throughout the *Nyāyānusāra, Saṅghabhadra adopts, usually without any change, the verses (kārikā) of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośakārikā. In his own commentary to these verses, Saṅghabhadra also frequently includes, without attribution, sections from Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary (bhāṣya), especially when he agrees with Vasubandhu’s interpretation. On points with which he disagrees, however, Saṅghabhadra quotes the appropriate section of the verse or auto-commentary and attributes it explicitly to the “Sūtra master,” that is, to Vasubandhu. The English translation offered here follows Hsuan-tsang’s Chinese translation in all sections. The Sanskrit text of the verses and of those sections explicitly attributed to Vasubandhu as well as English translations of these Sanskrit references are included in the notes to the translation.

Our possession of a Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya might suggest another procedure whereby all passages in the *Nyāyānusāra located within the current Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya are translated in accordance with the Sanskrit. However, this latter procedure would produce a hybrid translation in which it would be impossible to distinguish within the English translation sections translated from the Sanskrit and sections translated from the Chinese trans-
lation. This problem is further complicated by Hsüan-tsang’s habit of adding explanatory introductions, transitions, and conclusions within his own translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and, we must presume, also the *Nyāyānusāra. Whereas, in the case of his translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, probable discrepancies can be detected by checking against the current Sanskrit edition and against Paramārtha’s translation, in the case of the *Nyāyānusāra we have no such tests. It is then virtually impossible to determine which sections of Saṅghabhadra’s auto-commentary might have been added by Hsüan-tsang himself in his attempts to make his translation clearer. Even in the case of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, cross-checking for discrepancies to determine Hsüan-tsang’s additions tacitly assumes consistency among the Sanskrit manuscript used by him, the manuscript used by Paramārtha, and the current Sanskrit edition. Therefore, the most consistent and least confusing method is to translate this section of the *Nyāyānusāra from Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation, while reserving translations of the Sanskrit for the notes.

The divisions between verse and commentary in the English translation of this section of the *Nyāyānusāra also follow the ordering of Hsüan-tsang’s translation, in which topically related segments of each verse are grouped together followed by the appropriate commentary. In the case of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya, Hsüan-tsang’s ordering differs considerably from that of our current Sanskrit edition, which, generally corresponding to the divisions in Paramārtha’s translation, divides the auto-commentary into much smaller topical sections. The present divisions in the case of this section of Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the *Nyāyānusāra may also, therefore, differ from the ordering of the original text.

All material added to this translation is enclosed within square brackets. This added material consists primarily of substantive additions made in the translation to supply necessary context or otherwise aid in intelligibility. Added material also includes the following: any identification of the speaker not explicitly stated in the text; all chapter, section, subsection, and paragraph divisions; and page, column, and line number references to the *Nyāyānusāra in boldface and interspersed throughout the translation. In the case of incomplete columns in the Chinese text of the *Nyāyānusāra, the line numbering follows the absolute numbering of complete columns. Parentheses are used merely to enclose suggested Sanskrit equivalents.

As mentioned previously, in virtually all Indian philosophical treatises the identification of opponents presents a major problem. The *Nyāyānusāra is no exception. Often statements in the text are attributed simply to “others,” but not infrequently, alternative views are left without any
11. Translation—Critical Apparatus

Attribution or even an indication that a change in speaker has occurred. One must then depend either upon the assistance of commentaries, which may identify the participants in the argument, or upon the context, which may dictate that statements be attributed to a previously identified opponent. In the present English translation, an effort has been made to identify the speakers. Those passages attributed explicitly to the “Sūtra master,” or Vasubandhu, and located in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya are indicated as such through direct statement or through the symbol [V] (Vasubandhu). Passages representing presently unidentified opponents are labelled with the symbol [O] (Opponent). Passages attributed to Sthavira, or Śrīlātā, are also indicated through direct statement or through the symbol [Sth] (Sthavira). Saṇghabhadra’s own responses in argument are labelled with the symbol [S] (Saṇghabhadra) or are left unmarked if clear in context. All unidentified passages in the translation represent Saṇghabhadra’s own comments.

Portions of only one commentary on the *Nyāyānusāra are extant: the Shun cheng-li lun shu-wen chi by Yuān-yū, the 7th century A.D. disciple of Hsüan-tsang.7 Of the two extant fascicles, one fortunately preserves the commentary on almost half of the presently translated section. In addition to Yuān-yū’s commentary on the *Nyāyānusāra itself, the numerous extant commentaries on the Abhidharmakośakārikā and Bhāṣya are invaluable for interpreting Saṇghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra. The following commentaries were used in preparing this English translation:

Sanskrit:

*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra.8

Chinese:

*Chū-she lun shu* by Shen-t’ai.9
*Chū-she lun chi* by P’u-kuang.10
*Chū-she lun shu* by Fa-pao.11

Japanese:

*Abidatsumakusharon hongishō* by Shūshō.12
*Abidatsumakusharon shiyōshō* by Tan’ei.13
*Abidatsumakusharon yōge* by Fujaku.14
Abidatsumakusharon högi by Kaidō. 15
Kandō abidatsumakusharon by Saeki Kyokuga. 16

Other indispensable materials used include Hirakawa Akira's indices to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, 17 indices that trace references to scripture cited in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, 18 and various annotated translations of the Abhidharmakośākārikā and Bhāṣya, the *Nyāyānusāra, and the *Abhidharmasamayapradipikā. 19

Most primary texts are referred to in the notes by abbreviations given in the abbreviation key prior to the introductory commentaries. The primary texts are also cited in the bibliography, which is arranged according to primary and secondary sources. Japanese names are given according to the Japanese custom with the last name first. The Wade Giles system has been used for transliterating Chinese. Characters are given in an appendix and only for the Chinese terms cited in the text or discussed in the notes.

Though no glossary is provided, the index lists all references to the Sanskrit terms cited. Translations and discussions of the terms to which the index refers can be found in the translation and commentarial sections. The index does not include every bibliographic reference to texts or authors cited in the notes, but rather cites texts or authors only if their opinions are discussed.

Notes

1 NAS 12 p. 396c7—14 p. 416a28.
3 Kudara (1982).
6 For a review of the relevant textual information on the Abhidharmakośākārikā and Bhāṣya, see Hall (1983) 22ff.
7 Shun cheng-li lun shu-wen chi. Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō. 1.83.3.
8 Wogihara (1932). For a Japanese translation of chapters 1—2, see Wogihara and Yamaguchi (1933—1939).
9 Chū-she lun shu. Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō. 1.83.3—4. Only seven fascicles of this text remain, including the two fascicles—four and five—containing the commentary on the translated section.
The commentaries of Shen-t'ai, P'u-kuang, and Fa-pao are grouped as the three great Chinese commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Whereas the commentaries of Shen-t'ai and P'u-kuang are relatively straightforward, following the text and often only listing alternative interpretations, Fa-pao exercises more freedom. He examines certain doctrinal points at length and attempts to evaluate, synthesize, and, at certain points, develop novel interpretations. Occasionally, on points of direct conflict between Sañghabhadrā and Vasubandhu, Fa-pao decides in favor of Sañghabhadrā.

*Abhidatsumakusharon hongishō* T 63 (2249). This commentary examines specific issues or problems in doctrinal interpretation and concentrates on contradictions in the commentaries of P'u-kuang and Fa-pao. Written in strict catechetical style, it is extremely illuminating as to the assumptions and implied contradictions within doctrinal arguments. It was compiled by Shūshō, among others, over a 130 year period.

*Abidatsumakusharon shiyōshō* T 63 (2250). 89. Fujaku cites the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and summarizes the views of the Chinese commentaries, often giving his own judgments as to the validity of arguments.

*Abidatsumakusharon hōgi* T 64 (2251). Truly a critical scholar, Kaidō outlines and evaluates virtually all variant interpretations and gives his own independent exegesis of doctrinal points. The value of this commentary for the study of Abhidharma cannot be overestimated.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Saeki ([1886] 1978). Louis de La Vallée Poussin, in his translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931)), used Saeki Kyokuga's text and, it would appear, also followed Saeki's commentary for much of the material provided in his own notes.

Hirakawa (1973); Hirakawa (1977); Hirakawa (1978). For an index to Saeki Kyokuga's *Kandō* edition of the Chinese translation, see also Funahashi and Funahashi (1956).


Chapter 12

[Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought]

[396c7] Among the factors that are without form, we have finished discussing thought and thought concomitants (cittacaitta). Next, we will discuss the conditioned forces dissociated from thought (cittavipnyuktasamśkāra). The verse states:

[vs. 35] The conditioned forces dissociated from thought are possession (prāpti), non-possession (aprāpti), homogeneous character (sabhāgata), [396c10] the state of non-conception (āsamajñika), the two states of equipoise (samāpatti), vitality (jīvita), the [conditioned] characteristics (lakṣaṇa),

[vs. 36a] the name set (nāmakāya), and so on, and [other factors of that] type.¹

[Commentary:] The phrase 'and so on'² (ādi) includes the phrase set (padakāya), the syllable set (vyājanakāya), and the complete assemblage (sāmagrī).³ The phrase 'and [other factors of that] type' (ca) indicates other factors that are falsely imagined: namely, [those factors] that are, [in reality,] precisely of the same type as those of the previous categories. That is to say, [certain expositors] have falsely imagined [additional factors as existing separately with] intrinsic nature such as the acquisition of the aggregates (*skandhapratilābha), and so on,⁴ apart from the [factors of] possession, and so on, [mentioned in the verse].

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12.1 [The Name ‘Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought’]

Since such factors as these are not associated with thought, they are given the name ‘conditioned forces dissociated from thought;’ they are not like thought concomitants, which have the same basis (āśraya) and object-support (alambana) as thought [396c15] and arise associated with it. The word ‘thought’ [in the name ‘conditioned forces dissociated from thought’ is stated] in order to indicate that the possession, and so on, referred to here fall within the same category as thought (cittasamāna-jātiya) [insofar as they are not form (arūpin)]. [However, since] thought concomitants share the same bases and supports as thought, [those thought concomitants, like the conditioned forces dissociated from thought,] are also of the same category as thought (tulyajātiya). In order to distinguish [the conditioned forces dissociated from thought from] those [thought concomitants, the former] are said to be ‘dissociated.’ Unconditioned factors (asarīśkṛta) also fall into the same category as thought [insofar as they are not form]. They are without a basis or support and, therefore, are also dissociated. In order to distinguish [the conditioned forces dissociated from thought from] those [unconditioned factors, the former] are said to be ‘conditioned forces.’ [Thus, the three components—‘thought’ (citta), ‘dissociated’ (viprayuktā), and ‘conditioned forces’ (saṃskāra)—within the designation, ‘conditioned forces dissociated from thought,’ are explained.]

Notes

1 See AKB 2.35–36a p. 62.11ff.: “[vs. 35] The conditioned forces dissociated from thought are possession and non-possession, homogeneous character, the state of non-conception, the two states of equipoise, vitality, the [conditioned] characteristics, [vs. 36a] the name set, and so on, and [other factors].” viprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāptya-prāptī sabhāga-tā asamjñi-kaṃ samāpatti jīvitaṃ laksanāni ca. nāmakāyāda-yā ca ’ti. See also GAKB p. 79 no. 35–36; SAKV p. 142.16ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22a4ff.; PAKB 3 p. 180c15ff.; ADV no. 128 p. 85.16ff.

2 Saṅghabhadra distinguishes factors represented by the term ca (Ch.: lei) ‘[other factors of that] type’ from those represented by the term ādi (Ch.: teng) ‘and so on.’ Ca represents factors that, in Saṅghabhadra’s opinion, do not exist separately as factors dissociated from thought: that is, factors that are merely varieties of the dissociated factors listed in this verse. Ādi represents additional factors that are to be accepted as separately existing factors dissociated from thought, such as the phrase set, and, in Saṅghabhadra’s opinion, sāmagri. Yūan-yū (Yūan-yū 9 p. 234c15–16) explains ca as referring to factors that do not exist as distinct real entities despite the fact that they have different names; ādi refers to factors that both exist as distinct real entities and have separate names. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 142.29ff.) explains ca as
"indicating those dissociated [factors], not yet mentioned, belonging to the same categories." caśabda evamjātiyakānuktaviprayukta-pradarśanārthāḥ. Yaśomitra supports this explanation with a reference to the Prakaranapāda: ... ye 'py evamjātiyakā iti sāstre 'py uktatvāt. See PP (1541) 1 p. 627a21–22, (1542) 1 p. 692c8–9; cf. DŚ 10 p. 501b21–22. See also *Pañcavastu[naka] [Sa-p‘o-to-tsung wu shih lun] T 28 (1556) p. 995c23–24; *Pañcavastu[naka] [A-p‘i-t’an wu fa hsing ching] T 28 (1557) p. 998c25–26; P‘u-kuang 4 p. 84b7ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 535b29ff.; Kaidō 4 p. 87c18ff.

3 Saṅghabhadra’s inclusion of complete assemblage (sāmāgni) within those factors referred to by  ādi indicates that he accepts it as a distinct dissociated factor in addition to the fourteen factors listed in verses 35–36a. See supra, introductory commentary, “Conditioned Forces Dissociated from Thought,” note 25.

4 Saṅghabhadra is referring to a threefold set of acquisitions including acquisition of the corporeal basis (*āsrayapratilābha, *upadhipratilābha), acquisition of the sense spheres (*āyatanapratilābha), and acquisition of the given entity (*vastupratilābha): DS 10 p. 500c21; SP 11 p. 415c19; PP (1541) 1 p. 627a20, p. 628c20ff. and PP (1542) 1 p. 692c7, (1542) 1 p. 694a24ff., which gloss *vastupratilābha as *skandhapratilābha; *Pañcavastuka [Sa-p‘o-to-tsung wu shih lun] T 28 (1556) p. 995c22; *Pañcavastuka [A-p‘i-t’an wu fa hsing ching] T 28 (1557) p. 998c24–25; AARS hsia p. 979c1; Imanishi (1969) 8. Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 234c13) identifies these three types of acquisition as *skandhapratilābha, *dhatupratilābha, and *āyatanapratilābha.


6 Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 143.2–3) adds that the conditioned forces dissociated from thought are of the same category as thought because both are included in the name component (nāma) within the twofold classification of all factors as name and form (nāma-rūpa).
Chapter 13

[Possession and Non-possession]

These [conditioned forces dissociated from thought] have been cited together. They should be further interpreted separately. First, among these we will discuss the characteristics of possession and non-possession. The verse states:

[vs. 36b–d] Possession (prāpti) refers to acquisition (lābha) and accompaniment (samanvaya). Non-possession (aprāpti) is the opposite of this. Possession and non-possession apply only to [the factors that fall within] one’s own life-stream (svasamātānapatita) and to the two cessations (niruddha).¹

[Commentary:] Even though the referent of possession, acquisition, and accompaniment is the same, they are given distinct names in accordance with differences in perspective (parityāya).² There are two varieties of possession: namely, [the possession] of that which has not yet been attained (aprāptapūrva) and [the possession] of that which has already [once] been attained (prāptapūrva). The possession of that which has not yet been [396c25] attained is given the name ‘acquisition’ (pratilambha); the possession of that which has already been attained is given the name ‘accompaniment’ (samanvāgama). It should be known that non-possession is the opposite (viparyaya) [of possession]: in other words, [it is the non-possession] of that which has not yet been attained (aprāptapūrva) and [the non-possession] of that which, once attained, has been lost (prāptavīhīna). The
non-possession of that which has not yet been attained is given the name ‘non-acquisition’ (apratilambha), and the non-possession of that which [has been attained once] and lost is given the name ‘non-accompaniment’ (asamanvāgama). Accordingly, the phrase ‘the non-acquisition of the noble factors’ is used to define the nature of an ordinary person (*prthagjanatva*), [because an ordinary person is one who has not yet attained noble factors].

13.1 [Possible Objects of Possession and Non-possession]

To what factors do possession and non-possession apply? First, among conditioned factors (*sarīrakrtadharma*), possession and non-possession occur with respect to [those factors that fall within] one’s own life-stream (*svasamātānapatița*), and neither [with respect to those factors that fall within] the life-stream of another (*parasamātānapatița*), nor [with respect to factors that do not fall within] any life-stream (*asamātānapatița*). This is because one can be either accompanied (*samanvāgata*) or not accompanied (*asamanvāgata*) by the aggregates (*skandha*) that fall into and abide in one’s own life-stream; one can never be either accompanied or not accompanied by the aggregates within another life-stream or by the aggregates included among factors not constituting sentient beings.

Next, among the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛta*), possession and non-possession occur only with respect to the two cessations. No sentient being has non-accompaniment of the cessation not resulting from consideration (apratirasamkhyaānirroṭha). Therefore, the following statement appears in the Abhidharma: “Who is accompanied by the factors not tending toward the fluxes (*anāsravādharma*)? [397a5] All sentient beings.” With the exception of those noble ones in the first moment [of the path of vision (*ādikṣaṇastha*),] who are bound by all bonds (*sakalabandhanna*), and all [those] ordinary persons who are bound by all bonds, the remaining sentient beings are accompanied by cessation resulting from consideration (*pratisamkhyaānirroṭha*).

It is established that there is no accompaniment of space (*ākāśa*), since there is no possession of space. Likewise, there is no non-accompaniment [of space], since there is no non-possession [of space]. If there is possession of a factor, there is also non-possession [of it]; if there is no possession of a factor, non-possession [of it] is also impossible. This principle is established.
13.2 [Existential Status of Possession and Non-possession]

The following passage [implicitly] refers to possession: “The form aggregate (rupaskandha) and the forces aggregate (sanskāraskandha) [397a10] are possessed by one possession. [Each of the] remaining aggregates and the forces aggregate can also be described in this way. Factors tending toward the fluxes (sāsravadharma) and those not tending toward the fluxes (anāsravadharma) are possessed by one possession. Conditioned and unconditioned factors are possessed by one possession. Other such categories [of factors] should be considered in accordance with this principle.”

On this point the Sūtra master asked the following question: “How do we know that there is a discrete entity (bhāvāntara) referred to as possession?”

[S] We should reply that [possession is known to exist as a discrete entity] because the term ['accompaniment'] is mentioned in the sūtra. According to the sūtra, the Lord has said: “One should know that such an individual (pudgala) is accompanied by virtuous (kusala) [397a15] and unvirtuous (akusala) factors.”

One might claim that a categorical fault (atiprasariga) [is incurred from] the sūtra passage, which states: “There is a wheel-turning king (cakravartin) who is accompanied by the seven jewels.” [In that case, the wheel-turning king would have accompaniment of factors that do not fall either within his own life-stream or within any life-stream.] This criticism is untenable because [in the case of this latter sūtra passage], the wheel-turning king’s unhindered mastery (vaṣitva) over the seven jewels is referred to [non-technically] as accompaniment. It would be untenable to claim that the term ‘accompanies’ mentioned in the former sūtra passage should also be taken [in the non-technical sense of mastery], because one who is in the present can only have the power of mastery with regard to present [factors], and not with regard to past or future [factors]. In other words, the wheel-turning king has the power of mastery with respect to the seven jewels in the present, which he manipulates according to his desire (kāmacāra), because they are sovereign effects (adhipatiphala), and because they are constantly present before him; [397a20] [this then] can be referred to as accompaniment, [but only in a non-technical sense]. [But in the case of the former sūtra passage, accompaniment with regard to] virtuous or unvirtuous factors is not restricted [to the present time period]. Now, [for example,] when virtuous factors are present before one (samimukhiḥbhāva),
that individual can be said to have accompaniment of those present virtuous factors. [However,] that [individual's] relation to past and future unvirtuous factors still needs to be determined. Since, [in the case of the possession of past or future unvirtuous factors,] there is no possession of a present [factor, that possession cannot be referred to as mastery]. With regard to what discrete [present] factor would one use the term 'mastery'? The examination of [the case of] virtuous factors when unvirtuous factors are present before one [would proceed] in the same way.

How much greater the problem is for those, [like the Sūtra master,] who claim that past and future factors are completely without intrinsic nature! With regard to what would there be mastery, which might then be referred to as accompaniment? [397a25] If one claims that, [even though past and future factors lack intrinsic nature,] the capability of production in the future is to be referred to as accompaniment, this is untenable, since undesired faults are incurred. [If accompaniment were defined as such a capability,] then those abiding in the last state of existence as ordinary persons, who are destined thereafter [to become noble ones by] producing the factors not tending toward the fluxes, should already be noble ones, [since they are already accompanied by the capability of the future production of factors unique to noble ones]. [Likewise,] arhats abiding in the last moment of thought, who will never again be able to produce factors not tending toward the fluxes, should not be arhats, [since they are no longer accompanied by this capability of the future production of factors unique to noble ones]. In that case, [these arhats] should retrogress and abide in the mundane [path] as ordinary persons; or since the defilements, once severed by the first stage of the path of vision, will never arise again, these arhats should [retrogress at least to the stage of] the realization of the fruit of the stream-enterer (srotaāpatti-phala). [S] Why is it unreasonable (ayoga) to posit that there is a discrete real entity referred to as possession?

[V] It is unreasonable in this way: the possession that is maintained [by you] has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva) that can be discerned like [that of] form (rūpa) and sound (śabda) or passion (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa), and so on, and it has no activity (kṛtya) that can be discerned like [that of] the eyes (cakṣus) and ears (śrotra), and so on. Therefore, since a discrete real entity (dravyadharma) referred to as possession is impossible, your claim that it exists as a discrete real entity is unreasonable.

[S] This objection is untenable because [our claim that there is a discrete real entity referred to as possession] is not unreasonable. [This is because] possession, [397b5] as posited, [has an activity] as the cause of
the non-disappearance of factors that have been acquired (pratilabdhdhadr-
mvaprSnSsakSarna). Further, it is to be known that it is the marker of
the knowledge (jSnacihna) that “this” belongs to “that.”23 Aside from
this [possession], is there another discrete entity [that accomplishes] these
activities thereby superseding [possession and] allowing one to claim that
it does not exist?24

13.3 [Theory of Seeds]

[V] Even25 if [these two activities that you suggest] are accepted, what is
the use of maintaining that this possession performs [them]?26 It27 is simply
that the term ‘accompaniment’ is applied to seeds (Sija) in certain states
within the corporeal basis (aSraya): that is, seeds that are not plucked
out (anapoddhrta), seeds that are not yet damaged (anupahata), and seeds
that are to be nourished (paripSta) to the point of mastery (vasitvakSle).28
Hence, there is no disappearance of factors that have been obtained, and
there is a marker of the knowledge that “this” belongs to “that.”

[397b10] How [can this be explained] further? First,29 there are, in
brief, two varieties of virtuous factors: one variety is not produced through
effort (ayatnabhavin) and the other variety is produced only through effort
(yatnabhavin). These are referred to, [respectively,] as those that are ac-
quired at birth (upaprittSpratilabhika) and those that are acquired through
application (prSygika).30 As for those [virtuous factors] that are not pro-
duced through effort, one is said to have accompaniment [of them] when
their seeds have not been damaged (anupahata) within the corporeal basis
(aSraya). If their seeds have already been damaged within the corporeal
basis, one is said to have non-accompaniment [of them], and one is said to
be one whose roots of virtuous factors have been eradicated (samucchinn-
nakuSalamSla).31 Those seeds of the roots of virtuous factors within the
corporeal basis should be known as eradicated in the sense that they are
damaged by false views (mithySdrSthi); [397b15] it is not the case that they
are referred to as eradicated in the sense that these seed-states (bijabhSva)
of the roots of virtuous factors within the corporeal basis32 are absolutely
obliterated (samudghSta). As for those [virtuous factors] that are produced
only through effort, one is said to have accompaniment [of them] when these
factors have already arisen within the corporeal basis and one’s mastery
with regard to the effort that produces them is undamaged. The opposite
of this is referred to as non-accompaniment.33

As for unvirtuous and indeterminate factors, [when]34 the seeds of un-
virtuous and [obscured,] indeterminate factors have been abandoned by
the [noble] path that counteracts defilements (pratipakSa), or have been
suppressed [by the mundane path that counteracts defilements],\textsuperscript{35} or when there is no effort that can produce the present operation of [unobscured,] indeterminate factors, one is said to have non-accompaniment [of them]. The opposite of this is referred to as accompaniment.\textsuperscript{[397b20]} Therefore, the possession that you have posited is without an activity [because its activities can be accounted for through our theory of seeds].

[S] These contorted (vipyāṣa) theories [concerning seeds] represent mere verbiage and are without a real referent. [You should clarify your statements.] First, what is this that is given the name ‘seed’?\textsuperscript{36}

[V] It is that name and form (nāmarūpa) that has capability (samartha) in the production of its own effect either remotely (pāramparyena) or immediately (sāksāti),\textsuperscript{37} [this capability becomes effective] through a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream (samātāparināma-viśeṣa).\textsuperscript{38}

[S] What is name and form?\textsuperscript{39}

[V] It is the five aggregates (skandha).\textsuperscript{40}

[S] Why do you claim that these [five aggregates] are the nature of the seed?

[V] [These five aggregates] can act as the cause of the production of virtuous factors, and so on.

[S] Do these [five aggregates act together as the cause], combining [to form one seed]; or, [do they act as] separate [causes, each constituting one seed]; or, do they produce factors only according to their own category?\textsuperscript{41} [397b25] Your theory must correspond to one of these options. If you respond that [the five aggregates] combine [to form one seed that then acts as the cause], the nature of the seed [as a composite entity] must be provisional (prajñapti), and it is not reasonable that a provisionally existing entity acts as the real cause [of the production of virtuous and unvirtuous factors, and so on]. If you respond that they each separately [constitute a seed that acts as the cause], how can you maintain that a seed of indeterminate form is the cause of the production of virtuous and unvirtuous factors?\textsuperscript{42} If you respond that they [produce factors only] according to their own [moral] category, then of what type is the seed when unvirtuous factors are produced immediately after virtuous factors, or vice versa?

[O-V] Fool, you have not understood the nature of seeds.\textsuperscript{43} Due to a distinctive volition produced together with a prior moment of thought [397c1] a capability (sāmarthya) is distinguished and arises in a subsequent moment of thought. This distinctive capability in the subsequent
moment of thought is called a seed. An effect will then originate from this distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream. For example, within an unvirtuous moment of thought there lies a distinctive capability that has been projected by a [prior] virtuous [volition]; [it will produce its effect either] remotely or immediately and is considered to be a seed. From this [seed], a virtuous factor can be produced immediately [after the destruction of that unvirtuous moment of thought]. Or, within a virtuous moment of thought there lies a distinctive capability that has been projected by a [prior] unvirtuous [volition]; [it will produce its effect either] remotely or immediately and is considered to be a seed. From this [seed], an unvirtuous factor can be produced immediately [after the destruction of that virtuous moment of thought].

[Theory of Seeds—Saṅghabhadra’s Refutation]

[Saṅghabhadra’s Refutation—I]

[S] Now, is the seed, or distinctive capability, that you have proposed an entity separate from (artha) or not separate from (anartha) that virtuous or unvirtuous moment of thought [in which it appears]? This [seed] is not an entity separate [from thought].

[O-V] This [seed] is not an entity separate [from thought].

[S] Wouldn’t [you then be forced to] admit that a virtuous [moment of thought] acts as the seed of an unvirtuous [factor] and, likewise, that an unvirtuous [moment of thought] acts as the seed of a virtuous [factor]? Who would maintain that though heat and fire are not discrete entities, only heat, and not fire, is capable of burning?

Suppose that a seed, or a distinctive capability, is projected by a distinctive virtuous volition capable of bringing about desirable (iṣṭa) matured effects. How can [this virtuous seed] be implanted in an unvirtuous moment of thought that is capable of bringing about [undesirable] matured effects (vipāka) such as that of [rebirth in a] hell, and so on? Suppose, further, that a seed, or a distinctive capability, is projected by a distinctive, evil volition capable of bringing about undesirable (aniṣṭa) matured effects. How can [that evil seed] be implanted in a pure and virtuous moment of thought that is capable of bringing about [desirable] matured effects such as that of [rebirth as] a human being, and so on? [Further,] since unvirtuous moments of thought are not capable of bringing about desirable matured
effects, and pure and virtuous moments of thought are not capable of bring­
ing about undesirable matured effects, how can one say that each of these
two [moments of thought] can bring about either a [virtuous or unvirtuous]
effect? Thus, [by maintaining that a moment of thought and the seeds
within it are not separate,] you undermine the power of the knowledge of
possibility and impossibility (sthānāsthānaajñānabala) included among the
ten powers (daśabala) attained by the Buddha-lords.\textsuperscript{49}

Further, [if seeds and the moment of thought in which they are im-
planted are not discrete entities,] you must allow that the seed—that is,
the distinctive capability projected by a distinctive, [prior] volition—and
the [subsequent moment of] thought [in which it appears] produce an iden-
tical effect. Accordingly, since the distinctive capability [that produces fac-
tors] tending toward the fluxes would appear within a moment of thought
not tending toward the fluxes, \textsuperscript{397c20} then that moment of thought not
	
tending toward the fluxes [itself] should also be able to bring about [effects
tending toward the fluxes] such as existence (bhava) in the three realms.
Since\textsuperscript{50} [you] also allow the implanting of seeds of defilements within a
moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes, then that moment of
thought not tending toward the fluxes [itself] should also be able to act as
the cause in the production of defilements. Or, [if you object that neither
the seeds of factors tending toward the fluxes nor those of defilements can
appear in a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes, then you will
be forced to admit that the] defilements that are to be abandoned by the
path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) within the body of a noble one origi-
nate automatically without seeds.\textsuperscript{51} Since [you] also allow the implanting
of seeds not tending toward the fluxes within a defiled moment of thought,
then that defiled moment of thought [itself] also should be able to act as
the cause of the production of factors not tending toward the fluxes. Or, [if you
object that factors not tending toward the fluxes cannot depend upon a de-
filed moment of thought, you will be forced to admit that] those factors not
tending toward the fluxes, \textsuperscript{397c25} which are produced within the body
of a noble one [immediately] after a defiled moment of thought, originate
without seeds. Or, [if you object that, in that case, factors not tending
toward the fluxes arise in a defiled moment of thought without depending
upon seeds,] then this moment should be referred to as the first moment of
thought not tending toward the fluxes (prathamānāsrayacitta), [since that
moment of thought alone arises without a homogeneous cause].\textsuperscript{52}

Further, [it is accepted that] retrogression (parihāni) from the stage
of the realization of the fruit of arhatship can occur due to the arising of
defilements. Thus, [in order to explain retrogression, you must admit that]
the defiled seeds of the three realms exist within a [moment of] thought of
13.3.1.2 Saṅghabhadra’s Refutation of Seeds—II

an arhat who is beyond training. Retrogression resulting from [the arising of] defilements will be discussed extensively at a later point.\(^{53}\)

Moreover, it has never been observed that factors are distinguished in moral quality, and yet are not discrete entities. Therefore, his position [that seeds and the moment of thought in which they are implanted are not discrete entities] is fallacious.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Refutation—II]

[S] Next, how do the distinctive volition that arises in a prior [moment of thought] \(^{398a1}\) and the distinctive capability within the subsequent moment of thought function as cause and effect, and [how are they] associated (saṁprayukta) with one another?\(^{54}\)

[O-V] What is the objection here? It is the nature of factors (dharmatā) to act as cause and effect.\(^{55}\) This distinctive capability in the subsequent moment of thought is produced only through a distinctive volition in the prior [moment of thought]; if there were no distinctive volition in the prior [moment of thought], the distinctive capability of the subsequent moment of thought would not arise.\(^{56}\) Therefore, these two are able to act as cause and effect and, hence, are associated.

[S] \(^{398a5}\) If that [capability], which is to be produced, existed to any extent at the time when that prior volition occurred, the [above] interpretation would be possible. However, [since the Sūtra master maintains that] future [factors] do not exist, [the capability] that is to be produced is completely nonexistent when that prior volition occurs; an existent prior volition and a nonexistent subsequent moment of thought cannot be contiguous. How could one claim that they act as cause and effect and are associated? Such matters will be examined further in the discussion of the past and future.\(^{57}\)

[The Sūtra Master’s Statements—Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism]

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism of Statements—I]

The\(^{58}\) [Sūtra Master] has stated [previously]: “[Those seeds of the roots of virtuous factors within the corporeal basis should be known as eradicated in the sense that they are damaged by false views;] it is not the case that they are referred to as eradicated in the sense that these seed-states of the roots
of virtuous factors within the corporeal basis are absolutely obliterated."

Why did he merely state that "it is not the case that [these seed-states] are absolutely obliterated?" He should simply have said, "they are absolutely not obliterated," because there were never any seeds in the first place.

Moreover, his statement contradicts the sūtra because the sūtra declares that [these seeds of the roots of virtuous factors] are [indeed] absolutely eradicated. As the Lord has said: "One should know that in such an individual, the virtuous factors are concealed (antarhita) and the evil factors are manifest (*prādurbhūta, *samāmukhībhūta). There are roots of virtuous factors that have not yet been eradicated and that accompany [these evil factors]. As they have not yet been eradicated, it is still possible for other roots of virtuous [factors] to arise from these roots of virtuous [factors]. At a later time, for this [individual], all [roots of virtuous factors] will be eradicated." If, as the sūtra states, all the subtle roots of virtuous factors are eradicated, how [can he say that] they are not absolutely obliterated? In making these statements, the [Sūtra master] has simply been beguiled by the demons of his own discursive speculation.

Moreover, if the capability of the seeds [of the roots of] virtuous [factors] were damaged by the power of false views, causing them not to produce sprouts, even if one claimed that [the seeds of the roots of virtuous factors] were not absolutely eradicated, since they would be without the capability of producing sprouts of the roots of virtuous [factors], what other activity would they have? [But] if the power of false views were not able to damage their capability of producing virtuous sprouts, then, insofar as they are able to produce virtuous [sprouts], one should not refer [to this individual as one who has] eradicated the roots of virtuous [factors].

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism of Statements—II]

Further, the [Sūtra master] has maintained: "As for those [virtuous factors] that are produced through effort, one is said to have accompaniment [of them] when those factors have already arisen within the corporeal basis and one's mastery with regard to the effort that produces them is undamaged."

This statement is also unreasonable. [In our previous criticism of the theory of seeds we proved that,] given the [Sūtra master's] accepted doctrine [that the momentary present alone exists], the [very] production of virtuous [factors] is not even possible. Since his statement, "when those factors have already arisen within the body and one's mastery with regard
to the effort that produces them is undamaged,” [depends upon the feasibility of the prior production of these virtuous factors], how much more [implausible would it be]! Given his accepted doctrine mentioned previously that future [factors] do not exist, to what would the power of mastery be applied? Precisely because, [if one follows his interpretation,] a cause of production [of the seeds of virtuous factors] does not reasonably exist, he should not seek another cause, [such as false views,] for their non-production. Since there is no cause of their production, what is he referring to in his statement “one’s mastery with regard to the effort that produces them is undamaged?”

In accordance with this [argument] are also refuted his falsely imagined theories concerning the grades and groups of defilements to be abandoned.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism of Statements—III]

Further, the [Sūtra master] has stated: “Just as seeds that have been burned completely by fire transform to become different from before in that they lack the activity of production, so also a noble one who lacks the capability of producing defilements within his corporeal basis is referred to as one who has abandoned defilements (prahīṇaklesa). Or, when the seeds of defilements in the corporeal basis [of an ordinary person] have been damaged by the mundane path (laukikamārga), [such a one] likewise is referred to as one who has abandoned [defilements]. [398a25] [In states that are the] opposite of these, [noble ones or ordinary persons] are referred to as those who have not yet abandoned defilements.”

Now, the [Sūtra master] should explain the distinction between abandoning defilements by the path not tending toward the fluxes and abandoning defilements by the mundane path; in both cases [the seeds of defilements] are compared to seeds burned completely by fire that lack the activity of production.

[O-V] [398b5] Seeds of defilements damaged by the mundane path are like seeds that are not profoundly damaged such that they are permanently incapable of producing sprouts. In this way, [these seeds of defilements] like before, are still able to produce effects of action and will be able to give rise to various defilements.

[S] [If this were so,] how could it be said that [these seeds of defilements] are like seeds that have been damaged? The fact that seeds have been damaged means that they cannot produce sprouts. If they can produce sprouts, then they should not be referred to as damaged. Abandoning
defilements through the mundane path should be understood in the same way: [namely,] if one damages the seeds of defilements, then they should no longer be able to produce [those defilements]. If afterward the [seeds] were able to produce [defilements], they should not be referred to as damaged. If they cannot [even] be referred to as damaged, how can they be referred to as “abandoned?”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism of Statements—IV]

Further, it is unreasonable for that which is able to abandon [defilements] and those [defilements] that are to be abandoned both to exist in the same moment of thought. Since the meaning of “abandoning” [398b10] cannot be established [through the Sūtra master’s theory of seeds], his statement, “that name and form that has capability, either remotely or immediately, in the production of its own effect is called a seed,” is not reasonably established.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism of Statements—V]

Further, [the Sūtra master] has stated: “[This capability of name and form becomes effective] through a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream. What is this that is referred to as transformation (parināma)? It is the change between prior and subsequent moments within the stream. What is this that is referred to as the stream (saṅtati)? It refers to conditioned forces having the nature of cause and effect within the three time periods. What is this that is referred to as the distinctive characteristic (vīṭeṣa)? It is the capability of producing an effect immediately.”

[398b15] All such statements of the Venerable one, [the Sūtra master,] contradict the meaning and expression, as well as the central point [of the accepted doctrine of his school that the momentary present alone exists]. [Without accepting the existence of past and future factors,] the Dārśāntikas cannot uphold change between prior and subsequent moments within a stream, conditioned forces having the nature of cause and effect within the three time periods, or the capability of producing an effect immediately. This will be discussed further subsequently.

[Theory of Seeds—Conclusion]

[In proposing this theory of seeds] and rejecting the accepted doctrine of the Abhidharma, that [Sūtra master] presents various fallacious positions
13.4 Particular Varieties of Possession

that are contrary to [Buddhist] scripture. The rejection of possession is one such fallacious position that is presented against scriptural authority and that [also] contradicts reasoned argument on numerous points. [398b20] If one allows the real existence of possession, what contradiction is there to the meaning of [the Buddhist] scriptures?

Even though there are many statements made here by the Sūtra master in accordance with his own viewpoint, none of them is established because his theory of seeds is not reasonably established. Since the seed does not exist, it is known that the [factor] possession, which we maintain, definitely has the following activities: it is the cause of the non-disappearance of factors that have been obtained and the marker of the knowledge that “this” belongs to “that.” Since the existence of these activities is established, it is known that there exists separately [a factor] that has intrinsic nature [and performs these activities]. Therefore, the intrinsic nature and activity of this [factor] possession, which we maintain, are unequivocally established (prasiddha).

[398b25] In the arguments among the various Ābhidhārmikas, the Dārśāntikas often appeal to their own [theory] of seeds, and thereby, pervert the correct meaning and cause it to become unclear. There are certain masters who give different names to these seeds, each according to his own understanding. Some call them subsidiary elements (*anudhātu), others call them traces (vāsanā), still others call them capability (sāmarthya), or non-disappearance (avipraṇāsa), or accumulation (upacaya).72 Therefore, through extensive analysis of [the theory of seeds] we have [also] demolished these [other theories] and have established the correct accepted doctrine.

13.4  [Possession—Particular Varieties]

[398c1] Thus, we have established the intrinsic nature of possession and non-possession. Now, we should consider their particular varieties.73 First, what are the [particular varieties] of possession? The verse states:

[vs. 37] Factors of the three time periods (traiyadhvika) have, in each case, three [varieties of possession]. Virtuous [factors] (śubha), and so on, have only virtuous [possession], and so on. [Factors] that are connected (āpta) [to a realm] have possession [belonging to] their own realm; the possession of [factors] that are not connected [to a realm] (anāpta) extends through four varieties.
[vs. 38a–b] [398c5] [Factors] that [belong to those] neither in training nor beyond training (naivaśaikṣānaśaikṣa) have three varieties of possession, and [factors] that are not to be abandoned (aheya) have two varieties [of possession].

[Commentary:] Each of the factors of the three time periods has three types of possession: that is to say, past factors have past possession as well as future possession and present possession; likewise, future and present factors each have three varieties of possession. Now, we make these statements concerning the theoretical possibility [of varieties of possession in relation to the three time periods]. At a later point, we will discuss the particular instances [of certain factors that represent exceptions] within this [general rule].

The possession of virtuous factors, and so on, is only virtuous, and so on: that is to say, virtuous (kusala), unvirtuous (akusala), and [398c10] indeterminate (avyākṛta) factors have, respectively, [only] virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate possession.

The possession of factors connected [to a particular realm] (dhatvāpta) belongs only to their own realm: that is to say, the factors of the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), the realm of form, (rupadhātu), and the formless realm (ārupyadhātu) only have, respectively, possession belonging to the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the formless realm.

The possession of factors not connected to any realm extends through four varieties. That is to say, in terms of general categories, factors not connected to any realm have altogether four varieties of possession: that connected to [one of the] three realms and that not connected [to any realm]. In particular, they are differentiated [as follows]. The possession of cessation not resulting from consideration is connected to any of the three realms [depending upon the locale of the sentient being by whom it is experienced]. The possession of cessation resulting from consideration [398c15] is connected to the realm of form or the formless realm, or is not connected [to any realm, depending upon the character of the path through which it is realized]. The truth of the path (mārgasatya) has only possession that is not connected [to any realm].

Further, the factors belonging to one in training (śaikṣa) have only [possession whose nature is that of a factor] belonging to one in training. The factors belonging to one beyond training (aśaikṣa) have only [possession whose nature is that of a factor] belonging to one beyond training. Therefore, those factors of one in training and of one beyond training each have only one variety [of possession].
In general, there are three varieties of possession of factors characteristic of those neither in training nor beyond training (naiṣaikṣānāśaikṣa). In particular, they are differentiated [as follows]. All five appropriative aggregates (pāñcopādānakṣandha) and the three unconditioned factors are in general referred to as factors belonging to one neither in training nor beyond training.\textsuperscript{81} First, the five appropriative aggregates and cessation not resulting from consideration as well as cessation resulting from consideration realized by the path of the non-noble one [398c20] (anāryamārga), have only possession [whose nature is that of a factor] belonging to one neither in training nor beyond training. In the case of cessation resulting from consideration realized by the [noble] path of training (śaikṣamārga), there is only [possession whose nature is that of a factor] belonging to one in training. In the case of cessation resulting from consideration realized by the [noble] path beyond training (aśaikṣamārga), there is only [possession whose nature is that of a factor] belonging to one beyond training.\textsuperscript{82}

Further, the factors that are to be abandoned by the [path of] vision (darsānamārga) or cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) have possession that is to be abandoned, respectively, either by the [path of] vision or cultivation. In general, there are two varieties of possession of those factors that are not to be abandoned (aheya). In particular, they are differentiated [as follows]. Those factors that are not to be abandoned are not tending toward the fluxes (anāsrava). [Even though] the cessation not resulting from consideration, as well as the cessation resulting from consideration realized by the path of the non-noble one [are factors not tending toward the fluxes, their possession is to be abandoned]. Their possession is of one variety only: that is, it is to be abandoned by [the path of] cultivation. The cessation resulting from consideration realized by the path of the noble one as well as the truth of the path [398c25] [each] have only one variety of possession: that is, possession that is not to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{83}

[Possession]—Particular Varieties—Exceptions]

Previously, it was stated that the [factors of the] three time periods each have three [varieties] of possession.\textsuperscript{84} Are all conditioned factors determined [to have three varieties of possession] in this way?\textsuperscript{85} They are not. Why is this? The verse states:

[vs. 38c–d] The possession of indeterminate [factors] (avyākṛta) arises simultaneously with (sahaja) them, with the exception [of the possession of] the two supernormal powers (abhijñā) and
Possession and Non-possession

[the possession] of thoughts that create magically (nirmāṇacittā).

[vs. 39a–b] The possession of obscured form (nivṛtarūpa) also [arises] simultaneously with it. [The possession] of form within the realm of desire does not arise prior to it. 86

[Commentary:] [399a1] The possession of unobscured, indeterminate [factors] (anivṛtānyākṛta) arises only simultaneously [with those factors]. It is not produced either prior [to those factors] (agraja) or subsequent [to them] (paścātālāja). This is due to the weakness (durbalatvā) [of these un-obscured, indeterminate factors]. 87 Is the possession of all unobscured indeterminate factors determined to be such? It is not. Why is this? The [two] supernormal powers of divine sight (divyācakṣurabhijñā) and divine hearing (divyāśrotrabhijñā) and thoughts that create magically are excepted. 88 That is to say, insight characterized by the [two] supernormal powers of divine sight and divine hearing and by thoughts that create magically are strong (balavattva) because they are accomplished by extraordinary application (prayogavaisanispati). 89

[399a5] Therefore, even though they are included [among those factors] whose nature is unobscured and indeterminate, they have possession that arises prior to, subsequent to, and simultaneously with [them].

Further, the possession of the four aggregates produced by the modes of proper deportment (airiyāpathika) is, in most cases, exclusive with respect to time period and exclusive with respect to moment: [that is to say, it is limited to the time period and moment of the production of those aggregates]. 91 [The possession of the four aggregates produced by the modes of proper deportment practiced] by the various buddhas, by the monk Aśvajit, 92 and by others who practice modes of proper deportment intensively is excepted. [In such cases, possession occurs prior to, subsequent to, and simultaneously with the practice of those modes of proper deportment.] The possession of the four aggregates produced by skill in the creative arts (śailpasthānika) is also, in most cases, exclusive with respect to time period and exclusive with respect to moment. [The possession of the four aggregates produced by skill in the creative arts] of Viśvakarma and others who practice the creative arts intensively is excepted. [In such cases, possession occurs prior to, subsequent to, and simultaneously with the practice of these skills.]

Are unobscured, indeterminate factors alone in having possession that arises [only] simultaneously [with them]? [399a10] They are not. Why is this? The possession of obscured, indeterminate [manifest] form (nivṛtānyākṛtavijñaptirūpa) also [arises only simultaneously with that form].
This refers only to the possession of the defiled, manifest, corporeal and vocal actions (*kliṣṭavijñaptirūpa*) within the first level of trance of the realm of form, which, as in the case of [the possession of the obscured, indeterminate factors], arises only simultaneously with [those actions]. Even though [these actions arise obscured by] excessive (*adhimātra*) defilements, since they cannot give rise to unmanifest actions (*avijñaptirūpa*), they are weak and are definitely without possession [that arises] prior to or subsequent to them.

Are the various types of form within the realm of desire also determined to have only possession that arises simultaneously [with them]? They are not. Why is this? [399a15] There is no possible prior arising of the possession of virtuous and unvirtuous form [that is either manifest or unmanifest] and is connected to the realm of desire; they have only possession that arises simultaneously or subsequently.96

13.5 [Non-possession—Particular Varieties]

Thus, we have discussed the characteristics of the particular varieties of possession. What are the characteristics of the particular varieties of non-possession? The verse states:

[vs. 39c–d] Non-possession is undefiled and indeterminate (*a-kliṣṭāvyākṛta*). [Factors of the] past and future time periods (*atitājāta*) each have three varieties of non-possession.

[vs. 40] [Factors that are connected to] the three realms and those that are not connected to any realm (*kāmādyāptāmala*) have three [varieties of non-possession]. It is held that the non-possession of the noble path is referred to as the nature of an ordinary person (*prthagjanatva*). [Non-possession of a factor] is discarded by the possession (*prāpti*) of that [factor] and by passing to another stage (*bhūmisaṁcāra*).97

[Commentary:] [399a20] Distinguished by moral quality, all non-possession is grouped [in the category of factors] whose moral quality is unobscured and indeterminate (*anivrtāvyākṛta*).98

Distinguished by time period, past and future [factors] each have three varieties of [non-possession]. That is to say, past and future factors, in each case, have non-possession that belongs to the three time periods. In the case of present factors, there is only past and future non-possession;
there is definitely no present non-possession [of a present factor] because a present factor and its non-accompaniment do not operate simultaneously. There are those who claim that present factors lack present non-possession, [399a25] because [a present factor and its present non-possession] are mutually contradictory in nature. 99

Distinguished by realm, the factors connected to the three realms and those not connected to any realm have, in each case, three varieties of non-possession [depending upon the corporeal basis or support of the sentient being to whom this non-possession belongs]. That is to say, the factors connected to the realm of desire have three varieties of non-possession [belonging to the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the formless realm]. [Factors] connected to the realm of form, and the formless realm, as well as those not connected to any realm also [have non-possession connected to any of the three realms]. 100

13.6 [Nature of an Ordinary Person]

There is definitely no non-possession [whose nature is] not tending toward the fluxes. 101 Why is this? This is because the non-possession of the noble path is held to be the nature of an ordinary person (prthagjanatva). As the śāstra states: “What is the nature of an ordinary person? It is the non-acquisition of the noble factors.” 102 Non-acquisition is a synonym for non-possession. [399b1] [If the non-possession of factors not tending toward the fluxes were, itself, not tending toward the fluxes,] how could this factor not tending toward the fluxes be referred to as the nature of an ordinary person, [since an ordinary person does not possess any factor not tending toward the fluxes]?

To the non-acquisition of which factors does the nature of an ordinary person refer? 103 [According to two interpretations, it is maintained that the nature of an ordinary person] is either the general non-acquisition of all (sarva) noble factors or the [specific] non-acquisition only of the presentment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti). 104

There are those who claim, [in accordance with the first interpretation,] that [the nature of an ordinary person] is the non-acquisition of all noble factors.

[O] If this were so, isn’t it the case that there would be no non-ordinary person, since there is no general accomplishment of all noble factors as a
The non-acquisition [of the noble factors] that is not mixed with the acquisition [of any noble factor] constitutes the nature of an ordinary person. [Non-acquisition] that is mixed with the acquisition [of a noble factor] constitutes the nature of a non-ordinary person. Therefore, no fault is incurred [from this interpretation].

If this were so, the śāstra should have used the restrictive word 'alone' (eva): [that is, the nature of an ordinary person is non-acquisition alone].

This is not necessary because a [restrictive] meaning is evident even apart from the [actual use] of the word ['alone']. As in the case of such categories [of creatures] as those who live on water (abbhāṣa) and those who live on air (vāyuḥbhāṣa), even though the word 'alone' does not occur, it is known that these creatures live on water alone or on air alone, and do not mix [water or air] with other [types of food].

There are [others] who claim, [in accordance with the second interpretation,] that [the nature of an ordinary person] is the [specific] non-acquisition of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering. [One might object that, if this were so, one would again become an ordinary person when this specific factor is discarded.] However, after this knowledge is discarded, one does not again become an ordinary person because the non-possession [of the noble factor of presentiment that defines the nature of an ordinary person] has already previously been permanently destroyed.

[The Sūtra Master’s Interpretation]

In this connection, the Sūtra master makes the following comments: “The particular state of the stream that has not yet produced the noble factors (anutpannāryadharmasamātati) is referred to as the nature of an ordinary person.” Why would the Sūtra master then make the following statement: “The nature of an ordinary person is totally without existence as a real entity.” If this were so, to the state of whose stream does [this nature of an ordinary person, as he defines it, refer]?

It is namely the state of the stream of the eyes and ears, and so on.
Is it possible to claim that the state of the eyes, and so on, in one moment becomes the nature of a non-ordinary person, and yet also claim that the stream of the eyes, and so on, alone constitutes the nature of an ordinary person? [In that case, they would not be analogous. One might respond that for some factors such as form, a moment is actually a stream; therefore, the nature of an ordinary person, as such a moment-stream, would be analogous to the momentary nature of a non-ordinary person.] [However,] [399b15] it is not possible to refer to [one] moment as a stream because that would result in the fallacy that a moment, [so defined,] is not real.111

[The Sūtra master's definition of the nature of an ordinary person] is fallacious not only because the term ['stream' used in his definition] contradicts the meaning [of the nature of an ordinary person, which, as a real entity, must consist of a single moment]; it also incurs the fault of contradicting the sūtra. Therefore, the Lord has said: "[Such a one] is said to be one who practices in accordance with faith (śraddhānusārin). [When] one enters the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured (niyāmāvākṛanti), that one surpasses the stage of being an ordinary person (prthagjanatvaabhumi)."112 The "stage of being an ordinary person" referred to in this sūtra passage is precisely the nature of an ordinary person.113

[O] How is it known [that this stage of an ordinary person is to be equated with the nature of an ordinary person]?

[S] [It is known] because it is stated that one acquires [the noble factors] and discards [the nature of an ordinary person].114 [However,] even though one acquires noble factors that had not been possessed previously, it cannot be discerned that one discards at that time even a small portion of the various factors such as the eyes, and so on, which were possessed previously.115 [399b20] A noble one in the first stage of the path of vision, is accompanied by all the grades and groups of [defilements associated with the] eyes, and so on, with no exception, just as they were in the prior stage.116 If, [as the Sūtra master claims,] the nature of an ordinary person did not exist separately as a real entity, it would contradict this sūtra, since, at that time, [when entering the path of vision,] there would be no discrete real entity—that is, the "stage of being an ordinary person”—that one could surpass.

If one were to claim that this stage of being an ordinary person [refers to existence in a] bad rebirth state (apāyagati), then when the [preparatory] stage of presentiment (kṣānti) is attained, [and one overcomes the possi-
bility of birth in a bad rebirth state, one should no longer be an ordinary person.¹¹⁷

One might claim that since one is separated from the noble factors when the [stream of the] eyes, and so on, has not yet attained the [state of a] noble one, [399b25] the name 'ordinary person' is provisionally established as the nature of an ordinary person on the basis of that [stream of the eyes, and so on, that has not yet acquired noble factors]. Since, when one enters the path of vision, one surpasses that [stream of the eyes, and so on, that has not acquired the noble factors], one can be said to have surpassed the stage of being an ordinary person; this, [however,] is untenable. Since at that time the various factors of the eyes, and so on, continue as they were originally, how can it be said that one surpasses them?

Further, one might claim that [surpassing the eyes, and so on, in the first moment of the path of vision in which one acquires the noble factors] is like surpassing [the defilements associated with] the eyes, and so on, through the realization of the fruit of arhatship; this also is untenable. At that time [when the fruit of arhatship is attained], one realizes completely the severance of the bonds [connected with the] eyes, and so on. Even though one is still accompanied by these eyes, and so on, one is referred to as “having surpassed” [in the sense that one has surpassed the defilements originating in dependence upon the eyes, and so on]. [399c1] Now, in this case [of the first moment of acquiring the noble factors in the path of vision], one is accompanied by the eyes, and so on, bound by all bonds, just as they were originally. Therefore, the example of [surpassing the defilements associated with the eyes at the attainment of arhatship] is not equivalent [to that of surpassing the stage or nature of being an ordinary person].¹¹⁸

One might then claim that [one who surpasses the eyes, and so on, in the first moment of acquiring the noble factors], is similar to a noble one not yet free from passion (avītarāga) who has surpassed bad rebirth states.¹¹⁹ This also is untenable because [that noble one] has already attained cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyānirodha) with regard to those [bad rebirth states]. Since noble ones who are not yet free from passion have no force that instigates [actions that result in bad rebirth states], no proceeding toward [the effect of these actions that result in bad rebirth states], and no [present] operation [of defilements that result in bad rebirth states], they can be said to have surpassed them.¹²⁰ Now, in this state of the path of vision, what eyes, and so on, has one surpassed [in this way]?

[The opponent might raise the following objection: If it is claimed that an ordinary person possesses a “nature of an ordinary person” apart from
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the corporeal basis of the eyes, and so on, then] there should be a pot-nature, and so on, [399c5] apart from the substratum, the physical pot, and so on. This is untenable because, [in the case of the pot,] it is not reasonably established that one discards the pot-nature, and so on, without breaking the physical pot, and so on. [Therefore, one knows that there is no pot-nature apart from the physical pot.] [However, in the case of an ordinary person,] when a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes arises [in the first moment of the path of vision], one discards the nature of an ordinary person even though the eyes, and so on, remain as they were originally. [Therefore, one knows that apart from the eyes, and so on, of an ordinary person there exists a "nature of an ordinary person" that is discarded upon entering the noble path of vision.] Thus, the example [of the pot] is not equivalent. Through this [argument], other examples [that might be raised to deny the discrete existence of the nature of an ordinary person], such as that of cow-nature [and the physical cow,] and so on, are refuted. 122

[Saṅghabhadra’s Refutation of Other Interpretations]

If one objects: “Why is [this difference between the nature of an ordinary person and that of a noble one] not like that between the nature of a brāhmaṇa [and the nature of those of other castes?]” [We would respond that these two cases are not similar] because no established distinction is observed [between a brāhmaṇa and those of other castes] as there is between the noble one and the ordinary person. There is a particular established distinction between a noble one and an ordinary person because [the noble one has] no force that instigates [actions that result in bad rebirth states] and no proceeding toward [the effect of actions that result in bad rebirth states, while] an ordinary person has both this instigating force and this proceeding. [399c10] [In the case of a brāhmaṇa and those of other castes,] there is no particular established distinction in terms of insight [into Dharma], skill in the creative arts, suppression [of evil], and dexterity [in the cultivation of virtue]. 123 If the brāhmaṇa alone among the various castes were able to perform these actions and those of other [castes] were not able to perform them, it would then be possible, for this reason, to posit a nature of the brāhmaṇa [as distinct from the nature of those of other castes]. [However, such a distinction is not possible because these actions are not performed by brāhmaṇas alone.] Even though certain distinctions between [brāhmaṇas of the] central and surrounding regions are observed, they do not have separate intrinsic natures. Since we allow that this [observed] distinction [between brāhmaṇas of different regions] is based on the fact
that they have separate homogeneous characters (*sabhāgatā*), [we are not forced into the] erroneous position [of maintaining that these various groups of *brāhmaṇa* have, in each case, a discrete intrinsic nature].

One might claim that the noble factors constitute the nature of a noble one, [399c15] and that one is called a noble one because one is accompanied by this intrinsic nature. In the same way then, shouldn't the factors of an ordinary person constitute the nature of an ordinary person, and shouldn't one be called an ordinary person because one is accompanied by this intrinsic nature? This analogy is untenable. Since the various noble factors are possessed by a noble one alone, it is possible to claim that the noble factors constitute the nature of a noble one. [However, since the] factors of an ordinary person are also possessed by a noble one, how would it be possible to establish the [possession of ordinary factors] as the nature of an ordinary person? If the factors of an ordinary person belonged to ordinary persons alone and were found among ordinary persons everywhere (*sarvatra*), they could be considered to be the nature of an ordinary person. [However,] since [the factors of an ordinary person such as] a bad rebirth state, [399c20] the state of non-conception, and [existence in the] Uttarākuru, [127] and so on, are not found among ordinary persons everywhere, they do not constitute the nature of an ordinary person. Even though the remaining factors such as vitality, are found among ordinary persons everywhere, [since] they do not belong to ordinary persons alone, they also do not constitute the nature of an ordinary person.

Further, [one might claim that the homogeneous character (*sabhāgatā*) of an ordinary person fulfills these two criteria of] being that within the life-stream which belongs to an ordinary person alone and that which is found among ordinary persons everywhere. [However, the nature of an ordinary person has the additional characteristic, not shared by homogeneous character, of being] contrary to the acquisition of the noble path.

[Nature of an Ordinary Person—Existential Status]

Further, [this nature of an ordinary person can then indeed be established as a real entity by its activity; that is to say,] there exists a factor—the nature of an ordinary person—that acts as the cause of production for the body of an ordinary person.

[0] Isn't it the case that prior actions and defilements act as causes of production for the body of an ordinary person? Of what use is the nature of an ordinary person?
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This criticism is unreasonable because it is observed that certain factors are only capable of acting as causes of another factor when they depend upon [still] other causes. [For example,] the eyes, and so on, which are produced from prior actions and from defilements, cannot attain production apart from the four fundamental material elements. Similarly, though the body of an ordinary person depends upon prior actions and defilements, it can also be said to depend upon the nature of an ordinary person.

Therefore, because its activity has been established, it is known that there exists a discrete factor referred to as the nature of an ordinary person. When one surpasses that [nature], one is said to have surpassed the stage of an ordinary person. Only through this interpretation does the [previously cited] sūtra expounded by the Lord have meaning.

13.7 [Discarding Non-possession]

This digression [concerning the nature of an ordinary person] has been completed. Now we should consider when non-possession will be discarded. The non-possession of a factor is discarded when one acquires (lābha) that factor and when one passes to another stage (bhūmisamācāra).

[Discarding the non-possession of a given factor by acquiring that factor is illustrated] by the case of the non-possession of noble factors, which is referred to as the nature of an ordinary person. As soon as one acquires a noble factor, one discards the non-possession of [noble factors—that is, the nature of an ordinary person—as found in all] three realms. Or, one who is abiding in the first moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes [discards the non-possession of the] knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering [as soon that knowledge is acquired]. [The process of the sequential discarding of non-possessions continues in the path of practice] as one progresses up to the state of the adamantine concentration (vajropamasamādhi), in which one discards, accordingly, the non-possession of the [next] stage of preparation for the realization of arhatship (arhattvapratipannaka) as soon as one acquires that factor. Thus, [this process continues as one progresses up to the] realization of the fruit of arhatship in which one who has liberation limited by the occasion (samayavimukti) discards the non-possession of liberation not limited by the occasion (asamayavimukti) as soon as one acquires that factor. [Discarding] the non-possession of other factors should be understood in the
same way.

[O] Now, in what way [specifically] is non-possession said to be discarded?

[S] Non-possession is said to be discarded in the sense that the possession of that non-possession is abandoned, and the non-possession of that non-possession is produced.139

Even though possession and non-possession, [400a10] [as discrete factors,] have, in each case, other possessions and non-possessions, there is no fault of infinite regress (nānāvasthapraṇaṅga).140 Through the power of possession (prāpti), one is accompanied by the original factor as well as the possession of possession (prāptiapraṇa). Through the power of the possession of possession, one is accompanied by the possession of the [original] factor. [Since there is an interdependency between possession and the possession of possession,] how would an infinite regress be established?141

[The impossibility of infinite regress in the case of] non-possession should also be considered in accordance with [the following] principle: that is, a non-possession of the non-possession [of a particular factor] never arises simultaneously with [that original non-possession].142

Further, [according to the second method of discarding non-possession by passing to another stage,] when one is born from a lower stage into a higher stage, all former non-possessions [of the higher stage, characteristic of the] lower stage are completely discarded. The process of being born from a higher into a lower [stage] should be considered in the same way. [Non-possession can be discarded by passing to another stage] because non-possession operates in dependence upon the power of the corporeal basis [to which it is connected].

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**Notes**

1. See AKB 2.36b-d p. 62.16ff.: "[vs. 36b-d] Possession refers to acquisition and accompaniment. Possession and non-possession apply only to [the factors that fall within] one's own life-stream and to the two cessations." prāptir labhaḥ sāmanuvāyaḥ prāptyaṃprāpti svasaṁyutapatitāṁ nirodhyoḥ. See GAKB p. 79; SAKV p.143.8ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22a11ff.; PAKB 3 p. 180c18ff.; ADV no. 129a-b p. 86.8ff.

2. MVB 157 p. 797a19ff. See also ADV no. 129a-b p. 87.1ff. Though possession (prāpti) and accompaniment (samanuvāma) are declared to be identical in intrinsic nature, there is evidence that they were distinguished in use. For example, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 45 p. 231c28ff.), in discussing the possession of various noble or ordinary factors, refers to noble ones who may have possession (prāpti) of certain factors and yet "do not have accompaniment of them within their bodies because [those factors] are not present before them." For various theories that distinguish possession
and accompaniment on the basis of the stage in the process of possession that they represent, see MVB 162 p. 823a20ff.; supra, introductory commentary, “Possession and Non-possession.”

3 The “Mahāvibhaṣa (MVB 158 p. 801a6ff.) enumerates three types of possession discriminated by the factors to which they apply: (1) possession of conditioned factors (samskṛtadharma); (2) possession of cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyāniruddha); (3) possession of cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyāniruddha). See also MVB 157 p. 799a15–21.

4 One has possession of all five aggregates that fall within one’s own life-stream, including the form aggregate (rupaskandha) from which the body is made. See also MVB 157 p. 799a15–21.

5 The *Mahāvibhaṣa (MVB 158 p. 801a6ff.) enumerates three types of possession discriminated by the factors to which they apply: (1) possession of conditioned factors (samskṛtadharma); (2) possession of cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyāniruddha); (3) possession of cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyāniruddha). See also MVB 157 p. 799a15–21.

6 JP (1544) 19 p. 1022a15ff.; MVB 186 p. 931a23ff. In this passage, the phrase ‘factors not tending toward the fluxes (anāsravadharma)’ includes the truth of the path (mārgasatya) and the three unconditioned factors: namely, space (ākāsa), cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyāniruddha), and cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyāniruddha). See AKB 1.5a–c p. 3.15ff.; SAKV p. 13.30ff. For a discussion of anārava factors and their distinction from āsrava factors, see MVB 2 p. 7c21ff., 67 p. 346a28ff., passim, 76 p. 392b20ff. See also MVB 2 p. 7c21ff., 67 p. 346a28ff., passim, 76 p. 392b20ff.

7 The first moment of the path of vision (darsanamārga) is the stage of presentation of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmañjanakānti). See AKB 6.25c–d p. 350.1ff.; SAKV p. 541.13ff. Though one who has entered this stage is, by definition, a noble one, since the defilements of the realm of desire that are to be abandoned by the path of vision are not yet abandoned, and those to be abandoned by the path of cultivation may not yet be abandoned, the noble one in this stage may also be one who is said to be “bound by all bonds.” Most ordinary persons are also bound by all bonds. By contrast, those ordinary persons who have abandoned defilements by the mundane path (laukikamārga) as well as those noble ones in or beyond the second stage of the path of vision have abandoned some defilements and are, therefore, accompanied by cessation resulting from consideration; hence, they are excepted from the category of being “bound by all bonds.” This variety of cessation resulting from consideration refers to the abandonment of specific defilements through the practice of the path, and, as such, there are as many instances of cessation as there are defilements to be abandoned. See AKB 1.6a–b p. 3.24ff.; SAKV p. 16.1ff. See also SAKV p. 144.18ff.; P‘u-kuang 4 p. 85c24ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 536b22ff.; Yuan-yü 9 p. 235b7ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 317d8ff.
Here, it would appear that Hsüan-tsang (HTAKB 4 p. 22a21–22; NAS 12 p. 397a5–6) offers a translation that attempts to clarify the compound sakalabandhanadikṣaṇāsthavājyāḥ. It differs from both Paramārtha’s translation (PAKB 3 p. 180c–28ff.) and from Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakosābhashya (AKB 2.36d p. 62.26ff.): “All noble ones, with the exception of those in the first moment [of the path of vision], who are bound by all bonds and certain ordinary persons are accompanied by cessation resulting from consideration.”

It differs from both Paramārtha’s translation (PAKB 3 p. 180c–28ff.) and from Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakosābhashya (AKB 2.36d p. 62.26ff.): “All noble ones, with the exception of those in the first moment [of the path of vision], who are bound by all bonds and certain ordinary persons are accompanied by cessation resulting from consideration.”

According to Hsüan-tsang’s translation of this sentence in the *Nyāyānusāra (cf. ASPŚ 7 p. 804a7ff.), the possibility of accompaniment is declared to be dependent upon the possibility of possession. This differs from his translation of the corresponding passage in the Abhidharmakosābhashya (HTAKB 4 p. 22a23ff.) and from Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakosābhashya (AKB 2.36c p. 63.1–2): “There is no one accompanied by space; therefore, there is no possession of it. [A factor] of which there is no possession does not have non-possession....”

This latter causal order, whereby possession is a function of accompaniment, would agree with the causal order cited in the prior discussion of conditioned factors. Neither Yüan-yü nor any other commentator refers to this difference in the causal order between the *Nyāyānusāra and the Abhidharmakosābhashya. Hence Saṅghabhadra’s or possibly Hsüan-tsang’s reason for reversing the causal order is unclear. Paramārtha’s translation (PAKB 3 p. 181a1ff.) is of interest here: “There is no sentient being who is accompanied by space. Why is there no non-possession of space? If there is no possession of a factor, there is also no non-possession.” See also P’u-kuang 4 p. 85c28ff.

This passage is given in the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 158 p. 801b4ff.) in a section discussing the problem of how one’s possession of a given factor is itself possessed without the fault of infinite regress. This problem is solved through a secondary “possession of possession” (prāptiprāpti), which occurs in every moment together with the original factor and its primary possession. The primary possession possesses this secondary possession of possession as well as the original factor, and the secondary possession of possession, in turn, possesses the primary possession. The *Mahāvibhāṣa suggests that the term ‘forces aggregate’ (samskāraskandha) in the passage cited here should be understood to refer to the secondary possession of possession, which, as a “force dissociated from thought” would be included within that forces aggregate. The passage then indicates that the primary factor and the secondary possession of possession are both possessed by one factor, that is, the primary possession. See also Yüan-yü 9 p. 235b10ff. Cf. Shen-t’ai 4 p. 321a17ff. Saṅghabhadra’s reasons for quoting this passage here are not immediately apparent; it may be intended as an example of the principle of mutual determination, or mutual correlation, cited in the previous sentence, whereby possession and non-possession determine each other’s applicability to a given factor. Or, this passage may be intended simply as an authoritative scriptural reference that, by mentioning the term ‘possession,’ verifies its existence.

AKB 2.36d p. 63.3ff.: “There exists a certain discrete entity named possession. How is that [known]?” prāptī prāpti nāmā ‘sti kīṁcit bhāvāntaram iti. kuta etat. See also SAKV p. 144.34ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22a26; PAKB 3 p. 181a2ff. The criticism offered by Vasubandhu as well as both the sūtra passages and the reasoned arguments offered by Saṅghabhadra in this discussion closely follow the *Mahāvibhāṣa: MVB 93 p. 479a8ff., 157 p. 796a26ff.

In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu refers to another scriptural passage, also cited in the *Mahāvibhūdā (MVB 93 p. 479a11ff., 157 p. 796b20ff.), that mentions the accompaniment of ten factors characteristic of one beyond training. These passages are cited simply to indicate that the term *samanvagama ‘accompaniment’ appears in the sūtra; thereby, they serve as scriptural authorities, which prove that accompaniment, or possession, exists as a discrete real entity. The particular content of the passage cited here by Saṅghabhadra, though unimportant in this context, becomes important in the following argument.

14 AKB 2.36d p. 63.7ff.; SAKV p. 145.12ff.; MVB 93 p. 479a24ff., 157 p. 796b10ff. See SA 27 no. 721 p. 194a6ff., no. 722 p. 194a24ff.; MA 11 no. 58 p. 493a12ff., 11 no. 59 p. 493a29ff., 15 no. 70 p. 520b25ff.; EA 33 no. 7 p. 731b15ff., no. 8 p. 731b27ff.; DA 3 no. 2 p. 21c10ff., 18 no. 30 p. 119b26ff. The fault is as follows. Various insentient objects such as a wheel or other sentient beings such as an elephant are included among the seven jewels. Thus, if a wheel-turning king had accompaniment of these things in the technical sense under discussion here, it would contradict the previously stated rule that one has accompaniment only of conditioned factors that fall within the scope of one’s own life-stream, and of the two cessations. See MVB 93 p. 479a21ff., 157 p. 796b6ff., where this argument appears as an objection raised by the Dārṣṭāntikas. See also P'u-kuang 4 p. 86a13ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 235c12ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 317d17ff.; SAKV p. 145.11ff.

15 See MVB 93 p. 479b24ff., 157 p. 796c17ff.

16 Saṅghabhadra draws a distinction between mastery (*vaśītva) and accompaniment (*samanvāgama) and claims that *samanvāgama can, in certain cases, be used in the non-technical sense of *vaśītva, that is, as in the case of the wheel-turning king. However, whereas *vaśītva can only be used with respect to objects in the present time period, *samanvāgama, in its technical sense as accompaniment, or possession, can occur with regard to past, present, or future objects. If Vasubandhu claimed that *samanvāgama is, in all cases, *vaśītva, then the possession relationship with respect to past and future factors—a relationship recognized by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas—would be impossible. Thus, Saṅghabhadra concludes that there must be a type of *samanvāgama with respect to past and future factors that is distinct from *vaśītva. It is this *samanvāgama in its technical sense as distinct from *vaśītva that is used in the former sūtra passage concerning virtuous and unvirtuous factors. See MVB 93 p. 479b10–12, 157 p. 796b26–28 where a similar argument is presented. See also Yüan-yü 9 p. 235d1ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 317d12ff.

17 See ASPS 6 p. 803c25–28. “Now, as in the case when virtuous factors are present one, with regard to past and future unvirtuous factors, is there a mastery apart from present possession that might be referred to as accompaniment?” Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 235d4–5) explains: “It is not the case that [possession] with regard to past and future virtuous or unvirtuous factors is [mastery], since neither operates in the present. If, when [either virtuous or unvirtuous factors] are operating in the present, there were no possession of those [factors] that are not operating, how would there be accompaniment of past or future [factors]?"

18 Cf. ASPS 6 p. 803c29.

19 The stage of the realization of the fruit of the stream-enterer is the first moment of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga). See MVB 54 p. 278c1ff.; AKB 6.29c–31b pp. 353.19–354.12, 6.34ab p. 355.23ff. For the impossibility of further retrogression from the realization of this initial noble fruit, see MVB 61 p. 316b28ff.


21 As Yaśomitra (*SAKV p. 145.24ff.) suggests: “Here, that given entity which exists as a real entity would be grasped either by direct perception or by inference. Among these, form, sound, and so on, are to be grasped by direct perception because
they are to be grasped by the five externally directed sense organs. Certain [types of] direct perception such as passion and hatred, and so on, are to be grasped by mental perceptual consciousness because they are to be sensed oneself. But the eyes and ears, and so on, are to be grasped by inference because they are to be inferred through the activity of visual perceptual consciousness, and so on."

\[\text{they are to be grasped by the five externally directed sense organs. Certain [types of] direct perception such as passion and hatred, and so on, are to be grasped by mental perceptual consciousness because they are to be sensed oneself. But the eyes and ears, and so on, are to be grasped by inference because they are to be inferred through the activity of visual perceptual consciousness, and so on.} \]

\[\text{cakśuḥrotrtrādī tu anumāṇagrāhyam cakṣuṣuvāṇānādiktyānuyatvāt.} \]

22 Cf. ADV no. 128 p. 85.13–15. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.36 p. 63.11ff.; SAKV p.145.31ff.) offers and criticizes another explanation, presumably attributed to the Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, of possession’s activity, by which that possession might be discerned to exist: that is, possession acts as the cause of the arising (upatīthetū) of factors. However, Vasubandhu responds, this activity of causing arising should not be attributed to possession because of the following undesirable consequences: (1) there would be no possession of unconditioned factors, since they do not arise; (2) there would be no possession of factors that have never been possessed or of those that have been abandoned, since they do not arise. If, in response, one claimed that that possession, which arises together with a factor, acts as its cause, the following undesirable consequences would ensue: (1) the primary characteristic of birth (jātīlakṣaṇa), and the secondary characteristic of the birth of birth (jātijāti) would have no function; (2) there would be no distinction among the various grades of defilements, since there is no distinction among grades of possession. By omitting this discussion, Saṅghabhadra implicitly rejects this generative causal activity as the activity of possession. See also YBS 52 p. 586C25ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 86b11ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 318b7ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 536c18ff.; Kaidō 4 p. 90a2ff.

23 Quoted in SAKV p. 148.22–23. idam asye ’ti jñānacihnam pratilabdhadharmāvipraṇāṣakāraṇam ca práptir ity asāryasaṅghabhadhrah. Yaśomitra claims that this latter function as “the marker of the knowledge that ‘this’ belongs to ‘that’” is not established because the knowledge of “this” occurs by means of a distinction in the corporeal basis, or through a corporeal basis of a particular type (āśrayaviśeṣa tajjñānam). This explanation suggests that Yaśomitra interprets this second function of possession as referring to the characteristic by which noble ones can be distinguished from ordinary persons. For the meaning of cihna, see MVB 177 p. 889a10–11: “What is the meaning of ‘characteristic?’ A marker (cihna) is a characteristic; a distinctive characteristic (*viśeṣa) is a characteristic; a good omen is a characteristic.” Or, MVB 187 p. 939a5–6: “The [four] characteristics of conditioned factors are the markers (cihna) of all conditioned factors.” See also MVB 74 p. 384c12–13.

24 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 236a13ff.

25 As an introduction to the following explanation of seeds, one should note that Vasubandhu (AKB 2.36d p. 63.16ff.) presents an explanation of the activity of possession that Yaśomitra attributes to the Vaibhāṣikas (SAKV p. 146.20ff.). Possession is said to be the cause of the distinction between the states (vyavasthāhetu) of a noble one and an ordinary person. Vasubandhu counters this theory with the statement that this distinction between the states of a noble one and an ordinary person can be attributed to a distinction in the corporeal basis (āśrayaviśeṣa), that is, a distinction between the states of having abandoned or not having abandoned defilements (prahānprahānakīlesataviśeṣa). For the Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, this distinction between having abandoned and not having abandoned certain defilements depends upon whether or not one is separated from the possession of those defilements. Hence, the existence of possession is necessitated by its activity of distinguishing noble ones from ordinary persons. For Vasubandhu, however, this distinction depends upon a distinction between the corporeal bases (āśraya) of noble ones and ordinary persons, which occurs when the corporeal basis (āśraya) of an ordinary person is transmuted (parāvṛttā)
upon becoming a noble one. This transmutation results from the abandonment of defilements, or of the seeds of defilements, and occurs through the power of the path. Thus, for Vasubandhu, accompaniment and non-accompaniment are not discrete real entities, but merely refer provisionally to states characterized by the presence or absence of seeds. See also Shen-t'ai 4 p. 318c11ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 136b10ff.; P'u-kuang 4 p. 86c1ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 537a2ff.

29 For the translation of this sentence, cf. infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b20.

27 See AKB 2.36 p. 64.3-4; SAKV p. 147.29ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22c10-11; PAKB 3 p. 181b11-13.

28 Four varieties of seeds are referred to in this passage: (1) seeds that are not yet plucked out are the seeds of defiled factors not yet plucked out by the noble path (āryāmārga); (2) seeds that are not yet damaged include two varieties—first, seeds of defiled factors not yet damaged by the mundane path (laukikāmārga), (3) and, second, seeds of virtuous factors not produced through effort (ayatnabhāvā) that are not yet damaged by false views; and, finally, (4) seeds that are to be nourished are the seeds of virtuous factors that are produced through effort (yatnabhāvā). In the corresponding section of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.36 p. 63.25ff.), Vasubandhu discusses at length only the two categories of virtuous factors: that is, numbers 3 and 4. See also SAKV p. 147.29ff.; P'u-kuang 4 p. 86c17ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 318d7ff.; Yuän-yü 9 p. 236a18ff.

29 See AKB 2.36 p. 63.25ff.; SAKV p. 147.16ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22c1-9; PAKB 3 p. 181b4-11.


31 See MVB 35 p. 181b22ff.

32 Both Pradhan's Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.36d p. 64.2) and Paramārtha's translation (PAKB 3 p. 181b8) use the term saritati; Hsüan-tsang in his translation of both the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (HTAKB 4 p. 22c5) and the *Nyāyāṇusāra (NAS 12 p. 397b14) uses the term āṣraya. For the meaning of bijabhāva here and a possible distinction between bija and bijabhāva, which is not evident in Hsüan-tsang's translation, see Hsüan-tsang (1980) 69-73; supra, introductory commentary, "Possession and Non-possession," note 46.

33 This sentence appears only in Hsüan-tsang's translations (HTAKB 4 p. 22c9; NAS 12 p. 397b17-18), and neither in Pradhan's Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.36d p. 64.3), nor in Paramārtha's translation (PAKB 3 p. 181b11). According to Yuän-yü (Yuän-yü 9 p. 236b15ff.), this section is added by Saṅghabhadra in order to extend the four categories of seeds mentioned by Vasubandhu above—that is, as not plucked out (anapoddāhita), not damaged (two types) (anupaha), and as nourished to the point of mastery (vaśītvakāle paripuṣṭa)—to factors of every possible moral quality, including also unvirtuous factors, the two categories of obscured, indeterminate factors (nīvṛtvāyākṛta), and unobscured (anīvṛtvāyākṛta) indeterminate factors. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas propose that indeterminate factors—that is, factors whose moral quality is not manifest as either virtuous or unvirtuous—are of two types: obscured, indeterminate (nīvṛtvāyākṛta) and unobscured, indeterminate (anīvṛtvāyākṛta). Obscured, indeterminate factors are obscured by association with defilements (kleśādikta), and, like unvirtuous factors, they constitute an obstacle to the noble path. See MVB 161 p. 815c13ff. However, unlike unvirtuous factors, they are incapable of producing an effect. For example, a moment of thought within the realm of desire can be obscured and indeterminate in moral quality if associated with the view of self (satkāyadṛśī) or with a view that grasps the extremes of permanence and annihilation (antagrahādṛśī). A moment of thought within the realm of form or the formless realm can be obscured and indeterminate if associated with any defilement. Unobscured indeterminate factors refer to certain types of form (rupa), space, cessation not resulting
from consideration, certain dissociated factors, all matured effects (vipākaphala), and moments of thought associated either with skill in the creative arts (saśāpathānīka) or with modes of proper deportment (airyāpāthika), and thoughts that create magically (nairmti’fk). See [Akb] 3.28a–b p. 139.5ff.; [Sakv] 2.9 p. 297.18ff.; [Nas] 25 p. 482b21ff.

35 See [Akb] 4.42c–d.f. p. 225.25ff.; [Sakv] 389.7ff. where the noble paths of vision and cultivation, and the mundane path are described as counteragents (pratipakṣa) to defilements.


37 For remote (pāramparyeña) and immediate (sāksat) as two possible types of conditioning relations (pratīyāyabhāva), see [Akb] 3.28a–b p. 139.5ff.; [Sakv] 297.18ff.; [Nas] 25 p. 482b21ff.


40 For nāmarūpa as the five aggregates, see [Mvb] 23 p. 118c19–20; [Akb] 3.28 p. 140.5ff.

41 See Yūn-yū 9 p. 236d5ff. As the following argument will make clear, “their own category” refers to a similar moral category as virtuous (kuśala), unvirtuous (akuśala), or indeterminate (avayākta), or to a similar category as tending toward the fluxes (sāsrava) or not tending toward the fluxes (anāsrava).

42 Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 236d6–7) explains that since the Sautrāntikas maintain that form (rūpa) is only indeterminate, seeds of form (rūpa) cannot act as the cause of virtuous and unvirtuous factors. However, the Sāvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas classify manifest (vijñapti) and unmanifest (avyāpti) action as well as material form within the category of form. Therefore, form can be virtuous, unvirtuous, or indeterminate, and can serve as the cause of virtuous, unvirtuous, or indeterminate factors. See [Mvb] 13 p. 65c29ff., 19 p. 96a24ff., 51 p. 236a8ff., 128 p. 667b16ff.

43 See [Sakv] p. 150.6ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 537b21ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 319b12ff.

44 See [Sakv] p. 149.5ff., p. 150.6ff.

45 Quoted in [Sakv] p. 148.26ff. See also Fa-pao 4 p. 537b29ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 319b18ff.

46 Yaśomitra ([Sakv] p. 148.27–28) notes that if the seed were admitted to be separate from thought, that would be tantamount to admitting possession, which is also maintained to be an entity separate from thought. In that case, the argument concerning possession and seeds would be merely a question of names—that is, whether
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this entity separate from thought should be called “possession” or a “seed.” arthāntaram cet siddhāram prāptir astī ‘ti saṅjñāmātrā tu vivādāḥ.

Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 149.2-5) gives the following response to Saṅghabhadra’s criticism: “Here we say, if [the seed] were not an entity separate [from thought], there would be the fault of mixture [of the character of the seed and the character of thought]. But that seed must be said to be neither an entity separate from thought nor an entity not separate from thought, since it has the nature of a dependent provisional entity.”

48 See SAKV p. 148.29ff. Since heat and fire are not discrete entities, they can both be said to be capable of burning. Likewise, if an unvirtuous seed and a virtuous moment of thought in which that seed lies were not discrete entities, they should both be capable of producing the same effect.

49 The power of the knowledge of possibility and impossibility is the first of ten powers characterizing the Buddha. See MVB 30 p. 156c18ff.; AKB 7.28c-d .411.13ff.; SAKV p. 642.27ff. In this case, the knowledge of possibility and impossibility is to be understood as the knowledge of the proper operation of the cause and effect relation: specifically, that a virtuous cause produces a virtuous effect and an unvirtuous cause produces an unvirtuous effect. See AHŚ.-U 4 p. 855b24–25; SAHS 6 p. 921a29ff.; ŚAŚ 10 p. 599a25ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 327b2ff. Cf. AHŚ.-D 3 p. 823a7ff.

50 See Yūn-yū 9 p. 237b7ff.

51 Though a noble one (ārya) has given rise to a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes as a result of having entered the first stage of the path of vision (darśanamārga), that noble one has not yet abandoned all defilements. Since Vasubandhu proposes that both virtuous and defiled factors are caused by seeds, defilements that remain to be abandoned by a noble one must also be caused by seeds. If Vasubandhu maintained that no seeds of defilement reside in a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes, he would be forced to admit that those defilements, which remain to be abandoned by a noble one, arise in some other way, that is, without seeds.

52 The first moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes differs from all prior moments of defiled thought and from all subsequent moments of thought not tending toward the fluxes in that it does not arise through a homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu); it is not preceded, either remotely or immediately, by a moment of thought of its own category, that is, a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes. Furthermore, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihānas, the causal relation by which homogeneous causes give rise to effects of uniform outflow (nīṣyandaphala) demands the real existence of that prior homogeneous cause. See MVB 17 p. 85c8–9, passim. Since, for Vasubandhu, the real existence of past factors is denied, the causal relation of uniformity can only be explained through the continued presence of seeds. Therefore, if Vasubandhu refuses to admit that subsequent moments of thought not tending toward the fluxes arise from seeds within a defiled moment of thought, they too must be allowed to arise without seeds, or without a homogeneous cause. They would then be identical to the first moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes. See MVB 2 p. 9c11–13; AKB 1.38b p. 26.8ff.; SAKV p. 71.12ff.

53 See NAS 68 p. 711a7ff.; AKB 6.58 p. 374.9ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā states that the Dārṣṭāntikas (MVB 60 p. 313a14ff.) do not accept the existence of retrogression as a discrete entity and the Vibhajyavādins (MVB 60 p. 312b8–9) deny the possibility of retrogression altogether. However, as Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 237b18ff.) suggests, if the Sautrāntikas and Vasubandhu do not accept retrogression, Saṅghabhadra’s objection is unfounded. For the problem of retrogression, see also MVB 60–62 p. 313b–319c.

54 Here, Saṅghabhadra assumes that if, like Vasubandhu, one claims that factors do not exist as discrete real entities in all three time periods and one rejects simultaneous
causation, the cause and effect relation becomes impossible. How can a nonexistent past factor act as a cause in producing a present effect that does not yet exist?

55 See AKB 3.28a–b p. 137.10ff.

56 Throughout Buddhist texts, causal interaction is defined by a twofold formula: “When this exists, that exists; from the production of this, that is produced. When this does not exist, that does not exist; from the cessation of this, that ceases.” See MN no. 79 Cūlasakuludāyasutta 2: 32: dharmāṁ te desessāmi: imasmīṁ sati idaṁ hoti, imassu ‘ppādā, idaṁ uppaṭṭati; imasmīṁ asati idaṁ na hoti, imassa nirodā idaṁ nirujjhati; EA 32 no. 9 p. 724b16-17. For various patterns in which this formula appears in the sūtra collection, see Saigusa (1979). For various interpretations of this formula, see also AKB 3.28a–b p. 138.28ff. in NAB pp. 419a7ff., 25 p. 482a3ff.; SAKV p. 297.9ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 237c6–8.

57 See NAB 50–52 pp. 621c5ff.–636b16.

58 Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 237c12ff.) notes that Saṅghabhadra’s criticism of Vasubandhu’s prior statements includes four major points: (1) a refutation of the statement that virtuous factors acquired at birth are not absolutely obliterated (See NAS 12 p. 398a8ff.); (2) a refutation of the statement that virtuous factors acquired through effort have already arisen (See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 398a19ff.); (3) a refutation of the statement that defilements are eradicated by two paths (See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 398a27ff.); and (4) a refutation of the statement concerning the immediate and remote operation of seeds (See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 398b9ff.).

59 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b15ff. AKB 2.36d p. 64.1–2: “But, it is not the case that there is absolute obliteration of the seed-state of virtuous factors within the life-stream.” na tu khātu kuśalānāṁ dharmānāṁ bījabhāvasyā ‘tyantāṁ saṁtattau samudghātaḥ.

60 Saṅghabhadra’s argument is as follows. If Vasubandhu admitted that seeds exist as discrete real entities, he could maintain that they are not absolutely obliterated. However, since he maintains that seeds exist only as provisional entities, they do not, in the strict sense, actually exist. Therefore, Vasubandhu should say that the seed-states are “absolutely not obliterated,” because there actually exist no seeds to be obliterated. See Yūn-yū 9 p. 237c16–17.


62 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b16–17; AKB 2.36d p. 64.2–3: “Further, as for those that are produced through effort, one is said to be accompanied by those that have arisen within the life-stream, because one’s mastery with regard to their production is undamaged.” ye punar yaśabhāvānas tair utpattāsa vaśītvāvighātāt saṁtateḥ samanvāgata ucyate.

63 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397c6ff., 12 397c29ff.

64 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397a24ff.

65 The preceding argument used to criticize Vasubandhu’s theory of the arising of virtuous factors can also be applied to his theory of the abandonment of defilements. The production of seeds of defilements in a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes is unreasonable. Since there are then no defilements in the present, and they do not exist as discrete real entities in the past and future, how can there exist any defilements whatsoever to be abandoned? If there were seeds of defilements latent within a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes, since they are not separate from that moment of thought, those seeds and that moment of thought should have the same effect, and like that moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes, these seeds of defilements should not be abandoned. However, since, according to Vasubandhu, these seeds of defilements do not exist as discrete real entities, there is, in fact, nothing to be
abandoned. See Yiian-yü 9 p. 237d17ff. The five groups of defilements (pañca-nikāyā) include those to be abandoned by the vision of each of the four noble truths in the path of vision (darsanamārga), and those to be abandoned by cultivation in the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). See AKB 2.52b p. 85.19ff. The nine grades (navaprakāra) refer to degrees of defilements: namely, defilements that are slight, moderate, and extreme (nrdumaṇḍhādhimūtra), each of which also have slight, moderate, and extreme sub-degrees. See MVB 18 p. 88c17ff., passim; AKB 6.33 p. 355.4ff.; Sakurabe and Ueyama (1969b) 115–125.

66 AKB 2.36d p. 63.22–24: “As when grains of rice have been burned completely by fire, when the corporeal basis is not in the state of having seeds of defilements, one is said to have abandoned defilements; or one [is said to have abandoned defilements] when [the corporeal basis] has seed-states damaged by the mundane path. [In states that are the] opposite [of these], one [is referred to as one who has] not yet abandoned defilements.”

67 If both the defilements that are to be abandoned and the counteragents to those defilements that cause them to be abandoned are associated with thought (saṁprayukta), since they are contradictory, they can never exist together in the same moment of thought.

68 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 397b22. AKB 2.36d p. 64.5–6: “[It is that] name and form which is capability in the production of an effect either immediately or remotely.”

69 See AKB 2.36d p. 64.6–7: “[This capability of name and form becomes effective] through a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream. What is this that is referred to as transformation? It is a change of the life-stream. What is this life-stream? It is conditioned forces of the three time periods having the nature of cause and effect.”

70 The translation of this sentence is uncertain.

71 See Yiian-yü 9 p. 238b18ff.


73 Like all discretely existing factors, possession and non-possession are to be discriminated according to various perspectives including the following: (1) time period; (2) moral quality; (3) location by the region or by the realm to which they are connected; (4) relation to the path—that is, their character as belonging to one in training, beyond training, or to one neither in training nor beyond training; (5) the manner in which they are to be abandoned. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 158 p. 801a6ff.) explains the general principle by which the character of the possession of a particular factor is to be determined. First, in general, possession is determined in accordance with the nature of the factors possessed. However, there are three categories of factors and, therefore, three specific principles that determine the character of the corresponding possession: that is, possession of conditioned factors (saṁskṛtadharma); possession of the cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyaṇirodha); and possession of the cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyaṇirodha). The specific character of the possession of conditioned factors is determined by the character of the factor possessed, because conditioned factors have the activity of projecting their own possession. The character of the possession of the two unconditioned factors (asaṁskṛtadharma)—that is, the two
varieties of cessation—is determined by other conditions, and not by the character of the unconditioned factor possessed, because cessation is incapable of projecting its own possession. Specifically, in the case of the cessation resulting from consideration, the character of its possession is determined by the particular path through which it is realized; the path projects the possession of the cessation that is realized through it. Since the cessation not resulting from consideration is not realized through a path, the character of its possession is determined by the character of its corporeal basis (āśraya) or by the vitality and homogeneous character of the sentient being who experiences it.

74 AKB 2.37–38b p. 64.13ff.: “[vs. 37] [Factors of] the three time periods have three [varieties of possession]. Virtuous [factors], and so on, have virtuous [possession], and so on. [Factors] that are connected to a particular [realm] have possession [belonging to] their own realm; [factors] that are not connected [to a realm] have four varieties [of possession]. [vs. 38a-b] [Factors] that [belong to those] neither in training nor beyond training have three varieties of possession, and [factors] that are not to be abandoned are held to have two varieties [of possession].” trasyadvikānāṁ trividhā subhādīnāṁ subhādātukā tadāptānām anāptānām caturvidhā. tridhā naśaṅkā 'ṣaṅkṣānam aheyānāṁ dvidhā matā. See also GAKB p. 79; SAKV p. 150.11ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 22c24ff.; PAKB 3 p. 181b23ff. See also ADV no. 132a–b p. 88.1ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 238d13ff.; P‘u-kuang 4 p. 87b26ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 537c13ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 319c10ff.; MVB 157 p. 797a8–9.

76 See AKB 2.38c–d p. 65.12ff.; infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 398c28ff. See the discussion of this issue, supra, introductory commentary, “Possession and Non-possession.”

77 As a general rule, the moral quality of the possession of conditioned factors is determined by the moral quality of the factor that is possessed. In the case of unconditioned factors, the moral quality of the possession of the cessation resulting from consideration is determined by the moral quality of the path by which that cessation is attained. The moral quality of the cessation not resulting from consideration is determined by the moral quality of the corporeal basis of the sentient being who experiences it. See MVB 157 p. 798b18–20; P‘u-kuang 4 p. 88a15ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 538a17ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 239a9ff.

78 Only conditioned factors are connected to a particular realm. Since the character of the possession of conditioned factors is determined by the character of the factors possessed, a factor connected to the realm of desire has possession belonging to the realm of desire, and so on. See MVB 157 p. 798b20ff.

79 The two categories of those factors connected (āpta) to a particular realm and those not connected (anāpta) to any realm are identical to the two categories of factors tending toward the fluxes (ānāśrava) and those not tending toward the fluxes (anāśrava). In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 22.36c–d p. 64.21–22; HTAKB 4 p. 23a3–4) Vasubandhu glosses anāpta in the verse with anāśrava in the bhāṣya; Hsüan-tsang, in translating Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra, uses only the term anāpta. There are only four factors not connected to any realm, or not tending toward the fluxes: that is, the three unconditioned factors and one conditioned factor, the truth of the path (mārgasatya). All remaining conditioned factors are connected to a particular realm. Since the truth of the path is a conditioned factor, the location of its possession is determined by its own location: that is, it is not connected to any realm. Possession not connected to any realm is then, itself; also a factor not tending toward the fluxes. See P‘u-kuang 4 p. 88a26ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 538b4ff.; SAKV p. 151.3ff.

80 See MVB 157 p. 798c14ff. The category of factors belonging to one in training (saṅkṣa) refers to those factors characteristic of a noble one at any stage from the first moment of the path of vision up to the stage of preparation for the fruit of arhatship (arhattvapratipannaka). One who has attained the knowledge of the destruction of
the fluxes (āśravaksayajñāna), and thus the fruit of arhatship (arhattvaphalastha), is beyond training; factors characteristic of that stage are also beyond training (asaikṣa). See MVB 144 p. 738a18ff., 148 p. 758a21ff.; AKB 6.45a–b p. 365.10ff.; SAKV p. 573.14ff. These two categories of factors belonging to one in training and factors belonging to one beyond training together constitute the truth of the path, also referred to as the noble path (āryamārga). See SAKV p. 151.21ff.

81 See MVB 157 p. 798c23ff. According to Vasubandhu (AKB 2.38a p. 65.3), factors belonging to those neither in training nor beyond training include factors tending toward the fluxes (sāravas) and the three unconditioned factors (asaṁskṛta): that is, all factors exclusive of the truth of the path. Instead of the term ‘factors tending toward the fluxes’ (sārava), Saṅghabhadra uses the term ‘all five appropriative aggregates’ (pañcopādānaskandha), which may be identified with factors tending toward the fluxes. See MVB 75 p. 386a11ff.; 75 p. 387a9ff., 157 p. 798c25–26.

82 The character of the possession of conditioned factors is determined by the character of the factor possessed. Factors belonging to one in the path of training or beyond training are conditioned and hence possess a corresponding character. Among the factors belonging to one neither in training nor beyond training, the five aggregates, as conditioned factors, have possession determined by their own nature: that is, as factors belonging to one neither in training nor beyond training. The possession of the cessation not resulting from consideration is determined by the corporeal basis (āśraya) of the sentient being who experiences it: that is, as neither in training nor beyond training. The possession of the cessation resulting from consideration is determined by the path through which it is realized; hence it is neither in training nor beyond training if realized by the non-noble path, in training if realized by the noble path of training, and beyond training if realized by the noble path beyond training. See P’u-kuang 4 p. 88b9ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 239b3ff.

83 See MVB 157 p. 799a1ff. Factors that are to be abandoned by either the path of vision or cultivation are conditioned, and hence the character of their possession is determined in accordance with their own character: that is to say, their possession is to be abandoned, respectively, by the path of vision or cultivation. The possession of cessation not resulting from consideration is to be abandoned by the path of cultivation. The possession of cessation not resulting from consideration is to be abandoned by the path of cultivation. The possession of the cessation resulting from consideration is determined by the path through which it is realized through the non-noble path to be abandoned by the path of cultivation, since the non-noble path belongs to the path of cultivation. See P’u-kuang 4 p. 88c2ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 538b25ff.

84 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 398c3ff.

85 See MVB 157 p. 797a22ff.

86 See AKB 2.38c–d p. 65.13ff.: “[vs. 38c–d] The possession of indeterminate [factors] arises simultaneously [with those factors], with the exception of [the possession of the two] supernormal powers and [the possession of] thoughts that create magically. [vs. 39a–b] [The possession] of obscured form also [arises simultaneously with it]. [The possession] of form within the realm of desire does not arise prior to [it].” avyākṛtāptih saha ābhijñānairmānṣākād rte. nivṛtasya ca rūpasya kāme rūpasya na ‘graja. See also GAKB p. 79; SAKV p. 162.8ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 23a20ff.; PAKB 3 p. 181c18ff.; ADV no. 132c–d p. 88.5ff.

87 Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 152.8) explains that unobscured, indeterminate factors are weak because they are not possessed of force that instigates action. anabhisaṁskāravattvād durbalatvam. See also AKB 4.7a p. 200.27–28; NAS 36 p. 545b22–24.

88 For the two supernormal powers, see SAKV p. 152.9; AKB 7.45a–b p. 423.10ff. Cf. MVB 195 p. 977a23ff. For thoughts that create magically, see MVB 135 p. 696b24ff.; AKB 7.49c–d p. 426.10ff.

89 See AKB 2.38d p. 65.18–19. tesāṁ hi balavattvātprayogaviseṣanispatteḥ. The translation follows SAKV p. 152.12–15 and Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 239b18–238c1).
The other Chinese commentators take "because they are strong" and "because they are accomplished by an extraordinary application" as two separate reasons. See Shen-t’ài 4 p. 320a8–9; P’u-kuang 4 p. 88c19–20; Fa-pao 4 p. 538c8–9.

The terms *airyāpathika* and *śailasthānika* refer to those mental factors, classified among the four non-material aggregates, that arise in conjunction with the modes of proper deportment and skill in the creative arts. See *MVB* 126 p. 660c29ff.; *AKB* 2.72 p. 106.5ff.; *SAKV* p. 242.24ff.

91 See *MVB* 157 p. 797b1ff. The phrase ‘exclusive with respect to time period and exclusive with respect to moment’ is explained as follows: “If a factor is in the past time period, its possession also belongs to the past time period, and so on.” Conversely, not being exclusive with respect to time period or moment means: “a factor in the past, present, or future time period has three kinds of possession.” Therefore, exclusivity with respect to time period indicates that the factor and its possession are restricted to the same time period. Exclusivity with respect to moment indicates that the factor and its possession are restricted to the same moment: that is, the possession of a given factor can only arise simultaneously with that factor. In the case of the modes of proper deportment or skill in the creative arts, since their possession is restricted, it can only occur in the same time period as the original factor, and it cannot arise prior to or subsequent to it. Exceptions are made when these skills or modes are practiced intensively. See Yuan-yü 9 p. 239c8–9.

92 See *MVB* 144 p. 740c1–2. Āśvajit was one of the five original disciples of the Buddha. He so impressed Śāriputra with his deportment in begging alms that Śāriputra inquired about the doctrine of his teacher, and as a result, went to study with the Buddha. See *Abhinirmbramanasūtra [Fo pen hsing-chi ching]* T 3 (190) p. 875c22ff.; *Vinayapitaka (Mahāvagga)*, Oldenberg (1879) 39ff. Cf. Akanuma ([1931] 1975) 60; Malalasekera ([1937–1938] 1983) 1: 222–225.


94 Among the three varieties of action—mental (*manaskarman*), corporeal (*kāyakarman*), and vocal (*vākkarman*)—the latter two, corporeal and vocal action, are of two types: manifest (*vijñapti*) and unmanifest (*avijñapti*). These are both considered varieties of form (*ṛūpa*). See *AKB* 4.1b ff. p. 192.10ff.; *SAKV* p. 345.9ff. All form (*ṛūpa*) is indeterminate with the exception of certain corporeal or vocal manifest actions (*kāyavāgavijñaptirūpa*), and all unmanifest actions (*avijñaptirūpa*). See *AKB* 1.29c–d p. 20.5–11; *SAKV* p. 60.5–9; *AKB* 1.30a p. 20.14–15; *SAKV* p. 60.23–25; *NAS* 4 p. 348b27ff.; *AKB* 4.7a–b p. 200.26ff.; *SAKV* p. 360.32ff.; *NAS* 36 p. 545b19ff.

95 The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*MVB* 2.39b p. 65.28; cf. *PAKB* 3 p. 182a2ff.) qualifies the varieties of form that lack prior possession as “manifest and unmanifest” (*vijñaptavijñapti*), while Huśian-tsang (HTAKB 4 p. 23b5; *NAS* 12 p. 399a14) uses the phrase “virtuous and unvirtuous” (*kusāliikkusāla*). Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 152.28ff.) glosses the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* with the phrase “virtuous and unvirtuous, manifest and unmanifest form [or action]” (*kusāliikkusālasya vijñaptavijñaptirūpa*...). The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 157 p. 797a28ff.) also clearly indicates that this restriction of manifest and unmanifest applies to virtuous and unvirtuous form.

96 See *MVB* 157 p. 797a28ff. Yuan-yü (Yuan-yü 9 p. 239d3ff.) explains: "Because both manifest and unmanifest virtuous and unvirtuous within the realm of desire are determinate [as virtuous or unvirtuous], they have possession that arises subsequent to it; because they are not associated with thought, they lack prior possession. One should know that the four aggregates that are unvirtuous, the virtuous four aggregates connected to the realm of desire and the formless realm, the virtuous five aggregates
13. Possession and Non-possession

Connected to the realm of form, and the four aggregates or five aggregates not tending toward the fluxes all have possession belonging to the three time periods.

97 AKB 2.39c-40 p. 66.1ff.: "[VS. 39c–d] Non-possession is undefiled and indeterminate. Past and future [factors] have three varieties of non-possession. [VS. 40] [Factors] that are connected to the three realms and [those] that are not connected to any realm also [have three varieties of non-possession]. It is held that the non-possession of the noble path is the nature of an ordinary person. [Non-possession of a factor] is discarded by possession of that [factor] and by passing to another stage." aklisťavyākṛtā 'prāptih sā 'hitājūtayos tridhā. kāmādyāpiśāmalānām ca mārgasyā 'prāptir iṣyate prthagjanatvam tatprāptihūsamcārād vihiyate. See also GAKB p. 79; SAKV p. 153.3ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 23a20ff.; FAKB 3 p. 182a5ff. Like possession, the character of non-possession is discriminated from various perspectives: (1) moral quality, (2) time period, (3) the realm to which it is connected, (4) its relation to the practice of the path—that is, its character as belonging to one in training, beyond training, or to one neither in training nor beyond training, and (5) the specific path by which it is to be abandoned. In general, the character of non-possession is not determined by the character of the particular factor that is not possessed, because non-possession and the particular factor with regard to which it operates are contradictory. Nor is the character of the non-possession of cessation resulting from consideration determined by the path through which that cessation is attained, because its non-possession is not attained by that path. Rather, the character of non-possession is determined by the corporeal basis of rebirth (upapattiyāśraya) or, where there is no corporeal basis, by the vitality and the homogeneous character of the sentient being who experiences it. See MVB 158 p. 801a13ff. This verse does not mention the two modes of discriminating non-possession according to its relation to the practice of the path and the specific path by which it is to be abandoned. However, since non-possession is unobscured and indeterminate, it is not included among the factors belonging to one either in training or beyond training, which are only virtuous; thus, it is grouped with those factors belonging to one neither in training nor beyond training. Further, since non-possession is unobscured and indeterminate, it is to be abandoned by the path of cultivation; all factors that are to be abandoned by the path of vision are defiled. See MVB 45 p. 233c23–24. See also MVB 157 p. 799a21ff.; Yün-yü 9 p. 239d8ff.; P'u-kuang 4 p. 89c1ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 539c6ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 321d6ff.

98 See MVB 157 p. 799a24. Unlike possession, the moral quality of non-possession is not determined by the factors to which it is applied, but rather by the corporeal basis or by the vitality and homogeneous character of the sentient being to whom it belongs. If the moral quality of non-possession were determined by the factor to which it is applied, the non-possession of a defilement would itself be defiled; non-possession of a virtuous factor would itself be virtuous, and so on. See MVB 157 p. 799c22ff., 158 p. 801a19ff.; SAKV p. 153.3ff.

99 See MVB 157 p. 799a22–24. If a factor is present, there is also present accompaniment of that factor. Since it is impossible for non-possession (or non-accompaniment) and possession (or accompaniment) to operate on the same factor simultaneously, there can be no present non-accompaniment of a present factor.

100 Since the character of non-possession is not determined by the factor to which it is applied, but rather by the corporeal basis or by the vitality and homogeneous character of the sentient being to whom it belongs, the realm to which non-possession is connected is determined by the region or realm of the sentient being whom it characterizes. See MVB 157 p. 799a25; SAKV p. 153.14ff.; Yün-yü 9 p. 240a8ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 539c28ff.; P'u-kuang 4 p. 90c2ff.

101 From this statement, the following points are also clear: (1) non-possession belongs among those factors not characteristic of one in or beyond training, since all such factors are not tending toward the fluxes; and (2) non-possession is to be abandoned...
and that abandonment occurs through the path of cultivation, since non-possession is indeterminate. See *MVB* 157 p. 799a25–27; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 322a1ff.

102 *JP* (1544) 2 p. 928c5ff.; *MVB* 45 p. 232b9ff.: “What is the nature of an ordinary person? The nature of an ordinary person is the present, past, and future non-possession of noble factors, noble heat, noble views, noble patience, and noble insight;” cf. *AKB* 2.40c p. 66.11 _prthagajanatvam katemat. āryadharmānām alābha iti śāstrapāthah_. For various interpretations of this quotation from the *Jāntraprasthāna*, see *MVB* 45 p. 232c15ff. Thus, the non-possession of factors not tending toward the fluxes is not, itself, a factor not tending toward the fluxes; it is, instead, the nature of an ordinary person.

103 Cf. *AKB* 2.40c p. 66.12ff.; *SAKV* p. 153.30ff. See also Yūan-yü 9 p. 241a18ff.; P'u-kuang 4 p. 90c10ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 322a6ff. Fa-pao 4 p. 540a6ff.; Kaidō 4 p. 96c20ff. The structure of this argument closely follows the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 45 p. 232b11ff.). For other interpretations of the nature of an ordinary person, see *MVB* 45 p. 231b21ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 147a3ff.

104 The presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering marks the first stage of the path of vision. See *MVB* 158 p. 802a18ff.; see also *Puggalapaññatti* 1.9–10 pp. 12–13.

105 The opponent's objection arises from ambiguity in the phrase 'non-acquisition of all [factors]' (sarvesām alābhah). If the nature of an ordinary person were understood to be the “non-acquisition of all noble factors as a whole,” then one could understand its contrary, the “acquisition of all noble factors,” to be the nature of a noble one. However, if this were so, even the Buddha Śākyamuni who does not have accompaniment of those factors characteristic of a Śrāvaka or of a pratyekabuddha, which are also noble factors, would not be a noble one. Thus, this phrase ‘the non-acquisition of all noble factors' must be understood as “the non-acquisition of any noble factor;” one thus becomes a noble one through the possession of even one noble factor. See *MVB* 45 p. 232b29ff., 45 p. 232b29ff.

106 Here, both the Taishō and the Chi-sha editions of the *Nyāyānusāra* (*NAS* 12 p. 399b6; *NAS-Chi-sha* 398 p. 14b23) use the term _tsa_, 'mixed.' See also Yūan-yü 9 p. 240b14ff.; cf. Shen-t'ai 4 p. 322a17ff.; *AKB* 2.40c p. 66.15; *HTAKB* 4 p. 23b23ff. Hsūan-tsang's translation of Saṅghabhadra's *Abhidharmasamayaprādīpikā* (*ASPS* 7 p. 805a14), however, uses the term _li_, 'to leave,' or 'apart from.' The English translation offered here follows the reading of the *Abhidharmasamayaprādīpikā*. See also infra, translation, *NAS* 12 p. 401a27.

107 This statement serves as a response to the following objection. When one first attains presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering, one enters the path of vision. Upon completing the path of vision, one realizes the stage of the first fruit, or the realization of the fruit of the stream-enterer within the path of cultivation. At this point, one discards the path of vision and the initial presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering. Thus, if the nature of an ordinary person were defined as the non-acquisition of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering, one would become a noble one when it is acquired in the first moment of the path of vision. However, when it is discarded upon entering the path of cultivation, one should again become an ordinary person. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* offers several responses to this objection. Once the non-possession that constitutes the nature of an ordinary person is abandoned through the initial acquisition of a noble factor, it is not re-acquired when that particular noble factor is lost; consequently, the initial non-possession of the noble factors, once damaged, can never arise again. See *MVB* 45 p. 232b12–15, p. 232b19ff., p. 232c9ff. According to Yūan-yü (Yūan-yü 9 p. 240b17ff.), after acquiring a noble factor, the corporeal basis (_āśraya_) changes to that of a noble one. Re-acquisition of the nature of an ordinary person is, thus, impossible.
This interpretation is similar to Vasubandhu’s explanation of the distinction between an ordinary person and a noble one as consisting of a transmutation of the corporeal basis (āsrayaparāvṛtti) through the power of the noble path such that seeds of defilements no longer have the capability of sprouting. See AKB 2.36d p. 63.21ff. See also P’u-kuang 4 p. 91b3ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 321b4ff.

108 See AKB 2.40c p. 66.20: “The stream that has not yet produced noble factors is the nature of an ordinary person.” anutpānna-rādhaṃsa-ārtiḥ prthagjanatvam iti. See SAKV p. 154.28–31.

109 At this point in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, Vasubandhu does not explicitly state that the nature of an ordinary person lacks existence as a real entity. It is implied, however, in the preceding statement. There the nature of an ordinary person is defined as a stream, which, as a composite entity, cannot be real. In the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (AKB 2.40c p. 66.19–20), this definition of the nature of an ordinary person as a stream is attributed to the Sautrantikas. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 45 p. 231b26–29), a theory denying the existence of the nature of an ordinary person as a real entity is attributed to the Dārśāntikas.

110 Though this statement is not found in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and is not explicitly attributed to Vasubandhu in the *Nyāyānusāra, it is consistent with Vasubandhu’s explanation of the distinction between a noble one and an ordinary person: that is, as resulting from a transmutation of the corporeal basis (āsrayaparāvṛtti). Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 154.29) identifies this stream as a stream of aggregates (skandha-ārthiḥ).

111 The translation of this passage depends on the interpretation of Yuan-yü (Yuan-yü 9 p. 240c18ff.). One acquires a single noble factor and becomes a noble one (that is, a non-ordinary person) in one moment. The state of the ordinary person, as the opposite of this state of the non-ordinary person, should also then be determined by a factor found in one moment. However, the opponent here has defined the nature of an ordinary person as a stream. Therefore, the nature of an ordinary and non-ordinary person, though contraries, are not analogous. One might claim that in the case of some factors such as form, one moment is actually equivalent to a stream. In a similar fashion, the stream of the eyes, and so on, that constitutes an ordinary person could be considered to be one moment. However, since a stream is a provisional entity, such a moment-stream also would exist only provisionally and hence would not be real. This would then contradict Vasubandhu’s position that a moment—specifically the present moment—alone is real.

112 A similar sūtra passage is cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 45 p. 232a26–27). See SA 3 no. 61 p. 16a6, 31 no. 892 p. 224b28; cf. SN 25.1 Cakkhusutta 3: 225. Those practicing the various paths of practice are divided into two categories: (1) those who rely on faith in the testimony of others (śraddhānusārīn) and (2) those who rely on their own understanding of the doctrine (dhammānusārīn). See MVB 54 p. 278a8ff.; 109 p. 562a25ff.; AKB 6.29 p. 353.12ff.; Puggalapaññatti 1.35–36 p. 15, 7.2 p. 72, 9.1 p. 74. The stage of niyamavakranti corresponds to the first stage of the path of vision: the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering. From this point on, the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured and rebirth as an ordinary person becomes impossible. In that sense, one could be said to have surpassed the stage of being an ordinary person. See MVB 3 p. 13a2ff.; AKB 6.26a p. 350.5ff.; SAKV p. 541.18ff.

113 The fact that the term ‘stage of being an ordinary person,’ here identified with the “nature of an ordinary person,” is mentioned in the sūtra proves by scriptural authority that the “nature of an ordinary person” exists separately as a real entity. Thus, Vasubandhu, in denying that it is a real entity, contradicts the sūtra.

114 Cf. infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400a1ff. In the *Abhidhammasamayapradipikā (ASPS 7 p. 805a23), Saṅghabhadra explicates this sentence in the context of the pre-
viously quoted sūtra passage concerning the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured: "Because one acquires a certain factor, one is referred to as 'entering.' Because one should discard another factor, one is referred to as 'surpassing.'” See also AHS-D 4 p. 831a29ff.; SAHS 9 p. 943c7ff. Note also the following corresponding passage from the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 3 p. 12a13ff.): “Such moments of thought and thought concomitants are contiguous conditions. One discards the nature of an ordinary person and acquires the nature of a noble one; one discards the incorrect nature and acquires the correct nature. Since one becomes able to enter the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured (niyāmavakrānti), it is referred to as the stage of highest mundane existence (laukikāgradharma).” See also MVB 2 p. 6b9–15, p. 7a2ff. For a description of gradual progress along the religious path through sequential stages of discarding the non-possession of certain factors and acquiring the possession of other factors, see MVB 54 p. 278b17ff.; 63 p. 324b9ff.; 94 p. 484a28ff.; 155 p. 789a6ff.; 170 p. 859a17ff. In commenting on this passage, Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 240d14ff.) cites two sūtra passages, which could not be located. The first explains that one discards the nature of an ordinary person and acquires the nature of a noble one in the stage of highest mundane existence (laukikāgradharma). The second passage suggests that the possession of the accompaniment of the nature of an ordinary person ceases together with the stage of highest mundane existence, and the possession of the accompaniment of the non-possession of the nature of an ordinary person is produced together with the stage of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering. See also AAŚ hsa p. 987b15–16 for a reference in the sūtras to discarding and acquiring the nature of an ordinary person in rebirth.

115 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 241a1ff. Sarighbadra objects that the opponent’s interpretation of the nature of an ordinary person as the stream of the eyes, and so on, does not allow for both discarding and acquiring at the moment of becoming a noble person. That is to say, when one becomes a noble one through the acquisition of noble factors nothing would be discarded, since the eyes, and so on, that constitute the stream identified with the nature of the ordinary person would remain the same as they were in one's state as an ordinary person. Cf. MVB 45 p. 233c27ff.

116 For discussions of the six internal and six external varieties of bonds (samyojana) associated with the twelve sense spheres and of the process through which they are severed, see MA 24 no. 98 p. 584a14ff.; MN no. 10 Satipatthānasutta 1: 61; DS 6 p. 478c14ff.; VK 1 p. 533a4ff.; JP (1544) 19 p. 1023c6ff.; esp. MVB 190 p. 951c13ff.

117 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 241a5–7. One first overcomes rebirth in a bad rebirth state in the preparatory stage of presentiment (kṣaṇti), which is the third of four stages of penetration (nirvedhābhāṣṭya) prior to the first moment of the path of vision. This stage of presentiment immediately precedes the fourth and last preparatory stage of penetration called the highest mundane existence (laukikāgradharma) from which one enters the path of vision. Since one is still an ordinary person when one overcomes rebirth in a bad rebirth state in this preparatory stage of presentiment, the possibility of rebirth in a bad rebirth state cannot be equated with the nature of an ordinary person. See AKB 6.23b p. 348.4ff.; MVB 7 p. 34a8ff., 32 p. 165a20–21, 32 p. 165b4ff., 68 p. 352a11–12, 120 p. 625b21ff.; Sakurabe (1979) 298.

118 The opponent cannot attempt to defend the definition of the nature of an ordinary person as "the stream of the eyes, and so on," by claiming that surpassing the stream of the eyes in the first moment of the path of vision is analogous to surpassing defilements associated with the eyes upon attaining the fruit of arhatship. Whereas upon attaining the fruit of arhatship bonds connected with the eyes are severed, this is not the case upon attaining the first moment of the path of vision, in which one can, even though a noble one, remain bound by all bonds. For defilements associated with the five varieties of perceptual consciousness, of sense organs, and so on, see MVB 56 p.288c2ff.
According to Yiian-yü (Yiian-yü 9 p. 241b1ff.), in this argument, the noble one who is not yet free from passion (av'ftaraga) refers to one in the stage of the realization of the fruit of the stream-enterer (srotaṇapattiphalas-tha). The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 134 p. 693c19–21) suggests that either a stream-enterer or a once-returner (sakrādāgāmin) may be one who is not yet free from passion, but it does not explicitly identify the stage at which one becomes one who is free from passion. Cf. Puggalapāṇahiiti 1.47 p. 17; YBS 10 p. 377c10ff. Though one first attains the cessation of bad rebirth states in the preparatory stage of presentiment prior to entering the path of vision, one is said to have overcome bad rebirth states absolutely as a stream-enterer, because there is no retrogression from that stage. See AKB 6.34a–b p. 353.27ff.; SAKV p. 554.5ff.; MVB 125 p. 652b24ff., p. 652c16ff. For various interpretations of how one surpasses bad rebirth states, see MVB 120 p. 625b24ff.

The opponent suggests that, like the stream-enterer who surpasses bad rebirth states without becoming free from defilements, the ordinary person can be said to surpass the eyes without surpassing the defilements associated with the eyes. Saṅghābhādra responds that the two cases are not analogous because it cannot be said that an ordinary person who has entered the path of vision and has become a noble one has “no force instigating, no proceeding of, and no operation of” the eyes, and so on. Therefore, it cannot be said that one surpasses the eyes upon entering the path of vision.

For a discussion of homogeneous character (saṭhabhāgata), see infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400a16ff.

For these interpretations of the content of this insight, and so on, see Yiian-yü 9 p. 241c2ff.

For a discussion of homogeneous character (saṭhabhāgata), see infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400a16ff.

According to Buddhist cosmography, the Uttarakuru is the northern continent among the four continents (dvapā) that surround Mt. Meru, the massive mountain forming the central point of the world. See MVB 113 p. 585b5ff.; AKB 3.55d p. 162.5ff. This particular list of factors belonging to an ordinary person appears in the Prakaraṇaṇapāda (PP (1542) 6 p. 716a16–18) and is cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 45 p. 231b29ff.).

For a list of distinctions between the “nature of an ordinary person” and the “factors of an ordinary person,” see MVB 45 p. 232a12ff. The “nature of an ordinary person,” as a dissociated factor, is not of the category of form, not seen, without resistance, dissociated from thought, without basis, without support, without aspect, undefiled, not a matured effect, and so on. On the contrary, the various “factors of an ordinary person” can have all of these characteristics.

According to Yiian-yü (Yiian-yü 9 p. 241b1ff.), in this argument, the noble one who is not yet free from passion (av'ftaraga) refers to one in the stage of the realization of the fruit of the stream-enterer (srotaṇapattiphalas-tha). The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 134 p. 693c19–21) suggests that either a stream-enterer or a once-returner (sakrādāgāmin) may be one who is not yet free from passion, but it does not explicitly identify the stage at which one becomes one who is free from passion. Cf. Puggalapāṇahiiti 1.47 p. 17; YBS 10 p. 377c10ff. Though one first attains the cessation of bad rebirth states in the preparatory stage of presentiment prior to entering the path of vision, one is said to have overcome bad rebirth states absolutely as a stream-enterer, because there is no retrogression from that stage. See AKB 6.34a–b p. 353.27ff.; SAKV p. 554.5ff.; MVB 125 p. 652b24ff., p. 652c16ff. For various interpretations of how one surpasses bad rebirth states, see MVB 120 p. 625b24ff.

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13. Notes

129 For the translation of this passage, see Yüan-yü 9 p. 241c11–13. Cf. infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 400b4ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 45 p. 235a4ff.) attributes to Ghōṣaka this opinion that the nature of an ordinary person is merely the homogeneous character of an ordinary person.

130 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 241c14ff. See also MVB 45 p. 232a22: "The nature of an ordinary person is the cause, the factors of an ordinary person are the effect."

131 See MVB 20 p. 102c10ff., 131 p. 682b17ff.

132 See infra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399b16ff.

133 See AKB 2.40d p. 66.21ff.; SAKV p. 154.32ff.; HTAKB 4 p. 23c3ff.; PAKB 3 p. 182a27ff.

134 Since the non-possession and possession of the same factor are contradictory and cannot operate simultaneously in the life-stream of the same sentient being, the non-possession of a given factor is discarded with the arising of the acquisition (or possession) of that factor. In certain cases, all varieties of non-possession that might pertain to factors of a particular category are discarded with the acquisition of a factor of that category. For example, in the case of the non-possession of noble factors (or the nature of an ordinary person), with the acquisition of the first noble factor, all categories of the nature of an ordinary person—that is, the nature of an ordinary person belonging to all realms—are discarded. However, in the case of most factors, their non-possession must be discarded individually. See MVB 45 p. 233c25ff.; SAKV p. 155.12ff.

135 Passing to another stage is effective in discarding non-possession, because the character of non-possession is determined by the corporeal basis of the sentient being in whose life-stream it operates. Therefore, if one passes to another stage, all factors that depend upon the corporeal basis of the former stage are discarded, and those dependent upon the corporeal basis of the new stage arise. See also P'ú-kuang 4 p. 91c10ff.; Pa-pao 4 p. 540b20ff.; Shen-t'ai 4 p. 322c8ff.

136 Since the character of non-possession is determined by the character of the corporeal basis of the sentient being in whose life-stream it operates, and not by the factor to which it is applied, the nature of an ordinary person, itself a variety of non-possession, is connected to the particular realm to which that ordinary person belongs. Therefore, there can be three varieties of the nature of an ordinary person: that is, one characterizing ordinary persons in each of the three realms. The problem then arises of which one of these three natures of an ordinary person (or non-possessions) is discarded when one enters the path of vision. Since non-possession as a class can be discarded through the possession of a single factor, the nature of an ordinary person in all three realms can be discarded as a class through the possession of a single noble factor; this non-possession—that is, the nature of an ordinary person—is then discarded generically. See MVB 45 p. 233c27ff.

137 The stage of the adamantine concentration is the stage in which the ninth and final category of defilements—those associated with the summit of existence (*bhavāgra)—are abandoned. As a result, all defilements are finally and completely eradicated, the knowledge of the destruction of all defilements, or of the fluxes (*kṣayaṛāṇa), arises, and one attains the fruit of arhatship. See AKB 6.44b–45a p. 364.14ff.; SAKV p. 568.31ff.; MVB 36 p. 189c16ff., 64 p. 332c19–20, 155 p. 721a4ff.

138 Among the six varieties of arhats, the first five are referred to as having realized liberation limited by the occasion (*samayavimuktī) because their liberation is unstable or the period of their liberation is limited; that is to say, they are subject to possible retrogression (*parihāri). The sixth variety, or the unshakable arhat (*akopyadharman), is referred to as having realized liberation not limited by the occasion (*asamayavimuktī) because the liberation realized is not dependent upon any circumstances or because there is no retrogression from this stage. See MVB 101 p. 522c26ff.; AKB 6.56–57 p. 372.16ff.; SAKV p. 582.30ff.
The non-possession of a given factor is discarded through a two stage process. First, the possession of that non-possession is severed, and then a new non-possession of that prior non-possession is produced. The discarding of non-possession must occur over two moments because a given factor (in this case, non-possession) and its own non-possession cannot operate in the same moment. Therefore, the non-possession of that original non-possession can only arise in a subsequent moment. See AKB 2.40d p. 66.24–25. vihīyata iti tasyā aprāpter aprāptir utpadyate prāptīḥ chidyate. See also Yūn-yū 9 p. 242a4ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 91c19ff.; Shen-t’ai 4 p. 322c15; Fujaku 4 p. 149a14ff.

This statement assumes the following objection. If you explain discarding the non-possession of a factor through the discarding or the non-possession of the possession of that non-possession, or through the production or possession of the non-possession of that non-possession, each of these possessions and non-possessions would have other possessions and non-possessions ad infinitum. In other words, as discrete factors, each of these possessions and non-possessions can only be associated with or dissociated from the life-stream of a given sentient being through other possessions and non-possessions, these others through still others, and so on. See AKB 2.40d p. 66.25ff.; SAKV p. 156.3ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 91c28ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 149b3ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 242a12ff.

A given factor arises together with two other factors: its possession (prāpti) and a secondary possession (anuprāpti) of that primary possession. As discrete factors, both this primary possession and the secondary possession of possession must each be possessed. However, the primary possession and the secondary possession of that primary possession operate on one another: the primary possession operates on both the original factor and the secondary possession; the secondary possession operates only on the primary possession. Therefore, no further tertiary possession is required, and there is no fault of infinite regress. See MVB 158 p. 801a26; AKB 2.40d p. 66.27ff.; SAKV p. 156.3ff.; P’u-kuang 4 p. 92a9ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 540b26ff. However, as Vasubandhu points out (AKB 2.40d p. 673ff.; SAKV p. 156.8ff.), this theory that factors, both as present and as past, are connected to a given life-stream in each moment by primary and secondary possessions leads to an explosion in the number of possessions required to account for each event: see supra, introductory commentary, “Possession and Non-possession,” note 61.

Since the non-possession of a particular factor can never arise together with that factor, there is no possibility of a simultaneous secondary “non-possession of non-possession” analogous to the simultaneous secondary “possession of possession.” In this case, the non-possession of the original non-possession cannot arise together with it, but rather arises only in the subsequent moment. Whereas possession has prior, subsequent, and simultaneous possessions, non-possession lacks simultaneous non-possession and has only prior and subsequent non-possessions. Therefore, there is no fault of infinite regress. See MVB 157 p. 799a21–24; P’u-kuang 4 p. 92a3ff.; Fa-pao 4 p. 540c1ff.
Chapter 14

[Homogeneous Character]

Thus, we have finished discussing the [400a15] characteristics of possession and non-possession. What is homogeneous character? The verse states:

[vs. 41a] Homogeneous character (sabhāgatā) is the uniformity of sentient beings (sattvasāmya).1

[Commentary:] There is a discrete real entity (dravya) referred to as homogeneous character; it is the mutual similarity (sādṛṣya) of sentient beings. In the śāstra it is given the name ‘homogeneous character of the group’ (nikāyasabhāga).2

14.1 [Homogeneous Character—Activity]

The homogeneous character of the group refers to the cause (kāraṇa) of the mutual similarity (sabhāgya) of the body (sārīra), the appearance (sāṁsthāna), the various controlling faculties (indriya), the modes of behavior (cēṣṭā), the sustenance (āhāra), and so on, [400a20] or to the cause of the mutually similar aspirations (abhisamānta) of the various categories of sentient beings born in the same rebirth state.3

[It would be unreasonable to object that the body, and so on, is the effect of previous action alone, leaving homogeneous character with no activity.] [For example,] just as [the attainment of] subtle form (rupaprastāda), has [previous] action, the [present] moment of thought, and the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta) as its [three] causes,4 [in the same way] the body, the appearance, and so on, [of sentient beings within the
same category] do not have only [previous] action as their cause. Even though it is observed that the body and appearance are effects projected by [previous] similar action, since there are [also] distinctions among the controlling faculties, modes of behavior, sustenance, and so on, [one should acknowledge that these distinctions are caused by homogeneous character]. It is untenable to claim that these distinctions [in the controlling faculties, and so on] result from distinctions in actions that have a specific fleshing effect (paripūraka), or that the body and appearance originate only from similar actions that have a generic skeletal effect (ākṣepaka). [400a25]

There are distinctions in the modes of behavior, and so on, because there are distinctions in the homogeneous character of the group. If the body and appearance, and so on, were the effects of action alone, one would be unable to engage freely in modes of behavior such as discontinuing [one action] and performing [another action]. [Therefore, one knows that there exists a real entity, homogeneous character, to which this activity as the cause of similarities and differences in the body, and so on, among sentient beings within the same category can be attributed.]

14.2 [The Name ‘Homogeneous Character’]

[In accordance with the above interpretation, the first element] sa, [or ‘homogeneous,’ of the compound sabhāgatā] indicates the “mutual similarity” of the body, the appearance, the modes of behavior and the aspirations [of sentient beings]. [The second element] bhāga, [or ‘part,’] has the meaning of “cause.” There exists a discrete real entity that is the “cause of this mutual similarity;” thus, [the two elements are combined as a dependent determinative compound (tatpuruṣa),] which we refer to as “homogeneous character.”

14.3 [Homogeneous Character—Range]

The Lord applied homogeneous character only to sentient beings, and not to [insentient objects such as] grass and trees. [400b1] Accordingly, the sūtra states: “The homogeneous character of these gods, the homogeneous character of these human beings,” and so on, as is presented in detail (iti vistaraḥ). There are innumerable varieties of homogeneous character of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgatā) in accordance with distinctions in realm (dhātu), rebirth state (gati), mode of birth (yoni), region (bhūmi), body, and so on.
Further, there is homogeneous character [also] of the factors (dharma-sabhāgatā) [included among those factors constituting sentient beings]: that is, in accordance with the aggregate (skandha), sense sphere (āyatana), and element (dhātu) [classifications].

14.4 [Discarding Homogeneous Character]

[Each type of homogeneous character is discarded when one enters a state contradictory to it.] [For example,] the homogeneous character of an ordinary person is discarded when one enters the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured (niyāmāvakṛanti): [that is, the first stage of the path of vision]. [Or,] the homogeneous character of a sentient being is discarded when one enters nirvāṇa.

14.5 [Objections to Saṅghabhadra’s Interpretation]

[Objection—I—Homogeneous Character Is the Nature of an Ordinary Person]

[V] Isn’t the nature of an ordinary person (prthagjanatva) precisely this homogeneous character of an ordinary person, [and not a variety of non-possession as you maintained previously]?12

[S] [400b5] This is untenable because the activity [of the nature of an ordinary person] differs from that of [the homogeneous character of an ordinary person]. That is to say, the cause of the mutual similarity of the bodies, the appearances, the modes of behavior, and the aspirations [of ordinary persons] is referred to as homogeneous character. [By contrast,] the cause of the state of being an ordinary person, which cause is opposed to the accompaniment of the noble path, is referred to as the nature of an ordinary person. Further, when one enters the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured, one both discards and acquires homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga): [that is, one discards the homogeneous character of an ordinary person and acquires the homogeneous character of a noble one]. [By contrast, at that time] one discards the nature of an ordinary person, and yet does not acquire [another nature of an ordinary person].13
[Objection—II—Its Activity Cannot Be Known]

[V] Since homogeneous character has no form (arūpin), [it cannot be known by direct perception]. How can one know that it has the activity of being able to produce undifferentiated categories of things [such as the body, appearance, and so on]?

[S] One knows that [homogeneous character] has that [activity], because one observes its effect. [400b10] [Thus, the activity of homogeneous character is proven through inference,] just as one knows that there was an action performed in a former life, because one observes a present effect attained through action. [The activity of homogeneous character is also proven through direct perception] because a yogic practitioner knows it through direct perception.

[Objection—III—Homogeneous Character of Insentient Objects]

[V] Why don’t you allow that there is homogeneous character of insentient objects, [since they are also characterized by similarity]?

[S] We should not be criticized in this way, [for by raising this objection to our interpretation you incur] a categorical fault (atiprasāṅga) [in your own position]. Since you also allow that, [for sentient beings,] there are the rebirth states of human beings, gods, and so on, and modes of birth by the womb, egg, and so on, why do [you] not likewise allow [for insentient objects] the “rebirth state of a mango,” and so on, and modes of birth by the “lentil” or “bean,” and so on?

[Further,] since the Lord never expounded [the homogeneous character of insentient objects, we know that it is not to be applied to them]. We must consider carefully why the Lord stated that only sentient beings [400b15] have homogeneous character, and not grass, and so on. Further, how does one know that such homogeneous character exists separately as a real entity?

Now, we have understood [the Lord’s intention] in this way. [First, the Lord] did not state that grass, and so on, has a homogeneous character, because it is without the mutually respective similarity in modes of behavior and aspirations [characteristic of sentient beings]. [Second,] because grass, and so on, is inevitably produced only so long as it has sentient beings
as its cause, it is claimed that there is homogeneous character only with regard to sentient beings.\textsuperscript{14} [Third, homogeneous character] is produced with actions from a previous life or effort (prayatna) in the present life as its cause. Since grass, and so on, \textsuperscript{400b20} has neither of these two causes—[neither action nor effort]—it is without homogeneous character. It is precisely through the existence of these two causes that the existence [of homogeneous character] as a real entity is proven.\textsuperscript{15} [Fourth,] even though images that are wooden, plain, lacquered, carved, and painted and their actual model have mutual similarity of form and appearance, it is said that one [of them—that is, the actual model]—is real. [The actual model] is not said to be real only on the basis of the observed similarity [between the model and the image]. [If this were so, the image, as similar, also would be referred to as real.] The word ‘real’ arises only with regard to a category of objects that are similar and yet distinguished. As a result, one discerns that the distinguished factor really exists, and the word ‘real’ arises on the basis of that factor.\textsuperscript{16} [Fifth,] due to previous statements, \textsuperscript{400b25} [it is known that homogeneous character is a discrete real entity]. What was stated previously? Namely, it was stated that “even though it is observed that the body and appearance are effects projected by [previous] similar action, since there are [also] distinctions among the controlling faculties, the modes of behavior, sustenance, and so on, [one should acknowledge that these distinctions are caused by homogeneous character].”\textsuperscript{17} [Homogeneous character should be recognized to exist as a discrete real entity, precisely because it is acknowledged to perform this activity of distinguishing sentient beings.]

[Objection—IV—Homogeneous Character in General]

[V] [Since these various types of] homogeneous character are distinguished from one another (anyonyabhinna), how could one give rise to a notion (buddhi) and a provisional designation (prajñāpī) of homogeneous character in general (abheneda), without yet [another] homogeneous character [that provides a basis for this general homogeneous character]?\textsuperscript{18}

[S] The various types of homogeneous character are [all,] by nature, causes of similarity among things in the same category. [This function] is precisely the cause for [our] notion and provisional designation of their mutual similarity as constituting the same category. It is like the case of the visual sense organ, auditory sense organ, and so on, \textsuperscript{400c1} which are only established in their nature as form because they are creations of the [four] fundamental material elements. Even though these fundamental material
elements are not creations of [yet] other fundamental material elements, [since they act as causes in producing form] their own nature as form is established.

[Objection—V—Confusion with Vaiśeṣika Categories]

This [homogeneous character] would seem to be the category of generality (sāmānyapadārtha) or the category of particular generality (sāmānyaviśeṣapadārtha) maintained by the Vaiśeṣika school.

[S] If the Vaiśeṣika school maintained that these two categories [of generality and of particular generalities] were not singular, were momentary and impermanent, were without support, and were distinguished [from the object to which they apply], we could accept their opinion and suffer no categorical fault (atiprasāṅga). The Buddha did not reject the view that the visual sense organ is able to operate with form [as its object] and suggest other interpretations, simply because the Vaiśeṣika school maintain [that view]. Therefore, this objection represents mere partisan bias; those who seek the correct principle should not heed it.

Notes

1 See AKB 2.41a p. 67.13ff.: "[vs. 41a] Homogeneous character is the uniformity of sentient beings." sābhāgata sattvasāmyam. See also GAKB p. (1946) 79; SAKV p. 157.3ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 247ff.; PAKB 3 p. 182b20ff.; ADV no. 134a–b p. 89.1ff.

2 PP (1542) 1 p. 694a23–24; *Pañcavastu [Sa-p'o-to-tsung vu shih lun] T 28 (1556) p. 997c23–24; JP (1544) 1 p. 921c25; MVB 27 p. 138a9ff. Cf. SAKV p. 157.9ff.: "In the Jñānapraśṭhāṇa, and so on, this dissociated factor is referred to by the name 'homogeneous character of the group' (nikāyasabhāga). But here, due to conformity with the composition in verse, it is referred to by the name 'homogeneous character' (sābhāgata)—this is the intention." Jñānapraśṭhāṇikādika śāstre nīkāyasabhāga iti anayā sāmyāyā ayaṁ citta-viprayukto nirdīṣyate. iha tu sloka-bandhānu-gunyāḥ sābhāgata 'ti anayā sāmyāya 'ty abhiprāya. The compound 'homogeneous character of the group' (nikāyasabhāga) is subject to several interpretations. For example: (1) many similarities (*nikāya-samāna) and distinctions (*bhāga); (2) the cause of similarity (*sabhāga) among many factors or entities (*nikāya), or among many sentient beings (*nikāya): P'u-kuang 5 p. 93a2ff.; Yiian-yü 9 p. 242c2ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 97b24ff. Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 97b27) suggests that Saṅghabhadra and the Abhidharmavatārasāstra rely upon the sense of sabhāga as cause, whereas the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AAŚ hsia p. 987b7) relies upon the sense of similarity.

3 Quoted in SAKV p. 159.9–11: śaṅvrendriyaśanāsthānaṃ cetāhāraṇidīsabhāgyakāra-nām anyonyābhir abhisambandhanimittaṁ ca sābhāgata 'ti ācāryasaṅgahahadraḥ. Saṅghabhadra's definition of homogeneous character resembles that given in the Abhidharmavatārasāstra (AAŚ hsia p. 987b4ff.). Cf. Yiian-yü 9 p. 242c4ff. The *Saṁ-
14. Notes

yuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra (SAHS 9 p. 843a16ff.) enumerates six varieties of similarity: realm, rebirth state, mode of birth, region, body, and family.

4 The term rūpaprāśāda is used specifically to refer to a subtype of form not subject to resistance, from which the sense organs are made: PP (1542) 1 p. 692c12ff.; MVB 13 p. 63a18ff.; AKB 1.9c–d p. 5 27ff.; SAKV p. 24.15ff.

5 Yūn-yū 9 p. 242c11ff.

6 One Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika method of classifying actions is according to the two categories of actions that either project a generic skeletal effect (ākṣepaka) or project a specific fleshing effect (paripūraka). The first variety results in the generic character of one’s existence as a human being, animal, and so on, while the second variety provides the specific qualities that make one’s existence unique. See MVB 19 p. 98a11ff., 35 p. 185a7ff., 177 p. 887c19ff., 198 p. 991c13ff.; AKB 4.95 p. 258.11ff.; SAKV p. 424.26ff.; NAS 24 p. 476c7ff., 43 p. 585b20ff.

7 See Yūn-yū 9 p. 242dff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 92c15ff. Shūshō 9 p. 168b28ff., p. 168c23ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 97b25ff. The compound sabhāgata can also be interpreted as a descriptive determinative (karmadhāraya): that is, simply as ‘similar’ or ‘shared’ (sa) ‘part’ (bhāga).

8 Location unknown.

9 See AKB 2.41a p. 67.17–18; SAKV p. 157.14ff.

10 Saṅghabhadra’s *Abhidharmasamayap猛地pika (ASPŚ 7 p. 805c10ff.) suggests that this dharmasabhāgata refers only to the homogeneous character included among factors constituting sentient beings. See also Yūn-yū 9 p. 242c16ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 93a24ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 541b11ff. Shūshō (Shūshō 9 p. 168c9ff.) suggests that these two varieties of homogeneous character refer to two stages of specificity in its activity: that is, sattvasabhāgata operates on the level of sentient beings as a whole, and dharmasabhāgata operates on the level of the constituent components into which sentient beings can be analyzed. Tan’e (Tan’e 5 p. 864b3ff.) quotes K’uei-chi’s Ch’eng wei-shih lu nü shu-chi T 43 (1830) 2 p. 280a12ff.) to the effect that the homogeneous character of factors is not found in earlier Sarvāstivādin discussions of homogeneous character, and is initiated by the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and the *Nyāyānusāra. Cf. Shen-t’ai 5 p. 323b2ff.

11 Vasubandhu (AKB 2.41a p. 67.21ff.) offers a tetralemma (catuskoti) with regard to the discarding and acquisition of homogeneous character: (1) one dies and is reborn with no change in homogeneous character; (2) one discards one kind of homogeneous character and acquires another without dying or being reborn; (3) one dies, discarding one kind of homogeneous character and is reborn in another rebirth state thereby acquiring another kind of homogeneous character; (4) none of the above—that is, one neither dies nor is reborn and does not discard or acquire homogeneous character. Saṅghabhadra’s two examples correspond to the second possibility. See also MVB 27 p. 138a29ff.; SAKV p. 157.27ff.; ADV no. 143 p. 90.1ff.

12 The following five objections are offered by Vasubandhu: AKB 2.41a p. 67.25ff.; SAKV p. 158.8ff. See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 93c15ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 541b20ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 323c17ff. Cf. AAŚ hisa p. 987b11ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 167.

13 Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 243a13–14) offers the following interpretation of this sentence: “One discards the homogeneous character of an ordinary person and acquires the homogeneous character of a noble one; one discards the nature of an ordinary person, but does not acquire the nature of a noble one.” This interpretation—that “one discards the nature of an ordinary person, but does not acquire the nature of a noble one”—is contradicted by the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 3 p. 12a13–14), which states explicitly: “One discards the nature of an ordinary person and acquires the nature of a noble one.” P’u-kuang (P’u-kuang 5 p. 93c27ff.) offers another interpretation adopted here in the translation: “... one only discards the nature of an ordinary person, but does not acquire [some other] nature of an ordinary person. One should not say, ‘... but does
not acquire the nature of a noble one,’ because it is precisely noble factors that are referred to as the nature of a noble one, [and one does indeed acquire noble factors].” Sanghabhadra’s own intention is not clear, but either interpretation could be justified. For example, Yüan-yü’s interpretation, that “one discards the nature of an ordinary person, but does not acquire the nature of a noble one,” could be defended because there exists no discrete real entity, “nature of a noble one,” analogous to the nature of an ordinary person. P’u-kuang’s interpretation, that “one only discards the nature of an ordinary person, but does not acquire [some other] nature of an ordinary person,” would hinge upon Sanghabhadra’s use of the general term ‘homogeneous character of the group’ (nikāyasabhāga), in the previous sentence: that is to say, the homogeneous character of an ordinary person and of a noble one are both specific varieties of this more general homogeneous character of the group. In this way, Saṅghabhadra would be justified in distributing the “discarding” and “acquiring” over two subsets of the general homogeneous character of the group: that is, the homogeneous character of an ordinary person is discarded and that of a noble one is acquired. However, in the second sentence, the nature of an ordinary person, which is itself a form of non-possession, and the nature of a noble one do not represent specific varieties of a more general category. As a result, one should understand the object of “acquire” to be “another nature of an ordinary person,” thereby preserving the reference to a single category as in the previous sentence.

14 Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 243c3ff.) explains: “Since external [factors] exist having internal [factors] as their cause, [homogeneous character] is applied to internal [factors].” In this case, ‘internal’ and ‘external’ refer, respectively, to factors “included among factors constituting sentient beings” (sattvākhya) and those “included among factors not constituting sentient beings (asattvākhya).” Cf. AKB 1.10b p. 6.25ff.; SAKV p. 26.19ff. For various interpretations of ‘internal’ and ‘external,’ see MVB 138 p. 714a12ff. According to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system of six causes and five effects, the internal factor, or sentient beings, would act as the comprehensive non-obstructing cause (kāraṇaḥetu) in the arising of insentient objects, which would then be identified as the dominant or sovereign effect (adhipatiphala). See MVB 20 p. 103c16ff., p. 106a15. Cf. also MVB 98 p. 508a19ff.: “Factors included among those constituting sentient beings (*sattvākhya, *sattvasarīkhyaśa), each arise from the actions and defilements of [sentient beings]; factors included among those not constituting sentient beings are all projected from the sovereign power of the action of sentient beings.”

15 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 243c7–8.

16 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 243c11ff. Homogeneous character is the cause of both the similarity and distinction among categories of sentient beings. Through this example, Saṅghabhadra attempts to demonstrate the reality of homogeneous character. Though there is similarity between a work of art and the model from which it is made, there is also the recognition that the model is distinct and, therefore, that the model alone is real. Though artwork is a common example illustrating the varieties of action and the specific activity of homogeneous character, the exact correspondence between the image, or model in this example, and homogeneous character is ambiguous. The translation and interpretation of this passage is, therefore, questionable. For other similar examples, see MVB 19 p. 98a13ff.; AKB 4.95b p. 258.24ff.; NAS 34 p. 538c24ff, 43 p. 586a1ff. Cf. YBS 76 p. 722c6ff.; Sar dhinirmocanasthra T 16 (675) 2 p. 673b25ff.; Sar dhinirmocanasthra T 16 (676) 2 p. 697a3ff.

17 See supra., translation, NAS 12 p. 400a21–23.

18 Here, Vasubandhu alludes to the fault of infinite regress that he claims would result if one attempts to use homogeneous character as a generic characteristic to account for the notion of similarity. One would be forced, Vasubandhu suggests, also to provide a further basis for the notion of “homogeneous character” in general: AKB
2.41a p. 68.3–4. Cf. Shūshō 8 p. 170a17ff. Throughout his discussion of homogeneous character, Saṅghabhadra is much more concerned to emphasize the distinguishing activity of homogeneous character, and he refuses to equate it with a characteristic that serves as the basis for generic similarity. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.41a p. 67.19–20) refers to an activity of homogeneous character as providing a basis for the notion or provisional designation of such general categories as “sentient being” or “aggregate,” and so on. Saṅghabhadra does not refer to this generic activity and, therefore, would appear to reject it. Instead, the generic concept characterizing a class of objects is, for Saṅghabhadra, simply a function of the similar natures or activities of all members of the class.

19 See SAKV p. 159.1ff.; Yuän-yū 9 p. 243c10ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 94b18ff., esp. p. 95b8ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 324b7ff.; Shūshō 8 p. 170c11ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 98b8ff., esp. p. 99a2ff. For these two Vaiśeṣika categories of generality and particular generality among the classification of ten padārthas as suggested by Candramati, see Frauwallner (1973b) 2: 154ff.; Uī (1917) 66ff., 99–100, 173ff; see also Halbfass (1992) 70ff.

Chapter 15

[The State of Non-conception]

We have finished discussing homogeneous character. What is the state of non-conception? The verse states:

[vs. 41b–d] The state of non-conception (āsamijnika) is the cessation of thought and thought concomitants (nirodhaś cittacaittanām) among [those sentient beings who are] without conception. It is a matured effect (vipāka). [Those who are without conception] abide among the Brhatphala gods.1

15.1  [State of Non-conception—Nature]

[Commentary:] [400c10] For those born among the gods who are sentient beings without conception (asamijnisattva),2 there is a factor referred to as the state of non-conception that is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought concomitants; it is a real entity that can obstruct future thought and thought concomitants, and can cause them not to arise for a period of time (kaltāntara), like the damming of a river.

15.2  [State of Non-conception as a Matured Effect]

This factor, [the state of non-conception,] is exclusively (ekantena) a matured effect (vipāka) produced by the equipoise of non-conception (asam-
Among those gods who are sentient beings without conception, the state of non-conception as well as form are matured effects produced by the equipoise of non-conception alone. This equipoise [of non-conception] is without the power to project the homogeneous character of the group and vitality (jīvita) [of the gods without conception] because the homogeneous character of the group and vitality are effects produced only by the fourth level of trance (dhyāna) [within the realm of form], in which thought occurs. The remaining aggregates [belonging to gods without conception] are the matured effects of both [the equipoise of non-conception and the fourth level of trance] because, for those born among the gods who are sentient beings without conception, thought occurs for a long period of time [both] before entering and after emerging from that state of non-conception. However, because this state of being without thought lasts for an extremely long period of time, these gods are referred to in general as “gods who are without conception.”

15.3 [State of Non-conception—Location]

In what region do these sentient beings without conception abide? They abide among the Brhatphala [gods]. That is to say, among the Brhatphala gods in a particular region (pradeśa) [within the fourth level of trance], there are [certain beings] who are referred to as gods who are without conception, just as in the case of [those beings in the particular region of] the intermediate stage (dhyānāntarika) [located between the first and second levels of trance in the realm of form].

15.4 [State of Non-conception—Supporting-Sustenance]

Those [born among the gods without conception] take past action and contiguous conditions (samanantarapratyaya)—[that is, immediately prior moments of thought]—as their supporting sustenance (āhāra). That is to say, past action, which projects the homogeneous character of the group, vitality, and so on, [acts as the mental volition variety of sustenance]. The impetus of thought in continuous rebirth and the assistance of [the moment of] thought immediately prior to entering this state of non-conception [act as the perceptual consciousness variety of sustenance]. These [sentient beings in the state of non-conception] also have past contact, and so on, as
their supporting sustenance. The state without thought has only past contact, and so on, as its sustenance; present [contact] is totally nonexistent. [Sentient beings] in states that have thought have both [past and present contact as their sustenance].

15.5 [Falling from the State of Non-conception]

[400c25] Sentient beings fall *(cyutir bhavati)* from this region [of gods without conception] through the arising of conception.⁹ It is determined that, having fallen, they will be reborn in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and in no other place. Since the power of life produced by the conditioned forces of the previously cultivated equipoise [of non-conception] has been exhausted, and since these [sentient beings] are not able to cultivate that equipoise further,¹⁰ [they fall] like arrows, which, having been shot into the air, fall when their momentum is exhausted (*kṣīnavega*).¹¹

Sentient beings who will be reborn in that state [of non-conception in the next lifetime] necessarily [also] have action whose effects are received in the third lifetime or after (*karmāparaparaparyāvedanīya*)¹² within the realm of desire.¹³ This is similar to the case of those sentient beings who will be reborn in the Uttarakuru; they necessarily have action whose effects will be received as rebirth among the gods (*devopattivedanīya*).¹⁴

Notes

¹ See *AKB* 2.41b–d p. 68.12ff.: "[vs. 41b–d] The state of non-conception is the cessation of thought and thought concomitants among those without conception. It is a matured effect. They are [among the] Bṛhatphala gods." āsāṁjñikam āsāṁjñīru. nirodhaś cittačaitānāṁ vipākas te bhṛhatphalaḥ. See also *GAKB* p. 79; *SAKV* p. 159.13ff.; *HTAKB* 5 p. 24b13ff.; *PAKB* 3 p. 182c23ff.; *ADV* no. 134c–d p. 91.1ff.

² Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 242a4ff.) observes that beings are referred to as "sentient" because they have perceptual consciousness. Even though beings in this state of non-conception do not have perceptual consciousness, they still have sense organs that serve as the basis for perceptual consciousness. Therefore, because they are of the same category as sentient beings insofar as they too possess this basis for perceptual consciousness, they can be referred to as "sentient."

³ Since the state of non-conception is a matured effect, its moral quality is known to be indeterminate (*āvyākṛta*). See *AAS* hsia p. 987a15–16.

⁴ The *Mahāvibhāṣā* offers five theories concerning the effects of the equipoise of non-conception and of the fourth level of trance in the realm of form: *MVB* 118 p. 615a5ff.; cf. *MVB* 19 p. 96c17ff. Saṅghabhadra supports the first of these interpretations, and not the interpretation of the arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 118...
The dispute hinges upon whether or not form, or the five externally directed material sense organs, can be the product of action (karman). The arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣā maintains that the form aggregate is the product of action and, therefore, can be produced only by a state having thought, which is necessary in order to initiate action. Hence, according to the arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣā, the form aggregate must be produced by the fourth level of trance, which is characterized by thought, and not, as Sanghabhadra suggests, by the equipoise of non-conception. All interpretations agree that homogeneous character and vitality are the effects of action and, consequently, can be produced only by the fourth level of trance. Cf. Pu-kuang 5 p. 93c3ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 542a21ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 244a12ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 153 (chart).

When beings are actually in the state of non-conception, the term ‘remaining aggregates’ refers to certain factors within the forces aggregate (sanskāraskandha): that is, certain dissociated factors other than the dissociated forces of homogeneous character of the group and vitality listed previously. Since neither thought nor thought concomitants occur in the state of non-conception, there is no perceptual consciousness aggregate nor thought concomitants among the forces aggregate. As indicated previously, the form aggregate is brought about by the equipoise of non-conception alone. However, beings in the rebirth state referred to as non-conception actually exist with thought and thought concomitants for a period of time at the beginning and end of their life-span. Therefore, in their term ‘remaining aggregates’ would refer to all four aggregates except form. Cf. Yüan-yü 9 p. 244a18ff. For a lengthy discussion of conception in this rebirth state of non-conception, see MVB 154 p. 784b14ff.

This period of being without thought is identified as five hundred great cycles of time (mahākalpa): MVB 154 p. 784a24ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 325b13ff. For a discussion of the term kalpa, see MVB 135b23ff.; AKB 3.93c p. 18023ff.

There are different views, even within the Sarvāstivādin school, concerning the location of these Brhatphala gods, the status of the intermediate stage (dhyānāntarika), and, as a result, the enumeration of heavens within the realm of form (rūpadhātu). According to the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the realm of form is divided into sixteen heavens with the intermediate stage, also called the abode of the Mahābrahma gods, located as a particular region within the second of two stages within the first level of trance immediately prior to the first stage of the second level of trance. See MVB 193 p. 965c14ff. The Sarvāstivādins referred to as Westerners (paścātvyoga) and those referred to as Outsiders (bahirdeśaka) include the abode of this intermediate stage, or the Mahābrahma gods, as a discrete stage within the realm of form, that is, as the third stage of the first level of trance. Thus, the total number of heavens within the realm of form increases to seventeen. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 154 p. 784b5ff.) gives an alternative opinion of the Outsiders whereby the abode of the gods without conception is also counted as a discrete stage in the fourth level of trance, bringing the total number of heavens in the realm of form to eighteen. See SAKV p. 159.18ff.; AKB 3.2d p. 111.21ff.; SAKV p. 254.33ff., esp. p. 255.27ff.; NAS 21 p. 456c14ff., esp. 21 p. 457a2ff., where Śrīlāta is quoted supporting the view that there are eighteen heavens; AKB 3.6c-d p. 117.15ff.; SAKV p. 262.29ff.; MVB 98 p. 509a23ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 326a16ff.; de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) 3: 2–4 note 5; Watanabe (1954) 247.

See Yüan-yü 9 p. 244b11; MVB 129 p. 674b28ff., 154 p. 785a14ff. This discussion assumes the following objection. In the sūtra, it is said that all sentient beings are supported by four types of sustenance: (1) material food (kālaṇḍikāra); (2) mental volition (manāḥsaṁcetanā); (3) perceptual consciousness (vijñāna); and (4) contact (sparsā). There is no material food sustenance for beings in the realm of form, and the other three varieties of sustenance are absent in all states without thought; hence, beings in this state without thought would be left with no sustenance. Sanghabhadra, following the *Mahāvibhāṣā, claims that beings in this state of non-conception are supported only
by past, and not by present, sustenance. See also AKB 3.39–40a–b p. 152.15ff.; SAKV p. 316.28ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 96a6ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 542b27; Fujaku 4 p. 154a12ff. For a discussion of the four types of sustenance, particularly in the Śrāvakabhūmi, see Wayman (1961) 136ff.

Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition and both Paramārtha’s and Hsüan-tsang’s translations of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya attribute this statement to the śūtra: AKB 2.41d p. 68.24; HTAKB 5 p. 24b22; PAKB 3 p. 183a4. Cf. DA 1 no. 21 p. 92a19ff.; Honjō (1984) 19; SAKV pp. 448–449. However, this attribution is not present in Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the *Nyāyānusāra.

Whereas Hsüan-tsang translates the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and *Nyāyānusāra identically here, Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.41d p. 68.25; cf. PAKB 3 p. 183a5) reads: “... due to the exhaustion of the conditioned forces of the previous equipoise, and since [sentient beings in that state] cannot [perform action to] accumulate future [effects] ...” pūrvasamāpattisaṁsāraṁparikṣayāt apūrvānupacayāt ca... Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 159.24ff.) explains these reasons as follows: “The compound pūrvasamāpattisaṁsāraṁparikṣayāt means ‘due to the exhaustion of the cause of maturation having as its characteristic the conditioned forces of the previous equipoise.’ Therefore, its meaning is ‘due to the fact that the effect is accomplished.’ Others explain it as ‘due to the exhaustion of the momentum of the conditioned forces of the previous equipoise.’ The compound apūrvānupacayāt has as its intention ‘due to the non-accumulation of action as a result of the absence of thought [in that state of non-conception].’” pūrvasamāpattisaṁsāraṁparikṣayāt iti. pūrvasamāpattisaṁsāraṁkālaṁśa-nyaśya vipākākhetoḥ parikṣayāt. tataḥ samāptathalatvād ity arthaḥ. pūrvasamāpattisaṁsāraṁvedhaparikṣayād ity apare vijyacṣate. apūrvānupacayāc ce ‘ti. cittābhāvāt karmānupacayād ity abhiprāyāḥ. Hsüan-tsang’s inclusion of the phrase ‘power of life’ (*āyus) in his interpretation of the first reason would appear to contradict the previous statement that vitality, which is identified with life (infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b7; cf. infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405b22ff.), is not a matured effect of the equipoise of non-conception, but rather only of the fourth level of trance; since life is not produced by the conditioned forces of the previously cultivated equipoise, it would not be terminated simply as a result of the exhaustion of those forces.

Several interpretations of the reasons for the termination of the state of non-conception and for one’s rebirth in the realm of desire are given in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB 254 p. 783c22ff.

Action (karma) is of two types: undetermined (aniyata) and determined (niyata). Determination refers both to the fact of maturation and to the time of appearance of the effect. Determined actions are of three types depending upon the time of the appearance of their effect: those whose effects are received in the present lifetime in which the action is performed (dṛṣṭadharmavedaniyā), in the next lifetime (upapadyavedaniyā), or in the third lifetime or after (aparaparyāyavedaniyā). Undetermined actions are undetermined as to the time of the appearance of the effect and may or may not be undetermined in regard to the fact of the maturation of the effect. See MVB 19 p. 98a20ff.; AKB 4.50 p. 229.19ff.; NAS 40 p. 569a22ff.

Another interpretation in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 154 p. 784a10ff.) suggests that just as birds rise to the skies through the force of their wings and then fall to the earth, so also sentient beings rise to the realm of form or the formless realm through the force of cultivation or of action and fall to the realm of desire when that force is exhausted.

According to the interpretation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 154 p. 784a7ff.), these two cases of rebirth in the state of non-conception and rebirth in the Uttarakuru are perfectly analogous. That is to say, for those who perform action that will result in rebirth in the Uttarakuru in the next lifetime, according to the nature of factors, they
also perform action that will result in rebirth in the third lifetime or after among the
gods within the realm of desire. Similarly, for those who perform action that will result
in rebirth in the state of non-conception in the next lifetime, according to the nature of
factors, they also perform action that will result in the third lifetime or after in rebirth
in the realm of desire.
Chapter 16

[The Equipoise of Non-conception]

[401a1] We have finished discussing the state of non-conception. What are the two states of equipoise? They are the equipoise of non-conception and the equipoise of cessation. First, what are the characteristics of the equipoise of non-conception? The verse states:

[vs. 42] In the same way (tathā), the equipoise of non-conception (asamjñāsamāpatti) [is the cessation of thought and thought concomitants]; [it is located in] the last level of trance (dhyāne 'ntyca); [it is cultivated with] a desire for deliverance (niḥṣṛti-cchaya); it is virtuous (subha); its effects are received only in the next lifetime (upapadyavedaniya); it is not [appropriate for] noble ones; and it is acquired belonging to one time period (ekādhvikā 'pyate).

16.1 [Equipoise of Non-conception—Nature]

[Commentary:] [401a5] As stated previously, “there is a factor referred to as the state of non-conception that is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought concomitants;” so also there is a discrete factor referred to as the equipoise of non-conception that is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought concomitants. The phrase ‘in the same way’ simply
indicates that this equipoise is like the state of non-conception insofar as [each is] a cessation of thought and thought concomitants.³

16.2 [The Name ‘Equipoise of Non-conception’]

[The term ‘equipoise’ (saṃpatti) can be understood in the following way.][The second member -āpatti of the compound should be understood as meaning “to accomplish” (niḥpatti); [the first member sama or sam,] as “correctly” or “thoroughly.” Therefore, [the state of “accomplishing correctly” or “accomplishing thoroughly”] is referred to as an equipoise.⁴ There are other masters who claim that the “appropriate” or “equilibrated” (sa-matā) “operation” [of the life-stream as a whole] is to be referred to as equipoise because that equipoise equilibrates (samatāpādana) thought and the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta).⁵

[The compound ‘equipoise of non-conception’ (asaṃjñīsamāpatti) can be interpreted in two ways.][It can be understood as a dependent determinative (tatpuruṣa)—that is, the “equipoise of the beings who are without conception”—[401a10] or [as a descriptive determinative (karmadhār-aya)—that is,] the “equipoise that is without conception.”⁶

[One might claim that since, in this equipoise, thought and all thought concomitants are extinguished, it should be referred to not simply as the equipoise of non-conception, but rather as the equipoise of no thought or thought concomitants.] [This, however, is unjustified.] [It is referred to as the equipoise of non-conception] because one produces it through aversion [specifically] to conception. Ordinary persons are not able [to produce this equipoise through] an aversion to feelings (vedanā) because they enter this equipoise attached to feelings.⁷

16.3 [Equipoise of Non-conception—Location]

In what region is this equipoise located? It occurs in the last level of trance (antyadhyāna)—that is, in the fourth level of trance [within the realm of form]—and in no other [region].⁸
[O] There was no need to state [the location of the equipoise of non-conception again] here [in the verse].

Why is this? This equipoise is able to produce the matured effect of the state of non-conception, and it was stated [in the previous verse that those sentient beings who are] without conception abide among the Brhatphala gods. It was then explained that these Brhatphala gods are located in the last level of trance. How could one cultivate the cause [of this state of non-conception] in any other region?

[S] This criticism is untenable because there has been no statement [to this effect: that is,] it has not yet been stated anywhere [in a verse] that the equipoise of non-conception is considered to be the cause of the state of non-conception.

[S] Didn't the previous verse state that the state of non-conception is a matured effect? In the auto-commentary, the [state of non-conception] was then said to be the effect of the equipoise of non-conception.

[S] This also is untenable because there has not yet been a verse stating [that the equipoise of non-conception is the cause of the state of non-conception]. [A statement made previously in the auto-commentary does not make the statement made here in the verse redundant.] [The location of the equipoise of non-conception] is established [only by] the statement in the present [verse].

16.4 [Equipoise of Non-conception—Practitioners]

Why is this equipoise referred to as an equipoise [only] of ordinary persons? [That is] because one cultivates this equipoise with a desire for liberation (mokṣakāma). Claiming that the state of non-conception is the true liberation (mokṣa), and claiming that the equipoise of non-conception is the path of deliverance (niḥsaraṇa), [ordinary persons] cultivate this equipoise in order to realize non-conception. No noble one would claim that a factor tending toward the fluxes (āsrava) is the true liberation or the true path of deliverance. Therefore, this equipoise is said to be the equipoise [only] of ordinary persons.
16.5  [Equipoise of Non-conception—Moral Quality]

Since [it was stated in the] previous [verse that] the state of non-conception is a matured effect (vipāka), its inclusion among [factors] having an indeterminate nature (avyākta) is established (siddha) without [any additional explicit] statement. Here, the equipoise of non-conception [is said to be] exclusively virtuous (kuśalai 'va).

[O] Since this factor is the cause of a matured effect, isn’t its inclusion among factors having a virtuous nature established without [any additional explicit] statement? This [equipoise of non-conception] is the cause [401a25] that has, as its matured effect, the five aggregates of the gods who are sentient beings without conception.12

[S] [This objection] is unfounded because it has not yet been stated in the verse [that this equipoise of non-conception is the cause of the state of non-conception]. Further, [if it were not stated that it is exclusively virtuous,] who would be able to refute [those who claim that it has a] defiled, indeterminate nature (nivṛttaavyākta).13

[O] If [the intention had been to exclude factors having a defiled, indeterminate nature, the restrictive phrase] ‘virtuous alone’ (eva) should have been used in this [verse]: [that is, “the equipoise of non-conception is virtuous alone”].

[S] This is not necessary because a [restrictive] meaning is evident even apart from the [actual use] of the word [‘alone’]. Here one should follow the previous interpretation [given in the discussion of] the nature of an ordinary person: [that is, that a restrictive meaning can be inherent in a single term].14 Or, [a restrictive meaning would be implied because] simply by stating that [the equipoise of non-conception] is virtuous, it is clearly indicated that it is not otherwise.

16.6  [Equipoise of Non-conception—Maturation of the Effects]

Since this equipoise is, by nature, a cause of maturation (vipākahetu), when does one receive its effects? One group of masters adamantly claims that one receives its effects only in the next lifetime, (upapadyavedaniya), and not in the present lifetime (dṛṣṭadharmavedaniya), nor in the third lifetime.
or after (aparāparyāyavedanīya); nor are its effects undetermined (aniy-ata).\textsuperscript{15} [401b1] Actually, its effects are either received in the next lifetime or are undetermined.\textsuperscript{16} Why is this? It is possible that one who accomplishes this equipoise also will be able to enter the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured (niyāmāvakṛanti), [from which stage on one is no longer an ordinary person].\textsuperscript{17} Having entered [this stage and having become a noble one], one is necessarily without the present arising of this equipoise [of non-conception, since it is limited to ordinary persons]. [However, in response to this claim,] the equipoise of non-conception is referred to as the equipoise of ordinary persons in reference to its present operation, and not in reference to one’s accompaniment of it. [Therefore, there is no contradiction in maintaining that a noble one, though lacking the present operation of the equipoise of non-conception, has accompaniment of it.]

16.7 [Practitioners—continued]

Further, it is held that this equipoise is attained by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist ordinary persons, but not by noble ones, [401b5] because noble ones see this equipoise of non-conception as a deep pit (vinippātaṣṭhāṇa) and do not desire to enter into it.\textsuperscript{18} The phrase ‘a desire for deliverance’ (nīlṣṛṭicchā), already mentioned in the verse, indicates precisely that this equipoise belongs only to ordinary persons. This further statement “it is not [appropriate for] noble ones” then is useless.\textsuperscript{19}

16.8 [Possession of the Equipoise of Non-conception]

When one first attains [this equipoise] in how many time periods is it attained?\textsuperscript{20} In the various stages [of the possession of] this [equipoise], it is attained separately, moment after moment, like the prātimokṣa vows of discipline.\textsuperscript{21} In the first moment [of the attainment of the equipoise of non-conception], since it has never been attained, there is no possession of it as past. Since there is no thought [in this equipoise], one cannot cultivate it as future.\textsuperscript{22} [401b10] Therefore, when one first attains it, it is acquired only as belonging to one time period, that is, as present. In the second and following moments until one is about to emerge from it, one is also accompanied by it as past. After emerging from it until one is on the point of discarding it, one is only accompanied by it as past.\textsuperscript{23} There is no cultivation of it as future as [there is in the case of] divine sight (divyacakṣus)
and divine hearing (divyāśrotra). It is only attained through application (prayoga), and not through mere detachment (vairāgya).

Notes

1 See AKB 2.42 p. 68.28ff.: "[vs. 42] In the same way, the equipoise of non-conception [is the cessation of thought and thought concomitants]; it is in the last level of trance; [it is cultivated] with a desire for deliverance, and is virtuous; its effects are received only in the next lifetime; it is not [appropriate for] noble ones; and it is acquired belonging to one time period." tathā 'saṃjñīsamāpattit dhīyāne 'ntyā niḥśrtīcchayā śubho 'papadyavedayā 'va nā 'ṛyasya ekādhvūkā 'pyate. See also GAKB p. 80; SAKV p. 159.31ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 24b28ff.; PAKB 3 p. 183a9ff.; ADV no. 135 p. 92.1ff. The following discussion of the equipoise of non-conception closely follows the "Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB 152 p. 773a21ff.

2 NAS 12 p. 400c10-11.

3 For distinctions between the state of non-conception and the equipoise of non-conception, see MVB 154 p. 784a25ff.

4 Yiian-yü 9 p. 244c3ff.

5 The "Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 152 p. 775b23ff.) raises the following problem. If the term 'equipoise' is used to refer to the harmonizing or equilibrating of thought, how can it be used in reference to a state that is without thought like the equipoise of non-conception? It responds: "There are two types of equipoise: one equilibrates thought and the other equilibrates the four fundamental material elements." Obviously, the two states of equipoise that are without thought would be included in the latter type. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44d p. 73.4–5) raises the same problem in his discussion of the equipoise of cessation, and Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 167.32ff.) explains that this problem arises due to the assumption that thought and thought concomitants are brought to a state of equilibrium and one-pointedness by means of equipoise, or concentration (sāmaññ): samādpāyante ekādikriyānta ity evam maṇḍā prachati. In the case of states without thought, equipoise occurs when the four fundamental material elements arrive at a state of equilibrium through this concentration: mahābhūtāni samāny āpāyante 'naye 'ti samāpattih. This equilibrium of the four fundamental material elements is a state that is contrary to the arising of thought: cittotpattiprātikālyasamatavasthānam. See also AAŚ hisā p. 987a3ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 165; P‘u-kuang 5 p. 100c15ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 545b24ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 330a9ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 104b17ff.

6 AKB 2.42a p. 69.2.

7 Since ordinary persons are attached to feelings, they would be reluctant to enter an equipoise called the "equipoise of non-feelings or non-thought." Thus, despite the fact that feelings and, indeed, all thought and thought concomitants are extinguished in this state of equipoise, it is referred to only as the "equipoise of non-conception."

8 For several reasons why the equipoise of non-conception is attained only in the fourth level of trance, see MVB 152 p. 773a23ff.

9 In the following section, Sanghabhadra defends the present verse, including the reference to the location of the equipoise of non-conception as stated in the Abhidharmaṇaḥ, against the criticism of an opponent who presumably would not be Vasubandhu.

10 See NAS 12 p. 400c19.

11 Yiian-yü (Yiian-yü 9 p. 245a17ff.) explains that ordinary persons conceive of the state of non-conception as the truth of cessation, or the liberation constituting
nirvāṇa. They posit this equipoise of non-conception as the truth of the path that leads to deliverance from birth and death; the realization of the fruit of liberation, therefore, occurs only through the cultivation of this equipoise of non-conception. Noble ones do not share this view; they would never consider a factor tending toward the fluxes as nirvāṇa. As a result, noble ones do not cultivate this equipoise, and the equipoise of non-conception, which is practiced only by ordinary persons, is referred to as the equipoise of ordinary persons. Cf. Shen-t'ai 5 p. 327b4ff.

12 See MVB 152 p. 774a11ff.
13 Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 245b10ff.) interprets the phrase ‘a defiled, indeterminate nature’ as referring to the single class of indeterminate factors that are obscured and indeterminate (nirūtānāyākṛta), as opposed to those factors that are unobscured and indeterminate (anirūtānāyākṛta). He cites the view of the Westerners (pāścātīya) who claim that such obscured, indeterminate factors should also be included among the causes of maturation (vipākahetu). According to their theory, the equipoise of non-conception, as a cause of maturation, could possibly be a defiled or obscured, indeterminate factor. This, however, contradicts the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiḥśāṅika position that indeterminate factors, whether obscured or unobscured, can only be matured effects, and not causes of maturation: MVB 19 p. 98b22ff., 161 p. 815c13ff.
14 See supra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399b6ff.
15 According to the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 152 p. 774a6ff.), the equipoise of non-conception does not produce its effect in the present lifetime, because this effect only takes the form of rebirth among the gods who are without conception. Nor is its effect received in the third lifetime or after, because the equipoise of non-conception is strong and produces its effect quickly. Nor is its effect undetermined, because retrogression from that effect is not possible. Cf. MVB 152 p. 773c18ff.
16 Cf. ASPŚ 7 p. 807c9ff. The present translation of the prior two sentences follows the interpretations of Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 245c14ff.) and Shen-t'ai (Shen-t'ai 5 p. 329b13ff.), which are consistent with Saṅghabhadrā's later discussion of the same topic. See infra, NAS 13 p. 401c6ff. If, however, Saṅghabhadrā maintains that the effects of the equipoise of non-conception either are received in the next lifetime or are undetermined, he contradicts the view of the arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣa, that is, that its effects are produced only in the next lifetime. See MVB 152 p. 776a9; cf. AKB 2.42c p. 69.12; AAS hsia p. 987a1ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 164. Therefore, the following translation, which would be consistent with the interpretation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa, is also possible: “One receives its effects only in the next lifetime, and not in the present lifetime, nor in the third lifetime or after; nor are its effects undetermined. One group of masters adamantly claims that, actually, its effects are received in the next lifetime or are undetermined.”
17 This alternative interpretation—that the maturation of the effects of the equipoise of non-conception is undetermined—is stimulated by the issue of whether or not it is possible to enter the path of vision, or become a noble one, immediately after cultivating this equipoise. See MVB 152 p. 773b18ff. Otherwise stated, it involves the issue of whether or not it is possible to have retrogression from the equipoise of non-conception or from the effect of rebirth in the state of non-conception that it produces. The equipoise of non-conception is cultivated only by ordinary persons and, likewise, they alone attain its effect of rebirth in the state of non-conception. If, after emerging from this equipoise, one could enter the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured—that is, the first moment of the path of vision—and, thereby, become a noble one, then one would be forever unable to receive its effect. In this case, the effect of the equipoise of non-conception would be undetermined, that is, never received. The arbiter of the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 152 p. 773b26ff.) adopts the position that both immediate entrance into the path of vision as well as retrogression from receiving the
effects of this equipoise (MVB 152 p. 773c18ff.) are impossible. The Dārśāntīkaś (MVB 152 p. 773c29ff., cf. 152 p. 773b23ff.), however, uphold the possibility of retrogression from receiving the effects of this equipoise. Saṅghabhadra's own view will become clear only with the determination of the correct translation of the two previous sentences. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.42c p. 69.12ff.) adopts a middle position, allowing the possibility of retrogression, and yet suggesting that even after retrogression, the equipoise is cultivated again immediately and rebirth in the state of non-conception results without entering the path of vision. He does, however, use the word kīla suggesting his skepticism concerning this latter view. For lengthy discussions of these issues, see P'u-kuang 5 p. 96c25ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 543a20ff.; Shūshō 8 p. 179c13ff., esp. 8 p. 180a24ff.; Tan'e 5 p. 864b27ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 99c2ff. Cf. Yūn-yū 9 p. 245c13ff.; Shūshō 8 p. 181c24ff. For discussions of the particle kīla, see van Daalen (1988); Katō Junshō (1989).

18 This equipoise produces the state of non-conception, a conditioned factor, which, as an effect of action, leads to further existence in the cycle of birth and death for a period of five hundred mahākalpas. In this sense it is compared to a deep pit that is to be avoided by noble ones. See AĀŚ hstia p. 986c29ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 245d2ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 97a3ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 327a1ff. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 160.8) glosses the word vinīpatasthāna with apaya as in apayo, meaning bad rebirth state.

19 The apparent criticism of Vasubandhu's verse here stands as evidence of the fact that Saṅghabhadra did not always agree with and accept Vasubandhu's presentation of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine in the verses of the Abhidharmakosakarika.

20 This discussion should be understood as a response to the following objection. It is stated that noble ones do not cultivate the equipoise of non-conception. However, when noble ones become detached from the defilements of the third level of trance, they attain automatically all the states of concentration in the subsequent fourth level of trance. Since they attain these states of concentration without having cultivated them, they are said to have future possession of them: that is, they accomplish or attain these states when these states are still future. Since the equipoise of non-conception is located within this fourth level of trance, noble ones should also attain it automatically while it is still future. This, however, would contradict the proscription against noble ones attaining the equipoise of non-conception. Further, accompaniment of this equipoise while it is still future is not possible because this equipoise is characterized as lacking thought. Therefore, it is stated that the equipoise of non-conception is attained only in the present. See MVB 152 p. 773b27ff.; AKB 2.42d p. 69.17ff.; SAKV p. 160.11ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 245d14ff.

21 MVB 119 p. 622c19; SAKV p. 160.18–19; P'u-kuang 5 p. 97a18ff. For the pratimokṣa vows, see MVB 120 p. 623c10ff.; AKB 4.35 p. 219.11ff.; SAKV p. 381.17ff. This represents the first of two options given in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 152 p. 773c2ff.) in answer to the following question: "Is the equipoise of non-conception also possessed as past and cultivated as future?" According to this first option, only those states of concentration that have thought can be said to be characterized by possession as past and cultivation as future. According to the second option (MVB 152 p. 773c5ff.), this equipoise of non-conception can be said to have cultivation as future, because factors that are attained through application (prayoga) have cultivation as future. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 152 p. 773c15) prefers the first option.

22 Saṅghabhadra differentiates three stages in the possession of the equipoise of non-conception: (1) in the first moment, one has only present possession of it; (2) in the second and following moments while still in the state of equipoise, one has present and past possession of it; (3) after emerging from this equipoise, but while still among the gods without conception, one has only past possession of it. See Yūn-yū 9 p. 245d15ff.

23 For the prior possession of divine sight and hearing as future, see NAS 12 p. 399a3ff. Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 246a1ff.) suggests that this reference to divine sight
and divine hearing may be understood as an example used by an opponent who claims that all states of concentration should have cultivation as future. This claim would agree with the second option outlined in the *Mahāvibhaṣā (MVB 152 p. 773c5ff.), whereby factors that are attained through application (prayoga) can be cultivated as future. However, the equipoise of non-conception, though attained through application, is different from other states of concentration because it lacks thought; for this reason, the *Mahāvibhaṣā concludes that it cannot be cultivated as future.

States of equipoise or concentration are attained in two ways: (1) by specific application (prayoga) in practice; or (2) by the mere fact of becoming detached (vairāgya) from the defilements of the stage prior to that particular state of concentration. See MVB 152 p. 773b27ff., 152 p. 773c10ff., 168 p. 845c29ff. Those states of concentration that are accomplished through great mental instigation (mahābhīsnaskārasādhyā), are obtained through great effort (mahāyatnābhīnīpāda), or are without thought (acittaka), and cannot be attained merely through detachment. See AKB 2.42d p. 69.17ff.; SAKV p. 160.15ff.
Chapter 17

[The Equipoise of Cessation]

Next, what are the characteristics of the equipoise of cessation? The verse states:

[vs. 43] The equipoise of cessation (nīrodhasamāpatti) is also thus. [It is cultivated] in order to [reach] a tranquil abode (vihāra); it is [produced from] the summit of existence (bhavāgraṇa); [401b15] it is virtuous (śubha); its effects are received at two [specified times] (dvivedya) and are undetermined (aniyata); it is attained by noble ones (ārya) through application (prayogataḥ).

[vs. 44a–b] [For the Buddha,] it is acquired when he becomes a buddha, and not before (na prāk), because one [attains enlightenment] in thirty-four [consecutive] moments ¹

17.1 [Equipoise of Cessation—Nature]

[Commentary:] Like the previously described equipoise of non-conception, the equipoise of cessation is also thus. That is, for one who is already detached from the passions of the third level of trance, there is a factor referred to as the equipoise of non-conception that is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought concomitants; so also for one who is already detached from passions in the sphere of nothing at all (ākīṃcanyāyatana), there is a factor referred to as the equipoise of cessation that is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought concomitants.²

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17. Equipoise of Cessation

17.2 [Distinctions Between the Two States of Equipoise]

[Distinctions—Intended Purpose]

[401b20] The distinctions between these two states of equipoise are as follows. In the previously described equipoise of non-conception, one develops an aversion to conception through a desire for liberation; [that equipoise of non-conception] is attained if preceded by attention (manasīkāra) [directed toward] the concept of deliverance (niḥsaraṇasārīṇījñāpūrvaka). In the present equipoise of cessation, one develops aversion to agitation through a desire for a tranquil abode; [this equipoise of cessation] is attained if preceded by attention directed toward the concept of a tranquil abode (sāntavihārasārīṇījñāpūrvaka).

[Distinctions—Location]

The previously described equipoise of non-conception is located in a peripheral region of the realm of form, and the present equipoise of cessation is located in a peripheral region of the formless realm. [The term ‘summit of existence’ can be explained in two ways.] Since rebirth in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (naivasārīṇījñānarājñāyatana) [401b25] is projected by the highest type of action, it is referred to as the summit of existence (bhavāgra). Or, as in the case of the uppermost limit of a tree referred to as the summit of the tree, this region [in the formless realm] is referred to as the summit of existence because it is the extreme limit of existence. The equipoise of cessation is found only in this region, [that is, in the summit of existence].

Why do the lower regions lack this equipoise? One is able to attain this supreme liberation only when all states of thought are rejected and thought at the extreme limit is abandoned. That is to say, one establishes this liberation in dependence upon two conditions: first, one shuns all states of thought, [and this is possible only with regard to states of thought of the lower regions]; and second, thought at the extreme limit is abandoned for a period of time. [401c1] If this equipoise were to occur in a lower region, then [these two conditions would not be fulfilled]. One could not shun all states of thought because one would not yet be able to shun the states of thought above [that lower region]. Also, it would not be referred to as [the state in which] thought at the extreme limit has been abandoned, because
thought in the upper regions still would not have been abandoned. [Thus, if this equipoise occurred in a lower region,] it should be referred to as [a state in which] a "certain portion of states of thought are shunned," and as a [state in which] "thought of the middle region has been abandoned."

[Distinctions—Moral Quality]

In terms of the three moral qualities—[virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate]—[401c5] this equipoise of cessation, like the previous [equipoise of non-conception], is only virtuous (kusāla 'va) and is neither defiled (kliṣṭa) nor indeterminate (avyākṛta). Noble ones do not renounce agitation and seize a defiled or indeterminate [state, as if] considering it to be a tranquil abode.

[Distinctions—Maturation of Effects]

[The effects of] the previously described equipoise of non-conception are received in the next lifetime or are undetermined. [The effects of] this present equipoise of cessation include those that are received in the next lifetime (upapadyavedaniya), or in the third lifetime or after (aparaparyāya-vedaniya), or its effects are undetermined (aniyata). That is to say, in reference to the maturation of its effects, [this equipoise] has those that are received in the next lifetime, or are received in the third lifetime or after, or are undetermined. Or, [its effects] are not received at all. That is to say, after one has given rise to this equipoise in a lower region, one then enters nirvāṇa without being reborn into a higher region.

[401c10] This equipoise of cessation is able to produce, as its matured effect, the four aggregates within the summit of existence.

[Distinctions—Practitioners]

The previously described equipoise of non-conception is attained only by ordinary persons. This equipoise of cessation is attained only by noble ones. Ordinary persons are not capable of giving rise to the equipoise of cessation because they have not yet abandoned the obstacle, which is characteristic of their own stage, to the arising of the equipoise of cessation. [That is to say,] one is absolutely incapable of giving rise to the equipoise of cessation until the defilements of the summit of existence that are to be abandoned by the path of vision are surpassed. Since no ordinary person is able to
surpass the defilements of the summit of existence that are to be abandoned by the path of vision, only noble ones attain the equipoise of cessation.\textsuperscript{11}

[401c15] There are other masters who claim that because ordinary persons dread complete extinction (ucchedabhārutvāt) and because noble ones enter [this equipoise] having a resolution [to attain] nirvāṇa in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇasya tadadhimuktītah), only noble ones, and not ordinary persons, [attain this equipoise].\textsuperscript{12} This theory is unreasonable because the equipoise of non-conception would be the same as this [equipoise of cessation], since they cannot be distinguished on the basis of either the extinction of thought or a resolution [to attain] nirvāṇa.

With regard to the [reason why ordinary persons do not attain the equipoise of cessation], some masters claim that because in the fourth level of trance in the realm of form thought and thought concomitants are gross and still have a corporeal basis, [an ordinary person enters the equipoise of non-conception] not dreading the extinction [of thought and thought concomitants]. This also is unreasonable [401c20] because the purpose of the cultivation of the equipoise of non-conception, [like that of the equipoise of cessation,] is to extinguish thought. Desiring liberation, [ordinary persons] give rise to [attention directed toward] the concept of deliverance, and then cultivate the equipoise of non-conception. It would be unreasonable to assume that they also dread the extinction of thought. When they cultivate the equipoise of non-conception [preceded by] the concept of deliverance, they should also enter it with a resolution [to attain] nirvāṇa. Therefore, these theories do not represent correct reasons [why ordinary persons do not attain the equipoise of cessation].\textsuperscript{13}

17.3 [Possession of the Equipoise of Cessation]

When noble ones attain the summit of existence, do they all attain this equipoise of cessation, or not? It should be said that they do not [all] attain it, because this equipoise [of cessation] is not attained through detachment (vairāgya). Through what, then, is it attained? It is attained through application alone (prayogalabhyaśvav).\textsuperscript{14} [401c25] Since it is attained only through application, when it is first realized, its possession, like that of the equipoise of non-conception, is only of the present time period. There is no past possession of it. There is no cultivation of it as future because one can only have future cultivation through the power of thought. In the second
and following moments, until one is about to abandon it, one also has past accompaniment of it.

[The Equipoise of Cessation as Attained by the Lord]

[O] Did the Lord also attain [the equipoise of cessation] through application?\textsuperscript{15}

[V] He did not.

[O] Why [do you maintain this]?

[V] He acquired it when he became a buddha; that is, the Lord acquired it at the same time as the knowledge of destruction (kṣayājñānasamakāla).\textsuperscript{16}

[S] Isn’t it the case that the knowledge of destruction cannot be said to be “acquired” at the time when one becomes a buddha?\textsuperscript{17} [402a1] How much less can the equipoise of cessation [be said to be “acquired” at that time]! [This is the case] because bodhisattvas can be said to “acquire” the knowledge of destruction when they abide in the state of adamantine concentration [in the moment prior to enlightenment], since when the acquisition [of a factor’s] nature is produced, [that factor] is referred to as “acquired.”\textsuperscript{18} It should be said that the knowledge of destruction is present before one at the time one becomes a buddha, but not through application (prāyogika).\textsuperscript{18} [In the case of the Buddha,] as soon as aspiration arises, the perfection of all qualities, having arisen in accordance with his desires, is present before him (sargasamānatsamkhiṃdhava). [In this one respect, the Sūtra master’s response is satisfactory.] [However,] none of these qualities within the body of the Buddha [402a5] was acquired at the time when he became a buddha; how [then] could it be maintained that the Buddha acquired this equipoise at the time of the knowledge of destruction? Since one is permanently separated from all defilements and adventitious defilements when one is a bodhisattva [in the adamantine concentration], qualities are able to arise [subsequently] in one’s body as a buddha. [It is in this sense that we say that] the qualities of the Tathāgata are all attained through detachment.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, [the Sūtra master’s] statements are [partially] erroneous.

Our interpretations [of how the Buddha attains the equipoise of cessation] would agree if his position were understood in the following way. [Though the equipoise of cessation is actually acquired in] the proximate stage [of the adamantine concentration, the Sūtra master has simply stated that it is acquired] in the remote stage [in which one actually becomes a
Or, [it could be understood in the following way:] Since bodhisattvas in the adamantine concentration [402a10] will inevitably become buddhas, [those bodhisattvas] could also be referred to as having already become buddhas, because they will definitely become buddhas in the immediately succeeding moment. [Therefore, the equipoise of cessation can be said to be “acquired at the time when one becomes a buddha,” though one is actually still a bodhisattva].

Now, [an opponent] raises the following objection: “When the Lord [attains] the knowledge of destruction without having given rise to the equipoise of cessation, how is he established as one who has the most complete liberation through both parts (ubhayatobhāgavimukta)?”

[S-V] Since he is forever separated from the obstacle to the equipoise [of cessation] and has discarded its non-accompanyment, he has attained mastery (vaśītva) over the arising of the equipoise of cessation. Therefore, like one who has already given rise to that equipoise, he is established as one who is liberated through both parts.

The Westerners (pāscātyya) claim that bodhisattvas first give rise to this equipoise [of cessation] in the stage of training (śaikṣāvasthā) and afterward attain enlightenment. [402a15] The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīra claim that one does not give rise to the equipoise of cessation first and only afterward produce the knowledge of destruction. What reasons do the masters of this country [of Kaśmīra] give as to why [the equipoise of cessation] does not arise prior [to attaining enlightenment]? How can one not condemn the reasons for the [prior] arising [of the equipoise of cessation within the bodhisattva stage offered by] the masters of the Western region?

[In response to the first question,] we masters of Kaśmīra maintain that enlightenment is attained in thirty-four [consecutive] moments of thought. That is to say, it is established that various bodhisattvas only enter the [stages of the] comprehensive observation of the truths after first attaining detachment from passions in the sphere of nothing at all (ākīmāncanyāyatana-vītarāga). [At this point,] there is no further need to abandon defilements of the lower regions (adhobhūmika). [27] [402a20] Having entered the path of vision, [they] attain the great enlightenment in thirty-four moments: that is, sixteen moments in the [stage of] the comprehensive observation of the truths (satyabhīsamaya) and eighteen moments in the [stage of] attaining detachment [from passions] in the summit of existence (bhavāgravairāgya). One abandons the nine grades of defilement of the summit of existence [in eighteen moments]: that is, those in the nine stages of the path of immediate succession (ānantaryamārga) and those in the nine [succeeding] stages of the path of liberation (vimuktimārga). Thus, when these eighteen are appended
to the previous sixteen, there are altogether thirty-four moments. It is not possible to give rise to a dissimilar moment of thought (visabhāgacittā) in the midst of this [series of thirty-four consecutive moments]. Therefore, it is determined that it is not possible to give rise to the equipoise of cessation in the stages prior [to attaining enlightenment].

If [bodhisattvas] were to give rise to the equipoise of cessation in the prior stages, they would then swerve from their intention (vyutthānāsaya) [to attain enlightenment]. However, it is determined that the various bodhisattvas do not swerve from their intention.

O It is true that bodhisattvas do not swerve from their intention [to attain enlightenment]. However, it is not the case that they do not swerve from the noble path not tending toward the fluxes. [Hence, even though this equipoise of cessation is a factor tending toward the fluxes, it would be possible for bodhisattvas to produce it in the course of their practice of the noble path not tending toward the fluxes.]

[S-V] If this were so, [and they swerved from the noble path not tending toward the fluxes], how would they not also swerve from their intention [to attain enlightenment]?

O [Not swerving from one’s intention] means the following: “As long as I have not attained (aprāpta) the destruction of [all] fluxes (āsravakṣaya), I will not break (na bhetsyami) this cross-legged position [for meditation] (paryanka).” It is determined that by not swerving from such an intention, all things will arrive at perfection in one sitting.

[S] If we accepted your opinion that bodhisattvas give rise to this equipoise, wouldn’t they have already violated their intention that seeks to give rise to the noble path not tending toward the fluxes? In order to exhaust all the fluxes, bodhisattvas cultivate the two paths of vision and of cultivation that have not yet been attained. [Bodhisattvas] desire to pluck out the roots of defilements of the summit of existence to be abandoned by the path of vision, and they desire to expel the enemy, that is, the defilements of the summit of existence [that are to be abandoned by] the path of cultivation. Vowing [to eradicate them], bodhisattvas sit cross-legged with this intention. In the midst of this [cultivation], when the great work has not yet been brought to perfection, how could bodhisattvas discard the intended path not tending toward the fluxes that counteracts [defilements] and laud the types of worldly equipoise, which, from beginningless time, have been able to delude us? [How could bodhisattvas swerve from their intention and thus allow themselves] to be detained in order to seize this equipoise of cessation that is easily attained
17. Equipoise of Cessation

by everyone?\textsuperscript{32}

Since it has thus been well established that bodhisattvas attain enlightenment in thirty-four [consecutive] moments, this is the reason [that bodhisattvas do] not [cultivate this equipoise] prior [to the moment of attaining enlightenment].

17.4 [Equipoise of Cessation—the Subsequent Arising of Contact]

According to the \textit{sūtra}, it is said: "When one emerges from the equipoise of cessation, one will have three types of contact. These include contact that is motionless (acala), contact that is of the nature of nothing at all (ākīmcanya), and contact that is signless (animitta)."\textsuperscript{33} What are these three types of contact, and how is such contact made?

Some claim that associated with thought that has emerged from the equipoise of cessation there are three types of contact having the nature of voidness (śūnyatā), of the wishless (apraṇāhita), and of the signless (animitta). When one emerges from the equipoise of cessation, [402b10] one has these three types of contact in that order.\textsuperscript{34}

There are other masters\textsuperscript{35} who claim that the type of contact that is associated with thought in the sphere of the infinity of perceptual consciousness (vijñānānantaśyatana) or the sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśānantaśyatana) is referred to as "contact that is motionless." This is due to the fact that these two [spheres] produce the concepts of perceptual consciousness and space alone; [hence, there is no movement to other concepts]. The type of contact associated with thought in the sphere of nothing at all is referred to as "contact that is of the nature of nothing at all," because there is nothing that exists before [perceptual consciousness as its object in that sphere]. The type of contact associated with thought in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception is referred to as "contact that is signless," because the characteristics of conception and non-conception are not clearly discriminated [in that sphere]. [Since the characteristics of conception and non-conception, though not clearly discriminated, are present even in that sphere,] the four spheres of the formless realm are referred to as levels of concentration with conception.\textsuperscript{36} [According to this theory, the process by which thought emerges from the equipoise of cessation can be explained as follows.] [402b15] Thought that has emerged from the equipoise of cessation either tends toward the fluxes
or does not tend toward the fluxes.\textsuperscript{37} When one emerges from the equipoise of cessation, one either enters these spheres of concentration [within the formless realm], consecutively, in reverse order, or one enters one sphere, bypassing others, in reverse order. It is [theoretically] possible that one will have present before one any of these types of thought that have emerged from the equipoise of cessation.\textsuperscript{38}

Still other masters\textsuperscript{39} claim that thought [that emerges from the equipoise of cessation] is limited to [the type] that does not tend toward the fluxes, is in the sphere of nothing at all, and has [the truth of cessation], or nirvāṇa, as its object. [Thus,] it is said that upon emerging from the equipoise of cessation, one has three types of contact: since [that emerging thought] does not tend toward the fluxes, [contact associated with it] is referred to as “motionless;” since [that thought] belongs to the sphere of nothing at all, [contact associated with it] is referred to [as of the nature of] “nothing at all;” [402b20] since [that thought] has nirvāṇa as its object, [contact associated with it] is referred to as “signless.”

\section*{17.5 Distinctions Between the Two States of Equipoise}

[Distinctions—Region of the Supporting Corporeal Basis]

Though we have already mentioned many similar and distinguishing characteristics (vīśeṣa) of the two states of equipoise, they have still other similar and distinguishing characteristics. The verse states:

[vs. 44c–d] These two states of equipoise have their corporeal basis in the realm of desire and the realm of form (kāmarūpāśraya). The equipoise of cessation occurs first among human beings.\textsuperscript{40}

[Commentary:] The phrase ‘these two’ refers to the equipoise of non-conception and the equipoise of cessation. These two will arise supported [by a corporeal basis belonging to either] the realm of desire or the realm of form.\textsuperscript{41}

However, on this point, there are those who claim that one enters the equipoise of non-conception [402b25] only from the three lower levels of
trance [in the realm of form] and not from the fourth level, since cause—
[that is, the equipoise of non-conception]—and effect—[that is, the state of
non-conception]—must not be precisely coexistent [in time and space].

Others claim that one enters the equipoise of non-conception also in the
fourth level of trance [in the realm of form]. [Only] the region of the gods
without conception is excluded because birth in that heaven is received as
the matured effect of that [equipoise].

Other masters claim that one enters the equipoise of non-conception in
the realm of desire, but not in the realm of form. [This claim] contradicts
the following passage in the śāstra: “Or, there may be a type of existence
in the realm of form (rūpakāya) that is not endowed with the five aggre­
gates (pañcavayavacāra). This refers to sentient beings [402c1] entangled
in the realm of form (rūpāvacāra), [including those] who are abiding in a
dissimilar moment of thought (visabhāgacitta) among the gods who have
conception (saṃjñideva), those practicing the equipoise of non-conception
or the equipoise of cessation, or those born among the gods without con­
ception who are in the state of non-conception; such sentient beings have
types of existence in the realm of form that are not endowed with the five
aggregates.” From this [passage], it is proven that these two states of
equipoise will arise supported [by a corporeal basis belonging to either] the
realm of desire or the realm of form; this is their common characteristic.

[Distinctions—Initial Arising]

[If we consider further] the distinguishing characteristics (viṣeṣa) [of these
two states of equipoise], whereas the equipoise of non-conception can arise
for the first time [in one whose corporeal basis is] either in the realm of
desire or the realm of form. [402c5] the equipoise of cessation arises for
the first time only among human beings (manusya): [that is, in the realm of
desire]. The equipoise of cessation can only be cultivated for the first time
among human beings, because it is only among human beings that there
are those who expound and interpret the teaching and those who have the
utmost power of application. Only if one is first able to cultivate this
equipoise as a human being [in the realm of desire] and then retrogresses
from it, is one then able to cultivate it once again after being reborn in the
realm of form where one is supported by a body in the realm of form.

One who has been reborn in the formless realm cannot enter the equi­
poise of cessation, because there is no corporeal basis [in that realm to
act as the support for this equipoise. Vitality (*jīvita*) necessarily occurs in conformity with [either] form or thought.\(^{51}\) If one who had been reborn in the formless realm were to enter the equipoise of cessation, since there would be neither form nor thought, vitality would be abandoned. Since the various aggregates abide in mutual dependence upon one another, there is no sentient being [in any realm] who is endowed with only one aggregate. Further, since thought and thought concomitants cannot be separated from one another, there is no sentient being endowed with only three aggregates.\(^{52}\)

### 17.6 [Retrogression]

For what reason is it known that there is retrogression (*parihāṇī*) from the equipoise of cessation? It is known on the authority of the *Udayisūtra*, which states: "O Venerable ones! There are monks in this world who, having perfected morality (*śilasamāpāna*), concentration (*samādhisamāpāna*), \(^{402c15}\) and insight (*prajñāsamāpāna*), are able to enter and emerge repeatedly from the cessation of conception and feelings (*samjñāveditanirodha*); it is known in accordance with fact that this is possible. If they are unable to attain the controlling faculty of final and perfect knowledge (*ājñā*) either previously in the present life or at the moment of death, when their present body is broken up, they will surpass the stage of the gods who eat material food to be reborn in a divine body made of mind (*manomaya*).\(^{53}\) Having been reborn\(^{54}\) there, they will again enter and emerge repeatedly from the equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings; it is known, in accordance with fact that this is possible."\(^{55}\) The Lord has explained that the divine body made of mind, [mentioned in this passage,] is in the realm of form. [However,] this equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings is located \(^{402c20}\) only in the summit of existence [within the formless realm]. If there were no retrogression from this equipoise once it is attained, one would not be able to be reborn [from that equipoise] into the realm of form [and the *sūtra* would be contradicted]. [Thus, retrogression from the equipoise of cessation is clearly possible.]

Thus, we have extensively elaborated the distinguishing characteristics (*viśeṣa*) of these two states of equipoise. In general, there are six varieties [of distinguishing characteristics]: their location (*bhūmi*), their intended purpose (*prayoga*), the life-stream in which they occur (*samātāna*), their matured effects (*phala*), the manifestation of their matured effects (*vedanīya*), and the place where they are first produced (*prathamotpādana*).\(^{56}\)
17.7 [Objections to the Equipoise of Cessation]

[Objection—I—the Name 'Cessation of Conception and Feelings']

Now, we should consider the following: if thought and thought concomitants are all extinguished in the equipoise of cessation, why is it referred to only as the equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti)? Since one produces this equipoise by opposition [specifically] to those two (tatprātikūlya)—[that is, conception and feelings—it is referred to as the equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings]. That is to say, since conception and feelings are capable of forming the basis of the defilements of [false] views and desires, one opposes them in particular. [403a10] As has already been extensively analyzed in the discussion of the five aggregates, these two factors [present] numerous dangers (adña). Therefore, one enters the equipoise of cessation by opposing them in particular. Other masters [of our school] maintain that all associated factors originate or cease, are attained or are abandoned, or undergo any such event together at the same time. [403a15] However, it does not force one invariably to maintain only what is stated and nothing beyond that. One should understand the purport of the sūtras in accordance with that method. If they state that perceptual consciousness is not separated from the body in this equipoise [of cessation], one should acknowledge that thought concomitants likewise should not be separated [from the body]. If they state that the various mental forces (cittasāmāskāra) are extinguished in this equipoise [of cessation], one should acknowledge that thought likewise should be extinguished in that state.

Other sūtras also contain vague passages [whose implicit meaning is to be explicated in this way]. Thus, there are sūtras that claim that "the right complete enlightenment of the buddhas, in every case, takes heedfulness as
its essence." In other sūtras, Ānanda is reported as saying, "the incomparable enlightenment is attained through striving (vīrya)." [Though the terms 'heedfulness' and 'striving' differ, the meaning of the two sūtra passages is the same.] [403a20] Some sūtras claim that "insight is able to destroy defilements," and others state that "if one cultivates the concept of impermanence, one is able to abandon passion for desires (*kāmarāga) in the realm of desire," and so on, as is presented in detail. [Again, though the terms 'insight' and 'concept of impermanence' differ, the meaning of the two passages is the same.] [Thus, in the case of the equipoise of cessation, though it is also sometimes referred to as the "equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings," the referent is the same.]

[Objection—II—Dārśāntika Interpretation]

The Dārśāntikas make the following statement: "In the equipoise of cessation, one only extinguishes conception and feelings [and not all other varieties of thought]. [Four reasons are given for this.] [First,] it is determined that there are no sentient beings who are without thought. [Second,] there is a distinction between the equipoise of cessation and death. [Third,] the sūtra states that when one enters the equipoise of cessation, perceptual consciousness is not separated from the body. [Finally,] it is said that one’s life (āyus), warmth (ūṣman), and perceptual consciousness (vijñāna) are never separated from one another.

17.8 [Saṅghabhadra’s Responses]

[General Response]

This theory is unreasonable because all states of thought are produced or destroyed together with conception and feelings. What scriptural authority is there to prove that this interpretation is correct? As is stated in the sūtra: "The eye (cakṣus) and form (rūpa) constitute the conditions that produce visual perceptual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna). Contact (sparśa) [results from] the collocation (saṁnipāta) of these three [factors]. Feelings (vedanā), conception (saṁjñā), and volition (cetanā) arise together with [contact (sparśasahajāta)]. And so on in this way, the mental organ [sense sphere] (manas) and the factors [sense sphere] (dharma) constitute the conditions that produce mental perceptual consciousness, and so on." No sūtra passage states that there is a seventh type of perceptual
consciousness, thereby allowing one to claim that [some type of] perceptual consciousness is produced apart from conception and feelings.\(^{72}\)

Further, because the basis (āśraya)—[or perceptual consciousness]—is extinguished in this equipoise of cessation, that which is supported by this basis (āśrita)—[or feelings, and conception, and so on]—is likewise extinguished. \(^{403b1}\) It is not possible that the various thought concomitant factors are capable of arising independently without a basis. Therefore, thought and thought concomitants are all extinguished in this [equipoise].\(^{73}\)

[O] [In the previous passage concerning the arising of feelings, conception, and volition,] the term ‘together with,’ or saha, refers to immediately successive (anantara) arising, [and not to simultaneous arising as you interpret it]. [We can give two supporting examples for this interpretation from the sūtras.] [For example,] since king Mandhātā gave rise to an evil moment of thought, he fell “immediately” (saha) [from his current state of existence]. Or, one can cultivate the mindfulness limb of enlightenment (smṛtibodhyāṅga) “immediately” (saha) after an impure [moment of thought].\(^{74}\) [The term saha] in this case [of feelings, conception, and volition] also [should be interpreted] in this way.

[S] [This objection] is untenable because there is a distinction [between the meaning of the term saha in the case of the former sūtra passage concerning the production of feelings, conception, and volition, and the latter passages that you have just offered]. \(^{403b5}\) It is true that the term saha appearing in the passages concerning king Mandhātā, and so on, indicates immediately successive arising, since it is established that a disagreeable action and a disagreeable effect should not be produced at the same time.\(^{75}\) Further, since that sūtra passage uses the ablative case, [succession, and not simultaneity, is intended]. As that sūtra passage states, since king Mandhātā gave rise to an evil moment of thought, he fell immediately [from his current state of existence]; this means that he fell from that state only at a later time, [after giving rise to the evil moment of thought]. [In the case of the second sūtra passage,] because the impure [moment of thought] and the [mindfulness] limb of enlightenment are distinguished in nature, [respectively], as tending toward the fluxes and not tending toward the fluxes, they do not arise at the same time. [However,] if the term saha in the sūtra [concerning the arising of feelings, conception, and volition] indicates arising at the same time, \(^{403b10}\) neither scriptural authority nor reasoned argument is contradicted in any way. Therefore, in that case, the term saha does not [refer to] immediately successive arising.

Further, if one maintained that the term saha indicates immediately successive arising, the fault of errancy (*vyabhicāra) would be incurred.
[because the same term would indicate simultaneity in some cases and succession in others]. As the sūtra states: "The comprehensive observation (abhisamaya) of the four noble truths occurs ‘together with’ (*saha) happiness and ‘together with’ (*saha) joy." One cannot further maintain that this has the same [meaning] as the sūtra concerning Mandhātā, and so on: that is, that the comprehensive observation of the four noble truths is produced only “immediately after” happiness and joy. Further, as the sūtra states: “Since moments of thought, and so on, that have passion are ‘simultaneous with’ (*saha) passion, they are referred to as moments of thought having passion.” This should not be interpreted [403b15] as meaning that the moment of thought that arises “immediately after” passion is referred to as a moment of thought having passion. If it is [interpreted] in this way, a categorical fault (atiprasaṅga) is incurred: [namely, that any virtuous or indeterminate moment of thought arising after passion would be referred to as a moment of thought having passion]. Therefore, the term saha in this case [concerning the arising of feelings, conception and volition] means “at the same time.”

Moreover, conception and feelings, and so on, are referred to as “thought concomitants” because they rest upon thought as their basis; conception and feelings, and so on, cannot be produced apart from this basis. If one claims that [a given moment of] thought that acts as the contiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya) is referred to as the basis, [then] since [that moment of] thought also is produced in immediate succession in dependence upon a [previous moment of] thought, it should be referred to as a “thought concomitant,” [and not as a moment of “thought”]. Similarly, since thought is produced in immediate succession in dependence upon thought concomitants, [403b20] the thought concomitants also should be established as having the nature of the basis [and could be referred to as “thought”]. [Thus, the functions of thought and thought concomitants would be confused.] Such points as these will be discussed extensively in the section on the six causes.

Further, the sūtra states: “When one enters the equipoise of cessation, mental forces are extinguished.” [Since the term ‘mental forces’ includes both thought and thought concomitants,] one knows that the equipoise of cessation not only extinguishes these two factors of conception and feelings, [but also extinguishes thought and all thought concomitants as well].

Further, if the stream of perceptual consciousness were not extinguished for a period of time in this equipoise, the collocation of the basis, objectsupport, and perceptual consciousness would definitely occur because perceptual consciousness cannot be produced apart from its basis and its
object-support. Then, with the collocation of these three, contact would inevitably result, [403b25] and together with the arising of contact, there would be feelings, conception, and volition. [Thus, if perceptual consciousness were not extinguished] in the equipoise of cessation, the two factors—conception and feelings—also would not be extinguished.

[O] The sūtra states: "Craving (tṛṣṇā) has feeling as its condition (vedanāpratyaya)."82 However, even though an arhat has feelings, [these feelings] do not serve as the condition for craving. Contact also should be understood in this way: that is, not all types of contact produce feelings, and so on.

[S] [This analogy] is not appropriate (asamāna), because there is a distinction [between that contact referred to in this sūtra, and contact as used in other contexts such as in the case of the arhat].83 [Certain] sūtra passages explicitly qualify [contact] as follows: "Feelings produced by contact having ignorance (avidyāsamsparśaja) constitute the condition that produces craving."84 Since arhats are without contact having ignorance, even though they have feelings, [403c1] [those feelings] do not produce craving. [However, in the present sūtra,] there is no passage that qualifies contact [in its role as the condition for] the production of feelings.85 Therefore, through the simple presence of contact, feelings, and so on, are inevitably produced.

[O] Other masters claim that even though the nature of perceptual consciousness remains in the equipoise of cessation, there is no contact. [Since there is no contact, feelings and conception do not arise.]

[S] It is not known what they understand contact to be. All types of perceptual consciousness necessarily arise in dependence upon a basis and an object-support. The Buddha has explained that the collocation of the three factors of the basis, object-support, and perceptual consciousness results in contact. [403c5] Since contact is the condition for the production of feelings, and conception, and so on, to allow the collocation of the three [factors of the basis, object-support, and perceptual consciousness] in the equipoise of cessation, and yet claim that there is no contact, is merely vain prattle.86

[Refutation of the Dārśāntikas]

[As for the first reason offered by the Dārśāntikas—that there are no sentient beings who are without thought—even if one were to claim that] thought alone exists in the equipoise of cessation, there would be no volition or discernment87 because it is stated [in the sūtra] that all mental
Forces are completely extinguished in the equipoise of cessation. If [a moment of] thought is without volition (cetanā), then it is without volition and discernment. A moment of thought without volition and discernment, similarly, is not permitted. Since thought in every case has activity due to volition, when there is no volition, there is also definitely no thought. [Therefore, since all mental forces, including volition, are extinguished in the equipoise of cessation,] it is reasonable that there must be sentient beings without thought.

[As for the second reason offered by the Dārśāntikas—that there is a distinction between the equipoise of cessation and death—the equipoise of cessation is different from death because sentient beings in that equipoise have vitality (jīvita), and so on. Sentient beings need not have both form and thought. If thought definitely existed [at all times], form also should be so; [since] there are times when form does not exist, [as in the case of the formless realm], there should also be times when thought [does not exist, as in the case of the states without thought]. Therefore, a sentient being is defined as one who has vitality. However, [it should be noted that] vitality necessarily depends upon either form or thought.]

[As for the third reason offered by the Dārśāntikas—that the sūtra claims that perceptual consciousness is not separated from the body—the quotation from the sūtra [cited by the Dārśāntikas], which states that "perceptual consciousness is not separated from the body," does not disprove the fact that thought is absent in the equipoise [of cessation]. It is said that [perceptual consciousness] is not separated [from the body in this equipoise], precisely because perceptual consciousness will necessarily be produced once again in the body that acts as the corporeal basis [for one in this equipoise].] That is to say, [even after entering the equipoise of cessation,] the stream of perceptual consciousness flows within the homogeneous collection of components (nikāyasabhāga) constituting one life-stream and is not absolutely eradicated. It can be illustrated by the example of illness caused by spirit possession: though the symptoms may not be manifest for a period of time, since the possessing demon has not yet been permanently ousted, it is referred to as not separated [from the body].

[As for the fourth reason offered by the Dārśāntikas—that it is said that one's life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness are never separated from one another—the statement [from the sūtra cited by the Dārśāntikas], which states that "life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness are not separated from one another," also does not disprove the fact that thought is absent in the equipoise of cessation. It is maintained [that these three are]
not separated from one another] only in certain cases. Since in the formless realm, one has no warmth at all, but one is not without life or perceptual consciousness, similarly, in this equipoise [of cessation] one has no perceptual consciousness at all, but one is not without life or warmth. [403c20] The fact that there is no form of any kind in the formless realm will be extensively discussed at a later point. [89] Since we have refuted the four reasons offered by the Dārśāntikas as to why there is thought in the equipoise of cessation, we can conclude that] the equipoise of cessation is necessarily without thought (acittika).

17.9 [Equipoise of Cessation—the Subsequent Arising of Thought]

Thought is capable of being produced once again after the equipoise [of cessation] because it is projected by the moment of thought [just] prior to equipoise; [this prior moment of thought] acts as the contiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya) [for thought upon emerging from equipoise]. [90] Further, the duration [of the equipoise of cessation] is projected by the force [developed through] application (prayoga) [in practice before entering equipoise]. [91]

17.10 [Equipoise of Cessation—Existential Status]

Is the nature of the equipoise of cessation provisional or real? One should say that the nature of this equipoise is real, and not provisional, because it [has an activity: that is, it] obstructs thought and causes it not to arise (cittotpattipratibandhana).

On this point, the Sūtra master adopts a different interpretation and states: [403c25] “The moment of thought just prior to equipoise (samāpatticitta) is able to obstruct [thought, and not a discrete factor such as the equipoise of cessation.] That is to say, the moment of thought just prior to equipoise arises opposed to other moments of thought, and because it arises, other moments of thought are caused merely not to operate for a period of time (cittasya 'pravṛttimātra). That [moment of thought prior to equipoise] is able to project a corporeal basis opposed to other moments of thought (tadviruddhāśrayāpādanāt) and causes [that corporeal basis] to continue. [92] That state of mere non-operation is provisionally referred to
as an equipoise; there exists no discrete real entity, ["equipoise of cessation"]. The state of the mere non-operation [of moments of thought] that constitutes this provisional equipoise does not exist either before entering or after emerging from it, and therefore one can provisionally claim that this [equipoise] is included among conditioned factors. Or, [according to an alternative interpretation,] precisely that [particular condition of the] corporeal basis, which is projected by the moment of thought [just prior to] equipoise [404a1] and is caused to arise in such a way that (tathā) [thought does not arise], is provisionally established as an equipoise.”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I]

If [this interpretation] were accepted, from what would the moment of thought after [equipoise] arise? [The Sūtra master] states that the [moment of thought after equipoise] arises in dependence upon the body possessed of sense organs (sendriyāt kāyāt), because the body possessed of sense organs and thought contain each other’s seeds (anyonyabījaka).94

How is this theory reasonable, since, [if it were], the perceptual consciousness of all objects [present before one] would arise simultaneously at all times, [even when one is in the equipoise without thought].95 For those who claim that the moment of thought after [equipoise] arises in dependence upon the moment of thought prior [to equipoise], [404a5] even though the corporeal basis and the object-field exist at the same time, there is no simultaneous arising of [the perceptual consciousness of] all objects. This is due to the fact that there is no [moment of thought], other than [that moment of thought just prior to equipoise that could act as a] contiguous condition [in producing that perceptual consciousness within equipoise].

[However,] if one maintains that perceptual consciousness arises in dependence, not on causes and conditions of its own kind, but rather on the body possessed of sense organs, what factor constitutes the obstruction to the simultaneous arising of the perceptual consciousness of all objects at all times? I have heard that there are other masters who have proposed [precisely] this [false] view, maintaining that there is the simultaneous arising of many types of perceptual consciousness in one body.96 Now if one examines [the Sūtra master’s statements], it seems that since [their theory] resembles his own inherited tradition, he has made these statements with the desire to be consistent with their theory.

[O-V] Our statement [404a10] that perceptual consciousness arises after [the equipoise of cessation,] not from the moment of thought just prior to [equipoise], but rather from the body possessed of sense organs, was
made [only] with regard to states without thought. Since the seeds of thought are in the body possessed of sense organs, [perceptual consciousness after equipoise] arises only from those [seeds within the body] and is not dependent on the moment of thought prior [to equipoise]. In states in which there is thought (sacittaka), [however, the successive moments of thought] do not arise from those [seeds within the body].

[S] This [explanation] is also unreasonable because there should not be different causes for the arising of thought in each case: [that is, states in which there is thought and states without thought]. Consequently, when the various types of perceptual consciousness arise in states in which there is thought, they should further depend reciprocally upon seeds within the body possessed of sense organs, [and not upon causes of their own kind]. Why is this? [According to the opponent’s theory,] when one is in states without thought, there are, within the body possessed of sense organs, seeds of the moment of thought prior to equipoise, which oppose other moments of thought. The seeds of other moments of thought within the body possessed of sense organs are suppressed by [these seeds of the moment of thought just prior to equipoise]; there should then be no predominant force (anigbha) that can cause the arising of these other states of thought [upon emerging from equipoise]. One might claim that in these states [without thought] there are, within the body possessed of sense organs, unlimited seeds of thought that do not oppose [other] moments of thought, and that other moments of thought are produced [upon emerging from equipoise] from the predominant force of these seeds. [In that case,] states in which there is thought should also be so. How could [thought in states in which there is thought] be produced without depending upon [seeds within] the body possessed of sense organs?

Moreover, [to maintain that thought arises, not from causes of its own kind, but from seeds in the body possessed of sense organs] is like maintaining that sprouts of wheat or rice, and so on, are capable of being produced from [the assisting conditions of the] ground, and so on, alone, without depending upon seeds of their own kind as their cause. What thinking person could hear this and not roar with laughter?

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—II]

Now, if one maintains that the nature of the equipoise of cessation is merely provisional, it is not clear which factors serve as the basis of this provisional [equipoise]; it is not possible for a provisional entity to exist apart from its basis. Further, [if, as the Sūtra master claims, the equipoise of cessation]
were the mere non-operation [of other moments of thought] and its nature were nonexistence, how could he [then] say that it is included among conditioned factors? It would not exist before [one enters it], after [one emerges from it,] or in the present, because its nature as existent would forever be impossible. Nevertheless, he says that it exists and is included among conditioned factors. This is mere vain prattle and is totally without meaning.

[404a25] [The Sūtra master] might respond that this provisional equipoise does indeed have a basis, [that is, the corporeal basis of the sentient being giving rise to it]. [As he stated previously,] “that [particular condition of the] corporeal basis, which is projected by the moment of thought [just prior to] equipoise and is caused to arise in such a way that [thought does not arise], is provisionally established as an equipoise.” 101 [If this were so,] then this equipoise, [having an indeterminate factor, the body, as its basis,] should be included among the indeterminate factors. Since it is not possible for an indeterminate factor to be virtuous, [this interpretation contradicts the established doctrine that the equipoise of cessation is virtuous].

17.11 [Equipoise of Cessation—Conclusion]

Therefore, [one moment of] thought should only arise in dependence upon [other moments of] thought. It is not the case that the power of the moment of thought just prior to equipoise is capable of obstructing other moments of thought. From this it is known that, apart from the moment of thought just prior [to equipoise], there definitely exists a discrete factor that is capable of obstructing thought. [404b1] Even though the causes of the [arising of] thought—[that is, the sense organs and the object-field—still] exist in the state without thought, thought does not arise because of this [obstructing] factor. Precisely this discrete factor is referred to as the equipoise of cessation. Its nature is conditioned and is real, not provisional. [The duration of the equipoise of cessation] is projected by the intensity of the intention of thought just prior to equipoise [and is developed] by one who cultivates discernment.102 [This intention determines] the force of the equipoise of cessation and allows it to diminish gradually until it reaches a state of complete extinction. When there is no [further] activity of obstruction, mental perceptual consciousness is produced once again having the mental organ [sense sphere] (manas) and factors [sense sphere] (dharma) [that were present prior to equipoise] as its conditions.

[Given this explanation,] one should interpret accordingly the previously
discussed equipoise of non-conception and the state of non-conception.

Notes

1. See AKB 2.43–44 p. 69.24ff.: “[vs. 43] That referred to as [the equipoise of] cessation is also thus. [It is cultivated] in order to [reach a tranquil] abode; it is produced from the summit of existence; it is virtuous; its effects are received at two [specified times], and are undetermined; it belongs to noble ones; it is attained through application. [vs. 44a–b] In the case of the Buddha, it is acquired with enlightenment, and not before, because one attains [enlightenment] in thirty-four [consecutive] moments.”

2. Cf. AAS hsiā p. 986c25ff., p. 987a2ff.; MVB 152 p. 774a18ff.; TSŚ 13 no. 171 p. 346a11ff. The sphere of nothing at all is the third of four spheres (āyatana) within the formless realm (āruppādhatu). It acquires its name from the object of the mental application through which it is attained: that is, the concept that there is nothing at all. One enters the equipoise of cessation in the succeeding state: that is, the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, which is the fourth sphere of the formless realm. For these two spheres within the formless realm, see MVB 94 p. 433b7ff., 94 p. 433c1ff.; AKB 3.3b p. 112.6ff.; SAKV p. 256.5ff.; AKB 8.4 p. 436.3ff.; SAKV p. 671.10ff.

3. See Yuan-yū 9 p. 246a5ff.; MVB 152 p. 775b28, 152 p. 775c23ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā cites differences between the two states of equipoise in name, realm, location, practitioner, intended purpose, aversion, object of cessation, the thought and thought concomitants that are surpassed, effect, and time of maturation of effect. It (MVB 152 p. 776a11ff.) then includes additional distinctions introduced by the Abhidharmika, Vasumitra. Cf. MA 58 no. 210 p. 789a14ff., 58 no. 211 p. 791c23ff.

4. See MVB 152 p. 774c11ff. The summit of existence is equated with this fourth and most refined sphere in the formless realm—the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception.

5. See MVB 152 p. 774b10ff. Saṅghabhadra here adopts one of many interpretations given in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (152 p. 774c7ff., cf. 152 p. 775c14ff.), with a possibly significant change. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā, the first condition is said to be, “shunning all object-supports (ālambana).” Saṅghabhadra substitutes ‘thought’ for ‘object-supports’ that is, “shunning all states of thought (citta).” Whereas the wording of the *Mahāvibhāṣā is ambiguous on the question of whether or not thought occurs in the equipoise of cessation, Saṅghabhadra, through this substitution, clearly precludes the possibility of any thought within this equipoise. Cf. ŚAS 21 p. 663b1ff.

6. See Yuan-yū 9 p. 246b8ff.

7. See AKB 2.43c p. 70.10; Yuan-yū 9 p. 246b12ff. Cf. supra, translation, NAS 12 p. 401a26; Yuan-yū 9 p. 245b12ff., where the same phrase ‘defiled, indeterminate’ is taken to refer to a single class of indeterminate factors: that is, the obscured, indeterminate factors (nivṛtāyakrta).

8. If Saṅghabhadra’s characterization here of the effects of the prior equipoise of non-conception was indeed present within Hsüan-tsang’s manuscript of the *Nyāyañusāra, and does not represent Hsüan-tsang’s own explanatory addition (cf. ASPŚ 7 p. 807a16–17), it then confirms that Saṅghabhadra contradicts the view of the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVb 152 p. 776a9), which claims that the equipoise of non-conception has only one variety of matured effect: that is, effects that are produced in the next lifetime. In Hsüan-tsang’s
translation of the corresponding passage from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (*HTAKB* 5 p. 25a9; cf. *PAKB* 3 p. 183b13–14), the following sentence may have been added to clarify what he understands to be Vasubandhu's position concerning the effects of the equipoise of non-conception: "The effects of the previously described equipoise of non-conception are received only in the next lifetime." The fact that Hsüan-tsang's translations of corresponding sections from the *Nyāyānusāra* and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya differ lends some support to the possibility that this characterization of Saṅghabhadra's views on the prior equipoise of non-conception was present in the original manuscript of the *Nyāyānusāra* that Hsüan-tsang used for his translation. If, however, this sentence in the *Nyāyānusāra* is Hsüan-tsang's own explanatory addition, it may be the result of his interpretation of a related passage (see supra, translation, *NAS* 12 p. 401a29ff.), in which Saṅghabhadra's view concerning the effects of the equipoise of non-conception is initially stated.

9 Both Paramārtha (*PAKB* 3 p. 183b14ff.) and Hsüan-tsang (*HTAKB* 5 p. 25a10ff.) in their translations of this section of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya also suggest these four options for maturation. Cf. P'u-kuang 5 p. 97c26ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 146b16ff. Pradhan's Sanskrit edition (*AKB* 2.43c p. 70.12) is ambiguous, but would suggest that the third option, the "undetermined variety," is to be equated with the final option of "never receiving the effect: "The equipoise of cessation has effects that are to be received at two times: in the next lifetime, or in the third lifetime or after. It also has effects that are undetermined: that is, that never will develop into a matured effect." Dvayoj kālahor vedyā upapadyavedaniyā cā parśaryāvedaniyā ca. aniyata ca vipākam prati kadācin na vipacyate. Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 161.5) corroborates this interpretation and explains that one does not receive the effect of this equipoise of cessation because one attains *parinirvāṇa*.

10 The four aggregates produced by the equipoise of cessation include the four non-material aggregates: perceptual consciousness, feelings, concepts, and forces. Since the fifth aggregate, or form, is not found in the formless realm, production of the four non-material aggregates is sufficient to result in rebirth in the summit of existence within the formless realm. Therefore, the equipoise of cessation produces as its effect rebirth in the summit of existence, that is, in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception. See *MVB* 19 p. 97a19ff.: "[Through the equipoise of cessation one receives,] as a matured effect, the four aggregates in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception. Vitality and homogeneous character are to be excluded, since they are only the effects of action." Cf. *MVB* 118 p. 615a21ff.

11 The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 153 p. 779c+) offers several reasons why ordinary persons are unable to attain the equipoise of cessation. Saṅghabhadra here adopts the second reason: *MVB* 153 p. 780a3ff. No ordinary person within any region can surpass defilements that are to be abandoned by the path of vision, because one in the path of vision is, by definition, a noble one and no longer an ordinary person.

12 The phrase 'other masters' here would include Vasubandhu (*AKB* 2.43d p. 70.16–17): "Ordinary persons are not capable of giving rise to this equipoise of cessation because they dread complete extinction, and because [noble ones], having a resolution [to attain] *nirvāṇa* in the present life, give rise to [that equipoise] through the power of the noble path." Na hi prthiganā nirodayasamāpattin utpādayitum śaknuvantī uuccheda-bhūrūtaå āryamārgṣabaleṇa ca 'tpādenād drṣṭādharmanirvāṇasya tadaḥhūmiktaḥ. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, this view is attributed to the master, Bhadana: *MVB* 153 p. 780a18ff. Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 161.15ff.) gives two interpretations of the phrase *drṣṭādharmanirvāṇasya tadaḥhūmiktaḥ*. According to the first, *tad* refers to the equipoise of cessation, which is then equated with *nirvāṇa* in the present life as expressed in the previous compound: "[A noble one] is resolved with regard to that [equipoise of cessation] considering it to be this *nirvāṇa* in the present life," *dṛṣṭe janmani etan nirvāṇam*. 
Equipoise of Cessation

According to the second interpretation, the compound *drṣṭadharmanirvāṇasya* is read as *drṣṭanirvāṇasya*—that is, as a possessive compound (*bahuvṛti*) referring to the noble one: “In the case of a noble one, for whom nirvāṇa is present, [that noble one] is resolved with regard to that [equipoise], and no other one [is so resolved].” *drṣṭanirvāṇa āryaṁ tāṁ adhimucyate nā 'nya iti.*

13 Saṅghabhādra, therefore, rejects this theory offered by Vasubandhu and others concerning the distinction between the equipoise of ordinary persons and that of noble ones. Cf. *ADV* no. 136c–d p. 93.11–12. Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 100b22, esp. p. 100c9ff.; cf. P'u-kuang 5 p. 98a18ff.) counters Saṅghabhādra’s criticism as follows. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 152 p. 773b9ff.) states that ordinary persons cannot enter the equipoise of non-conception in the formless realm because they fear the resulting cessation of both thought and form. This fear, the extinction of thought that is coupled with the absence of form can indeed be used as a reason why ordinary persons do not enter the equipoise of cessation. Further, a noble one’s resolution to attain nirvāṇa and an ordinary person’s desire for liberation should be distinguished from one another. Ordinary persons falsely consider the equipoise of non-conception to be the path to deliverance and further consider non-conception to be liberation itself. Noble ones, however, do not consider the equipoise of cessation to be nirvāṇa; it merely resembles nirvāṇa and gives one a presentiment of the state of nirvāṇa, or acts as a sign that one will attain it. See also *MVB* 152 p. 775b28ff.; *AKB* 4.56 p. 232.21ff.: “Upon emerging from the equipoise of cessation, one attains the highest tranquility of thought because this equipoise resembles nirvāṇa.” *niruddhasamāpattiyyutthitāḥ parāṁ cittadāntiṁ labhate. nirvāṇasadṛśatvāt samāpattayāt.* Cf. Sakurabe (1969a) 320; *AAS* hsia p. 987a2ff.; Yūan-yū 9 p. 246c16ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 98a6ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 327c3ff.; Shūshō 9 p. 184c4ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 157a4ff.

14 If this equipoise of cessation were attained by detachment, then all noble ones would attain it automatically as soon as they abandon the defilements of the previous sphere of nothing at all within the formless realm. Accordingly, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*MVB* 152 p. 775a4ff.) describes two types of sentient beings in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception: those who attain that sphere through detachment, and those in the equipoise of cessation who attain that equipoise, and consequently that sphere, only through application. See also Yūan-yū 9 p. 246d7ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 98a21ff.

15 See *NAS* 12 p. 401c28ff.; *AKB* 2.44a p. 70.21ff.; *SAKV* p. 161.31ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 98a26ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 327d1ff.; esp. Kaidō 5 p. 101a7ff.

16 See *AAS* hsia p. 987a11ff.: “Only the Buddha acquires the equipoise of cessation through detachment. When he first [acquires] the knowledge of destruction, because he is already able to have mastery with regard to the arising of this equipoise, it is referred to as ‘acquired.’” The knowledge of destruction refers to the knowledge of the destruction of all fluxes. The knowledge of destruction together with the knowledge of non-arising constitute enlightenment, which marks the stage of becoming a buddha. See *MVB* 46 p. 240b20, 96 p. 496b18, 102 p. 527c6ff.; *AKB* 4.45a p. 365.10ff.; 6.67a p. 382.24ff. For a detailed description of these two varieties of knowledge, see *AKB* 7.7 p. 394.5ff.: The knowledge of destruction is applied to the four noble truths in such a way that suffering has been completely understood (parijñāta), the origin of suffering has been abandoned (parihīna), the cessation of suffering has been actualized (sāksākrta), and the path leading to the cessation of suffering has been cultivated (bhāvita). The knowledge of non-arising is the knowledge that this complete understanding, abandonment, actualization, and cultivation need not be performed again.

17 Yūan-yū (Yūan-yū 9 p. 247a7ff.) offers an interpretation of Saṅghabhādra’s response that turns upon Vasubandhu’s own interpretation of the various stages of possession. Yūan-yū suggests that Saṅghabhādra is pointing out an inconsistency between, on one hand, Vasubandhu’s terminology for and analysis of the functioning of possession and, on the other, the statement here that the knowledge of destruction is “acquired”
at the time one becomes a buddha. That is to say, according to Vasubandhu's interpretation, a factor can be described as "acquired" only in that first moment when it is on the point of arising; when it is present in the second moment and thereafter the term 'accompaniment' should be used. The final group of defilements under discussion here is abandoned and the knowledge of destruction is on the point of arising in the stage of adamantine concentration immediately prior to attaining enlightenment and becoming a buddha. Thus, in describing the possession of the knowledge of destruction at the time of enlightenment, which follows the stage of adamantine concentration, Vasubandhu should use the term 'accompaniment,' and not 'acquisition.' Cf. Kaidö 5 p.101b20ff.


19 See MVB 153 p. 780b26ff.: "Because [the Buddha] has already attained a state of thought characteristic of entrance into and emergence from this equipoise [of cessation], he is referred to as one who is liberated through both parts. But because he has not attained that equipoise in its nature, [that is to say, not actualized it], for this reason, it is said to be attained through detachment. [This equipoise of cessation] will not arise through application at a subsequent time because a bodhisattva realizes the incomparable right complete enlightenment in thirty-four consecutive moments of thought."


21 See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 328a12ff.; cf. Yüan-yü 9 p. 247a18ff. This rule, which might be called "contiguous assimilation," a variety of metonymy, is quite common in Abhidharma argumentation. When two stages are closely related, whether causally, temporally, or spatially, the name or characteristics of one stage can be applied, in either direction, to the other. In this case, the state of the adamantine concentration (= A) immediately precedes that time when one becomes a buddha (= B). Hence, Vasubandhu could be understood as saying that this equipoise of cessation, though actually attained in the stage of the adamantine concentration, is acquired at the time when one becomes a buddha (A → B); or he could simply be applying the name, 'the time when one becomes a buddha,' to the adamantine concentration (B → A).

22 In this section, Saṅghabhādra recounts an exchange from the Abhidharma-kosa-bhāsya (AKB 2.44a p. 70.25ff.; SAKV p. 162.8ff.) between Vasubandhu, purporting to represent the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāsika position, and two opponents: the Westerners (pāścātya) and the Outsiders (bahirdēśaka). Vasubandhu does not clarify his own position in this argument.

23 One who is "liberated through both parts" (ubhayatobhāgavimukta) is the last of seven varieties of individuals distinguished according to practice. This seventh type of practitioner refers to one who has not only destroyed the fluxes through insight but also has realized all eight liberations directly with the body. See MVB 54 p. 278c19ff.; Puggalapaññatti, Morris (1883) 14, 72; de Silva (1978). This stage of "liberation through both parts" is then dependent upon attaining the equipoise of cessation. As Vasubandhu (AKB 6.64a–b p. 381.3) states: "One who has attained the equipoise of cessation is liberated through both parts." yo nirodhasamāptilābhi sa ubhayatobhāgavimuktah. Specifically, the term 'liberation through both parts' is defined as liberation of thought from both the obstacle of defilements (klesāvaraṇa) through insight (prajñā) and the obstacle to the eight liberations (vimokṣāvaraṇa) through concentration (samādhi). See MVB 54 p. 279a10ff.; AKB 6.64a–b p. 381.3ff.; SAKV p. 162.8ff., p. 597.8ff. The final of these eight liberations is also identified with the equipoise of cessation. See MVB 84 p. 434b22ff., 141 p. 727a4ff., 152 p. 776a19ff.; AKB 8.33a p. 455.20ff. Thus, the opponent here demands to know how the Buddha can be said to be "liberated through
both parts" without first attaining the equipoise of cessation, since one can only be said to have realized the eight liberations through the attainment of this equipoise, which constitutes the final eighth liberation.

24 P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 5 p. 98b19ff.) raises the following objection. Previously, in the section on possession (see supra, translation, NAS 12 p. 399a19ff.), it was stated that the non-possession of a factor is discarded through the possession of that factor. If the Buddha does not attain the equipoise of cessation, how can you say that he has "discarded its non-accompaniment, [or non-possession]?" In response, P'u-kuang suggests that there are two types of non-accompaniment: that dependent upon the body of a bodhisattva, and that dependent upon the body of a buddha. Thus, the Buddha can be said to have discarded the non-accompaniment of the equipoise of cessation in the sense that he has abandoned that variety of non-accompaniment that is dependent upon the body of a bodhisattva. Cf. MVB 153 p. 780b15ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 328a17ff.; Yuan-yu 9 p. 247b9ff.

25 Yasomitra (SAKV p. 162.11ff.) recounts in detail this view of the Westerners: Bodhisattvas, in their last lifetime (caramabhavika), having attained the summit of existence (bhavāgralabhī bhūtva), give rise to the path of vision supported by a corporeal basis of the fourth level of trance (caturthadhyānasamniśrayena) within the realm of form. Emerging from that path of vision, the bodhisattva enters the summit of existence, and, from there, enters the equipoise of cessation. Emerging from that equipoise, once again supported by a corporeal basis of the fourth level of trance in the realm of form, the bodhisattva abandons the defilements to be abandoned by the path of cultivation belonging to the summit of existence (bhavāgrikabhāvanāpahārātavyaklesaprahaṇānta kṛtya). Beginning from the moment of attaining the knowledge of destruction, the bodhisattva is incomparably, rightly, and completely enlightened (anuttarasamāyaksambuddho bhave). Thus, the Westerners claim that a bodhisattva gives rise to the equipoise of cessation after emerging from the path of vision and before entering the path of cultivation. Cf. VSŚ 4 p. 748c5ff. See also Yuan-yu 9 p. 247b18ff.; MVB 54 p. 279a4ff., 153 p. 780a29ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 98c3ff.

26 See MVB 54 p. 279a5ff., 153 p. 780b7ff. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44b p. 71.7ff.) suggests his skepticism concerning this Sarvastivāda-Vaihāśika view through the use of the particle, kīla. For an overview of the positions of the various Sarvāstivādin groups on this question, see Kawamura (1974) 33.

27 For a description of these thirty-four moments, see MVB 153 p. 780b29ff.; AKB 6.27–28 p. 351.7ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 98c14ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 328b11ff.

28 Here, Saṅghabhadra omits an objection raised in the Abhidharmakosābhaṣya (AKB 2.44b p. 71.11–12) by the Westerners: "What fault would be incurred if [the bodhisattva] made present a dissimilar moment of thought in the midst [of these thirty-four consecutive moments]?" kim punaḥ syad yadi visahāgacchitam anītārā sanmukhiṣṭuryāt. This objection is based on the following assumptions. When one becomes a noble one in the first moment of the path of vision, a moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes arises; all subsequent moments of thought until the attainment of enlightenment are, similarly, not tending toward the fluxes. The equipoise of cessation is a factor tending toward the fluxes and is produced by a moment of thought tending toward the fluxes. Hence, if this equipoise is to be produced, a dissimilar moment of thought—that is, one tending toward the fluxes—must arise in the midst of a series of similar moments not tending toward the fluxes. Thus, since the Westerners claim that a bodhisattva gives rise to that equipoise of cessation prior to enlightenment, it would be necessary for the bodhisattva to make present a dissimilar moment of thought in the midst of these thirty-four consecutive moments. Cf. MVB 153 p. 780b7ff.

29 Pradhan's Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakosābhaṣya (AKB 2.44b p. 71.13) reads: "...it is not the case that they do not swerve from the path tending toward
the fluxes.'... na tu āsravamārgāvyutthānāt. However, both Chinese translations, all commentaries, and the logic of the argument suggest that this passage be emended to read: na tu anāsravamārgāvyutthānāt. See HTAKB 5 p. 25b11; PAKB 3 p. 183c14–15; P’u-kuang 5 p. 98c25ff.; Yūn-ye 9 p. 247c18; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 328c7.

30 See MA 56 no. 204 p. 777a12ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā gives many reasons why the cross-legged position is unsurpassed as a position for meditation: MVB 39 p. 204b3ff.

31 Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44b p. 71.15) attributes this statement to the Outsiders (bahirdesaka).

32 See Yūn-ye 9 p. 247c6ff.

33 See MA 59 no. 211 p. 792a19ff.; SA 21 no. 568 p. 150c1ff.; MN no. 43 Mahāvedallasutta 1: 296–297. Cf. TSŚ 13 no. 170 p. 344a23ff.; NAS 8 p. 372a29ff. Yūn-ye (Yūn-ye 9 p. 248a9ff.) explains that the term ‘contact’ is used because when thought emerges from the equipoise of cessation, it is like running into a wall in the dark.

34 See MVB 153 p. 781b12ff.; Yūn-ye 9 p. 248a1ff. According to this first interpretation, the three types of contact mentioned in this sūtra quotation—motionless, nothing at all, and signless—correspond, respectively, to voidness, the wishless, and the signless, or to the three gates of liberation (vimokṣaṃukhātraya). See MVB 104 p.539c18ff.; AKB 8.25b p. 450.6ff. Yūn-ye gives the following explanation: (1) Grasping the self and what belongs to the self produces agitation. Voidness and non-self characteristic of the equipoise of cessation are able to counteract this agitation; hence, the equipoise is referred to as “motionless.” Contact associated with thought that has arisen from this equipoise is, therefore, motionless and characterized by voidness. (2) Thought that has passion toward objects appropriates objects for itself. Concentration of thought characteristic of the equipoise of cessation is able to remove these objects resulting in “nothing at all.” The second form of contact is, thus, contact with nothing at all and is characterized as wishless. (3) The equipoise of cessation, like nirvāṇa, is devoid of the discriminated signs or characteristics found in saṁsāra. Thus, this equipoise is “signless,” and the contact associated with thought arising from it is characterized as signless.

35 See MVB 153 p. 781b10ff.; Yūn-ye 9 p. 248a11ff. This interpretation is attributed to Vasumitra. Thought that emerges from the equipoise of cessation is located in the sphere of the infinity of perceptual consciousness, the sphere of nothing at all, or the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception. Thought in each of these three spheres is associated, respectively, with contact that is motionless, wishless, or signless. Even though one cannot enter the sphere of the infinity of space from the equipoise of cessation, it is mentioned here together with the sphere of the infinity of perceptual consciousness, both of which are characterized as motionless.

36 Yūn-ye (Yūn-ye 9 p. 248a15ff.) explains: “Because the characteristics of conception and non-conception are not clearly discriminated in the summit of existence, it is referred to as signless. Since even in the summit of existence, one cannot say that there is no conception, the four spheres of the formless realm are referred to as having conception.”

37 See MVB 153 p. 778a1ff.

38 See Yūn-ye 9 p. 248a17ff. If thought that emerges from the equipoise of cessation tends toward the fluxes, one enters the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, or one bypasses that sphere and enters the sphere of nothing at all. If thought that emerges from the equipoise of cessation does not tend toward the fluxes, one enters the sphere of nothing at all, or one bypasses that sphere and enters the sphere of the infinity of perceptual consciousness. One cannot enter the sphere of the infinity of space from the equipoise of cessation. Cf. Shūshō 9 p. 186a24ff.

The equipoise of cessation is produced for the first time among human beings. The location of these two states of equipoise and the region in which one gives rise to them must be clearly distinguished. For example, the equipoise of non-conception is located in the fourth level of trance within the realm of form. However, it is produced by one whose corporeal basis is located either in the realm of desire or in the realm of form. Similarly, the equipoise of cessation is located in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception within the formless realm; one enters it, however, supported by a corporeal basis in the realm of desire or in the realm of form.

Sanghabhadra refers to three theories concerning the arising of the equipoise of non-conception presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 152 p. 773b11ff.). For a discussion of these theories, see Shūshō 9 p. 188c17ff. For the arising of the equipoise of cessation, see MVB 153 p. 779b13ff. See also P‘u-kuang 5 p. 99a3ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 544b29; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 328c13ff.; Fujaku 3 p. 159a6ff.; Kaido 5 p. 102a21ff.

The equipoise of non-conception and the state of non-conception are related, respectively, as the cause of maturation (vipakahetu) and the matured effect (vipakaphala). This causal relation of maturation requires both a temporal and spatial interval. In certain other causal relations, the cause and the effect may be simultaneous: for example, associated causes (samprayuktahetu) such as thought and thought concomitants; or simultaneous causes (sahabhūhetu) such as the four characteristics indicating the conditioned nature of conditioned factors (samskrtaḥkṣaṇa) and all conditioned factors, the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta), and possession (prāpti) and the factors possessed. See Sakurabe (1969b) 68ff.

The term vyavacāra, or vyavakāra, is used as a synonym for skandha. For various interpretations of the term, see de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) 2: 207 note 4. The *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 192 p. 959b11ff.) suggests that the term vyavacāra was the term used by former buddhas because it was better understood by the disciples of their time; Śākyamuni Buddha used the term skandha for the same reason. The term vyavacāra, or “wandering,” was chosen because it indicates the interdependence of the aggregates over a period of time; those of a past birth produce those of the present birth, and so on.

The sentient beings referred to here have developed moments of thought of a category dissimilar from those moments of thought characteristic of the realm of form, which tend toward the fluxes and belong to the realm of form. These dissimilar moments of thought would include, for example, thoughts that do not tend toward the fluxes (anāsravacitta), or moments of thought that belong to another realm. Since these dissimilar moments of thought do not belong to the realm of form, such sentient beings lack the four mental aggregates characteristic of the realm of form.

When practicing the equipoise of non-conception or the equipoise of cessation, both of which lack thought and thought concomitants, sentient beings, whose corporeal bases are within the realm of form, also lack thought and thought concomitants. Such sentient beings possess only form and factors dissociated from thought: that is, the form aggregate and those forces among the forces aggregates that are dissociated from thought.

Sentient beings born among the gods without conception have a corporeal basis within the realm of form, but lack thought and thought concomitants. Like those practicing the equipoise of non-conception or the equipoise of cessation, these gods without conception possess only the form and the forces aggregate (or certain factors dissociated from thought).
17. Notes


48 Since this śāstra passage refers to sentient beings of the realm of form who enter the equipoise of non-conception or cessation, it contradicts the view of those who claim that one enters these states of equipoise with a corporeal basis only in the realm of desire.

49 See SAHS 9 p. 943a7–8, which claims that the equipoise of non-conception is cultivated, or specifically, that one escapes conception for the first time only with a corporeal basis in the realm of desire. For a lengthy treatment of this view, see Shūshō 9 p. 189a25ff.

50 See Yūn-yū 9 p. 248c14ff. The buddhas expound the teaching and their disciples interpret the teaching only within the realm of desire. These teachings stimulate one to cultivate the path in order to abandon defilements and, therefore, also stimulate one to cultivate the equipoise of cessation. Further, one develops great power from one's application directed toward the abandonment of defilements in the realm of desire. As the realm of form and the formless realm have fewer defilements, the power developed in those regions is weaker. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 153 p. 779b9ff.) explains this point further, stating that the equipoise of cessation, unlike other states of concentration, is produced for the first time only through the power of application. Since it has never been produced before, it is not the result of a similar previous cause. Since it is not of the nature of action, it is not the result of action. Finally, it does not arise automatically after the cosmic destruction at the end of the cycle, because the formless realm is not so destroyed.

51 See MVB 153 p. 779b13ff.

52 See Yūn-yū 9 p. 248c17ff. A sentient being in an equipoise without thought has two aggregates: the form aggregate (or the corporeal basis), and the forces aggregate (or certain factors dissociated from thought within the forces aggregates, including vitality, homogeneous character, possession, non-possession, the four characteristics of conditioned factors, the equipoise of cessation and of non-conception, and the state of non-conception). Beings reborn in the formless realm have four aggregates, excluding the form aggregate. Since the forces aggregate (or certain factors dissociated from thought) exists in all types of existence, all other beings have five aggregates.


54 Both the Taishō and the Chi-sha editions of the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 12 p. 402c17; NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 19b20) use the phrase sui shou t-show, while Hsüan-tsang's translations of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (HTAKB 5 p. 25c4) and of Saṅghabhadra's *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā (ASPS 7 p. 807c27) use the phrase sui shou i-ch'ü.


56 This list represents a summary of the preceding discussion, into which additional topics have been inserted. Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 248d12ff.) refers to these six distinguishing characteristics and adds four similar characteristics, which should be understood as implicit in the previous discussion. The similar characteristics include their intrinsic nature, their moral quality, the time period of their possession, and the location
of their supporting corporeal basis. See also AKB 2.44d p. 72.13ff.; SAKV p. 166.12ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 99c29ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 545a20ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 329a14ff.

57 In the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 152 p. 775a22ff.), this question is raised in implicit criticism of the views of the Dārśāntikas, who claim that only the two specific mental events of conception and feelings are extinguished in the equipoise of cessation. The same objection could be raised against the name 'equipoise of non-conception.' See AKB 2.44d p. 72.17ff.; SAKV p. 166.29ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 100a9ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 329c9ff. Cf. TSS 13 no. 171 p. 345a15ff.

58 MVB 152 p. 775b9ff.: "Conception and feelings are able to give rise to two types of defilements: desires and [false] views. Desires arise through the power of feelings, [false] views, through the power of conception. All defilements have these two as their head." Thus, the two categories—desires and false views—represent all defilements; false views include all those defilements to be abandoned by the path of vision, and desires, those to be abandoned by the path of cultivation.

59 For the five appropriative aggregates (upādānakandha), see AKB 1.8a-b p. 5.-9ff.; NAS 1 p. 333a12ff. For the aggregates of feelings and of conception, see AKB 1.14c-d p. 10.13ff.; NAS 2 p. 338c2ff. The five aggregates present dangers because they constitute the object for appropriation or for views of self: the four mental aggregates represent the self, and the form aggregate represents what belongs to the self. For the dangers in grasping the self, see AKB 9 p. 466.14ff. For a detailed discussion of the relation between the five aggregates and the views of self and what belongs to self, see MVB 8 p. 36a9ff.

60 The phrase 'all associated factors' refers to all mental associated factors: namely, the thought concomitants that are associated with thought. Thus, even though the equipoise of cessation is referred to simply as the "equipoise of the cessation of conception and feelings," all thought concomitants are understood to be extinguished together with those two.

61 Location unknown.
62 Location unknown.
63 Location unknown.
64 Location unknown.

65 See MVB 152 p. 774a14ff., where the Dārśāntikas and Vibhajyavāḍins are cited as maintaining that subtle thought remains in the equipoise of cessation. Cf. Yüan-yü 9 p. 249b2ff., who identifies the Dārśāntikas as the group of Kumāralāṭa; ADV no. 136 p. 93.14ff. For a lengthy treatment of this issue of the possibility of mental events in the equipoise of cessation, see also the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 783c29ff; Lamotte (1936) 237ff.

66 MVB 152 p. 774a15: "Those [masters] maintain that there are no sentient beings who are without form; accordingly, there is no state of equipoise that is without thought." Cf. de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) 2: 212 note 2, who follows Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Saeki ([1886] 1978) 1: 211: "There are no sentient beings who are without thought and also without form; accordingly, there is no state of equipoise that is without thought."

67 MVB 152 p. 774a16ff. The Dārśāntikas and Vibhajyavāḍins claim that life (āyus) occurs in conformity with thought. As a result, if thought were completely extinguished in equipoise, life would also be abandoned. See MVB 16 p. 81a14ff., 151 p. 770c5ff.

68 Location unknown. It is possible that the sūtra passage mentioned in the following note is intended here also, or that a reference is made to another version of this sūtra that has not been preserved.

69 See MN no. 43 Mahāvedallasutta 1: 295ff.; MA 58 no. 210 p. 789a1ff., 58 no. 211 p. 791c9ff. These sūtras claim that the conjunction of three factors—life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness—determine the living state; their abandonment defines death.
The same sūtra (MA 58 no. 210 p. 789a7ff., 58 no. 211 p. 791c16ff.) describes the distinction between the equipoise of cessation and the state of death: "For one who is dead, life is extinguished, warmth disappears, and the controlling faculties (indriya) are destroyed; for one in the equipoise of cessation, this is not the case." It is important to note that even though the presence or absence of perceptual consciousness is used as a criterion in this sūtra for the determination of life as opposed to death, it is not used as a criterion for distinguishing between the state of death and the equipoise of cessation; this leaves the possibility that some kind of perceptual consciousness is present in the equipoise of cessation. Cf. SA 21 no. 568 p. 150b11ff.

70 Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44d p. 72.24ff.) presents the same argument contrasting the theories of Vasumitra and Ghoṣaka: "Vasumitra has said in the Paripṛcchā (śāstra): 'Those who claim that the equipoise of cessation is without thought incur this fault, but I claim that there is thought in this equipoise [and, therefore, am free from any such fault].' Ghoṣaka replies: 'This is not the case because the Lord has said: 'When there is perceptual consciousness, there is the collocation of the three—the sense organ, the object-field, and perceptual consciousness—which is, contact, and with contact as their condition, there are feelings, conception, and volition.'" bhadantavasumitrās tu aha paripṛcchāyārān. yasyā cittikā nirodhasamāpattīs tasyai 'ya daśo mama tu sacittikā samāpattīr iti. bhadantaghoṣaka aha tad idam no 'papadyate satī hi viññāne trayañāṁ samnipiṭāḥ sparsāḥ. sparsapratyayā ca vedanā saññāṁ cetanā 'ty uktam bhagavatā. See also the Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa T 31 (1609) p. 784a2ff. According to P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 5 p. 100b6ff.), this Vasumitra is not the Abhidhāmikā cited frequently in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 167.21ff.) identifies Vasumitra as an Abhidhāmikā and author of the *Pañcavastuka. See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 329d15ff.; Shūshō 5 p. 189c12ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 104a22ff.; esp. Fudō 5 p. 160a13. For a detailed treatment of the various Vasumitrās, see Yamada (1959) 391ff.

71 See SA 8 no. 221 p. 55a19, 11 no. 273 p. 72c9ff.; SN 12.5 Duddhasutta 2: 72; AKB 9 p. 465.11ff.: caśoṣaḥ pratitya rūpāṇi co 'papadyate caśoṣuvaśījnānaṁ trayañāṁ samnipiṭāḥ sparsāḥ sparśasahajatā ca vedanā saññāṁ cetanā. The Sanskrit and the Pāli, (tīṇnaṁ saññhati phassu) suggest that "the collocation of the three is contact." However, since, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāsikas, contact is not simply a provisional collocation of three elements, but rather a separately existing real entity, the translation, "results from," is more appropriate here. The existential status of contact serves as the focus for lengthy arguments among the Abhidharma schools: MVB 149 p. 760a27ff.; NAS 10 p. 384b12ff.; AKB 3.30 p. 143.1ff.; NAS 26 p. 485c23ff.

72 If there were a type of perceptual consciousness that arises apart from conception and feelings, it could remain in the equipoise of cessation. This anticipates the later controversies concerning the nature of thought and the Yogācāra theory of the store-consciousness (ālayavijñāna). See Schmithausen (1987) 1: 18ff., 34ff.

73 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 249c9ff.

74 These two sūtra passages are cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 161 p. 818b11ff., 161 p. 818b17ff.) in a discussion of the meaning of the term saha as found in a passage similar to the second passage concerning the mindfulness limb of enlightenment. For references in the sūtras to Mandhātā, see Akanuma ([1931] 1975) 407; Malalasekera ([1937–1938] 1983) 2: 44ff.

75 The disagreeable action is king Mandhātā's evil moment of thought, and the disagreeable effect, his fall to a less desirable rebirth state.

76 For an explanation of Diināga's treatment of vyabhicāra, see Hayes (1988) 155ff.

77 Location unknown.

78 Location unknown.

79 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 249d13ff.
For an extensive discussion of causation, see MVB 16–19 p. 79ff.a16ff.; AKB 2.49ff. p. 82.19ff.; NAS 15ff. p. 416b7ff. Among the six causes, the simultaneous cause (saḥahāḥetu), associated cause (saṃprayuktahetu), and contiguous condition (saṃantarapratyaya) are the most significant in discussions of mental activity.

See SA 21 no. 568 p. 150b13ff.; SN 41.7 Dutiyakāmabhūsutta 4: 294. Mental forces are defined (SA 21 no. 568 p. 150a29ff.) as follows: “Mental forces are conception and volition. They are based on thought, belong to thought, and occur in conformity with thought; therefore, mental forces are conception and volition.” Cf. MVB 153 p. 780c23ff.

See SA 8 no. 221 p. 55a20; SN 12.5 Dukkhasutta 2: 72; SA 12 no. 284 p. 79b26ff.; SN 12.6 Mahārukkhasutta 2: 87. The following argument is cited by Vasubandhu (AKB 2.44d p. 72.28ff.; Cf. SAKV p. 167.26ff.), presumably as a continuation of the argument between Vasumitra and Ghoṣaka.


Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 167.30) attributes this response to Ghoṣaka. See P’u-kuang 5 p. 100c6ff. Shen-t’ai 5 p. 330a3ff.

See Yuán-yü 9 p. 250a16ff. The opponent claims that perceptual consciousness can occur without contact, and without contact, there will be no condition for the production of feelings and conception. Therefore, perceptual consciousness can occur in the equipoise of cessation without feelings and conception. However, for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, if perceptual consciousness occurs, the other two conditions—the basis and the object-support—must also be present, and, with these three present, contact necessarily arises; contact then provides the condition for the production of feelings and conception.

See Yuán-yü 9 p. 251b6ff. For a discussion of the two thought concomitants, ssu and lū, and a reference to the Dārśāntika view that ssu and lū are merely varieties of thought, and not distinct thought concomitants or separately existing real entities, see MVB 42 p. 216b21ff. Though, from this discussion in the *Mahāvibbāṣā, ssu and lū would appear to be two distinct factors, and not a single compound, their Sanskrit equivalents are unclear. Ssu is used by Hsūn-tsang as an equivalent for cetanā, and is described as such in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB 42 p. 216c4ff. Lū is identified with prajñā (MVB 42 p. 216c20ff.), but the Sanskrit equivalent is uncertain.

Cf. TSS 13 no. 171 p. 345b18ff.

See AKB 8.3c–d p. 435.20ff.; NAS 77 p. 757a4ff.

Saṅghabhadra here responds to perhaps the central issue in the opponents’ objections to these states of equipoise without thought: that is, if thought is extinguished for a long time in equipoise, how can thought be produced again after emerging from it? See Yuán-yü 9 p. 250c3ff. The opponent assumes that the contiguous conditioning relation must be immediately contiguous temporally; since more than one moment has elapsed in the state of equipoise without thought, contiguous conditioning cannot be used to explain the arising of thought after equipoise. For the operation of contiguous conditioning especially in relation to states of equipoise without thought, see MVB 11 p. 52b3ff., 152 p. 777b4ff., 153 p. 778a12ff.; AKB 2.62a–b p. 98.24ff., esp. p. 99.21ff. See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 100a25ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 545b3ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 329d5ff.; SAKV p. 167.8ff.; Shūshō 9 p. 194a7ff.

See Yuán-yü 9 p. 250c5ff. The implied objection to which Saṅghabhadra responds is as follows. Since the contiguous conditions (saṃantarapratyaya) that will give rise to thought when one emerges from the equipoise cannot be distinguished in
terms of when they will produce their effect, how can the variation in the duration of the equipoise of cessation be explained? Saṅghabhadra suggests that variation in the duration of the equipoise can be explained by the force of the application that projects it.

Hsüan-tsang's translations (HTAKB 5 p. 26a15; NAS 13 p. 403c27) and Paramārtha's translation (PAKB 3 p. 184b19) include phrases not found in Pradhan's Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.44d p. 73.9). Hsüan-tsang translates: “It is able to project a corporeal basis opposed to other moments of thought and causes [that corporeal basis] to continue.” Paramārtha translates: “This [thought prior to] equipoise projects a stream, which is opposed to other moments of thought, as the corporeal basis.” Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 168.14) glosses the term āśraya with samātana; thus, the term samātana probably did not appear in the manuscript of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya used by Yaśomitra. Whether samātana appeared in the manuscripts used by Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha, or whether its addition is merely the result of commentarial interpolation is unclear.

See AKB 2.44d p. 73.7ff.: “[Thought] is obstructed by the moment of thought just prior to equipoise alone, [and not by a discrete factor, namely, the equipoise of cessation]. For it is that very moment of thought just prior to equipoise that arises opposed to other moments of thought, by which there is the mere non-operation of thought for a period of time, because [that moment of thought prior to equipoise] projects a corporeal basis opposed to [other moments of thought]. It is that state of the mere non-operation [of moments of thought] that is provisionally referred to as an equipoise. [This non-operation of moments of thought that constitutes the provisional equipoise] did not exist before entering [the equipoise] nor will it exist after emerging from [the equipoise], and therefore, this [equipoise] is provisionally referred to as conditioned. Or, the condition of the corporeal basis, [projected by the moment of thought just prior to equipoise] in such a way that [thought does not arise], is [ provisionally referred to as an] equipoise.” samāpatticittenai 'va tatkālīaśāntam āśraya samāpatticittam eva hi tac cittānuravipruddham utpadaye yena kālāntaram cittasya praśrītāmātām bhaavati tad viruddhāśrayāpādam. ya 'samāpattire tathā āśrayante tae ca 'prāśrītāmārān. na pūrvam āsīt na pāścāt bhavati vyutthāasye 'ti samākṛtā 'sa samāpattih āśrayante. atha āśrayante 'va tathā samāpādānaṁ samāpattih. According to the first interpretation, the equipoise of cessation is the state of the mere non-operation of moments of thought; it depends upon a corporeal basis projected by the moment of thought just prior to equipoise. According to the second interpretation, the equipoise of cessation is a particular condition of the corporeal basis effected by the moment of thought prior to equipoise. See SAKV p. 168.7ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 100c24ff.; Pa-pao 5 p. 545b29ff. The term samāpādāna in the second interpretation requires further interpretation. Hsüan-tsang (HTAKB 5 p. 26a18; NAS 13 p. 404a1) would appear to equate samāpādāna with the arising of the corporeal basis. For Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 168.20), samāpādāna refers to a “certain state (tathāavyavasthānam) or particular condition” (avasthāviveśaṁ) of the corporeal basis. Paramārtha (PAKB 3 p. 184b22) interprets samāpādāna as “equilibration,” and the phrase in which it is used as “this equipoise is only able to equilibrate the corporeal basis in this way.” This interpretation would be consistent with the immediately preceding section of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, in which Vasubandhu explains the meaning of the term ‘equipoise’ as “equilibrating the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūtasamatāpādāna).” In accordance with this prior section, the term samāpādāna here also could be understood as samatāpādāna, that is, as “equilibrating the four fundamental material elements or the corporeal basis.” Cf. Sakurabe (1969a) 326.

See AKB 2.44d p. 72.21ff. Vasubandhu attributes this opinion to the ancient masters (pūrvācārya), whom Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 167.16) identifies as the Sautrāntikas.
For the identity of the ancient masters (pūrva-cārya) as early Yogācāra masters, see Schmithausen (1987b) 286 note 170; Hakamaya (1986). Just as, after existence in the formless realm, form arises only from thought, not from previous form, so also after the equipoise of cessation, thought arises from form, not from a previous moment of thought.

Perceptual consciousness arises in dependence upon a sense organ, or basis (indriya, āśraya), an object-field, or object-support (viṣaya, ālambana), and, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the contiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya) of the prior moment of thought: MVB 11 p. 52c11ff., 152 p. 777b3ff. If this last condition of the contiguous series of thoughts were not required, and thought arose in dependence simply upon seeds within the corporeal basis, since the sense organs, object-fields, and seeds would all three be present at all times, the perceptual consciousness of all object-fields should arise simultaneously.

See MVB 109 p. 563a8ff.: “There are masters who claim that many types of perceptual consciousness are produced simultaneously; many types of knowledge arise conjointly. In order to refute this position, it is made clear that one sentient being only gives rise to one type of perceptual consciousness in each moment; knowledge is also so.” Cf. VK 1 p. 531b7ff., passim; MVB 10 p. 49b9ff.

The translation here follows the reading chi that also appears in the Chi-sha edition (NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 21b6), and not kuo.

Vasubandhu uses the term aṅgībhāva, here translated by “predominant force” as a gloss for one type of kāraṇahetu, or “comprehensive cause.” In the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (AKB 2.56b p. 94.23ff.; SAKV p. 222.2ff.) Vasubandhu examines the issue of why the effect of the comprehensive cause is referred to as the “dominant” or “sovereign effect” (adhipati-pratyaya). In response, this “sovereign effect” is interpreted as reflecting both aspects of the causal activity of the comprehensive cause. As one aspect of its causal activity, the comprehensive cause “acts” by simply providing a state of non-obstruction (anāvaraṇabhāvaḥ | mātrāvasthā) to the arising of another factor. This non-obstruction is explained (AKB 2.50a p. 83.7ff.) as analogous to the proper activity of a sovereign. However, this “sovereign effect” also describes the effect of the “predominant aspect” (pradaṁśa) of the activity of the comprehensive cause. This “predominant aspect” has the capability of production (uttarādāna | pi | samarthāh): for example, the visual sense organ and form are considered the comprehensive generative causes of visual perceptual consciousness. See AKB 2.50a p. 83.8–9. The term aṅgībhāva is used to refer to this second type of comprehensive cause: it is the producer (janakabhiiva), or the predominant cause (pradhaṇabhiiva). See SAKV p. 222.3ff. Cf. MVB 20 p. 104b15ff.

See Yūan-yū 9 p. 251b9ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 545c8ff. To claim provisional existence for an entity, one must be able to specify an actually existing real entity upon which it is based. For example, the four fundamental material elements are the real basis of the provisional entity, “pot;” without the four fundamental material elements, the pot would not exist. Cf. NAS 50 p. 621c21ff., 50 p. 624c12ff. Sanghabhadra (NAS 58 p. 666a7ff.) explains that entities having provisional existence are of two types: those that depend upon a real entity; and those that depend upon other provisional entities. However, those provisional entities that serve as the basis of another provisional entity can be further analyzed; in the end, all entities that exist provisionally depend upon real entities.

See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403c29ff.

See Yūan-yū 9 p. 251c4ff.
[404b5] We have finished discussing the two states of equipoise. What is vitality? The verse states:

[vs. 45a–b] The controlling faculty of vitality (jīvitendriya) is life (āyus), which is the support (ādhāra) of warmth (ūṣman) and perceptual consciousness (vijñāna).¹

18.1 [Vitality—Nature and Activity]

[Commentary:] The nature of vitality is precisely life. Thus, the śāstra states: “What is the controlling faculty of vitality (jīvitendriya)? It is life [belonging to one in any] of the three realms (traiḍhātukam āyuh).”² Even though [the term ‘life’] is given as a synonym [for vitality], the intrinsic nature [of life] has not yet been presented in detail and should now be described. What factor is referred to as life? [404b10] There is a discrete factor, which acts as the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness, and is given the name ‘life.’ Therefore, the Lord has said:

“When the three factors of life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness discard the body, having been cast off, it collapses, unconscious like a piece of wood.”³

Therefore, that discrete factor, which is the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness and is the cause of the abiding (sthitiṣṭetu) of their stream, is referred to as life.⁴
If [life is the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness], what factor acts as the support of life?5

We claim that the support of life is previous action (karman), because [life] is exclusively the matured effect of previous action, and because it operates continuously for the period of one lifetime. [Even though warmth operates continuously for the period of one lifetime, since it is not exclusively the matured effect of previous action, it cannot be said to be supported by previous action]. Perceptual consciousness is neither of these two: [that is, neither is it exclusively the matured effect of previous action, nor does it necessarily operate continuously for the period of one lifetime]. Even though there are cases in which perceptual consciousness operates continuously for the period of one lifetime—[that is, when one does not enter a state without thought]—since it is not exclusively the matured effect of previous action, one cannot claim that perceptual consciousness is supported by previous action. Therefore, we claim that life is the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness. [As for the second case of perceptual consciousness that is not the matured effect of previous action, previous action would have no supportive activity; therefore, action cannot support perceptual consciousness]. [As for the first case of perceptual consciousness that is interrupted, perceptual consciousness produced through the maturation of previous action within one homogeneous collection of components can be interrupted and then continue precisely because it is supported by life.

Further, how is it known that life supports warmth? [Life supports warmth] because one has warmth only if one has life. Since there are cases in which those who are without warmth have life, it is known that life is not supported by warmth.10

Aren't there cases, [such as inanimate objects], in which there is warmth without life?11

Even though such cases are observed, they are not being discussed here, since this discussion concerns [only] that warmth that occurs together with life and perceptual consciousness.

Thus, it can be known [404b25] that there is a discrete real entity whose power is such that it is able to support [both] the warmth that is included among factors constituting sentient beings and perceptual consciousness; [this] is referred to as life.
18.2 Existential Status

18.2 [Vitality—Existential Status]

[The Sūtra Master’s Interpretation]

With regard to this, the Sūtra master makes the following statement: "Now, we do not say that life does not exist at all; we only claim that life is not a discrete real entity (dravyāntara). If this is so, what factor is referred to as life? It is the momentum of the period of abiding (sthitikālāvedha)\(^{12}\) of the six sense organs together with their basis\(^{13}\) as projected in accordance with [previous] action in the three realms. Due to the momentum, which is projected by [previous] action, of the period of abiding of the six sense organs together with their basis, [404c1] the life-stream is [temporally] determined, and in accordance with the [extent of] that period of abiding, for that period of time, [the six sense organs together with their basis] abide. This momentum is referred to as life. It is like the momentum of the period of development (pākakālāvedhavat) as projected by a seed of grain (sasya), or the momentum of the period of flight as projected by an arrow that has been shot (kṣipteṣusthitikālāvedhavat).”\(^{14}\)

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism—I]

It has already been established in the section [concerning the] controlling faculties (indriya) that life exists as a real entity.\(^{15}\) On the following point alone will we question the opinion of the Sūtra master. One who is without the five internal material sense organs that are matured effects projected by [previous] action, [404c5] at certain times, [also] lacks the sixth mental sense organ that is projected by [previous] action. That is to say, if after a long time, defiled states of perceptual consciousness, or virtuous states of perceptual consciousness tending or not tending toward the fluxes arise, in such a stream, there would be no momentum that is the matured effect as projected by [previous] action.\(^{16}\) [At such times,] what would constitute life? If, in these cases, the matured effects of [previous] action operated continuously without interruption from the moment of birth until death, it would be possible to say that there is a momentum of the period of abiding as projected by [previous] action, [due to which] the life-stream is [temporally] determined, and which is referred to as vitality. [404c10] But since there is no continuous and uninterrupted operation of the momentum of the period of abiding as projected by [previous] action, how can he claim that vitality exists? Given [the Sūtra master’s] principle [concerning the nature of life],\(^{17}\) what factor would be referred to as the momentum of the
period of abiding as projected by [previous] action? When there is no projected momentum of the period of abiding, on what would the [temporal] determination of the life-stream depend? When there is no [temporal] determination of the stream, in what sense would he claim: “in accordance with the [extent of] that period of abiding, for that period of time [the six sense organs together with their basis] abide; [this momentum] is then referred to as life?” Therefore, the lengthy explanation of the meaning of that [life] fabricated by the Sūtra master alone [404c15] is completely without a referent.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Criticism—II]

Further, the examples cited by [the Sūtra master] cannot be used to prove [that life is the momentum of the period of abiding of the six sense organs together with their basis]. Since the stream projected by a seed is without interruption, and operates continuously throughout the time of its development, and since the stream projected by an arrow that has been shot is without interruption and operates continuously throughout its flight, it is possible that these two have momentum that lasts throughout their period of development, or their period of flight. [However,] the stream of the matured effects of [previous] action is not without interruption at all times. [Hence,] it is not possible to state that even when [previous] action has been expended, it is still [the case that] “[due to] the projected momentum of the period of abiding, [404c20] the life-stream is [temporally] determined, and in accordance with the [extent of] that period of abiding, for that period of time, [the six sense organs together with their basis] abide.”

Therefore, these examples cannot be used to prove [that life is simply the momentum of the period of abiding of the six sense organs together with their basis]. Thus, life is a discrete real entity that supports warmth and perceptual consciousness, and is referred to as vitality.

18.3 [Bases of Vitality]

This vitality does not operate only in conformity with the body, since vitality exists in the formless realm; nor does it operate only in conformity with thought, since vitality also exists in the state without thought. If this is so, then in conformity with what does vitality operate? It operates in conformity with the action from a previous lifetime that is able to project it [404c25] and in dependence upon homogeneous character in the present
18.4 Death

 lifetime. Homogeneous character should also be understood in the same way as vitality: [that is, it operates in conformity with action from the previous lifetime and vitality in the present lifetime].

18.4 [Death]

Now, we should consider further whether the various types of death occur as a result of the destruction of life (āyukṣaya), or as a result of other causes. The Prajñaptiśāstra states: “There is [the possibility that] death results from the destruction of life, and not from the destruction of merit (punyakṣaya).” [The possibilities for death can be] elaborated in terms of four alternatives. [According to the] first alternative, [death results from] the exhaustion (paryādāna) of the force of actions that have life as their matured effect (āyurvipāka). [According to the] second alternative, [death results from] the exhaustion of the force of actions that have enjoyment as their matured effect (bhogavipāka). [According to the] third alternative, [death results from] the exhaustion [of the force of] actions that have both effects (ubhayā). [According to the] fourth alternative, [death results from] an inability to avoid unfavorable circumstances (viśamāparihāra). [Death that results from the] relinquishment at will of the conditioned forces of one’s life should not be mentioned [within this fourth alternative] because its sense is included within the first alternative.

In the state in which life is exhausted, exhaustion of merit has no further capability (samarthya) to effect death. Therefore, [the third alternative]—death that results from the destruction of both [types of] actions (ubhayakṣaya)—means death that occurs at the time when both [types of] actions are exhausted.

The Jñānaprasṭhānaśāstra states: “Should it be said that life continuously operates bound to the life-stream (saṁtatyupanibaddha), or that it abides, having arisen once (sakṛdutpanna)? [405a5] It should be said that the life of those sentient beings entangled in the realm of desire (kāmavacara) who have not entered the equipoise of non-conception or the equipoise of cessation, continuously operates bound to their life-stream. [The life of those sentient beings entangled in the realm of desire who are cultivating the equipoise of non-conception or the equipoise of cessation as well as all sentient beings of the realm of form and the formless realm (rūpārūpyāvacara) should be said to abide having arisen once.”

What is the significance of this passage? When the corporeal basis is
damaged, life accordingly is damaged; [this refers to] the first case in which [life] continuously operates bound to the life-stream. When the corporeal basis is not capable of being damaged, [405a10] [life] abides as it arose; [this refers to] the second case in which [life] abides having arisen once.27 [Or,] the first case [in which life operates bound to the life-stream] refers to that [type of life] that has an obstacle (sāntarāya); the second case [in which life abides having arisen once] refers to that [type of life] that is without an obstacle (nirantarāya).28 Through this, it is determined that untimely death (akālamrṭyu) is possible.

Therefore, the sūtra states: “There are four varieties of acquiring modes of personal existence (ātmabhāvapratiśālā): that is to say, there is a mode of personal existence whereby mortal injury can occur only through one’s own volition (ātmasamcetanā), and not through the volition of another (parasamcetanā);” and so on, in detail, there are four alternatives.29

[The first category of] those for whom mortal injury can occur only through their own volition, and not through the volition of another, includes those born in the realm of desire as gods who are carried away with amusements (krīḍāpramoṣaka), and those who are corrupted in mind with anger (manāḥpradūṣaka). [The gods who are carried away with amusements] exhaust their bodies [405a15] and become distracted in mind by engaging only in excessive rapture (prahāra). Further, [the gods who are corrupted in mind with anger] regard each other with hostile thoughts after giving rise to excessive anger (pradoṣa). For these reasons, and no others, they fall from their current state.30 Here one should also mention those who are able to relinquish their life at will, since they relinquish their life through their own volition, and not through the volition of another.31

[The second category of] those for whom mortal injury can occur only through the volition of another, and not through their own volition, includes those [sentient beings] still in an egg, or those in the womb—that is, in the five stages of fetal development of kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghanā, and praśākhā.32 [They experience mortal injury only through another] because they are not capable of inflicting mortal injury through their own volition. [405a20]

[The third category of] those for whom mortal injury can occur through both their own volition and the volition of another includes the majority of other sentient beings in the realm of desire [with the exception of those in the previous and following categories].

[The final category of] those for whom neither type of mortal injury occurs includes all sentient beings in the intermediate state (antarābhavika),
[all sentient beings] in the realm of form and the formless realm, and certain sentient beings in the realm of desire: namely, those in hell (nāraka), in the Uttarakuru; those correctly abiding in the path of vision (darśanamārga); those in the equipoise of sympathetic joy (maitrisamāpatti), in the equipoise of cessation and in the equipoise of non-conception; sages (rājarśi); messengers of the Buddha (jina-dilta); those predicted by the Buddha [to live for a certain period of time such as] Dharmila, Uttara, Gaṅgila, and the youth Yaśas who is the son of a leading merchant, Jivaka, and so on; all bodhisattvas in their last lifetime (caramabhavika), and mothers who are carrying bodhisattvas; all wheel-turning kings, and mothers who are carrying wheel-turning kings.

[Objections—the Fourth Type of Mortal Injury]

[O] If it is the case [that all of these beings are included in the category of those for whom neither type of mortal injury occurs], why is this stated [next] in the sūtra: “Lord, who are those sentient beings whose mode of personal existence is not capable of having mortal injury either through their own volition or through the volition of another? Śāriputra, those are the sentient beings belonging to the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception.”

[S] [According to one interpretation,] in that sūtra, by giving the last in a series, the previous ones are included implicitly, just as other sūtras give the first in a series and implicitly include the later [members]. As is stated in the sūtra, “in the first level of trance [within the realm of form] there is happiness that is produced through separation [from defilements].” Here, by giving the first level [of trance] the sūtra implicitly includes the later stages that also have this happiness. The sūtra [passage concerning the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception] should also be understood in this way: the previous stages are implicitly included by giving the last in the series.

[According to a second interpretation,] sentient beings born either in the formless realm, except for those in the summit of existence, or in the levels of trance [of the realm of form] can also [be said to fall within the first type: that is, the category of those] having mortal injury only through their own volition, like the gods of the realm of desire who are carried away with amusements and those [gods] who are corrupted in mind with anger. [These sentient beings can be said to have mortal injury only through their own volition, because they] also fall from their current state through the production of defilements of the same category, [that is, defilements charac-
characteristic of their respective stages. [Therefore, this sūtra passage states that only those in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, which is identified with the summit of existence, are without either type of mortal injury.]

[A third interpretation maintains that] in the other [spheres of the] formless realm, [except for the summit of existence], and in the various levels of trance [of the realm of form], mortal injury through one's own volition can occur through the noble path (āryamārga) of one's own stage (svabhūmīka), and mortal injury through the volition of another occurs through [the mundane path (laukikamārga)] of the threshold of the next higher stage (uttarabhūmīsāmāntaka). In the summit of existence, these two types of mortal injury are not possible, [because there is no noble path in the summit of existence, and because there is no higher stage]. Therefore, [this sūtra passage] maintains that [only the summit of existence] is not subject to either type of injury.

[V] Isn't it the case that the summit of existence also has mortal injury caused by the noble path of other stages [and, therefore, also] should be referred to as having mortal injury through the volition of another?

[S] This interpretation would also be consistent with reason. However, the word 'another' (para) in this case refers to higher regions because the word 'another' is also applied to something that is surpassing. Or, something is said to be "another" only if one is without mastery with regard to it. Since, in all cases, the higher regions have mastery with regard to the lower regions, the word 'another' [in the case of the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception] does not refer to [the lower regions].

However, the following criticism of this [third interpretation] should be offered. If the Buddha, [in his response to Śāriputra], used the phrase 'injury through one's own volition or through the volition of another' in the sense of abandoning defilements through the path of one's own stage or another stage, then one should not say that one reaches the point of death as a result of injury through oneself or another. It is not the case that one either has death or does not have death as a result of abandoning or not abandoning defilements. Further, this would not be consistent with the prior interpretation [405b15] [according to which], hell-beings, and so on, [should be classified in the fourth category of those for whom] neither type of mortal injury occurs. [They should, if this third interpretation were accepted, be classified instead in the second category of those for whom mortal injury can occur only through the volition of another, since their defilements would be subject to injury by the noble path of another region.]
However, the Venerable [Śāriputra], though thoroughly understanding the meaning of the previous statement concerning mortal injury through one's own volition or through the volition of another, made the following statement in order to suggest another meaning: "Lord, do those sentient beings [in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception] fall from their current state, or not? Śāriputra, if those sentient beings have not yet abandoned defilements, they will fall once again; but if they have already abandoned defilements, they will attain final nirvāṇa precisely in that state." Why did the Venerable [Śāriputra] [405b20] ask the Lord this question only about the final mode of personal existence? He asked this question in order to expel the excessive pride [in the apparent] permanence that occurs in beings in this final mode of personal existence, pride that results from their lack of mortal injury either through their own volition or through the volition of another. [With this purpose in mind, he asked,] "do those sentient beings ...," and so on, as is presented in detail [suggesting that their existence does indeed come to an end].

### 18.5 [Distinctions—Vitality and Life]

What is the distinction between the conditioned forces of vitality (jīvita-saṃskāra) and the conditioned forces of life (āyuḥsaṃskāra)?

The conditioned forces of vitality refer to life that is destined to arise, while the conditioned forces of life refer to life that is not destined to arise. Some have made the following statement: "The conditioned forces of vitality refer to that which is not to be discarded, while the conditioned forces of life [405b25] refer to that which is to be discarded." Further, others state: "The conditioned forces of vitality refer to the effects of the four bases of supernormal power, while the conditioned forces of life refer to effects of actions in a previous lifetime." Still others state: "The conditioned forces of vitality refer to that which is produced under the sovereignty of clear intuition, while the conditioned forces of life refer to that which is produced under the sovereignty of ignorance." Or, others state: "The conditioned forces of vitality refer to that which is attained only in the life-stream of one who is free from passion, while the conditioned forces of life refer to that which is attained also in the life-stream of one who has passion." These are the distinctions between the conditioned forces of vitality and the conditioned forces of life.
Notes

1. See AKB 2.45a-b p. 73.15ff.: "[vs. 45a-b] The controlling faculty of vitality is life, which is the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness." ayur jīvatam ādhāra uṣma vijñānāyor hi yath. See also GAKB p. 80; SAKV p. 168.27ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 26a22ff.; PAKB 4 p. 184c7ff.; ADV no. 138 p. 97.3ff.


4. See SAKV p. 168.27-28: "Vitality, [that is, life,] is called the support of warmth and perceptual consciousness because warmth and perceptual consciousness function in dependence upon vitality; it is precisely the cause of their abiding." uṣma1 o vijñānasya ca jīvatapratibaddha pravīttāṃ. tasmaj jīvatam uṣma1 o vijñānasya eva 'dhara uṣmāyate sthitihetus tayor eva. But see MA 58 no. 211 p. 791b20ff., which claims that the mind depends upon life, and life, upon warmth, which are then declared to be mutually dependent. Cf. MN no. 43 Mahāvedallasutta 1: 295ff.

5. See AKB 2.45b p. 73.22ff.; Yuān-yū 9 p. 252a6ff. Vasubandhu examines two possible responses to this question. (1) Life, warmth, and perceptual consciousness support one another. Vasubandhu, criticizing this response, suggests that if these three supported one another, they would be eternal, since it is impossible to determine which of the three would be terminated first. (2) Life is supported by action. This is the only response offered by Saṅghabhadra, perhaps in an attempt to evade Vasubandhu's criticism. Cf. AKB 3.3c-d p. 112.15ff.; SAKV p. 256.20ff. The Chinese commentators identify the opponent here as the Sautrāntikas: P'ū-kuang 5 p. 101b1ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 546a3ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 161b5ff.; Kaido 5 p. 105b3ff.

6. For āyus as a matured effect, see AKB 2.10a p. 43.9ff.; NAS 9 p. 380c12ff. See also the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 16 p. 427b29ff.), which attributes this view that vitality is a matured effect to the Prakaraṇapāda and discusses various interpretations of this assertion. Action may either have life as its matured effect (āyurupāka) or enjoyment as its matured effect (bhogavipāka). Certain arhats are able to transform the matured effects of enjoyment into those of life and thereby extend their life-span. See MVB 126 p. 656a17ff.; Jaini (1958a).

7. Here Saṅghabhadra responds to an objection raised in the Abhidharmakosābhaṣya (AKB 2.45b p. 73.25ff.): if action supports life, why doesn't action also support warmth and perceptual consciousness? As Yuān-yū (Yuān-yū 9 p. 252a9ff.) explains, if an entity is to be supported by action, it must comply with two criteria: (1) it must be exclusively a matured effect of previous action; and (2) it must continue without interruption.

8. See Yuān-yū 9 p. 252a11-12. Warmth violates the first criterion: namely, there is warmth that is not a matured effect, but rather is an effect of uniform outflow (niśyandaphala) and is produced through the purely physical processes of accumulation (auṣpacyākā).

9. See Yuān-yū 9 p. 252a12ff. Perceptual consciousness violates both criteria: namely, when perceptual consciousness depends upon a prior moment of perceptual consciousness of like moral quality, it is an effect of uniform outflow (niśyandaphala), and not an effect of maturation; further, since there are states without thought, perceptual consciousness can be temporarily interrupted in the period of one lifetime.

10. See Yuān-yū 9 p. 252b8ff. In the formless realm, one has life without warmth. This would appear to contradict the previously mentioned sūtra passage (MA 58 no. 211 p. 791c1ff.), which describes warmth and life as mutually dependent.
11 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 252b11ff.

12 Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 169.2–3) glosses the compound sthitikalāvedha as “that particular capability (-avedha), which is the cause through a succession of moments (-kāla-) for the abiding (sthi-), defined as a continuous series of aggregates.”

13 Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (AKB 2.54b p. 74.4) and both Hsüan-tsang’s and Paramārtha’s translations (HTAKB 5 p. 26b17; PAKB 4 p. 184c25) use the term nikāyasabhāga here. Saṅghabhadra, according to Hsüan-tsang’s translation, chooses the phrase ‘the six sense organs together with their basis.’ Cf. AKB 4.73a-b p. 243.26, where ‘the body possessed of sense organs’ (sendriyāḥ kāyāḥ) is used to characterize life as opposed to death when the sense organs are absent. Saṅghabhadra’s use of the phrase ‘the six sense organs together with their basis’ may reflect his desire to avoid using the term nikāyasabhāga in a non-technical sense to refer to the “homogeneous collection of components” constituting a sentient being, and instead, reserve it for its technical sense as the discrete real entity posited by the Śarvāstivāda-Vaibhūvika’s: namely, the dissociated factor, homogeneous character (sabhagata). Cf. AKB 2.10a p. 43.23, where, in an analogous passage, Vasubandhu uses the phrase indriyamahabhilata ‘controlling faculties and fundamental material elements.’ Cf. AHS-D 4 p. 831a4; cf. AHS-U 6 p. 866a17ff. See also AARŚ hsia p. 979c8.

14 AKB 2.45b p. 74.3ff.: “Of course we do not say that [life] does not exist, but rather that it is not a discrete real entity. What then [is it]? It is the momentum of the period of abiding of the homogeneous collection of components [as projected by previous] action in the three realms. For as long as the momentum of the homogeneous collection of components is projected by action, in accordance with a period of such an extent that is to be established, for that period of time, [the homogeneous collection of components] is established; this is referred to as life. It is like the momentum of the period of development of a seed of grain, or the momentum of the period of flight of an arrow that has been shot.” na hi nā ‘sti ‘ti brūmo na tu dravyāntaram. kiṁ tarhī. traiddhātukena karmānā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikalāvedhah. yāvad dhi karmānā nikāyasabhāgasyā ‘vedhah krto bhavaty etāvantaraṁ kālam avasthātavyam iti tāvat so ‘vatiṣṭhate tad āyuḥ ity ucyate. sasyānāṁ pākakālāvedhavat keśiteṣuṣthitikalāvedhavac ca. See also SAKV p. 168.30ff.

15 See AKB 2.1 p. 38.18ff.; NAS 9 p. 377c9ff.

16 The Chinese commentators suggest that this sentence presents a case in which the momentum projected by previous action, which Vasubandhu defines as life, is interrupted. That is to say, for one reborn in the formless realm, there is an interruption in the material basis or the five internal material sense organs, which form one aspect of Vasubandhu’s “homogeneous collection of components.” This one reborn in the formless realm would also undergo an interruption in the sixth mental sense organ through the arising of a dissimilar moment of thought within the stream of mental factors produced through the maturation of similar action. In this case, life, which is defined by Vasubandhu as the momentum of the period of abiding of the homogeneous collection of components (nikāyasabhāga), or, in Saṅghabhadra’s rendering, the “six sense organs together with their basis,” would be broken, since the six sense organs and their corporeal basis would be interrupted. See Yüan-yü 9 p. 252c17ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 101c14ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 162a9ff.

17 The interpretation of this phrase is uncertain.

18 See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b29ff.

19 See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 404b29ff.

20 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 253a7ff.

21 See MVB 20 p. 103b3ff. This quotation has not been located in the Chinese partial translation of the Prajñāaptiśāstra. Fujaku (Fujaku 4 p. 162b11ff.) states that this
quotation is taken from the *Mahāvibhāṣā. This section in the *Mahāvibhāṣā quotes the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) from the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, which Saṅghabhadra, following Vasubandhu, would appear to summarize here.

The reading of this sentence in the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya is uncertain. Hsüan-tsang (HTAKB 5 p. 26c2) translates: "Further, [death] resulting from the relinquishment at will of the conditioned forces of one's life should also be mentioned [here].," Paramārtha (PAKB 4 p. 185a9) includes no statement of any kind. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 170.8) also makes no comment. Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition (AKB 2.45b p. 74.15–16) agrees with Saṅghabhadra’s quotation: "And [death] resulting from the relinquishment at will of the conditioned forces of one's life is to be mentioned. No, it is not to be mentioned because that [type of] death results simply from the exhaustion of life and is included within the first alternative." āyuvṛtsargāc ce 'ti vaktavyam. Na vaktavyam. āyuḥkṣayād eva taṃ maraṇam. prathamakotyantaragamāt. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 20 p. 103b13ff.) claims that in the case of the relinquishment at will of the conditioned forces of one's life neither variety of actions is extinguished, but it does not classify it as a variety of death due to unfavorable circumstances. The Chinese commentators follow Hsüan-tsang’s translation: Yüan-yü 9 p. 253a12; P'u-kuang 5 p. 102a23ff.; Fa-pao 55 p. 546c19ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 162b17ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 106a23ff.

The reading of this sentence in the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya is also uncertain. Both Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha in their translations of the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya (HTAKB 5 p. 26c3ff.; PAKB 4 p. 185a9ff.) and Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 169.34) all agree with the *Nyāyānusāra here. Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition (AKB 2.45b p. 74.17), however, reads: "Therefore, it is said that death when both are exhausted results from the destruction of life." tasmañ ubhayakṣayye sati maraṇam āyuḥkṣayād ity uktam. Cf. Fa-pao 5 p. 546c25ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 102b4ff.; Yüan-yü 9 p. 253a16ff.

Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya (AKB 2.45b p. 74.19) reads saṃāpanna, ‘who have entered,’ instead of asaṃāpanna, ‘who have not entered.’ The Chinese translations of the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya (HTAKB 5 p. 26c5; PAKB 4 p. 185a13) both support the reading of the *Nyāyānusāra, which suggests asaṃāpanna. Note, however, the variant reading in Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition of the Abhidharmakośabhūṣya (AKB 2.45b p. 74.19), va saṃāpannānām, for ca saṃāpannānām, which would also make the reading vāsaṃāpannānām, that is, vā asaṃāpannānām, possible.

This passage from the Jñānaprasthāna is quoted in order to elucidate the last of the previously listed four possible causes of death: death that results from an inability to avoid unfavorable circumstances. Through its reference to those sentient beings whose life operates bound to their life-stream, it establishes the possibility of untimely death (aksiṁmrtyu): namely, death at a time other than that determined by the exhaustion of actions that have life as their matured effect. See MVB 151 p. 771a23, where untimely death is rejected by the Dārśāntikas; cf. Kaidō 5 p. 106b10ff. For further references to untimely death, see de La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931) 2: 218–219 note 4.

The first case refers to normal sentient existence within the realm of desire—existence that is subject to untimely injury and death. The life-span of beings in the realm of form and the formless realm is predetermined; thus, their life is not subject to premature mortal injury or untimely death. The duration of the two states of equipoise without thought is also determined by prior application; thus, beings in those states are not subject to premature termination of their state of equipoise. According to an alternative interpretation, life depends upon the corporeal basis; injury to the body in the two states of equipoise is impossible because the body is brought to a state of equilibrium in those states. See MVB 151 p. 771a27ff., 154 p. 782a25ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 102b11ff.; AKB 3.43a p. 156.7ff.

Both Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 253b6ff.) and Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 106c3ff.) sug-
suggest that Saṅghabhadra considers this second interpretation of the two cases to be a restatement of the preceding one. Yaśomitra (p. 170.11) also states that these two interpretations differ only in terminology. Nevertheless, Yaśomitra attributes the preceding interpretation to the Outsiders (bahirdeśaka), and Vasubandhu (AKB 2.45a–b p. 74.24) attributes at least the second interpretation to the masters of Kāśmīra; he, thereby, implies a possible difference from the preceding interpretation. Cf. P'u-kuang 5 p. 102c5ff. Indeed, a subtle distinction between these two interpretations can be found. The first interpretation would be consistent with Vasubandhu’s view that life is nothing more than the momentum of the period of abiding of the corporeal basis; the duration of life would then depend upon the susceptibility of the corporeal basis to injury. The second interpretation is consistent with the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāṣika view that life is a separately existing factor; it exists as a discrete factor that is either susceptible or not susceptible to an obstacle. See Yūn-yū 9 p. 253b9ff.

29 See DN no. 33 Saṅgītisutta 3: 231; Saṅgītiparyāya, Stache-Rosen (1968) 110ff.; AN 4.171 Cetanāsutta 2: 159. This discussion follows the *Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB 151 p. 771b25ff. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 170.14ff.) suggests that this sūtra passage also is offered to support the possibility of untimely death. See also AKB 2.45a–b p. 74.24ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 102c8ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 547a9ff.; Yūn-yū 9 p. 253c7ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 106c12ff.


31 Vasubandhu (AKB 2.45a–b p. 74.28ff.) states: “[The mode of personal existence] of the buddhas is also to be mentioned since [they have] death by their own accord.” buddhānāṃ cē ‘t vaktavyam suvayammarṣtvuṭ. See SAKV p. 170.16ff.


33 For interpretations of rājarṣi, for example, as including wheel-turning kings who have entered the religious life (pravrajita), see SAKV p. 170.19ff.; P'u-kuang 5 p. 103a7ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 547a23ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 331d2ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 106c12ff.

34 AKB 2.45a–b p. 75.6ff. See also MVB 151 p. 771c26ff.: “When Śāriputra asked the Lord this question, did he already know the answer, or not? If he knew the answer, why did he ask? If he did not know the answer, how can he be said to have become an ideal hearer (śrāvakā)?” Several explanations are then offered: for example, Śāriputra knew the answer but asked in order to clarify what had been said; or, since Śāriputra is completely without fear, he could ask the Lord freely in order to benefit others. Hereafter, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 151 p. 772a14ff.) lists a number of answers to this question, several of which are cited by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra.

35 Here, once again, Saṅghabhadra uses the principle of “contiguous assimilation,” a variety of metonymy whereby contiguous stages are related in argumentation. See supra, translation, NAS 12 p. 402a9ff. and “[Equipoise of Cessation],” note 21. Though this sūtra passage mentions only the last sphere in the formless realm, the other three spheres of the formless realm as well as the levels of trance in the realm of form are also to be understood. See NAS 2 p. 339b27, where Saṅghabhadra outlines various types of sūtra exposition and their appropriate interpretation, and offers (NAS 2 p. 339c14) this sūtra passage again as an example of this principle of inclusion of previous members in a final member. For references to the happiness of the first level of trance, see MA 43 no. 168 p. 700c6ff., 46 no. 176 p. 714b27ff.; SN 36.29 Nirāmisasutta 4: 236.

36 In this second interpretation, Saṅghabhadra combines two interpretations of this sūtra passage presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 151 p. 772a24ff.), neither of which appears in the Abhidharmakosābhaṣya. Sentient beings in all stages lower than the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception can fall from their current stage by giving rise to defilements, which can be interpreted as inflicting “mortal injury.” Since sentient beings produce defilements through their own power, they are described as subject to “mortal injury through their own volition.” Yūn-yū (Yūn-yū 9 p. 253d18ff.) observes
that this interpretation is not acceptable as a response to the previous objection because if these sentient beings in the realm of form or the formless realm, with the exception of those in the summit of existence, are included within the first category of beings who experience mortal injury through their own volition, this would then contradict the prior explanation of the four modes of personal existence.

37 The third interpretation takes the term 'mortal injury' to refer to the termination of existence in a particular stage (or passing to another higher stage) that results from the abandonment of defilements characteristic of that lower stage. Both the noble path and the mundane path enable one to surpass a particular stage by eradicating the defilements characteristic of that stage. Each of the four primary (maula) trance levels in the realm of form and the four spheres in the formless realm also have a threshold (sāmantaka), or a stage of preliminary concentration, in which counteragents to defilements characteristic of that stage can be practiced. See MVB 163 p. 825b4ff.; AKB 8.21–22 p. 447.8ff.

38 The *Mahāvibhūṣaṇa (MVB 151 p. 772a28) attributes this interpretation to Dharmatrāta. See also SAKV p. 170.31ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 332b3ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 107a24ff. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.45a–b p. 75.8) qualifies his presentation of this interpretation with the word kīla.

39 AKB 2.45a–b p. 75.9. Vasubandhu suggests that the summit of existence, or the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, also can be said to have injury through the noble path of a lower region, which Yasōmitra (SAKV p. 170.33ff.) identifies as the sphere of nothing at all within the formless realm. Therefore, in contrast to this third interpretation, beings in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception can be understood to have injury through the volition of another, and not injury through one's own volition.

40 Whereas the threshold of a level of trance within the realm of form or of a sphere within the formless realm is only effective with regard to the defilements of the immediately preceding region, the noble path within the primary level of trance or sphere is effective with regard to defilements either of its own region or of a higher region. Thus, it would be theoretically possible for the defilements of the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception to be “injured” by the noble path of a preceding sphere. See Yüan-yü 9 p. 254a11ff. In response, Saṅghabhadra interprets the word ‘another’ in the general principle concerning moral injury as referring only to other “higher,” not “lower,” regions. As a result, Vasubandhu’s suggestion that beings in the summit of existence are “mortally injured by another”—that is, by the noble path of lower regions—would not apply.

41 See Yüan-yü 9 p. 254b5ff. The defilements whose effects are being experienced by hell-beings can be abandoned by a bodhisattva practicing the noble path in another region. Thus, if the term ‘injury’ were interpreted to refer to abandoning defilements, hell-beings would be subject to mortal injury through the volition of another and the previous sûtra passage describing the four modes of personal existence would be contradicted.

42 The *Mahāvibhūṣaṇa (MVB 126 p. 657c10ff.) gives fourteen interpretations of this distinction between the conditioned forces of vitality and the conditioned forces of life. See also SAHS 9 p. 943a28ff.; AKB 2.10a p. 44.7ff. Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 254d4ff.) explains the distinction between the two, in general, as follows: “Vitality means being animated, existing, or abiding; not yet being dead is precisely referred to as vitality. Life means to be determined, [to be established] for a period of time, or to be limited; that which is attained immediately [in the present life] is not referred to as life. Therefore, there are those who have life without vitality, [that is, in the intermediate state before conception] those who have vitality without life, [that is, an arhat who has discarded the conditioned forces of life] and those who have both, [that is, the majority of sentient beings].”

43 See MVB 126 p. 657c15ff. This distinction would appear to refer, respectively,
to factors whose nature is to arise (utpattidharmin) and those factors whose nature is not to arise (anutpattidharmin); the exact meaning and reason for the distinction here is, however, unclear. Perhaps the term āyus can be used with regard to that portion of life that can be extended or discarded, as, for example, in the case of those, like buddhas, who relinquish the conditioned forces of their life at will (āyurutsarga). See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405a1ff.; SAKV p. 170.16ff.

44 Cf. MVB 126 p. 657c14ff.; see also references to āyurutsarga in the previous note.

45 Cf. MVB 126 p. 657c18: “The effects of cultivation are referred to as the conditioned forces of vitality, while the effects of actions are referred to as the conditioned forces of life.”

46 See MVB 126 p. 657c19.

47 Yüan-yü (Yüan-yü 9 p. 254d12ff.) suggests that even though life and vitality are, in reality, without distinction, these five distinctions can be understood in terms of four alternatives: (1) that which is life, but not vitality, refers to the controlling faculty of vitality that abides, but is not destined to arise; (2) that which is vitality, and not life, refers to the controlling faculty of vitality that is prolonged through the power of concentration; (3) that which is both refers to the controlling faculty of vitality that is destined to arise with previous action as the cause; and (4) that which is neither refers to everything else.
Chapter 19

[The Four Characteristics]

[405c1] We have finished discussing the controlling faculty of vitality. What are the four characteristics? The verse states:

[vs. 45c–d] The characteristics (lakṣaṇa) are the nature of birth (jāti), continuance (sthiti), senescence (jārā), and desinence (anityatā) of conditioned [factors].

[Commentary:] These four are the characteristics of conditioned [factors]. Since they indicate the [conditioned] nature (samskṛtatva) [of factors], they acquire their name as ‘[conditioned] characteristics’ [(samskṛta-lakṣaṇa)].

19.1 [Four Characteristics—Nature]

Among these [four,] birth is a discrete factor that acts as the predominant cause of non-obstruction when conditioned forces are in a state of being about to be produced, [405c5] because it is able to draw out [conditioned forces] and enable their production. Being able to draw out [conditioned forces] means that this factor [of birth] has, as its nature, the ability to act as the predominant condition of those [forces] at the time when they are being produced. Even though all arising of conditioned forces could be referred to as birth, this name ‘birth’ is given only to the predominant cause of non-obstruction when conditioned forces are in a state of being produced.
Continuance is a discrete factor that acts as the predominant cause of the non-obstruction of [the activity of] conditioned forces, which have already been produced but have not yet been destroyed; [this activity of conditioned forces is the activity of] projecting their own effect.⁴

Senescence is a discrete factor that acts as the cause of the fact that subsequent [moments] within the stream of conditioned forces differ from prior ones.⁵

Desinence is a discrete factor that acts as the predominant cause [405c-10] of the destruction of conditioned forces that are produced together with it.⁶ [The suffix] tā, or ‘nature,’ [in the word anitya-tā] has the meaning of “real entity” (dravya).⁷

19.2 [The Sūtra Mentions Only Three Characteristics]

[O] Doesn’t the sūtra state: “There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned factors?”⁸ [Why then do you claim that there are four characteristics?]

[S] Continuance acts as a virtuous friend (kalyānamitra) that is able to stabilize conditioned [factors].

[O] Why was it not mentioned [in the sūtra]?

[S] The fact that the sūtra did not mention it must have a reason, and [that reason] should be clarified.⁹ The sūtra mentioned those characteristics that indicate only the conditioned [nature of factors]. The characteristic of continuance does not indicate only the conditioned [nature of factors] because unconditioned factors by nature also have continuance as their particular inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇasthitihāva) [and, therefore, can also be described by the term ‘continuance’].¹⁰

Or, here [we mention] four kinds [of characteristics] in order to indicate completely [both] the qualities [405c15] and defects of conditioned factors. In that sūtra passage, only three are mentioned in order to indicate only the defects of conditioned factors.¹¹

Or, just as another sūtra passage states only that conditioned forces are factors that have production and destruction, and yet it is not to be assumed that they lack senescence, so also in the case of this sūtra passage, it is not to be assumed that [conditioned factors] lack the nature
of continuance.\textsuperscript{12} [This \textit{sutra} passage] only mentions that there are three [conditioned characteristics] in consideration of certain specific reasons.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, that four [characteristics are mentioned here] does not contradict [the fact that only] three [characteristics are mentioned in that \textit{sutra} passage].

In consideration of what reasons did [the \textit{sutra} passage] mention only these three [conditioned characteristics]? Since [the omitted characteristic,] continuance, applies to both the categories of conditioned and unconditioned factors, [the \textit{sutra} did not mention it]. Even though there is continuance [also among conditioned factors], the \textit{sutra} mentions only [the other] three characteristics in order to prevent disciples [405c20] from questioning whether conditioned and unconditioned factors are mutually similar.\textsuperscript{14}

Or, [it could be said] that this \textit{sutra} passage implicitly refers to continuance because it mentions three explicitly, but does not use the restrictive word ‘only.’ If [its intention] were different from this—[that is, if it intended that continuance should not be included among the conditioned characteristics]—it would have stated that there are “only” three types of conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors].\textsuperscript{15}

Or, [it could be said that continuance is indeed mentioned] in the \textit{sutra} because the compound ‘change in continuance’ (\textit{sthityanyathātva}), [which refers to desinence,] is mentioned. If [the conditioned characteristic of continuance] were not [to be included], the word ‘continuance’ [in the compound ‘change in continuance’ (\textit{sthityanyathātva})] would be without a function. The purpose of the compound is to indicate that the continuance of conditioned factors necessarily involves change.\textsuperscript{16} Unconditioned factors [405c25] are distinguished from conditioned factors because they have continuance without change. That the compound ‘change in continuance’ is mentioned in that \textit{sutra} passage does not indicate that continuance is precisely change; it only indicates that conditioned factors have arising, passing away, continuance, and change.

One might claim that the continuance of unconditioned factors is not established, [and hence, the possibility of confusion between conditioned and unconditioned factors cannot be used as a reason why continuance is not explicitly mentioned in this \textit{sutra} passage]. This, however, would be unreasonable because [the continuance of unconditioned factors] is necessarily established. The fact that unconditioned factors have continuance is established precisely by establishing that there are three unconditioned factors.
Therefore, it is determined that there are precisely four conditioned characteristics.

19.3 [Secondary Characteristics]

[O] Since these characteristics of birth, and so on, are [themselves] conditioned (saṁskṛṭatvāt), they should [each] have four additional characteristics of birth, and so on.\footnote{406a1} If these additional characteristics existed, it would incur the fault of infinite regress (aparyavasānadoṣa) because those [additional secondary characteristics] would [also] have still other characteristics of birth, and so on.

[S] It is true that we allow that still other [secondary characteristics] exist, but there is no fault of infinite regress. Why is this? The verse states:

[vs. 46a–b] These [four primary characteristics of birth, and so on,] have [secondary characteristics] of the birth of birth (jātijāti), and so on. Those [primary and secondary characteristics] function (vṛtti) with regard to eight [factors] and one [factor, respectively].\footnote{406a5}

[Commentary:] In this [verse], the verb ‘to have’ also conveys a restrictive meaning.\footnote{406a5} Its intention is to indicate that these [primary characteristics] have only four [secondary characteristics] and no others. [406a5] [The word] ‘these’ refers to the four primary characteristics mentioned previously. The phrase ‘the birth of birth, and so on’ refers to the four secondary characteristics (anulaksana): that is, the birth of birth, [which functions with regard to the characteristic of] birth, on down to the desinence of desinence, [which functions with regard to the characteristic of] desinence. Conditioned forces are conditioned due to the four primary characteristics; the primary characteristics are conditioned due to the four secondary characteristics.

[Secondary Characteristics—Scriptural Authority]

[O] Where did the Lord expound these four secondary characteristics?
19.3.1 Scriptural Authority

[S] Didn’t [the previously mentioned] sūtra passage also [implicitly] refer to the four secondary characteristics? That is to say, since the [primary] characteristics of birth, and so on, also are conditioned, the characteristics of the birth of birth, and so on, likewise have arising, and so on, as their nature. When the sūtra states, [406a10] “there are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors], the arising (utpāda) of that which is conditioned also can be discerned, the passing away, (vyaya), and the change in continuance (sthityanyathātva) [of that which is conditioned] also can be discerned,” how can the secondary characteristics not [also] be included here?²⁰

Further, since the word ‘also’ (api) appears in connection with each of these [primary] characteristics, the secondary characteristics are also [implicitly] mentioned in the sūtra passage. In the statement, “the arising (utpāda) of that which is conditioned also can be discerned (prajñāyate),” the word ‘arising’ refers to the primary characteristic of birth, and the word ‘also’ indicates the [secondary characteristic of] the birth of birth. The phrase ‘the passing away (vyaya), and change in continuance (sthityanyathātva) also can be discerned’ would be understood correctly according to this interpretation of the words ‘arising’ and ‘also’: [that is, ‘passing away’ and ‘change in continuance’ indicate the primary characteristics, and ‘also’ indicates the respective secondary characteristics]. If this were not so, [406a15] what function would the word ‘also’ have?

With regard to unconditioned factors, it is stated in the sūtra that “it can be discerned that they are even without arising, and so on.”²¹ The intention of this passage is that it can be discerned that unconditioned factors are even without the primary characteristic of birth, and so on. How much less could the secondary characteristics of the birth of birth, and so on, be assumed? If this were not so, [the sūtra] would have stated simply, “it can be discerned that [unconditioned factors] are without arising,” and so on; the sūtra would not have used the word ‘even.’

Further, the Lord states in the sūtra that the conditioned characteristics have further characteristics. Thus, it is stated in the sūtra: “Form has arising and passing away. [406a20] It should further be discerned that these [factors of arising and passing away] also have arising and passing away,” and so on, as is presented in detail.²²

Further, the sūtra mentions the birth, and so on, of old age and death.²³

Therefore, it is known from these [sūtra passages] that these [primary] characteristics have further [secondary] characteristics.
[Secondary Characteristics—Fault of Infinite Regress]

[O] If this were so, each primary characteristic, just as any factor that is characterized, would have four [additional] secondary characteristics. Those [additional] characteristics would each in turn have four other [characteristics, thereby incurring] the fault of infinite regress (aparyavasānadoṣa). 24

[S] This fault is not incurred because the capability of the four primary characteristics and that of the four secondary characteristics are distinguished as applying respectively to eight factors and to one factor. Their power as proximate conditions is referred to in the verse as their function (vr̥tti). 25 This means that the four primary characteristics [of birth, and so on,] each function [406a25] with respect to eight factors, and the four secondary characteristics [of the birth of birth, and so on,] each function with respect to one factor. What is the meaning of this? When a factor is produced, nine factors arise simultaneously including itself: that is, the factor itself constitutes one factor, and the primary and secondary characteristics constitute eight factors. Birth among the primary characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition in producing the other eight factors with the exception of itself; factors do not have the function of production with regard to themselves. The birth of birth among the secondary characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition in producing only that primary characteristic of birth among the nine factors. [The distinction between] the production of one [factor by the secondary characteristic of the birth of birth] [406b1] and the production of many [factors by the primary characteristic of birth] is a distinction based on their respective capabilities. 26

[O] Since their nature as productive is not different, how is there a distinction in their capability?

[S] It is like the case of feelings; though they are not different in their nature as experienced sensation (anubhava), there are distinctions in their capability for injury or benefit. 27 Further, [this distinction between birth and the birth of birth could be understood as a] difference in [the range of] the objects of the primary characteristics and the secondary characteristics: that is, [their range is] extensive or limited, respectively. It is like the case of the five types of perceptual consciousness and mental perceptual consciousness. [Though, as perceptual consciousness, their nature is the same, there is a difference in the range of] their objects: that is, as limited and extensive, respectively.

Similarly, continuance among the primary characteristics is able to act
as the proximate condition in causing the other eight factors to abide, that
is, with the exception of itself. [406b5] The continuance of continuance
among the secondary characteristics is able to act as the proximate con­
dition causing only that primary characteristic of continuance among the
nine factors to abide. The capability of continuance is such that it acts
as the proximate condition causing factors to abide for a period of time,
thereby enabling them to project their own effect.

Senescence among the primary characteristics is able to act as the prox­
imate condition in causing the other eight factors to change, that is, with
the exception of itself. The senescence of senescence among the secondary
characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition causing only that
primary characteristic of senescence among the nine factors to change.

Desinence among the primary characteristics is able to act as the prox­
imate condition in causing the other eight factors to be destroyed, that is,
with the exception of itself. [406b10] The desinence of desinence among
the secondary characteristics is able to act as the proximate condition caus­
ing only that primary characteristic of desinence among the nine factors to
be destroyed.

Therefore, the characteristics of birth, and so on, have additional char­
cacteristics [of the birth of birth, and so on]. [However,] since there are
only four secondary characteristics, there is no fault of infinite regress
(anavasthāprasaṅga).

19.4 [Four Characteristics—Existential Sta­
tus]

Why are the characteristics discriminated in this way? It would not be
reasonable to discriminate them otherwise. Why is this? If one were to
discard the correct principle by which the Abhidharma establishes these
characteristics and accord oneself with other schools, one would scarcely be
able to establish the conditioned characteristics at all. All notions that are
opposed to the correct principle of the Abhidharma [406b15] concerning
the true meaning of these characteristics, and so on, are mistaken. In
every case, such common notions pervert the truth. We will now discuss
this extensively.

Now, that Sūtra master, relying upon others,29 states: “Why is there
such splitting (pātyate) of space?30 It is not the case that the characteristics
of birth, and so on, exist (sāñvidyante) as real entities (dravyatāḥ) in the way (yathā) in which they have been discriminated (vibhajyante). Why is this? It is because there is no means of valid cognition (pramāṇābhāvāt) [through which they can be known to exist]. That is to say, these characteristics cannot be proven to exist as real entities through means of valid cognition by direct perception (pratyakṣa), by inference (anumāna), or by scriptural authority (āptāgama), as can form (rūpa), and so on.”31

[Existence of the Characteristics as Real Entities]

[S] [406b20] Would [the Sūtra master then] say that these characteristics of birth, and so on, discriminated in some other way (anyathā) exist as real entities?32 He would not. If [they could be discriminated in another way as real entities], his statement, “the characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as real entities in the way in which they have been discriminated,” would be useless [as an objection against the existence of the characteristics as real entities].

Then, is there a means of valid cognition by direct perception, inference, or scriptural authority that would prove that these characteristics exist provisionally as in the case of a pot? While [the Sūtra master] rejects their existence as real entities, he should definitely allow that these characteristics of birth, and so on, exist provisionally, because it is necessarily unreasonable to posit a third form of existence [that is neither real nor provisional].33 This is due to the fact that if one denies that birth, and so on, have the distinctive characteristic [of either real or provisional existence], [406b25] one should, accordingly, acknowledge that they are not to be admitted at all, because they would be absolutely nonexistent.34

[There is no means of valid cognition that proves the provisional existence of these characteristics for the following reasons.] First, the nature of the characteristics of birth, and so on, cannot be proven by direct perception to exist provisionally, because there is debate [concerning whether or not they are perceived].35 Likewise, the nature of those characteristics of birth, and so on, cannot be proven by scriptural authority to exist provisionally, because there is no passage that asserts their [provisional existence]. If their provisional existence were [proven] by inference, then their existence as real entities could also be [proven by inference]. Thus, isn’t it you, on the contrary, who cuts up space by maintaining that [these characteristics] exist provisionally?
[Proof that the Characteristics Exist as Real Entities]

We will present at a later point the reasoned arguments that prove the existence of the characteristics as real entities. Now, we will first cite those scriptural passages that serve as proof. [406c1] The sūtra has said: “The corporeal, verbal, and mental actions, and intentions belonging to one possessed of false views belong [to the category of those false views]; the conditioned forces (saṃskāra) belonging to [one possessed of false views] are all of the category of those [false views].”36 The intention of this sūtra passage is that since the various conditioned forces such as the characteristics of birth, and so on, occur in conformity with those [false views], since [the conditioned forces] all have the same effect, and since those [false views] are considered to be their cause, it is said that [these conditioned forces] are of the category of those [false views]. Since the three types of [corporeal, verbal, and mental] action are mentioned in this sūtra passage, [406c5] the [term ‘conditioned forces’ (saṃskāra)] does not refer to the forces aggregate (saṃskāraskandha) of feelings, and so on, [but rather to the conditioned characteristics, which can also be referred to as “conditioned forces” (saṃskāra)]. Further, only if entities occur in conformity with one object [as the conditioned characteristics do], can it be said, accordingly, that they are of one [category].37 Therefore, the term ‘conditioned forces’ [in the sūtra passage] should indicate only the conditioned forces of birth, and so on, that operate simultaneously with the corporeal, verbal, and mental actions. These conditioned forces are produced in accordance with those false views and are their effect. Therefore, they are referred to as being of the category of those [false views]. [We can then conclude that the characteristics of birth, and so on, are mentioned implicitly in the sūtra through this reference to “conditioned forces;” as a result, the existence of the conditioned characteristics is proven by scriptural authority.] If this sūtra passage is not as we have interpreted it, what other meaning do you propose that it has? Regardless, our interpretation does not contradict the sense of this sūtra passage.

Further, the sūtra on the three characteristics is sufficient as a scriptural authority [to prove that the four characteristics exist as discrete real entities]. [406c10] That sūtra states: “There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors]. The arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned, the passing away, and change in continuance also can be discerned.”38 If [the sūtra did not intend to indicate that the characteristics themselves also exist separately as real entities], it would have said merely, “[there are] three conditioned characteristics: that is, the conditioned characteristics of arising, passing away, and change in continuance.”
If that were the meaning, the repetition of both the phrase ‘of conditioned [factors]’ and the phrase ‘also can be discerned’ would be without a function. You who claim that the three conditioned characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as discrete real entities apart from the factors that they characterize should consider what the purport of these phrases ['of conditioned factors' and 'also can be discerned'] is.

You might reply that if [the sutra] had not mentioned the [first] phrase ‘of conditioned [factors]’ one would not discern to what these characteristics belong. [Even in that case,] the [second] phrase ‘conditioned characteristics’ would be sufficient to enable one to discern that the characteristics belong to conditioned [factors]. There would be no need to add this [first] phrase ['of conditioned factors'] because even apart from this phrase, the sense [that characteristics belong to conditioned factors] could be established.

Moreover, in both [the initial] citation [in the sutra] and in [the following] elaboration the genitive case is used. Therefore, it is known that the characteristics exist apart from that which is characterized, because it is observed that [in the case of the genitive] one entity is referred to by means of another.

You might reply that there are also cases in which, though the genitive case is used, [the characteristics and that which is characterized] do not refer to separate entities. Therefore, [our appeal to the use of the genitive as] a reason [for the fact that the characteristics and that which is characterized exist as separate entities] would be subject to the fault of errancy (*vyabhicāra), [since it would be applicable in some cases, and not in others].

Isn’t it the case that if the characteristics do not exist apart from the thing characterized, then this sutra passage should have been worded [as we suggested] previously—that is, as omitting the repeated phrase ‘conditioned’ and the phrase ‘also can be discerned’—and the meaning [of the passage] would be established even apart from the use of the genitive case? Furthermore, your adducing of [examples] in which the genitive does not refer to two separate entities as a reason justifying your interpretation of this sutra passage [as not indicating that characteristics exist apart from that which is characterized] is equally subject to the fault of errancy, (*vyabhicāra) [since this interpretation too would be applicable in some cases, and not in others]. How can one conclude with certainty from this that the three characteristics mentioned in the sutra passage are provisional, and not real?
19.5 [The Sūtra on the Three Characteristics]

[The Sūtra Master’s Interpretation—I]

Further that [Sūtra master] states: “Fool! You cling to the words (granthajñā) and miss the meaning (na tv arthajñā). The Lord has said: ‘The meaning (artha) is the reliance (pratisaraṇa).’ What is the true meaning of this sūtra passage? [406c25] It is that fools blinded by ignorance are obsessed (abhiṣvajante) throughout the long night of transmigration, since they are convinced that the stream of conditioned forces [has the nature of] ‘self’ and of ‘what belongs to the self.’ The Lord, for the sake of removing their conviction, made the following statement in order to indicate that the stream of conditioned forces has the nature of being conditioned (saṃskṛtatva) and of being dependently originated (pratītyasamutpādanatā): ‘There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors].’ [He did] not [make this statement in order to] indicate that conditioned forces have all three characteristics within a single moment, since the [three characteristics] of arising, and so on, as applied to a single moment cannot be discerned (prajñāyante). That which cannot be discerned should not be established as a characteristic. [407a1] Thus, [since] it is further stated in this sūtra that ‘the arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned, the passing away, and the change in continuance also can be discerned,’ [these conditioned characteristics must be capable of being discerned, and hence, they must be applied to the stream of conditioned forces (saṃskārapravāha), and not to a single moment (kṣaṇa)].”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Locus of Application]

Now, this interpretation by [the Sūtra master] should not [be accepted as] the meaning of the sūtra. First, one should not allow that there is only one arising, one passing away, and one change within the stream of conditioned forces. Further, if it were admitted [that the characteristics are to be applied to the stream of conditioned forces as a whole, and not to a single moment], it would not need to be expounded. Even if those [fools] who grasp the self had never heard [this teaching] that there is arising and passing away, and so on, in the stream of conditioned forces, [407a5] they would still be capable of discerning it automatically. Since, even though they discern it, they still grasp the self, the further expounding of this teaching would be superfluous.
[Since this single arising and single passing away in the stream of conditioned forces are already discerned, and grasping for the self is still prevalent, [the Lord] now desiring to remove [that grasping], further expounded this teaching. We should consider the purpose for which the Lord expounded this doctrine to his disciples. Ordinary persons, oblivious to the subtle production and destruction [characterizing each moment] within the stream of conditioned forces, grasp "self" and "what belongs to the self." The Lord, desiring to remove that grasping, [407a10] clearly indicated that there is a particular production and destruction for [each of] the many moments within one life-stream of the various conditioned forces. Therefore, he made the statement that "there are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors]," and so on, as is presented in detail. Thus, there was a profound purpose dictating the expounding of this sūtra.

If one claims, [as you do,] that since those [ordinary persons] do not observe the birth, and so on, of conditioned forces in [each] moment, expounding them is without benefit, you equally do not observe this [to be so]. Isn’t it the case that if one searches in accord with correct principle, one will not fail to discern [these characteristics]? If one does not discern the birth, and so on, of each moment, one will never be able to discard [407a15] the grasping of "self" and of "what belongs to the self." Only the Buddha is able to use skill in expedient means to enable those [ordinary persons] to search in accord with correct principle and, thereby, become able to discern [these characteristics]. Not having already discerned [these characteristics as applied to each moment], they produce the view of self. When they come to discern them at present, the view of self is discarded. Therefore, one knows that this passage about the three characteristics of conditioned factors is made only in reference to moments, and does not depend upon the stream [of conditioned forces]. Thus, since, [according to our interpretation,] the birth, and so on, of a moment is not observed, expounding them has a function. However, since, given your interpretation of the meaning of the sūtra, [expounding them] is without a function, [your interpretation] is necessarily unreasonable. Therefore, our understanding of the sūtra passage does not agree with your interpretation.

[407a20] Now, you should respond to the following: do those who are blinded by ignorance and have given rise to the view of self with regard to the stream of conditioned forces observe those characteristics of birth, and so on, as applied to the stream of conditioned forces before they have heard this teaching, or not? If you respond that they do observe them, then [such observation] would supersede the accepted doctrine of our school [concerning the four characteristics], and to expound them further would be useless. If [such persons] do not observe [these characteristics], then even after the
Buddha has expounded them, they still would not discern them because there would be no other cause [that would enable the characteristics to be discerned after they are expounded by the Buddha]. If you respond that the power of expounding [the teaching] causes [the characteristics] to be discerned, the principle would be the same for the characteristics as applied to a moment. [In other words:] if the characteristics of the stream [of conditioned forces] are gross and easily discerned, then those ordinary persons should know them even apart from the power of the Buddha’s expounding the [teaching]. If the characteristics of the stream of conditioned forces are not observed, and yet one allows that expounding [them] causes them to be discerned, thereby enabling one to remove grasping of the self, the characteristics [belonging to each] moment should also be so: [that is, they should be able to be discerned as a result of being expounded]. How, then, can you further say that since those [ordinary persons] do not observe birth, and so on, as applied to a moment, expounding them is without benefit? Moreover, who is not capable of discerning the birth, and so on, among conditioned forces as applied to the stream? Since it was necessary to further expound [them], the interpretation of the [sūtra master] must contradict the meaning of the sūtra.

Further, [even though the characteristics of] birth, and so on, as applied to a single moment [cannot be observed by ordinary direct perception], they can be discerned by subtle discriminative intellect: that is to say, if one closely examines the immediate succession of moments, one will be able to discern them. Subtle discriminative intellect is produced as a result of the exposition of [the teaching], and it discerns the impermanence of conditioned forces and is able to remove grasping of the self. Since this impermanence of conditioned forces is discerned by subtle discriminative intellect, it is unreasonable to claim that the three characteristics of arising, and so on, as applied to a single moment cannot be discerned.

Next, as for [the Sūtra master’s] statement, “that which cannot be discerned should not be established as a characteristic,” one cannot state unequivocally that an entity’s not being discerned constitutes a sufficient reason for its not being a characteristic. Even though gross discriminative intellect cannot discern characteristics such as [the aggregate of] feelings, and so on, it is not the case that they are not characteristics. Therefore, [his] statement, “that which cannot be discerned is not a characteristic,” is not reasonable.

Finally, the statement in the sūtra, “the arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned, the passing away, and change in continuance also can be discerned,” is made with regard to moments. The
intention of this sūtra passage is that when the arising, and so on, of a moment is examined, it can be discerned. Therefore, the Lord made this statement in order to motivate his disciples to examine [the arising, and so on, of each moment].

[The Sūtra Master’s Interpretation—II]

[Continuing his criticism of our interpretation of the sūtra on the three characteristics,] the Sūtra master has said: “Further, the fact that the sūtra repeats the word ‘conditioned’ enables us to recognize that these characteristics indicate [that factors] are conditioned. It does not mean that these characteristics indicate the existence of conditioned [factors] as in the case of the presence of a waterfowl, which indicates that water does not fail to exist nearby.”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Mode of Existence]

This criticism contradicts the accepted doctrine of [the Sūtra master’s] own school. If one allows, [as we do,] that a conditioned factor exists in the state of not yet having been produced, [407b15] one can maintain that birth does not indicate the existence of that conditioned factor, because that [conditioned factor] already exists prior to its production. [However,] when one maintains, [as the Sūtra master does,] that a conditioned factor in the state of not yet having been produced is nonexistent, how can it be that birth does not indicate the existence of that conditioned factor? The example of the waterfowl, which indicates the [existence of] water, is then consistent with his own accepted doctrine, [according to which] birth must [be accepted to] indicate the existence of conditioned factors. If, [as the Sūtra master suggests,] birth did not indicate the existence of conditioned factors [in the sense that something] “not having existed, [now] exists” (abhūtvā bhāva utpādaḥ), then this would also undermine [his own] accepted doctrine, which maintains that conditioned factors alone exist, [and he would then be forced into the position of admitting that nothing exists].

[The Sūtra master] maintains that birth refers to the fact of a conditioned factor merely acquiring its own nature (ātmalābha). [407b20] The nature of birth is to be equated with the nature [of factors] as conditioned. Since, [according to his theory,] birth and [a factor’s nature as] conditioned do not exist as discrete real entities, [a factor’s nature as] conditioned and existence also are not distinguished. How [can he maintain that] these
characteristics can indicate [a factor’s nature as], conditioned, and not its existence?

Further, if [we accepted the Sūtra master’s interpretation that the second reference to “conditioned” indicates the conditioned nature of conditioned factors], the first of the two references to “conditioned” would be without a function. The phrase ‘the arising of conditioned factors also can be discerned’ would be sufficient to establish this meaning [that the nature of conditioned factors is conditioned]. Therefore, this [second reference to “conditioned”] should indicate the sense that [the characteristics and that which is characterized exist] separately.

[Sthavira’s Interpretation]

Sthavira\(^59\) has said: “If the word ‘conditioned’ were not repeated, \[407b25\] then one would not discern the quality indicated by these characteristics of conditioned factors: that is, [it would be unclear] whether these characteristics indicate the nature [of conditioned factors] as having form, and so on, or their nature as having flavor, and so on, or their nature as virtuous or unvirtuous, and so on. In order to avoid this confusion, the word ‘conditioned’ is repeated.”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response to Sthavira]

[Sthavira’s interpretation] is likewise unreasonable. Since [the sūtra] has already stated, “there are three characteristics of conditioned [factors],” how could these characteristics possibly indicate [the nature of factors as] having form, and so on?\(^60\) It is not the case that separate factors lack distinguishing characteristics that may be considered separate from that factor.\(^61\)

\[407c1\] Further, the sūtra passage will then state, “the arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned,” and so on, and will deny that these three characteristics of arising, and so on, are to be applied to unconditioned factors. These [statements] are sufficient to allow one to recognize that these characteristics clearly indicate the nature [of factors] as conditioned. What need would there be [for the word ‘conditioned’] to be repeated?

Further, how could [Sthavira] possibly question whether these various characteristics are able to indicate other [qualities such as] the nature of
a factor as having form? Since having form, and so on, are particular inherent characteristics (svalakṣaṇa), if arising, and so on, indicated such qualities as having form they would become particular inherent characteristics, [407c5] and one real entity should not have three particular inherent characteristics. Why then would the sutra state that [conditioned factors] have three such characteristics? Therefore, it is impossible for [Sthavira] to raise this question.

Further, the word ‘also’ [in the second phrase of the sutra passage] will also convey the sense of “collection,” thereby enabling one to know that the three characteristics [together] indicate the single [quality of being] conditioned. There is no possibility of questioning whether these three characteristics in each case have separate referents. Therefore, [Sthavira’s] claim is definitely not to be accepted.

19.6 [Four Characteristics]

[The Sutra Master’s Interpretation—I]

Now, on what basis and in what way does [the Sutra master] establish provisionally the characteristics of conditioned factors?63 First, the Sutra master, conforming to the accepted doctrine of Sthavira’s school, makes the following statement: [407c10] “The initial arising of the stream of conditioned forces is referred to as production; in the state of extinction, it is referred to as destruction; the continuous operation of the stream in the interim is referred to as continuance; the distinction between prior and subsequent [moments] is referred to as change in continuance.”64

Next, [the Sutra master] claims that the Lord, relying on this sense of the characteristics as applied to the stream of conditioned factors, addressed Nanda saying: “The son of the good family knows well that feelings are produced, he knows well that feelings abide, he knows that feelings deteriorate and are destroyed.”65

[S] What is specified by the term ‘stream of conditioned forces?’

[O-V] It refers to the uninterrupted flow of conditioned factors.

[S] Then, what factor constitutes its intrinsic nature?

[O-V] [407c15] [The stream] is a provisional factor (prajñaptidharma). How could one seek intrinsic nature [in it]? Rather, moments are mutually similar; they are interconnected [in a relation of] cause and effect;
the conditioned forces produce effects, which occur in succession without termination; this is referred to as the stream [of conditioned forces].

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I—Birth of the Stream]

[S] If [the stream of conditioned forces is defined in this way], it is not reasonable [for the Sūtra master] to claim that this stream [of conditioned forces as a whole] has one birth, because [the conditioned forces of which it consists] do not arise simultaneously. Given that, [according to the opponent’s definition,] the uninterrupted production of an unlimited number of moments of conditioned forces is referred to as a stream, how can he claim that the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole] has birth? It would only be possible for him to establish the birth of conditioned factors with regard to those [present] conditioned forces that have already been produced and have not yet been destroyed, [407c20] because [birth cannot be established] with regard to those [future conditioned forces] that have not yet been produced or with regard to those [past forces] that have already been destroyed. [Thus, a single birth cannot be applied to the stream of conditioned forces as a whole.]

Further, if this stream [of conditioned forces] exists provisionally, is its basis (āśraya) only present [factors], or does its basis also extend to both past and present [factors]?66 If its basis were only present [factors], then this [stream of conditioned forces] should not be said to be a provisionally existent entity, because it is unreasonable for a factor in a single moment alone to be considered the basis of a provisional factor consisting of a stream [of innumerable forces]. Rather, the characteristic of provisional existence is that one thing is established as a whole on the basis of many factors, as in the case of a pot or of motion.

[407c25] If the basis of [this stream of conditioned forces] extended to past and present [factors], then, since this stream, which is provisional, takes [both factors] of previously produced moments and present factors as its basis, it would be meaningless to speak of [one] birth of the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole]. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to say that birth occurs in the past [and a stream includes past factors]. Further, if the factors [upon which this stream depends] were [only] present, then [these factors] would not constitute a stream because a stream, [by definition,] is not [only] present. Thus, since it is only possible to establish birth in the present, one should only [use the term] ‘moment,’ and should not refer to a stream.
[Sānghabhadra’s Response—II—Continuance of the Stream]

[O] If [we did] not [adopt] this sense—[that the characteristics apply to the stream as a whole, and not to a single moment—the following] sūtra passage would be contradicted. The sūtra states: [408a1] “Or, there is a certain group whose bodies abide for as long as 100 years.”67 It is not possible for one moment to abide for 100 years.

[S] Who has said that the body in one moment abides for 100 years? [This sūtra passage] simply means that within this stream of similar [moments that constitutes] the body, moments of a different category are not produced for a period of time. That is to say, similar subsequent moments continue to be produced without interruption from the prior moments [within the] body; this is provisionally referred to as one body abiding for 100 years. [408a5] What contradiction does this [interpretation] present to the statement in the sūtra?

Further, [the Sūtra master] should not maintain that the stream [of conditioned factors as a whole] has continuance, since the name ‘stream [of conditioned forces]’ is established on the basis of numerous moments and these numerous moments never abide at the same time.

[O] Don’t we both allow that a moment (kṣaṇa), a state (avasthā), and the homogeneous collection of components (nikāyasabhāga), are all three established together in the present?68 How, then, can one say that it is not possible for continuance to be applied to the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole, and yet also be established on the basis of the present moment alone]? If there were no [continuance of] the stream [of conditioned forces], the last two—[that is, the state and the homogeneous collection of components]—would not be found.69

[S] This [assertion concerning a moment, a state, and the homogeneous collection of components] would be interpreted correctly if it were interpreted in the same way as the previous sūtra passage:70 that is, the last two—[that is, the state and the homogeneous collection of components]—are provisionally referred to as present, and birth, and so on, are likewise provisionally applied to them.

[408a10] If one allows that [factors] exist in the three time periods, this sense of [the characteristics of birth, and so on, as applied to the stream of conditioned forces as a whole], can be accepted. [However,] if one claims that [factors] do not exist as real entities in the past or future, but only exist in the present, how can one maintain that there is birth, and so on, of a stream [of conditioned forces as a whole] within the period of one moment
[alone]? At that time when conditioned forces of the prior moment are not yet destroyed, those of the subsequent moment are not yet produced; how can one maintain that these two moments share a single characteristic of birth? Further, [if the existence of past and future factors were denied and only present factors were admitted,] how would the two characteristics of birth and desinence not both be established simultaneously within a single moment?

Further, when there is mutual similarity [between two consecutive moments, [408a15] or when the conditioned forces are produced without interruption, it might be possible to maintain that there is [one] birth, and so on, of that stream [of conditioned forces as a whole]. [However,] since at certain times an unvirtuous state of perceptual consciousness is produced without interruption from a [prior] virtuous moment of perceptual consciousness, and then an indeterminate state of perceptual consciousness arises without interruption from [that unvirtuous] moment of perceptual consciousness, at such times the nature of the prior and subsequent states of perceptual consciousness would not be the same. [In such cases, then,] how could one maintain that there is [one] birth, and so on, of the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole]?71 If one claimed that, since prior and subsequent moments are of the same category as perceptual consciousness, one can refer to them as [constituting] a stream [of conditioned forces] characterized by similarity, then such a stream [of conditioned forces, so defined,] would be without birth. [408a20] This is due to the fact that this single stream of perceptual consciousness has come down [through countless births] from beginningless time; [similarly] this stream [of perceptual consciousness] should continue without desinence until one is just about to enter nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhīṣeṣanirvāṇa).72

Further, if an unvirtuous state of [perceptual consciousness] arises after a virtuous moment of perceptual consciousness has already been produced and destroyed, or if an indeterminate state of perceptual consciousness arises after that unvirtuous moment of perceptual consciousness has already been produced and destroyed, how can the two characteristics of birth and desinence, at such times, not be established simultaneously in the period of one moment?73

Just as [we have] rejected [the position] that the stream of conditioned forces [as a whole] has birth, so also [we] would reject [the position] that [the stream as a whole] has continuance and desinence. What person, sound in mind and body, [408a25] could maintain that what has already been destroyed or has not yet been produced has continuance, or that there is a stream [of conditioned forces] in a single moment?
Further, if the Dārśāntikas do not allow that the conditioned forces of form, and so on, have birth and desinence in each and every moment, then they [should] also maintain that conditioned factors abide over a long period of time. In that case, then, how would their position be different from that of the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika masters? However, if they reply that because there is destruction in the last moment [of the stream], every moment has desinence, [and, therefore, their opinion is different from that of the Vaiśeṣikas], can’t they be accused [of being hypocritical] in attempting to refute the accepted doctrine of these other schools by saying one thing and thinking another?

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—III—Desinence of the Stream]

[408b1] Further, since, [according to the Dārśāntikas,] it is merely the nonexistence of factors that is referred to as the nature of desinence, it is their accepted doctrine that this desinence (anītyatā) takes the nonexistence of factors as its intrinsic nature. In that case, factors should not be impermanent [by nature] because [a factor that takes the mere] nonexistence of factors [as its nature] cannot possibly be referred to as a factor. If factors are said to be impermanent, the nature of desinence should not take nonexistence as its intrinsic nature because all factors take existence as their nature. The intrinsic nature of the characteristic of desinence is referred to as the nature of desinence. [408b5] That which has nonexistence as its intrinsic nature cannot be given the name ‘nature.’ How, then, is it possible that their accepted doctrine speaks of the nature of desinence?

Further, it would not be reasonably established that conditioned forces (sāṁskāra) are factors having desinence because desinence has nonexistence as its intrinsic nature. That which has nonexistence as its intrinsic nature should not be established as the nature of a factor.

Further, if the nature of impermanence had nonexistence as its intrinsic nature, then the genitive case should not be used in the phrase ‘the impermanence of form,’ because nonexistence lacks a relation of connection to either self or other [as is required in a genitive relationship].

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—IV—Senescence of the Stream]

Further, senescence also, [as applied to] the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole] is not reasonably established because [if senescence were applied to the stream, and not to individual moments, then] it would not
be possible to allow that there is a distinction between prior and subsequent [moments within the stream] at all times and in all circumstances. Therefore, it is said that since [the Sūtra master] maintains that the body, and so on, do not have the characteristic of senescence in every moment, when there is no change in external causes, [which would effect a change in the body], how would it be possible for the body at a subsequent time to be distinguished from the way it presently exists? If there is no change in external causes, then what produces the distinction between the prior and subsequent moments of the stream [of conditioned forces]?

One should not say that the distinction [between prior and subsequent moments] occurs automatically; the [particular inherent] characteristic [of the body] continually [arises] in the same way and should be without change. Furthermore, [in that case,] one would be forced to maintain that birth [also] occurs automatically.

Moreover, one should not claim that the apparent distinction [between prior and subsequent moments in the body] is caused by [conditioned forces] of the same category, because [a stream of conditioned forces] of the same category is without change. If one claims that there is change in the stream [of conditioned forces] because the prior production [of conditioned forces] within that same category is considered to be the cause or condition of subsequent [conditioned forces], in that case, earth, and so on, in dependence upon the prior [moments of earth], should alone give rise to the transformation of cooking quite apart from the collocation of fire, and so on. However, since [cooking] does not actually arise [in dependence upon the prior moments of earth alone], it is not reasonable [to assume that change in the stream of conditioned forces occurs only as a result of the prior production of conditioned forces within that same category].

Thus, [the Sūtra master] rejects the characteristic of senescence that is produced simultaneously [with each factor], and yet, given cases in which there is no distinction between prior and subsequent [moments of the stream] due to external conditions, he nevertheless firmly maintains that the characteristic of senescence is found in the stream [of conditioned forces] at all times and in all circumstances. There is no reason for this, and yet he obstinately advances his claim.

Further he should not maintain [in some cases] since the prior moment of the cause has the nature of being the condition in conjunction with external conditions, it is able to produce the subsequent moment, which has the nature of being an effect, and that through these [prior and external conditions] there are differences between the prior and subsequent moments of the stream [of conditioned forces]. [Nor should he
maintain that] in other cases, when conditioned forces do not depend upon external conditions, [there are differences between prior and subsequent moments of the stream of conditioned forces] due to the characteristic of senescence—[that is, impermanence]—which conditioned factors possess as their nature. [Such a position should not be maintained because the causes for change would be different in each case.]

There are those who maintain that the subtle deterioration in the characterized stream [of conditioned forces] over a long period of time is referred to as senescence. This [position] also is not acceptable, since [in that case] the entire stream [of conditioned forces] would not at every point have the characteristic of senescence as its nature. That is to say, when [the stream of conditioned forces] is flourishing, [408b25] it should be without senescence. As has been said, "the body, formed from the combination of the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta) and the derived material elements (bhautika) is, at certain times, seen to grow and, at other times, to deteriorate." Further, what is the cause for this deterioration of the stream [of conditioned forces]? The fault here would be the same as in the immediately preceding example [concerning the conditions for change in the case of the body: that is, the causes would be different in each case]. Thus, we have refuted [the position] that [the characteristics of] birth, and so on, are to be applied to the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole].

[Saṅghabhadra's Response—V—Sūtra Passage Concerning Nanda]

The sūtra passage cited by [the Sūtra master] does not serve as proof [of the fact that the four characteristics are to be applied to the stream of conditioned forces as a whole, and not to a moment]. [From that very passage we can conclude that Nanda,] the son of a good family, knows well future and past feelings. That is to say, his present knowledge knows future feelings [408c1] because [the word] ‘production’ is applied to that which is just about to be produced, not to that which is in a state of having already been produced; [therefore, if Nanda knows feelings as they are produced, he knows a future factor.] [His present knowledge] knows past feelings because [the word] ‘destruction’ is applied to that which has already been destroyed, not to that which is in a state of being about to be destroyed; [therefore, if Nanda knows feelings as they are destroyed, he knows a past factor.] It is not the case that he knows feelings [only] in the state of having already been produced, or in the state of not yet having been destroyed, because this would not be reasonable [given the use of the terms ‘production’ and ‘destruction’].
The phrase 'the son of the good family knows well that feelings abide and deteriorate' was not given in the original [sūtra passage]. However, if it had been given, then the meaning would not be contradicted.83

Since [even the Sūtra master would admit that] past and future [factors] have birth, and so on, in the sense that they “have existed” and “will exist,”84 these characteristics of birth, and so on, must exist at all times. [408c5] Thus, this sūtra passage cited by him cannot be used as proof [of his interpretation].

Therefore, on the basis of the scriptural authority and reasoned arguments [offered here] one should accept that [the characteristics of] birth, and so on, exist as real entities within conditioned forces in each and every moment, and are not [simply to be applied to] the stream [of conditioned forces as a whole].

[The Sūtra Master’s Interpretation—II]

Next, the Sūtra master states: “The four characteristics can also be established for conditioned factors in each and every moment if it is not maintained that they exist as real entities. How can this be established? In each moment, that which not having existed [now] exists is referred to as production, and that which having existed no longer exists is referred to as destruction. The arising of each subsequent moment in connection with prior moments is referred to as continuance, and the distinction between the prior and subsequent [moments within] that [series] is referred to as change in continuance. [408c10] When similar consecutive moments are produced, the dependence between prior and subsequent [moments] is not without distinction.”85 Therefore, [according to the Sūtra master,] so long as one does not maintain that the four characteristics of birth, and so on, exist as [discrete] real entities, they can be established in the span of one moment.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Characteristics as Real Entities]

[S] [Through this interpretation,] doesn’t [the Sūtra master] now unwittingly establish precisely that previously dreaded theory that his own accepted doctrine would not allow: that is, that the characteristics of birth, and so on, exist as discrete real entities? [Otherwise,] how can one conditioned [factor] in the span of one moment take the four factors of birth, continuance, senescence, and desinence as its nature, [408c15] without the
If he replies that these [four characteristics do not carry out their activity at one time] because they are each connected to various conditions, these conditions should, in the same way as these [four characteristics], become conditions [for the production of their respective characteristics] at one time. Since each one of those conditions [also] takes the four characteristics of birth, continuance, senescence, and desinence as its intrinsic nature, for what reason are there four such conditions, and why does the first [among these] act as the condition of birth and does not itself cause desinence? Further, for what reason do conditioned factors take only 'the condition having the nature of birth as that condition which first makes them arise, [408c20] and do not take the condition having the nature of desinence as that condition which would make them not arise at all? Further, when birth and desinence are established [as existing provisionally] on the basis of one factor, [and not as discrete real entities,] whether [that factor and these characteristics] are different [from one another] or not, a fault is incurred. Why is this? If they were different [from one another, since the characteristics are considered by you to be mere aspects of one factor], that [factor] would be different from itself, which is unreasonable. If they were not different from one another, then when that [factor] is produced, it should be destroyed, and when it is destroyed, it should be produced. Therefore, [if the characteristics were established only on the basis of one factor, that factor] should be without the two characteristics of birth and desinence because they are contradictory. Further, that factor having the nature of birth would be precisely that factor having the nature of desinence. Nevertheless, [the Sūtra master] maintains that there is no fault of confusion between birth and desinence. [408c25] This would only be possible as an illusion created by the god Viṣṇu.

Further, one should determine whether or not [factors] exist in the past and the future. Only then would it be possible to claim that the four characteristics are merely provisionally established as applied to either the stream of conditioned factors or a moment [in the sense that they] “not having existed, [now] exist, and having existed, no longer exist.”87

Next, in what sense does he use the compound ‘characteristic of continuance’ as referring to “the arising of each subsequent moment in connection with prior moments?”88 This arising in connection with prior [moments] should be precisely birth. Since, [in that case,] birth would be mentioned twice, there should be [three], not four characteristics.
Further, what condition causes the dissimilarity between the prior and subsequent moments in the stream [of conditioned forces]? [409a1] The fault mentioned previously would also be incurred here. 89

Further, if the nonexistence of factors is referred to as the nature of desinence, the fault incurred would be as previously discussed. 90 Therefore, it is known that the [characteristics of] birth, and so on, exist separately as real entities.

19.7 [The Sūtra Master’s Criticism]

[Four Characteristics—Simultaneous Activity]

Next, the Sūtra master states: “If [the characteristics of] birth, and so on, existed as real entities apart from the intrinsic nature of the conditioned factors of form, and so on, then, one factor at one time would be produced, abide, decay, and be destroyed, since [you] allow that [those characteristics] exist together with [that factor].” 91

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I—Simultaneous Activity]

[S] If one maintains, [as the Sūtra master does,] that the characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as discrete real entities apart from the conditioned factors [that they characterize], [409a5] this fault cannot be resolved because it is not reasonably established that there are distinctions in the capability of one factor at one time. No such fault is incurred when one allows that the characteristics of birth, and so on, exist as discrete real entities apart from conditioned factors, because, given the fact that the intrinsic nature [of the characteristics and the characterized factor] are not the same, their activities are [all] separate. 92

It is observed that among the other conditions that assist such internal factors as fetal stages or such external factors as seeds 93 in the production of their own effect, [certain factors] have predominant capability. That is to say, [in the case of internal factors,] the first fetal stage (kalala), 94 for example, assisted by perceptual consciousness, has the nature of being the predominant cause in producing the second (arbuda) and subsequent fetal stages. [409a10] Even though it is not the case that the second and subsequent fetal stages do not depend upon perceptual consciousness, perceptual consciousness is not the predominant cause in producing them. This is due to the fact that the two streams—[that of states of perceptual consciousness
and that of the fetal stages—are distinguished. However, it is [also] not the case that this perceptual consciousness does not act as a predominant condition with regard to the [production of] the second and subsequent fetal stages, since when this [perceptual consciousness] exists, those [fetal stages] will exist, and when this [perceptual consciousness] does not exist, those [fetal stages] will not exist. Further, this perceptual consciousness is not a simultaneous condition assisting [only] such [factors] as the first fetal stage in the production of such [effects] as the second and subsequent fetal stages. It is maintained that perceptual consciousness also acts as a simultaneous condition assisting such [factors] as seeds in their production of sprouts, and so on.

[409a15] In the same way, [in the case of external factors,] seeds, for example, assisted by such [factors] as the earth, have the nature of being the predominant cause in producing such [effects] as sprouts. Even though it is not the case that those sprouts do not depend upon such [factors] as the earth, the earth is not the predominant cause in producing them. This is due to the fact that it is the seeds that produce the sprout without interruption. However, it is [also] not the case that such [factors] as the earth do not act as the predominant condition with regard to the [production of] such [effects] as the sprout, because the existence or nonexistence of the sprout depends upon that of the earth. Further, such [factors] as the earth are not simultaneous conditions assisting [only] such [factors] as seeds in the production of such [effects] as sprouts. [409a20] It is maintained that the earth is also able to act as a simultaneous condition assisting such [factors] as the first fetal stage in its production of the second and subsequent fetal stages.

Thus, other factors, which act as conditions assisting [predominant] causes in the production of their own effect, should be explained in this way. Further, since [the opponent] calls himself a disciple of the Buddha, he should also allow the existence of simultaneously produced causes, since the sūtra states: "Perceptual consciousness and name and form act as reciprocal conditions and, thereby, are able to abide." In this case, the first fetal stage and seeds are previously produced causes, respectively, of the second fetal stage and the sprout; [409a25] perceptual consciousness and the earth, and so on, are simultaneously produced conditions. Compared with the previously produced causes, the power of these simultaneously produced conditions is predominant. This is due to the fact that even given the presence of such previously produced causes as the first fetal stage and seeds, if there were no simultaneously produced conditions, such
as perceptual consciousness or the earth, then the effects, such as the second fetal stage or sprouts, would never be produced.

From this [discussion] it should be known accordingly that even though conditioned factors have many types of external assisting causes and conditions, they must also have internal birth, continuance, senescence, and desinence to act as immediate assisting causes [in the production of their effects]; only then would they be able to pass through the time periods.99

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—II—Simultaneous Activity]

[409b1] Moreover, the states (avasthā) of conditioned factors are not [all] the same. In brief, there are three types: that is, distinguished [according to whether] the activity [of that conditioned factor] of projecting its own effect is not yet attained, is just attained, or has already been destroyed. Conditioned factors are, further, of two types: that is, those that exist with activity (kāritra) and those that exist only with intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The former [category] refers to the present: [that is, when a factor exists as a real entity characterized by intrinsic nature with activity]. The latter [category] refers to the past or future: [that is, when a factor exists only as a real entity characterized by intrinsic nature alone, lacking activity]. Each of these [types of conditioned factors] has two further types: that is; those whose capability (sāmartiya) is predominant or subordinate. [409b5] That is to say, if conditioned factors are able to act as the cause in projecting their own effect (phalākṣepa), this [capability is predominant and] is referred to as activity (kāritra); if they are able to act as conditions assisting [factors] of a different category, this [capability is subordinate and] is referred to [simply] as capability (sāmartiya). These two types will be extensively considered in the discussion of the three time periods.100

By holding in one’s mind the principle of dependent origination [as applied to] distinctive [states of factors], one will produce conviction and understanding concerning the distinctive capability of those [characteristics of] birth, and so on.101 That is to say, when a factor has not yet acquired the activity of projecting its own effect [that factor] gives rise to an internal condition through the assistance of external conditions that have not yet acquired, are about to acquire, or have lost the activity of projecting their own effect. [409b10] [That internal condition,] which has the capability of assisting [that factor] in carrying out its appointed task, is the characteristic of birth. Or, when a factor is just about to acquire the activity of projecting its own effect, it gives rise to internal conditions through the assistance of external conditions in those [various states].102 [Those internal
conditions,] which have the capability of assisting [that factor] in carrying out its appointed task, are the three remaining characteristics [of continuance, senescence, and desinence]. Birth acts as the internal condition that gives rise to a factor that is to be produced when it is in a state of being about to be produced, and [that causes it to] reach the state of having already been produced. [In that state,] this factor to be produced is referred to as having already arisen. [409b15] Continuance acts as the internal condition that stabilizes a factor that is to be maintained, enabling [that factor] to project its own effect when it is in a state of being about to be destroyed, and [that causes it to] reach the state of having already been destroyed. [In that state,] this factor to be maintained is referred to as having already been able to project its own effect. Desinence acts as the internal condition that terminates a factor that is to be destroyed precisely when it is in a state of being about to be destroyed, and [that causes it to] reach the state of having already been destroyed. [In that state,] this factor to be destroyed is referred to as having already been terminated. The characteristic of senescence should also be understood in this way.

[Sanghabhadra's Response—III—Simultaneous Activity]

Other masters claim that because causes deliver their effects only in dependence upon a location, a time period, a particular time, a state, or associates, there is a distinction in the time of the arising of their activities: [409b20] that is, either when [those causes are about to be] produced or when they have been produced. That is to say, there are causes that deliver their effect in dependence upon a location, as in the case of the rain, which is produced only in dependence upon a location in which there are clouds or as in the case of the incomparable right complete enlightenment, which is realized only in the adamantine seat in Jambudvīpa. Or, there are some causes that deliver their effect in dependence upon a time period, as in the case of causes of maturation (vipākahetu) or as in the case of causes leading to liberation (mokṣabhāgīya), which deliver their effect only when they are in the past time period. Or further, there are some causes that deliver their effect in dependence upon a specific time, as in the case of the actions that lead to rebirth as a wheel-turning king; [409b25] [these actions] lead to that state only after a number of cycles. Further, there are some causes that deliver their effect in dependence upon a [particular] state, as in the case of seeds, which are able to produce a sprout only after having reached a transformed state. Or, [this dependence upon a particular state is evident also] in the case of the first moment of thought not tending toward the
19.7.2 Three Characteristics — Simultaneous Activity

fluxes or in the case of light (āloka). Even though [these two] exist as real entities beforehand, they are able to have an effect only in that future state in which they are about to be produced.\(^{103}\) There are [still other] causes that deliver their effect in dependence upon associates, as in the case of the four fundamental material elements or as in the case of thought and thought concomitants, which are able to have an effect only when associated with one another.

In accordance with the principle of dependent origination [as applied to] distinctive [states of factors], [409c1] the states (avasthā) in which the activities of the four characteristics arise are [shown] to be not the same. That is to say, when [the characterized factor and the characteristics] are about to be produced, the characteristic of birth gives rise to its activity; when [the characterized factor and the other three characteristics] reach the state of having already been produced, the three [characteristics] of continuance, senescence, and desinence each give rise to their distinct activities together at one time. Thus, since the activities and the times of the four characteristics are distinct, how can one raise the objection that one factor should at one time be produced, abide, decay, and be destroyed?\(^{104}\) When the factor that is characterized is about to be destroyed, it abides for a while and is able to project its own effect [409c5] due to the distinct characteristic of continuance that acts as the predominant cause. At precisely that time, [the characterized factor] is made to decay due to the distinct characteristic of senescence that acts as the predominant cause. At precisely that time, it is destroyed due to the distinct characteristic of desinence that acts as the predominant cause. Therefore, the fact that the three [characteristics of continuance, senescence, and desinence give rise to their distinct activities] at one time—[that is, in that state in which the characterized factor is about to be destroyed]—presents no contradiction.

[Three Characteristics—Simultaneous Activity]

The Sūtra master next raises the following objection with regard to the [position that the three characteristics of continuance, senescence and desinence all perform their functions at the time when a factor is about to be destroyed]: “Would a factor at that time abide, decay, or be destroyed?”\(^{105}\)

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Simultaneous Activity]

Now, this will be determined. The three [characteristics] of continuance, senescence, and desinence each give rise to their functions separately in
the state in which the factor has already been produced and cause that characterized factor to have, at one time, points of dependence\textsuperscript{106} that are not the same. [409c20] Altogether there are three [such points of dependence]. What contradiction to reason is there in an interpretation such as this? Therefore, his objection should not be considered reasonable.

[Activity and Capability]

Further, [the Śūtra master] has stated previously: "If one allows that birth has activity [when it is] future, how is it established as future? One should state the characteristic of the future. When that factor is present, the activity of birth has already faded; how is it established as present? One should state the characteristic of the present."\textsuperscript{107}

[S] There is no contradiction because there is no activity (kārita) at any time other than the present.

[O] Don't [you claim that] the characteristic of birth is able to produce factors while it is still future, [409c25] and precisely this is its activity (kārita)? Why then do you say that this [activity] occurs only in the present?

[Saṅghabhadra's Response—Activity and Capability]

[S] Fool! You do not understand this activity (kārita). These [characteristics function as] capabilities (sāmarthya) and have no relation to activity. As has been previously discussed: "If conditioned factors are able to act as the cause in projecting their own effect (phalākṣepa), this [capability is predominant and] is referred to as activity (kārita). If they are able to act as conditions assisting [factors] of a different category, this [capability is subordinate and] is referred to [simply] as capability (sāmarthya)."\textsuperscript{108} All present [factors] are able to act as the cause in projecting their own effects—[that is, they must exert their own activity]—but not all present [factors] are able to act as conditions assisting [factors] of a different category—[that is, they need not exert capability]. [410a1] For example, an eye in the dark or [an eye] whose capability [of assisting] has been damaged is not capable of acting as a condition that assists in enabling visual perceptual consciousness to arise. However, its activity [of projecting its own effect] is not damaged by darkness because it is definitely able to act as a cause in projecting a future eye. In this way, there is a distinction between activity and capability.\textsuperscript{109}
Moreover, in the production of the effect within a stream of conditioned forces of the same category, there are certain functions that are definite, and other functions that are indefinite; the power of projecting its own effect is referred to as activity and is also referred to as capability. In the case of the production of an effect within a stream of conditioned forces of a different category, another factor acts only as the condition that assists in enabling the effect to arise; this is only capability, and not activity.

Haven't you argued that these three factors—the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti)—that is, the first moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes—light (āloka), and the characteristic of birth (jāti)—all are able to give rise to their activities when they are in the future time period?

Fool! You cling to the words and miss the meaning. The accepted doctrine of our school interprets this reference as follows: these statements merely provisionally apply the term 'activity' to what are actually "capabilities" functioning as immediate conditions. It is well established (prasiddha) that birth is the immediate condition among many kinds of conditions for the production of a factor. Therefore, we provisionally apply the name 'activity,' which is [actually] the cause in the other state—[namely, the present]—to this [future] state [in which birth exerts its "capability."] The characteristics of continuance, and so on, should be understood in the same way. The presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering and light also have a predominant force in their [future] state to which the name ['activity'] is provisionally applied. Actually, the name 'activity' refers only to [that particular "capability" of a factor] to project its effect in the present moment.

Some raise the following objection: "If the [characteristics] of birth, and so on, do not exist in the state in which they are about to be produced, how does birth perform its activity at that time, and not continuance, senescence, and desinence? If the [characteristics] of birth, and so on, do exist in the state in which [they are about to be produced], why do continuance, and so on, lack activity, while birth alone has it?"

This objection is untenable. First, it is not the case that the [characteristics] of birth, and so on, do not exist in the state in which [they are about to be produced]; therefore, the opponent's first question is unfounded. [As for the second question,] since at that time the characteristics of continuance are not in the present time period at that time, they have not yet realized their capability [and cannot be assumed to function]. Even if
we assumed that the characteristics of birth, and so on, do not yet exist in this state in which the characteristics and the characterized factor are about to be produced, our claim that birth has its capability in that state would be as reasonable as your [view] of the relation of cause and effect. For, according to the accepted doctrine of your school, you allow both immediate and remote causes regardless of whether the cause that is capable of producing [the effect] exists or does not exist in the state in which the effect is about to be produced.

[Senescence]

With the following statement, the Sūtra master provisionally acknowledges three of the four characteristics, [410a20] but rejects the characteristic of senescence: "Now, it can reasonably be allowed that, [in the case of] one factor, [the fact of] having already been produced and having not yet been destroyed is referred to as continuance, and being destroyed after having already abided is referred to as desinence. [But] senescence, through any deliberations whatsoever, cannot reasonably be said to exist in reference to a single factor. Why is this? Senescence refers to the transformation in the nature and characteristics [of factors] in prior and subsequent [moments]; it is not the case that a given factor can be said to be different from itself. Therefore, the verse states:

"[If a factor were] precisely [as it was] before, senescence would not be established; if it were different from before, it would not be a single factor, [but would have become another factor]. [410a25] Therefore, in the end it is not established that senescence is applied to a single factor."114

[Saṅghabhadrā's Response—I—Senescence]

[S] First, it has already been established briefly that senescence exists as a discrete real entity; [therefore,] senescence as applied to the stream of moments [as a whole] is likewise not established.115 Now, both [the Sūtra master and I] should consider further the implications of our [positions]. If one allows, [as I do,] that the characteristic of senescence exists as a real entity apart from the factor [that it characterizes], then this [senescence] must cause the single factor that is characterized to change, and yet not become a different [factor]. Such is the problem that I must consider. If, [like the Sūtra master,] one does not allow that the characteristic of
senescence exists as a real entity apart from the factor [that it characterizes], and yet one allows that the stream of moments [as a whole] has senescence, then how can there be senescence even when external conditions are without distinction? Such is the problem that the Sûtra master must consider.

The issue that I am to consider will be presented clearly in a later passage that examines the meaning of the three time periods. However, since my interpretation is pertinent to the sense of this [discussion of senescence], we will present it briefly in order to dispel possible confusion. From the beginning, factors have only the stable abiding of their intrinsic nature; their distinctive activity is not found. When a factor encounters the power of conditions produced prior to or produced simultaneously [with it], its distinctive activity, though not having previously existed, is caused to arise. Precisely this [activity] is referred to as its present activity (kārita); [that activity] is also referred to as the capability [by which a factor] is able to project its own effect. The Lord has made the following statement with regard to this [activity of a factor]: “Not having existed, this [now] exists; having existed, this no longer exists.”

[However,] just as the discriminated capabilities of loss or benefit [resulting from certain feelings] are not different from the intrinsic nature of the experience of those feelings, [so] one cannot say that the activity [of a factor] is different from its intrinsic nature. Further, as the [opponent himself] maintains, the traces (vāsanā) projected by the distinctive characteristic of a prior moment of thought that are found within a subsequent moment of thought cannot be said to be different from that subsequent moment of thought. [Or further, the relation between a factor’s activity and its intrinsic nature] is illustrated by the nature of that action, [which is of the category of] virtuous derived form, which is seen, and which has resistance; even though it is not [intrinsically] different from [the general category of] form, the distinctive characteristics of this specific category [of form as virtuous, and so on,] are well established.

Therefore, in this case, the Ābhidhārmikas apply the term ‘senescence’ to a factor in that state in which its intrinsic nature [is connected with] its distinctive activity, and not [when it exists only as] intrinsic nature. That is to say, the activity whereby a conditioned factor is able to project its own effect within its intrinsic nature is referred to as continuance; precisely the deterioration of this activity is referred to as senescence. It is not possible that [a factor] possesses this abiding and deterioration within itself; instead, there should exist separate factors that cause the abiding and deterioration. The causes of these two are precisely the characteristics
of continuance and senescence. What is unacceptable in this theory?

[O-V] What we find unacceptable in this [theory] is this: since the distinctive activity [of a factor] in the present is not of a nature different from its intrinsic nature, when its activity changes, its intrinsic nature should likewise change. How can one claim that the activity [of a factor] changes, but not its intrinsic nature?\footnote{120}

[S] This fault is incurred in the accepted doctrine of [the Sūtra master's school], which maintains that intrinsic nature does not exist in the past or future, \footnote{[410b20]} but is not [incurred in the position of] those [like us] who allow the permanent existence of intrinsic nature in the three time periods.\footnote{121} Why is this? When the activity [of a factor] ceases, it merely discards the present; the intrinsic nature of that factor still remains. Why would the intrinsic nature [of that factor] also be forced to have senescence?\footnote{122} For the verse states:

"The intrinsic nature [of a factor] is referred to as having senescence due to the deterioration of its predominant activity. Why isn't it established in the end that senescence is applied to a single factor?"\footnote{123}

One cannot apply the term 'senescence' to [a factor] in the state in which it is about to be produced, because the factor's activity does not yet deteriorate at that time. \footnote{[410b25]} Precisely for this reason, the compound 'change in continuance' was used [in the sūtra]: that is, because this [senescence, or change,] causes [a factor's] activity of projecting its effect to deteriorate, [and this activity of projecting its effect is made possible only through continuance]. A factor projects its own effect only at that point when its activity is caused to deteriorate. As a result of the deterioration within the cause, the state in which the subsequent effect is produced gradually becomes weaker than the prior cause. Therefore, the effect gradually becomes weaker due to the senescence found in the [prior] cause. In the moment of this particular effect, another characteristic of senescence that arises simultaneously with that effect acts as the condition causing the deterioration [of that effect]. As a result, it is also able to act as the condition for the weakening of a subsequent effect. In this way, since every moment in a stream of conditioned factors causes a subsequent moment to change, \footnote{[410c1]} it is established that all prior moments have senescence.\footnote{124}

When this meaning [of the characteristic of senescence] has been established, the following inference can be made: if one observes that there is a particular distinctive characteristic in the last moment [of a stream], then
the prior moments [also] definitely have this distinctive characteristic. This is not like the principle of illusory senescence as applied to the stream of moments [as a whole], which was set forth by the Dārṣṭāntika master.\textsuperscript{125}

[0] If this were so, then when the stream of [moments] is gradually flourishing, there should be no characteristic of senescence because its effect [of deterioration] is not observed.

[S] [\textsuperscript{410c5}] This fault is not incurred because [it is simply that] the power of the characteristic of continuance, assisted by external causes, is predominant at that time [of flourishing] and suppresses senescence.\textsuperscript{126}

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—II—Senescence]

Other masters claim: “The activity of factors cannot abide beyond the period of one moment; therefore, conditioned factors are referred to as having senescence. They do not attain the name ‘senescence’ by discarding their particular inherent characteristic, and yet the fault that conditioned factors have the nature of permanence is not incurred.”\textsuperscript{127} The nature of all factors is such that the intrinsic nature [of each factor] is permanent (\textsuperscript{*}nitya), does not instigate activity (\textsuperscript{*}anabhisamāṇskāra), is without transmutation (\textsuperscript{*}aparārvṛtti), and cannot vary (\textsuperscript{*}avyabhicāra). Therefore, fire always takes heat as its intrinsic nature; apart from heat, no nature of “fire” can be attained. \textsuperscript{[410c10]} However, since the activity of fire must avail itself of various conditions, it is established by the accepted doctrine of our school that fire is, by nature, impermanent.

If, [as the opponents would suggest,] it is the intrinsic nature [of a factor] that changes, then a discrete factor would be established [with each change in intrinsic nature]. [However,] since intrinsic nature is without transformation, [if one does not admit change in some other aspect of the factor such as activity, then factors] should not be impermanent. That is to say, if one maintained, [as the opponents do,] that [a factor] exists only in the present time period, and does not exist as a real entity in the past and future, then the nature of factors that are conditioned forces should be permanent because there would be no change.\textsuperscript{128} Why would there be no change? \textsuperscript{[410c15]} [There is no change] because the nature of both existence and nonexistence are firmly settled and are without change. Since [the opponents] maintain that factors are momentary by nature and exist in the present time period alone, it is not possible for [these momentarily existent factors] to change. Since their intrinsic nature does not exist in either the past or future time periods, how could one say that nonexistent factors change? Therefore, [since the opponents cannot say that factors}
change in the past, present, or future time periods,) they cannot claim that conditioned forces are impermanent.

Nor can the opponents reply that existence refers to that which is without transformation, and nonexistence, to that which has transformation, and call [this difference between them] "change." The two natures of existence and nonexistence do not cooperatively establish [change] because existence and nonexistence are contradictory in nature. Further, [existence and nonexistence cannot together establish change] because it is not possible for the effect—[that is, present existence]—to change, and the cause—[that is, the past cause]—to be without change. It is not possible for the effect to change without a change in the cause, because the effect only has change [410c20] in dependence upon [change in the] cause.130

[The assertion that there is change] because the nature of existence (*sattā) is itself impermanent is also unreasonable because the nature of existence cannot be established as anything other [than existence]. Since the nature of existence characterizing factors has never been nonexistent, and since that which exists and that which does not exist are established separately, change in conditioned forces is, as a result, impossible. Therefore, [according to the opponent’s position,] conditioned factors would all continue permanently.

One might allow that [factors] in the past and future time periods both exist and do not exist, [because] from nonexistence in the state of not yet having been produced, [factors] can be produced and become existent, and from existence in the state of having already been produced, [factors] can be destroyed and become nonexistent. [In that case,] neither the nonexistence [of factors] in the past and future, [410c25] nor the existence [of factors] in the present would be firmly established, and variation (*vyabhicāra) would be possible for both.

The existence [of factors] in the past and future time periods is the same as [the existence of factors] in the present time period in that it is at all times permanent and without variation. [However,] since [a factor’s] activity either exists or does not exist in conjunction with its intrinsic nature, which always exists, one can say that conditioned factors have change in their states, (avasthā) [that is, as having or not having activity]. Therefore, for those who accept the doctrine that [a factor exists in] the three time periods, it is possible to say that there is change within one factor; since one factor has change, it is possible to establish the characteristic of senescence; since the characteristic of senescence is established, the meaning of impermanence is upheld. [However,] this is not the case for those who accept the doctrine that [a factor] exists only in the present, [411a1] since, [for them],
Simultaneous Production of Factors in the Future

[Simultaneous Production of Factors in the Future]

(O-V) If [the characteristic] of birth, while in its future [state], produces the factor that is to be produced, then why aren't all future factors produced together, since, in each case, the causes capable of producing [them] would always be provided? \(^\text{132}\)

[Sanghabhadra’s Response—Simultaneous Future Production]

[S] This has been discussed previously. What was discussed previously? “That is to say, when a factor has not yet acquired the activity of projecting its own effect, \([411a5]\) [that factor] gives rise to an internal condition through the assistance of external conditions that have not yet acquired, are about to acquire, or have lost the activity of projecting their own effect. [That internal condition,] which has the capability of assisting [that factor] in carrying out its appointed task, is the characteristic of birth.” \(^\text{133}\) It is in precisely this sense that we say that [birth while in its future state produces a factor that is to be produced]. The verse states:

\[ \text{[vs. 46c–d] Birth (jiiti) is able to produce that which is to be produced (janya), but not apart from the assemblage of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya).}^{134} \]

[Commentary:] The power of the characteristic of birth alone, apart from the complete assemblage of other causes and conditions (\(\text{hetupratyaya-sāmagrī}\)), is not able to produce that which is to be produced. \([411a10]\) Therefore, future factors do not all arise together. The characteristic of birth acts as the simultaneously arising, immediate cause that is able to produce [factors] that are to be produced. Nevertheless, conditioned factors [also] inevitably depend [for their production] upon the assistance of the complete assemblage of [both] previous causes of their own category and other external causes. \(^\text{135}\) [This case of assisting causes and conditions in the production of any given factor] is like that of the distinctive causes and conditions such as a seed and earth, and so on, that assist in the production of such [effects] as a sprout and cause the sprout to be produced.
[Causal Efficacy Must be Observed]

[V] If this is so, then we observe only the various causes and conditions that have the capability of production; there is no discrete characteristic of birth. [The dependence of production upon an assemblage of causes and conditions is proven by the fact that] factors are produced precisely when there is a complete assemblage of causes and conditions, and are not produced when there is no such [complete assemblage]. [411a15] What is the use of this characteristic of birth? Therefore, there is production only through the power of causes and conditions.136

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I—Causal Efficacy]

[S] This criticism [of our position] is untenable because the same criticism can be offered against those [like the opponents] who allow that the production of factors is due only to an assemblage of conditions. That is to say, if, [like the opponents] one were to allow that future factors could be produced only through a complete assemblage of causes and conditions, then the same criticism could be offered: namely, since the causes and conditions of these future factors are not distinguished from [one another in terms of an order of arising], why would [future factors] not all be produced simultaneously?137

Further, [it follows from the opponents’ position that] even if one among the assemblage of causes and conditions is lacking, since the rest are provided, the effect should be produced.138 For example, the visual sense organ,139 which is projected by previous actions, [411a20] should be produced even apart from the four fundamental material elements. Or, the visual sense organ should be able to arise through the power of the fundamental material elements alone, and not through previous actions. Or, the visual sense organ, which is projected in accordance with [previous] actions, should be able to produce the fundamental material elements because there is no time when the visual sense organ is not assembled [with those elements]; when one is produced, the others should also arise. Or, the fundamental material elements should be without capability with regard to the visual sense organ because one does not observe that the fundamental material elements alone produce [the visual sense organ] apart from the prior visual sense organ.140 [If] the subsequent visual sense organ could be produced with the prior visual sense organ alone as its cause, [then] the claim that the fundamental material elements are able to produce [the
visual sense organ] should be determined to be useless. [411a25] In the case of the seed, water, earth, and so on, when one of these conditions is lacking, the sprout definitely will not arise. Therefore, one knows that the power of the seed, and so on, [in producing the sprout] is unequivocally established (prasiddha). [However,] the power of the fundamental material elements of earth, and so on, in producing the visual sense organ is not observed. [According to the argument of the opponent,] since this power of the fundamental material elements is not observed, it should not be a cause in producing the visual sense organ.¹⁴¹

Further, you maintain that there is transformation within the stream of seeds of action (*karmabija).¹⁴² What then acts as the obstacle preventing the simultaneous production of all effects [of those seeds of] action? [411b1] If one claimed that the seeds of action are only able to produce [their effects] through the assistance of conditions, then one should [allow that] those conditions alone are able to produce [the effects]. What is the use of proposing these seeds of action? [However, the dependence of the production of the effect upon assisting conditions is proven by the fact that] the effect of action is produced through the assistance of various conditions, and is not produced when these conditions do not exist. Since [the opponents claim that the effect] depends upon the assistance of conditions, [and yet also maintain that] the seeds of action are not nonexistent, how can they reject the characteristic of birth simply because it avails itself of various conditions?

Further, it is observed that when the first moment of [thought] not tending toward the fluxes is produced, [the characteristic of] birth is able to act as the cause that gives rise to the possession [of these factors that] do not tend toward the fluxes. The existence of possession [as a factor] having its own particular inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) [411b5] has already been unequivocally established.¹⁴³ [If the opponents deny the existence of this characteristic of birth, then they] should explain what discrete factor other than birth is able to act as the prior or simultaneously arising cause of this possession [of factors that do not tend toward the fluxes]. If there were no cause at all, then their possession would not arise; in that case, the first moment of [thought] not tending toward the fluxes could not be established.

[Saṅghabhadrā’s Response—II—Causal Efficacy]

When the characteristic of birth produces [a factor], are there additional, separately existing and simultaneously produced causes, or not?¹⁴⁴ One
should say that there are also [such simultaneously produced causes]. These are the factors, aside from the real entity, birth, that have the same effect. How are [the characteristics of] senescence and desinence causes that assist in production? The ancient masters all offered the following interpretation: “Factors that have the same effect are reciprocal causes, [411b10] just like the fundamental material elements that accord with one another.” The following interpretation can also be offered. Since conditioned factors all are produced, and so on, by nature, when each of the four characteristics of birth, and so on, functions, the other three, taking that one [characteristic] as their occasion, become assisting forces. To support this interpretation, one can cite the case of the four applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), in which one observes [that the objects of each of the four applications such as] the body, and so on, are of the nature of impermanence.145

19.8  [Sthavira’s Objections]

[Continuance—I]

Moreover, Sthavira has said: “Conditioned forces are without continuance. If conditioned forces were able to abide for [even] the shortest period of time, then why wouldn’t they abide for an hour, a day, a month, a season, a year, or a cycle, since the cause [for their abiding] would not be different [in each case]?” [411b15] Further, [conditioned forces lack continuance because the scriptures have also stated that conditioned forces are without continuance. As the Lord has said: “O monks! When all conditioned forces are about to be destroyed, they are without continuance and also without destruction.”146

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I—Continuance]

Now, [your] statement, “if conditioned forces were able to abide for [even] the shortest period of time,” and so on, is not acceptable. The shortest period of time is one moment (kṣaṇa). If there were no continuance even for a moment, then conditioned forces would be absolutely nonexistent.

To those who maintain that conditioned factors are completely without continuance [411b20] because they are destroyed immediately after they have acquired their own nature (ātmalābha),147 [we would ask]: since there is a time when [factors] acquire their own nature, couldn’t that very [time]
be referred to as “the shortest period of time during which conditioned forces abide?” [If you replied that] even though there is such a time, there is no continuance, then to what state [of conditioned factors] does your statement, “there is no continuance,” refer: to the time when they acquire their own nature or to the time after they have acquired their own nature? The claim that there is a state without continuance can refer only to these two periods of time. If [you reply that conditioned factors] are without continuance even at the time when they acquire their own nature, then you cannot escape the fault mentioned previously [that these conditioned forces should be absolutely nonexistent]. If, [however, you reply that] they are without continuance only after they have acquired their own nature, then since [we] do not claim [that there is continuance in that state, this] objection is superfluous.

[411b25] The time that you refer to as that “time when the [conditioned factors] acquire their own nature” is precisely the time when we claim that “continuance enables [conditioned factors] to project their effect:” [in both cases, it is the present moment]. The accepted doctrine of our school does not hold that conditioned forces have continuance after the time when they project their effect. [Since we both allow that there is such a time when conditioned forces acquire their own nature, or project their effect,] how can you deny that there is a time when conditioned forces abide, while we [accept it]? Just as you [claim that] the existence of conditioned forces for a certain time—[that is, in the present]—is necessarily established only when their activity is produced in dependence upon other factors, so also, [for us,] this projection of the effect is necessarily established only when the activity is projected in dependence upon another factor; that [factor] upon which it depends is given the name ‘continuance.’ This, then, is the accepted doctrine of our school. [Accordingly, why doesn't Sthavira also allow continuance as the factor upon which the production of the activity of conditioned forces depends?]

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—II—Continuance]

[411c1] Your claim [that conditioned forces lack continuance] presents numerous contradictions to both reasoned arguments and scriptural authority. 

[O-Sth] Didn’t the sūtra state that “conditioned forces are without continuance?” If one claims that there is continuance, this scriptural authority is contradicted.  

[S] Your claims contradict [reasoned arguments and scriptural authority] because the various falsely imagined theories [that you raise] are contrary
to the true meaning. What fault of contradiction does the principle of interpretation presented by the Ābhidhārnikas entail?

Furthermore, the statement in the sūtra that "[conditioned forces] are without continuance" was made in order to deny permanent continuance.149

The next statement, "they are also without destruction," denies that the conditioned forces are annihilated. If this statement that they are without destruction does not deny that the conditioned forces are annihilated, what else then does it deny? The destruction of conditioned forces can only be of two types: one is destruction immediately after production (upāttyanantaракṣaya); the other is absolute annihilation. Therefore, [alluding to the second of these two types of destruction,] the sūtra stated that conditioned forces are without both continuance and destruction in order to refute the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. It was not intending to refute [the view] established by the Ābhidhārnikas that continuance acts as the cause enabling [a factor] to project its effect.

[411c10] We implore the learned ones to discern accurately whose statement contradicts reasoned argument and scriptural authority: those who claim that conditioned forces have continuance for a period or those who claim that conditioned forces are completely without destruction.150

O We have never said that conditioned forces, having already been produced, are completely without destruction.

S Why, then, did [this same] sūtra passage state that "[when all conditioned forces] are about to be destroyed, they are also without destruction?"

O The phrase 'without destruction' means without rest. The meaning of this sūtra passage is that conditioned forces, having been produced, will inevitably be destroyed without interruption: [that is,] without even a short period of rest.

S [If this phrase means that there is no rest,] since this meaning [of being without rest] is already clearly indicated in the phrase '[conditioned forces] are without continuance' [411c15] then the further phrase 'they are also without destruction' is useless.

We, likewise, do not state that conditioned forces, having been produced, absolutely abide permanently.

O If this is so, why do you claim that conditioned factors, having been produced, have continuance?

S [In the sūtra passage,] the phrase '[conditioned forces] are without continuance' means that they stop for a period. That is to say, when conditioned forces are about to be destroyed, they abide for a period. One
cannot apply the term ‘continuance’ [to conditioned forces] when they have already been destroyed or are about to be produced, because [a factor] has no activity [at those times]. As has been stated previously, conditioned forces only have the activity of projecting their effect at the time when they are about to be destroyed.\(^1\)

[0] [411c20] In spite of these statements, continuance is necessarily nonexistent because no sūtra passage states that there is continuance.

[S] [Accordingly,] since [continuance] has never been denied [in the sūtra], can one state unequivocally that it does not exist? Further, since [continuance] is urged by reason, one should accept that it exists. Even if there is no scriptural authority, [the existence of continuance] presents no contradiction to reasoned arguments. What fallacy is there in the statement that [continuance] exists?

Moreover, there is [indeed] scriptural authority that proves that continuance exists. For example, it has been said in the [sūtra] on hand-clapping: “O monks! Conditioned forces are like a mirage, like a flame. They abide for a period and quickly pass away.”\(^2\) [411c25] Isn’t the statement by the Ābhidhārmikas that conditioned forces abide for a short period of time proven through this [sūtra passage]? Through this, the Vaibhāṣika interpretation is also established: that is, the statement, “[conditioned forces] are without continuance,” is made in implicit reference [to the period] after the present moment; it does not mean that [continuance] is completely nonexistent.\(^3\)

However, [Sthavira’s] statements indicate that he has interpreted the venerable sūtras by applying falsely imagined theories in accordance with his own individual ideas. [His statement here that there is no continuance because] the sūtra has never stated that there is continuance indicates that he and his group have not yet read this sūtra [on hand-clapping, which we have just quoted,] or that he follows his own feelings and rejects the authority of [this sūtra], or perhaps the claims of those in his school have sullied his mind, and even though he has culled numerous passages [that mention continuance], [412a1] he does not remember them.

We implore those who are searching for the correct principle to investigate which of us is attributing their own individual interpretations to the Buddhist sūtras: those who claim that conditioned forces abide for a period or those who reject the authority of this sūtra?

Moreover, the first statement of the Lord in the sūtra passage, “when all conditioned forces are about to be destroyed, they are without continuance,” could have been made in consideration of the future time period.
The Dārśāntīka master [Sthavira] claims that this sūtra passage denies continuance as applied to a moment. Consequently, we offer the passage from the sūtra on hand-clapping, which indicates that conditioned forces [do indeed] abide for a period of time.

[Continuance—II]

Not accepting these words of the Great Master, [the Dārśāntīka master Sthavira] offers the following criticism: "Why do you allow that ['the phrase “conditioned forces are without continuance”'] is made only in implicit reference [to the period] after the present moment, and not [in reference to the period] after the homogeneous collection of components (nikāyasabhiṣga)? What distinction can possibly be drawn between the [continuance of] a moment and [the continuance of] this [homogeneous collection of components]?

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Continuance]

This criticism is not reasonable because there is a distinction [between the continuance of a moment and that of the homogeneous collection of components]. Continuance for the period of a moment has a cause: [namely, the characteristic of continuance] that arises simultaneously—that is to say, in that moment. The continuance of the homogeneous collection of components, however, has no such cause. Therefore, this criticism is not reasonable.

[Continuance—III]

[412a10] [The Dārśāntīka master Sthavira] offers yet another criticism: "If the power of continuance is able to cause conditioned forces to abide for a period of time, then why doesn’t this [power of continuance] cause conditioned factors to abide through a period of ten billion moments? Why would that very cause that makes conditioned forces abide for one moment not make them abide for ten billion moments?"

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Continuance]

This [criticism], likewise, is unreasonable [because the same criticism can be levied against Sthavira’s own theory of production]. Since he does not allow
that conditioned forces are produced apart from the cause that is capable of production, why would that cause of the production of conditioned forces in one moment not itself cause their production in ten billion moments? [412a15] The method of reasoning would be the same in every way.

The following sūtra passages [can be offered as further proof of the fact that continuance is to be applied to a single moment]: “One should know that both the birth and continuance of pleasant feelings are pleasant;” or “One should know that form, and so on, has birth and has continuance.”155 It would not be reasonable to claim that the sūtras use [the term ‘continu­ance’] in reference to a stream [of conditioned forces] because, [in that case,] the meaning [of the phrase ‘continuance of the stream of conditioned forces’] would not be established. That is to say, if one does not allow that [each] moment has continuance, then how can the meaning of the phrase ‘continu­ance of the stream [of conditioned forces]’ be established? This is due to the fact that the stream [of conditioned forces] is necessarily established in dependence upon the moments [of which it consists].

Thus, the characteristic of continuance is well established by both rea­soned argument and scriptural authority. However, the Dārśāntika master [Sthavira] [412a20] firmly states that [the characteristic of continuance] does not exist. We do not know what grievance he has with continuance. The correct principle [of the existence of continuance] is evident, and yet he will not accept it.

19.9 [Other Objections]

[Desinence—I]

Another objection156 has been raised [to the characteristic of desinence]: “If the characteristic of impermanence (anityatā) exists separately as a real entity apart from the nature [of factors as] impermanence, why isn’t there also a characteristic of suffering (duḥkha) existing separately apart from suffering.”157

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—I—Desinence]

Objections using examples such as these are not reasonably established. If one were to claim that [factors] exist having a nature as impermanent due to a [discrete] “characteristic of impermanence,” then one could, on the basis of this claim, raise the following objection: “[Factors] should likewise
exist having the nature of suffering due to a ‘characteristic of suffering’.” However, conditioned factors that are impermanent by nature [412a25] are simply destroyed with the characteristic of desinence as their condition, just as conditioned factors that are impermanent by nature are simply produced with the characteristic of birth as their condition. What would be the use of proposing that the nature of factors such as suffering, similarly, has yet another “characteristic of suffering” that acts as its condition? Therefore, objections using such examples are not reasonably established. Through this [argument, in the same way] objections [using examples of] voidness and non-self are refuted.

Further, that very characteristic of impermanence is also the characteristic of suffering because the intrinsic nature of factors is impermanent, and, as is stated in the sūtras on the topic of suffering, [whatever is impermanent is also suffering].

Further, [the position of the] opponent could also be challenged with a similar objection. [412b1] If [he admits that] a factor that is to be produced is only able to be produced through separate conditions of production, then he must [also] allow that the factors characterized by suffering are only able to be established as suffering in dependence upon separate conditions of suffering. [If he denies this,] then any factor that is to be produced should be produced automatically apart from the conditions of production, in the same way as suffering, and so on.

[Saṅghabhadrā’s Response—II—Desinence]

[The fault in the opponent’s objection can be explained further through] a previous statement. What was stated previously? Whereas “you [claim that] the existence of conditioned forces for a certain time—[that is, in the present]—is necessarily established only when their activity is produced in dependence upon other factors,” according to the accepted doctrine of our school, [conditioned forces have] existence at all times; therefore, the nature of factors as existent is not dependent upon causes and conditions. Suffering and non-self, and so on, should [be considered] in the same way as the nature of conditioned factors as existent: [that is, as not dependent upon causes and conditions]. However, destruction should [be considered] in the same way as production: that is, as necessarily dependent upon another factor. Therefore, one knows that there exists separately, apart from that factor that is to be destroyed, an internal cause, which is capable of causing destruction and which is referred to as the characteristic of impermanence.
If [the opponent] claims that conditioned forces have no separate cause of destruction,\(^{163}\) production also should be so: it should occur without depending upon a cause. This is due to the fact that these two—[that is, production and destruction]—are factors both simultaneous with, but distinct from the real entity [being characterized].\(^{164}\) Or, [if he claims that production depends on a cause and destruction does not depend upon a cause,] he should explain the reason for this distinction between them.\(^{165}\)

[The opponent might] respond that there is a distinction between these two—[production and destruction]: \([412b10]\) namely, since the production of conditioned forces is necessarily dependent upon causes, one will observe distinctions in the interval of time [between the cause and effect] in the case of production. If the destruction of conditioned forces were also dependent upon causes, then there should also be differences in the interval of time [in the case of] destruction. If for destruction, like production, there were an interval of time, then this would contradict the accepted doctrine that conditioned forces are momentary (\(kṣaṇika\)). Therefore, one should know that factors are destroyed automatically without causes.

[S] This fault is not incurred because the cause of destruction necessarily exists simultaneously with the conditioned forces [that will be destroyed]; there is no distinction in time [between them]. The cause of production is either simultaneous or not simultaneous with the conditioned forces [that will be produced]. \([412b15]\) Since it can act as the cause even if temporally separated [from the conditioned force that it will produce], there can be an interval of time in the case of the production of conditioned forces.

If the destruction of conditioned forces were not due to causes, then they should be destroyed precisely when they are about to be produced. Or, there should be no destruction even in a subsequent state because you allow that prior and subsequent [moments] are the same in being without a cause [of destruction].

[The opponent might] respond: how could one object that there should be destruction in this state in which conditioned forces are not yet produced? In that case, then, one should allow that production is the cause of destruction, because it is observed that there is destruction only when there is production.

[S] If [the opponent] allows that the destruction of conditioned forces is necessarily dependent upon their production, \([412b20]\) how could it be said that they are destroyed without a cause?

Further, one can prove by scriptural authority that destruction has a cause. The \(sūtra\) states: "Since this factor is destroyed, that factor is
destroyed.” Further, it is said: “Everything has a cause.” Therefore, one should know that conditioned forces are destroyed due to a cause.

Further, the [four] characteristics of conditioned forces act as reciprocal causes: there can be desinence only when there is birth; there can be birth only when there is desinence; there can be senescence only when there is continuance; [412b25] continuance can be altered only when there is senescence.

[Desinence—II]

Another criticism states: “Since there is no cause of continuance, factors are destroyed automatically [without further causes]. What is the use of a cause of destruction?”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Desinence]

This criticism is not reasonable. For those who claim that previously produced [factors] alone act as causes, that which is to be produced would not yet exist at the time when the cause is about to exist, since they also maintain that factors do not exist as real entities in the future time period. In the state in which the subsequent effect is produced, the prior cause has already become nonexistent. Even if there were no [simultaneous] cause of continuance, how could one deny that there is continuance? [As a result, some cause for the termination of this continuance is required.] Therefore, their claim [that there is no cause of continuance] cannot [be used as a reason for their claim that] there is no cause of destruction.

Further, it has been explained previously that conditioned forces that have already been produced [412c1] abide for the period of one moment with the characteristic of continuance as their cause. Why does [the opponent] then claim that continuance is without a cause?

[The opponent might] respond that because conditioned forces are necessarily without existence after one moment, they are destroyed automatically.

[S] If there were no characteristic of desinence, then what would send them back to nonexistence? The cause of the destruction of that which has already been produced is, in all cases, the characteristic of desinence. Therefore, the characteristic of desinence exists as a real entity apart from the conditioned factor [that it characterizes].
Further, one should not maintain that the characteristic of desinence does not exist as a real entity, [because this characteristic is clearly referred to] in the sutra passage quoted previously: [412c5] "The arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned, the passing away, and change in continuance also can be discerned." It is not the case that one can arouse discernment with regard to a nonexistent factor, because the statement, "can be discerned," is a synonym for existence.

Further, just as there is necessarily a distinctive characteristic that is capable of production and that causes those factors that are to be produced to reach the state in which they have already been produced, in the same way there is necessarily a distinctive characteristic that is capable of destruction and causes factors that are to be destroyed to reach the state of having already been destroyed. Therefore, it is established that desinence, like birth, exists as a discrete [factor].

19.10 [Sthavira’s Objections]

[The Four Characteristics—Discrete Existence]

Sthavira then makes the following statement: [412c10] “Just as one is able to establish factors such as existence, singularity, longness, shortness, conjunction, and disjunction, and so on, even without a separate nature of existence, singularity, longness, shortness, conjunction, or disjunction, and so on, upon which they depend, [so also] continuance, and so on, should be likewise; [that is, they are established] without a separate [characteristic] upon which they depend.

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Discrete Existence]

This [objection], in turn, incurs the fault of self-contradiction because, according to the accepted doctrine of his school, the factors such as existence, singularity, longness, shortness, conjunction, disjunction, and so on, must be established in dependence upon other [factors]. Since he maintains that factors not having existed, [now] exist in dependence upon causes and conditions, factors are dependent upon others, and that “nature of existence” must also, [according to this position,] have something upon which it depends.

[Specifically, we could refute your objection in the following way.] [412-c15] According to your accepted doctrine, conditioned forces, not having
existed, [now] exist, and this "nature of existence," in the same way as [our characteristic] of birth, is only established as existing dependently. The Ābhidhārmikas, however, claim that this "nature of existence" of factors exists at all times and is not dependent upon causes and conditions. Therefore, [Sthavira’s] objection contradicts the accepted doctrine of his own school, [not that of the Ābhidhārmikas].

Since, [according to his doctrine, the notion] ‘one’ is only established by denying other [notions] of the same category, the meaning of [the notion] ‘one’ is also established in dependence upon others. Longness and shortness are established reciprocally in mutual dependence, or they are established in dependence upon a [particular] arrangement of atoms. Therefore, [each] does not exist in and of itself, but is necessarily established in dependence upon the other. Conjunction and disjunction are also dependent upon separate entities. [412c20] Therefore, all [these examples] have something upon which they depend; if there were nothing upon which they depended, then it would not be possible to establish the name ['one,' and so on].

Further, the cause of the production of factors would also be refuted through these examples. If, [as Sthavira suggests,] the nature of existence, and so on, were established without anything upon which they depend, then production also should be so. However, this is not the case. Therefore, the distinctive states of conditioned factors are all established in dependence upon different causes and conditions; they do not exist automatically.

Therefore, it is unequivocally established that the characteristics of conditioned factors exist separately as real entities within each moment. Those characteristics of conditioned factors as proposed by the Dārśāntikas—that is, a provisionally existing birth, and so on, were established without anything upon which they depend, then production also should be so. However, this is not the case. Therefore, the distinctive states of conditioned factors are all established in dependence upon different causes and conditions; they do not exist automatically.

Notes

1 See AKB 2.45c–d p. 75.19ff.: "[vs. 45c–d] Further, the characteristics are birth, continuance, senescence, and desinence." lakṣaṇānāṁ punar jātiṁ jātāṁ sthittāṁ anityatā. Paramārtha (PAKB 4 p. 185b18ff.), like Hsiian-tsang, includes a reference to "conditioned," or "conditioned factors" within this verse. See also GAKB p. 80; SAKV p. 171.23ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 27a12ff.; ADV no. 139 p. 103.12ff. Only the Taishō edition of the *Nyāyānusāra has the reading *hsien* for jāti; all other sources have sheng: HTAKB 5 p. 27a13; ASPŚ 7 p. 808c3; NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 23b19.
2 This sentence reads literally: "Because they indicate 'that' nature, they acquire the name 'that' characteristic." Unfortunately, the referent of the word 'that' is not specified, and could support two interpretations. Fa-pao (Fa-pao 5 p. 547c13ff.) interprets this sentence as follows: "These four characteristics indicate that the nature of conditioned [factors] is impermanent; in accordance with what they indicate, they are called the characteristics of conditioned [factors]." According to Fa-pao's interpretation, the word 'that' indicates the nature of all conditioned factors as "conditioned." These four characteristics thus acquire their name 'conditioned' characteristics because they indicate a factor's "conditioned" nature. This view interprets the statement as offering a general qualification of the function of these four factors as distinguishing characteristics. According to an alternative interpretation, the word 'that' could refer to each of the four characteristics: namely, birth, continuance, senescence, and desinence. In that case, each characteristic would acquire its name due to the particular function (or nature) that it indicates. This sentence would then read: "Since they indicate the nature of [birth, and so on], they acquire their name as the characteristic of [birth, and so on]." Sanghabhadra lends support to this interpretation by a sentence that he adds at this point in the *Abhidharmasamayapādīpikā (ASPS 7 p. 808c5): "In dependence upon this, it is said that there are categories of conditioned forces."

3 The characteristic of birth draws out a factor from its future state and enables it to become present. See MVB 39 p. 201b4ff. Though there are other conditions that contribute to the production of any conditioned factor, birth is considered the predominant cause. See MVB 39 p. 201a4ff., 39 p. 203a1ff. Sanghabhadra in the *Abhidharmasamayapādīpikā (ASPS 7 p. 808c9ff.) discusses the various types of conditions by which a factor is produced. These include both prior conditions that are of the same category as or are of different categories from the factor to be produced and simultaneous conditions that are always of a different category. This characteristic of birth is the predominant cause among the simultaneous, heterogeneous conditions. Cf. AAS hsiā p. 987b18ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 167.

4 See MVB 39 p. 201c16ff.: "Due to the power of the characteristic of continuance, conditioned factors that have been produced are able to seize, [or project,] their own effect, and seize, [or be directed toward,] the object-support. Due to the power of senescence and desinence, [conditioned factors] no longer have this activity after one moment. If there were no characteristic of continuance, conditioned factors would have no stream of cause and effect, and thought and thought concomitants would have no object-support. Therefore, there must be continuance." Cf. AAS hsiā p. 987b23ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 167. Sanghabhadra (ASPS 7 p. 808c23ff.) explains that continuance alone allows for each factor's apparent manifestation of activity. This function of causing the non-obstruction of a factor's activity cannot be attributed to the stream itself because the characteristics of the stream as a whole depend and, therefore, derive from those of each moment of which the stream consists.

5 For a definition of senescence that appeals to the deterioration, decay, weakening, or injury of the activity of conditioned factors, see MVB 38 p. 199a9ff., 39 p. 201c24ff. Here, Sanghabhadra follows an alternative definition given in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 39 p. 201c36ff.): "Some maintain that [this characteristic] is referred to as the characteristic of senescence because it causes transformation (pariṇāma) .... When the stream of conditioned factors changes there is transformation in the sense that the prior [state] is destroyed and the subsequent one is produced ...." The *Mahāvibhāṣā distinguishes the meaning of transformation in this interpretation from that of the non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya school, which claims that "when the stream of conditioned factors changes, the prior state is not destroyed, but transforms into the subsequent state." Sanghabhadra (ASPS 7 p. 809a3ff.) explains that this transformation cannot occur automatically without a
cause: namely, senescence.

6 See MVB 38 p. 199a26ff. See also MVB 39 p. 203a9ff., esp. 14ff. Saṅghabhadra (ASPS 7 p. 809a8ff.) notes that it is not reasonable to assume that the characteristic of desinence is an unconditioned factor or that destruction does not result from conditions. Like production, destruction occurs in dependence upon a discrete causal factor, namely, desinence.

7 Though Hsüan-tsang in translating the corresponding section of the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (HTAKB 5 p. 27a16) also includes this sentence, it does not appear either in Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition (AKB 2.45c–d p. 75.22) or in Paramārtha’s translation (PAKB 4 p. 185b22). It does appear in slightly different form in Saṅghabhadra’s *Abhidharmasamayapraṇidhīpaka (ASPS 7 p. 809a12). There, the sentence is preceded by the adverb ‘in general,’ this might indicate that Saṅghabhadra interprets the suffix -tā as referring implicitly to all four characteristics, rather than simply as a suffix in the word anitya-tā.

8 The sūtra passage (AN 3.47 1: 152) reads: “These three, O monks, are the conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors]. What are the three? Arising is to be discerned, passing away is to be discerned, change in continuance is to be discerned.”

9 See MVB 39 p. 201a25ff.


11 See MVB 39 p. 201a29ff.

12 For example, SN 6.2.5 Parinibbāna 1: 158; SA 44 no. 1197 p. 325b17; *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra [Ta pan-nieh-p’ian chung] T 1 (7) p. 205b16.

13 This final phrase is ambiguous. It could also be translated as follows: “...since the sūtra passage was considering only a small part [of the larger group of four characteristics] ...”

14 See SAKV p. 172.13ff.: “Since the continuance [of conditioned factors] is similar to the continuance whose characteristic is a particular unconditioned state, it was not mentioned in order to avoid the undesirable conclusion that unconditioned factors have a conditioned nature. That is the intention of the Lord, master of the teaching.”
In the previous paragraphs, Saṅghabhadra offered reasons why the sūtra did not mention continuance. Here, he offers the interpretation that the sūtra alludes to continuance. The following paragraph proposes that, indeed, continuance was mentioned.

See MVB 39 p. 201b18ff.; AKB 2.45c-d p. 76.6ff.; SAKV p. 172.17ff.

See MVB 39 p. 200c13ff.; AHS-D 1 p. 811b20ff.; AHS-U 1 p. 838a8ff.; SAHS 2 p. 882b29ff.; AAS hisa p. 987c13ff. Yasomitra (SAKV p. 172.29ff.) explains that a certain factor arises through the capability of birth (jātisāmarthyaḥ). Birth itself is also conditioned, and therefore, must also have another characteristic of birth enabling its own production because: (1) no factor can function with regard to itself (svātmane vṛttivirodhāḥ); and (2) it is the accepted doctrine of our school (see AKB 2.23b p. 54.6) that all conditioned factors arise together with conditioned characteristics (sarvasāṁ saṁskṛtalakṣaṇaṁ ity).

See AKB 2.46a-b p. 76.11ff. “[vs. 46a-b] These have the birth of birth, and so on. These function with regard to eight factors and one factor.” Jāttijātyādayas teṣāṁ te 'śadharmaśākṣaṇaṁ.

No verbal form conveying the sense ‘to have’ appears in Pradhan’s or Gokhale’s Sanskrit editions of this verse (AKB 2.46a p. 76.11; GAKV p. 80 no. 46), though the finite verb form bhavanti, “they are” or “they have” should be understood, especially in view of the auto-commentarial gloss on this quarter-verse: AKB 2.46a p. 76.12. See also Fa-pao 5 p. 548b29ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 107c20.

See AKB 2.46b p. 77.1-4; MŚ-P p. 59.

The Sanskrit equivalent of the word shang, ‘even,’ is uncertain. See Hirakawa (1973, 1977) 2: 247, which indicates that shang with a negative particle has been used by Hsüan-tsang in translating either eva na or adhyā. This sūtra passage is cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 38 p. 198a10ff.) with no corresponding particle.

Location unknown

Location unknown. In sūtra passages concerning the twelve members of dependent origination, frequent reference is made to birth as the condition for the arising of old age and death. See, for example, MA 24 no. 97 p. 578b24, DN no. 15 Mahānidānasutta 2: 56ff., where birth is declared the condition for old age and death; or MA 7 no. 29 p. 462b21, AN 9.13 Kotṭhikasutta 4: 385, where the cessation of old age and death depends upon the cessation of birth.

Even though Hsüan-tsang usually uses kung-neng as a translation for sāmarthya, Pradhan’s Sanskrit edition would suggest that he is here translating vṛtti by kung-neng. See AKB 2.46b p. 76.15ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 27b14. Determining the equivalent of kung-neng here in Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra becomes problematic given the difference between Vasubandhu’s and Saṅghabhadra’s definitions of vṛtti: these differing definitions of vṛtti also suggest a major point of divergence in their interpretations of the four characteristics and ultimately in their ontological models. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 76.16ff.) defines vṛtti as follows: “What is this function? It is activity or performance.” Kim tān vṛttir iti. kārtriṇam puruṣākārah. In his discussion of the five effects (pañcapahā), Vasubandhu (AKB 2.56d p. 95.2ff.) identifies puruṣākāra with kārtra, and explains that the word puruṣākāra is used because this activity resembles human action; that is, activity necessarily performed by or linked to an agent. Saṅghabhadra in his definition here of vṛtti emphasizes the power of the characteristics to act as proximate or immediate conditions, and not their activity (kārtra). He, therefore, preserves his distinction between a factor’s activity (kārtra) and its capability (sāmarthya), which includes...
this power of the conditioned characteristics as immediate conditions. The distinction between activity and capability is central to Sanghabhadra's ontological model and is discussed at length in the introductory commentary, supra, "The Four Characteristics of Conditioned Factors." See also P'u-kuang 5 p. 104b29ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 548c25ff.; Tan'e 5 p. 868a10ff.; Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, Saeki ([1886] 1978) 1: 222–223.

26 See the *Mahāvibhāṣa* (MVB 39 p. 201a1ff.), which explains that these factors—birth and the birth of birth—function differently simply according to their nature (dharmaṭā); it also compares this distinction in capability to that of a hen who, at certain times, gives birth to eight chicks and, at other times, gives birth to only one. Cf. AKB 2.46b p. 76.18ff.

27 See Fa-pao 5 p. 549a2ff. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 50 p. 625b23ff.) gives the same example of feelings to indicate the relation among a factor's mode of being (bhāva), its capability (śārṣṭryya), and its status as a real entity (dravya).

28 The Sanskrit equivalent and exact sense of chen shih-i, 'true meaning,' are uncertain here.

29 Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 76.22) attributes this statement to the Sautrāntikas. See also P'u-kuang 5 p. 104c5ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 549a7ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 333d15ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 108a14ff.

30 Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 173.22ff.) explains that "space is the mere absence of real entities that have resistance." supratigradvrāhavāmaṭrām ākāśam. Therefore, space does not exist as an object that can be split or discriminated. Likewise, since, according to Vasubandhu, the four primary and four secondary characteristics lack any intrinsic nature and do not exist as real entities, they should not be discriminated in this way.

31 AKB 2.46b p. 76.22ff.: "This indeed is splitting space. For the factors of birth, and so on, do not exist as real entities in the way in which they have been discriminated. For what reason? It is due to the absence of any means of valid cognition [through which they can be known to exist]. For there is no means of valid cognition whatsoever by direct perception, inference, or scriptural authority with regard to their existence as real entities, as there is in the case of factors such as form, and so on." tadb etad ākāśaṁ pātyata iti sautrāntikāḥ. na hy ete jātyādayo dharma dravyataḥ saṃvidyante yathā vibhajyante. kim kāraṇam. pramānabhāvāt. na hy esāṁ dravyato 'stute kīrticd api pramānām asti pratyaksam anumānam apiṣṭagamo va yathā rūpaṁ dharmāṁ nāṁ iti.

32 Saṅghabhadra plays upon the ambiguity inherent in Vasubandhu's use of the adverb yathā in his previous statement: "The characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as real entities in the way in which (yathā) they have been discriminated." Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 173.26ff.) identifies the referent of yathā, 'the way in which,' as the previously described functions of the primary and secondary characteristics as applying, respectively, to eight factors and one factor. Shen-t'ai (Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334b8ff.) explains yathā as meaning "like the Sarvāstivādins" and anyathā as "like the Sautrāntikas.

Saṅghabhadra could then be asking whether Vasubandhu would accept the reality of the characteristics if they were discriminated with other activities or in accordance with someone else's interpretation. Whatever the referent of yathā, Saṅghabhadra's purpose here is to clarify Vasubandhu's intention as that of denying the existence of the characteristics as real entities. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 174.33ff.), in commenting on a later passage, explains this intention: "We, [that is, Vasubandhu], do not say that birth, and so on, do not exist. Rather, we say that they do not exist in the way in which they have been discriminated: [that is,] as real entities by nature." na brūmo jātyādayo na saṃvidyanta iti. yathā tu dravyaratpaḥ vibhajyante tathā na saṃvidyanta iti brūnaḥ. See also MVB 38 p. 198c22ff.: "The Dārśāntikas claim that the characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as real entities. Factors like pots and cloth, and so on, that do not exist as real entities should not be discriminated in this way."
The same argument appears in the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyānusāra* (NAS 51 p. 626b29ff.) where Saṅghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu's interpretation of the three time periods: "[The Sūtra master's] interpretation of the word 'exists' is definitely not acceptable. He does not allow that [factors] actually exist in the past and future time periods, and their provisional existence, as previously demonstrated, is not reasonably established; there is no possibility of yet another [third] category of existence."

Shen-t'ai (Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334b15ff.) offers the following interpretation: "Since [Vasubandhu] rejects the first alternative of real existence, he must allow the second alternative that the nature of the characteristics of birth, and so on, is such that they exist provisionally. A third type of existence that is neither real nor provisional is necessarily unreasonable. The term 'distinctive characteristic' refers to the real or provisional existence of the characteristics; this distinctive characteristic necessarily depends upon intrinsic nature. Since [Vasubandhu] denies their distinctive characteristic as either real or provisional, one should accordingly acknowledge that [the characteristics of birth, and so on], are not to be admitted because they would be absolutely without intrinsic nature. Therefore, it is apparent that there is some factor having intrinsic nature, aside from these factors of birth, and so on, [that performs these activities of birth, and so on]."

The translation of this final phrase is uncertain. See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334c1ff.

See *MVB* 16 p. 79b26ff. For a similar discussion, see *MVB* 57 p. 293b21ff. Cf. *SA* 28 no. 787 p. 204a25ff.; *AN* 10.104 Būjasutta 5: 213, both of which list various factors that are of the same category as false views but does not include the general term sanāskāra so important to Saṅghabhadra's argument.

Factors that operate on or occur in conformity with one object are classified in the same category. See *MVB* 29 p. 151a21ff., 30 p. 153a8ff. A characteristic and the characterized factor can be said to belong to the same category due to the identity of their time period, their shared effect, and the simultaneity of their operation. See *MVB* 3 p. 10c28ff., 38 p. 198b8ff., 157 p. 797a9ff.

See supra, translation and notes to *NAS* 13 p. 405c10.

For Saṅghabhadra, the repetition of the word 'conditioned' in the phrase 'three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors]' indicates that the characteristics exist as real entities apart from that which is characterized. On the relation between the characteristics and the factors characterized, see *MVB* 39 p. 202a9ff., esp. 39 p. 202a26–27; *AAS hsia* p. 987c10ff., Sakurabe (1975b) 168ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334a18ff.

See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334c10ff.: "You who claim that the three conditioned characteristics of birth, and so on, do not exist as discrete real entities apart from the factors that they characterize would pervert this sūtra passage. What is the purport of the phrases 'of conditioned [factors]' and 'also can be discerned.'"

See *NAS* 25 p. 482a5ff., 25 p. 482b1ff., 26 p. 488b5ff., 27 p. 493c10ff. The Sanskrit equivalents of the terms 'initial citation' and 'elaboration' are uncertain. See *MVB* p. 71b3ff. where both terms appear together in a discussion of the characteristics of the dissociated factor, pāda, in the sense of a "phrase" or a "quarter-verse." It is possible that the term 'citation' corresponds to pratīka "citation by headword," literally "that which is towards" or the first part of an enunciation used as an abbreviation for the entire statement, and that the term 'elaboration' corresponds to anūka "that which follows," or the remainder of the statement implied by the pratīka.

Shen-t'ai (Shen-t'ai 5 p. 334c15ff.) suggests that the term 'initial citation' refers to the phrase 'characteristics of conditioned [factors]' and the term 'elaboration' refers to the phrase 'the arising of that which is conditioned,' and so on.

Vasubandhu (*AKB* 2.46b p. 78.5ff.; *SAKV* p. 177.5ff.) gives several examples in which the genitive does not indicate a relationship between separately existing entities: a great person (*mahāpurūsa*) and the characteristics marking that great person; a cow and the characteristics of a cow; and the four fundamental material elements (*mahābhuța*)
and their defining qualities. See also AKB 2.46c–d p. 79.23ff.; SAKV p. 179.29ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 110c26ff.

44 See Shen-t’ai 5 p. 334c17ff.; SAKV p. 177.4–5.
46 Cf. AKB 9 p. 465.18.
47 See MVB 39 p. 200a3ff., where the view that these three characteristics are not to be applied to a single moment is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas. See also Kaidō 5 p. 109a29ff.; see infra, translation, NAS’ 14 p.413c24–25.
48 See SAKV p. 174.18ff.
49 See AKB 2.46b p. 76.27ff.: “A fool knows the words, but does not know the meaning. It has been said by the Lord: ‘The meaning is the reliance.’ What is the meaning of this [sūtra passage]? Fools blinded by ignorance are obsessed, being convinced that the uninterrupted series of conditioned forces [has the nature of] ‘self’ and of ‘what belongs to the self.’ For the sake of removing their conviction in false [views], the Lord, desiring to make it clear that that stream of conditioned forces has the nature of being conditioned and is dependently originated, made the following statement: ‘There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors].’ [He did] not [make the statement in order to suggest that the three characteristics] belong to a single moment, since the [three characteristics] of arising, and so on, belonging to a single moment cannot be discerned, and these that are not discerned do not not deserve to be established as characteristics. Thus, [since] it was further stated in this sūtra that ‘the arising of that which is conditioned also can be discerned,’ [these conditioned characteristics must be capable of being discerned and, hence, must apply to the stream of conditioned forces, and not to a single moment.]”

50 The translation of these two sentences is uncertain. In particular, the referent of the term ‘this,’ which the Sūtra master claims is not observed, is unclear.
51 See Shen-t’ai 5 p. 335b14ff.
52 See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 406c29ff. Cf. AKB 2.46b p. 77.3: “these that are not discerned do not not deserve to be established as characteristics.” na cā ‘praṇāyaṁmāṇā ete laksanāṁ bhavitum arhanti.
53 See AKB 2.46b p. 77.4ff.: “Further, the [repeated] word ‘conditioned’ should be understood as meaning that these characteristics [indicate the nature of factors] as conditioned. It should not be understood thus as meaning that these characteristics [indicate] the existence of a given conditioned entity as in the case of the waterfowl ....” punah saṁskṛtasya laksanāṁ saṁskṛtavete laksanāṁ ‘tathā viññāyeta. mai ‘varā viññāgī saṁskṛtasya vastuno ‘sītue laksanāṁ jalalakāvяв .... See also SAKV p. 174.23ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 105a3ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 549a26ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 334d13ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 109a7ff. Determining the intended referents of the repeated use of the term ‘conditioned’ (saṁskṛta) in the sūtra passage, “conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors],” (saṁskṛtasya saṁskṛtalaksanām i...) is central to the difference between Vasubandhu’s and Sanghabhadra’s interpretations of these four characteristics of conditioned factors. Unlike Sanghabhadra, Vasubandhu claims that one should not understand the second reference to “conditioned” as indicating the separate existence of the
characteristic apart from that which is characterized. If a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) indicated the separate existence of the thing characterized (lakṣya), then one could conclude that the characteristic and the thing characterized are separate entities. Instead, Vasubandhu maintains that the first reference to “conditioned,” indicates that which is characterized—that is, conditioned factors—and the second reference indicates the nature of these conditioned factors as conditioned—that is, the quality that is indicated by these characteristics of conditioned factors. Thus, Vasubandhu concludes that this sūtra passage does not prove that the characteristics and the thing characterized exist as separate entities. In addition to the example of the waterfowl, Vasubandhu offers the example of the virtuous maiden: that is, “…as in the case of the characteristics of a maiden that indicate her nature as virtuous or unvirtuous.” …sādhvasādhutve vā kanyālakṣaṇaṇavad iti. By these two examples, Vasubandhu hopes to suggest that the characteristics should not be understood as indicating a quality of conditioned factors other than their nature as conditioned: that is to say, these characteristics should not be compared to a waterfowl that indicates the quality of existence of water nearby, nor to the characteristics of a maiden that indicate qualities such as virtue or lack of virtue other than her maidenness. Here Saṅghabhadra omits the example of the maiden from his citation of Vasubandhu’s statement and instead later cites an interpretation of Sthāvira that represents this view. See infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 407b24ff.

54 Since, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, factors exist as real entities (dravya) in the three time periods, they exist even in the future time period when they have not yet been produced. Production, therefore, refers not to a factor’s coming into existence, but to the arising of its activity, and when its activity arises, a factor is referred to as present. Factors are then considered to be conditioned precisely because their activity arises and passes away. Thus, for Saṅghabhadra, birth does not mark the existence of a conditioned factor. See MVB 76 p. 394b19ff. According to Vasubandhu, however, factors can be said to exist only in the present time period when they acquire their own nature, which is identified by Vasubandhu with their particular activity. The arising and passing away of this nature or activity determines their existence or nonexistence and constitutes their conditioned nature. Thus, Saṅghabhadra concludes, if, as Vasubandhu suggests, the repeated reference to “conditioned” indicates the conditioned nature of factors, it must also indicate the presence or absence of their activity and, hence, their existence. Therefore, Vasubandhu’s position would, in the end, be identical to Saṅghabhadra’s own: that is, that the repeated reference to “conditioned” indicates the separate existence of the characteristics and the factor characterized.

55 This is Vasubandhu’s definition of production as used in reference to a single moment (AKB 2.46b p. 77.23): pratikṣaṇam abhātvabhāvav utpādaḥ.

56 See Shen-t’ai 5 p. 335c3ff. Whereas the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas allow the existence of both conditioned and unconditioned factors in the three time periods, the Sautrāntikas and here Vasubandhu allow the existence only of conditioned factors in the present time period. In this argument, Saṅghabhadra suggests that if Vasubandhu claims that birth does not indicate existence, he should not define birth as the fact that something “exists not having existed.” Further, if birth does not indicate existence, the existence of conditioned factors becomes impossible. Since Vasubandhu rejects the existence of unconditioned factors and does not allow the existence of conditioned factors at any time other than the present, he would then be forced to admit that nothing exists.

57 Vasubandhu (AKB 3.85c p. 176.12ff.) defines a moment as “the time during which a factor acquires its own nature when there is a complete assemblage of conditions,” samagreṣu pratīyageṣu ēvavatā dharmasyā ’tmalābhah gacchan. . . . Thus, birth is marked by a factor acquiring its own nature. This nature is its activity, and also determines its existence. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 32 p. 521b25ff.), criticizing Vasubandhu’s definition, states: “One should consider whether or not a factor exists as a real entity before that
factor is produced. The Ābhidhārmikas maintain that factors are produced when there is the complete assemblage of conditions. They do not, however, acquire their own nature at that time, since factors already have their own nature—that is, exist as real entities—when they are not yet produced."

58 The translation of this sentence follows Shen-t’ai’s (Shen-t’ai 5 p. 335c6-7) reading: “The nature of birth is to be equated with the state of being conditioned (yu-wei-yu-hsing).” The Taishō and Chi-sha editions of the *Nyāyānusāra (NAS 13 p. 407b20; NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 26b1) both have the following: “The nature of birth is to be equated with the existence of a conditioned factor (yu-wei yu-hsing).” Though, in view of expected character divisions, Shen-t’ai’s reading would indeed appear to be missing one character, the reading of the Taishō and Chi-sha editions make little sense in this argument.

59 For the probable identity of Sthavira as the Darṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika master, Śrīlāta, see supra, historical introduction, “Sectarian Buddhism—The Emergence of the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika Schools,” and “Sectarian Buddhism,” note 102.

60 For Saṅghabhadra, a single reference to the word ‘conditioned’ is sufficient to indicate both that the characteristics belong to conditioned factors and that they indicate the nature of factors as conditioned. The repeated reference, therefore, must indicate the separate existence of the conditioned characteristics and the factor characterized.

61 The translation of this sentence is uncertain. Cf. TSP no. 1803ff. p. 620–621.

62 See MVB 39 p. 200b16ff., which considers various opinions as to whether these characteristics should be considered particular inherent characteristics (sva-sākyāna) or generic characteristics (sāmānyalakṣana). The arbiter of the *Mahāvibbāna (MVB 39 p. 200c9ff.) concludes that the four characteristics should be understood as generic characteristics.

63 Saṅghabhadra here alludes to Vasubandhu’s rejection of the existence of the four characteristics as real entities: AKB 2.46b p. 76.22; supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 406b16ff.

64 AKB 2.46b p. 77.6ff.: “In that case, the beginning of the stream [of conditioned factors] is arising, its extinction is passing away, that very stream [of conditioned factors], which is occurring is continuance, and the distinction between the successive [moments] of this [stream of conditioned factors] is change in continuance.” *tatma pravāhaśyo ’dir utpado. nivṛttaśyo vyaśaḥ. sa eva pravāha ’nuvartamānaḥ sthitīḥ. tasya pūrvaparāvṛtīśeṣaḥ sthitīyanyathātvaṃ. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 175.1ff.) explains passing away as the stopping of the stream (pūrvaparāvṛtiḥ), continuance as the stream that is occurring due to a succession of similar moments (sadbhāvakṣaṇaṇuṣṭṛiḥ anuvartamānaḥ pravāhāḥ sthitīḥ iti ucyate), and change in continuance as the distinction between one moment and a prior one or between successive moments (pūrvaparāvatiḥ kṣaṇaṇor a visesāḥ. pūrvaparāvatiḥ kṣaṇaṇor vā visesāḥ . . . ). The *Mahāvibbāna (MVB 38 p. 198a13ff.) gives several alternative interpretations of the four characteristics proposed by various Buddhist sects. Two are significant here: The Dārṣṭāntikas (MVB 38 p. 198a14ff.; cf. MVB 195 p. 977b9ff.) maintain that “the conditioned characteristics do not exist as real entities;” and the Sautrāntikas (MVB 38 p. 198b1ff.) claim that “the time when the five aggregates of form, and so on, emerge from the womb is birth, the time when they deteriorate is senescence, and the end of life is desinence.” Cf. TSS 7 no. 94 p. 289b18ff. This view attributed in the *Mahāvibbāna to the Sautrāntikas would conform to the view presented here by Vasubandhu. Katō Junshō (Katō Junshō (1989) 115–118), after comparing this passage with analogous passages from the *Mahāvibbāna (MVB 195 p. 977b8ff.) and the *Abhidharmavibbānasāstra (AVB 20 p. 148b3ff.), notes that neither the specific view attributed to the Sautrāntikas nor the reference to the Sautrāntikas appears in these other passages. Katō tentatively concludes that Hsüan-tsang added this attribution to the Sautrāntikas in his translation
of this passage from the *Mahāvibhāṣā on the basis of his knowledge of this position as cited in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya. Vasubandhu does refer explicitly to the Sautrāntikas (AKB 2.46b p. 76.23) earlier in his criticism of the conditioned characteristics, but not in this particular passage.

AKB 2.46b p. 77.9ff.: "Feelings are indeed known by Nanda, the son of a good family, as arising; [feelings] are indeed known as abiding; [feelings] are indeed known as coming to an end, disappearing, or going to exhaustion." viditā eva nandasya kula-pतrasya vedanā upadyante viditā avatisthathe viditā astatā pariśayān pariśādānān gacchanti 'ti. See AN 8.9 Nandasutta 4: 168; SA 11 no. 275 p. 73b24ff.; cf. MN no. 111 Anupadasutta 3: 25. Yasomitra (SAKV p. 175.8ff.) explains that the feelings that are known, as mentioned in this sūtra passage, are those in a stream, not those of a single moment. Two reasons are given: first, a single moment is difficult to delimit (kṣaṇasya duravadharatvat) — that is, it is difficult to distinguish one moment from the next, and thereby, establish the limits of any given moment within the experience of feelings; second, feelings here must apply to a stream, since it is impossible to establish a moment that is known (viditasya ca kṣaṇasyā 'vasthānāsamābhavāt). See also Shen-t'ai 5 p. 335c13ff.

See supra, translation and notes to NAS 13 p. 404a20.

For nīkāyasabhāga in the sense of "homogeneous collection of components," see supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 403c15, 13 p. 404b20. These three—the moment (kṣaṇa), the state (avasthā), and the homogeneous collection of components (nīkāyasabhāga)—appear together with the stream (sāriṅtati) as a fixed group of four at several points in the *Mahāvibhāṣā in discussions of dependent origination and of cause and effect relations. See MVB 161 p. 816a24ff., 195 p. 976a23ff. Clues as to the significance of this fixed group of four can be found in classifications of five varieties of or perspectives from which the term 'stream' (sāriṅtati) can be understood: namely, from the perspectives of the intermediate state, birth, stages, factors, or moments. See MVB 60 p. 310a16ff., 138 p. 711b23ff., 192 p. 961a13ff. Thus, the discussion here could represent four perspectives from which an entity or being can be viewed: a moment, a state, a homogeneous collection of components, or as a stream. Given this fourfold perspective, there are two possible reasons for the opponent's objection: first, if the perspective of a "stream" were denied, the perspectives of a "state," and of the "homogeneous collection of components," which are both dependent upon a period longer than one moment, would also be undermined; second, since these three factors—the moment, the state, and the homogeneous collection of components—exist in one moment, the stream could be said to be dependent on these three in any given moment. Consequently, even from the perspective of a single moment, the stream could be said to be dependent upon many factors; this would preserve its sense as a composite or provisional stream and would undermine Saṅghabhadra’s criticism that one cannot use the term 'stream,' which denotes a provisional entity, to refer to a single moment.

Though a moment is not, in itself, dependent upon a stream of consecutive moments, a "state" (avasthā) is only meaningful in the context of a series of states, and the "homogeneous collection of components" (nīkāyasabhāga) is only meaningful in the context of a series of collocations of related aggregates. Thus, if there were no continuance of the stream, both the state and the homogeneous collection of components would be untenable.

The stream was defined (supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 407c29ff.) as "the uninterrupted flow of conditioned factors," in which "moments are mutually similar," and "occur in succession without termination." Since in the case outlined here by Saṅghabhadra, the moments differ in moral quality and are not mutually similar, the term 'stream' is
unfounded. Accordingly, the “birth of such a stream” would also be meaningless.

72. Nirvāṇa can be classified as of two types: first, that with remainder (sopadhiṣeṣa), in which “vitality still exists, the stream of the fundamental material (mahābhūta) and derived material elements (bhautika) is not yet terminated, and the stream of thought occurs in conformity with the five sense organs and the body;” and second, that without remainder (nirupadhiṣeṣa), in which “vitality is destroyed, the stream of the material elements is terminated, and the stream of thought no longer occurs.” See MVB 32 p. 167c13ff.

73. Again, Saṅghabhadra returns to Vasubandhu’s definition of a stream as a series of similar moments. Since virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate moments of thought are dissimilar in moral quality, they cannot all be said to belong to one stream of similar moments. Thus, one birth and one desinence cannot be applied to all of them together as one stream. Each consecutive moment of differing moral quality must then undergo a distinct production and destruction. Further, given the fact that Vasubandhu does not admit the existence of factors as real entities in the past and future, the “stream” of each of these dissimilar moments of thought would be limited to one moment. Vasubandhu would then be forced to admit the simultaneous operation of birth and desinence in each moment.

74. See MVB 39 p. 200a3ff.: “There are those, like the Dārṣṭāntikas, who claim that the three characteristics of conditioned factors [are not to be applied to] a single moment. They claim that if there were three characteristics in a single moment, then one factor would be produced, grow old, and be destroyed at the same time.”

75. See AKB 4.2d p. 193.7ff.; SAKV p. 345.20ff.

76. Saṅghabhadra’s criticism of the Dārṣṭāntikas here focuses on the abstract suffix tā that appears within the word anityatā ‘desinence.’ According to Saṅghabhadra, this suffix indicates that desinence exists as a factor having intrinsic nature or as a factor that exists as a real entity (dvaya). The Dārṣṭāntikas, however, maintain that desinence refers to a factor’s mere absence or nonexistence. In that case, Saṅghabhadra suggests, since all factors are accepted as “impermanent”—that is, as characterized by desinence—all factors would be, by nature, nonexistent.

77. Nonexistence, as an absence, does not itself exist as an entity capable of standing in a relation of connection to another entity and, therefore, cannot enter into a genitive relationship such as indicated by the phrase ‘impermanence of form.’

78. In this section, Saṅghabhadra discusses the function of senescence in terms of the principle of dependent origination, that is, in terms of interrelations of cause and effect, which can then be described from several different perspectives. See NAS 25 p. 480c7ff. One such perspective is the distinction between internal and external causes. See MVB 83 p. 430a18ff., 132 p. 684b2ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 138 p. 714a12ff.) enumerates three methods of distinguishing internal from external: with regard to the life-stream; with regard to the conditions necessary for perception; and with regard to the distinction between factors included among those constituting sentient beings and factors included among those not constituting sentient beings. See also NAS 6 p. 360b20ff. Here, Saṅghabhadra relies on the first of these three: that is, those factors within one’s own life-stream are considered internal, and those factors in the life-stream of another as well as those not included among factors constituting sentient beings are considered external. Though both internal and external causes are required in the production of any entity, the internal causes predominate. See MVB 18 p. 88a16ff. In the following argument, Saṅghabhadra places the characteristic of senescence and the other conditioned characteristics within the category of internal causes. He argues that if there were no cause of senescence within one’s own life-stream, then there would be no internal cause to account for the fact of change. One of the following options would then result: (1) change must be attributed only to external conditions; (2) change must occur automatically without
a cause; (3) change must occur as a result of the homogeneous causal relation between
moments of the same category; or (4) change must be explained in some cases through
the first alternative, and in other cases through the third alternative. Sanghabhadra
refutes, in turn, each of these options and, thereby, attempts to establish the existence
of senescence as an internal cause of change.

79 All conditioned factors act as homogeneous causes (sabhāgahetu) in the produc-
ton of similar effects of uniform outflow (niṣyandaphala) in the next moment. See MVB
17 p. 85b27ff.

80 Location unknown.

81 See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 407c11ff.

82 Here Sanghabhadra offers reasons to counter Vasubandhu’s attempt to use
this sūtra passage as proof that production, destruction, and so on, are discerned and,
therefore, must apply to a stream of conditioned forces as a whole rather than to a sin-
gle moment. Sanghabhadra interprets this passage in terms of his own theory of the
activity or capability of birth and desinence (infra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b7ff.).
Sanghabhadra maintains that the characteristic of birth manifests its capability of pro-
duction immediately prior to the arising (that is, coming into the present) of the factor
that it produces. It would be unreasonable to maintain that the act of production is to
be applied to a factor in the present moment, because that factor, in the present moment,
is already produced. Sanghabhadra’s argument is identical for the case of destruction.
Thus, “knowing production and destruction” implies that future and past factors can
be discerned. However, since Vasubandhu maintains that past and future factors do not
exist, he should not, Sanghabhadra argues, maintain that production and destruction
are discerned. Therefore, he cannot use this sūtra passage to support his application of
production and destruction to the stream of conditioned forces as a whole.

83 Sanghabhadra’s intention here is unclear. Abiding and change in continuance
are both mentioned in Sanghabhadra’s own quotation of this sūtra passage as used by
Vasubandhu (supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 407c11–12), and though deterioration is
omitted in the passage as found in the extant sūtra or āgama collections, abiding is
clearly mentioned. See AN 8.9 Nandasutta 4: 168; SA 11 no. 275 p. 73b24ff. It is, of
course, possible that neither appeared in the sūtra source that Sanghabhadra accepted,
despite his earlier reference to Vasubandhu’s quotation.

84 The syntax of Hsüan-tsang’s translation would suggest that this phrase functions
as the reason for the previous statement. However, since abiding and deterioration
would occur in the present moment, and not in the past or future, this phrase has been
interpreted as a reason for the conclusion that follows. Elsewhere, (AKB 5.27c p. 299.1ff.;
SAKV p. 472.33ff.; see also NAS 51 p. 626b20ff.) Vasubandhu states: “We also say that
the past and future exist, but the past is that which has existed and the future is that
which will exist when there is a cause. [The Lord] used [the term] ‘exists’ in that sense,
and not in the sense of existence as a real entity.” vayam api brūmō 'sty atītānāgatam
iti. atītān tu yad bhūtapūrvam anāgatam yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati. evam ca krtvā ‘sty
ty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ. Thus, Sanghabhadra suggests that even Vasubandhu
would admit the “existence” of factors in the past and future, at least in the sense that a
past or future tense verb can be used to describe them.

85 AKB 2.46b p. 77.21ff.: “These characteristics of conditioned factors can also
be applied to [each] moment if one does not imagine them to be discrete real entities.
How so? Arising [as applied] to each moment [refers to the fact that it] exists not
having existed. Passing away [refers to the fact that] having existed, it no longer exists.
Continuance [refers to] the connection of each prior [moment] with subsequent moments.
Change in continuance [refers to] the dissimilarity in that [connection]. In that case,
when similar [factors] are produced, they are not without distinction.” pratikṣaṇām
cā 'pi saṁśrētasyaī 'tāni laksṇāṇī vinā 'pi dravyāntarakaḷpanayā. katham
According to the *Mahāvibhāṣa* (MVB 39 p. 20a4ff.), the Dārṣṭāntikas raise this fault that one factor undergoes birth, abiding, and so on, within the limits of one moment as a criticism of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position that the four characteristics apply to a single moment. Vasubandhu also uses the same criticism. See AKB 2.46b p. 78.13ff. In this section, Saṅghabhadra turns this criticism against Vasubandhu's own position: that is to say, if the four characteristics do not exist as real entities apart from the single factor to which they are applied and are still said to function within the span of one moment, they must function as aspects of that single factor, which would then itself carry out simultaneously the mutually conflicting activities of production, abiding, and so on.

Here, in this criticism of Vasubandhu's position, Saṅghabhadra follows the syntax of Vasubandhu's own criticism of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position (AKB 2.46b p. 78.16ff.): "First, at this point, this is to be determined: does the [characteristic of] birth exist as a real entity in the future, or not? Only afterward, should one establish whether or not it produces." idam tāvad āha sampradhāryam bhavati. kim anāgatam dravyato 'sti nā 'sti 'ti paścaj janayati vā na ve 'ti sidhyet.

The fault referred to here is that such dissimilarity, or change, cannot be attributed solely to external conditions; therefore, an internal condition such as the characteristic of senescence is required.

The fault referred to here is that factors could not be said to be impermanent by nature because their nature, as desinence, would be equated with nonexistence, and that which is nonexistence cannot be considered a factor.

AKB 2.46b p. 78.12ff.: "Moreover, if birth, and so on, existed precisely as discrete real entities, what would be unreasonable [in that]? One factor at one time would be produced, be maintained, decay, and be destroyed, since those [characteristics] exist together [with that factor]." athā 'pi nāma dravyāntarānye 'va jātyādīni bhaveyuh. kim ayuktam syāt. eko dharmah ekasmin eva kāle jātaḥ sthito jīrno na vaiḥ syād eṣāṁ sahahūtavāḥ. See also SAKV p. 176.7ff.

See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 408c9-10.

See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 408b8ff. The fault referred to here is that factors could not be said to be impermanent by nature because their nature, as desinence, would be equated with nonexistence, and that which is nonexistence cannot be considered a factor.

AKB 2.46b p. 78.12ff.: "Since the time of the activities [of these characteristics] is different, there is no contradiction. That is to say, birth has its activity when the factor is about to be produced; desinence has its activity only when [that factor] is about to be destroyed. Even though they exist as real entities at the same time, their activities are sequential; the limits constituted by the activities of the production and destruction of one factor are referred to as one moment. Therefore, the fault [that the characteristics perform their activities at the same time] is not incurred." Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 78.14) cites a similar response: "[A factor is not produced, and so on, at one time] due to the temporal distinction in the activities [of these four characteristics]. For birth performs its activity when it is future, since what is already born is not produced. When the factor is already produced, [the characteristics of] continuance, senescence, and desinence perform their activities when they are present. It is not the case that when [a factor] is produced, it is also abiding, decaying, and being destroyed." kāritrakālaśabdāt. anāgatā hi jātāḥ kāritram hi karoti yasmān na jātām jānyate. jānte tu dharme vartamānāḥ kṣīyādayāh kāritram kuryanti 'ti. na āha jāyate tātā tiṣṭhati jīryati vināśyati vā. In the following discussion, Saṅghabhadra develops his own interpretation of activity (kārita), of its distinction from capability (sāmarthya), and of the possibility of the performance of capability in the future.
These two examples of fetal stages and seeds are used frequently to illustrate the process of dependent origination as applied, respectively, to internal and external factors. See AKB 2.52a p. 85.12ff. The terms 'internal and external' could be used here to modify either these fetal stages and seeds, or their various assisting conditions. For a discussion of internal and external, see supra, translation and notes to NAS 13 p. 408b10.


The following rule determines that a conditioning relation obtains between two entities, A and B: When A is found, B is found; through the arising of A, B arises. If A is not found, B is not found; through the cessation of A, B ceases. See AKB 3.28a–b p. 139.1: *asmin satī 'daṁ bhavati asyo 'tpadād idam utpadyate ....* See also Saigusa (1979).

In this discussion, the predominant cause corresponds to the homogeneous cause (*sabhāgaḥetu*): that is, a cause of one category that produces an effect of the same category in a subsequent moment. See MVB 17 p. 85b27ff. The fetal stages and the seeds act as homogeneous causes that produce subsequent similar effects. By the term 'predominant condition' Sanghabhadra refers to the conditions that are essential in assisting the homogeneous cause in the production of its effect. In these examples, the assisting conditions are simultaneous with the effect. It is in this category of simultaneous assisting conditions that Sanghabhadra would place the four characteristics of conditioned factors.

Here, Hsüan-tsang's translation has the term *chū-sheng-yin*—that is, 'simultaneously produced cause'—and not *chū-yu-yin*, which Hsüan-tsang uses as a translation of *sahabhūhetu*, 'simultaneous cause.' In a general discussion of causal relations, Sanghabhadra (NAS 15 p. 419a1ff.) broadly distinguishes two categories of causes: those that are simultaneously produced and those that are previously produced. Among the six varieties of causes established within the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma system, the associated cause (*sāniprayuktahetu*), the simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*), and a certain portion of the comprehensive cause (*kāranyahetu*) are included in the first category of simultaneously produced causes. The remaining portion of the comprehensive cause and the other varieties of causes must precede their effect, and therefore fall within the category of previously produced causes. The specific variety of simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*) refers to thought and thought concomitants, the four fundamental material elements, and those factors that operate in conformity with thought (*cittanuparivartin*), including the characteristics of conditioned factors. See MVB 16 p. 81b4ff., esp. 16 p. 82a10ff.: "All conditioned factors have the characteristic of birth, and so on, as simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*)." The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 16 p. 81b10ff., 16 p. 81c7ff., 17 p. 85b22ff.) suggests that these simultaneous causes can be said to be reciprocal in the sense that they share the same effect or act for a single objective. Therefore, this causal taxonomy appears to imply that two simultaneous factors that do not serve as direct or reciprocal causes for one another may still be considered simultaneous causes. Sanghabhadra's use of the two terms 'simultaneously produced causes' and 'simultaneous causes' is problematic. Katō Junshō (Katō Junshō (1989) 309–310) interprets Sanghabhadra as distinguishing simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*) from simultaneously produced causes (*sahajahetu*): that is to say, simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*) refer to simultaneous factors that are reciprocally cause and effect; whereas simultaneously produced causes (*sahajahetu*), though simultaneous with their own effect, are not themselves reciprocally caused by that effect. However, Sanghabhadra, like the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, would appear to allow that factors that are not reciprocal effects can still be considered simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*). The secondary conditioned characteristics would provide an example of a simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*) that is not reciprocally caused
by its simultaneous effect. See *NAS* 15 p. 417c22ff.; cf. *AKB* 2.50c–d p. 83.23ff.

98 See *Mahāniddānasūtra* [*Ta sheng-i ching*] T 1 (52) p. 845b9ff. The final two characters in this passage from the *Ta sheng-i ching* are *sheng-ch‘i*, or ‘arise,’ and not *chu ku*, or ‘abide’ with *ku* indicating a reason, as in the text here of the *Taishō* and the *Chi-sha* editions (NAS 13 p. 409a23; *NAS-Chi-sha* 398 p. 28b29). Cf. DN no. 15 *Mahāniddānasutta* 2: 63; MA 24 no. 97 p. 580a1ff.

99 Through this argument, Saṅghabhadra has attempted to prove that the four characteristics are essential as simultaneously produced, internal conditions that enable factors to arise in the present from the future, to exert in the present their activity of projecting their effect, and to disappear into the past.

100 *NAS* 50 p. 621c5ff., esp. 52 p. 631c5ff.

101 The translation of this sentence is uncertain. As an alternative: “By holding in one’s mind the excellent principle of dependent origination ...”.

102 The phrase ‘those [various states]’ refers to external conditions that have not yet acquired, are about to acquire, or have lost the activity of projecting their own effect.


104 Birth has its activity at the time when the characterized factor is in the state of being about to be produced: that is, when it is future. Continuance, senescence, and desinence have their activity when the factor is in a state of being about to be destroyed: that is, when it is present. Thus, these characteristics perform their activities at two distinct times, or states, of the characterized factor. It should be noted that since the four characteristics and the characterized factor are simultaneous, these states of the characterized factor correspond to the same states of the four characteristics: the state in which the characterized factor is about to be produced is also the state in which the characteristics are about to be produced, and so on. Thus, from the perspective of either the characterized factors or the characteristics themselves, the times of the activities of the four characteristics are distinct.

105 *AKB* 2.46b p. 78.22–23: “Would this [factor] at that time abide, or decay, or be destroyed?” *kim ayaṁ tatra kāle tiṣṭhatu āhosiṣvī jīryatu vinaśyatvā vā*.

106 The exact meaning of this key phrase *so-wang*, ‘points of dependence’ or possibly ‘desires’ or ‘objectives,’ is unclear, and as a result, the meaning of Saṅghabhadra’s response is obscure. The term *wang* is used elsewhere in this section on the four characteristics from the *Nyāyānusāra*, see supra, translation, *NAS* 13 p. 408c11.

107 *AKB* 2.46b p. 78.17ff.: “Even given the fact that this [future factor] exists, how is birth that is performing its activity established as future? [Since that characteristic of birth displays the characteristic of the present through this activity and yet is said to be future,] the characteristic of the future should be declared. How is [the characteristic of birth] that has arisen and whose activity has disappeared established as present? [Since that characteristic of birth displays the characteristic of the past through the disappearance of its activity,] the characteristic of the present should be declared.” *saty api tu tasmin jātiḥ kāritram kurvati katham anāgatā sidhyati ‘ty anāgatakāsaṇam vaktavyam. uparatākāriṇā tāpamā katham vartamāna sidhyati ‘ti vartamānalakāsaṇam vaktavyam.* Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 178.9ff.) explains the assumptions underlying Vasubandhu’s criticism: “Even when a future [factor] exists as a real entity, how is birth, which is performing its activity in the future state, established as future? It is an accepted doctrine that [a factor] whose activity is not yet attained is future. That [accepted doctrine] would be contradicted [by your explanation of the activity of birth]. Therefore, that [characteristic of the future] is to be declared. How is the present [birth] established? It is held that [a factor] whose activity has disappeared is past. [The fact that the characteristic of] birth [performs its activity when it is] future results in the fact that in the present state, when its activity has disappeared, that [characteristic of birth] would not be present. The characteristic of the present is to be declared. If
[you defined] a present [factor] as one whose activity is not yet accomplished, even a past factor would be present, for it is held that a past [factor] has the activity of presenting its effect. The Taimā tad vaktavyam. Katham vartamaṇā sa dhīyati. Aparaktākāśram hi anāgatam iti siddhāntaḥ. Sa viruddhāta.

Vasubandhu’s criticism is stimulated by the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāsika definition of the nature or extent of a moment, a definition that Vasubandhu does not accept. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 78.24) gives the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāsika definition as follows: “According to our, [that is, the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāsika view], a moment is precisely [that time] during which [the activity of these characteristics] is completely realized.”

See *supra*, translation, NAS 13 409b4ff. Cf. NAS 52 p. 631c5ff. This distinction between capability (samarthya) and activity (kārīta) is central to Saṅghabhadrā’s explanation of the four characteristics and, more generally, to his ontological and causal models. Saṅghabhadrā follows the Sarvāstivāda–Vaibhāsika position (MVB 76 p. 393c14ff.) that factors exist as real entities in the three time periods of past, present, and future. These time periods are distinguished or defined in accordance with a factor’s activity: a factor that has not yet manifested its activity is future, one whose activity is just being performed is present, and one whose activity has disappeared is past. However, it is important to remember that Saṅghabhadrā divides the functioning of a factor into two varieties: whereas the performance of activity (kārīta) always marks the present time period, a factor can have capability (samarthya) when it is future or past. Thus, the future characteristic of birth has the capability, not the activity, of assisting a factor in its production. Similarly, a past factor has the capability, not the activity, of delivering its effect.

In this example, the eye performs its activity by functioning as a homogeneous cause (sabhāgaḥetu) in producing an effect of uniform outflow (niṣyandaphala), that is, a similar eye, in the next moment. See MVB 17 p. 85b27ff. The “Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 76 p. 393c27ff.) also uses this example of the eye: “Even though that [eye] is without the activity of seeing, and so on, it definitely has the activity of projecting, [or seizing,] its effect because it is the homogeneous cause of a future factor. All conditioned factors in the present are able to act as the cause that projects, [or seizes,] an effect of uniform outflow. This activity of projecting, [or seizing,] their effect pervades present factors, precluding any confusion [with past or future factors]. Therefore, through this, the distinction between the past, future, and present is established.” However, in this passage from the “Mahāvibhāṣā, there is no distinction, similar to that drawn by Saṅghabhadrā, between activity and capability.

The translation of this clause and its relation to the following statement is uncertain. It is perhaps referring to Saṅghabhadrā’s distinction between a factor’s activity and its capability as definite and indefinite, respectively. A factor exerts its activity as the homogeneous cause of future uniform outflow within a stream of conditioned forces of the same category; this exertion of activity is definite. Since Saṅghabhadrā considers activity to be a subset of capability, that activity can also be referred to as capability.
However, in the case of a stream of conditioned forces of a different category, a factor cannot function as a homogeneous cause and, therefore, cannot exert activity; that factor can only be said to exert capability, and that exertion as capability is indefinite. Cf. NAS 52 p. 631c5ff.

111 The *Mahāvibhaṣa (MVB 3 p. 12b4ff.) states: “In general, those factors that are able to perform their activity in the future are of three varieties: (1) internal factors, such as the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering; (2) external factors, such as the light of the sun, and so on; and (3) factors that are both internal and external, such as the characteristic of birth.” See also NAS 13 p.409b26ff.


113 In what seems a rather weak response, Saṅghabhadra appeals to his previous definition of the temporal distinction in the functioning of each of the four characteristics: that is, the characteristic of birth, by nature, realizes its capability at the time when both it and the factor it characterizes are about to be produced, whereas the three characteristics of continuance, and so on, by nature, realize their capability when they and the characterized factor are in the present time period. It is important to note, however, that whereas the opponent uses the term ‘activity’ in asking about the functioning of the characteristics, Saṅghabhadra responds using the term ‘capability.’

114 See AKB 2.46b p. 79.6ff.: “Now, it might be that the non-destruction of a single factor that has been produced is continuance or its destruction is desinence, but senescence cannot in any conceivable way [belong to one factor], because [senescence is] the distinction between prior and subsequent [moments, or is change [within the stream of conditioned forces]. Therefore, when [a certain factor becomes] something other than itself, it is precisely another [factor]. For it is said: ‘If [a factor] were precisely as it is, senescence would not be established; when it becomes something other than it is, it is precisely another [factor]. Therefore, it is not justified to attribute senescence to one entity in one mode of being.’” Syāc ca tāvad ekasya dharmasya ‘pannasya ‘vināśaḥ sthitīḥ vināśo ‘nityatā járā tu khālu sarvathātvena na tathā pūrvaparaviśeṣāt viparīnāmāc ca. atas tadanyathātve ‘nya eva. uktaṁ hi. tathātvena járā ‘śiddhir anyathātve ‘nya eva saḥ tasmān naī ‘kasya bhāvasya járā nāma ‘papadyate. See ADV no. 140a-b p. 105.10-11. Cf. MVB 39 p. 200a14ff.

115 As a real entity, senescence cannot refer to or be based upon a provisional entity, namely, the stream of moments as a whole.

116 See NAS 50 p. 621c5ff.

117 Cf. MN no. 111 Anupadasutta 3: 25; SA 13 no. 335 p. 92c16ff. Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 77.23) defines birth as the fact that a factor “not having existed, exists” (abhūtvā bhāva utpādah), and desinence as the fact that a factor “having existed, no longer exists” (bhūtvā ‘bhāvo vyayah). See also AKB 5.27c p. 298.17. Here, Saṅghabhadra interprets this definition as applying not to its nature, or its very existence, but rather to the presence of its activity.

118 This statement that the activity of a factor is not different from its intrinsic nature opens the Sarvastivādā-Vaibhāṣika position to severe criticism by Vasubandhu: that is, if the activity were not distinguished from intrinsic nature, the activity, like the intrinsic nature, would also exist in all time periods, and the distinctions among factors in the three time periods would be undermined. See AKB 5.27c p. 298.8ff. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 52 p. 632c7ff.) following the *Mahāvibhaṣa (MVB 76 p. 39c5ff.) responds that the intrinsic nature and the activity of a given factor are neither identical nor absolutely distinct. Though the intrinsic nature of a factor remains constant, the factor can be said to exist in various “states” (avasthā) of either performing, or not performing its activity. This difference in states, or modes of being (bhāva), differentiates the three time periods. See TSP nos. 1790-1792 p. 616-617.
Here Saṅghabhadra gives an alternative definition of senescence. Previously (supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405c9), Saṅghabhadra defines senescence as “a discrete factor that acts as the cause of the fact that subsequent [moments] within the stream of conditioned forces differ from prior ones.” This alternative definition that appeals to the deterioration, decay, weakening, or injury of the activity of conditioned factors also appears in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB 39 p. 201c24ff.

For a detailed discussion of this issue, see AKB 5.27 p. 297.18ff.; NAS 52 p. 631c20ff.

See AKB 5.27c p. 298.20ff.; NAS 52 p. 633c17ff.

See MVB 39 p. 200a29ff.: “Further, there are two types of transformation: transformation in intrinsic nature and transformation in activity. If one speaks in terms of transformation in intrinsic nature, one should say that the conditioned forces are without transformation, because their intrinsic nature is without variation. If, however, one speaks in terms of transformation in activity, one should say that conditioned forces have transformation. That is to say, a factor in the future does not yet perform its activity; when it enters the present, it performs its activity; when it enters the past, its activity has ceased. Therefore, there is transformation of activity.”

Here, Saṅghabhadra rephrases the verse introduced previously by Vasubandhu (AKB 2.46b p. 79.9ff.; supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 410a24ff.) as a challenge to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of senescence. This rephrasing reflects Saṅghabhadra’s theory of activity and the relation of activity to intrinsic nature: that is to say, the functioning of senescence should be distinguished from a factor’s intrinsic nature.

In this explanation, Saṅghabhadra attempts to combine the two definitions of senescence offered thus far: first, as the cause of the distinction between consecutive moments in a stream (supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 405c9); and second, as the cause of the deterioration of a factor’s activity (supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 410b14). Moments in a stream of conditioned factors are interrelated as cause and effect, and the apparent change from one moment to the next, or the change that appears at any point within the stream, can only be explained if there is a condition producing subsequent change within the prior moment of the cause. The effect of that transforming cause—that is, the change itself—will then become manifest in the succeeding moment referred to as the effect.

See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 408b8ff. By using the phrase ‘Dārșṭāntika master’ here, Saṅghabhadra could be referring to the Dārșṭāntikas in general, implicitly identifying Vasubandhu as a Dārșṭāntika, or equating Vasubandhu’s position with that of the Dārșṭāntikas. See also infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 412c24–25.

See AKB 2.46b p. 78.26ff.

This interpretation could not be located in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. See MVB 39 p. 200a14ff.

In the following argument, Saṅghabhadra, implicitly criticizing Vasubandhu’s position, attempts to demonstrate that if the existence of factors in the three time periods is not admitted, their change, or impermanence itself, is untenable. Saṅghabhadra’s criticism focuses on Vasubandhu’s claims that: (1) production and hence existence occur when a factor acquires its intrinsic nature, which is to be equated with its activity; and (2) production refers to the fact that a factor “not having existed, exists,” and destruction, to the fact that a factor “having existed, no longer exists.” See also NAS 33 p. 533a20ff., 51 p. 630a11ff., 52 p. 634a4ff.

Cf. NAS 52 p. 634a14ff.

Since Vasubandhu and the opponents here maintain that factors do not exist in the past and since a nonexistent factor cannot change, any past factor that acts as the cause cannot change, and the present effect must also, therefore, be without change.

See the argument beginning supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 410a26ff.
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132 For this objection, see AKB 2.46c–d p. 79.17. Cf. MVB 76 p. 394c16ff. See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 107a28ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 337c17ff. Since, according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika interpretation, the four characteristics of birth, and so on, are discrete conditioned factors that exist in the three time periods, past and future factors would always be accompanied by their own characteristic of birth. If this characteristic of birth produces its characterized factor in the future, what is to prevent all future factors from being produced simultaneously? See also TSP no. 1828–1829 p. 626.

133 See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b8ff.

134 See AKB 2.46c–d p. 79.18ff.: “[vs. 46c–d] Birth is the producer of that which is to be produced, but not without [other] causes and conditions.” janyasya jantkā jātār na hetupratyayair vinā. See also CAKB p. 80; SAKV p. 179.16ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 28c6ff.; PAKB 4 p. 187a8ff.; ADV no. 141 p. 106.26ff.

135 Saṅghabhadra (NAS 15 p. 419c11ff.) presents the same argument in his defense of the efficacy of simultaneous causes (saḥabhūhetu).

136 See AKB 2.46c–d p. 79.19ff.

137 A similar objection is raised in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 21 p. 105a6ff.) against the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theory of production due to multiple causes and, specifically, against their theory of the causal relation of non-obstruction, whereby all factors can act as the non-obstructing variety of comprehensive cause (kārāṇaghetu) in the production of every other factor: “Factors are produced due to an assemblage of causes and conditions; they are destroyed due to an assemblage of causes and conditions. Since there is no time when the causes and conditions are not assembled, why are factors not produced and destroyed at all times?”

138 In their previous objection, the opponents maintained simply that a factor is produced from an assemblage of causes and conditions; they did not specify any cause or condition as predominant, did not distinguish among the various types of causes, and did not establish any criterion by which the assemblage of causes and conditions can be established as complete. Thus, as in the following example concerning the arising of the visual sense organ, if a certain effect is established as resulting from three or more causes, there is nothing to preclude its production from just two causes, which can also constitute an “assemblage.”

139 In the following section, Saṅghabhadra considers the assemblage of causes and conditions that give rise to the visual sense organ; specifically, he examines the role of the four fundamental material elements within this assemblage and gives four alternatives concerning their causal efficacy. All four alternatives are intended to represent the undesirable consequences that result from the opponents’ attribution of the causal efficacy of production merely to an ill-defined assemblage of causes and conditions. See P’u-kuang 5 p. 108a10ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 169a6ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 20 p. 102c10ff.) explains the relationship among the previous visual sense organ, previous action, and the present four fundamental material elements, all of which function as different varieties of causes in the production of a visual sense organ: “According to the statement of the sūtra, action is the cause of the visual sense organ. The Abhidharma states that the four fundamental material elements are the cause. It is further stated that the [previous] visual sense organ is the cause. Aren’t these three theories contradictory? [No], no fault of self-contradiction is incurred. In reference to the cause of maturation, it is said in the sūtra that action is the cause of the visual sense organ. In reference to the cause of production, of support, of abiding, of maintenance, or of growth, the Abhidharma states that the four fundamental material elements are the cause. In reference to the homogeneous cause, it is further said that the [previous] visual sense organ is the cause.”

140 Explaining the causal relation between the four fundamental material elements and the visual sense organ, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 131 p. 681c13ff., 131 p. 682b17ff.) states that the four fundamental material elements act as the cause of the visual sense or-
gan in five ways: that is, in production, support, abiding, maintenance, and growth. The four fundamental material elements also act as its sovereign condition \((\text{adhipatispratāyaya})\). The visual sense organ, however, only acts as a sovereign condition (or a non-obstructing condition) in the production of the four fundamental material elements.

141 Through this example, Saṅghabhadra intends to demonstrate that: (1) in the assemblage of three causes, including the prior visual sense organ, the four fundamental material elements, and previous action, none can be omitted if the effect is to arise; and (2) even though the capability of the four fundamental material elements is not directly observed, it still functions as a necessary cause in producing the visual sense organ. Thus, Saṅghabhadra emphasizes the role of the four fundamental material elements here in an attempt to prove that causal efficacy need not be observed; hence, the causal efficacy of the four characteristics should not be rejected simply because it is not observed.

142 The term 'seeds of action' \((\text{karmabtja})\) would appear to refer to seeds that result from action and provide the basis for the arising of the subsequent effect. Since this term is used extremely rarely in Abhidharma texts, its full implications and its specific function in the larger seed theory of the Dārṣṭāntikas or Sautrāntikas are not clear. See \(\text{YBŚ} 31\) p. 454b17 esp. 28ff., where it appears together with seeds of perceptual consciousness, form, the six sense organs, and feelings. See also Funahashi (1954) 114ff.

143 See supra, translation, \(\text{NAS} 12\) p. 397a12ff.

144 The four characteristics and the characterized factor are classified as "simultaneous causes" \((\text{saḥabhāhetu})\), which constitute a specific subset of a more general category of "simultaneously produced causes." For a discussion of the relation between these two types of "simultaneous" causes, see supra, translation, \(\text{NAS} 13\) p. 409a22ff. and "[Four Characteristics]," note 97.

145 In one's practice of the fourth application of observing factors \((\text{dharmasmṛtyupāsthāna})\) as a composite object \((\text{samastālambana, sambhinnālambana})\), each of the four objects of the body, feelings, thought, and factors becomes an opportunity for observing impermanence, suffering, voidness, and non-self. See \(\text{AKB} 6.13\) p. 343.6ff. For an examination of the four applications, see Schmithausen (1976); Cox (1992b).

146 Location unknown. Cf. \(\text{MVB} 39\) p. 201b23.

147 See supra, translation, \(\text{NAS} 13\) p. 407b19.

148 See supra, translation, \(\text{NAS} 14\) p. 411b19.

149 See \(\text{MVB} 39\) p. 201b24ff.: "Because [conditioned forces] do not abide forever, the phrase 'they do not abide' was used [in the śūtra]. It does not mean that conditioned forces are without abiding [even] for a moment."

150 The correct identification of the speakers in the following dialogue is difficult. The statement "those who claim that conditioned forces have continuance for a period" represents Saṅghabhadra's own position. Thus, Saṅghabhadra is attributing the other position—"those who claim that conditioned forces are completely without destruction"—to the opponent. Clearly, neither Vasubandhu nor Sthāvira would support this position. However, Saṅghabhadra, in his argument against Sthāvira, could be attributing this position to him; that is to say, since Sthāvira uses the previously cited śūtra passage to assert that conditioned forces are completely without continuance, Saṅghabhadra, demanding consistency, points out that Sthāvira would be forced also to accept, in accordance with the statement in the śūtra, that they are completely without destruction.

151 See supra, translation, \(\text{NAS} 13\) p. 409b15ff.

152 Cf. \(\text{SA} 11\) no. 273 p. 72c12ff.: "O monks! Conditioned forces are like a mirage, like a flame. They are exhausted after the period of a moment; they do not come from reality, or go to reality." This śūtra also refers to the example of hand-clapping (\(\text{SA} 11\)
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p. 273 p. 72c8ff.). However, since continuance is not mentioned, this particular sūtra passage differs significantly from the passage quoted here by Saṅghabhādra.

153 For a similar opinion attributed to the master Vasumitra, see MVB 39 p. 201-b25ff.: "The sūtra merely uses the phrase '[conditioned forces] do not abide' in order to deny continuance after [the present] moment. It does not mean that conditioned forces are without continuance for the period of one moment. If they were completely without continuance, then the Lord would not have been able to establish the provisional designations 'time period' and 'moment.'


155 Location unknown. Cf. P'ìn-p'ó-so-lo wang ching T 1 (41) p. 826a4ff.: "It is to be known that form has production and destruction; it is discerned that this form has production and destruction."

156 In this series of objections to the characteristic of desinence, the opponent is not explicitly identified as Sthavira, or Śrīlāta. Sthavira is, however, identified as the opponent supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 411b13 and again infra, translation, NAS 14 p. 412c9 and, therefore, is at least a possible opponent in the intervening discussion.

157 This objection arises from the possibility of confusing desinence (anityata) as one of the four characteristics of conditioned factors with impermanence (anityata) as one of the three or four generic characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of all factors: that is, including suffering, impermanence, voidness, and non-self. See SA 6 no. 127 p. 41a15ff.; MA 21 no. 86 p. 565c8ff.; MVB 7 p. 34c10ff., 79 p. 408c9ff. This objection does not appear explicitly in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya: cf. AKB 2.46c-d p. 79.22ff.; SAKV p. 180.8ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 338a4ff., esp. 5 p. 338b1ff. For a discussion of the nature of the four characteristics as particular inherent characteristics (sva-lakṣaṇa) or as generic characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), see MVB 39 p. 200b16ff.

158 The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 39 p. 203a9ff.) raises a related issue. The phrase 'characteristic of impermanence' should, however, be interpreted in this quotation as referring to the "characteristic of desinence." "Question: When conditioned factors are destroyed, are they destroyed because their intrinsic nature is that of an impermanent factor or are they destroyed because they meet with a 'characteristic of impermanence'? What is the fault in either option? If they were destroyed because their intrinsic nature is that of an impermanent factor, then the characteristic of impermanence would be established as being without a function. If they were destroyed because they meet with the characteristic of impermanence, then unconditioned factors that meet with impermanence would also be capable of being destroyed. Answer: One should make the following statement: They are destroyed because their intrinsic nature is that of an impermanent factor. Question: If this were so, then the characteristic of impermanence would be without a function. Answer: Even though their intrinsic nature is that of an impermanent factor, if they did not meet with the characteristic of impermanence, they would not be able to be destroyed. Therefore when that [factor] is destroyed, [its destruction] is due to meeting with impermanence, since impermanence is the predominant cause of its destruction. This is like the case of a factor that is capable of being produced and the cause of production that is able to produce [it]."

159 The translation of this sentence is uncertain. See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 338b16ff. For references to the relation between impermanence and suffering, see SA 5 no. 104 p. 31b17ff., 6 no. 121 p. 39c21ff., 10 no. 261 p. 65a15ff.; EA 30 no. 10 p. 715b4ff.; SN 22.85 Yamakasutta 3: 112.


161 See supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 411b28ff., for the remainder of the passage cited previously: "... so also, [for us], this projection of the effect is necessarily established only when the activity is projected in dependence upon another factor."
Hsüan-tsang here (see also NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 33b14) uses the term wu-ch'ang-hsiang, which he ordinarily uses as a translation of anityatā in the general sense of "impermanence," his translation of the 'characteristic of desinence' is usually mieh-hsiang. Nevertheless, Saṅghabhadra here is clearly referring to the characteristic of desinence among the four characteristics. Shen-t'ai (Shen-t'ai 5 p. 338c9-10) paraphrases this passage with the phrase wu-ch'ang mieh-hsiang.

See MVB 21 p. 105a26ff.: "Are factors destroyed due to causes and conditions just as factors attain production due to causes and conditions? The Dārṣṭāntikas make the following statement: 'Production is dependent upon causes and conditions, but destruction is not so . . . .' The Abhidhārmikas say that both the production and destruction of factors is dependent upon causes and conditions, because both production and destruction are activities." Vasubandhu (AKB 4.2c-d p. 193.2ff.) agrees that destruction is an expression of the momentariness of all factors and is, therefore, without a cause: "What is this moment? That which has destruction immediately after the acquisition of its own nature is momentary." ko 'yaṁ kṣaṇo nāma. ātmalābha 'antaravīnāśī. so 'syā 'sit 'ti kṣaṇikam. Vasubandhu (AKB 4.2d p. 193.7ff.) continues: "The destruction of entities is causeless. Why is this? That which is to be done has a cause, [but] destruction is an absence. What is to be done by an absence?" akasmikō hi bhāvanāṁ vināśāḥ. kim kārṇaṁ. kāryasya hi kāraṇam bhavati. vināśaḥ cā 'bhūvaḥ. yaś ca 'bhūvas tasya kim kartavyam. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 345.20ff.) adds: "Occurrence not due to a reason is causeless; that means it is without a cause. Here the logical demonstration is as follows: destruction is without a cause because it is an absence, as in the case of absolute nonexistence." akasmābhava akasmikāḥ ahetuka ity arthaḥ sādhanaṁ cā 'tra. ahetuka vināśaḥ. abhāvatat. atyantābhāvasvat.

The translation of this sentence is uncertain.

See Shen-t'ai 5 p. 338c10ff.

Location unknown.


See supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b13ff.

Cf. supra, translation, NAS 13 p. 409b13ff.

Cf. AKB 2.46c-d p. 79.24ff.: "In order to establish notions such as one, two, great, small, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness, existence, and so on, you should admit [factors having the nature of] number, extension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness, and existence, and so on, as falsely imagined by the heterodox masters." samkhāyāparimāṇāprthaktvakaramyaṃvibhāgapararupadhiṣṭhānāya ni trīṭhakaratipariṣṭhānaḥ abhyupagantavyā ekadvimahadānaprthakśāntyaktaṃ vibhaktaparāparasādādibuddhisiddhayarthāṃ. The heterodox masters who hold this view are identified by Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 180.16ff.) as the Vaśesikas.
Chapter 20

[The Name, Phrase, and Syllable Sets]

We have finished extensively discriminating the characteristics of conditioned factors. What do the categories of the name set, and so on, mean? The verse states:

[vs. 47a–b] The name set (nāmakāya), and so on, are the so-called collection (samuktī) of concepts (sānjñā), [collection of] sentences (vākyā), and [collection of] phonemes (aṅkṣara).

20.1 [The Name, Phrase, and Syllable Sets—Nature]

[413a1] [Commentary:] The phrase ‘and so on’ (ādi) includes the phrase set (padakāya) and the syllable set (vyāñjanakāya), since the name, phrase, and syllable sets are mentioned in the śāstra.³ The name set is precisely the collection of concepts, the phrase set is precisely the collection of sentences, and the syllable set is precisely the collection of phonemes.⁴ The term ‘collection’ (samuktī) has the meaning of “gathering” (samavāya), because the verb root uṣ has been used in the sense of “gathering.” ⁵

Concepts [properly] refer to concepts that grasp (udgrahana) a factor through conceptual discrimination (vikalpa) [413a5] and are issued forth from phonemes that have been established in common: for example, the eye, the ear, a pot, clothing, a cart, and so on.⁶ Such a concept set is precisely the name set: that is, the eye, the ear, and so on.
Sentences refer to explications. Worldly treatises are interpretations consisting of inexhaustible explications and containing various distinct sentences, [each of which] is able to bring to completion the explication of the object-referent that [one] desires to express (*arthaparīsāṁapti).\textsuperscript{7} for example, [the expression] "merit brings a pleasurable matured effect," and so on. Such a sentence set is precisely the phrase set. As has been said:

\[413a10\] "Merit brings a pleasurable matured effect. All that one desires [is obtained] at will, and one quickly realizes the highest eternal and peaceful nirvāṇa."\textsuperscript{10}

Such is the phrase set.

Phonemes refer to such phonemes as a, ā, i, ī, and so on. Such a phoneme set is precisely the syllable set: [it includes also] ka, kha, ga, and so on.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{20.2 [The Name, Phrase, and Syllable Sets—Existential Status]}

There are other masters who state: "It has been said in the śāstra: 'What is the set of many names? It refers to names, appellations, and so on.'\textsuperscript{12} Those masters of the śāstra, desiring to discuss names, and so on, [413a15] as actually existing characteristics, do not raise this question with the assumption that [names] are provisional collocations. Therefore, their deliberative questions about the set of many names, and so on, should definitely be taken as questions about names, and so on, as characteristics that exist as real entities. In this consideration of names, and so on, as characteristics that exist as real entities, what use is it to question whether names, and so on, are provisional collocations?"

Further, each of the three characteristics of name, [phrase, and syllable] are to be distinguished [as follows]. The characteristic, name, is manifested by articulated sound (ghoṣa) and is [then] able to manifest the object-referent. It is a specification established in common (kṛtāvadhi), which both manifests that which is produced by an intention (*āśaya)\textsuperscript{13} and is able to represent the intrinsic nature of object-fields (viśaya) that are known, [413a20] in the same way as an echo. The characteristic, phrase, is able to explicate the object-field that is known from both a detailed and cursory perspective. The characteristic, syllable, when a speaker's articulated sound is in the state of having been destroyed, causes [that utterance
20.2.1 Objection—I—Name, Phrase, and Syllable are not Distinct

[Objection—I—Name, Phrase, and Syllable are not Distinct]

Certain masters claim: “Since phonemes such as a and i are able to manifest names and phrases, they are said to be syllables. [When] these very phonemes, either separately or together, are able to specify the intrinsic nature [of an object-referent], they are said to be names. [When] this very assemblage of [names] is able to bring to completion the explication of the object-referent from the perspective of its distinctive characteristics, these names are said to be phrases. [413b5] In this way, these three—[name, phrase, and syllable]—should be established as having the same nature. Further, they do not exist as real entities and, therefore, cannot be relied upon.”

Still other masters [claim]: “One and the same passage in the sūtra contains the three characteristics, [name, phrase, and syllable]. For example, as the [sūtra passage] states: ‘Desire, I know you to be the root.’ [413b5] In this [passage], the phonemes individually are syllables; ‘desire’ is a name; the collection [of names] is a phrase. Therefore, the sets of names, phrases, and
syllables are collected together [in a single place; the object-referent of the term 'set' or 'collection' should be understood in this way]." 17

[Saṅghabhadra's Response—Name, Phrase, and Syllable are not Distinct]

These [positions] do not escape the fault mentioned previously: [that is, that the sūtra and śāstra use these terms assuming that they exist as real entities, not as provisional collocations]. 18 Therefore, the first explanation [that we offered] of the three characteristics of name, and so on, is to be accepted because it withstands investigation.

[Objection—II—Definition the Term 'Name']

[413b10] "In the sūtra, aren't the four non-material aggregates of feelings, concepts, forces, and perceptual consciousness collectively referred to as 'name'? 19 Also, the śāstra has said: 'Corporeal activity and verbal activity that are contained within the factors sense sphere are included within form. The other factors within the factors sense sphere are all included within name.' 20 Why is it claimed here that name is, by nature, only a factor dissociated from thought contained within the forces aggregate, [and that it does not include the four non-material aggregates or a variety of factors within the factors sense sphere]?" 21

[Saṅghabhadra's Response—Definition]

[These passages from] the sūtra and the śāstra both attempt to include all factors within two categories: those having the nature of form are collectively referred to as form; the others that are not form are collectively referred to as name. [413b15] Since names are included in the group that is not form, [that category] is collectively referred to as name in accordance with this distinct instance [of name included within it]. 22 Now, [the variety of] name [that is under discussion] here refers only to an expression that is able to manifest a specified object-referent, [and not name as a general category opposed to form]. Therefore, [this specifying variety of name] is, by nature, only a factor dissociated from thought that is included within the forces aggregate.
20.3 [Relation Between Names and the Object-referent]

[Objection—Direct Expression of the Object-referent]

Is it possible for the object-referent, [or the meaning,] to be expressed [directly], or not?\textsuperscript{23}

Actually, one should respond that the object-referent cannot be expressed [directly].

If that were so, then how could one’s understanding of the object-referent “elephant,” and so on, based upon the word ‘elephant,’ and so on, not be mistaken? Further, [if a name cannot express the object-referent directly,] this would contradict the \textit{sūtra} which states: “I will briefly expound the essence of the doctrine for you \textsuperscript{[413b20]} with meaning and with syllables.”\textsuperscript{24}

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Direct Expression]

This fault is not incurred because [the relation between expression and its object-referent] is established provisionally. That is to say, people at the beginning of a cycle establish in common particular concept-names for certain object-referents. [This established specification] is then handed down, and in this way, there is no mistake in understanding these name-concepts.\textsuperscript{25}

Further, as it is said: “Speech is able to issue forth in name, and name is able to manifest the object-referent.”\textsuperscript{26} [Therefore, the object-referent, or the meaning, is expressed not directly, but indirectly.]

Moreover, the \textit{sūtra} states: “The syllables and the meaning are skillful (*kauśalya).” However, there is no statement [in the \textit{sūtra}], “with meaning and with syllables.”\textsuperscript{27}

Even if we allow that [this passage, “with meaning and with syllables,” does occur in the \textit{sūtra}], no fault is incurred because the Lord’s statements [\textsuperscript{413b25}] are complete in both syllables and meaning. That is to say, the teaching of the Lord is able to correctly manifest the object-referent from unlimited perspectives. The syllables are entirely complete and there are no omissions. For these reasons, one can make this statement [“with meaning and with syllables,” and not because the meaning or the object-referent is expressed directly].
20.4 [Names—the Three Time Periods]

Further, all of the factors in the three time periods have names that belong to the three time periods. That is to say, in the case of past factors, past buddhas have already indicated them with past names. Future buddhas will indicate them again with future names. Present buddhas are now indicating them with present names. Future and present [factors] should be understood in the same way.\(^\text{28}\)

20.5 [Scope of Names and Object-referents]

[413c1] Further, there is no factor that is without a name. If there were, then it would result in the fallacy that [that factor] is not known. Thus, the Lord states as follows:

"Name is able to illuminate all [factors]; there is nothing that eludes name. Therefore, the single factor, name, operates freely in accord with [all factors]."\(^\text{29}\)

[413c5] Some masters state: "Object-referents are few and names are numerous because there are many names for one object-referent." Other masters state: "Names are few and object-referents are numerous because names are included as a part of only one of the elements (\(\text{\textit{dhātu}}\)), while object-referents encompass all eighteen elements."\(^\text{30}\) And still others state: "Both [names and object-referents are either] few or numerous. That is to say, [if considered] in terms of their inclusion of the [eighteen] elements, object-referents are numerous and names are few. [If considered] in terms of exposition of the teaching, object-referents are few and names are numerous. This is due to the fact that the Lord provisionally established an unlimited number of names with regard to each factor in accordance with its object-referent. Just as desire is referred to as love, [413c10] fire, a snake, a creeper, thirst, a net, poison, a spring, a river, long-reaching, widespread, a needle and thread, and so on, so also all things [can be referred to by an unlimited number of names]."\(^\text{31}\)
20.6 [The Sūtra Master’s Objections]

[Objection—I—Name as Form]

Next, the Sūtra master makes the following statement: “Isn’t it the case that since these three—[name, phrase, and syllable]—have speech as their intrinsic nature, they use sound as their essence and are included among those [factors] having form as their intrinsic nature? How can it be said that they are factors dissociated from thought included within the forces aggregate?”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Name as Form]

This criticism is not reasonable. Why is this? It is known on the basis of both scriptural authority and reasoned argument that [name, and so on,] exist separately [apart from sound].

[The following sūtra passages can be offered as] scriptural authority [proving that name and sound are distinct]. The sūtra states: “The power of speech, the power of syllables.” If syllables and speech were identical, then why would they have been mentioned separately? It is stated further: “One should preserve the syllables and the phrases of the true doctrine.” Further, it is said: “Rely on the meaning, do not rely on the syllable.” It is stated further: “The source of a verse (gāthā) is meter (chandas) and syllables (akṣara).” Meter means the measure through which a verse is composed; it has speech as its nature. Further, the sūtra has said: “Know a factor and know the object-referent.” A factor refers to names, and so on, and the object-referent is that which is specified. Further, the sūtra has said: “The syllables and the meaning are skillful.” Further, it is said: “One should recite the true doctrine by using well-expressed syllables and phrases.” If one were to recite the true doctrine by using poorly expressed syllables and phrases, then the object-referent would be difficult to understand. Further, it is said: “The Tathāgatas have acquired sets of names, phrases, and syllables that are extraordinary.” Further it is said: “In each case, their comprehension of syllables and phrases is extraordinary.” From such scriptural references as these, it is proven that the sets of names, phrases, and syllables, which are able to specify various object-referents, exist separately [apart from sound], and that, like the sound of speech, they are real and not provisional.

[The following] reasoned arguments [can be offered to prove that name and sound are distinct]. It is observed that at certain times one hears the
sound, and does not grasp the phoneme; at certain times one grasps the phoneme, and does not hear the sound. Therefore, one knows that [the phoneme] exists separately as a real entity [apart from sound].

Hearing the sound [413c25] without grasping the phoneme occurs in those cases in which one hears the sound, but does not apprehend the object-referent. It is observed that there are people who, only vaguely hearing what another has said, ask “what did you say?” In all such cases, [people] hear the sound of the speech, and do not apprehend the object-referent, because they have not yet comprehended the syllables that were issued forth. How, then, can one maintain that the syllable is not different from sound?

Grasping the phoneme without hearing the sound occurs in those cases in which one apprehends the object-referent without hearing the sound. It is observed that there are people who apprehend what has been expressed by seeing the movements of the lips, and so on, without hearing what has been said. [414a1] In all such cases, [people] apprehend the object-referent without hearing the sound because they have already comprehended the syllables that were issued forth. By these reasoned arguments it is proven that the syllable is necessarily different from sound.

Further, it is commonly observed that incantations are muttered under one's breath. Therefore, one knows that the phonemes of these incantations are different from their sound.

Further, it is commonly observed that even though the articulated sounds of the words used by two debaters may sound similar, one loses and one wins. The cause for this victory or loss must exist apart from the sound.

Further, since the object-fields of the two types of special knowledge (pratisaṅvid)—[414a5] [that is, the special knowledge of] the teaching (dharmapratisaṅvid) and [the special knowledge of] expression (niruktipratisaṅvid)—are separate, it is known that the phoneme is different from sound.\textsuperscript{42}

Therefore, [in such cases], sound is merely the articulated sound of words; it is without any distinguishing characteristic. The variations within that [sound] necessarily depend upon [the classes of phonemes] ka, ca, ta, ta, pa, and so on. Phonemes, which are issued forth only in dependence upon the articulated sound of speech, combine in a [particular] sequence and produce a name. When this name is produced, it alone is able to manifest the object-referent.\textsuperscript{43} The following statement is made on the basis of
20.6.2 Objection—II—Name and Speech

This process of successive dependence: speech is able to issue forth in name, and name is able to manifest the object-referent.

Therefore, it is unequivocally established by reasoned argument that name and sound are different. [414a10] It should be known that, in this case, sound is that which is able to express and the syllable is that which is expressed; the object-referent is neither of these two. In this way, [sound, syllable, and the object-referent] are established without confusion.44

[Objection—II—Name and Speech]

Next, the Sūtra master makes the following statement: "It is not the case that mere articulated sound is always interpreted as speech. Only that articulated sound through which the object-referent can be apprehended is interpreted as speech. [Speech is] that specification established in common by speakers with regard to object-referents.45 [The Sūtra master continues:] "If [one claims that] the object-referent of a phrase is manifested through name, [then we respond that] this function of manifesting has already been explained [to occur] through sound. [414a15] What then is the use of positing that name exists separately as a real entity?"46

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Name and Speech]

To what does the "specification established [in common by speakers with regard to object-referents"] refer? Doesn’t it refer to those concept-names established in common with regard to object-referents? It is these [concept-names] that are considered to be the specifications established [with regard to object-referents]. That is to say, certain phonemes that speakers have previously set down in common with regard to certain object-referents are definitely able to specify those object-referents through a process of successive dependence. Since certain phonemes have been set down in common, certain names are issued forth from those phonemes. It is precisely these names that are the specifications established [with regard to object-referents]. When speakers [414a20] are about to issue forth speech, they must first reflect upon a certain specification. In this way, they are able to understand the object-referent manifested in their own speech or in the speech of others. Therefore, sound alone is not able to manifest the object-referent. Only when speech issues forth in phonemes, and phonemes further issue forth in names, are the names then able to specify the object-referent that one desires to express. Just as speech issues forth in phonemes, and
phonemes further issue forth in names, so in this way also one should consider the method of reasoning as to how a phrase is issued forth.

[Objection—III—the Evolution of Name]

Continuing, the Sūtra master offers the following statement: "Further, it is not yet known how this name is issued forth by speech: [414a25] is it manifested by speech or is it produced by speech? If it were produced by speech, then since speech has articulated sound as its intrinsic nature, all articulated sound should be able to produce name. If one claimed that there is a particular articulated sound that produces name, then that [particular articulated sound alone] would be sufficient to manifest the object-referent. How could it depend upon a discrete name? If [name] were manifested by speech, then since speech has articulated sound as its intrinsic nature, all articulated sounds should be able to manifest name. If one claimed that there is a particular articulated sound that manifests name, then that [articulated sound alone] would be sufficient to manifest the object-referent. How could it depend upon a separate name?"47

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Evolution of Name]

If one maintained, [as the opponent does], that articulated sound [alone] is able to specify [the object-referent], then this objection would apply equally. [414b1] That is to say, if the nature of articulated sound were such that [articulated sound] alone is able to manifest [the object-referent], then there would be no articulated sound that is incapable of manifesting [the object-referent]. If one claimed that there is some particular articulated sound that is able to manifest [the object-referent], then that particular [articulated sound] would be precisely [what we refer to as] name. Therefore, these deliberative questions [offered by the opponent concerning the possible relations between speech and name] do not constitute a criticism [of our position].

[Our position should be understood in the following way.] Speakers first hold the intended name in thought and only then form [the following] intention: "I will issue forth such and such a word [414b5] and express such and such an object-referent to others." In this way, at a subsequent time speech is issued forth in accordance with one's intention, and phonemes are issued forth in dependence upon speech. Phonemes, further, issue forth in names, [but] only names manifest the object-referent. [The evolution of name, and so on], is reasonable, if established relying upon the perspective
of this principle of successive dependence such that "speech issues forth in names and names manifest the object-referent." If name were not first held in thought, even if one were to issue forth speech, there would be no definite specification, and [this speech] would not enable others to understand the object-referent.  

[Objection—IV—Only Syllable Exists]

The Sūtra master further states: "Or, [we] should maintain only [414b10] the discrete existence of syllables as a real entities. Precisely the collocation of these [syllables] is considered to be the name set, and so on. To maintain further that the other [two—that is, names and phrases]—exist would then be useless."  

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Only Syllable Exists]

This [position] is also unreasonable [for three reasons]: there is no [one moment of] time in which syllables operate simultaneously; a collocation [of syllables] is not reasonably established; and it is not the case that no single syllable can manifest an object-referent.

[The dependence of name, and so on, upon a collocation of syllables is analogous to the case of a tree and its shadow.] It is like a tree that is established through the combination of fundamental (mahābhūta) and derived material elements (bhautika), [and thus exists provisionally]. A shadow is not produced separately without depending upon [the tree]. Even though that shadow is issued forth in dependence upon a provisional entity, the nature of the shadow is not provisional.  

In the same way, many syllables gather and produce a separate name and phrase. [414b15] Even though that name and phrase are issued forth in dependence upon a provisional entity—that is, the collocation of syllables—their nature is not provisional. This is the preferred interpretation because it is established unequivocally by reasoned argument.

If this were so, then all provisional factors could be established to exist as real entities possessed of intrinsic nature.

[Our assertion that names exist as real entities] is not subject to this fault. Why is this? It is due to the fact that there are [also] names consisting of one phoneme, [and, as the Sūtra master has just admitted, phonemes, or syllables, can be established to exist as real entities]. [Further,] there is no provisionally existing factor that can be established as
identical to a real entity; [thus, names consisting of a single phoneme that must, therefore, be acknowledged to be real entities, cannot also be admitted to be provisional factors]. Therefore, name cannot be subsumed under the category of provisional factors.

[O] Since a name can consist of a single phoneme, how much more impossible is it to acknowledge that names exist apart from phonemes!

[S] [414b20] A single phoneme of the type [that is also a name] does not specify anything [by itself], just like a phoneme that is without an object-referent. A name arises separately taking this [single phoneme] as its condition, and only then is [that name] able to indicate the object-referent. However, just as it is difficult to distinguish two patches of light on a wall, so also is it difficult to apprehend the separateness [of two things that] are extremely close, [such as a phoneme and the name that it issues forth].

20.7  [Objection—Articulated Sound Manifests the Object-referent]

If one were to maintain that it is precisely articulated sound that is able to manifest the object-referent, without any separate name, and so on, then what fault is incurred?

[Śaṅghabhadra’s Response—Articulated Sound]

It would contradict the characteristics of those particular factors; how could [such a position] not be fallacious? There is no articulated sound that can be grasped by mental perceptual consciousness alone; this is not the case for phonemes, and so on. Therefore, the intrinsic natures of [these factors—that is, articulated sound and names]—are not the same.

Moreover, there are cases in which even though articulated sounds, [414b25] issued forth from a consensus established in common (*saṁkēta), are heard with attention (*manaskāra), nevertheless only the articulated sound is apprehended, and not the object-referent. That [object-referent] comes to be apprehended afterward in dependence upon this [articulated sound]. However, when the articulated sound is apprehended initially, and the object-referent is not apprehended, the object-referent cannot be understood afterward in dependence upon this [articulated sound] alone. Therefore, one knows that names, and so on, exist separately apart from artic-
ulated sound. Initially, when mental perceptual consciousness has not yet grasped [the name, and so on], one does not apprehend what has been specified. Only afterward, when mental perceptual consciousness has grasped [the name, and so on], is one able to apprehend the object-referent.

One might object that [name is not grasped, but rather] mental perceptual consciousness becomes able once again at a later point to apprehend the object-referent because it grasps a particular articulated sound, [414c1] and this particular articulated sound is nothing other than articulated sound; [it is not some separate name]. This [position] also is unacceptable because it is not reasonably established that this consensus, which is able to specify [the object-referent], is merely a particular articulated sound. If this consensus established in common that is able to specify [the object-referent] were merely a particular articulated sound, [then these particular articulated sounds] should be like particular colors that are capable of being apprehended even though they are not established by common consensus. It is not the case that the two particular colors, blue and yellow, are apprehended only after being established by common consensus. [414c5] Even though the distinction between the two colors is not established initially by common consensus, since the distinguishing characteristics of the particular colors, blue and yellow, are not different from form, mental perceptual consciousness is able to apprehend each particular color through conceptual discrimination after they have been grasped by visual perceptual consciousness.

Further, it would not be reasonable to construct yet another consensus [that is able to specify the object-referent] on top of that [first] consensus [that distinguishes the particular articulated sound from other sounds]. Therefore, one should not claim that even though this consensus that is able to specify the object-referent is not different from articulated sound, it is not established initially by some common consensus. [In that case,] even though one hears an articulated sound, because that [articulated sound that specifies the object-referent] depends upon yet another established consensus [for its distinctive identity], one would not yet be able to distinguish [414c10] the distinctive characteristics of this articulated sound from another articulated sound.

Further, if the established consensus were nothing other than a particular articulated sound, then one should be able to apprehend the distinction between sounds that have an object-referent and those without an object-referent even without initially establishing a common consensus [to determine this distinction]. That is to say, one articulated sound would have that particular distinctive characteristic [indicating that it has an object-
referent], and another articulated sound would be without it. When the consensus with regard to the distinctive characteristics [of these sounds] is not yet established and one hears two articulated sounds, as in the case of two colors [414c15] then one should be able to grasp the characteristic distinguishing a particular articulated sound that has a consensus [established with regard to a particular object-referent] and one that does not, even without apprehending the object-referent.

Therefore, [since the opponent’s position has been proven to be untenable], it is known that the sets of names, phrases, and syllables exist separately, that they are produced in dependence upon articulated sound, and that they are able to manifest the object-referent.

20.8 [Sthavira’s Objections]

[Objection—I—the Relation between Articulated Sound and Names]

Moreover, Sthavira states further on this point: “Mental action, [or intention,] occurs first; it arranges the phonemes and determines their distinctive characteristics in the state in which sound is about to be produced, and thereby, establishes names, and so on. It is unreasonable to assume that this [name, and so on,] exist separately through intrinsic nature apart from articulated sound.”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Articulated Sound and Names]

In the same way, on the basis of the previous reasoned arguments and [sūtra passages cited as] scriptural authority, we should demonstrate that Sthavira’s statements are untrue. [414c20] One cannot establish that the nature of name, and so on, is precisely articulated sound only on the basis of his vain prattle. If one were able to establish that name, and so on, are precisely articulated sound only on the basis of his vain prattle, then one would, likewise, be able to establish that all factors that are unequivocally established as existing separately through intrinsic nature are without that discrete intrinsic nature. For example, [if one accepted mere vain prattle as a reason, one would be justified in asserting that] precisely that moisture (snehatva) that collects and congeals should be referred to as solidity (kharatva); precisely that solidity that is dispersed and dissolved should be referred to as moisture; precisely that solidity or moisture that deviates
from coolness [414c25] should be referred to as warmth (uṣṇatā); precisely those above three natures, when stirred slightly, should be referred to as motion (īraṇā).51 [Or, one could assert that] the form element (rūпадhātu) perceived through visual perceptual consciousness should be included within the sense sphere of odor (gandhāyatana),52 or that the four fundamental material elements should be possessed of an object-support (sālambana) and should be referred to as thought and thought concomitants.53 In this way, one should be able to establish anything.

Further, since an object-referent can be apprehended through the characteristics of odor and physical sensation, and so on, that act as present stimuli, one should not establish the name, phrase, and syllable sets as having only articulated sound as their intrinsic nature.54

Therefore, our position that the three [characteristics] of name, and so on, exist apart from sound [415a1] can be demonstrated to be reasonable. If it could be validly demonstrated that [our position] is incorrect in any way, then I would concede.55 [However,] one is not able to overturn the valid principle [that name, and so on, exist separately as real entities] through [Sthavira's] vain prattle alone.

[Objection—II—Speech Arises from Initial Inquiry and Investigation]

[Sthavira] also maintains the following: “As the Lord has stated: ‘Through initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra) one utters speech (vāc). One does not utter speech without initial inquiry and investigation.’56 Since sound is issued forth from sound, [and not from name,], the three [characteristics of] name, and so on, do not exist separately as real entities.”57

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—the Arising of Speech]

This [sūtra passage] does not result in a fault [in our position]. [415a5] [This sūtra passage] should be understood like the [sūtra that refers to] giving (dāna). As that sūtra states: “Equanimity-giving results in pleasure.” In this case, equanimity is referred to by its effect, giving.58 This [sūtra passage offered by Sthavira should be understood in the] same way. The cause of speech, [or name,] is referred to [by the effect,] or speech, [and not by name, which would reflect its actual identity]. It is like the causes of contact, and so on, that are referred to [by the name of the effect], or
contact, [and not as the collocation of the three—that is, the sense organ, the object-field, and perceptual consciousness—as one would expect].

[Objection—III—Name, Phrase, and Syllable Are Not Commonly Apprehended]

Further, that [Sthavira] raises the [following objection]: “[People think,] ‘I will speak to another,’ without commonly apprehending that these sets of names, phrases, and syllables are forces dissociated from thought. Since it is not commonly apprehended [that such factors as name, and so on, exist as forces dissociated from thought], in dependence upon what is speech issued forth?”

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Not Commonly Apprehended]

This objection is not reasonable because in the world, [under ordinary circumstances,] one is able to follow [a situation in general] even without any particular discriminative effort.

As is said in the world, [415a10] [something] is burned by fuel or decomposed by mud. Even though, [under ordinary circumstances,] one does not understand [what actually happens], one is able to follow [the situation generally]. [These names, and so on, that belong to the category of forces dissociated from thought] should also be [understood] in the same way: [that is to say, even though name, and so on, are not commonly apprehended, they can still actually function as the cause of speech]. Further, it is like the case of the eye observing light: one [normally] says “I see,” not, “I apprehend form.” Or, as in the case of the cause of a sound produced by clapping the hands, one says, “I have made a sound,” not, “I have clapped.” Further, those without knowledge say simply, “one defecates through a desire to purge oneself.” The actual occurrence is that one begins the process of defecation through a desire to purge oneself; one is [then] able to issue forth an intention to exert pressure (*āpanavāyu); [415a15] this intention, in turn, issues forth pressure; only this pressure is able to purge [the body].

Thus, it is not the case that one is able to cognize object-referents without apprehending the cognition of names, and so on; it is simply that one is not able to be aware [of the process] because the characteristics of the cognition of names, and so on, are very subtle. Even though an unsettled [moment of] thought is not capable of discriminating [subtle mental processes—that is], “this is the cognition of articulated sound,” “this is the
cognition of names, and so on,” and “this is the cognition of the object-referent”—still, actually, it is not the case that [these three stages] do not [occur]. Therefore, when one investigates the distinctive characteristics of factors in accordance with the truth, statements produced by untutored worldly thoughts are not sufficient to stand as proof.

[415a20] Moreover, in the world, [under ordinary circumstances.] one is not [even] able to become aware of those object-fields within the range of one’s own cognition. Therefore, the Lord Buddha expounds the following in accord with the way things really are: “All such considerations that grasp the self, and so on, arise merely with regard to the five appropriative aggregates.”61 Thus, since [people of] the world are not even able to apprehend these gross and superficial matters without hearing the teaching, how much less can they understand the subtle name, phrase, and syllable as included among the factors dissociated from thought, within the forces aggregate without relying upon instruction! Therefore, Sthavira’s objection is definitely unreasonable.

20.9 [The Sūtra Master’s Objection]

[Objection—the Evolution of the Name from the Syllable]

[415a25] The Sūtra master further states: “The various moments of sound (śabda) [that constitute a word] are not able to meet [one another], and there is no gradual production of a single factor part by part. How then can the production of name occur through speech issuing it forth?”62 Next, he offers an interpretation himself: “How is the last moment [in a series] of manifest [actions] (vijñaptikṣaṇa) able to produce unmanifest [action] (avijñapti) in dependence upon those past moments of manifest [action]? [The production of name in dependence upon the last moment of sound could be explained in the same way.]”63 He next raises his own objection [against this suggestion]: “If this is so, then [since] sound in the last moment produces name, one should be able to apprehend the object-referent only by hearing the last moment of sound. If one maintains that speech is able to produce syllables, syllables further produce name, [415b1] and only name manifests the object-referent, then the fault in this would be the same as that stated previously, because the syllables in various moments cannot be assembled. If speech [is said to] manifest name [instead of producing it], then the fault would be the same as in the case of production. In
accordance with\textsuperscript{64} the [undesirable consequences that result regardless of whether] speech is [understood to] produce or to manifest syllables, it is not reasonable to allow that speech [operates on—that is, either produces or manifests—] name.'\textsuperscript{65}

[Saṅghabhadra’s Response—Evolution of Name]

[The Sūtra master’s last] objection [can also be used to] refute the accepted doctrine of his own school. He claims that [factors] are without intrinsic nature in both the past and the future. [Since] the prior and subsequent moments of a sound could not be produced at one time, [415b5] how would syllable, name, or phrase be established? If [he replied that] through the successive and mutual dependence of each of the prior moments, the last moment establishes the syllable, name, or phrase, then [he would be forced to admit that] one should be able to apprehend the object-referent by hearing only the last moment [of sound].

Moreover, [given his accepted doctrine,] there can be no mutual dependence [of successive moments] because no past or future [factor] exists. Since [he maintains that] there is always [only] the one moment [of the present], how can there be mutual dependence? If there were no mutual dependence, then the prior and subsequent moments would all be equivalent: that is to say, a subsequent moment, like the first moment, would be unable to specify [the object-referent]; one would be as incapable of apprehending the object-referent when hearing the last moment as when hearing the first. Therefore, his claim that sound is able to specify [the object-referent] through a mutual dependence of prior and subsequent moments [415b10] is not reasonably established.

Since, according to our accepted doctrine, no [factor] fails to exist in all three time periods, the last [moment] is able to produce the name, and so on, in dependence upon prior [moments that still exist]. Even though name, and so on, are only [actually] produced in the last moment, one cannot apprehend the object-referent by hearing only that [last moment]. This is due to the fact that one has not heard all the [prior] sounds that were issued forth in accordance with an initial consensus established in common with regard to the name, and so on. However, there are cases of apprehending [the object-referent] even though [only] one sound is heard; this is due to custom. One compares the [sound heard] with other [sounds whose relation to an object-referent is established by custom].

Therefore, this objection raised by the Sūtra master undermines his [own position], not ours.
20.10 [The Interpretation of Name in the *Mahāvibhāṣā]

The *Vibhaṣa* states that the three factors of name, phrase, and syllable, have three varieties each. The three varieties of name are name, the name set, and the set of many names. Phrase and syllable should also be understood to be so.

Names are found in many states: that is to say, names that are produced from one phoneme, from two phonemes, or from many phonemes [in accordance with the three varieties listed above]. Names produced from one phoneme [are explained as follows]. When one phoneme is uttered, only name is possible. When two phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a name set. Some claim that when three phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a set of many names. Others claim that only when four phonemes are uttered is there a set of many names.

Names that are produced from two phonemes [are explained as follows]. When two phonemes are uttered, only name is possible. When four phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a name set. Some claim that when six phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a set of many names. Others claim that only when eight phonemes are uttered is there a set of many names.

Among those names that are produced from many phonemes, those that are produced from three phonemes [are explained as follows]. When three phonemes are uttered, only name is possible. When six phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a name set. Some claim that when nine phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a set of many names. Others claim that only when twelve phonemes are uttered is there a set of many names.

Phrases also [are found in] many states that is, middle-length phrases, beginning phrases, ending phrases, short phrases, and long phrases. If a phrase is produced from eight phonemes, it is referred to as a middle-length phrase because it is neither long nor short. Thirty-two phonemes produce four middle-length phrases; these four phrases form a verse (śloka). The sentences of the sūtra and śāstra largely depend upon this unit of thirty-two phonemes. The phrase that is produced from the initial six phonemes is referred to as the beginning phrase. [The phrase] that is produced from the final twenty-six phonemes is referred to as the
ending phrase. A phrase that is produced having fewer than six phonemes
is referred to as a short phrase, and those that are produced having more
than twenty-six phonemes are referred to as long phrases.

Moreover, there are three varieties of middle-length phrases. When eight
phonemes are uttered, only [one middle-length] phrase is possible. When
sixteen phonemes are uttered, that precisely is referred to as a phrase set.
Some claim that when twenty-four phonemes are uttered, [415c5] precisely
that is a set of many phrases. Others claim that only when thirty-two
phonemes are uttered is there a set of many phrases.

Since syllables are precisely phonemes, they exist in only one state. When
one phoneme is uttered, only a syllable is possible. When two
phonemes are uttered, precisely that is a syllable set. Some claim that
when three phonemes are uttered precisely that is a set of many syllables.
Others claim that only when four phonemes are uttered is there a set of
many syllables.

The following statements should be made in dependence upon this
principle. When one phoneme is uttered, [415c10] there is name, but
there is no name set, or set of many names. There is no phrase, phrase set,
or set of many phrases. There is syllable, but there is no syllable set, or
set of many syllables. When two phonemes are uttered, there is name and
there is name set, but there is no set of many names. None of the three,
phrase, and so on, is found. There is syllable and there is the syllable set,
but there is no set of many syllables. When four phonemes are uttered,
there are the three, name, and so on. None of the three, phrase, and so on,
is found. There are the three, syllable, and so on. When eight phonemes
are uttered, there are the three, name, and so on. There is phrase, but
there is no phrase set, or set of many phrases. [415c15] There are the
three, syllable, and so on. When sixteen phonemes are uttered, there are
the three, name, and so on. There is phrase and phrase set, but there is
no set of many phrases. There are the three, syllable, and so on. When
thirty-two syllables are uttered, the three, name, phrase, and syllable, each
can appear in all three varieties. Through this method, other cases are to
be explained in accordance with [this] principle.

20.11 [Discrimination from Various Perspectives]

We have already briefly discussed these three [characteristics of name, and
so on]. We should consider them further. To which [realm] are this name,
and so on, connected (pratisamuyukta)? Are they factors included among those constituting sentient beings (sattvakhyā), or included among those not constituting sentient beings (asattvakhyā)? Are they produced as a matured effect (vipākaja), as the effect of accumulation (aupacayika), or as the effect of uniform outflow (naiṣyandika)? Are they virtuous (kusala), unvirtuous (akusala), or indeterminate (avyākṛta)? All these [points] should be discussed. The verse states:

[vs. 47c–d] [Name, and so on, are connected to the realms of] desire and form (kamarūpāpta), are factors included among those constituting sentient beings (sattvakhyā), are the effect of uniform outflow (niṣyanda), and are indeterminate (avyākṛta).  

[Discrimination—Location]

[Commentary:] These three, name, and so on, are connected only to the two realms of desire and form.  

Concerning [the location of name, and so on], within the realm of form, there are those who claim that these [three factors of name, and so on,] are found only in the first level of trance. Others claim that they extend throughout the three upper levels of trance. [415c25] [This difference in opinion results from the fact that] the region to which these three [factors of name, and so on,] are connected is determined either in accordance with speech (vāc) or in accordance with the body (kāya) [of the one who produces them].  

[Those of the first group who claim that name, and so on, are found only in the realm of desire and the first level of trance in the realm of form] claim that these three are connected [to a region] in accordance with speech. [For example], when one born in the realm of desire produces speech that is characteristic of the realm of desire, that speech, name, and so on, as well as the body, are all connected to the realm of desire. The object-referent that is being expressed by that [name] can be connected to [any] of the three realms or not connected to any realm. When that one [born in the realm of desire] produces speech that is characteristic of the first level of trance, that speech and name, and so on, are connected to the first level of trance, and the body is connected to the realm of desire. The object-referent [being expressed] is as was described previously: [that is, it is connected to any of the three realms or is not connected to any realm]. In the same way, the case of one born in the first level of trance [within the realm of form], who produces speech that is characteristic of the two regions [of the realm of desire or the first level of trance within the realm of form], should also
be considered in accordance with the same principle. [416a1] The case of one born in the second, third, or fourth levels of trance [within the realm of form], who produces speech that is characteristic of these two regions [of the realm of desire and the first level of trance within the realm of form], should also be considered in accordance with the same principle.

[Those of the second group who claim that name, and so on, extend throughout the three upper levels of trance within the realm of form] claim that these three factors [of name, and so on], are connected [to a region] in accordance with the body [of the one who produces them]. [416a5] [For example], for one born in the realm of desire or in any of the four levels of trance [within the realm of form], name, and so on, as well as the body, are each connected to the particular region [in which that being is born]. Speech is either connected to that particular region or to another region. The object-referent [being expressed] is as was described previously: [that is, it is connected to any of the three realms or is not connected to any realm].

[Discrimination—Range]

Further, the three [factors of] name, and so on, are [factors] included among those constituting sentient beings (sattvākhya) because one does not have accompaniment of conditioned factors included among those not constituting sentient beings. [416a5] The speaker, and not [the object-referent] that is manifested, has accompaniment [of name, and so on]. One only has accompaniment [of name, and so on] in the present; one does not have accompaniment of them in the past or future.

[Discrimination—Type of Effect]

The three [factors of] name, and so on, are only the effect of uniform outflow (naiḥsyandika); they are neither the effect of accumulation (aupaçaayika) nor the effect of maturation (vipākaja) [resulting from action]. Nevertheless, when it is said that name, and so on, are produced from action, it means that they are the sovereign effects (adhipatiphala) produced by action.

[Discrimination—Moral Quality]

Further, the three [factors of] name, and so on, are included only within [the group of] unobscured, indeterminate factors (anivṛtāvyākṛta). Thus,
when those whose roots of virtuous factors have been eradicated (*samucchinnakusalamūla*) express [the name of] a virtuous factor, even though they are accompanied by the name, and so on, of that virtuous factor, they are not accompanied by that virtuous factor itself. Likewise, one who has become free from passion (*vitarāga*) is not accompanied by unvirtuous factors [simply by uttering the name of an unvirtuous factor]. [416a10] Those beyond training (*asaikṣa*) are not accompanied by defilement [simply by uttering the name of a defilement]. [When one utters a name], one is accompanied by the name, and so on, that is able to specify [a certain factor], and not by the factor that is specified.81

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**Notes**

1 Hsüan-tsang translates *samuktī* as *tsung-shuo*, as if it were derived from the root *vac*—despite Vasubandhu’s etymology from the root *uc*. Cf. *ASPS* 8 p. 811a2. Paramārtha (*PAKB* 5 p. 187b8) translates *samuktī* as *tsung-chi*, reflecting Vasubandhu’s etymology.

2 See *AKB* 2.47a–b p. 80.12ff.: “[vs. 47a–b] The name set, and so on, are the collections of concepts, sentences, and phonemes.” *nāmakāyadayaḥ sarvajñāvākyākāśa-samuktayaḥ*. See also *GAK* p. 80; *SAKV* p. 181.28ff.; *HTAKB* 5 p. 29a10ff.; *PAKB* 4 p. 187b7ff.; *ADV* no. 142 p. 108.16ff.

3 See *ASPS* 8 p. 811a3ff.; *DS* 10 p. 500c22ff.; *PP* (1542) 1 p. 692c8ff.; *JP* (1544) 12 p. 981b4ff. This reason is not found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: *AKB* 2.47a–b p. 80.14; *HTAKB* 5 p. 29a11; *PAKB* 4 p. 187b8).

4 For these definitions, see *AAŚ hsia* p. 987c24ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 169. For the meaning of *kāya* as set, or collection, see *MVB* 14 p. 71a3ff., where *nāmakāya* is defined as a meeting, or grouping, of more than one name.

5 See *AKB* 2.47a–b p. 80.20ff.; *SAKV* p. 183.8ff.; *Kaidō* 5 p. 122c4ff. See also Tripāṭhi (1965) 37.

6 Concepts are defined as that which grasps the distinguishing mark of an object-field (*viṣayanimittodgraha*). See *AKB* 2.24 p. 54.20ff.; *AKB* 1.14d p. 10.16ff.; *SAKV* p. 37.5.

7 The translation of this phrase is uncertain. See *AAŚ hsia* p. 988a4; Sakurabe (1975b) 170.

8 Vasubandhu (*AKB* 2.47a–b p. 80.16ff.) offers an alternative interpretation: “[A sentence is that] by which the distinctive relations of verbal activity, quality, and tense are understood.” *yena kriyāguṇakālasāmbhandhaviśeṣā gamyate*. See also *SAKV* p. 182.28ff.; *ADV* no. 142 p. 109.13ff. Yasomitra (*SAKV* p. 182.31ff.) adds: “Thus, in that way, it is said that name is that which indicates the particular inherent characteristic [of each word], and phrase is that which indicates the distinctive relations of verbal activity, and so on, [of words in an expression].” *tad evaṁ svakṣaṇābhidyotakaṁ nāma kriyāāsambhandhaviśeṣābhidyotakam padaṁ ity uktam bhavati.*

9 The word *pada* can refer to one quarter of a verse or to an inflected word. In this case, *pada*, though illustrated by a passage in verse form, is explained as a combination of words that form a meaning bearing unit. Therefore, Yasomitra (*SAKV* p. 182.3) specifies that because the word *pada* can refer to a word with declensional or conjugational endings, *pada* here is defined as a sentence long enough to bring the object-referent, or meaning, to completion. See also Tan’e 5 p. 868c25ff.
10 Location unknown.

11 The topic in this section is the smallest unit of articulation, that is, syllables, here designated as vyāñjana. Therefore, vyāñjana does not simply refer to the category of consonants, but is equated with aksara, which is not to be understood here in the narrow sense as vowels, but in the wider sense as phonemes including vyāñjana, or consonants, and their inherent vowels. See AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.16–17, 23–24.

12 JP (1544) 1 p. 920b15ff.; MVB 14 p. 69c23ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 14 p. 70a4ff.) explains that the Jñānāprasthāna mentions the three factors of name, phrase, and syllable precisely in order to specify that they are actually existing real entities included within the category of dissociated factors. Through this interpretation, the *Mahāvibhāṣā undermines both the views of the Dārṣṭāntikas, who maintain that name, phrase, and syllable do not exist as real entities, and that of the Śabdikas, who maintain that the nature of name, and so on, is sound.

13 The translation of this phrase is uncertain.

14 Sanghabhadra's interpretation here reflects an explanation of name found in the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 14 p. 70c25ff.; cf. AVB 9 p. 57c11ff.), which interprets name in three ways: it is that which accords with (sui), summons (chao), and joins with (ho) the object-referent. Kaidō (Kaidō 5 p. 111a11ff.) suggests that three of the characters within the phrase here in the *Nyayañāsāra be read separately as sui 'to accord with,' kuei 'to return to,' and ju 'to move toward.' Cf. P'u-kuang 5 p. 108a23ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 551c23ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 169b5ff. Yokoyama (Yokoyama (1964) 2–3) suggests an emendation in this passage in the *Nyayañāsāra to conform to this threefold meaning in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: that is, that ju be read as chao 'to summon.' Though Sanghabhadra's subsequent explanation of this activity of name as involving summoning is suggestive, the syntax of the Chinese sentence and parallelism of the expression ju ju with the following expression ju-shih ju-shih would not support this emendation. See NAS-Chi-sha 398 p. 34b29. See also P'u-kuang 5 p. 108c20ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 551c23ff., which refers to four senses in which name is active. The activity of name as going toward or calling forth the object-referent is also mentioned in Sanghabhadra's discussion (NAS 76 p.751a5ff.) of the four varieties of special knowledge (pratisamvid), where the three—name, phrase and syllable—are said to constitute the first variety of special knowledge: that is, the special knowledge of the teaching (dharma-pratisamvid).

15 The translation of this phrase is uncertain.


17 These two masters would suggest that because name, phrase, and syllable represent merely different perspectives from which the same phenomenon can be described, they should not be understood as discrete real entities. The second master would also suggest that the word 'set,' or 'collection,' indicates precisely that the three—name, phrase, and syllable—are inseparable. Though Sanghabhadra does not identify these two masters, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 14 p. 70a4ff.) does cite the Dārṣṭāntikas as rejecting the existence of name, and so on, as real entities.

18 See supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413a13ff.

19 For the identification of name and form with the five aggregates, see MA 7 no. 29 p. 463c25ff.; Yuan-ch'i ching T 2 (124) p. 547c8ff.

20 Location unknown. Here, corporeal activity and verbal activity refer to the unmanifest (avijñapti) variety of action, which, though considered to be of the nature
of form (rūpa), is included within the factors sense sphere. Cf. PP (1542) 2 p. 697a16ff.

21 The opponent here refers to a twofold taxonomy of the five aggregates (skandha) as name (nāman), including the four non-material aggregates of feelings, concepts, forces, and perceptual consciousness, and as form (rūpa), or the aggregate of form. In this classification, name is not the factor dissociated from thought, but rather refers to thought and thought concomitants. Cf. MVB 15 p. 73b1ff.

22 See the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB 15 p. 73b2ff.): “The Buddha categorized conditioned factors generally in two groups: form and not-form. Form is the form aggregate; not-form is precisely the four aggregates of feelings, and so on. The group that is not-form is referred to as name because names, which are able to manifest all factors, are included within it.”

23 This objection concerns the relation between an expression and its object-referent. If expression were direct—that is, if the specified object-referent or meaning were inherent in or identical with the expression—then uttering that name would bring forth the object itself. However, if there were no intrinsic relation, then expression would be indefinite or arbitrary. See MVB 15 p. 73a11ff.: “If it were possible to express [the object-referent, or meaning, directly], then saying ‘fire’ should burn the tongue, saying ‘knife’ should cut the tongue, saying ‘impure’ should soil the tongue, saying ‘drink’ should quench thirst, and saying ‘food’ should satisfy hunger, and so on. If it were not possible to express [the object-referent, or meaning, directly], then how is what is sought not mistaken? If one seeks an elephant, one might get a horse; if one seeks a horse, one might get an elephant, and so on.” Name as that which is able to manifest should, therefore, be clearly distinguished from the object-referent as that which is manifested: MVB 15 p. 72c23ff. See also AAS hsa p. 987c26ff.; Sakurabe (1975b) 169.

24 Here, the opponent attempts to demonstrate that since the Buddha is said to have expounded the meaning, the meaning, or object-referent, can be said to be directly expressed.

25 See MVB 15 p. 73a18ff. This passage is important in indicating the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikā view that specific names originate from consensual determination and are, therefore, established only provisionally.

26 Cf. MVB 15 p. 73a20ff.: “It is said that speech is able to give rise to name, and name is able to manifest the object-referent. Even though it cannot be said that speech attains the object-referent directly, through an indirect relation of successive dependence, as in the case of a son and a grandson, there is no misunderstanding in [object-referents] that are sought, such as elephants, and so on.” Cf. MVB 15 p. 74a26ff., 126 p. 659b8ff.

27 For a reference to this sutra passage in the discussion of name, see MVB 15 p. 73a15ff., esp. p. 73a22ff. See also MVB 77 p. 894a4. For a similar sutra passage, see SA 12 no. 297 p. 84c12ff., 13 no. 305 p. 87a28ff., passim. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 652.15ff.) also quotes a similar formula in his discussion of the special knowledge of the teaching (dharma-pratisamvid): “Accordingly, O monks, I will expound the teaching, propitious in the beginning, the middle, and the end, having excellent meaning and excellent syllables, exclusive, complete, purified, cleansed, the pure life, I will manifest it ....” tadyathā dharmam vo bhikṣavo dāśāyasyāmi. ādau kalyāṇaṁ madhye kalyāṇaṁ paryavasāne kalyāṇaṁ svartanāṁ svayānjanāṁ kevalaṁ paryavastatāṁ paryūpāṇaṁ paryavastatāṁ brahmacaryānāṁ sariprakāśasyāmi ’ti. The difference between this passage cited by Sāṅghabhadra and that cited previously by the opponent would appear to lie in the fact that the opponent’s reference to “expounding with meaning and syllable” is lacking in Sāṅghabhadra’s reference. The opponent’s sutra passage would appear to be similar to the Pāli sutta (MN no. 148 Chachakkasutta 3: 280), which uses the phrase ‘having meaning and having syllables’ (sāthāṁ svayānjanāṁ). Sāṅghabhadra’s rejection of the opponent’s appeal to scriptural authority here might be taken as evidence of the fact that he and the opponent accepted different collections of sutras.
28 See *MVB* 15 p. 72b25ff. There is a difference of opinion as to whether or not the time period of a given name is determined by the time period during which the name is uttered or by the time period during which the object-referent appears. See *MVB* 15 p. 74a19ff., 15 p. 74b2ff., 15 p. 74b23ff., 15 p. 74c4ff. If, however, a factor is to have names that belong to the three time periods, then the time period of that name must be determined by the time period during which the name is uttered. For example, all names of any factor—past, present, or future—uttered in the present time period are considered present names. Those uttered in the past are past names, and so on. As Saṅghabhadra explains (infra, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 416a5), from the perspective of the speaker, one has accompaniment of (samāvāgama) or utters a name only in the present while one is speaking. However, from the perspective of the object to which the name refers, that object-referent can be described as having past, present, and future names because it can be referred to by anyone at any time, that is, in the past, present, or future.

29 This verse appears elsewhere in the *Nyāyānusāra* (*NAS* 11 p. 396a6ff.) where an opponent appeals to the verse’s use of the term ‘single factor’ as proof of the fact that thought and thought concomitants are not distinct. In that section, therefore, the opponent would appear to be understanding name in this verse as referring to the four non-material aggregates. Here, however, Saṅghabhadra understands this verse as referring to name as a dissociated factor. See also *NAS* 29 p. 503a3ff. For this sūtra passage, see *SA* 36 no. 1020 p. 266a24ff.; *SN* 1.7.1 Nāmasutta 1: 39. Cf. *Āṭṭhasālāki, Bapat and Vadekar (1943) 310.

30 These two views are presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣā: MVB* 15 p. 72c11ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* offers two reasons for the second view that the scope of object-referents exceeds that of names. The first is included here: whereas any of the eighteen elements can serve as an object-referent, or meaning, name, as a factor dissociated from thought, is included only within the single element of factors (dharma-dhatu). As a second reason, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MVB* 15 p. 72c18ff.) suggests that names can also themselves serve as object-referents, or meanings.

31 For similar examples, see *MVB* 72 p. 371a21ff.

32 See *AKB* 2.47a–b p. 80.24ff.: “Since these [three, name, and so on], have speech as their intrinsic nature and, therefore, take sound as their essence, don’t they have form as their intrinsic nature? Why are they said to be [factors] dissociated from thought?” *nānu ca tē vāksvabhāvavatvāc chadbātmakā iti rūpaśvabhāvā bhavanti. kasmāc cittavipaṇyuktā ity ucyante.* Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 183.10) attributes this question to the Sautrāntikas. Cf. *TSS* 7 no. 94 p. 289c1ff.; *P'u-kuang 5* p. 109b4ff.; *Fa-pao 5* p. 552b18ff.

33 Location unknown.

34 Location unknown.

35 This refers to one of the four reliances (pratisaraṇā). For an extensive discussion of these four reliances using primarily Pāli and Sanskrit textual materials, see Lamotte (1949) 341–361; *SAKV* p. 704.20ff.: *cattāri māṇi bhikṣavah pratisaraṇāṇī. katamāni cattāri. dharmaḥ pratisaraṇāṇī na pudgalaḥ. arthāḥ pratisaraṇāṇī na vyātjananam. nītārtha-pratisaraṇāṇī na neyārthān. jñāna-pratisaraṇāṇi na vijñānam iti.*

36 See *SA* 36 no. 1021 p. 266b9ff.; *SN* 1.6.10 Kavisutta 1: 38. Cf. *MVB* 126 p. 659a6ff.


38 See supra, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 413b23.

39 Location unknown.

40 Location unknown.

41 Location unknown.
propose that there are two distinct types of names: one as spoken and one as mental speech. Thereafter, one issues forth a verbal name.

If speech produces name, since speech has articulated sound as its intrinsic nature, all articulated sounds alone will produce name. If name is that by which the object-referent is indicated, then, since it has been proven that that by which the object-referent is indicated is sound alone, what is the use of positing name as a discrete entity? That which is able to manifest is name; that which is manifested is the object-referent. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśāghīka response to Vasubandhu’s initial criticism offered in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (AKB 2.47a–b p. 80.25ff.) summarizes Saṅghabhadra’s position: “Those [three—name, phrase, and syllable] do not have speech as their intrinsic nature. Indeed, speech is articulated sound, but the object-referent is not indicated by articulated sound alone. How then [is it indicated]? Speech issues forth in name, and the name manifests the object-referent?”

Saṅghabhadra attributes a double role to name. First, one holds a name, or a name-concept, in thought, and only then is one capable of uttering speech. Thereafter, one issues forth a verbal name. Saṅghabhadra does not explicitly propose that there are two distinct types of names: one as spoken and one as mental
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concept. However, the association between name and concept (सन्मष्टा) coupled with the frequent provision that name is issued forth from speech does lead to ambiguity as to the true nature of name.

49 See AKB 2.47a–b p. 81.26ff.: "Let [us] assume that syllable alone exists as a discrete real entity. The name [set, and so on, will be only collocations of those syllables]. The designation of that [name, and so on, as discrete real entities] would be useless." 

50 Cf. NAS 50 p. 622a5ff.

51 See MVB 127 p. 663b8ff. Here, Saṅghabhadra refers to the four fundamental material elements (mahābhūta) that are accepted as real entities by discrete intrinsic natures. These four include the following: (1) the element of earth (प्रथिविभूत), characterized by solidity (क्षारत्व); (2) water (महत्व), characterized by moisture (स्नेहत्व); (3) fire (तेजोभूत), characterized by warmth (वृष्टत); and (4) wind (वायुभूत), characterized by motion (विना). The apparent transformations of congealing, dispersion, or displacement occur when the elements characterized by solidity, moisture, or motion come to predominate; they do not indicate that moisture is itself solidity, or itself becomes solidity, and so on.

52 The form element (रुपद्धातृ) is the object-field of the element of visual perceptual consciousness (कष्टर्विज्ञानाध्यात). The sense sphere of odor, which is identical to the odor element (गंधद्धातृ), is the object-field of the element of olfactory perceptual consciousness (गंधविज्ञानाध्यात). Each object-field corresponds to a specific variety of perceptual consciousness and cannot be perceived by another variety; hence, the object-fields of form and odor cannot both be perceived by the single variety of perceptual consciousness.

53 Only the six varieties of perceptual consciousness and the mental element, or thought and thought concomitants, are said to be possessed of an object-support (सलिमबन). See AKB 1.34a p. 23.1ff.; NAS 4 p. 350b29ff.; AKB 2.34c p. 62.4ff.; NAS 11 p. 394c14ff.

54 Here, Saṅghabhadra also implies that apprehending an object-referent, or meaning, requires awareness of its name. Since the object-referent, or meaning, can be apprehended and its name grasped through stimuli other than sound, name must be distinct from articulated sound.

55 The translation of this sentence is uncertain.

56 See AKB 2.33a p. 61.6: वितर्कविचार्या वाचयं भूषय न 'वितर्कविचार्या. Cf. SA 21 no. 568 p. 150a28ff.; SN 41.6 Dutiyaśakabhāṣṭā: 293; MN no. 44 Cūla-vadallāsutta 1: 301.

57 Sthavira suggests that since speech arises directly from initial inquiry and investigation without name as an intermediary stage, one need not assume that name pre-exists, being held in thought before speech is uttered.

58 Location unknown. Cf. SA 30 no. 857 p. 218b7ff. The same method of argument employing the figurative use of the effect to refer to the cause (kāraṇe kāryopacāra) appears in the Abhidharmakosābхиṣṭya (AKB 1.10d p. 7.12ff.) in an explanation of the terms 'hunger' (jīghata) or 'thirst' (pipāsā), both of which figuratively employ the name of the effect, the state of hunger or thirst, to refer to the cause of that state.

59 See MVB 149 p. 760a17ff.; AKB 3.30b p. 143.20ff. The existential status of contact (स्पर्श) became a point of disagreement for the Sarvāstivādins and Dārśāntikas. In their interpretation of contact, both rely upon a sūtra passage, which states, ya esaṃ trayāṇī samādhiḥ samāpiṣṭah samavyāḥ sa sparśaḥ . . . , but each reads the passage differently. Sthavira suggests that this passage simply identifies contact as the collocation of the three (that is, the sense organ, the object-field, and perceptual consciousness);
Therefore, contact cannot exist as a discrete real entity. The Sarvāstivādins, however, claim that contact exists as a discrete real entity that arises from the threefold collocation. They explain the sūtra passage either by adopting another reading, “[contact arises] from the coming together, the collocation, the conjunction [of the three]” (saṃgateḥ saṁnipatētāt saṁavarādā ītī) or by suggesting that this sūtra passage figuratively employs the name of the effect, or contact, for the cause, or the collocation of the three. Cf. NAS 10 p. 384b12ff., 26 p. 487a17ff., 29 p. 505a12ff., for a lengthy refutation of Sthāvira’s view. See also MVB 197 p. 983b25ff.

In the following section, Saṅghabhadra gives four examples, all of which illustrate that people frequently carry out an activity, or come to some general understanding of a situation, without being aware of its actual cause. Hence, though speech actually arises in causal dependence upon names, which do exist separately, people are able to speak without any awareness of names as forces dissociated from thought.

20. Notes

See SA 2 no. 45 p. 11b3ff., 3 no. 63 p. 16b15ff.; SN 22.47 Samanupassanāsutta 3: 46. See also AKB 5.7 p. 282.1ff., 9 p. 467.6ff.

See AKB 2.47a-b p. 81.11ff.: “Indeed, [in the utterance of a word,] there can be no complete assemblage of sounds meeting as one [factor] within a moment, and the production of one [factor] part by part is not reasonable. How would that speech that is producing, produce name?” na khalu api sābdānāṁ sāmagryam asti kṣaṇaikamālam. na ca ‘kṣaya bhāgaśā utpādo yuktā iti katham utpādayantī vairi nāmo ‘tāpādayet. Cf. Saksurbe (1969a) 348; PAKB 4 p. 187c12. See also SAKV p. 183.28ff.; P’u-kuang 5 p. 109c2ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 558a8ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 340a8ff. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 183.33ff.) explains: “When [speech] produces that [name], how would [speech] produce it at that time?” Thus is the meaning of the sentence. For speech that produces name would produce it only when that speech is present, but not all moments of the sound of speech are present at one time. For in saying the word rūpa, when the sound ‘r’ is present, the ‘ṛ’, ‘p’, and ‘a’ are, at that time, [still] future. When the ‘ṛ’ is present, the sound ‘r’ has [already] been uttered at that time and the ‘p’ and ‘a’ are [still] future. In this way, when the ‘p’ and ‘a’ are present successively, the others are not present at that time. Thus, speech should not produce name. yadā tadb utpādayati tadā kathāṁ sā tad utpādayati ‘tī vākyārthaḥ. vartamāṇā hī vairi nāmō ‘tāpādayantī utpādayet. na ca sarve vāccabadaksanānā yugapad vartamāṇā bhavanti. yadā hī rūpam iti rasabdo vartamāṇo bhavati tadā ukārapakārākārāv anagātā bhavati. yadā ukāro vartamāno bhavati tadā rasabdā ‘tīḥah pakārākārāv anagātāv. evam pakārākārāv api kramāso yadā vartamānāv bhavatāḥ. tade ‘tare na vartamāṇā iti. evam sā vairi nāma vai ‘vō ‘tāpādayet.

See AKB 2.47a-b p. 81.12ff.: “First, how does the last [moment of] manifest [action] produce unmanifest [action] in dependence upon past [moments of manifest action]?” kathāṁ tāvad aṭṭāpekṣāḥ paścimo vijnāptikaṁ ṣaṁvarāsaṁvādayati avijñātām. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 184.11ff.) explains: “When one undertakes the prātimokṣa vows of discipline, the manifest actions of body and speech operate, [or issue forth,] and there is no complete assemblage of those [manifest actions in a given moment]. Then, the last moment of manifest action produces the unmanifest action imparted by the prātimokṣa vows in dependence upon past [moments of] manifest action of body and speech. In the same way, the last moment of the sounds of speech produces name in dependence upon past [moments of] sound.” prātimokṣasasvarasaṁvādayati kāya-vijñātāpayati pravartante. tāsāṁ nā ‘sti sā margayaṁ. atha ca ‘titikāya-vijñāntikaḥ aṭṭāpekṣāḥ paścimo vijnāptikāyaṁ prātimokṣasasvarasaṁvādyatām avijñātām utpādayati. evam atiṭāsabda kṣaṇāpekṣāḥ paścimo vāccabadaksanā nāmā ‘tāpādayati iti.

Here, Saṅghabhadra appears to have omitted a phrase from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB 2.47a-b p. 81.16ff.; see the following note): vyājaṁ ca ‘pi vāg [iṭī] viśiṣṭaprajñāṁ aṭṭā api avabhacetaksā lākṣaṇaṁ pariṣchetvām no ‘tahato iti ... . See also ASPŚ 8 p. 812b21ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 29b18ff.; PAKB 4 p. 187c17ff.; P’u-kuang 5
20. Name, Phrase, and Syllable Sets


65 See AKB 2.47a-b p. 81.13ff.: “In that case, as a result of to the production of name in the last [moment of sound], one who hears only that one [last moment of sound] should be able to understand the object-referent. Now, if one imagines that speech produces syllables and that syllables further [produce] name, in this case also the same undesirable conclusion would result due to the absence of a complete assemblage of various syllables [in one moment]. Precisely this undesirable conclusion would result in the case of speech manifesting name. Since even those with special insight and applied thought are not able to discriminate syllables and speech from the standpoint of [their] characteristics, it is not reasonable that speech be either the producer or manifesteer of syllables.”

66 See MVB 14 p. 71a7ff.; AVB 9 p. 57c19ff. See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 110a13ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 553b22ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 340d16ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 113c26ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 172-173 (chart).

67 The phrase to-ming-shen (bahunama-kāya) can be interpreted in two ways: (1) many sets of names (bahu-nāma-kāya); or (2) a set of many names (bahunama-kāya). The explanation offered in the *Mahāvibhāṣa (MVB 14 p. 71a4ff.) appears to follow the second interpretation: “What does [the phrase] ‘set of many names’ mean? It means a collection of many names. One elephant or two elephants are not referred to as a set of many elephants. Only when there is a group of many elephants is it referred to as a set of many elephants. Horses, and so on, should be understood in the same way.” For similar explanations of the phrase ‘set of many phrases,’ see MVB 14 p. 71a23ff.; for the ‘set of many syllables,’ see MVB 14 p. 71b17ff.

68 As Saṅghabhādra explains, names and phrases are found in many states because they can be formed from one or more phonemes. By contrast, a syllable is precisely a phoneme and cannot be formed from more than one phoneme.

69 For those who interpret bahunama-kāya as “a set of many names,” three names are sufficient to constitute such a set of many, that is, three or more, names. For those who interpret bahunama-kāya as “many sets of names,” three names would also be sufficient if these ‘many sets’ are understood in the following way: the first and second names, the second and third, and the first and third each combine to form one set, constituting three or ‘many sets.’ However, others claim that names are to be combined only in consecutive order, the first with the second, the second with the third, and so on; for these others, four names would be necessary to constitute a set of many names. See P’u-kuang 5 p. 110b26ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 554b20ff.

70 See MVB 14 p. 71b11ff.

71 See MVB 14 p. 71c2ff.

72 See AKB 2.47c-d p. 82.3: “[vs. 47c-d] [Name, and so on], are connected to the realm of desire and the realm of form, are factors included among those constituting sentient beings, are [effects of] uniform outflow, and are indeterminate.” kāmarūpāpta-sattvākhyā nihṣayandvāyākṛtāḥ. See also GAKB p. 80; SAKV p. 186.2ff.; HTAKB 5 p. 29c7ff.; PAKB 4 p. 185a5ff.; ADV no. 149 p. 113.20ff.

73 This is declared to be the view of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, as opposed to those who claim that name, and so on, extend throughout the formless realm: SAKV p. 186.5-6; Fa-pao 5 p. 555a7ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 341b14ff.

74 Both views are presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣa: MVB 15 p. 71c28ff.; VB 9 p. 58c28ff. It would appear that the first interpretation—that is, that name, and so
on, are limited to the first level of trance within the realm of form—represents the view preferred by the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. See *MVB* 15 p. 72a11ff., 15 p. 72a26ff.; *VB* 9 p. 59a14–15, 9 p. 59a29; *ASPS* 8 p. 813a22–23; P'u-kuang 5 p. 111a10ff.; Fujaku 4 p. 133b23ff.; Kaidō 5 p. 114a16ff. According to this first interpretation, names, phrases, and syllables are limited to the realm of desire and the first level of trance in the realm of form because the realm to which they are connected is determined in accordance with speech. Speech, as described previously (*supra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 415a3), is produced only in dependence upon initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*), which are present only in the realm of desire and the first level of trance within the realm of form. See *MVB* 52 p. 269c19ff.; *SAKV* p. 139.2. Thus, if the location of name is determined in accordance with speech, it too must be limited to these two regions. According to the second interpretation, name can exist in regions lacking initial inquiry and investigation, and therefore, speech. Those who maintain that name, and so on, exist in the upper levels of trance in the realm of form, or in the formless realm, would also claim that these names, and so on, though existent, are not expressed. Shen-ť'ai (5 p. 341b16ff.), quoting Paramārtha, attributes this view to the Sammatiya who claim that name exists in these regions only as concept, and not as expression. However, if names are not expressed, they would have no function and could not be known to exist. For this reason, the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas opt for the first interpretation. See *MVB* 15 p. 72a11ff., 15 p. 72a26ff.; *VB* 9 p. 59a14–15, 9 p. 59a29; *AKB* 2.47c–d p. 82.4; *SAKV* p. 186.4ff.

75 The *Mahāvibhaṣā* (*MVB* 15 p. 72a14ff.) in its discussion of this opinion transliterates the term *pudgala* 'individual,' and does not use the term *shen* 'body' (*kāya*).

76 See *MVB* 15 p. 72b1–2; P'u-kuang 5 p. 111b19ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 555b10ff. Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 186.6–7) explains: "They are only factors included among those constituting sentient beings, because they have, as their intrinsic nature, the letters, and so on, that proceed from the efforts of sentient beings." *sattvakhyā eva ca sattvaprayatnābhiniruttavarnādvisvabhavatvāt.*

77 Yaśomitra (*SAKV* p. 186.9–10) explains: "Just as the one who sees is accompanied by the visual sense organ, and not the sentient being who is seen, accordingly, the one who manifests [an object-referent] is accompanied [by the name, and so on], and not that which is manifested." *yathā caṣṭurinindriyena draśtai 'va samanuvāgato na drśyāḥ sattvaḥ tathā dyotayitai 'va tathā samanuvāgato na dyotāḥ.* The *Mahāvibhaṣā* (*MVB* 15 p. 72b11) cites the view of an opponent who claims that whether names accompany the one who expresses them or that which is expressed by them, a fault is incurred. In brief, if names accompany the one who expresses them, then an arhat who expresses the name 'defiled factors' should be accompanied by defiled factors, and ordinary persons who express the name 'noble one' should be accompanied by noble factors, and so on. If, on the other hand, names accompany that which is expressed, then external objects and unconditioned factors should also be accompanied by names because they can be referred to in speech. The *Mahāvibhaṣā* responds to this objection by claiming that names accompany the one who expresses them, and not the object-referent expressed. Nevertheless, the opponent's fault that an arhat who expresses the name 'defiled factors' should be accompanied by defiled factors, is not incurred because names are separate from the object-referent that they specify; therefore, the name 'defiled factors' and the defiled factors that are expressed by that name are quite distinct. The names themselves are always of indeterminate moral quality, and therefore, an arhat would not become defiled simply by uttering the name 'defiled factors.' For the view of those of other schools as well as non-Buddhists who maintain that names abide in the object-referent, or the meaning, see Shen-ť'ai 5 p. 342a7ff. See also *supra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 413b17ff.; *infra*, translation, *NAS* 14 p. 416a9ff.
Though the names themselves can be past, present, or future, they can be expressed by a speaker only in the present. Thus, the speaker can have only present accompaniment of them. See supra, translation, NAS 14 p. 413b26ff.

See MVB 15 p. 72b3ff. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 186.10–11) explains: "They are the effect of uniform outflow because they are produced by homogeneous causes. They are not the effect of maturation because they are issued forth in accordance with [one's] desire. They are not the effect of accumulation because that which is not form is not subject to accumulation." naḥṣyankikāḥ sabhāgahetujanitvatvāt. na vipākajā icchātaḥ pravṛtteḥ nau 'pacayikā arūpiṇāṁ cayābhavād stī. See also P'u-kuang 5 p. 111c4ff.; Fa-pao 5 p. 555b23ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 342a8ff.

See MVB 15 p. 72b8ff. P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 5 p. 111c12ff.) explains: "Why do name, and so on, not have three varieties [of moral quality—that is, virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate]—in accordance with the [moral quality of] the sound [that expresses them]? One desires to issue forth verbal activity as a result of attention (manaskāra). Therefore, articulated sound is of three moral qualities in accordance with the [moral quality of the moment of] thought that issues forth speech. But proper attention does not project names, and so on. Therefore, they are only indeterminate." See also Fa-pao 5 p. 555b27ff.; Shen-t'ai 5 p. 342a10ff.

See MVB 15 p. 72b14ff.; SAKV p. 186.12ff.
Chapter 21

[Discrimination From Various Perspectives]

21.1 [Remaining Conditioned Forces Dissociated From Thought]

Now, I will briefly discuss [the various modes of discrimination] that have not yet been explained for the remaining factors dissociated from thought mentioned above. The verse states:

[vs. 47d–48] Homogeneous character (sabhāgatā) is also thus; it is further [connected to] the formless realm¹ and is a matured effect (vipāka). Possession (prāpti) and the [conditioned] characteristics (lakṣaṇa) have these three varieties.² Non-possession and [the two states of] equipoise are effects of uniform outflow (niśyanda).³

[Commentary:] [416a15] The term 'is also thus' (tathā) indicates that homogeneous character, like the name set, and so on, extends through the realm of desire and the realm of form, is a factor included among those constituting sentient beings, is the effect of uniform outflow, and has an unobscured, indeterminate nature. The phrase 'it is further [connected to] the formless realm' indicates that it is not only [connected] to the realms of desire and form. The expression 'it is further a matured effect' indicates that it is not only an effect of uniform outflow. That is to say, [viewed from the perspective of] the realm [to which it is connected, homogeneous charac-
ter] has three varieties, and [viewed from the perspective of its classification as an effect, it has] two types. 4

Which [homogeneous character] is a matured effect? It is that homogeneous character [which determines] the rebirth state, [such as] hell, and so on, and that [homogeneous character which determines] the type of birth, [such as] birth from an egg, and so on. 5 Which [homogeneous character] is the effect of uniform outflow? It is the homogeneous character that belongs to those in a certain realm, a region, a place, a family, or caste; or [the homogeneous character that belongs to] a śramaṇa, or a brahmaṇa, [416a20] or to one in training (śaikṣa), or to one beyond training (aśaikṣa), and so on. Other masters state: "Among [the various types of] homogeneous character, that homogeneous character which is projected by action in a previous [birth] is a matured effect; that homogeneous character which arises from application in the present life is the effect of uniform outflow."

Possession and the [conditioned] characteristics each have three varieties. That is to say, they can be momentary, the effect of uniform outflow, or the effect of maturation. 6 Non-possession and the two states of equipoise are only the effect of uniform outflow. The word 'only' is used in order to clarify that they are not matured effects, and so on.

The remaining [topics] that should be discussed and yet will not be discussed [here include, first, the two factors of] vitality and the state of non-conception, [which will not be discussed here] because they have been discussed previously, and [second] other perspectives [from which the factors mentioned here could be discriminated]. [These will not be discussed here] because they can already be inferred from previous [discussions]. For example, since possession and [non-possession] are said to be precisely accompaniment and [non-accompaniment], it can be inferred that they are factors included among those constituting sentient beings. Since all conditioned factors have birth, and so on, it can be inferred that these conditioned characteristics are factors both included among those constituting sentient beings and included among those not constituting sentient beings. The other perspectives have already been indicated at an appropriate place. Therefore, there is no need to mention them again here. 7

Notes

1 Pradhan's Sanskrit edition (AKB 2.48a–b p. 82.9) contains no reference in this verse to the connection of homogeneous character to a particular realm. Both Gokhale's Sanskrit edition (GAKB 80 no. 48) and Paramārtha (PAKB 4 p. 188a11–12) refer to its connection to the three realms. As the translation indicates, Hsüan-tsang (HTAKB 5
p. 29c13; ASPŚ 8 p. 813b3) explicitly refers to its connection to the formless realm and implies its connection to the other two realms through the phrase ‘is also thus.’

2 Pradhan’s (AKB 2.48b p. 82.11) and Gokhale’s Sanskrit editions (GAKB 80 no. 48) as well as Paramärtha’s translation (PAKB 4 p. 188a15–16) refer only to two varieties. Hsüan-tsang translates ‘three’ throughout: HTAKB 5 p. 29c14; ASPŚ 8 p. 813b4.

3 See AKB 2.47d–48 p.82.8ff; GAKB 80 no. 47-48: “[vs. 47d–48] Homogeneous character is also thus; it is further a matured effect and is connected to the three realms. Possession is of two varieties [as are] the characteristics. The two states of equipoise and non-accompaniment are effects of uniform outflow.”

4 See MVB 27 p. 138a9ff.

5 See MVB 27 p. 138a13ff.

6 Pradhan’s edition (AKB 2.48c–d p. 82.15ff.) and Paramärtha (PAKB 4 p. 188a–14ff.) state that possession and the four characteristics are of only two varieties: that is, they are the effect of uniform outflow or are the effect of maturation. Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (HTAKB 5 p. 29c18ff.) also refers to three varieties, perhaps under the influence of the *Nyāyānasūtra. By momentary, Hsüan-tsang here refers to that possession and those conditioned characteristics that arise together with the first moment of thought not tending toward the fluxes: that is, the first moment of the path of vision in which one attains presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakānti). Such possession and conditioned characteristics are only momentary: that is, they arise without being preceded by a cause. See AKB 1.38b p. 26.7ff. All factors can, thus, be classified into five groups according to their status as an effect: (1) effect of uniform outflow (naiḥsyandika); (2) matured effect (vipākaja); (3) effect of accumulation (aupacayika); (4) existing only as a real entity (dravyavat); (5) momentary (kṣaṇika). See AKB 1.37–38 p. 25.6ff. These particular varieties of possession and conditioned characteristics in the first moment of the path of vision are not effects of uniform outflow (naiḥsyandika) resulting from a homogeneous cause (sabhāgahe) in the previous moment nor are they the matured effects (vipākaja) of previous action. They are also not the effect of accumulation (aupacayika) because they are not form and, therefore, are not composed of atoms. Finally, since they are not unconditioned, they are not classified as existing only as real entities (dravyavat). They are, therefore, merely momentary (kṣaṇika). See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 112a11ff.; Shen-t’ai 5 p. 342b8ff.

7 Cf. AKB 2.48c–d p. 82.16ff. Yaśomitra (SAKV p. 187.1ff.) identifies these ‘other factors’ as possession, the conditioned characteristics, the two states of equipoise and non-accompaniment; the remaining discriminative perspectives from which the factors mentioned in this verse could be discriminated include connection to a realm (dhatvatatā), classification among factors included among those constituting sentient beings or included among those not constituting sentient beings (sattvasattvākhyatatā), and moral quality (kusālakusālāvākyatatā). See also P’u-kuang 5 p. 112b3ff.
Chinese Characters

A-p'i-ta-mo tsang hsien tsung lun 阿毗達磨藏顯宗論
ch'eng-chiu 成就
ch'i 起
chao 召
chen shih-i 真實義
cheng fan-yü fan-wen 證梵語梵文
cheng i 證義
chieh 結
ching-chu 經主
chu ku 住故
chui wen 綴文
Chü-she pao lun 俱舍毘論
chü-sheng yin 俱生因
chü-yu-yin 俱有因
fu 赴
ho 合
ho-ho 和合
hsiang-tai 相待
hsien' 顯
hsien" 先
huo 獲
ju 如
ju ju 如如
ju-shih ju-shih 如是如是
ku 故
kuang 光
Kuang san-mo-yeh lun 光三摩耶論
kuei 歸
kung-neng 功能
kuo 果
lei 類
li 離
lui 慮
mieh-hsiang 誠相
pi shou 筆受
san-mo-yeh 三摩耶
Se-chien-ti-lo 塞建地羅
shang 尙
sheng 生
sheng-ch'i 生起
shih-fen 時分
Shun cheng-li lun 順正理論
so-wang 所望
ssu 思
sui 隨
sui shou i-ch'u 隨受一處
sui shou i-shou 隨受一受
Sui shih lun 隨實論
ta-fa 大法
te 得
te-kuo 得果
teng 等
Chinese Characters

to-ming-shen 多名身

tsa 雜

tso-yung 作用

tsong 宗

tsong-chi 總集

tsong-shuo 總說

tui-fa 對法

tzu hsiueh 字學

wang 望

wu-ch'ang mieh-hsiang 無常滅相

wu-ch'ang-hsiang 無常相

wu-pi-fa 無比法

yu-wei yu-hsiang 有為有性

yu-wei-hsiang 有為性
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